Energy Security and the Cyprus Question:
“Securitization” of Energy in the Eastern Mediterranean

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Abstract

In February 2014, Nikos Anastasiades, the President of the Republic of Cyprus and Dervis Eroglu, the Turkish-Cypriot leader, signed a Joint Declaration that established certain “ground-rules” upon which the then stalled peace talks -aiming at the island’s reunification- could be revived. The main stimulant prompting this evolution was the discovery of new energy sources in the Eastern Mediterranean, and especially offshore the RoC. In October 2014, Turkish navigational warning notified mariners that Turkey would soon perform its seismic surveys in sea areas that encroach on Cyprus’s EEZ, raising concerns on the escalation of the intractable and protracted Cyprus conflict. Aim of this research project is to provide readers with an insight on how the flow between energy and power politics is played out in the Eastern Mediterranean. Suggesting that the existing tensions extend beyond the struggle over the existing material energy assets in the seabed of the Levant Basin, the project casts light upon the notion of energy security by setting forth the indicators it is composed of. While scrutinizing the statements of the leaders on these events and seeking to highlight the security discourses they are coming up with, the project resorts to discourse analysis.

Key Words:

Accessibility and Availability, Cyprus Question, Energy Security, securitization.
Introduction

In February 2014, Nikos Anastasiades, the President of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and Dervis Eroglu, the Turkish-Cypriot leader, signed a Joint Declaration establishing certain “ground-rules” upon which the then stalled peace talks -aiming at the island’s reunification- could be revived. This evolution was arguably prompted by the discovery of new energy sources in the Eastern Mediterranean, and especially offshore the RoC. Gas had initially been portrayed as a potential catalyst for a restart of the long-standing peace process, and possibly for its successful conclusion. Nevertheless, a couple of months later, it seemed that these discoveries had worked against these aspirations and added chill to the Cyprus conflict. In October 2014, a Turkish navigational warning notified mariners that Turkey would soon perform its seismic surveys in sea areas that encroach on Cyprus’s EEZ, raising concerns on the escalation of the existing protracted conflict. Anastasiades withdrew from the negotiations, attributing his decision to these activities.

If someone had to summarize the Cyprus conflict in a few words, he would quote the aphorism of the deceased former President of the RoC, Glafkos Clerides’: “What satisfies their fears is what increases our fears, and so we have this paradoxical situation that unless we can find a way in which the fears of both communities are put at rest, it would be extremely difficult to find a solution to the Cyprus problem” (Coughlan 1991: 92). This phrase seems to capture the very essence of the diachronic security dilemma on the island. Reading into thorough analyses, embedded in the rich literature of the Cyprus studies, we have figured out that the roots of the Cyprus conflict, and other intractable conflicts alike, are mapped more into intangible sociological, cultural, religious and psychological factors rather than scarce resources. These intangible factors have resulted in a sense of mutual suspicion that exerts a significant influence in the tensions unfolding in the present.

The challenge of the current thesis is to comprehend how the legacies, based in the past, come into play in the course of the current developments. The central research objective of this project is to provide readers with an explanatory account on how the interplay between energy and power politics operates. We seek to sketch out a comprehensive framework for energy security in the Eastern Mediterranean, while bringing the intractable Cyprus conflict to the forefront.
In periods of such distress, grassroots expect their political leaders to step up and communicate a narrative explaining what is at stake, who is the threat and why. In other words, the leaders are expected to establish the proper “security discourses”. The research question that this article intends to address is: what are the indicators that formulate these “security discourses”? This question gains currency if we consider that the crisis episodes extend beyond the material resources in the seabed of the Levant Basin. They occur among entities whose relations have been characterized by historically mutual antagonism. In the light of the intractable nature of the Cyprus conflict, we want to learn which factors led the assigned political leaders of the contending parties to “securitize” the recent gas discoveries in the region the way they did. To this end, the current study places the concept of energy security under critical scrutiny by dissecting how the political leaders manipulate it.

To sufficiently tackle this question, certain steps seem necessary. The first part focuses on the very notion of security. Following the constructivist thought, we claim that its formation unfolds in various contexts and refers to various referent objects. The procedure that underscores the formation of its subjective character is “securitization”, meaning the discursive construction of threat (Buzan et al 1998). Using the recent tensions as our case study, the second part explains how securitization discourses unfold within that time frame. To this effect, it sheds light to the related statements and speeches, delivered by the political leaders of the disputants. Blame-games, pointing fingers and assigning the label of security threat to one another are expected to litter the speeches and interviews during these times.

The next step is to proceed with the definition of energy security. For the sake of this article we define it as the embodiment of two indicators that relate to its content and context dependent character respectively: availability and accessibility. Concerning the first, particular attention is paid to the estimations on the amount of the recent natural gas reserves that have been discovered around the island. The accessibility pillar, largely pertaining to the very notion of energy security, contains the geopolitical relations among the actors involved or potentially involved in exploiting these discoveries. Geopolitical relations as a notion, though, are too broad and vague. Therefore, we squeeze them into two contexts: legal and historical. As to the first, we try to identify how the disputants adopted international law to give legitimacy to their course of action, with particular reference to certain provisions of UNCLOS. As to the second, the paper embarks upon
the historical journey that explains the diachronically incompatible objectives of the disputants.

**Theoretical Framework: understanding energy security in the constructivist thought**

*The notion of security in the realist thought*

Edward Azar (1986: 28), a pioneer in the field of conflict studies, describes “denial of security needs” as an important variable in the genesis and the crystallization of protracted conflicts. The heartbreaking plight, in which the divided island of Cyprus finds itself today, is the manifestation of a dilemma which human societies have had to grapple with since the dawn of history: the security dilemma, coined by Herz (1950: 157). Security dilemma describes a constellation wherein an actor, seeking to increase his security, triggers the unintended effect of decreasing the security of the other. Groups, being “trapped” in such a predicament, are worried about their security “from being attacked, subjected, dominated or annihilated by other groups or individuals.” (ibid) Seeking to attain security from such an attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power aiming to alleviate the impact of the others’ power. This in turn, renders them more insecure and urges them to get prepared for armed conflicts or even for wars.

The quest for security -whether economic or military- raises a sense of urgency to politics and, thus, it constitutes one of the enduring sources of passion in policy controversies (Stone 2002: 88). Nonetheless, security is not devoid of meaning. It may be perceived for instance, as the preservation of a group’s or a nation’s core values. Such a broad and vague definition of security, though, does not sufficiently throw light on the identity of the groups, on the content of their core values and on where threats to these values come from (McDonald 2008: 61). The idea that security can be reduced to objective and countable needs is politically problematic. As Wolfers (1952: 491-92;) first postulated: states vary widely in the value they place on security while some of them may be so dissatisfied with the status quo that they are more interested in acquiring new values than in securing the values they already have. On account of these theoretical loopholes, we infer that although the realist thought has provided us with an intellectual insight into the overpowering effect of security in the bilateral relations, this concept is not as straightforward as it appears in their analyses. Therefore, we might lose a great deal when we squeeze the actor’s behavior
into the universalist and abstract categories that the realist thought provides (Jervis 1988: 344).

**The contribution of constructivism and the concept of securitization**

This is where the school of constructivism steps in. For constructivists, answers to these questions are different depending on the context and evolve through social interaction between the disputants. Specifically, constructivists treat security as a context-specific social construction. Instead of developing abstract definitions of security, constructivists and especially the Copenhagen School (CS), have focused on how security itself is given meaning through the inter-subjective processes that unfold between the disputants in geographically and historically specified contexts.

What animates the CS is the concept of ‘securitization’ that refers to the discursive construction of threat (Buzan et al 1998). More concretely, securitization may be identified as a process in which an actor assigns the label of an existential threat to a particular issue, dynamic or actor. The invocation of security opens the window for the political leader to mobilize special powers in order to handle existential threats (ibid: 21). Therefore, the meaning of security is not located in a philosophical and abstract universe, but lies in its very usage by the authorized political leaders.

The way to study securitization is to study discourse constellations. In security discourse, a topic is dramatized and presented by the political leaders as a topic of supreme priority. Hence, by framing an issue as security, a political leader claims a need for and a right to treat it even by extraordinary means.

Despite its subjective character, in order to adroitly direct the audience’s attention towards an event- construed as dangerous, the words of the leader need to resonate with the framework within which his reactions are collocated. This means, that the security statements of a political leader, aiming to win an audience must be associated with an existing external reality, for instance an evidently aggressive course of action performed by the opponent (Balzaq 2005: 182). This action must be perceived by the public as an action that violates the sovereignty and/or the resources of the state entity.
**General observations on energy security**

A field that could easily become subject to “securitization” is energy. The drive to control oil and natural resources is frequently said to be a cause of wars between states and within states. Energy trends and international politics are innately interconnected and energy security is an integral part of the foreign and national security policies of states. A country’s ability to access energy supplies and the ways in which it uses energy determine the state of its national security (Shaffer 2009). Rooted in the industrialization of the society, the very notion of energy security has traditionally been identified as the “safety and source diversification of energy fuels and services” (Sovacool & Brown 2009: 7).

Nevertheless, the meaning of energy fuels and services has been contingent upon content perspective. For most of the 20th century, public security concerns were almost exclusively concentrated on oil and coal supply. World War I and World War II had starkly highlighted the prominence of oil and coal in high politics (Yergin 2009: 773). Some decades later, these concerns had reached their peak during the 1970s when Western society, almost in its entirety, struggled to overcome the economically disastrous implications of the 1973-74 and 1979-80 oil crises. The shortages and spiking prices that resulted from the embargoes functioned as a critical juncture for many European countries to change their then dominant path of energy dependence by diversifying their resources away from Middle East oil.

**Natural gas at the forefront**

These oil crises expanded the nation-state laden and traditional concept of energy security to cover energy sources other than oil. The reason is that new natural gas discoveries and rising demand have shifted gas from a cluster of regional markets into a global marketplace (Gloystein 21.11.2012). Natural gas is currently the third most important energy source, after oil and coal, and is rapidly gaining prominence in global energy markets. Attributed to its relatively clean and efficient combustion, natural gas is emerging as the fuel of choice for a wide array of uses, like the generation of electric power (Barnes J. et al 2006: 1).

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1 With the nationalization of much of the Middle East’s oil industries, the oil embargoes triggered inflation in many OECD countries and ultimately resulted into economic recessions, substantial losses of GDP and high unemployment (Yergin 1988).
As a traded good, natural gas is supplied with permanent infrastructure and long-term supply arrangements, like pipelines and LNG infrastructures. These infrastructures are extremely costly to build and require long-run horizons as well as a predictable geopolitical and economic context for investors to “sink their capital and knowledge” (Barnes et al 2006: 3). The required long-term supply relationships and the permanent infrastructure offer a window of much greater opportunity for (geo)politics to come into play (Shaffer 2013: 114-115). Due to the state-regulated sphere, within which the gas market is operating (ibid.), governments are urged to play a larger role in the natural gas trade. Infrastructure projects link states and mirror the geopolitical relations among them. Thus, states in choosing routes to export their commodities and import their energy supplies naturally consider and promote their political ramifications of various route options (ibid.). Decisions on natural gas export projects are especially likely to be affected by political considerations because they can be quite risky otherwise (Shaffer 2009: 2).

**Operationalizing “securitization” of natural gas in the Cyprus conflict**

We observed above that the concept of energy security is not as straightforward as it might appear in various analyses. How it is conveyed is context dependent and springs from patterns of the anarchic international politics (Ciuta 2010: 130). What begs the question is how we narrow down the concept of energy security and comprehend it in the imbroglio of the Cypriot realities? Making use of the definitions of APERC (2007) and Kruyt et al (2009: 2168), this article treats the concept of energy security as the embodiment of two main indicators, two A’s:

a. the *availability* of gas reserves in the region, which, in general, pertains to the classical notion of geological or physical availability of hydrocarbon resources in the region. The indicator here is the exploration context. By exploration context, we mean here the amount of gas reserves, reported, estimated and/or discovered offshore the RoC.

b. the *accessibility* that signifies the political and economic “barriers” to ensure that energy supplies remain accessible (APERC 2007: 19). Energy security largely pertains to this indicator, since a depletion of energy reserves has seen countries struggle to maintain

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2 Liquefied Natural Gas
3 It should be stressed that large uncertainties surround the amounts of hydrocarbon resources and their extraction potential. Few studies provide estimates of fossil fuel resources and the most significant one is that of the US Geological Survey.
steady and accessible energy services. Factors that influence accessibility include the relations between the surrounding countries, especially when they are disputing over the “availability” of the resources. In order to understand how this indicator works in the current study, light will be cast upon the:

i. Legal context: we sketch out here the application of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in the Eastern Mediterranean, with special reference to the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey. Setting out the legal framework is instrumental in comprehending the legal positions and constraints within which the “securitization discourses” of the disputants evolve.

ii. Historical context: the paper will lay out the historical background that has shaped the relations between the contending parties. The challenge here is to identify and document if and how the lexicon of the protracted Cyprus conflict encourages modulations and transpositions in the meanings that the authorized political leaders assign to energy security.

Methodology and Data: securitization of natural gas discoveries through the statements of the political leaders

Data
To identify the securitization of the gas discoveries around the island, the current paper resorts, first of all, to the statements that the leaders in Cyprus delivered during the period of the tensions. It was in October 2014 when the President of RoC decided to pull out of the re-unification negotiations, after the Turkish seismic vessel Barbaros illegally entered RoC’s EEZ. Security issues, particularly energy security issues came to the spotlight. It is interesting to observe how the political leaders articulated their security concerns vis-à-vis each other through the statements delivered at that time (Table 1).

Why do we pay attention to these figures? Irrespective of whether these leaders activate their constituencies, they engage in opinion-making behavior. As Rosenau (1963: 6) underlines, national opinion-makers are considered to be those members of every society who occupy positions which enable them to transmit, with some regularity, opinions about national security issues to their constituencies and to point to what is at stake.
Why do we explicitly concentrate on the above-mentioned periods? People experience tensions, like the ones in October 2014, as episodes of threat and uncertainty. They face them as a grave predicament requiring urgent action (Rosenthal et al 2001). It is a natural inclination in such distress to look to their political leaders to step up and communicate a message or a narrative that explains what is at stake, who is the threat and why. The perceptive quality of these tensions is what we want to bring into scrutiny during these kinds of periods by documenting the phraseology that the leaders adopt. Within this timeframe of tensions we seek to identify and highlight “existential language as an indicator of securitization through the suggestion of a sense of urgency and prioritization” (Fischhendler & Nathan 2014: 155).

### Table 1: Statements of political leaders in October 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>President of the RoC</th>
<th>Turkish Cypriot Leader- Dervis Eroglu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3/10/2014</td>
<td>Statement (according to Turkish Cypriot Bayrak Television Channel)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/10/2014</td>
<td>Response Letter to Eroglu (Press and Information Office-PIO)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interview with Turkish Cypriot Newspaper Diyalog</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8/10/2014</td>
<td>Letter to the UN Secretary General</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10/10/2014</td>
<td>Statement (according to Turkish Cypriot Bayrak Television Channel)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/10/2014</td>
<td>Statement (according to Turkish Cypriot Star Kibris Newspaper)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>14/10/2014</td>
<td>Statement (according to Turkish Cypriot Guunes Newspaper)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/10/2014</td>
<td>Statement (according to Turkish Cypriot Newspaper Kibris)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/10/2014</td>
<td>Statement (according to Turkish Cypriot Bayrak Television Channel)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/10/2014</td>
<td>Letter to the UN Secretary General</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/10/2014</td>
<td>Statement during a meeting with union of veteran fighters (according to Turkish Cypriot newspaper Vatan)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/10/2014</td>
<td>Statement (according to Turkish Cypriot daily newspaper Kibris)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/10/2014</td>
<td>Statement on the occasion of a meeting in Istanbul</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>30/10/2014</td>
<td>Statement on the occasion of the 91st anniversary of the establishment of the Republic of Turkey</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Author
Discourse analysis

By examining the “securitization” procedure or otherwise the “discursive construction of threat”, this project will resort to discourse analysis in order to generate the categories of meaning (George 1994: 29) by which energy security in the Eastern Mediterranean can be understood and explained. Discourses refer to communication practices that systematically construct our knowledge of reality. A discourse “embodies a shared set of capabilities which enable the assemblage of words, phrases and sentences into meaningful texts intelligible to the readers” (Dryzek 1988: 710). By critically reflecting upon these statements, we seek to map out what “truths” on energy security issues these documents establish.

We document expressions centered on blame games, threats and referent object (the gas discoveries). The specific words and phrases will explain how and why the one side portrays the other as a danger to its security. We aspire to understand how securitization unfolds within these speeches, and what historical as well as legal dynamics underlie the leaders’ energy security discourses. More particularly we highlight two variables within specific sentences of the statements. The first, the dependent one, is composed of key words and phrases that unveil the articulations of the leaders’ energy security concerns (who is the threat, what is at stake). The second, the independent one, is prognosticative of the legalistic argumentation and consists of references to the experiences of the past. The independent variable, which refers to the legal and historical context of the accessibility pillar, will be analyzed in the following sections.

The securitization discourses by the President of the Republic of Cyprus: Turkish drilling activities as a reason for the negotiations to collapse

The most significant document at our disposal, signifying the securitization procedure on behalf of the Greek-Cypriot side, is the protest letter that President Anastasiades sent UN Secretary-General Bank Ki-moon in October 6, 2014 (Christou 21.10.2014). In this letter, he demonstrated his decision to pull out of the then-running negotiations. Turkish activities (of the seismic vessels) were recalled as the reason for his withdrawal and portrayed as the main threat torpedoing any possibility for the re-unification of the island.
His very words were that Turkish actions “strike a heavy blow against the negotiations for the settlement of the Cyprus problem”. He claimed that the Turkish encroachment on the island’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) has been articulated as a determinant factor, which had brought the negotiations into collapse. Pointing a finger to the Turkish side, he stated that their activities “destroy the efforts of creating a good and positive environment and actually derail the whole negotiating process”. “The increasingly aggressive nature of Turkey’s actions in areas in the eastern Mediterranean under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Cyprus” was one of the key phrases in his statement. He added that “negotiating under constant threat and blackmail that undermine all efforts to create the good environment necessary for a successful outcome of the negotiations for the settlement of the Cyprus problem is not just counterproductive. “It also has a negative effect on public opinion,” he noted in the letter.

In order to further highlight the portrayal of Turkish actions as a threat, he used the adjective “provocative” characterizing “Turkey’s decision to reserve areas, including parts of Cyprus EEZ for seismic surveys”. He adopted the same adjective to claim that these Turkish activities “had been the culmination of a continued provocative policy of disputing and interfering with the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus in its exclusive economic zone”. In this context he described that “this provocative policy included, apart from continued verbal threats and rhetoric, the harassment of vessels performing lawful activities authorized by the government of the Republic of Cyprus, by Turkish warships and military aircraft, and unlawful seismic surveys within the western exclusive economic zone of Cyprus by Turkish vessels”.

While the security discourses have been set forth above (the dependent variable), special attention will be paid to the last words of the last sentence. In this sentence, we realize how the legal pillar of energy security, one aspect of the independent variable comes into play amid the securitization procedure. Additionally, he stressed that Cyprus’ EEZ was delineated in 2004 in accordance with international law.

On Tuesday 7.10.2014, Anastasiades delivered a statement confirming his decision to suspend his participation in the UN-led re-unification talks. He justified his withdrawal, among other reasons, in the positions expressed by the Turkish Cypriot Leader, Dervis Eroglu (that will be underlined later). In this statement, the blame is not solely laid on
Turkey, as before, but also on the Turkish-Cypriots. While pointing a finger, he questioned whether the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot actions served any pre-electoral objectives\(^4\) or any other expediency. He added that the Turkish activities, which blatantly violated the sovereign rights of the RoC (legal pillar as the independent variable), underrated any potential benefits that the country would gain from a solution of the Cyprus question and torpedoed the efforts to find a just, viable and functional solution for the benefit of all the Cypriot people.

Two days later,\(^5\) Anastasiades expressed his hope that the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey would redress “the recent provocations and undertake the necessary practical and substantial steps towards this end”. Furthermore, he acknowledged “that although the Cyprus problem has been decisively shaped by a number of external factors, we, the Cypriots, have also committed mistakes”, adding that “we must have the courage to admit that we have failed to adequately address the challenges posed by the growing tensions that infiltrated the two communities and resulted in a deterioration of inter-communal bonding”.

The last statement of Anastasiades deviates content-wise (not significantly though) from the previous ones. He used the term “Cypriot” to connote common characteristics that the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots share while potentially portraying Turkey as an “external factor”\(^6\). In any case, the reference to the history that connects and divides the grassroots constituencies on the island reflects a statement, wherein history, as an independent variable, comes into play in the securitization procedure.

**The securitization discourses by the Turkish Cypriot leader: “Greek Cypriots are responsible for the current impasse”**

Turkish Cypriot leader, Dervis Eroglu, in his turn, was pointing fingers at the Greek Cypriot counterpart for the stalemate of the re-unification talks. He stated that “Anastasiades has left the talks in order to escape from a unified solution” (KP Daily News 7.10.2014). He portrayed the Greek Cypriots as being the problem since they are the ones “embracing diversion tactics to withdraw from the talks.” Besides this, he strongly advocated the presence of the Turkish vessel in the region: “it is not right to expect the

\(^4\) It was not clear during that moment whether Eroglu would run for the upcoming elections in the Turkish Cypriot part of the island.

\(^5\) On the occasion of an event at the English School during the celebration of the 54th anniversary of Cyprus’ independence http://www.parikiaki.com/2014/10/cyprus-hopes-that-turkey-will-redress-its-provocations/#sthash.XS45WRJm.dpuf

\(^6\) This term can be attributed to other countries, given the geopolitical complexity of the Cyprus question.
Turkish Cypriots to abandon their rights and for Turkey to stop activities that work on the benefit and the protection of the Turkish Cypriots, while the attitude of south Cyprus is not cooperative” (ibid.)

In another interview he (again) held the Greek-Cypriots accountable for the current tensions by stating that “President Nicos Anastasiades finds himself in the delusion that southern Cypriots are the only sovereign owners of Cyprus”. He portrayed the Greek Cypriots as being the threat to Turkish Cypriots justifying his opinion in the performance of search-rescue activities carried out by Israel and Russia in the East Mediterranean (in cooperation with the Greek-Cypriots), and the tension and diplomatic initiatives taken by the Greek Cypriots, who, according to his view, would like to use their diplomatic leverage to impose their will on the Turkish Cypriots.”

He said “in the negotiations with south Cyprus we have come to an agreement, according to which the natural resources and petrol in the seas will belong mutually to the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots, that the usage of these will be left to the authority of a federal state and that the agreements regarding the management will pass through the parliament with a qualified majority vote, which means that the Turkish side will have a right” (KP Daily News 14.10.2014). He characterized “the south Cyprus’ one sided sovereignty claims as a signal of their insincerity. Stressing the legal pillar of the energy security discourses, he claimed that, in alignment with the principles of the Sea Laws, “in half closed seas such as the Eastern Mediterranean, the boundaries of the sea areas can only be determined when the bordering states agree upon the delimitation of the sea management areas”. He evoked again the legal pillar by saying that, “south Cyprus does not have such an agreement with Turkey or with the Turkish Cypriots”. Due to this lack of agreement the Greek Cypriot cannot raise any claims with respect to the “illegality” of the Turkish-Turkish Cypriot agreements. He also underlined that these agreements have emerged as an outcome of Greek Cypriots’ reluctance to come to terms either with them or Turkey. On these grounds he justified his decision to pass the management of the natural resources on to Turkey Petrol Anon Partnership (ibid).

**Explaining the pillars of “energy security” in the Cyprus Question**
The previous part set forth the energy “securitization discourses” of the disputants. It depicted how the leaders have articulated the recent gas discoveries as a security issue, how they
portrayed the threats and stressed what is at stake. This part concentrates on these indicators that have potentially contributed to these modulations of energy security. As stressed above, these indicators are to be found in the notion of energy security as the embodiment of the two pillars: availability and accessibility. Due to the content and context dependent character of energy security, we need to know how these indicators are operationalized in the context of the Cypriot realities.

**The availability pillar of energy security: the exploratory context**

This section sheds light on the availability indicator that is embodied in the notion of energy security. More particularly, this part focuses on the documented and estimated amount of gas reserves in the region that surrounds the island of Cyprus, the Eastern Mediterranean. Until the past decade, much of the hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean went undiscovered because the resources lie in very deep waters (known in the industry as “ultra-deep-water”), with depths exceeding 2 km (1.24 miles) in some locations (Gurel et al. 2013: 1). This made it technically difficult, risky and expensive to carry out drilling activities in the area. Nevertheless, technological advances, accompanied by high international oil prices, which tended to encourage oil and gas companies to invest in these activities, prompted new exploration initiatives at the dawn of the 21st century. Employing a geology assessment methodology, the U.S Geological Survey in March 2010 estimated a mean of 122 trillion cubic feet of recoverable gas in the Levant Basin Province. The Levant Basin is located along and off the coast of Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and the Gaza Strip, extending westward into Cypriot waters (see Picture 1). The basin comprises a total sea and land area of 32,000 square miles, most of which is offshore and bounded by three distinct subsea features:

a) the Tartus Fault to the north
b) the Erosthenes Mount to the West
c) the Nile Delta to the south

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7 It should be noted that in the oil and gas industry, the USGS reports are considered merely indicative and are not taken as a reliable indicator of expected volumes. The outcomes of further exploration efforts are a prerequisite to estimate with greater accuracy the extent of oil and gas volumes in the region. See Shaffer B. (June 2012) “Energy Resources and Markets in the Eastern Mediterranean Region” GMF Policy Brief
By global standards, the Levant Basin’s gas resources are significant but not predominant. Russia for example, holds the world’s largest natural gas reserves at 1,680 tcf, accounting for about 25% of global gas reserves. By Mediterranean standards, the Levant Basin’s offshore natural gas reserves are sizeable, but they are less than the gas resources held by key North African producers, like Algeria (Paraschos 2013).

In the early 2000s, the government of the Republic of Cyprus had hired the Norwegian company PGS to perform a preliminary assessment of Cyprus’s hydrocarbons potential through seismic surveys. These kinds of surveys would contribute to determine whether it would be worth performing much more costly exploratory drilling (Giamourides 2013). PGS’s research outcomes proved favorable to this direction. In 2006 the Republic of Cyprus began prospecting for hydrocarbons in an exploration area of 51,000 sq km offshore the island (Gurel et al 2013: 3). Having proclaimed their EEZ, RoC (a topic that we will touch upon below) divided its exploration area into 13 blocks, as illustrated in Map 1.
Map 1: The RoC's present offshore exploration area along with its proximity in the south-east to the gas fields discovered by Israel

Source: Petroleum Gas Geo-Services (PGS), cited in Gurel et al 2013, p. 4

In February 2007 and relying on the available seismic data, the RoC initiated its first international tender for three-year gas exploration licenses offering 11 out of 13 blocks (3 and 13 were excluded). Nevertheless, only three small to medium-sized companies made bids. Larger international companies, due to their access to more attractive opportunities around the world, did not manifest any interest in the Cypriot hydrocarbons. As an outcome, the government of Cyprus awarded only one license in October 2008 to Noble Energy that had already been operating offshore Israel. After multiple seismic surveys, the first exploratory drilling unfolded in Block 12 in September 2011. Two months later, the company indicated a 5-8 tcf natural gas deposit in deep waters of about 1,700 meters (Ashurst 2012). This range of estimates seems too broad to confirm the commercial viability of the field. However, this discovery, in alignment with large findings in the Israeli Leviathan block, triggered a significant interest for the second Cyprus offshore licensing round that started in February 2012 with the participation of 15 bidders, including International Oil Companies⁸, upstream independents, natural gas buyers, as well as gas and LNG traders. Licenses were awarded for five offshore blocks out of twelve on offer. The Italian ENI and Korean Kogas are drilling in Blocks 2, 3 and 9 of Cyprus’ EEZ since the third quarter of 2014, followed by Total expected to drill in Blocks 10 and 11 of Cyprus’ EEZ in 2015.

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⁸ The most significant ones were: Total of France, ENI of Italy, Gazprombank of Russia, Petronas of Malaysia and Kogas of South Korea, cited in Gurel et al (2013); 4
The legal context as an accessibility pillar of energy security

The aim of this section is to explain how the legal framework of availability indicator comes into play within the securitization procedure of the natural gas reserves. We outline the “official rules of the game” by which the state-protagonists in the current tensions are supposed to abide, in order to grasp an understanding of the legal context within which the “security discourses” are unfolding.

There is a well-developed body of international law governing maritime boundaries and rights to undersea resources. The basic rules are set out in the 1982 UNCLOS with arbitration and judicial facilities available to resolve disputes, notably through the ICJ and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). As of January 2015, 166 countries and the European Union have joined the Convention. The four states that voted against its adoption back in 1982, and are not still parties to it, are Israel, Turkey, USA and Venezuela. It should be underlined, though, that certain provisions of UNCLOS III have acquired customary international law status.

UNCLOS III divides the marine space that is within the limits of national jurisdiction into several zones.

a. the territorial sea (up to 12nm from the baselines\(^9\))

b. the contiguous zone (up to an additional 12nm)

c. the EEZ (up to 200nm)

d. the continental shelf (up to 200nm or 350 nm under certain conditions).

Part five of that convention, more precisely Articles 55 to 75, entitles coastal states to an EEZ of up to 200 nautical miles. In accordance with Article 56, these rights confer to the purpose of “exploring, conserving, and managing living and nonliving resources of both the waters and the seabed and subsoil”. The rules in question apply to all oceans and seas, including enclosed or semi-enclosed, such as the Mediterranean or parts of it. In this kind of sea, issues of maritime boundaries between states with opposite or adjacent coasts are likely to unfold for various reasons, ranging from the geographical peculiarities of the coastlines in question to the poor political relationship between the states concerned (Scovazzi 2012: 4-5).

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\(^9\) UNCLOS III Art. 5 “Except where otherwise provided in this Convention, the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State”.

In 1988 the RoC ratified UNCLOS. The RoC delimited its EEZ in the south-western, southern and south-eastern direction through separate bilateral agreements, respectively with Egypt, Lebanon (that are contributing parts of the UNCLOS) and Israel (that has not become a contributing part of the UNCLOS). All three agreements contain more or less identical provisions, and according to all of them, boundaries are delineated in the spirit of the median line principle (Gurel et al 2013: 26).

On February 2003, RoC and Egypt signed in Cairo an Agreement on the Delimitation of the EEZ. The coastlines of the parties are opposed and located quite far away one from each other (Scovazzi 2012:6). The parties clearly stated in the agreement that the delimitation “is effected by the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest point of the base line of the two parties” (Article 1, para a). In 2007, RoC made a similar agreement with Lebanon (Karyotis 2011; Scovazzi 2012: 7). The agreement, not ratified yet by the Lebanese parliament, and relating to the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea, delimits most of the EEZ between the opposite coasts of Cyprus and Lebanon. Finally, in December 2010, RoC and Israel signed a bilateral agreement delimiting the EEZ between them. The distance from Israel to RoC is 230 nm and both parties had to adopt the median line method, meaning that each side would use 115 nm of EEZ (Scovazzi 2012: 7).

From the very beginning, Turkey had manifested its opposition to these agreements. First of all, Turkey, together with Turkish Cypriots, does not recognize the existence of the Republic of Cyprus and the international community’s perception of the present political
status quo in Cyprus (the historical section will explain why). They believe that Greek Cypriots cannot legitimately represent the RoC as a whole, as this contradicts the 1960 Treaties. Based on this, they fiercely object to all relative actions performed by the RoC relating to EEZ and offshore hydrocarbons development (Gurel & Le Cornu 2014: 18). They argue that any unilateral Greek Cypriot action in this field, before a settlement, does not only ignore the legitimate rights of Turkish Cypriots, but also establishes a *fait accompli* that prejudices the terms of a prospective settlement on sovereignty issues to the disadvantage of the Turkish Cypriots (ibid.). Addressing these objections, the Greek Cypriots, being in charge of the internationally recognized RoC government, claim that, as a contributing part of the UNCLOS, have the “inalienable and non-negotiable” right to explore for and exploit the natural resources in their EEZ. They underline that this right is non-conditional upon a settlement and should not be considered as a bi-communal issue to be put on the negotiation table for the unification talks. It should be stressed though, that Greek Cypriots, in alignment with the opinion held by the international community, accept that the management of the island’s natural resources should be for the benefit of all the original residents of the island.

To understand the second reason why Turkey and Turkish Cypriots hold this negative standing vis-à-vis the above mentioned agreements, one must go back to the year 1982. Although Turkey participated in the UNCLOS negotiations, Turkey has not signed either ratified UNCLOS, primarily because of its dispute with Greece over maritime boundaries it has unilaterally raised in the Aegean Sea. Turkey is not a party to UNCLOS. The Turkish perspective is that certain provisions of UNCLOS10, with special reference to Articles 3, 33, and 121 of the Treaty, puts vital interests of Turkey in the Aegean into jeopardy.

Utilizing the customary character of the international sea law, Turkey applies a territorial sea law that in general, delineates the breadth of its territorial sea at 6 NM (Gurel et al 2013: 31). Nevertheless, this delimitation is conditioned on a proviso authorization by the Council of Ministers (CoM) ‘to establish the breadth of the territorial sea, in certain seas, up to a limit exceeding six nautical miles, under reservation to take into account all special

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10 Which do not fall under the scope of the current project despite their relative importance
circumstances and relevant situations therein, and in conformity with the equity principle\textsuperscript{11} (ibid.). For the time being, Turkey applies a 6 NM limit to the territorial sea in the Aegean Sea while the limit in the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea is 12 NM, as provisioned in a CoM decree (ibid)\textsuperscript{12}. Turkey has no continental shelf- or EEZ-related legislation. A CoM decree established the Turkish EEZ in the Black Sea at 200 NM (ibid.) but no EEZ proclamation exists.

As a reaction to the commencement of exploratory drilling authorized by the RoC government off the island’s southern coast, and aiming at restoring the “balance of powers” in the region, on 21 September 2011 the Turkish Cypriots signed a continental shelf delimitation agreement with Turkey. The contributing parts drew a boundary line between the northern coast of Cyprus and the southern coast of Turkey in the Mediterranean seas. In doing so, Turkish Cypriots issued licenses to TPAO\textsuperscript{13} to conduct three-dimensional seismic research along with onshore and offshore drilling around maritime borders between the northern part of the island and Turkey.

**The historical context as an accessibility pillar of energy security**

This sub-part addresses the second parameter of the accessibility pillar, the historical context. Rather than treating history as a dead subject, irrelevant of the current energy tensions, we should conceive it as a living process, as a continuous path dependence, that links developments throughout decades and encourages us to concentrate on such linkages and their influence in the securitization procedure of the current events.

**Geography**

Throughout recorded time, the political experience in the island has reflected the interlocking impact of two utterly basic geographic factors: size and location (James 2002:3). The total area of the island is 9.251 square kilometers, 10 square kilometers of

\textsuperscript{12} Decree No. 8/4742, http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/TUR.htm. This decree preserved the erstwhile limits in the Mediterranean and Black Seas which applied in accordance with a previous law and were determined on the basis of ‘reciprocity’  
\textsuperscript{13} Turkish Petroleum Corporation
which is covered by water and the rest by land. It measures 149 miles latitudinally and 62 miles longitudinally. Its coastline amounts to 648 kilometers (CIA World Factbook). With respect to its demographic status and according to the last census, the Greek Cypriots form around 77% of the population, Turkish Cypriots more than 18% (CIA World Factbook) and other ethnic or religious groups (mainly Maronites, Latin Catholics, Armenians and the non-officially recognized Gypsies and others) the remaining 5%.

Concerning the second factor, Cyprus possesses a central position in global politics since it is located at the juncture of Eurasia with Africa. Turkey is the closest neighbor at 50 miles north of the island, while Syria and Lebanon are approximately 70 miles to its eastern side. Other neighboring territories include Egypt in the south (240 miles) and Israel to the southeast (124 miles). In the westward direction, the nearest Greek Dodecanesian island, Castellorizo is 170 miles away while its distance from the Greek mainland is close to 500 miles. The island’s main natural resources (besides hydrocarbons) are copper, pyrites, asbestos, gypsum, timber, salt, marble and clay earth pigment (CIA World Factbook).

From antiquity to the British administration

This place has witnessed the invasion, the establishment and the interaction of all the ancient civilizations of pre-history and proto-history projecting it into a “crossroad of civilizations”. Hellenic tribes (Arcadians, Achaeans and Mycenaeans -the latter arrived at the island during the middle Bronze Age, meaning 2000 BC- 1950 BC) - settled in Cyprus contributing to the formulation of the Hellenic character of the island. Phoenicians, Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, Macedonians (Epigones of Alexander the Great’s legacy, the Ptolemaic dynasty), Romans, Eastern Romans (contributing to the Hellenic Orthodox character of the island’s spiritual and cultural identity), Venetians and Ottomans had also settled on the island in the past. Between 1571 and 1878 the Ottoman Empire ruled over Cyprus, playing a crucial role in the formulation of the Turkish Cypriot identity. During the dawn of the 19th century Greek Cypriots constituted more than 80% of the total population.

From the beginning of the British Administration to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus

14 Without including the Turkish settlers whose case will be briefly depicted below in this section
In 1878 the Ottoman rule over Cyprus came to a substantial (but not official) end. The Sultan Abdul Hamit II, at the culmination of the Great Eastern Crisis and under the fear of an eventual Russian expansion into his territories decided to assign the administration of the island to the British as an exchange for formal guarantees to protect the integrity of the Ottoman borders from any Russian expansionism. According to Article VI of the Annex to the secretly signed Cyprus Convention in the context of the 1878 Berlin Congress, England was supposed to return Cyprus to the Ottoman Empire in case Russians had restored their territorial possessions in the Ottoman Empire. England was exercising de facto and the Ottomans de jure sovereignty over Cyprus. In 1914 the British annexed the territory justifying their action in the outbreak of the First World War and the Ottomans’ decision to align their forces with the opponents of the British during that time, the Central Powers. In 1923 they ratified the de jure annexation of Cyprus, through the Lausanne Treaty that was officially terminating the Greek-Turkish war of that time. In 1925 Cyprus was proclaimed a Crown Colony and Greek Cypriots envisaged in this evolution the potential “outlet” for the realization of their aspirations for enosis, meaning the self-determination and unification of the island with Greece. In 1931 these aspirations boiled over with a spontaneous rebellion against the British rule, leaving Government House in flames (Anderson 2008). As a response, the British administration suspended the colony’s constitution and decreed any agitations related to enosis punishable.

The enosis challenge to British authority got more intense in the aftermath of World War II. Under the aegis of Michael Mouskos-elected bishop of Kition in 1948 and archbishop Makarios III (since 1950)-the Church in 1949 mobilized mass popular support for enosis in a 'plebiscite' that was conducted in churches throughout the island in January 1950. 96% of the participants supported the union with Greece. On the other side, Turkish Cypriot separatism had never assumed any significant form till 1950s, when KATAK15, the Association of the Turkish Minority of the Island of Cyprus, established in 1943, came to embrace partition, taksim, as the main goal of the Turkish Cypriot nationalism in contrast to the Greek-Cypriot claim for enosis. Greece, under the leadership of Prime Minister Papagos (ex-field marshal), sought unsuccessfully to project the Cyprus question into the agenda of the 9th session of the General Assembly in the UN. Great Britain unveiled its concerns that a potential internationalization of the issue by the Greeks, without first

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15 The initials stand for Kıbrıs Adaı; Türk Azınlık Kurumu
informing the Turkish government, would flare up the Turkish fears that Greece was making a territorial claim for the island. This gave the British an ally in the UN (Turkey) on the one side and raised the claims for self-determination from the Turkish side on the other. As a result, the Turkish involvement in the Cypriot state of affairs revitalized the above-mentioned Turkish Cypriot nationalistic sentiments for *taksim*.

In 1955 an outbreak of anti-British military activities under the banner of EOKA, the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters, took place urging the search for a self-rule scheme with respect to the administration and sovereignty of the island. Under this pressure, Great Britain initiated a Tripartite Conference in London for the island’s political future but no solution was reached. It remained, however, significant since it has marked the beginning of the active participation of Turkey in the Cyprus question (Blay 1981: 80). Gradually the concept of double self-determination (*enosis* for Greece and *taksim* for Turkey) was gaining momentum as an option for the future of the island. Turkey adopted this idea and established partition as the cornerstone of its Cyprus policy for almost five decades. Greece and Turkey, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots became the main actors in the dispute while Britain assumed the role of an arbiter among them. The inter-communal relationship was mainly captured by mutual antagonism and resulted in occasional violent incidents. In November 1959 the Labor party initiated preliminary negotiations between Greece and Turkey aiming to resolve the Cyprus question. The main features of a settlement on this issue and agreed upon by the main actors (Greece, Turkey and Great Britain) rested on three pillars: the Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus, according to which the island would gain its independence, the Treaty of Guarantee, according to which three guarantor powers (Greece, Turkey and UK) would defend *la raison d’être* (excluding *enosis* and *taksim* as future options) and the Treaty of Alliance according to which the parties would take over the obligation to resist any attack or aggression against the independence of the state.

*The birth of the Republic of Cyprus and the 1974 developments*

With the London Agreement in 1960 the Republic of Cyprus came into existence. Nevertheless, the multiple checks and balances, provisioned in the Treaties, inhibited the functional operation of the constitution. The amendments proposed by the President

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16 The initials stand for Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston
Archbishop Makarios III faced the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot vetoes. This resulted in a constitutional deadlock situation, which led in its turn to the paralysis of the state. These disagreements lit the spark for widespread inter-communal violence, as a result of a quarrel that broke out in December of 1963 between a Greek Cypriot policeman and a Turkish Cypriot citizen that ended to the death of two Turkish Cypriots. British troops intervened, establishing the buffer zone, which is marked by a 'green line' between the opposing groups and then paved the way to the UN peacekeeping mission in 1964.

The political developments in Greece - the establishment of the military junta in 1967 and the inter-communal tensions in November 1967 (with the bombing of villages and forces in both sides) - brought the talks to the breaking point. In May 1968 the dialogue was resumed again and negotiations took place for almost six years but were terminated on 15 July 1974. A coup d’état attempt against Macharios III, supported by the then Greek military dictatorship, was followed by the Turkish invasion which altered the demographic structure of Cyprus and resulted to a massive social dislocation. Turkish forces occupied 37% of the island, including the towns of Famagusta, Kyrenia and Morphou and an important proportion of the agricultural land. Approximately 3,500 people were killed during the coup and invasion. The location of the bodies of almost 2,000 missing people (mostly from the Greek Cypriot side) is still under investigation. 180,000 Greek-Cypriots were obliged to flow to the south, relinquishing their homes and properties, whereas approximately 65,000 Turkish-Cypriots did subsequently move north and took their place (Souter 1984: 660). In the aftermath, Turkey established a presence of 35,000 Turkish occupation troops on the island.

Furthermore, the Turkish authorities, seeking to further alter the demographic status of the island and enhance the Turkish element in the Northern side, were continuously moving settlers from the Turkish mainland to the northern territories of the island. The number of the settlers, thus residing in the island, is disputed while a significant number of Turkish Cypriots were emigrating from the island. These policies have been continuously condemned by the international community as violating international human rights’ provisions.

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17 This can be confirmed by reports circulated in both the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot press.
From 1974 until today

In the light of these events, the Security Council immediately reacted and passed a resolution calling for a ceasefire, an immediate termination of the foreign military intervention and the withdrawal of all the forces besides those whose presence was authorized by the Treaties’ provisions. Amid negotiations between the primary stakeholders, a second wave of a Turkish invasion was launched consolidating the Turkish military presence on the island. The Security Council passed several resolutions calling Turkey to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and the independence of Cyprus Republic. The UN established ceasefire lines and a buffer zone between the areas controlled by the opposing forces. The difficulties in reaching a peaceful settlement became greater when on 15.11.1983 the Turkish Cypriot administration in the North unilaterally declared its independence and only gained recognition from the Turkish Republic. The condemnation by the international community was manifested in the Resolution 541 of the UN SC (1983) that clearly stated that the unilateral independence declaration had no legal grounds and should be withdrawn. Since this condemnation has not been echoed by both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, the island remains divided through a “green-line” between the southern part (Republic of Cyprus) on the one side – being recognized by all members-states of the UN, except for Turkey- and the northern part, ruled by the Turkish Cypriots, whose entity has not been legally recognized by any UN member state, besides Turkey.

Continuous efforts initiated by the international community to bring about a solution were fruitless, mainly attributed to the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot intransigence to conform their policies to UN SC resolutions. One of the milestones of these efforts was noted in 2004 when the UN came up with the decision to put the Annan Plan\textsuperscript{18} to referendum. Nevertheless, 76% of the Greek Cypriots rejected the plan while 65% of the Turkish Cypriots side favored the plan. In the aftermath, the negotiations conducted between the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Christofias and the Turkish Cypriot leaders Mehmet

\textsuperscript{18} The Annan Plan was conveying the establishment of the United Cyprus Republic covering the entire territory of the island with the exception of the British Sovereign Base Areas. It would constitute a bi-zonal and bi-communal federal republic with federal and constitutional laws. A national anthem and a new national flag were also depicted. There would be a single common state that would be formed by two component states-federal units (the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot) which would hold a political equality. Under the plan, some 8% of the land would be returned to the Greek-Cypriots, diminishing the Turkish-Cypriot share from 37% to 29%.
Talat (2008-2010) and Eroglu (2010-2012) led to the drafting of common positions or joint declarations but no evident progress was to be noted.

In February 2014, Nikos Anastasiades, the President of the Republic of Cyprus and Dervis Eroglu, the Turkish-Cypriot leader, signed a Joint Declaration that laid out certain “ground-rules” upon which the then stalled peace talks -aiming at the island’s reunification- could be revived. The perspective to cooperate on the exploitation of the natural gas reserves (analyzed below), detected off the southern side of the island was considered by the international community (UN, EU) as a carrot or “window of opportunity” to reach a settlement. However, as shown below, these reserves added extra chill to the Cypriot question.

Conclusions: Policy paradigm as an alternative route to examine security discourses

The aim of this research was to prove how the accessibility pillars, the historical and legal contexts, lend their perennial attributes to the securitization discourses of the leaders. By briefly presenting the energy discourses performed by the leaders and by analytically delineating the pillars upon which energy security is built, the first assumption of this paper is that the historical vocabulary of the Cyprus conflict has not captured the lexicon of the current tensions as it was expected to since the references to history were not as frequent as anticipated. The second assumption was that the leaders did recall provisions of UNCLOS to justify the validity of their securitization discourses.

In order to assert the impact of history on these discourses, a future research should broaden the amount of data. This means that another project could use more statements evidential of portraying the links between history and securitization, as the framing of the current tensions. The statements of the Turkish authorities, which have played an active role in the actual tensions, should be also included, although in rhetorical terms, the “securitization” discourses do not appear that often in the radar.

Besides this, an alternative theory could have been put in place in order to highlight the significance of history in the formulation of these discourses. By theorizing that much of these discourses are conducive to the formation of the leaders’ preferences, we have to cast light upon the driving forces that form them.
There is no doubt that the way in which the political leaders of nation-states view each other, as well as the nature of the conflict, is of fundamental importance in determining the discourses they resort to. According to George (1969), a political actor perceives and simplifies the reality through the prism of his own “cognitive map” of politics. This includes the belief system that has been referred to in the past and is called “operational code”. Following this line, Weir and Skocpol (1985) assert that the ideals, which leaders pursue at any moment in time, are shaped by “policy legacies” or “meaningful reactions to previous policies” and/or crises. Attributed to the lessons they draw from these experiences, they develop a “policy learning process” that deliberately attempts to “adjust the goals or techniques of policy in the light of past experience and new information” (Hall 1990: 7). Hence, they establish a set of cognitive and moral maps that orient them towards a policy sphere. This set works as a tool identifying problems, specifying and prioritizing leaders’ interests and goals (Bleich 2002) and thus, making their discourses comprehensive, convincing and legitimate (Campbell 1998: 381).

Coined by Peter Hall, we are referring to this system as the “policy paradigm”\(^{19}\). Paradigms constitute broad cognitive constraints on the range of solutions that actors perceive and deem serviceable for solving problems. They generally reside in their cognitive backgrounds as underlying theoretical and ontological assumptions about the nature of the conflict. Their effects are profound here in the sense that they define the terrain of the “securitizing discourses” (Hall 1993; Lau et al 1991). For Hall, policy paradigms guide learning processes through which existing policy legacies are evaluated and criticized.

Through the delineation of the contexts mentioned above, we could identify and document these historical and legal lessons that the leaders have pulled up in order to draft their line of argumentation in the light of the recent developments. Via the discourse analysis we conducted, and by broadening the amount of data, we could figure out how the “legacies of history” and “traumas of the past” might have come into the leaders’ phraseology while facing current challenges. We could find out whether and in which manner historical examples, deriving from the past, had been used by the leaders in order to establish their energy security discourses. This could, thus, illustrate the functionality that the historical context displays, as part of the “accessibility’ indicator.

\(^{19}\) From the latin word “paradigma”, which, in its turn from the Greek word “παράδειγμα” that means pattern or model.
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