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Ceasefires as bargaining instruments in intrastate conflicts: ceasefire objectives and their effects on peace negotiations

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Appendix Chapter Six

This appendix to chapter six (*The shifting role of ceasefires*) provides an overview of all events listed in the UCDP GED data (Högbladh 2019; Sundberg and Melander 2013) that resulted in battle-related deaths in the conflict between the Colombian Government and the FARC between 12 July 2015 and 30 November 2016.¹¹⁷

21 July 2015: The UCDP GED data lists one battle-related government death on this day. A Factiva search revealed only a single sentence in an international news article referencing the event, stating that the “soldier died in a clash with the FARC” in the Meta Department (*EFE News Service* 2015).

1 August 2015: The UCDP GED data lists one battle-related government death on this day. According to an army statement, the killed soldier was involved in military search and control activities and the death resulted from a shootout (*EFE News Service* 2015). This implies that the attack is likely to have been a local reaction to military activities in the area.

7 May 2016: The UCDP GED data lists one battle-related government death on this day. According to an army statement, a soldier that carried out “military operations of territorial control” was killed by a FARC sniper (*Latin American Herald Tribune* 2016). Again, this implies that the attack was likely a local reaction to military activities in the area.

16 November 2016: The UCDP GED data lists two battle-related FARC deaths on this day. This was shortly before the two sides signed the revised peace agreement. The circumstances surrounding this event are contested. FARC chief negotiator Iván Márquez claimed that the two were on their way to a demobilization zone, but the army stated that the fighters were 69 km from such a zone and were involved in criminal activities (see Gill 2016; ICG 2016c).

¹¹⁷ See chapter six, *Within-case congruence test*.

Appendix Chapter Seven

This appendix includes additional graphs and tables for the statistical analysis of chapter seven (*Logics of ceasefire design*) and discusses the findings of the robustness checks.

Survival curves for alternative fatality thresholds

With a fatality threshold of 1 battle-related death, almost 70% of cessations of hostilities, 50% of preliminary and 30% of definitive ceasefires are considered terminated after only three months (Figure 27). The dynamics for the fatality threshold of 100 battle-related deaths (Figure 28) are very similar for the threshold of 25 fatalities, but with longer survival times.




Figure 27: Cox proportional hazards regression survival curve, with a threshold of one battle-related death. Source: Clayton and Sticher (forthcoming, 27).




Figure 28: Cox proportional hazards regression survival curve, with a threshold of 100 battle-related deaths. Source: Clayton and Sticher (forthcoming, 36).

Local and unilateral ceasefires

In the primary analysis, unilateral arrangements and geographically limited ceasefire agreements were excluded from the analysis. However, it might be that excluding these agreements, and thereby reducing the sample, adds bias to the results. The results are thus re-estimated including local ceasefires (models 1 and 2) and unilateral arrangements (models 3 and 4). The findings do not change.

	(1) Include Local	(2) Include Local	(3) Include Unilateral	(4) Include Unilateral
Preliminary ceasefire	-0.612** (0.00)		-0.516* (0.02)	
Definitive ceasefire	-1.154** (0.00)	-0.912** (0.00)	-1.120** (0.00)	-0.887** (0.00)
Democracy	-0.213 (0.82)	-1.779 (0.16)	-0.323 (0.72)	-1.345 (0.28)
Population (logged)	-0.265** (0.01)	-0.019 (0.89)	-0.211* (0.04)	-0.042 (0.78)
GDP per capita (logged)	0.173 (0.31)	-0.185 (0.24)	0.017 (0.91)	-0.249+ (0.09)
Gov. incompatibility	-0.306 (0.19)	-0.719+ (0.06)	-0.368 (0.12)	-0.734+ (0.07)
No. conflicts in state	0.153+ (0.06)	0.075 (0.67)	0.119 (0.15)	0.089 (0.64)
Count dyads in conflict	0.363** (0.00)	0.198 (0.13)	0.337** (0.00)	0.206 (0.14)
Peacekeeping	-0.059 (0.77)	-0.055 (0.82)	-0.089 (0.71)	0.002 (0.99)
No. subjects	214	116	201	107
No. observations	8134	6078	8578	6047
No. terminations / failures	170	82	153	73
Time at risk	244288	183271	258038	182464
Log likelihood	-769.9	-329.0	-694.6	-290.3
Chi-squared	279.5	80.84	233.6	51.07

Table 20: including local and unilateral ceasefires. Source: Clayton and Sticher (forthcoming, 37).

Alternative temporal restrictions

In some cases, a cessation of hostilities serves purely humanitarian goals (e.g. allow the delivery of aid) or suspends the fighting for some mutually beneficial occasion (e.g. holiday or elections). In these cases, ceasefires tend to be put in place for a limited period of time only. What the primary analysis captures as ceasefire termination might then simply be the designated end, rather than a breakdown of an agreement. This does not contradict the theoretical argument, as such ceasefire termination reflects the underlying logic of the agreement. However, to exclude that the results are purely driven by these temporary agreements, temporary ceasefires were dropped from the analysis (models 5 and 6). The findings are not affected.

	(5) Drop time limited	(6) Drop time limited	(7) Limit analysis to 1yr	(8) Limit analysis to 1yr
Preliminary ceasefire	-0.642* (0.01)		-0.781** (0.00)	
Definitive ceasefire	-1.128** (0.00)	-0.804** (0.01)	-1.519** (0.00)	-1.068* (0.04)
Democracy	-0.531 (0.55)	-1.461 (0.24)	-0.327 (0.77)	-1.298 (0.41)
Population (logged)	-0.281** (0.00)	-0.086 (0.55)	-0.405** (0.00)	-0.089 (0.65)
GDP per capita (logged)	0.031 (0.84)	-0.203 (0.18)	0.259 (0.16)	-0.123 (0.54)
Gov. incompatibility	-0.401 (0.15)	-0.641 (0.10)	-0.496+ (0.10)	-0.894+ (0.10)
No. conflicts in state	0.169+ (0.08)	0.106 (0.60)	0.096 (0.47)	0.127 (0.57)
Count dyads in conflict	0.359** (0.00)	0.188 (0.18)	0.478** (0.00)	0.315* (0.04)
Peacekeeping	0.146 (0.47)	-0.015 (0.95)	-0.016 (0.95)	0.038 (0.89)
No. subjects	170	103	190	106
No. observations	7422	5729	1223	788
No. terminations / failures	128	70	118	55
Time at risk	223332	172822	34350	22405
Log likelihood	-557.7	-276.5	-530.6	-221.3
Chi-squared	293.7	50.56	216.6	63.73

Table 21: alternative temporal restrictions. Source: Clayton and Sticher (forthcoming, 38).

Similarly, it might be that some agreements continue to be observed for many years, and that these enduring agreements drive the results. To exclude this possibility, in models 7 and 8 the duration of all agreements is limited to a maximum of one year. The results are consistent with the main findings.

Alternative measures of definitive ceasefires

The PA-X data includes a number of variables that capture elements similar to the independent variables coded for the primary analysis. In particular, PA-X includes indicators for provisions to transition a non-state actor into a political party, and references to demobilization. Based on the theoretical framework presented in chapter seven, these elements are expected to produce a similar effect to the definitive ceasefire indicator. Models 9 to 12 estimate the results including these PA-X variables.

Both variables produce effects in the anticipated direction. However, they are only close to conventional levels of significance, possibly due to a slightly lower level of specification. The measure of definitive ceasefire agreements, as coded in the primary analysis, includes a wider collection of political arrangements beyond transitioning into political parties, and requires a firmer commitment to disarmament and demobilization in the text.

	(9) PA-X Pol party Transition Variable	(10) PA-X Pol Party Transition Variable	(11) PA-X Demobilization	(12) PA-X Demobilization
Preliminary ceasefire	-0.484 ⁺ (0.06)		-0.467 ⁺ (0.06)	
Political Party Transition	-0.817 (0.11)	-0.471 (0.36)		
Demobilization General				
			-0.631 ⁺ (0.07)	-0.541 (0.16)
Democracy	0.002 (1.00)	-1.028 (0.41)	-0.057 (0.95)	-1.071 (0.39)
Population (logged)	-0.297 ^{**} (0.00)	-0.149 (0.35)	-0.284 ^{**} (0.00)	-0.136 (0.29)
GDP per capita (logged)	0.198 (0.21)	-0.062 (0.70)	0.180 (0.25)	-0.077 (0.60)
Gov. incompatibility	-0.391 (0.11)	-0.526 (0.18)	-0.431 ⁺ (0.09)	-0.502 (0.20)
No. conflicts in state	0.198 [*] (0.02)	0.189 (0.29)	0.200 [*] (0.02)	0.231 (0.24)
Count dyads in conflict	0.402 ^{**} (0.00)	0.267 [*] (0.04)	0.375 ^{**} (0.00)	0.209 (0.17)
Peacekeeping	-0.009 (0.96)	0.017 (0.94)	0.033 (0.86)	0.099 (0.64)
No. subjects	188	104	190	106
No. observations	7761	5984	7802	6025
No. terminations / failures	145	70	147	72
Time at risk	233383	180586	234611	181814
Log likelihood	-647.4	-279.9	-658.3	-288.4
Chi-squared	179.4	51.25	144.6	43.98

Table 22: alternative measures of definitive ceasefires. Source: Clayton and Sticher (forthcoming, 39).

Including ceasefire related and prior agreements

Provisions of a ceasefire might be updated or amended in prior or subsequent agreements, and that might lead to a misclassification of certain agreements. In a robustness check, all related agreements were read and changes in key provisions coded. In this process, six agreements were ‘upgraded’ to a higher class of ceasefire design. The results were then re-estimated. They remain consistent with those of the primary analysis.

Multiple ceasefires often occur in the same conflict. To account for the effect of a prior ceasefire, additional controls were added to indicate whether there was a prior ceasefire and, if so, the class of ceasefire design. The results remain consistent when controlling for prior ceasefires. Perhaps surprisingly, there is relatively little effect of prior agreements. The only statistically significant finding is that prior cessation of hostilities agreements are associated with a reduction in ceasefire duration. Investigating the impact of ceasefire sequencing is an important area for future research.

	(13) Including upgrades	(14) Controlling for prior CF	(15) Controlling for prior CF
Preliminary ceasefire	-0.519* (0.02)	-0.779** (0.00)	*
Definitive ceasefire	-1.095** (0.00)	-1.273** (0.00)	-0.832*
Democracy	-0.210 (0.82)	-0.279 (0.76)	-1.493 (0.29)
Population (logged)	-0.219* (0.03)	-0.290** (0.01)	-0.048 (0.75)
GDP per capita (logged)	-0.005 (0.98)	0.078 (0.63)	-0.232 (0.23)
Gov. incompatibility	-0.403+ (0.10)	-0.328 (0.18)	-0.641 (0.11)
No. conflicts in state	0.115 (0.19)	0.112 (0.19)	0.050 (0.84)
Count dyads in conflict	0.355** (0.00)	0.345** (0.00)	0.193 (0.22)
Peacekeeping	-0.089 (0.72)	-0.002 (0.99)	-0.064 (0.79)
Prior definitive CF		-0.109 (0.79)	-0.592 (0.49)
Prior Preliminary CF		0.332 (0.14)	0.246 (0.31)
Prior COH		0.495* (0.02)	0.233 (0.54)
No. subjects	196	114	183
No. observations	5499	4663	5513
No. terminations / failures	177	97	163
Time at risk	164412	140243	165055
Log likelihood	-772.373	-377.754	-705.390
Chi-squared	116.926	113.586	108.541

Table 23: including ceasefire related agreements and accounting for prior ceasefires. Source: Clayton and Sticher (forthcoming, 40).

Time specification

Research has shown that different measures of time can produce altered results (Gates and Strand 2004). To assess the robustness of the results across different time specifications, the analysis was thus re-run with an alternative calculation of conflict duration, using the number of weeks instead of months (models 16 and 17). The results remain consistent.

When calculating the fatality thresholds for the dependent variable, all events were included where at least the week in which they took place was known. This requirement is strengthened (models 18 and 19) and relaxed (models 20 and 21) to include all events for which the specific day or only the month is known, respectively. The results remain consistent.

	(16) Duration in Weeks	(17) Duration in Weeks	(18) Only GED events on specific day	(19) Only GED events on specific day	(20) All GED events in specific month	(21) All GED events in specific month
Preliminary ceasefire	-0.743** (0.00)		-0.698** (0.01)		-0.600* (0.01)	
Definitive ceasefire	-1.224** (0.00)	-0.887** (0.00)	-1.164** (0.00)	-0.777* (0.02)	-1.145** (0.00)	-0.844** (0.01)
Democracy	-0.191 (0.84)	-1.396 (0.27)	-0.414 (0.65)	-1.381 (0.17)	-0.228 (0.80)	-0.708 (0.54)
Population (logged)	-0.305** (0.00)	-0.043 (0.77)	-0.256** (0.01)	-0.059 (0.63)	-0.266** (0.01)	-0.096 (0.50)
GDP per capita (logged)	0.110 (0.51)	-0.236 (0.13)	0.157 (0.33)	-0.095 (0.57)	0.093 (0.57)	-0.208 (0.21)
Gov. incompatibility	-0.395 (0.12)	-0.742+ (0.06)	-0.420+ (0.08)	-0.831** (0.01)	-0.397 (0.11)	-0.735+ (0.05)
No. conflicts in state	0.155+ (0.08)	0.078 (0.70)	0.134 (0.13)	-0.001 (1.00)	0.144 (0.11)	0.084 (0.65)
Count dyads in conflict	0.366** (0.00)	0.205 (0.14)	0.341** (0.00)	0.230+ (0.09)	0.353** (0.00)	0.251* (0.05)
Peacekeeping	0.039 (0.85)	-0.013 (0.96)	-0.010 (0.96)	0.037 (0.83)	-0.002 (0.99)	0.108 (0.61)
No. subjects	190	106	190	106	190	106
No. observations	7802	6025	8458	6528	7691	5873
No. terminations / failures	147	72	143	69	148	73
Time at risk	7820	7820	254576	197122	231235	177188
Log likelihood	-651.0	-285.8	-637.7	-276.6	-656.4	-289.4
Chi-squared	299.5	51.03	154.4	47.34	265.6	48.23

Table 24: changing time specifications. Source: Clayton and Sticher (forthcoming, 41).

Dependent variable specification

In the primary analysis, ceasefires were considered to be terminated when they either cross the specified fatality threshold or when parties enter into a ceasefire with a new effect date. As an alternative approach, those observations in which a ceasefire was superseded by a subsequent ceasefire were right-censored (models 22 and 23).

The results remain relatively consistent with the primary analysis, although in some specifications, the definitive ceasefire variable is no longer significant in comparison to preliminary ceasefires. This is not surprising, as successful preliminary ceasefires are almost always superseded by a definitive ceasefire, whereas definitive ceasefires tend not to be superseded by another ceasefire. Right-censoring thus tends to bias the results against definitive ceasefires and is more useful if the focus lies on ceasefire failure more narrowly, rather than ceasefire termination more generally (which may be due to failure or due to a different ceasefire logic taking over).

In the primary analysis, only battle-related violence against conflict parties was included, based on the assumption that this type of violence is specifically prohibited in a ceasefire agreement. The results remain consistent when the data also includes violence against civilians (models 24 and 25).

	(22) Only violence as failure	(23) Only violence as failure	(24) All fatalities	(25) All fatalities
Preliminary ceasefire	-0.702* (0.03)		-0.690** (0.00)	
Definitive ceasefire	-0.847* (0.02)	-0.400 (0.14)	-1.183** (0.00)	-0.826** (0.01)
Democracy	0.325 (0.79)	0.791 (0.55)	-0.113 (0.90)	-1.073 (0.41)
Population (logged)	-0.029 (0.83)	0.179 (0.24)	-0.253 ⁺ (0.01)	-0.029 (0.83)
GDP per capita (logged)	0.223 (0.29)	-0.219 (0.36)	0.090 (0.59)	-0.205 (0.19)
Gov. incompatibility	0.277 (0.42)	0.033 (0.94)	-0.395 ⁺ (0.09)	-0.555 (0.17)
No. conflicts in state	0.053 (0.75)	0.277 (0.32)	0.099 (0.28)	0.090 (0.67)
Count dyads in conflict	0.507** (0.00)	0.329 ⁺ (0.09)	0.399** (0.00)	0.238 (0.11)
Peacekeeping	-0.202 (0.49)	-0.333 (0.34)	-0.016 (0.94)	-0.094 (0.70)
No. subjects	190	106	190	106
No. observations	7802	6025	7323	5821
No. terminations / failures	73	36	143	69
Time at risk	234611	181814	220028	175602
Log likelihood	-313.3	-139.5	-659.2	-289.5
Chi-squared	155.1	20.95	163.8	59.39

Table 25: changing dependent variable specifications. Source: Clayton and Sticher (forthcoming, 42).

Model specifications

The results also remain consistent when clustering is done on the UCDP conflict ID (models 26 and 27) and the dyad ID (models 28 and 29), instead of the country ID.

	(26) ACD ID	(27) ACD ID	(28) DYAD ID	(29) DYAD ID
Preliminary ceasefire	-0.743** (0.01)		-0.743** (0.00)	
Definitive ceasefire	-1.224** (0.00)	-0.887** (0.01)	-1.224** (0.00)	-0.887** (0.00)
Democracy	-0.191 (0.81)	-1.396 (0.35)	-0.191 (0.82)	-1.396 (0.35)
Population (logged)	-0.305** (0.00)	-0.043 (0.78)	-0.305** (0.00)	-0.043 (0.77)
GDP per capita (logged)	0.110 (0.47)	-0.236 (0.16)	0.110 (0.47)	-0.236 (0.20)
Gov. incompatibility	-0.395 (0.11)	-0.742 ⁺ (0.07)	-0.395 (0.13)	-0.742 ⁺ (0.08)
No. conflicts in state	0.155 ⁺ (0.10)	0.078 (0.67)	0.155 ⁺ (0.10)	0.078 (0.69)
Count dyads in conflict	0.366** (0.00)	0.205 (0.11)	0.366** (0.00)	0.205 (0.13)
Peacekeeping	0.039 (0.85)	-0.013 (0.96)	0.039 (0.85)	-0.013 (0.95)
No. subjects	190	106	190	106
No. observations	7802	6025	7802	6025
No. terminations / failures	147	72	147	72
Time at risk	234611	181814	234611	181814
Log likelihood	-651.0	-285.8	-651.0	-285.8
Chi-squared	143.6	36.44	129.8	24.95

Table 26: model specifications I. Source: Clayton and Sticher (forthcoming, 43).

When using jackknife estimations to account for potential outliers (models 30 and 31), the findings are also consistent.

Cox proportional hazards models assume that the hazard ratio is constant over time. To assess the validity of using these models, a test of the proportional hazards assumption was estimated, finding no evidence that this assumption has been violated.

The Cox model used in the primary analysis allows the inclusion of covariates of survival times but has less restrictive assumptions than the Weibull model. When using a Weibull model, the findings remain consistent.

	(30) Jackknife	(31) Jackknife	(32) Weibull	(33) Weibull
Preliminary ceasefire	-0.743* (0.02)		-0.827** (0.00)	
Definitive ceasefire	-1.224** (0.00)	-0.887* (0.02)	-1.358** (0.00)	-1.028** (0.01)
Democracy	-0.191 (0.90)	-1.396 (0.45)	-0.391 (0.66)	-1.439 (0.24)
Population (logged)	-0.305* (0.04)	-0.043 (0.81)	-0.192+ (0.07)	0.100 (0.54)
GDP per capita (logged)	0.110 (0.63)	-0.236 (0.31)	0.092 (0.60)	-0.341* (0.03)
Gov. incompatibility	-0.395 (0.23)	-0.742 (0.20)	-0.340 (0.26)	-0.728 (0.11)
No. conflicts in state	0.155 (0.15)	0.078 (0.79)	0.122 (0.23)	0.050 (0.82)
Count dyads in conflict	0.366** (0.01)	0.205 (0.21)	0.377** (0.00)	0.188 (0.28)
Peacekeeping	0.039 (0.89)	-0.013 (0.97)	0.219 (0.40)	0.158 (0.56)
Constant			-0.647 (0.70)	-1.462 (0.48)
No. subjects	190	106	190	106
No. observations	7802	6025	7802	6025
No. terminations / failures	147	72	147	72
Time at risk	234611	181814	234611	181814
Log likelihood	-651.0	-285.8	-381.3	-206.0
Chi-squared			80.22	36.94

Table 27: model specifications II. Source: Clayton and Sticher (forthcoming, 44).

Lagged violence measure

In the main analysis, a lagged violence measure was used to control for violence in the previous month. As an alternative, the lagged violence measure is removed (models 34 and 35) or changed to control for violence in the prior two and three months (models 36 to 39). The findings remain the same.

	(34) No lagged measure	(35) No lagged measure	(36) 2 months violence lag	(37) 2 months violence lag	(38) 3 month violence lag	(39) 3 month violence lag
Preliminary ceasefire	-0.622** (0.01)		-0.766** (0.00)		-0.774** (0.00)	
Definitive ceasefire	-0.770** (0.00)	-0.385* (0.02)	-1.218** (0.00)	-0.906** (0.00)	-1.218** (0.00)	-0.896** (0.00)
Democracy	-0.788 (0.19)	-1.032 (0.17)	-0.129 (0.89)	-1.602 (0.25)	-0.126 (0.89)	-1.530 (0.26)
Population (logged)	-0.152+ (0.06)	0.074 (0.44)	-0.314** (0.00)	-0.032 (0.83)	-0.316** (0.00)	-0.039 (0.80)
GDP per capita (logged)	0.043 (0.68)	-0.065 (0.50)	0.093 (0.58)	-0.268+ (0.09)	0.092 (0.59)	-0.258+ (0.10)
Gov. incompatibility	-0.370+ (0.05)	-0.322 (0.21)	-0.420 (0.11)	-0.780+ (0.06)	-0.425 (0.11)	-0.776+ (0.06)
No. conflicts in state	0.118 (0.13)	0.069 (0.56)	0.154+ (0.10)	0.021 (0.92)	0.153+ (0.10)	0.034 (0.88)
Count dyads in conflict	0.241** (0.00)	0.139 (0.23)	0.382** (0.00)	0.228 (0.10)	0.384** (0.00)	0.224 (0.11)
Peacekeeping	0.050 (0.77)	0.086 (0.66)	0.046 (0.83)	-0.063 (0.82)	0.050 (0.82)	-0.043 (0.87)
No. subjects	190	106	190	106	190	106
No. observations	10397	7723	7802	6025	7802	6025
No. terminations / failures	199	110	147	72	147	72
Time at risk	234611	181814	234611	181814	234611	181814
Log likelihood	-837.1	-404.3	-649.1	-284.2	-649.5	-285.1
Chi-squared	61.85	27.26	244.5	95.09	222.6	67.04

Table 28: changing lagged violence measures. Source: Clayton and Sticher (forthcoming, 45).

Interaction

The way the ceasefire variables were constructed creates a risk of autocorrelation. The results were thus re-estimated including an indicator for monitoring provisions, which was interacted with the indicator for definitive ceasefire agreements.

	(40) Interaction
Monitoring	-0.828** (0.00)
Definitive ceasefire	-1.790** (0.00)
Monitoring*Definitive CF	1.416* (0.02)
Democracy	1.416* (0.02)
Population (logged)	-0.373 (0.68)
GDP per capita (logged)	-0.196+ (0.07)
Gov. incompatibility	0.096 (0.58)
No. conflicts in state	-0.317 (0.31)
Count dyads in conflict	0.128 (0.22)
Peacekeeping	0.368** (0.00)
No. subjects	190
No. observations	7802
No. terminations / failures	147
Time at risk	234611
Log likelihood	-380.9
Chi-squared	90.26

Table 29: interaction. Source: Clayton and Sticher (forthcoming, 46).

The results are consistent with the primary analysis, and also suggest that monitoring is associated with shorter definitive ceasefires. This may relate to a selection bias: in more challenging cases, which have a greater likelihood of failure, parties may include ceasefire monitoring directly in the ceasefire text rather than relying on a more general peace agreement committee to do the job.

Additional controls

The primary analysis controlled only for those factors deemed most likely to influence ceasefire duration. To control for other possible confounders, models 41 and 42 account for the presence of a UN diplomatic mission (Clayton and Dorussen 2019), and models 43 and 44 for the total number of peacekeeping forces (International Peace Institute 2019).

	(OA41) Diplomatic missions	(OA42) Diplomatic missions	(OA43) No. PKO	(OA44) No. PKO	(OA45) UN Signatory	(OA46) UN Signatory
Preliminary ceasefire	-0.748** (0.00)		-0.768** (0.00)		-0.755** (0.00)	
Definitive ceasefire	-1.264** (0.00)	-0.891** (0.00)	-1.195** (0.00)	-0.814** (0.01)	-1.226** (0.00)	-0.878** (0.00)
Democracy	-0.194 (0.84)	-1.416 (0.27)	-0.057 (0.95)	-1.186 (0.33)	-0.141 (0.88)	-1.280 (0.34)
Population (logged)	-0.323** (0.00)	-0.051 (0.74)	-0.325** (0.00)	-0.051 (0.72)	-0.305** (0.00)	-0.016 (0.91)
GDP per capita (logged)	0.125 (0.44)	-0.229 (0.18)	0.182 (0.23)	-0.165 (0.25)	0.108 (0.52)	-0.232 (0.18)
Gov. incompatibility	-0.391 (0.12)	-0.743+ (0.07)	-0.388 (0.11)	-0.710+ (0.05)	-0.385 (0.13)	-0.759+ (0.07)
No. conflicts in state	0.165+ (0.08)	0.076 (0.71)	0.135 (0.12)	0.055 (0.78)	0.159+ (0.07)	0.055 (0.80)
Count dyads in conflict	0.355** (0.00)	0.207 (0.14)	0.425** (0.00)	0.270+ (0.09)	0.365** (0.00)	0.207 (0.12)
Peacekeeping	-0.019 (0.93)	0.083 (0.84)				
Political missions	0.394 (0.12)					
PKO troop numbers			-0.000** (0.01)	-0.000* (0.04)		
UN signatory					0.047 (0.85)	0.397 (0.14)
No. subjects	190	106	190	106	189	105
No. observations	7802	6025	7802	6025	7799	6022
No. terminations / failures	147	72	147	72	146	71
Time at risk	234611	181814	234611	181814	234529	181732
Log likelihood	-650.3	-285.8	-648.3	-284.6	-645.9	-280.3
Chi-squared	303.4	51.48	242.5	66.47	298.5	61.39

Table 30: additional controls. Source: Clayton and Sticher (forthcoming, 47).

Third party pressure may reduce the longevity of agreements (Beardsley 2008). To account for this, models 45 and 46 include PA-X data on the signatories of the agreements, based on the assumption that agreements with the UN or a major international power as a signatory were more likely to have resulted from international pressure. In all cases the findings remain consistent.

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