Ideology of Anti-Immigrant Parties in the European Parliament

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"Notre paradoxe, à nous qui défendons la diversité des identités et des souverainités, c'est que nous avons dramatiquement besoin d'unité."

Jean-Marie Le Pen
National-Hebdo nr. 641 (November 1996)

Abstract

In the European elections of 1989 the Front National, the Republikaner party, the MSI-DN, the Lega Nord and the Vlaams Blok gained representation in the European Parliament. This article tries to answer the question why it was so difficult for these anti-immigrant parties to form a political fraction in the European Parliament. It is based on semi-structured interviews with the representatives of these parties. The interviews focused on the political discourse of the parties and the personal views of their representatives. By carrying out these interviews we endeavoured to find out to what extent three possible answers are applicable. First, was it primarily personal friction that prevented the political unity of these parties? Our research shows that personal friction played a role, but mainly within the Republikaner party rather than between different parties. Second, was it the ultra-nationalist stance of these parties that prevented them from collaborating at the European level? It was found that ultra-nationalism was not the main barrier to political collaboration. Third, was it ideological differences that prevented the formation of a political fraction? Our interviews showed that ideological differences were largely responsible for the lack of unity amongst these anti-immigrant parties. Indeed, it is misleading to label all of these anti-immigrant parties as extreme right parties. And yet, a shared feeling of common identity exists that eventually may forge these variant parties into one political family.
1 Introduction

In 1984 the French party Front National entered the European Parliament with ten MEP’s after a fierce electoral campaign against immigrants and immigration. They formed a ‘fraction of the European Right’ with the MSI-DN delegates and some representatives of minor right-wing parties from Greece and Northern Ireland. Neither the MSI-DN nor the Greek and Irish right-wing parties were considered as anti-immigrant parties at the time.

In 1989, anti-immigrant parties were on the rise. The German Republikaner succeeded in having six of their candidates elected, the Lega Lombarda entered with two representatives, and the Belgian Vlaams Blok also won a seat. All three parties owed a great deal of their electoral support to their anti-immigrant stance. This time, however, it proved impossible to form a fraction in the European Parliament based on a common political platform. The Front National only succeeded in the formation of a ‘Technical Group of the European Right’ together with the Republikaner and the Vlaams Blok. MSI-DN and Lega Lombarda did not even join this non-political platform. Yet the MSI-DN and the Lega Nord also campaigned in 1989 against the immigration policies of their respective governments. Why is there so much discord among these parties that have similar political programmes directed against foreigners? Why were they not able to form a common anti-immigration platform? What lies behind the conflicts that decimated the Republikaner party in the nineties?

In order to answer some of these questions we decided to interview representatives of the anti-immigrant parties in the European Parliament, and gather additional information by following the plenary debates in the European Parliament in the period 1989-1994. We used a semi-structured interview that was organized along three distinctive hypotheses. The first one was that the difficulties in establishing a political fraction of anti-immigrant parties in the European Parliament stem from personal frictions and bad leadership practices. The second one was that anti-immigrant parties find it difficult to collaborate at an international level because of their ardent nationalism that turns them willy-nilly against each other. In other words, it is their antagonistic similarity that prevents them from creating a European platform. And the third one refers to the ideological differences between the different anti-immigrant parties that entered the European Parliament in 1989. We looked primarily at the way in which the members of the ‘Technical Group of the European Right’ and the representatives of the MSI-DN and Lega Lombarda linked their anti-immigrant position with other political views. One of the assumptions of this research was that anti-immigrant parties do belong to the extreme right political family, and that it is the extreme right ideology that creates a common identity on which a political identity might be formed.

Hence, our first research question is: do the representatives of anti-immigrant parties have a political discourse that can be defined as extreme right? If so, this would suggest a potential for collaboration at the international level. Our second research question is, whether or not the MEP’s of anti-immigrant parties regard personal frictions as an important explanation for the lack of cohesion between the anti-immigrant parties, even within the Technical Fraction. Finally, we wanted to find out whether nationalism created antagonism between representatives from different countries. However, before we report our findings it is necessary to clarify some problems concerning the use of the terms extreme right and anti-immigrant parties.

1.1 Theoretical background of the questionnaire

We agree with Mudde (1998) that the extreme right political family is primarily defined by a common political ideology. To answer the first research question we have to define the basic elements of the extreme right ideology. Ideology is defined by Martin Seliger as “a conceptual frame of reference which provides criteria of choice and decisions by virtue of which the major activities of an organization are governed” (cited in Sternhell 1976: 318). A conceptual frame of reference is a set of key concepts which are related in a specific way. The relations between these key concepts do not have to be logical, as long as they are psychological. In the latter case, the relations between the key concepts are of an axiomatic nature, without any logical grounding. The logical relations between the key elements of a political ideology are part of the political doctrine. Thus, a political ideology consists of a political axiom and a political doctrine (Fennema 1997: 482). A political doctrine is more often than not articulated by intellectuals who by doing so become political philosophers. In turn, a political movement defined by an ideology tends to create its philosophical founding fathers. This process has been strongest in the socialist movement of which Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels have been honoured as founders of the movement as well as of its political philosophy. Among neo-fascist and extreme right movements there is far less consensus on the founding fathers of the movement. One of the reasons may well be that the fascist movement has valued political philosophy less than has the socialist movement. In his famous article in the Enciclopedia Italiana (1932), Mussolini stressed the activist character of Fascism and downplayed the importance of a political doctrine. Another reason may be that the extreme right has been always very national in its organization and orientation.

Elsewhere, one of the authors (Fennema 1997: 483-486) has argued that the political doctrine of the extreme right is made up of four different themes. These
themes are: ethnic nationalism, anti-materialism, anti-parliamentarianism, and conspiracy theory. We will discuss these four themes briefly.

The first element in the extreme right doctrine is 'ethnic nationalism'. The nation is not defined in political but in ethnic terms and thus has a biological connotation. Political organization in itself, therefore, does not constitute the nation, as it does in nationalism, based on contract theories. The state should be an expression of the ethnic community.

The second element in the extreme right doctrine is 'anti-materialism'. Anti-materialism attacks the rational choice model of civil society, where interests define social actions and (lack of) solidarity. According to the anti-materialist position, liberalism preaches the pursuit of private interests, which leads to the fragmentation of society. Marxism, on the other hand, preaches class warfare which equally leads to the destruction of the nation.

The third element in the extreme right doctrine is its 'anti-parliamentary attitude'. In part the extreme right borrows from the 19th century anti-democratic tradition in that it assumes the mass of people to be incapable of governing. Yet the anti-democratic critique is populist rather than elitist in content. The political elites in a democracy do not represent the people, nor do they pursue the common good. The political elite as a whole only strives for its own material benefits; it is a parasitical class.

Finally, there is its 'conspiracy theory'. Conspiracies serve to explain why the nation is not as strong as it should be according to the ideology of ethnic superiority. They are related to political opponents who have, in extreme right discourse, no legitimate right to exist. The conspiracy is also related to the theory of democratic corruption, because the political class is—as we have seen—only out for the money and thus can easily be bought off by a secret money syndicate—like that of the Dreyfus family in France.

The questionnaire has been organized around these four themes (see Appendix). We used this questionnaire as the basis for interviews with the European MEP's of the anti-immigrant parties. These interviews were conducted in 1992 in the native language of these MEP's. The transcripts of the interviews are available at request. Jean-Marie le Pen and Franz Schönhuber were not available for an interview. Their position on the questions we asked have been taken—wherever possible—from the plenary debates in the European Parliament or from other (published) interviews. Finally, we also interviewed Hans Janmaat, the leader of the Dutch Centrumdemocraten, a party that is not actually represented in the European Parliament but nevertheless did very well in the European elections of 1989 even though the number of votes was just not enough for their representative to be elected. In this case we considered that inclusiveness was more important than a strict application of the selection criteria.

We chose to interview these representatives rather than study party papers as Mudde did (1998). Our choice was based on the idea that a questionnaire (with open answer categories) would increase comparability of the corpus. A study of party papers would in this respect have several disadvantages. First, the size of the corpus varies very much according to the organizational strength of the party involved; for example, the party papers of the Front National are much more numerous and sizable than those of the Republikaner. Second, the questionnaire enables us to compare the response to some questions, rather than compare texts which have been written on different occasions with different strategic purposes. Third, the questionnaire was focused on dilemmas in European policy orientation and in international collaboration among extreme right parties. Nevertheless, we have used the minutes of the European Parliament to fill in gaps in our material and to validate the findings of the interviews. In the analysis of the interviews we held with the leaders of the anti-immigrant parties, particular attention was paid to statements that refer to the four themes in the extreme right discourse. No direct questions were asked about their alleged racism, to prevent a confrontation between the interviewer and the interviewee. The focus was on the underlying political and philosophical foundations of the discourse rather than on xenophobic opinions about migrants. That was also the reason why we started with the question “Which political theorist(s), would you say, has most influenced the policies of your party?”, to be followed by, “Which political theorist(s) has personally influenced you the most?” The interview technique was to ‘give them a topic and let them talk’, to find out in how far the representatives of the anti-immigrant parties in the European Parliament express viewpoints which can be characterized as extreme right, even if only their public statements, the front stage of these parties (Goffman 1959), are taken into account. For an application of the front stage/back stage approach in the study of extreme right parties we refer to Van Donselaar (1991).

1.2 Formation of the Technical Group of the European Right

After the European elections of 1989, the formation of a parliamentary group of the anti-immigrant parties was not without problems. The Front National maintained its ten seats; the MSI-DN lost one representative, holding four seats, and the newly-founded Lega Lombarda entered the European Parliament with two delegates. Most spectacular, however, was the electoral success of the German Reublikaner party which entered the European Parliament with six delegates. Finally, the leader of the Vlaams Blok, Karel Dillen, was elected. The number of delegates of anti-immigrant parties thus had increased substantially: from ten to 23.

As Jean-Marie Le Pen had become the undisputed leader of the ‘extreme right’ in Europe by 1989, the formation of a new parliamentary group of the
European Right depended largely on him. Negotiations, however, were not easy. First of all there were ideological differences within the party family. The Vlaams Blok considered the Front National as ‘state nationalist’ whereas they considered themselves as ‘volk nationalist’. In that respect, Vlaams Blok sympathized with the regionalist Lega Lombarda rather than with the centralist Front National. The Lega Lombarda, however, wanted to avoid relations with the extreme right and opted for a place in the regionalist Rainbow Group. So, the Lega Lombarda was out.

Among the remaining parties there were some irridentist disputes: Vlaams Blok upheld a historical claim on the northern part of France, where Flemish is the dominant language. Of course, Le Pen rejected that claim. The Republikaner Party, on the other hand, supported the Austrian claim on South Tirol expressed by the Freiheitliche Partei Südtirols, while the MSI-DN was a staunch defender of Italian unity, including Alto Adige. While the antagonism between the Front National and the Vlaams Blok could be settled, that between the Republikaner and the MSI could not. When Le Pen eventually had to choose between the MSI-DN and the Republikaner, he chose the latter, on the assumption that the Republikaner had a brighter future than the MSI. Le Pen could not foresee that internal fights would soon decimate the Republikaner delegation in the EP. Due to these predicaments, Le Pen had to content himself with a parliamentary group without a political programme. The lack of political unity was expressed in the group’s name: ‘Technical Group of the European Right’. A series of conflicts broke out as early as 1990. Within the Republikaner Party there was a revolt against the authoritarian leadership of Franz Schönhuber. Harald Neubauer led the opposition that wanted to replace him as chairman of the Republikaner and even expel him from the party. In turn, Schönhuber tried to expel Harald Neubauer and Johanna Grund from the Technical Group. Because Le Pen did not support him, Schönhuber decided to leave the Technical Group himself. Shortly thereafter, Johanna Grund was expelled from the Technical Group because of her opposition to Le Pen’s stand in the Gulf War. Emil Schlee withdrew his Republikaner membership and also left the Technical Group, leaving only Neubauer, Klaus-Peter Köhler and Hans-Günther Schrodfrüh in it, none of whom, by 1992, were any longer members of the Republikaner Party. The Republikaner remained in the European Parliament with Franz Schönhuber as their sole representative. Neubauer created — together with Klaus Peter Köhler and Hans-Günther Schrodfrüh — his own political party, the Deutsche Liga für Volk und Heimat, and finally left the Technical Group in January 1994; all these ex-Republicaners were independent MEP’s until June 1994. None of them returned to the European Parliament after the European elections of 1994.

2 Philosophical roots

When asked which political theorists had been most influential in their own political formation, most MEP’s showed some surprise. Yet, with the exception of Bruno Méger and Jacques Tauran, they were willing to answer the question. Perhaps they found it too sensitive, as did Le Pen some years later when he said in an interview: “They often ask me to what political family I consider myself to belong, what writers inspired me, from what movements I descend… none!” (Alexandre 1996: 6). The answers of the other French MEP’s were varied and expressed different ideological tendencies in the Front National. Sometimes this was quite explicit. Bernard Antony, for example, said that Alain de Bénos — leader of the Nouvelle Droite — was as near to him as George Marchais of the Communist Party. As his philosophical inspirators Bernard Antony referred to Saint Paul and Thomas de Aquino as the founding fathers; to Joseph de Maistre and Louis de Bonald as the great anti-revolutionary philosophers of the early 19th century; to Charles Péguy (“even though he declared himself socialist”) and to Charles Maurras and Georges Bernanos — representatives of Action Française — for the 20th century. Yvan Blot, on the other hand, referred to the German school of philosophical anthropology of Arnold Gehlen (who supported the National Socialist regime, MFP). Blot also mentioned Maurice Barrès and Charles Maurras and declared himself attached to Leibniz and Pascal. Yvan Blot was co-founder (in 1974) and honorary-president of the Club de l’Horloge, a think tank of right-wing, neo-liberal civil servants most of whom were, like Ivan Blot himself, alumni of the Ecole Nationale d’Administration. Blot also participated in GRECE, the think tank of the pagan Nouvelle Droite. Hence, an enormous ideological rift exists between the philosophical positions of Bernard Antony, who can be considered as a fundamentalist catholic, and Yvan Blot who is a representative of a secular right-wing political philosophy. Finally, Pierre Ceyrac only mentioned Jean-Marie le Pen as his maître de penser.

The MSI-DN delegates were most consistent in naming Mussolini as the political theorist who had most influenced their party ideology. Benito Mussolini and Oswald Spengler were mentioned by Gianfranco Fini as most influential for his personal political development, Giovanni Gentile was mentioned by Antonio Mazzone, and Julius Evola by Giuseppe Rauti. Julius Evola is considered the intellectual inspirator of the radical and often violent Ordine Nuovo which was organized by Rauti after the 1956 MSI congress in Milan. Luigi Moretti, of the Lega Lombarda, referred to the federalist ideas of Carlo Cattaneo, born in 1801. Moretti eulogized the federalist scholar from Milano, as “a communist and a federalist”. MSI-DN delegates presented themselves as the heirs of Italian Fascism, while Lega Lombarda delegates appeared as authentic regionalists.
Karel Dillen (Vlaams Blok) referred solely to Flemish nationalists, such as Wies Moens and Joris van Severen. The Republikeinse delegates showed much less coherence in philosophical ancestry than the delegates of the Front National and those of MSI-DN. Emil Schlee, for example, referred to Horkheimer and the Frankfurter Schule as very influential on his intellectual development. Hans-Günther Schodruch referred to Franz-Josef Strauss (CSU) and Schumacher ("der Alte von der SPD"). No wonder that this mixed bag of philosophical influences did not combine easily. Compared to the delegates of the Front National, surprisingly few extreme right philosophers were mentioned. The most surprising answer, however, came from Hans Janmaat who mentioned as the political theorists who influenced him most Thomas Hobbes and the famous Harvard political scientist Carl Friedrich. "But," Janmaat added, "for practical politics you need Machiavelli." Janmaat was the only leader of an anti-immigrant party who did not feel influenced by philosophers of his own national extraction. All other representatives of anti-immigrant parties predominantly referred to politicians and philosophers of their own nationality, or even - as in the case of the Vlaams Blok and the Lega Lombarda - of their own region. The exceptions were references to extreme right philosophers of German extraction (Gehlen and Spengler) and the reference to a 'classical' philosopher, Leibniz. From the answers it is clear that there are no intellectual founding fathers of the anti-immigrant parties, although fascist intellectuals score high on the list of preferred philosophers, especially among the MEP's of the Front National and the MSI-DN.

### 3 Ethnic nationalism

Agreement on the concept of the nation was overwhelming. A nation, according to Karel Dillen, is "a people with its history, its common descent, a territory where it has lived for centuries, bound by the language." Dillen added: "A people may even lose its language for a while." The state's role is to defend the people. Moretti said that to protect the nation the state had to protect the family rather than break it up. According to Rauti "the state is the juridical conscience of the nation and serves as the interpreter not only of the nation's contemporary life but also of its traditions and customs." The influence of Mussolini but also of Julius Evola's thinking in this conception of state and nation is paramount. Rauti paraphrases Mussolini's famous dictum: "The people is the body of the State and the State is the spirit of this body." (See Evola 1993: 40.)

According to Emil Schlee a people is a culture of descent, a community of language and history that becomes a nation through the common will to live in a free and autonomous state ("eine Abstammungskultur, Sprach- und Geschichtsgemeinschaft und wird durch den gemeinsamen Willen, in einem freien, selbstbestimmten Staat zu leben, zur Nation."). Yvan Blot saw the ethnic cohesion as the fundament of the nation. The 'ethnic' is defined in terms of culture, language and common historical heritage. When confronted with the fact that France contains several ethnicities, Blot referred to anthropological investigation which, according to him, shows that the biological stock of the French people has not changed substantially since the invasion of the Franks in the 5th century. ("Il semble que le stock génétique des Français soit resté le même sur près de deux mille ans."). This is the strongest biological statement we heard from the MEP's we interviewed. Interestingly enough, this statement came from a Frenchman whose mother was Polish. Yet, the same point of view is expressed in an article by Bruno Mégret (1991: 7) and it appears also in the 1993 'Programme of Government' of the Front National (Mégret 1993: 30/31). In a book published in 1996, L'Héritage d'Athèna, Yvan Blot defends a neo-republican concept of politics in combination with ethnic homogeneity of the polity. It was the Greek democrats, according to Blot, who forged the link between *ius sanguinis* and the good life. French culture is incompatible with those cultures that are not helleno-centrist. Hence, cultural homogeneity is a condition sine qua non for democracy. Blot juxtaposes, in his political philosophy, the classical virtue of the "honnête homme" - still cherished in the Third French Republic - with Marxism that destroyed this ideal. Also according to Le Pen, "France is inextricably bound up with blood, soil and memory. It is made up of a homogeneous people living according to its tradition on a territory which is the patrimony of its fathers." (National-Hebdo 659: 17) Le Chevalier referred to the *ius soli* as the "out of date legislation in France. In that respect we could look for inspiration to Israeli national law which is based solely on *ius sanguinis.*" (CP 9-10-91)

Yet, among the French delegates an echo of Ernest Renan's voluntarist conception of nation can also be heard. Bernard Antony and Pierre Ceyrac maintained that the fundamental element of the nation is "the will to live together". Jacques Tauran defined the nation in terms of a long common history, but added that such a nation could admit people from outside on the condition that these outsiders recognize the values of the nation and do not enter with the purpose of turning everything upside down. An assimilationist position seems common to most representatives of anti-immigrant parties.

Even though Hans Janmaat and Franz Schönhuber fully shared the ethnic nationalism of the members of the Front National, their approach is more legalistic than that of the Front National. Janmaat maintained that those immigrants with a Dutch passport have the right to stay, "unless, of course, they have obtained their passport through illegal means". Schönhuber also stated that "nobody wants to throw out Turks who have lived here for 20
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years." Even in his expansionist claims on Silesia, Schönhuber was, in 1990, relatively moderate and wished the Eastern borders of Germany to be established only after consultation and negotiation: "We cannot and will not deport the Poles. One should not react to injustice by committing another injustice. There should be a legal solution." (Van den Brink 1994: 286-289). This discourse is quite different from the one employed by the Front National MEPs and Karel Dillen who only recognized ethnic ties and were conspicuously vague about the legal status of immigrants from outside Europe.

Racism lurks in the ethnic conception of nation that is shared by all MEPs we interviewed. Yet all interviewees are well aware of being accused of racism and anti-Semitism. Franz Schönhuber defended himself against such allegations by drawing a distinction between National-Socialism and Italian Fascism. "Fascism was not racist. The founder of the Fascist party in Rome was a Jew, Mussolini had Jewish girlfriends." (Die Tageszeitung 19-5-1992). Statements by an MSI delegate seem to confirm this view. Antonio Mazzone condemned anti-Semitism in terms that leave no doubt: "I am no racist and I think anti-Semitism is used by some to excuse themselves for racist terrorism. It's a shame and it is not in line with the traditions of the right, at least not in Italy. Unfortunately, we in Italy have territorial racism, propagated by the League." Nonetheless, MSI leader Gianfranco Fini did indeed use anti-Semitic phrasing during the interview. Hans Janmaat, finally, refused to speak out against anti-Semitism. He stated that he does not use anti-Semitism in his political propaganda because in the Netherlands there is no market for anti-Semitism. Indeed, Hans Janmaat's answer clearly suggests that the amount of anti-Semitism in the party's propaganda depends on political opportunity. Such opportunism is also expressed by Vlaams Blok leader, Filip Dewinter. When asked why the Vlaams Blok never attacked the Jewish community in Antwerp he responded by saying "We can calculate", referring to their strong economic position in the city. The Front National's newspaper National-Hebdo regularly uses anti-Semitism in its political assaults. (See, for example, the article about the president of the International League against Racism and Anti-Semitism, "Pierre Aidenbaum or the man with the double loyalty: towards Israel and towards the Socialist Party", National-Hebdo (October 1996 nr. 638: 71.)

3.1 Regionalism

Within the group of anti-immigrant parties two tendencies can be discerned: one in favour of state nationalism and the other promoting regional nationalism. The Lega Lombarda undeniably belongs to the latter, as does the Vlaams Blok. Front National and MSI-DN, on the other hand, speak out against regionalism in Europe. And yet, the ex-Republican Harald Neubauer is the most outspoken representative of a strong and centralized nation state. "The idea of a Europe of Regions is," according to Neubauer, "only an alibi to suppress the nations. Whereas nations were formed by history, regions are merely geographical and not political unities." Neubauer represents a tradition of state nationalism which also exists in France and Italy. A tradition which started with the French Revolution when it declared the new France one and indivisible. The revolutionary ideology regarded regional autonomy as anti-national and counter-revolutionary. Jean Claude Martinez of the Front National maintains in his book L'Europe Folle (1996) that the European Union is dismantling the nations through the financial support that goes to the regions. According to Martinez, regionalism is a "historical regression" (10-10-1991). If regional disparities exist, it is due to the Union's irresponsible free-tradism. "With these so-called 'Structural Funds' the pyromaniac has become fireman."

(National-Hebdo nr. 639: 14)

Italian nationalism, which considers Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872) as one of its founding fathers, is also averse to regionalism, especially the regionalism propagated by the northern Leagues. These Leagues are the Italian variant of a growing regionalism that is flourishing all over Europe. In this respect the Vlaams Blok is a regionalist party as well because it focuses on the autonomy of Flanders. In fact, the Vlaams Blok, like the Lega Nord, does not recognize the existing state. Karel Dillen expressed a much felt sentiment among the Flemish when he claimed not to have a 'fatherland'. In the eyes of the Vlaams Blok the Belgian state is a historical monstrosity of which they should be freed as soon as possible. This is one of the reasons why Karel Dillen has been a life-long propagandist of a Greater Netherlands. He still is, although he does realize that this idea will remain a political utopia for some time to come.

The Technical Group's second secretary, Frank van Hecke, who in 1996 succeeded Karel Dillen as president of the Vlaams Blok, hopes to detach the Lega Lombarda from the Rainbow Group (Vrij Nederland 15-8-1992). This, however, is not very likely to happen as it is not in the Lega's interest to join a group which not only has a spoiled identity but is also ravaged by internal conflict. More fundamental, however, is the question whether regionalist parties will exploit and strengthen the Volksnationalist tendencies and thus become more xenophobic. If so, a 'new right' might develop that incorporates anti-modernist and right-wing ecological strands of political thought.

3.2 Visions on Europe

All delegates regarded European integration with suspicion: the integration process should leave the individual nations alone. Martinez, in his previously
mentioned book, criticizes the fact that Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland and even East Germany profit from the structural funds of the European Union while France gets only 77 Francs back of every 100 Francs it contributes. The French farmer gets 3793.6 Ecu's from the European Community, while each Danish farmer receives 6954.4 Ecu's, each Belgian farmer 8648, the Irish farmer 9239.5 and the Dutch farmer gets most: 9545.7 Ecu's. "Add to this the enormous corruption and the picture is complete" (National-Hebdo 639:14).

This does not mean that the French delegates are altogether against European cooperation, but this cooperation should respect national sovereignty. Thus de Gaulle's "Europe of the fatherlands" is frequently quoted with enthusiasm. However, Karel Dillen, Luigi Moretti, and also Harald Neubauer, preferred to talk about a "Europe of the peoples" rather than about a "Europe of the fatherlands". These three M's clearly assumed a Volk nationalist position. They were not just skeptical about the European institutions but also about the national states.

Nationalism was sometimes expressed in bizarre examples. Bernard Antony of the Front National warned the European Commission not to propose any European legislation that would harm farm-made French cheese in favour of Dutch cheese, "that shapeless, slipshod substance". If this should happen, Antony would "have to take up arms". Hans Janmaat, in turn, suggested confiscating French property and taking the French ambassador hostage, to force the French government to halt the pollution of the river Rhine by French salt factories. This suggestion appeared in the Centre Democrats' election programme in 1994. Far more serious, however, is the rift between the Italian MSI-DN and the Repubbilikaner for Alto Adige. Indeed, the MSI-DN has taken a strong stand against the claim for cultural and political autonomy of the German-speaking population of Alto Adige, represented by the Südtiroler Volkspartei, thus attracting the electoral support of the Italian-speaking inhabitants of that region. Since the 1988 elections, the MSI-DN has been supported by the majority of Italian-speaking voters in Bolzano.

In spite of these nationalist rivalries, a definite European feeling existed among the members of the Technical Group. Emil Schlee even saw little difference between German and European culture: "There is not a single cookery book in Europe that does not include a German recipe. Nor are there any German cookery books without European recipes." After observing that the same goes for hymn books and dynasties, his conclusion was: "That's how German Europe is and how European, in a sense, Germany is." Bruno Mégret mentioned in one and the same breath Shakespeare, Molière, Cervantes and Goethe: "One can hardly feel a foreigner in the presence of these great men." The European culture is seen as an age-old civilization, a civilization threatened by an excess of tolerance and a lack of will-power to defend it against Americanism on the march. In this respect the views of the interviewees probably do not differ much from those en vogue among the traditional elites in Europe. It is these traditional European values that have been defended most consistently by the French Nouvelle Droite to which Blot belongs.

The anti-immigrant parties celebrate the European culture first and foremost as an argument to deter the invasion of non-European immigrants. The non-European immigrant is in their view the greatest threat to the European culture. Harald Neubauer, once again, was very explicit: "One should distinguish between migrants with a similar lifestyle and migrants with a very different culture and lifestyle. If 100,000 Englishmen were to come over to Germany, the German identity would not be threatened." History has proven this, said Neubauer, with reference to the Poles: "The numerous Kowalskis in the Essen telephone directory is a good example. We certainly wouldn't be able to integrate a similar number of Tamils, Indians, Turks, and God knows what else, in Germany." Bernard Antony also thinks that "a Pole makes a very good Frenchman." The number of such explicit new racist formulations, however, was very limited indeed, also because the questionnaires did not contain questions on migrants, nor did we ask any questions that would provoke racist answers.

It is clear from the interviews that the protagonists of anti-immigrant parties are not nationalist in a narrow sense of the term. They are well aware of the common origins of the Western culture and they all seem to be determined to defend it against the invasion of non-European immigrants. And yet, when the predicament of migrants was discussed, practically all the interviewees expressed sympathy for them. Luigi Moretti of the Lega Lombarda declared that he did not want "these desperate and poor people to be exploited(...) They have been robbed, used and colonized. They should not be deceived and brought here." Pino Rauti (MSI-DN) expressed something generally felt amongst the interviewees: "Immigration is as much a tragedy for them as it is for us." His conclusion follows suit: "We must help these people to develop within their natural environment." Most of those interviewed hence agreed that foreign aid was the only appropriate instrument. Hans Janmaat, in accordance with the programme of the Centre Democrats, supported foreign aid as a means of repatriating immigrants: "Yes, foreign aid to Surinam should, of course, be resumed. And we should, at the same time, make it quite clear that the Surinamese here must be taken back immediately!" Yvan Blot, however, was of the opinion that most foreign aid does not reach its proper destination, and was hesitant to speak out in favour of foreign aid as a general principle. Front National representatives refused to see foreign aid as a moral duty, as opposed to the Republikaner who regarded it as indemnities ('Wiedergutmachung') for a colonial past.

All the same, most representatives linked foreign aid with today's migration problems. The Front National's image of the non-European immigrant differs
somewhat from that of the (ex-)Republikaner. In the eyes of the Front National the non-European immigrant is a Muslim, posing a serious threat to European, Christian culture. According to Mégrét, Islam and Christianity are "completely incompatible"; the Islam is "totally alien to the European culture." Bernard Antony concludes: "We fight the Islam as vehemently as we did communism." The Germans, however, do not share this preoccupation with Islamic culture. Schodruch commented dryly: "I know too little about its threat or not." Emil Schlee admitted considering the Islam a political danger because "it often, also here in Germany, takes a militantly active stand against non-believers, just as Christianity did with its crusades in the course of history." This quotation shows that Schlee basically does not consider the Islam to be more dangerous than Christianity, a view which would not be appreciated among members of the Front National.

4 The revolt against materialism

All parties belonging to the Technical Group of the European Right plus the mep's seem to defend traditional values and adopt an idealist attitude against what they call communist and capitalist materialism. Protest about the latter was expressed mainly in the rejection of American values and society. Almost all mep's interviewed opposed the U.S., but in different ways. Kar Dillen talked of a "Coca-Cola and hamburger culture" and the "international culture of films and television." Bernard Antony (Front National) compared France's 900 wines with America's Coca-Cola, and Bruno Mégrét linked Americanism with materialism: "Consumer society's materialism is something that destroys both nations and peoples." Jacques Tauran (Front National) thinks that "the Americans send us the worst they've got, the worst a man can come up with." Giuseppe Rauti was probably the most vehement opponent of American influence in Europe. In 1996 he temporarily left the MSI because, in his opinion, it was not anti-American enough. In 1991 he defended in the European Parliament an active policy towards Eastern Europe to prevent the USA from stepping in:

"Post-communist countries should not become hunting ground for bankers and financiers, for speculators and slick businessmen. This is a real challenge for the whole of Europe, because now it can show what creative qualities and technical know-how it can offer. But above all Europe can show its capacity to transmit a sense of social awareness and civilization. (FP 11-9-1991)"

Political anti-Americanism is most clearly expressed in the evaluation of the Gulf crisis. Bernard Antony is the most extreme:

...those countries must share the blame for their frivolous, or should I say, criminal way in which they sought cheap labour, without first seeking other solutions. An influx of cheap labour followed without any consideration being given to the long-term consequences. In this way European countries have indeed sinned.

The Americans and their European allies have behaved unworthily. They behaved like criminals against the human race. The American way: Hiroshima, Nagasaki! A contempt of human life disguised as a philanthropical declaration. A dirty defense of interests that we know only too well.

The only member of the Technical Group who openly confronted this position taken by the Front National was Johanna Grund, who defended the war against Saddam Hussein. It contributed to her break with the Technical Group. Most (ex-)Republikaner delegates took a moderate view in their criticism of American influence. Hans-Günther Schodruch emphasized the elements that the American and European cultures have in common and drew attention to the fact that America came to Europe's rescue after World War II. Economic penetration was more than welcome: "If the Hitler regime had conceded the Americans more economic influence, they would never have started a war against us, because then they would have had to destroy their own property. So I am not against our economies being interwoven." Harald Neubauer, however, departed from this moderate view on American influence. Almost all interviewees juxtaposed the materialism of America and the higher European culture.

None of the mep's rejected capitalism completely. A distinction can be made between parties that link their xenophobia with a neo-liberal view, and parties that combine xenophobia with a critical view of capitalism. In the former, the internal contradiction between the support for neo-liberalism and the demand that borders are closed to immigrants remains unnoticed. The most outspoken form of anti-capitalism is found among those with strong ties to fascist ideology. Harald Neubauer - representing the fascist tradition among the Republikaner - compared the big entrepreneurs with the slave-holders of ancient Rome. He spoke of a "well-fed bourgeoisie whose work was done by slaves, nowadays by the so-called immigrant workers." This almost sounds like a Marxist critique. Karel Dillen from the Vlaams Blok also places the blame first and foremost on those who attracted the immigrants:

A clear distinction became apparent between the parties - like the MSI, Republikaner and Vlaams Blok - that blamed the capitalist entrepreneurs for the migration problem, and parties which did not. Republikaner leader Franz Schönhuber referred to Mussolini's employment policy as a positive model (Tageszeitung 12-5-1992). Front National and Centre Democrats, on the other
hand, have a more neo-liberal ideology (Pollmann 1992). Yet Bruno Mégré (Front National) rejected "both marxist materialism and capitalist inspired materialism." Representatives of the Front National argued not against capitalism as such, but maintained that economic rationality should not have too great an influence on political thinking. Yvan Blot maintained that the economy should be ruled by the economic logic, the army by the military logic, the policy by the political logic. The Front National is, according to Blot, successor of the 18th century physiocrats rather than of the 19th century bureaucrats. Economic freedom will only function if it is based on non-economic values. Bernard Antony stated that it is necessary to defend the traditional communal, yes, catholic values. Bruno Mégré regretted that "everything is being reduced to economics." In a different context, Karel Dillen expressed the opinion that religion can and should play a significant role in society's social cohesion, but he stressed that the Vlaams Blok itself is not a religious party. Emil Schlee thought that the European Community "lacks viability because it is founded on a materialist concept." And Karel Dillen supported his criticism of the European Community: "Instead of departing from the many and various ideals, the Occident's age-old traditions, the legacy of ancient Rome, Hellas, Christianity and its Germanic elements (...), all inspiring ideas, they began with a materialist conception."

The only anti-immigrant party leader who assumed an unambiguous materialist position was Hans Janmaat of the Dutch Centre Democrats. Janmaat saw the Americans purely as economic competitors who forced the governments of Europe to pursue a "foreigners-friendly policy" in order to undermine Europe's competitive position. He maintained that the American government was behind the free entrance of immigrants into European countries for purely economic reasons. By forcing the European governments to accept so many immigrants the national strength of the European countries is undermined. To prove his point, Janmaat mentioned President Bush's quick visit to Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers during his 1991 trip to the European capitals. "What else but this was there for Bush and Lubbers to discuss? It must have been something that could not be communicated by fax." This is a clear example of the conspiracy theories which we will discuss below (section 5). Janmaat rejected immigration in terms of material self-interest: "Every refugee in this country costs us, let's say: 200,000 guilders? And how many are we to get this year? A hundred thousand? We cannot pull that weight." According to Janmaat the European idea and the European culture do not have any particular significance at all.

\[5\quad \text{Decline of democracy and conspiracy theory}\]

As was argued in the introduction, critique of parliamentary democracy and conspiracy theory are closely related. In his criticism of the functioning of Germany's democracy, for example, Harald Neubauer said about Heinz Galinski, the former chairman of the Jewish Central Council in Germany:

"Take a man like Heinz Galinski. He's backed by 32,000 members of the German Jewish community. If he sneezes, Bonn is struck by flu. No German has ever voted for Heinz Galinski, but Heinz Galinski has a chat with the Federal Chancellor and manages to secure the payments to anti-fascist resistance-fighters - as the communists were called after the war - although the government had agreed to abolish these payments because they were part and parcel of communist thinking and communist injustice.

Two anti-Semitic themes are combined here. The first is that of excessive influence of Jews in politics (if Galinsky sneezes, Bonn is struck by flu), the second concerns their secret alliance with communism (Galinsky manages to secure the payments to anti-fascist resistance-fighters - as the communists were called after the war).

Political anti-Semitism and political paranoia are closely related as is demonstrated by Le Pen in his attacks on the French press. At a Front National meeting early November 1992, a journalist who was beaten up was called "dirty Jew." According to Le Pen, the war the press is waging on the Front National is not restricted to France. It happens all over the world. "There must be a secret concert master, somewhere." (Le Monde 9-11-1992) In 1996, anti-Semitism became fiercer in the party press and in his May Day speech Le Pen made a reference to "the perfidy of the attacks of those who want to dominate the planet in all its domains, not only that of finance, economy and commerce, but also in jurisdiction and even in religion." The next day he publicly declared that he had referred to Edmond Rothschild (Soudais 1996: 271). In September 1996, after a public outcry over his declaration on the inequality of races, Le Pen blamed "la presse gauchiste et marxiste" which had incited the rabble to violent actions at the meetings of the Front National (Le Monde 17-9-1996). According to Le Pen, freemasonry is launching a war on democracy and on the French nation. This was very clear when the Pope visited France in September 1996, a visit that was opposed by "des secteurs de l'anti-France" (Le Monde 24-9-1996). Yvan Blot evoked the notion of conspiracy in the European Parliament when he attacked a socialist MEP.

The truth is that Mr. Jakovlev distrusts the people - populism as he calls it - and is in favour of an enlightened socialism, enlightened by ideas that bear remarkable
Less than one month later, Blot alluded again to freemasonry when deriding the notion of a European state as "a transnational feudal power that replaces the national states and will turn everybody into brethren and finally will establish on this European land a paradise -- or a Lodge." (EP 9-10-1991).

As we have seen, political paranoia was also found in Hans Janmaat's explanation of the 'anti-nationalist' immigration policies of the European governments. Moretti notes a flowering of local and regional leagues which he divides into, on the one hand the Northern League, the Central League and the Southern League, and on the other the "little leagues, that were created by the Italian secret service in order to mix the sacred with the profane, if you will allow me this expression."

The solutions for the lack of democracy in the parliamentary system invariably boil down to a form of direct or 'real' democracy. However, what is rejected by most delegates is not the parliamentary system as such, but the party system, the partitocrazia in the words of Antonio Mazzone. Mazzone was exceptional in the sense that he did not make a sharp distinction between the other parties and his own. The MSI, according to Mazzone, "was born into the existing partitocrazia and therefore it has absorbed all of the defects of it." Dillen expressed the same aversion to political parties but excused the Vlaams Blok from this general malaise. "The other parties are parties of professionals, they are client parties, whereas our party was founded on the basis of a conviction, as a programme party." Dillen admitted a similarity with the communist parties: "Communist parties were parties of conviction until they degenerated into brutal power machines. I respect the first communists, even though we are the opposite of communism." Harald Neubauer views the other parties as dominated by a caste of technocrats that embraces everything in its tentacles. "We want to re-establish the ideas of the people as the basis of political action." Yet his colleague Hans-Günther Schodruch not only called himself a democrat but also affirmed his loyalty to the existing institutions. Emil Schlee was also of the opinion that the established parties do not represent democracy anymore. There is a shared feeling that democracy has degenerated and that the "political class" is responsible for the decline of democracy. Bernard Antony quoted Jacques Chirac and Raymond Barre who had expressed a desire to keep certain themes, like social security, abortion and the death penalty, away from electoral competition. This shows that the real problems are not presented to the people. "Paradoxically we, who object to this, are called anti-democrates, fascists, populists, you name it (...) because we reintroduce democracy in the political debate."

According to most representatives of anti-immigrant parties in the European Parliament, the decline of democracy is related to the decline of moral values, to the increasing permissiveness of modern society and to the professionalization of politics. All this leaves the democratic process dominated by economic interests instead of by political ideals.

6 Conclusions

6.1 Have the representatives of anti-immigrant parties an extreme right discourse?

Going back to the questions we posed at the beginning of this article we may now provide some answers. We will start with the first research question that refers to the ideological background of the different MEP's. There is not a uniform ideological position among the representatives of anti-immigrant parties in the European Parliament that is expressed in common philosophical roots, even though there is a tendency to eulogize extreme right and nationalist philosophers. The common denominator of the representatives we interviewed is ethnic nationalism: all delegates share an ethnic conception of nationhood. Within this shared ethnic nationalism, however, profound differences exist between parties which consider themselves as regionalist -- or Volks-nationalist -- and parties which can be seen as state-nationalist. The latter consider the regionalist movements as a threat to national unity and to the pursuit of a "Europe of the fatherlands". The regionalist parties, in contrast, supported ethnic movements and the pursuit of a "Europe of the peoples".

There was also considerable agreement on the theme of materialism. All MEP's of the anti-immigrant parties -- except perhaps for the delegates of the Lega Lombarda -- rejected materialism. The delegates of the Front National, the MSI-DN and the Vlaams Blok very explicitly linked their rejection of materialism with anti-Americanism. Most delegates from the Republikaner, however, were less explicit in their anti-Americanism. This difference came to a head in the conflict between the Front National and Johanna Grund in the Gulf War.

With respect to the other two elements of the extreme right doctrine there were considerable differences between delegates. To such an extent that we may make a distinction between parties that can be defined within the extreme right tradition (Front National, Vlaams Blok and MSI-DN) and those who cannot easily be defined as extreme right parties (Lega Lombarda,
Republikaner, Centre Democrats). The latter shared the anti-immigrant feelings, the ethnic nationalism and the rejection of materialism of the former, but their political discourse resembled that of the mainstream parties in their view of democracy. They seem to oppose the political class more that the political regime and cannot be considered, therefore, extremist. There were considerable differences in the conception of democracy. These differences existed between members of the same party as well as between the parties themselves.

Conspiracy theory, finally, was present in the discourse of some of the representatives of the Front National, especially that of Le Pen, but was not found in the discourse of the other MEP’s. This would suggest that only the Front National is a full-fledged extreme right party. Representatives of the Vlaams Blok and the MSI-DN have a tendency towards the extreme right ideology, whereas the representatives of the Lega Lombarda and those of the Republikaner can certainly not be said to have an extreme right public discourse.

6.2 Antagonistic similarities based on ultra-nationalism

We have, indeed, found some specific examples of antagonistic similarities among the anti-immigrant parties that express an aggressive form of nationalism. These antagonisms existed especially between the Dutch Centre Democrats and the French Front National, between the Front National and the Vlaams Blok, and between the German Republikaner and the Italian MSI-DN. It showed that international cooperation between nationalist parties is difficult to realize. The Front National is very well aware of this predicament as is shown in the motto chosen for this article: “For us, who defend diversity of identities and sovereignties, our paradox is that we dramatically need unity.” (Jean-Marie Le Pen in National-Hebdo 641 October 1996.) There is clearly a want for a ‘Nationalist International’ which seems difficult to attain. Yet, the interviews do not allow us to conclude that these ultra-nationalist antagonisms are primarily responsible for the lack of political cooperation in the European Parliament.

6.3 Personal antagonism and political conflict

Although the political convictions of the (ex-)Republikaner delegates were – with the exception of Harald Neubauer, who used to be a prominent member of the extreme-right NPD – more in line with mainstream political discourse than those of the Front National delegates, their personal political and philosophical convictions were remarkably dissimilar. It was sometimes hard to imagine that they once belonged to one and the same party. It should be remembered here that the Republikaner Party was a very young party, compared to the MSI-DN, the Front National and the Vlaams Blok. The personal antagonism that was expressed by the German representatives vis-à-vis the Republikaner president Franz Schönhuber, was at least partly due to huge differences in political opinion. Furthermore, the complaints about his dictatorial behaviour expressed a lack of political organization as much as anything else.

Compared to the Republikaner, haunted by personal antagonism and political intrigue, the Front National members made a very unified impression. Substantial ideological differences notwithstanding, the Front National MEP’s seemed to be more coherent and collegial in their answers. They were, on average, younger than their German counterparts in the European Parliament, and their professional careers had developed more successfully. They came from middle class if not upper class families. The representatives of the other parties also had an academic background, but they came from lower middle class families and followed less successful professional careers. The Front Nationalists we interviewed demonstrated a clear and elaborate political theory and contradicted each other less often than their German and Italian colleagues. Where the French almost invariably defined themselves as “right-wing”, the political self-image of the German members, on the other hand, varied from “national liberal” (Schodruch), “not right-wing, but conservative” (Schlee) and to the right of the CDU/CSU (Neubauer). Most MSI-DN representatives also considered their party as right-wing, but Giuseppe Rauti would like it to change position “beyond notions of right and left”. Lega Lombarda’s Moretti was the only one who defined his party as progressive and also showed in other aspects a considerable ideological distance to the parties organized in the Technical Group.

6.4 Towards a political family?

When asked about their political position in left-right terms there was not much agreement. Although most members considered themselves as right-wing or rather “national right”, some emphatically rejected the term. Emil Schlee considered himself a conservative, but “certainly not right-wing”. Hans Jannmaat also rejected the label “right”, “unless you would call a conservative ‘right’”. Bernard Antony hesitated between calling himself right-wing and maintaining to be “neither right nor left-wing”. Finally, Luigi Moretti would certainly call the Lega Lombarda anti-right: the Lega is according to Moretti, “a progressive movement of the centre, an inter-class party”. We can conclude that the ideological self-perception varied widely.
I ideological differences, antagonistic similarities based on ultra-nationalism and personal differences — and even antagonism — have been shown to exist in many ways among the delegates of anti-immigrant parties in the European Parliament. They all contribute to the lack of cohesion within and amongst these parties. And yet, there was a shared feeling of common identity, if only in the negative. All MEPs were profoundly disgusted with mainstream politics. This disenchantment with the “political class” must have been strengthened by the total isolation of the Technical Group in the European Parliament. The ostracism might have bolstered the solidarity within the Technical Group. Yet, internal cohesion was not only based on the negative principle that the enemies of my enemies are my friends. Their feeling of a shared Europeaness seemed to be much greater. Indeed, most representatives showed a strong feeling of European identity, but this European identity should not be confused with the European Union. Most representatives of anti-immigrant parties detested the institutions of the European Union and rejected the European Parliament as completely dominated by the Left.

The immigrant issue is increasingly defined in a European context, thus making the non-European immigrant a new term for an undesired foreigner. Paradoxically, the European unification may offer a new opportunity to anti-immigrant parties, which so far have resisted such unification. It is precisely at the European level that they may establish a steady position in the political spectrum, a position that is found historically on the right wing. Elements of a right-wing nationalist theory are present. Members of the Technical Group clearly cherish anti-materialist ideas, as philosophical idealism and as a critique of consumerism. In many ways they speak out against bourgeois individualism and they propose a communal project based on ethnic and religious values. Their rejection of a Hobbesian concept of politics is nearly unanimous. In this respect Hans Janmaat is very exceptional. In no other anti-immigrant party — except perhaps the Danish Fremskridtspartiet — would it be conceivable that the scientific institute be named after the author of Leviathan. The polity, according to the members of the Technical Fraction, cannot be based on possessive individualism. Their idea of the nation is predominantly organic-corporative and at the same time there is a tendency to favour direct democracy over parliamentary democracy.

Notes


three MEF delegates, Gianfranco Fini, Antonio Mazzoni and Giuseppe Rauti; Luigi Moretti of the Lega Lombarda; Pierre Ceyrac and Jacques Tauran of the Front National. Anneke Visser interviewed Johanna Grund. Saskia Daru collected the quotations from the proceedings of the plenary debates of the European Parliament. (See also Daru and Fennema forthcoming.)

2. Oral communication by Marc Swyngedouw.

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### Appendix: Questionnaire

#### I. PERSONALIA

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#### II. POSITION QUESTIONS

1. Which political theorist(s), would you say, has most influenced the policies of your party?
2. Which political theorist(s) has personally influenced you the most?
3. Where would you place your party on the traditional left-right political spectrum?
4a) Among the labels currently in use, which of the following would you consider the most appropriate for your party and its platform?
   - New Right
   - Far/Extreme Right
   - Neo-fascist
   - National Right
4b) What label would you prefer for a European platform of like-minded parties?
5. Would you say that your party is a revolutionary or a non-revolutionary party?
6. Is your party best characterized as a regionalist or a national party? Please explain why.
7. What is the fundamental element of a nation?
8. What is the fundamental role of the state?
9. Is there such a thing as the "European nation" or do you prefer the notion of a "Europe of Fatherlands"?
10. What are the primary shared features which allow for cooperation and coordination of activities between the European countries? Or are the nations too different to be conceived in these terms? If so, in which elements do they differ?
11. What is the common heritage of Europe if you feel that such a thing exists?
12. With which of these statements would you tend to agree?
   - A nation is a unification of individuals under a central government.
   - A nation is a corporation based on cooperation/interaction between different levels of societal affiliation (i.e. family, local community, region).

#### III. ISSUE QUESTIONS:

(please answer with your party’s official position, unless otherwise specified)

1. How important are environmental/ecological issues to your party? Can you give any examples of specific environmental/ecological policies that your party or the Technical Group of the European Right is currently pursuing?
   - Does the Rhine question reveal the difficulties in achieving a coordinated environmental policy among the parties of the European Right?
   - What is the relationship between environmental problems and overpopulation in the Third World?
   - Do you share any ideas or policies with the Green Left?
2. What is your party’s position with respect to and relationship with the Catholic Church?
3. Do you have any affiliations with any of the other Churches and religions in Europe?
4. What is your party’s position on NATO and its role in the international community? For example, who do you feel should command NATO troops?
5. What are the two most significant problems facing government today?
   - Many speak of excessive government spending, how do you feel about this and how would you propose resolving it?
6. What is your party’s position on the recent Gulf War? Do you feel that the U.S. and its European allies acted appropriately?
7. What do you think of Jean Marie Le Pen’s decision to visit Iraq during the crisis in the Gulf? Did your party do something similar? Does this mean that you agree with Hussein’s position on the Palestinian/Israeli situation?
8) Some people have accused Le Pen of anti-semitic comments; how do you feel about these accusations?
9) Given your opposition to immigration, what is your party’s position on the responsibilities of your country and the European Community to help the Third World? How much of the national or European Community budget would you dedicate to helping the Third World?

(Lega Lombarda and msi)
10) Describe your party’s position and role in calling for a revision of the Italian electoral system?
11) Which other parties and groups are involved/cooperating with your party in this effort?

IV. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT:

1) What would you say is the primary responsibility of European government?
2) Do you agree with the current structure and responsibilities of the European Parliament? If not, what specific changes would you suggest?
3) Do you think that the powers of the European Parliament should be strengthened? If yes, in what areas would you recommend strengthening the influence of the European Parliament?
4) What is your party’s position on Turkey’s efforts to join the European Community?
5) What is your party’s position on the incorporation, either directly or through special treaties, of the Eastern European countries into the European Community?
6) Do you feel that you (and the other representatives of your party) have had an influence in the proceedings and decisions of the European Parliament? If yes, please specify. If no, what are the main obstacles?
7) With which of the European parties represented in the European Parliament do you find you have the most in common in terms of outlook and/or political platform.

V. TECHNICAL GROUP OF THE EUROPEAN RIGHT
Organizational Coordination:

1) Why was the name Technical Group of the European Right given to your Parliamentary sub-group? Please give a brief history of the group, its primary aims and activities.
2) What is your opinion of the activities of the Technical Group of the European Right?
On Entering the Liberal State

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Abstract

Many people want to emigrate to a Western liberal state and for varying reasons. Some of them envision economic benefits, others flee war or totalitarian persecution in their home countries, still others want to reunite with their families. This multitude of aspiring newcomers raises difficult questions for liberal democratic states. How many newcomers should be allowed to enter and for what reasons? In this article an attempt is made to formulate a just admission policy for liberal states, inspired by two different theories of justice: Ackerman’s and Walzer’s. It is argued that newcomers ought to be admitted up to the point where important institutions in the liberal state face a ‘moral breakpoint’. Once these institutions can no longer uphold their own ‘moral logic’ the influx of newcomers should be decreased.

1 Introduction

Ever since the twentieth century renaissance of political philosophy, that is since the publication of Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, political philosophers have pondered over the right combination of liberty and equality, the foundations of liberal equality, the relation between rights and duties, and the importance of communities. The so-called liberal-communitarian debate was shaped by several now famous ‘primary position authors’ (Rawls, Nozick, Ackerman, Dworkin, MacIntyre, Walzer, Barber) and kept alive by numerous lesser gods who took the trouble to read, question, refine and criticize everything that had been written. Applied political philosophy turned out to be another respectable line of occupation. One could try to translate philosophical positions into practical solutions for policy problems: a Rawlsian environmental policy (several varieties are discussed in Manenschijn 1992), a Walzerian education (Gutmann 1987), a Rawlsian health care system (Daniels 1988), a Walzerian health care system (Trappenburg 1997), a Walzerian gender policy (Moller Okin 1987), a Dworkinian minority policy (Kymlicka 1989), a Walzerian social security system (Van der Veen 1994), etcetera. Some of the lesser gods did such an excellent job that they readily became real gods themselves.