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From socialism via anti-imperialism to nationalism : EDA-TIP : socialist contest over Cyprus

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Citation

Christofis, N. (2015, February 3). *From socialism via anti-imperialism to nationalism : EDA-TIP : socialist contest over Cyprus*. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/31818>

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Title: From socialism via anti-imperialism to nationalism : EDA-TIP : socialist contest over Cyprus

Issue Date: 2015-02-03

Chapter 3

The Greek Case

The EDA (*Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera* –The United Democratic Left)

The post-civil war environment found Greece divided between the KKE, which had been defeated during the civil war, and the *ethnikofrones* (loyal to the nation, ardent nationalists). The end of the civil war, however, did not end the hostilities between the two factions. One of the most prominent Greek scholars rightly argued that “the ideological and cultural consequences of the [Greek] civil war ended only in 1974,”¹ but still communism was viewed with suspicion.

The post-civil war environment– against the backdrop of the Cold War – was thus strongly anti-communist, and anything “red” was deemed illegitimate. It was within this context that the EDA was formed, but extreme caution was taken so that it wouldn’t be stigmatized as communist, and it represented not only the left, but also all the democratic forces of the country.

Establishment of the EDA

The left made its post-civil war appearance with a coalition of parties, collectively known as the Democratic Camp (*Dimokratiki Parataksi*), in the elections of the 5th of March in 1950. However, in the municipal elections of April of 1951, another party emerged, named the Democratic Alarm (*Dimokratikos Synagermos*), which believed that the Democratic Camp was moderate in its beliefs and that it acted opportunistically. As such, the Democratic Alarm tried to assemble a more coherent and consistent group of supporters. It should be added, however, that the Democratic Alarm was formed upon the initiative of the illegal communist party of Greece. The KKE tried to “cover” and take control of any other attempt to form a leftist party or a grouping that was outside communist control. In the end, the Democratic Alarm prevailed, as it retained the support of the KKE leadership.² Moreover, the defeat of the Democratic Camp and all the other small leftist groups made it apparent that the KKE would again dominate the left wing in the decade that would follow.

¹ Kostas Tsoukalas, “The Ideological Impact of the Civil-War,” p. 561, in John Iatridis (ed), *Greece During the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis*, Athens, Themelio, 1984.

² For more background on the conflict between the two parties, see Spyros Linardatos, *From Civil War to Junta*, vol. 1, Papazisis, Athens, 1977, pp. 217-221.

It was in this environment that the EDA was formed.³ The EDA would play a key role in the politics of Greece from its formation until the junta of colonels in 1967. The EDA first appeared just before the second post-civil war elections. Its formation was announced on the 3rd of August in 1951,⁴ while the party statutes concerning the formation of EDA were dated from the 1st of August. At this point it would be useful to quote at length from the party statutes to show the democratic spirit of the movement and the underlying desire to establish a party that would actually work for the people:

1. Common participation in the forthcoming elections according to the principles that we have collectively discussed and signed.
2. Support of the common program, through struggle inside and outside the parliament and at least until the end of the following parliamentary period.
3. The co-operation between us includes the type of co-operation of the Parties in absolute equality, and decisions will be made unanimously by our representatives.
4. The administration of the Coalition is exercised by a Committee consisting of one representative of each of the participating parties in absolute equality, and the Presidency of the Administrative Committee we assign to Mr. I. Pasalidis.
5. After the announcement of successful candidates and the confirmation of the validity of the elections from the electoral court, each of the participating Parties has the right to regain its independence. The name (title) of this newly formed Party is to be the "United Democratic Left."
6. Any democratic party can join the Coalition afterwards, once it accepts common principles (program) and undertakes the responsibilities that are written in the present proceedings.
7. The proceedings will not be published, and this binds the participating parties to the Coalition.⁵

It presented itself as a coalition of parties and personalities⁶ and from the outset, it was more than a simple electoral coalition, but still not a unified party. The President of the EDA was Ioannis Pasalidis (1885-1968),⁷ while the leader of the parliamentary team was Elias

³ Jean Meynaud, *The Political Forces in Greece*, vol. 1, Savvalas, Athens, 2002, p. 229.

⁴ For the preparatory fomentations see ASKI, "Programmatic Principles of EDA," *EDA Archive*, box 1.

⁵ ASKI, *EDA Archive*, Ibid.; the document is reproduced in Spyros Linardatos, pp. 286-287, using, as the author states, the personal archive of Stavros Iliopoulos.

⁶ Takis Benas, *A Conference that was Never Made*, Delfini, Athens, 1995; Jean Meynaud, p. 229.

⁷ Ioannis Pasalidis was a politician born in the Caucasus, and the founder and president of EDA. He studied medicine in Leningrad, but he was ousted from the school by the Czarist regime for his revolutionary actions. He continued his studies in Moscow where he was a member of the Menshevik party. He was elected as a deputy in Georgia and then as a Foreign Minister in the Republic of Georgia. After the October Revolution he went to Germany and then to Greece. He settled in Thessaloniki and worked as a doctor. He helped the refugees there, fought against the monarchy and joined the EAM. He was the leader of the socialist movement and became a member of the central committee of the EAM, and later he cooperated with the Communist Party of Greece. He

Eliou (1904-1985).⁸ Its motto was Peace – Democracy – Amnesty,⁹ three concepts that comprised the foundational goals the party was trying to achieve.

The parties and the personalities that merged were the Socialist Party of Greece (Ioannis Pasalidis), the Democratic Alarm (the party that took part in the elections of April 1951, Dimitris Mariolis), The Left Liberals (Stamatis Hajibey and Neoklis Grigoriades), and the Democratic Radical Party (Michalis Kyrkos). A few days later, on the 5th of August, the additional joining of a part of the Democratic Left Union (Ioannis Kokorelis and Heracles Papachristos) was announced.¹⁰

After 1956, the EDA formed a united party, a decision that was ratified during the party's First Conference.¹¹ It was created via three categories of parties and citizens: communists, socialists and leftist democrats, all of whom shared a common cause, which was National Democratic Change.¹² In other words, it was the legal representative of the leftist movement formed under a "Party coalition of EAM."¹³ The EDA was conceptualized as a party that "functions within the framework of democratic constitutional legality and the parliamentary system,"¹⁴ principles to which the party made frequent reference.¹⁵ So significant was the party that in 1957 a conference in Moscow was organized, the sole topic of which was: "What is the EDA?" at which Palmiro Togliatti (1893-1964), the leader of the Italian Communist Party, said: "What you have created is our dream also. Since 1923, we have suggested that the

founded the EDA in 1951 and remained its leader until his death. He was elected as a deputy from 1951 to 1964. He was detained by the dictatorship of April 21, 1967 and died a year later at the age of 83. See the rare biography by his nephew Giannis D. Nisyros, *Giannis Pasalides*, K. Semelides, n.d.

⁸ Elias Eliou was a politician born in Kastro on the island of Lemnos. He studied law in Athens and became a member of Alexandros Papanastasiou's youth party. He contributed to the literature magazine "Noumas." During the Metaxas dictatorship he cooperated with the Communist Party of Greece and later, during the occupation became a member of the EAM. He was arrested during the events of December 1944 and after his release became a member of the CPG. In 1947 he was exiled to Makronisos, Ai-Strati and Ikaria Island. While in exile, he managed consistently to be elected as an EDA deputy, and was the party's leader of the floor. He defended KKE members at their court-martials during the civil war. He was arrested by the 1967 regime and detained until 1970. After the fall of the junta he was elected as a deputy of the United Left in 1974, while he was president of EDA. He was a skilled speaker in Parliament and a man of strong political ethos.

⁹ EDA, *Statutes of EDA*, article 1, Athens, 1953. The Administration Committee of the Party approved the statutes on the 20th of June in 1952. In 1953, they were published in leaflet form.

¹⁰ Kokorelis and Papachristos represented the Democratic Left Union after the death of the founder of the party, Ioannis Sofianopoulos a few days before joining the EDA.

¹¹ EDA, *First Pan-Hellenic Conference, 15-18 July 1956*, EDA, Athens 1956, article 1, p. 21; for the material concerning the Conference see ASKI, *EDA Archive*, box 4.

¹² Takis Benas, pp. 9-11 and 13-21; Manolis Glezos, "EDA's 15 years of Struggles," *Helliniki Aristera*, issue 38, September 1966, p. 15.

¹³ Panagiotis Noutsos, *Socialist Thought in Greece*, Gnosi, Athens, vol. IV, 1992, p. 55. Meynaud agrees, stating that "[The EDA] was an attempt of reconstructing the EAM," Ibid.

¹⁴ EDA, *First Pan-Hellenic Conference, 15-18 July 1956*.

¹⁵ Jean Meynaud, p. 243; for example, the Party Statutes of 1959 and 1963.

Socialist Party dissolve and form a united party, with communists and socialists. We did not succeed, you did. Protect it as you protect the retina of your eye.”¹⁶

In terms of it being a party of “national democratic change,” which substituted its socialist terms with respect to the will of the “majority of the People” and rigorous adherence to “democratic methods,” Noutsos observed that “it promises the ‘peaceful’ waging of the ‘united struggle inside and outside the parliament’ for the effectiveness of the ‘Change’ which was recapitulated in the ‘minimum program’ of [the] democratization of Greek society.”¹⁷ The demands in the EDA program “reflect” the prevailing situation in the country and hence “represent the progressive thought and patriotic ideology” which stand against those who represent “the imperialist ideology” imbued by the “fear of rationale” and the mistrust of science, as well as the coalition of “Greek orthodox civilization” – a prominent notion after the civil war and throughout the junta of the colonels – with “sterile anticommunism” and the “bankrupt Great Idea.”

Ideology

The EDA was based around a Greek peculiarity which should be elaborated upon in order to bring to light its complexity. The EDA was born at a specific historical juncture and laid the foundations for a party under “construction,” one that would bear new characteristics that were original and innovative for the international socialist and communist movements of the time. The party aimed at a “broader left” which kept its horizons open, and it was willing, as we shall observe later, to embrace all the patriotic forces of the country, even those of the right.

Antonis Brillakis, in his speech to the party’s First Pan-Hellenic Congress, stated that “the Change,” as the EDA repeatedly proclaimed, “is not an issue of one party alone, but is an issue of cooperation of all the patriotic, democratic forces of the country.”¹⁸ In other words, the EDA aimed at a broader democratic socialism without clearly referring to socialism, in alliance with all the patriotic forces of the country. During its First Pan-Hellenic Congress, the EDA presented the reasons why this alliance should take place:

¹⁶ Interview with Manolis Glezos in Lefteris Mavroedes, *Fighters: The Greek Left Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow*, Proskinio, Athens, 2001, p. 39; during the period 1957-1964, which coincides with N. Khrushchev’s leadership of the CPSU, the Soviet Union was encouraging the EDA to represent the Greek communists. At the same time, in addition to the relationship that was built with the Italian Communist Party, good relations started with the French Communist Party.

¹⁷ Panagiotis Noutsos, p. 60.

¹⁸ EDA, *First Pan-Hellenic Congress, 28.11.1959-2.12.1959*, Athens, 1960, pp. 87-102, p. 94.

[Greece] belongs to the category of undeveloped countries that lack heavy industry. It maintains in its economy traces of feudal relations. It [Greece] lacks a strong domestic economy. [...] The responsibility for this dire delay of [our] economy and its after-effects is borne by foreigners, with the Americans being the pioneers who blotted out industrialization and economic development and generally plunged our country into a situation of dependency, into a market for their [American] industrial products. Connected to these is a tiny minority of our society, the foreign-driven oligarchy and its political representatives.¹⁹

The EDA was aware of the divergent interests of the various strata within society, i.e. the workers, peasants, middle class of the cities, national bourgeoisie, patriotic intelligentsia and youth, and therefore, their interest in “Change” varied to a certain extent. Hence, their role in and contributions to the struggle of “Change” also varied in terms of their own interests. However, this problem, the EDA claimed, could be solved via the analytic program of the party. The most dynamic force of “Change” was the close alliance between the work force and the peasant class.²⁰ Indeed, the EDA functioned according to the rights of the working class and peasants, and was open to participation by everyone who fought for National Democratic Change, independently of whether or not they belonged to different strata.²¹

The EDA believed so much in the patriotic alliance that in 1961 it went even further and put the “proposal of alliance” into writing by publishing a booklet entitled “Program of Patriotic Alliance.”²² This booklet presented the conclusions drawn after the three-day meeting of the Fifth Synod of the Administrative Committee of the party.²³ The “‘patriotic alliance’ is a pan-national demand against the anti-national and anti-popular politics of the oligarchy,” the EDA proclaimed, and then went on to propose a “charter of the struggle to

¹⁹ EDA, pp. 75-76.

²⁰ At this point, the role of the national bourgeoisie, according to the EDA, was to be noted at length. For the EDA, the national bourgeoisie should ally with the patriotic bloc, i.e. the working and peasant forces, because there is a basic common hostile factor working against them, which was deemed to be imperialist dependency. The national bourgeoisie had to be transformed into a reserve of vassalage. However, the fact that the national bourgeoisie entailed contradictory elements (in its “ideology”) blocked its consent. “It [the national bourgeoisie] wants the Change, but is afraid of it. It wants the Change as a reaction to the consequences of the imperialist intervention. But it [national bourgeoisie] is afraid of the Change because it was not able to disengage itself from the fear of the left, which is constantly fostered by the foreign-driven right. And this has as a consequence the loss of its own benefits. [...] *The national bourgeoisie is willing to march towards the Change, at the same time though it is trying to control the Change, so as to be a Change only for itself,*” Ibid., p. 76-77; emphasis in the original.

²¹ See Elias Eliou, “Second Pan-Hellenic Conference of the EDA,” *EDA Archive*, Box 7; for the preparations, see ASKI, *EDA Archive*, box 6, folder 2.

²² EDA, *Program of Patriotic Alliance*, Athens, 1961. It was approved during the Fifth Synod of the Party by the Administrative Committee. Synods were referred to as meetings of the Administrative Committee.

²³ ASKI, “Fifth Synod of the Organization Committee,” April 1-3, 1961, *EDA Archive*, Box 13 folder 4.

open the road for the democratic rejuvenation that simply means: Bread, Work, Peace, Democracy, and Independence.”²⁴ Moreover, the charter would help the country counter the policy of “national betrayal,” which was being carried out by the Greek bourgeoisie supporting foreign interests inside Greece at the expense of the country. Therefore, the Synod proposed, as had been suggested in the party manifesto, the adoption of a policy of political peace, national independence, pride, cooperation with all people for the service of national interests and the securing of world peace.²⁵

The EDA was a party of principles which were stipulated in the party charter and undergirded by political and organic unity: “The observance of these principles ensures the democratic functioning of the party: With the growth and evolution of freedom of criticism and self-criticism, with the collective function of all the organs and organizations and the democratic elevation of all the organizational organs of EDA.”²⁶ Article 4 of the statutes of the EDA exemplifies how the principles, decisions and program were to take effect, and in addition, indicates that the party was consistent in its initial statutes without substituting them, as Jean Meynaud rightly argues,²⁷ but revising them based on the initial statutes:

The principles of the EDA have been comprised in its declaration to the Greek people upon its foundation in 1951 and in the aims of its program, which was drawn up and published in 1952. The programmatic principles and aims have been developed and supplemented by the decisions and theses of the Executive Committee of the General Council and by the First Pan-Hellenic Congress of the EDA on basic subjects and have constituted – after having been integrated – the program of the EDA which was approved by its First Pan-Hellenic Congress.²⁸

Greece was under the control of foreign imperialists – the Americans, British, and neo-Hitlerites (i.e. neo-Nazi) of Bonn – and thus, “the hopes of the nation should be turned to the great *Change*, which has been prepared for years by the people’s struggles – the change that has matured and *can* be changed”²⁹ The EDA had been referring to this “Change” since its founding in 1951 and was imbued by its principles. This referred to the change in the social,

²⁴ EDA, *Program of Patriotic Alliance*, p. 5.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

²⁶ Brillakis Speech, p. 101.

²⁷ Jean Meynaud is correct when he states that the EDA was the only party in Greece that was functioning with persistence and consistency according to its program and statutes.

²⁸ EDA, *The Statutes of EDA*, Athens, 1959, p. 6.

²⁹ EDA, *For a National Democratic Change*, Athens, 1961, pp. 7-8. This is the EDA’s program of 1961 which was translated under the auspices of the party itself into English; emphasis as in the original.

political, and economic troubles afflicting Greece during, and especially after, the civil war. The content of the program of change was dictated against:

The American imperialists and the local plutocratic oligarchy together with its political parties [which] were in every way aiming to preserve the state of vassalage, which had been imposed through imperialist intervention, to keep Greece bound up on the chariot of the warlike imperialist policy.³⁰

For the EDA, after the civil war Greece was engaged in a continual struggle between the people and the oligarchy that allied with imperialist powers at the expense of the population. In other words, the civil war was continuing unabated under the disguise, one could claim, of “democratic constitutionalism.”

The fundamental principles of the party were stated in a text titled “For a National Democratic Change” at the First Pan-Hellenic Conference of the party in July of 1956. Generally, it was of Marxist inspiration as far as the political situation was concerned. However, it ended up being moderate in content and as Meynaud claims, tactically resilient.³¹ Meynaud made that comment in a rather negative light, however, taking the EDA to be another party without a definite political line, which, considering the environment in which the EDA emerged, is understandable. On the other hand, it can be argued that this resilience and moderate tone of the text can be attributed to the fact that the EDA itself wished to draw a distinct line to disengage itself from the dogmatic pro-Soviet KKE and, to some extent, to be more easily acceptable to the ruling circles, thus avoiding the possibility of being closed down.

A few months after a session of the National Cabinet, on the 1st of December in 1956, party chairman Ioannis Pasalidis emphasized that the EDA was not demanding a socialist transformation but a change in direction which had as its grounding “national, anti-imperialist and democratic inspiration.”³² In this way, its political strategy was to garner support from all national forces to achieve deliverance from foreign dependency. In other words, it was a strategy that sought national independence. The EDA’s persistence in the non-socialist transformation of Greek society became apparent in later talks as well. For example, during the First Pan-Hellenic Congress in 1959, Pasalidis explicitly stated:

The content of *Change* that the EDA is professing is anti-imperialistic, national and democratic. The EDA does not pose a question of change

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 8-9.

³¹ Jean Meynaud, p. 238.

³² Avgi, December 4, 1956, p.1.

of the social status quo. The EDA does not propose a program of Change of socialist character and the layout of our program emphasizes that we are a party of national democratic Change. It recommends, however, the economic and political field that will secure its headway according to the will of the majority of the People.³³

Although the party's goal was purportedly to be achieved through a "non-socialist" transformation of the country, this was a strategic political move. Considering the Cold War context and especially the fact that Greece had just emerged from a civil war, the EDA wanted to avoid being referred to as "non-patriotic" and "anti-national." At the same time this had a direct impact on the party's internationalist dimension since every reference to internationalism was a direct reference to the Soviet Union. The "nation," or nationalism, for the EDA, was both a goal and a means to an end, i.e. the socialist transformation. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to think of the EDA's, and TIP's, rhetoric, especially on national issues, in terms of the "nationalization of communism" and the "communistization of nationalism."

Therefore, the EDA's ideology, and to some extent its rhetoric, was a set of ideals, values, and traditions that comprised the collective social imaginative³⁴ that dated back to 1821, and stood in reference to the struggles of the masses for independence. The perception of the past was a fundamental element in the EDA's popular ideology which sought to achieve the "contemporary message of popular emancipation."³⁵ As was noted, "the mixture with the traditional political culture is of great significance to the forms the discourse is taking. [...] There is a cultural underlay signifying new hermeneutic schemes and interpretive frames and which allows, through the proclamation of the socialist change, the rejuvenation of traditional political stereotypes of justice and social harmony, but also the reactivation of traditional forms of formulation of the rivalry and conflicts."³⁶

The vision of national liberation, and later that of national independence, played a crucial role in the popular ideology of the EDA. The Greek War of Independence of 1821 was, for the EDA, an inner struggle that could tacitly be regarded as a class struggle. In addition, the

³³ EDA, *First Pan-Hellenic Congress*, Athens, 1960, p. 70.

³⁴ The term "imagined" as used here draws upon Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Verso, London-New York, 1991.

³⁵ Tasos Trikkas, *EDA, 1951 – 1967: The New Face of the Left*, Themelio, Athens, vol. 2, p. 1336.

³⁶ Nikos Kotaridis, *Aris in Lamia*, Filistor, Athens, 2006 as quoted in Tasos Trikkas.

popular ideology of the EDA contributed significantly to the struggle of the left against the challenge of hegemony.³⁷

In the EDA's attempt to transform the proletariat as a national class, in Gramsci's terms it was acting as a totality despite the fact that it was just a part of a totality. And the main ideas of this totality were national independence and the abolition of vassalage, as well as the achievement of democratization and world peace. Moreover, the strong ties that the EDA felt with the Soviet Union should be pointed out, yet the party was always careful not to be stigmatized as communist. The Soviet Union represented an anti-imperialist platform that fought for peace and worked for good relations with Middle Eastern countries and stood against the imperialist United States and Great Britain, which had caused so much suffering for the Greek people.

The EDA's ideology was Marxist in orientation, although that wasn't stated clearly, and it was trying systematically to "educate" its members by publishing classic Marxist works and founding a Centre for Marxist Studies and Research. Hence, since the EDA was representing all the currents of which it consisted, it was looking for an indirect way to link the EDA with Marxism. At the closure of the First Pan-Hellenic Congress, Brillakis made the assertion that the EDA did not have a "united" ideology:

It [the EDA] does not have a united ideology. It is not a party totally of the working class, but a coalition of the working people with the peasantry and even further with the middle strata, with the youth and the patriotic intelligentsia. In other words, it is the party of the consistent forces of the National Democratic Change. Since the EDA consists of socialists, communists, bourgeois and democrats, maintaining their particular ideological world views, we cannot talk about a united ideology.³⁸

Brillakis' comments ring true. Following, however, the first years of the party's role as a coalition of personalities and groupings, the EDA's program, after its "First Pan-Hellenic Conference," defined and elaborated its ideas and managed to become a coherent, all-embracing ideology. Perhaps the most interesting point is that the people consented to that set of rules, providing the party and its ideas with the emotional appeal it needed, rendering this set of rules as an ideology that was continually being formulated.

³⁷As it is used here, the term "hegemony" draws upon the work of Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, as he formulated it in *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, Trans. and ed Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, International Publishers, New York, 1971. An ideology becomes hegemonic when it can interpret the wishes of the masses into ideas, values and specific actions.

³⁸ Antonis Brillakis, *First Pan-Hellenic Congress*, p. 182.

EDA – KKE Relations

The influence of the KKE on the EDA's structure and ideology is apparent in the love-hate relationship that emerged between the two parties after the EDA's formation. A full understanding of the EDA cannot be achieved without taking into account the KKE's contributions to the former. Additionally, many researchers even today claim that the EDA was created and sustained as a "temporality" in order for the EDA to present itself as the spokesman of the illegal KKE. Further support for this argument is based on the popular support the EDA received at the polls.

However, EDA-KKE relations were far more complicated than the EDA being a mere spokesperson for communist opinions, which were actually formulated by the Stalinist Soviet Union. Personal depositions, as well as official speeches and the decisions of the EDA, despite the "communistization" that was referred to before, demonstrate that point. Nevertheless, an analysis of the EDA cannot be complete without taking into account the KKE, and vice versa, since the EDA never renounced its communist inclinations. In addition, the strong communist presence in the mechanisms of the EDA makes it necessary to analyze EDA-KKE relations and the influence of the latter upon the former.

The outcome of the civil war forced the communist party to shift its functions abroad, initially to the Soviet Union and then to Romania. One of the members of the KKE, a member of its Central Committee since 1961, stated in an interview that "from the moment the leadership of KKE was found abroad, it was aware of the danger that it was threatening its authority and fought against any other autonomous guiding center."³⁹ This observation must be correct if we consider that in the first post-civil war elections the fighting off of the Democratic Front and the creation of a party guided by the KKE leadership in order to "cap" the Democratic Front, as Elefantis very accurately observed, also occurred in the post-junta era.⁴⁰ The illegal communist leadership's stance intensified even further after the formation of the EDA, despite the fact that it eventually agreed to its establishment. The formation of "another center [of decision making] that the leadership of KKE could under no circumstance accept"⁴¹ was ultimately undeniable.

³⁹ Grigoris Farakos, *About KKE and the Communist Movement*, Ellinika Grammata, Athens, 2005 p. 72; Tasos Vournas, *The Split of KKE*, Tolidis Brothers, Athens, 1983, p. 11-12.

⁴⁰ Aggelos Elefantis, "1951-1967: E.D.A.-K.K.E. The two organic faces of the Left," *O Politis*, issue 83, 2000. Elefantis was the first person to stress the fact of the KKE's "undermining" of the EDA and the silencing of the EDA's history even after the junta and until very recently.

⁴¹ Ibid.

The fact that the “EDA represented exactly the same political spectrum as they were representing the parties which were taking part or cooperating closely with EAM, until the end of 1947”⁴² may validate the above interpretation. However, it does so only simplistically and partially. There is no doubt that the EDA bore the mark of the illegal KKE, especially if we take into consideration party staffing on all levels,⁴³ and mainly after 1958, when the dissolution of illegal organizations connected to the KKE and their incorporation into the EDA was decided upon, which contributed significantly to the increased membership of around 92,000 members. It has been noted that “each Communist Party was the child of the marriage of two ill-matched partners, a national Left and the October Revolution. That marriage was based both on love and convenience.”⁴⁴ The Greek case is no exception.

We can find both similarities and differences, no matter how hard they are to locate, between the strategic policies of the two parties. For example, the two “centers,” as Vernardakis notes, both agreed on the basic (Third International) theories of dependency and state-monopoly capitalism, the bureaucratic (“democratic”) totalitarianism in the structure and function of the party, the analysis of bipolarity in the international political scene, and the defense of the role of the Soviet Union, as well as the guiding role of the CPSU.⁴⁵

However, there are also divergences that indicate the complexity of their relationship. The main divergence was brought about by the rapid changes that were taking place in Greece, and the fact that the EDA was representing the “center” of the interior to claim the self-evident guiding role in the shaping and processing of the party’s political line. The different perceptions of the two centers concerning the “organization” of the party became the main axis of the problem. The Stalinist perception of the “organization” of the party was regarded “as synonymous with the administrative-bureaucratic mechanism, a ‘transcendental’ pattern that always comes before the society” and a “more democratic” perception that conceptualized the “organization” of the party as an organic, dynamic and collective outcome that derived from the combination of the political program and social developments.⁴⁶

Moreover, there is another divergence derived basically from both “centers” having to face a different reality. On the one hand, the “center” in Greece had to face the cruel reality of

⁴² Elias Nikolakopoulos, *The Cachectic Democracy: Parties and Elections, 1946-1967*, Patakis, Athens, 7th edition, 2010 [2006], p. 136.

⁴³ Christoforos Vernardakis, “EDA and KKE during the 1960s. The Ideological, Political and Organizational ‘Dualism’ of the Traditional Left and their Influence upon the July 1965 Events crisis” in *From the ‘Relentless Struggle’ to Dictatorship*, Papazisis with the collaboration of The Konstantinos Mitsotakis Institute, Athens, 2009.

⁴⁴ Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Revolutionaries. Contemporary Essays*, Phoenix, Great Britain, 1973, p. 3.

⁴⁵ Christoforos Vernardakis.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

political persecutions and discriminations, which forced them to adopt a more “defensive” political position. This “defensive” stance was imbued in their political psychology and prevented the EDA from interpreting reality differently in the 1960s, as it reacted repressively towards the radicalized masses in 1965 when the social movement reached its heyday. Based on that psychology, the EDA was acting according to the dilemmas created by its opponents playing the game of the others, and was itself incapable of disengaging from its opponents, the Centre Union (EK – *Enosi Kentrou*) or the ERE. That psychology is still dominant nowadays among the Greek left. On the other hand, however, the KKE leadership was not living the Greek reality, of which it was totally ignorant, and was merely formulating policies according to its dogma but without ever escaping its political line.

The “substitute of the KKE” used by the right, state mechanisms, and of course the police, or the “legal expression of the KKE” used by the expelled leadership of KKE to characterize this political formation, provide explanations only for their own self-interest. The EDA characterized itself at the Third (un-convened) Congress of the party as “a Greek peculiarity, a creation of the post-civil war conditions. [...] [It] is not exclusively the party of any of the powers that comprise it. [...] It is...the *Union of the Left forces* prescribed for a common programmatic cause.”⁴⁷ It was a conglomeration of communists and EDA-ists sharing equal responsibilities and obligations, as well as equal participation in the party. Since 1956, Pasalidis, the leader of the EDA, had talked about this confusion concerning the EDA-KKE relationship and noted that actually it was not about the relationship between the EDA and KKE, so much as that between KKE and all the political currents within the EDA.

[...] The EDA is a party different from all other parties and currents that comprise it, and it has developed a political ideology that is the component of the ideology of the currents that comprise the EDA and does not identify itself with any of these. These define its character as a popular party that it is not revolutionary, but it is always unbendable in respect of the constitutional legality and to the parliamentary system.

He goes on to note that:

The EDA has no political dependency on anyone. [...] The bedevilment that the EDA is a camouflaged expression of the KKE is intentional, to justify the terrifying pressure that is exercised upon our party and the arrests of our party staff and members under the

⁴⁷ Takis Benas.

accusation that they belong to the illegal mechanism of the KKE. We have to fight these confusions underlying the character of the EDA.⁴⁸

Indeed, the EDA hosted many political currents, some of which were from the non-communist left, and they were not merely “satellites” for communist ideals. In fact, they were concrete political entities and the EDA expressed these in addition to the KKE. As Nikos Karras, one of the higher-ranking members of the EDA, mentioned, these entities “neither blindly accepted the leading role of KKE nor that the EDA is the domain (*çiftlik*) of the communists.”⁴⁹

Schematically, as in the case of the formation of the EDA, we could categorize the periods concerning the relations between the two parties. In addition, the formation of the function of the EDA also largely shaped its relations with the expelled communist leadership. In the establishment of the EDA, the KKE also participated with representatives of the illegal group of Nikos Ploumpidis (1902-1954), in contrast to Zachariadis who kept a rather strict stance and played a positive role regarding the fulfillment of the negotiations concerning the establishment of the EDA. Zachariadis, on the other hand, insisted on “strong, illegal party organizations.” In the years leading up to 1956, many illegal KKE members came to Greece, some of whom were incorporated in the EDA mechanism and formed a leading group within it.⁵⁰

Leftists who were released from prisons preferred to take up positions in the EDA and not in the illegal organizations of KKE. Moreover, there was a “leading relationship” on behalf of the KKE in the organization and leadership of the EDA, but, this “leading relationship” did not create problems or friction between the two parties because all the factors that went into the creation of the EDA had approved the historical, ideological and political gravity of the KKE, as well as the fact that the majority of the leftists were communists, whatever the meaning of that term might have been during that period.⁵¹

After the electoral successes of 1956, and especially of 1958, in which the party managed to become the main opposition party, the EDA entered a new stage, its main characteristic being its strengthening and smoothing of relations with the KKE, since after 1956 the KKE

⁴⁸ Ioannis Pasalidis, *Speech at the First Pan-Hellenic Congress*, pp. 27-28.

⁴⁹ Nikos Karras, “KKE and EDA in the years of the Democratic Resistance,” *KouEn*, no. 1, 1973. For similar remarks see also Ioannis Pasalidis’ interview in the *Makedoniki Ora* (*Macedonian Times*), September 1966 and Manolis Glezos, “EDA’s 15 years of Struggles,” pp. 15ff.

⁵⁰ Stefanos Sarafis (substitute member of the Political Bureau), Manolis Glezos, G. Papadimitriou, V. Efraimidis and Elias Eliou.

⁵¹ Aggelos Elefantis, “1951-1967: EDA-K.K.E. The Two Organic Faces of the Left,” *O Politis*, p. 43.

decided to self-dissolve its organizations, which were doing more harm than good to the Greek left movement. Moreover, the ousting of Zachariadis from the leadership of the communist party and the timing of the de-Stalinization policy of Khrushchev after the 20th Congress of CPSU also helped in that respect. In addition, the new KKE leadership, in agreement with Khrushchev, adopted a new policy concerning relations between the two parties which culminated in the “election” at the Eighth Congress of the KKE of many members of the EDA to the Central Committee of the Party.⁵² The 20th Congress of the CPSU brought another development in favor of the EDA. The 7th Plenum of the Central Committee of the KKE, obviously forced by the changing situation in Greece, officially proposed the transformation of the EDA into a Marxist-Leninist party (so that the EDA could function based on Leninist norms, and in the process all members and staff were to have Marxist-Leninist training, and so on).⁵³ All these developments signified the guiding role and the approval of the EDA on behalf of the KKE, and the EDA ceased to be considered to be a mere electoral mechanism and substitute for the KKE. Indeed, the EDA was being transformed into a harbinger of change during that period, when many successful movements were developed, as will be analyzed later, such as the democratic movement “114,” the 15% about Education, the peaceful movement with the organization of marathons and the youth movement. In other words, the claim that the EDA represented the dynamism of Greek society seeking “Change,” a situation that was also verified during the Second EDA Congress in 1962, would not be an exaggeration.

However, the good relations between the two parties would deteriorate after 1964 and their relationship would terminate in 1968 with the split of the communist party. The emergence of the EK Party of Papandreou and the replacement of Khrushchev by Brezhnev both contributed further to the deterioration of EDA-KKE relations.

The KKE miscalculated that the present state of vassalage could be overthrown. It also believed that the funeral of Grigoris Lambrakis (1912-1963) provided the necessary means to overthrow the state of vassalage. Grigoris Lambrakis was a Greek politician, physician, athlete and member of the faculty of the School of Medicine at the University of Athens. After delivering the keynote speech at an anti-war meeting in Thessaloniki, two far-right extremists murdered him by striking him over the head with a club in plain view of a large

⁵² Takis Benas, “EDA-KKE Relations,” *Eleftherotypia*, p. 30.

⁵³ Tasos Vournas, *The Split of KKE*, Ibid., p. 41-42; for the 7th Plenum of the Central Committee of KKE, see Panos Dimitriou (ed), *The Split of KKE: Through the Texts of the Period 1950-1975*, 2 vols, Themelio, Athens, 1978; Antonis Brillakis, *The Greek Communist Movement. Historical Route, Crises and Perspectives*, Eksantas, Athens, pp. 136-137.

number of people and (allegedly) some police officers. He suffered brain injuries and died in the hospital five days later, on the 27th of May. Kostas Gavras's movie "Z," the first initial of the word, "lives on in Greek and broaches this murder, while it became common graffiti as a symbol of the Lambrakis Youth."⁵⁴ Soon afterwards, the Lambrakis Democratic Youth, also known simply as *Lambrakides*, emerged upon the initiative of Mikis Theodorakis, a famous Greek music composer. In that respect, the KKE believed that something like this could be immediately achieved, and that it had to be done during the funeral of Grigoris Lambrakis at the expense of human lives. In addition, it seems that the old KKE had returned and aspired to take the leading role in the leftist movement again, clearly guided by the "Brezhnev line" that was subjugating the communist parties of Europe because the "Euro-communist" phenomenon that was gradually becoming apparent clearly preferred an obedient KKE to an autonomous EDA.

The tactic employed during the elections of 1963 and 1964, two elections that caused great political problems for the left, dealt a fatal blow to the prestige of the EDA. Firstly, in the beginning of 1963, the Interior Office of the Central Committee was founded, a guiding organ whose main goal was to control the actions of the EDA and the Lambrakis Democratic Youth, while securing the "official line." Secondly, after the elections of 1964 when the EK won a majority of votes and entered Parliament independently, the EDA was forced by the leading group of the KKE abroad to adopt a maximalist policy which brought about serious reactions. The Koligiannis leadership, during the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee in February of 1965, adopted the slogan of the "de facto" or "de jure" legalization of KKE, something that deteriorated their relations with the EK government even further. This maximalist position led many communists, even members of the leading group in the EDA, to react. One of these was Elias Eliou, who sent a letter to the Executive Committee of EDA criticizing this position:

Dogmatic, cut-and-dried guidance leads to, through its exaggeration, mistakes. [...] It is obvious that nobody believes that we are heading towards a revolution. There is a lack of sobriety... Our people want a serious party that proposes solutions and guides struggles to implement these solutions, not festivals. [...] In other words, the question is whether we believe in the potentiality of a smooth change with democratic means and if we sincerely and honestly believe in it, or whether this is an excuse that conceals hidden purposes, personal advantages...

It was concluded that:

⁵⁴ Kostis Kornetis, *Children of the Dictatorship: Student Resistance, Cultural Politics, and the "Long 1960s" in Greece*, Berg, New York and Oxford, 2013, p. 19.

It is our duty to convince the people that we are a party which is considered positively to be an element of power, even though gradually and without haste and umbrage, initially as a factor of support of another government, then as an element of participation and co-governance, until it leads to an attainment of a majority and power.⁵⁵

The Third Congress of the EDA was scheduled for 1965, as it was decided that one should be organized every three years. However, the major problems within the leftist movement and in Greece itself delayed preparations for the congress, which started only at the end of 1965. The EDA started working on a draft dealing with issues such as the final character of the EDA, the clarification of its social and political goals, its functions, and so on. This ideological fermentation, as was expected, caused much unrest within the Koligiannis group and raised suspicions about the EDA.

On the preparation team were many communist members such as Charilaos Florakis and Kostas Filinis. It was a difficult task, considering the varying currents that existed within the preparatory team, but eventually they agreed unanimously and had the draft printed and sent to the KKE abroad. The Koligiannis group, however, rejected the draft, claiming that “the text is not good. We will send you a layout with positions, based on which you will rewrite them.”⁵⁶ However, the rejection of the draft was based mainly on two points, as Vournas observes. The Committee devoted a great deal of space to the 15-year period of the existence of the EDA, not restricting itself just to typical historical events and information regarding its functions, but this was the first attempt to take an intrinsically political and ideological approach to the topic.⁵⁷ However, the Koligiannis group abroad rejected the draft, claiming: “It is a mistake to talk about the history of the EDA. There is not such a thing. There is only the history of the KKE. And the EDA is just a phase, a period, and [only] a part of that history.”⁵⁸ The KKE made it obvious that it was refusing to accept the self-evident proof of the EDA’s autonomy and its guiding role in Greece.

The second reason for rejecting the draft *in toto* was EDA’s usage, for the first time, of the term “socialism.” Indeed, the EDA had never before referred to socialism, not even in its

⁵⁵ Panos Dimitriou (ed), vol. 1, p. 198 ff.

⁵⁶ Tasos Vournas, p. 51.

⁵⁷ Perhaps the best study on the period 1964-1967 based on the archives of the EDA was prepared by Takis Benas; the draft was an attempt to explain the original phenomenon for the international movement, not just the co-existence of two Marxist parties albeit for a short time, but mainly the shaping and incorporation of the EDA in daily life. Furthermore, it explained the extensive help that the EDA received from National Resistance members and specifically the EAM staff, as well as the release from prison of members and expelled KKE members who were incorporated to EDA and helped the party become what was to be called “EDAic.”

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 52.

party programs and statutes, and as it was noted above, the EDA had not hitherto aimed at a socialist transformation of society. The main goals of the party were repeated once again, which were the same throughout its existence, i.e. National Democratic Change, with “the anti-imperialistic and antitrust character” as its main axis. In addition to that, the last paragraph bore the ultimate goal of the party, the carefully worded phrase describing the passing of the country through a period of a “socialist regeneration.”

The KKE believed that any reference to socialism by the EDA would be a grave mistake, because “socialism as a goal is KKE’s concern. EDA cannot proclaim such a goal. Its role as a leftist party ends with the National Democratic Change.”⁵⁹ If the EDA also included socialism in its political programmatic goals, then the existence of the KKE, which was acting from abroad, would be placed in jeopardy, as the ideological goal of its existence and continuation of its presence would no longer be needed. Moreover, if the EDA acquired a “socialist” character, then inevitably it would become the leader of the leftist movement. Therefore, the KKE faced that demand not realistically but as a matter of its own survival and to serve its own interests in having the whole movement dependent on the regime they were representing.

The Three Stages of the EDA

The fact that the EDA maintained a constant presence in the Greek political arena did not mean that the structure of the party remained unchanged and linear, or that it did not face difficulties, whether internal or external. We can discern three distinct stages by which the EDA finally took the form of a mass party, which was interrupted in 1967 by the military junta. There is general agreement among scholars concerning the outline of those stages.⁶⁰

To start with, the first stage the party went through was the Political Front Stage (1951-1956). In this stage, the EDA’s distinct characteristic was its attempt to unite the left, which was defeated militarily and politically in the civil war, and make an indirect reference to an older coalition, that of the EAM. The fact that the EDA was formed upon the initiative of an illegal communist party indicated its eventual goal of lifting the KKE’s bar and gradually taking over the leadership of the leftist movement again and be incorporated safely into Greek

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 54.

⁶⁰ Ioanna Papathanassiou, “Limits and Potential in the incorporation during the pro-dictatorial E.D.A. An attempt of Registering the Arithmetical Range, the Geographical Allocation and the Social Synthesis of the Left Population,” *The Greek Review of Social Research*, no. 86, 1995, pp. 21-82; *United Democratic Left, Archive 1951-1967*, Themelio, Athens, 2001; Christoforos Vernardakis and Giannis Mavris, *Parties and Social Coalitions During the Pro-Dictatorial Greece: The Preconditions of the Political Changeover*, Exantas, Athens, 1991, pp. 98-117; Tasos Trikkas.

society. Moreover, the acronym EDA also suggests the main ideas that the party would fight for– Peace – Democracy – Amnesty⁶¹– which were the underpinnings of the new positions taken up by the KKE for Greece and as guidelines for the partners of the front.⁶²

Added to that, the political formation's legitimization was based first on the communist left (including communist members in exile) during the elections, and second, on Greek society and other political forces as it proclaimed through its program a "change in national and political life."⁶³ However, as will be discussed later, the prohibition on political exiles being elected and taking up posts forced the EDA in a way to broaden its alliances with the parties of the center (in the elections of 1954 and 1956), and in addition, signified its acceptance within the political spectrum by other forces.

In this way, during the first years of its formation the EDA was a flexible group that tried to reunite the devastated post-civil war left under its auspices and, in addition, under the logic of the "political front" it did not yet wish to create a strong party core, a fact that can be verified by the political alliances with different parties of the center that were created so that it could incorporate itself in Greek society.⁶⁴

The second stage (1956-1963) was the Party-Front Stage which coincided with the institutional and organizational formation of the party. The beginning of this stage presents a break in the history of the party. In 1956, the political coalition of the EDA shifted towards party status, a decision that was ratified in July of 1956 at the party's First Conference, and in the process the leadership of the KKE changed as well as the fundamental points of its strategic policy, shifts that were also prompted by the changes happening within the international communist movement itself.⁶⁵ The actual function of the EDA as a coherent party however, began in 1958, after the party's electoral victory in national elections, when it became the main opposition party.⁶⁶

⁶¹ EDA is also used as a wordplay in Greek. Besides referring to *Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera*, EDA was also used as *Eirini – Dimokratia – Amnistia*.

⁶² The publication of the newspaper *Avgi*, the registration of the political coalition, as well as the institutionalization of membership, which was introduced to the party manifesto, refer to the organization and functioning of the Popular and Patriotic Fronts, as these were dictated by the international communist movement, and in addition, by the KKE. Ioanna Papathanassiou, p. 30.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Christoforos Vernardakis and Giannis Mavris, p. 100.

⁶⁵ Ioanna Papathanassiou, "Limits and Potential in the incorporation during the pro-dictatorial EDA. An attempt of Registering the Arithmetical Range, the Geographical Allocation and the Social Synthesis of the Left Population," p. 31. During the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the KKE, Nikos Zachariadis was replaced as General Secretary of the party. The Eighth Plenum in 1958 crystallized the final decision of its leadership. Additionally, the decision was made to incorporate the illegal KKE party-cells in Greece into the EDA.

⁶⁶ According to the first count, the registered members numbered 9,352, or the ratio of 1 member to 100 voters.

The institutional and organizational reconstruction of the EDA also helped its dual function. First, the EDA functioned as a “front” because the party revised neither its manifesto pledges of political and social intervention nor its goal of broadening its electoral basis. Secondly, it functioned much as other communist parties by copying their organizational structure, a strategy aimed at the “communistization” of the party mechanism and the enrolment of new members.

The process of “communistization” was accelerated in 1961 after members of the party recently released from prison decided to do so at the Eighth KKE Congress. The gradual incorporation of communists into the party and the adoption of the communist functional structure actually blurred the dividing line between the legal (those who were acting inside Greece and from within the political formation of the EDA) and illegal (the KKE, the left). This ambiguity caused much strife within the party and in the Greek communist movement as a whole.

The party’s influence was growing steadily, and in 1958, it won 24.42% of the vote. Circulation of *Avgi*, the newspaper of the party, grew, but that was not necessarily an indicator of growing membership. The party’s greater participation in parliamentary debates is indicative of its increasing confidence. According to the party’s first official census, 10,295 members comprised the electoral base of the EDA in the periphery outside Athens and Piraeus. Of those, only 3,749 kept regular contact with party organizations, the rest being characterized as inactive members because of their sporadic visits to the party’s electoral departments.

However, official incorporation into the political mechanism was not easy, despite the fact that it was the main opposition party, as indicated by the Fourth Synod of the EDA Organization Committee which was held in October of 1960 at the Second Conference of the Party.⁶⁷ Censorship, as well as other measures made against leftist activities by the anti-communist right-wing police state, prevented the EDA from realizing its organizational potential not only in the periphery but in the center as well. Specifically, the conclusions reached both by the Fourth Synod and the Second Conference were similar, indicating that “our party procrastinates dangerously from an organizational perspective. Its organized powers are too small and do not exist throughout the country.”⁶⁸

⁶⁷ ASKI, “Fourth Synod of the Organization Committee (15-17 October 1960),” *EDA Archive*, Box 13 folder 3.

⁶⁸ EDA, *Second Conference of the EDA*, Athens, 1962, p. 138.

The idea of the party-front was abandoned in 1962-63, giving way to the third and final stage, known as the Mass Party stage. After November of 1963, the Greek political landscape was marked by social, political, and cultural change, which made it possible for the EDA to increase its membership and create various organizations through two organizational conferences in 1964 and in 1966. By the summer of 1964, the party's membership numbered approximately 50,000. However, the mass party process of the EDA does not mark a break from the process of communistization. The two processes functioned in parallel without contradicting each other, both aiming to create the country's first post-civil war and broad-based "EAM-style" party of the left. These two processes also benefited from the electoral win by the EK, which contributed substantially to the accomplishment of the goals already put forward by the EDA. Leftists seemed to respond to these goals because "government policy provides the left with the potentiality to interpret the positive dynamic imbued in society in correlation with the EDA line."⁶⁹ In addition to that, the emancipation of the supporting base of the EDA owed much to its Educational Department⁷⁰ which sought the ideological enlightenment of its support base⁷¹ and a Research Department⁷² that was active since 1957. The supporting base of the party was protected also by the student movement, which during that period played one of the most crucial factors in the leftist movement represented by the EDA. Its alliance with the EDA's line (peaceful co-existence and opposition, rather than with the Albanian or Chinese line), with a few but notable exceptions represented a stance in favor of the "democratic turn" and "change," and lastly, they were, as regards the EK, of extreme assistance to the EDA.⁷³

The Cyprus Question as a National Issue

The Cyprus Question in Greece, of course in addition to sporadic attempts at *Enosis* starting at the end of the nineteenth century, dominated Greek politics in the early 1950s and it

⁶⁹ Ioanna Papathanassiou, "EDA: The Mass Party of Pro-Dictatorial Left, 1963-1967," *The Greek Society during the First Post-War Period, 1945-1967*, Sakis Karagiorgas Institute, Athens, 1994, p. 686.

⁷⁰ See ASKI, "Educational Department," *EDA Archive*, Boxes 44-47 and 48, folder 1.

⁷¹ Antonio Gramsci's thoughts on intellectuals and masses in the modern world, as he depicted them in the *Prison Notebooks*, is quite revealing in that respect: "[...] one can say that the parties are the elaborators of new integral and totalitarian intelligentsias and the crucibles where the unification of theory and practice, understood as a real historical process, takes place." David Forgacs (ed), *The Antonio Gramsci Reader*, introduction by Eric Hobsbawm, New York University Press, New York, 2000, p. 335.

⁷² See ASKI, "Centre for Marxist Studies and Research," *EDA Archive*, Boxes 88-92. The proceedings of the three *Weeks for Marxist Thought* were published in book form and are also available at ASKI; for the *Research Department* see ASKI, *EDA Archive*, Boxes 93-94.

⁷³ Papathanassiou rightly claims that it was because of the electoral win of the EK that leftists managed to cast off the fear of expressing their beliefs openly. Ioanna Papathanassiou, p. 687.

officially became part of the Greek political agenda in November of 1951. Following the 1950 referendum in Cyprus, Georgios Mavros (1909-1995), a liberal politician, brought up the issue at the council of the United Nations, despite the strong objections of the Greek government.⁷⁴ This occurred in accordance with the exacerbation of the political situation concerning Cyprus when a major student demonstration⁷⁵ in favor of *Enosis* was taking place in Propylaia, Athens.

The student issue was discussed in the Greek parliament because of the police violence that was used to suppress the demonstration. The EDA, through K. Gavriilidis, took a clear-cut position in parliament discussions and sided with the student movement, which had become active in the early 1950s. Gavriilidis took the chance to criticize the government and proposed that since the Cyprus Question was a “national issue that stirs popular emotions,” the Greek Parliament should “issue a decree in favor of *Enosis* which will be presented at demonstrations, meetings etc., without however, being anti-British.”⁷⁶ The EDA’s proposal was rejected by the government by Minister George Varvoutis (1891-1975), who claimed that the government should handle the issue “not with rallies and *irresponsible* demonstrations, but with diplomatic means”⁷⁷ because the stance of Greece on the matter was already known and shared by the Greek people as a whole.

The EDA’s very existence was marked by constant attempts to prove its patriotism. The post-civil war impact was so strong that the left’s legal representatives had to perpetually demonstrate their patriotism and staunch Hellenism. The Cyprus Question and the Greek government’s policy on Cyprus provided the means for the left to convince the people about its ideas and ideals, and in addition, to show that *Enosis* with Greece was just, self-evident, and above all, necessary for the nation.

The EDA’s parliamentarians, on the occasion of the Pan-Athenian demonstration in favor of *Enosis*, made the following statement: “[The EDA] sees the stance of the Greek government on the Cyprus Question hitherto as unacceptable because of the inanimate and

⁷⁴ This took place during the 6th Session of the General Council and was limited to stating that the Cyprus Question was included on the UN agenda. The same flat statement was repeated during the Seventh Session of the Council the following year. E. N. Tzelepi, *The Cyprus Question and Its Conspirators*, trans. Markos Dragoumis, Themelio, 2nd edition [1965], 1975, p. 23.

⁷⁵ The student demonstrations and the student movement were very important and therefore will be dealt with separately in a different chapter.

⁷⁶ Kostas Gavriilidis, *The Cyprus Question in the Greek Parliament* [hereafter CQGP], November 23, 1951, vol. 1, 1997, p. 33. Gavriilidis finished his speech by stating, “This is our opinion, purely national, and no one can raise a point on that, no matter how loud one shouts.” See also Tasos Trikkas, pp. 178-179.

⁷⁷ George Varvoutis, CQGP, November 23, 1951, vol. 1, p. 34; my emphasis.

compromising method, to which [the Cyprus Question's] non-solution is owed.”⁷⁸ In addition, when talks during that session of parliament intensified and repeated claims were made on behalf of the government that Greece should follow the diplomatic road and that there should be discussions about the approach, Efraimidis replied:

We [the EDA] thought that the issue of *Enosis* is beyond dispute. Everybody acknowledges the fact that *Enosis* of Cyprus with Greece bares a moral and historical rationale of freedom based on the notion of self-determination of the people.⁷⁹

A few months later, in June of 1952 when Archbishop Makarios visited Athens, he conveyed “the claim of the Cypriot people that the [Greek] government must take charge for the further administration of the issue, decisively.” On the other hand, a British Minister made it clear to Greek reporters that “the [British] government considers Cyprus a British territory which has an extreme strategic importance and it is not willing to accept any attempt for negotiations on the matter.”⁸⁰ This statement by the British Minister caused great tension and drew an intense reaction from Makarios, who condemned the British claims and started to press the Greek government further so that the Greek government would appeal to the United Nations. However, the Venizelos government,⁸¹ because of American intervention, refused to act accordingly. Naturally, the government's refusal to appeal to the United Nations evoked harsh reactions, but mainly from students, who organized pan-Hellenic demonstrations and gatherings in all major Greek cities. Many members of EDNE⁸² were arrested on the charge of “being leading members during the student demonstrations in favor of the *Enosis* of Cyprus with Greece” and “pioneering unpatriotic acts of hostility against allied countries” and they were therefore deemed to be “dangerous for public order and safety.”⁸³

⁷⁸ Parliamentary Team of EDA, *CQGP*, 14 May 1952, vol. 1, p. 36. The team was comprised of E. Mantakas, V. Efraimidis, Th. Vlamopoulos, G. Simos, L. Brillakis, G. Spiliopoulos, and P. Katerinis.

⁷⁹ Vasilis Efraimidis, May 14, 1952, vol. 1, p. 40; see also EDA, *Pasalidis' Speech of Mistrust to the Government*, Athens, 1952.

⁸⁰ As quoted in Trikkas, p. 179.

⁸¹ From August of 1950 to October of 1951, Sofoklis Venizelos headed three consecutive governments cooperating with Konstantinos Tsaldaris and Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, and afterwards, in cooperation with Georgios Papandreou and Nikolaos Plastiras, as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.

⁸² On the 15th of August in 1951, a coalition of leftist youth organizations was declared in a political organization that was named the United Democratic Youth of Greece (EDNE, Eniaia Dimokratiki Neolaia Ellados) and became the youth of the EDA. The EDNE published its own newspaper titled *Guardians of Peace*. At that point, they were acting mainly in academic circles.

i) The Youth Union of Left Democrats of Giannis Sofianopoulos was known to the student youth as DAN.

ii) The Liberal Left Youth (FAN), Chatzibey – N. Grigoriades.

iii) The Radical Left Youth (PAN) of Michalis Kyrkos.

iv) The Youth of Socialist Party of Ioannis Pasalidis.

The illegal EPON also, of the KKE, found shelter in EDNE.

⁸³ Decision of Commission of Public Safety, Athens Precinct, no. 7/2/2.52 as quoted in Trikkas.

The Cyprus Question thus became the main catalyst for ensuing popular struggles in the 1950s and 1960s. It was a convergence of all the anti-imperialistic tendencies of the masses and accumulated despair about police oppression.

In 1952, Greece's accession to NATO also marked a harsh government criticism of EDA's politics of neutrality. The government that signed the accession agreement declared that "Greece, with its accession to NATO, which includes free countries and institutions, feels safer.... The other theories about neutrality and peace have nothing to do with that fact."⁸⁴ In his speech concerning NATO, Pasalidis emphasized that

...we are a people who can contribute to the bridging of the gap that exists between the two systems [...] and as military officers often say, there is no limit between defense and attack. Consequently, we cannot understand that Greece is taking part in an agreement like this, while other countries, bigger than Greece, such as Sweden, which is geographically close to the Atlantic Ocean, did not participate. We are in favor of a Greek policy and we should listen to no foreign country. [...] In the fights of the Great, the small ones get their hands smashed. We, as a party, ungroup our responsibilities.⁸⁵

As was expected, the eight deputies of the EDA voted against the charter. L. Karamaounas, who had withdrawn from the EDA, voted in favor of the accession of Greece to NATO, while M. Kyrkos, who had also withdrawn from the party, opposed the move.⁸⁶

Apart from its leaders' speeches, the EDA continued to criticize the government the following year because of the Greek-American Agreement. Following the Truman Doctrine, Greece signed a second agreement with the US that signified the further dependency of Greece upon Washington. This agreement authorized the right of the US government to use railways, roads, and military facilities in Greece for NATO purposes, while the American military could pass through the country uninhibited without security checks. EDA's Organization Committee described the agreement as "a fatal blow to the independence of the country [of Greece]."⁸⁷ Moreover, in the announcement, additional emphasis was placed on the fact that the transfer and staging of foreign military operations and territorial concessions could be allowed only by law and that therefore, new elections should be held in order for the people to decide.⁸⁸ The bourgeois forces of the country were clearly shaken, a fact that was

⁸⁴ Spyros Linardatos, *From Civil War to Junta, 1949 – 1952*, vol. 1, Papazisis, Athens, 1977, p. 401.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Michalis Kyrkos, *Hellas and NATO*, Athens, 1961. See also pp. 16-17 for Kyrkos' reply opposing the accession of Greece to NATO.

⁸⁷ ASKI, "Announcement of the Organizational Committee of EDA," 22 October 1953, *EDA Archive*, Box 12, folder 1; Quoted also in Trikkas, vol. I, p. 224.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

further accelerated by the retiring of Markezinis from the Greek Alarm party, as well as by Papagos's illness which would lead to his death a few months later.

Avgi, the official newspaper of EDA, consisted of only a few pages in its early stages, but by the 1960s it had expanded and become richer in content. Despite the occasional and well-known annual celebrations, current affairs dominated the newspaper. For example, circulation of the paper was suspended for a month in support of the workers' strike of 1960. Thus, from 1954-1956, the primary topic of the newspaper was the Cyprus Question, which was at the center of popular interest.⁸⁹ In accordance, *Avgi* sent a celebratory message to the Cypriot people stating that:

[The]stirring national and patriotic celebrations of our people, the people's unrestrained rage against the occupiers of the people of Cyprus and its allies, demonstrate how rigorous are the ideals of the generation that gave us our freedom [...] Let today's anniversary be the day of Cyprus, of freedom, of national independence.⁹⁰

In the article, the Papagos' government and his Greek Alarm party were smeared by "condemnation of the wholehearted will of the Nation, not only because [they] accepted unconditionally and without the representatives of the Cyprus People, the Tripartite Conference with the British occupiers of Cyprus and their official Turkish supporters, but because the [Greek government] refuses to raise the [Cyprus] issue at the UN on July 20."⁹¹ It should be noted, however, that it was not only the Greek left that was worried about the Cyprus Question at the UN. There was an acute feeling among Cypriots that they were being made an exception at a time when, as Makarios put it to Papagos, they failed "to achieve whatever the semi-civilized peoples of today are achieving by their perseverance."⁹²

The Launch of the EOKA Struggle

The British position, as previously mentioned, was that the island of Cyprus should not be the concern of Greece since Cyprus was a Crown colony. However, London was willing to

⁸⁹ Anta Kapola, "History and Politics: The Celebration of 25th March in the newspaper *Avgi*, 1953-1967. Commemorations," unpublished manuscript provided by Kapola to the author. I thank her for her assistance.

⁹⁰ "Command of '21,'" *Avgi*, March 25, 1954, p. 1.

⁹¹ Promises were made to raise the issue before August 20 "since the Tripartite Conference will not lead to a satisfactory result." "Announcements of the Organization Committee of EDA on Cyprus," Athens, July 16, 1955, p. 27, in the EDA, *Decisions and Announcements of the General Council and of the Executive Committee of EDA on the Vital Problems of the People and the Country*, Athens, 1955.

⁹² Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Isle of Discord, Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem*, C. Hurst & Co, United Kingdom, 1999, p. 242. "There were also signs, according to diplomatic sources at least, that Cypriot opinion had begun to show 'a surprising lack of sincere interest' in *Enosis*. Wagner, the US Consul, continued to speak of a, however latent, constitutionalist current of opinion."

discuss the issue of Cyprus, not only with Greece but also with Turkey. Sir Anthony Eden announced in the House of Commons on the 30th of June in 1955 that he had invited the Greek and Turkish governments to come to London to talk about “political and military issues that concerned the Eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus”⁹³ and indicated that a gathering would be held, which would be the Tripartite Conference of 1955. Eden’s invitation was a radical departure from traditional British policy, and was triggered by the violence of the EOKA struggle that had started in April of the same year.⁹⁴ Hitherto, the British had considered colonial domestic matters to be internal affairs, not to be discussed with foreigners. Greece accepted the invitation with some hesitation, because no Cypriots had been invited, but reluctantly decided to attend. The Turks also agreed. However, as was feared, the meetings broke down in September having accomplished nothing. The Greeks were dissatisfied because Cypriot self-determination was not offered; the Turks were displeased because self-determination was not stricken from the list of possibilities. The British initiative was, in fact, nothing more than a clever trap. The conference proposed had nothing to do with direct negotiations between the British and the Greeks that were considered essential by the UN, and even less with what the Greek government desired. By including Turkey in the negotiations, Britain distorted the content and the goal of the talks and revealed the real intentions that had led to the initiative.⁹⁵

EDA denounced both the Tripartite Conference of 1955 and the Greek government and claimed that the conference had proven to be a “dangerous, British imperialistic maneuver.”⁹⁶ In addition, according to the Greek Alarm government,

Taking part in that conference, without the consent of the Greek and Cypriot People, with the presence of those who have nothing to do with Cyprus, i.e. the Turkish officials, with the positions it supported and its insistence on continuing talking about the unacceptable

⁹³ E. N. Tzelepy, p. 42.

⁹⁴ In Nicosia, the radio station was blown up. Grivas circulated his first proclamation as leader of the EOKA under his code name Digenis (a hero of Cypriot mythology), and the four-year revolutionary struggle was launched. According to seized EOKA documents, Cypriot communists were not to be accepted for membership and were enjoined to stand clear of the struggle if they were sincerely interested in *Enosis*. The Turkish Cypriots were described as compatriots in the effort against an alien ruler; they too were simply asked to stand clear, to refrain from opposition, and to avoid any alliance with the British.

⁹⁵ E. N. Tzelepy, pp. 43-44. The Foreign Office hoped that with Turkey as a political partner, Greece would find the British colonial presence and the vague promise of *Enosis* to be a preferable course. The alternative was to risk the implications that Turkish interference might bring. Hubert Faustmann, “The United Nations and the Internationalization of the Cyprus Conflict, 1949 – 1958,” pp. 3-49, here p. 19 in James Ker-Lindsay and Oliver Richmond (eds), *Promoting Peace and Development in Cyprus over four Decades*, Macmillan, London, 2001.

⁹⁶ “Announcement of the Organization Committee of EDA,” September 11, 1955, p. 19, in the EDA, *Decisions and Announcements of the General Council and of the Executive Committee of EDA on the Vital Problems of the People and the Country*, Athens, 1955.

colonial proposals of the British, helped the British maneuver and took liberties with the Turkish chauvinists.⁹⁷

In the meantime, the Turkish government had already stressed to the British the importance of Cyprus for Turkey⁹⁸ during a period that coincided with the rapid deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations. As early as in August 1955, Adnan Menderes, the Turkish Prime Minister, made a famous speech at the Liman Hotel in which he stated, among other things, that “Turkey will not accept any change to the *status quo* of Cyprus which in the present or in the future will harm the country.”⁹⁹ Moreover, he claimed that “the methods [Greece] put into effect in Crete” referring to the accession of Crete to Greece, “have been put into effect now in the case of Cyprus, [and] whether they like it or not, remind the Turks of the expansive attitude of Greece.”¹⁰⁰ This heated speech, in addition to the contacts the Turkish government made with Pan-Turkist and anti-communist groups¹⁰¹ before the end of the Tripartite Conference, triggered the Events of 6-7 September in Istanbul.¹⁰²

As soon as Turkey began an intervention in Cyprus, strong anti-Greek sentiment began to be politicized once again. We should note at this point that Greek and Turkish sentiment regarding one another were quite similar. In secular Kemalist nationalism, the “other” was Islam and the Ottoman Empire, and Mustafa Kemal’s attempts to modernize/Westernize Turkey and the population were based on inventing and shaping a new Turkish national identity based on Western values and ideals. However, in the collective Turkish memory the Greeks remained the dominant “other,” proving that the Balkan Wars and the period of 1919-1922 were stronger than the Venizelos-Ataturk Friendship Agreement, which existed only on paper. The Greeks shared similar feelings for their Turkish neighbors. In other words, as the Cyprus Question grew in scope, historical narratives and prejudices between Turkey and Greece resurfaced.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ For Turkish politics concerning Cyprus during the 1950s, see especially Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kışkacında Kıbrıs*, İletişim, İstanbul, 2002; Ibid., *Cyprus: The Impasse of Nationalisms*, Mavri Lista, Athens, 1999 and Melih Esenbel, *Kıbrıs I: Ayağa Kalkan Adam*, Bilgi, İstanbul, 1993.

⁹⁹ Melih Esenbel, p. 26.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 27. Menderes also claimed that Cyprus was an extension of Anatolia and was one of the most important positions for Turkey’s security.

¹⁰¹ Adnan Menderes on the 28th of August in 1955 invited the members of the “Cyprus is Turkish” organization to a meeting and told them, “The government will be no obstacle to you, but will assist to your efforts.” Özker Yaşın, *Nevzat ve Ben*, İstanbul, 1997, pp. 721-722 as quoted in Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Cyprus: The Impasse of Nationalisms*, p. 73.

¹⁰² Probably the most complete account can be found in Dilek Güven, *6-7 Eylül Olayları Cumhuriyet Dönemi Azınlık Politikaları ve Stratejileri Bağlamında*, İletişim, İstanbul, 2006; see also an interesting account based on French official archives, Anastasia-Ileana Moroni, “Soğuk Savaş ve Sömürgecilik Karşılı Hareket Işığında 6-7 Eylül Olayları,” *Tarih ve Toplum: Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, no 4, Autumn 2006, pp. 237-251.

The EDA was not immune to anti-Turkish sentiments regarding Greek society, and of course, it could not ignore the September events without commenting. The leader of the EDA stated:

The problem cannot be faced with impressive declarations and demonstrations to the Turkish government and at the NATO Council. There has to be substantial and determined actions: Immediate and definite notice of termination of relations with Turkey and their imperialist and colonial “allies.” Termination of all the talks with the British [and] Turks about the Cyprus Question.¹⁰³

However, in the rhetoric of the EDA there was a significant difference. Anti-Turkish rhetoric is a derivative of the Greek government’s policy that, firstly, was not able to foresee the Turkish reaction to the Cyprus Question, and secondly, perhaps more importantly, because the Greek Alarm government allowed the Turks to adopt and act that way. Moreover, the “Turkish chauvinistic and barbarian anti-Greek demonstrations, continuation and extension from the recent past, the hostile attitudes towards Greece, were combined by the Tripartite Conference with the threats of territorial integrity of the country [Greece].”¹⁰⁴ Therefore, the EDA opted to adopt a policy of national integrity and a radical change of policy, in order for the country to be saved from “constant humiliations” and disengage itself from the national crisis presented by the threat to her territorial integrity.¹⁰⁵

The adventure in the Cyprus Question, the brutality of the British imperialists, the brutality and the threats of the Turkish chauvinists, comprise symptoms of the general policy that have forced Greece’s accession to NATO. Therefore, in light of the real causes of today’s intense national crisis, the immediate release of the country from her commitments, concessions and obligations that were imposed upon the Greek people in absentia is ordered.¹⁰⁶

In response to these events, the EDA proposed the ousting of the Greek Alarm government, which was responsible for the impasse in which the country found itself, and, in addition, the party proposed a change in Greece’s foreign policy. The party claimed that this was the most important presupposition for the following disengagement from the state of vassalage of Cyprus. To that end, one of EDA’s most powerful weapons was the open call by all opposition parties in parliament for united action with common goals and common

¹⁰³ Ioannis Pasalidis, Declaration, 7 September 1955; Tasos Trikkas, 309.

¹⁰⁴ “Announcement of the Organization Committee of EDA,” September 11, 1955, p. 19, in Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., pp. 19-20.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 20; Trikkas mistakenly dates the announcement September 10, 1955; see Trikkas, vol. I, p. 309. Many city councils, through declarations, asked for the retreat of NATO (Kaisariani, Thessaloniki, Kavala, Dafni, Sikes, Keratsini, Nikaia etc.) ASKI, “Declarations of City Councils,” *EDA Archive*, Box 236, folder 1.

interests. In addition, the EDA called openly for all opposition deputies to resign from their posts as a vote of no confidence in the government. The left believed this was the only way to show to the government that the opposition did not agree with the policies of the government on issues neither domestic nor foreign.¹⁰⁷

The EDA's Administrative Committee met with the heads of all opposition parties and suggested to each "the creation of the presuppositions for the readjustment of national policy, the immediate withdrawal from power of the Alarm party and elections using proportional representation."

The international environment was also clement, specifically as regards the "Spirit of Geneva"¹⁰⁸ as it became known. EDA's newspaper *Avgi* noted "the parallel conditions" between Austria and Greece that were based on the geopolitical position of the two countries, while rapprochement between the USSR and Yugoslavia provided the necessary credibility needed for the EDA's proposed redirection of foreign policy regarding peace and neutrality.¹⁰⁹ For the EDA, the "Spirit of Geneva" became "the main link in the chain" to suggest and promote a minimum common program of "democratic turns" which would open the way to "national democratic change."¹¹⁰ It was not just a strategic move by the EDA leadership, but rather a move of greater caliber that was based on a specific analysis of the "new international situation" and its Balkan dimension.

The Cyprus Question was dominated, the EDA declared, by a "one-sided" Greek foreign policy. Papagos believed that having American support would minimize the British reaction by proceeding with the appeal to the UN concerning Cyprus. Papagos was wrong, however, and the internalization of the issue after strong pressure from Makarios destabilized Greece's relations with its Western allies.

The EDA, since its formation, had "declared its full and unconditional support to the fighting heroic people of Cyprus, in order for the pan-Cypriot and, at the same time, the pan-Hellenic desire of *Enosis* with Greece to be accomplished." When the Cypriot Ethnarchy

¹⁰⁷ "Decision of the Executive Committee of EDA," October 8, 1955, p. 51, in the EDA, *Decisions and Announcements of the General Council and of the Executive Committee of EDA on the Vital Problems of the People and the Country*, Athens, 1955; concerning the duties of the opposition according to the EDA, see also the "Political Decision of the General Council of EDA," 24 May 1955, p. 46-47, in *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ The Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, commonly referred to as the Fourth Geneva Convention and abbreviated as GCIV, is one of the four treaties of the Geneva Conventions. It was adopted in August 1949 and defines humanitarian protections for civilians in war zones and outlaws the practice of total war.

¹⁰⁹ *Avgi*, April 15, 1955; see also the series of articles referring to the meetings between Khrushchev and Bulganin in Belgrade with Tito.

¹¹⁰ Tasos Trikkas.

requested the Greek government to appeal to the UN, the EDA backed Nicosia's demand, despite reservations, as noted in Avgi: "[The] Greek people have no illusions that the UN with today's artificial American majority can possibly solve the issue of freeing Cyprus. But the setting up of the Cyprus Question in the international organization helps in that direction. The government has the obligation to put the issue on the UN General Assembly's agenda."¹¹¹

The General Commission of the UN decided to register the Cyprus Question on the 23rd of September in 1954 with 9 votes in favor, 3 against and 3 absentees. After the voting in the General Commission of the UN, Ioannis Pasalidis stated that:

The registration of the Cyprus Question on the daily agenda of the UN is characterized by all the Greek People in Greece and in Cyprus as a fact that can open a road to the solution of this national problem. The voting showed to the Greek People who its real friends are and who are the "allies" blocking the *Enosis* of Cyprus and undermining the real interests of our country. It is time for the political world to adjust its position to the teachings that derive from the voting on the Cyprus Question and to proceed with the reformulation of the foreign policy that is dominant today. The politics of peace and the equal friendship is proven once more as the only right, which is for the benefit of our national interest.¹¹²

Makarios sharply criticized Greek foreign policy as Grivas was arriving in Cyprus. According to the latter's memoirs, it was at that time that Makarios himself abandoned his hesitancy and sought a quickening of action which Stephanopoulos was also seeking.¹¹³ The appeal to the UN was halted "for the moment" not only by some of the allied powers but by Greece as well, and led to extensive demonstrations, mainly by the youth, as a reaction against government policy and the great powers. The allies' stance was perceived by the youth as "condensed expression of imperialism." The Cyprus Question fused anti-imperialist attitudes with unwavering expressions against oppression. The youth came dynamically to the fore, demanding support for the Cypriot cause, national independence, and democratization of the country.¹¹⁴

While the EDA representatives in parliament were accusing the government of "superficiality" and of leading the Cyprus cause to its "interment," the Cyprus Question entered a new stage. The creation of EOKA, and the bombing attacks it carried out, did not sit

¹¹¹ Avgi, February 22, 1953.

¹¹² Avgi, September 25, 1954.

¹¹³ Georgios Grivas-Digenis, *Memoirs of the EOKA Struggle, 1955-1959*, Athens, 1961, p. 25.

¹¹⁴ Nikos Psiroukis, *History of Modern Greece, 1940-1974*, vol. 3, 5th ed., Koukkida – Aigaion, Athens, 2011 [1976].

well with the EDA's anti-colonial stance. The left, known for its opposition to "individual terrorism," defined its position on the matter. Initially, the party was limited in its presentation of the news, but it published an AKEL announcement the day after the bombings:

The acts of violence cannot in any way promote the national struggle. The people of Cyprus must work for its fighting unity and be ready to undertake all kinds of struggle in order for its sacred desires to be satisfied [...] It must be careful though, not to be waylaid by potential challenges of the British and their agents in Greece, in actions that can prove harmful for the movement in favor of *Enosis*.

The EDA's stance was crystallized in an op-ed article in *Avgi* in which the party was ranged against the EOKA and its actions upon the occasion of the Bandung Conference. Specifically, the article says that "the expedience and the compromises of the high transatlantic politics, who he himself [Makarios] and the Alarm government kept on the occasion of the recourse to the UN, isolated the Cyprus case from its real supporters. They threw the Cyprus people into the adventure of explosions and bombings [...]: British! A slave Cyprus will always be against you, a free Cyprus will always be with you. EOKA."¹¹⁵

The Escalation of the Cyprus Question

At the time, the EDA's stance regarding the Cyprus Question was mainly concerned with the development of the anti-imperialist struggle and the redirection of Greek foreign policy, which was its constant goal. The Cyprus Question was for EDA "the beacon that lights up and guides the Greek people to the road of abolishing the foreign tutelage and to creating a foreign policy genuinely serving Greek interests." Moreover, "the Cyprus Question marks the new political struggles that cannot fit in the scheme Right-Center-Left, but they place the Greeks in the Movement of Change, Independence, Equal Friendship, or on the side of the 'subject ones.'"¹¹⁶

The bombings in Cyprus also drew a reaction from the American government, which, through its ambassador in Greece, Cannon Cavendish, urged against a repeated Greek recourse to the UN, and also proposed that center parties abstain from any partnerships with the EDA, criticizing their cooperation in the February elections. The Greek government, on the other hand, interpreted the statement as "interest" for the good of the country, and praised

¹¹⁵ *Avgi*, April 14, 1955.

¹¹⁶ Elias Eliou, *Avgi*, January 1, 1956.

the good and “productive use of American help.”¹¹⁷ The EDA, for its part, criticized American intervention, characterizing the Radcliffe proposals as “a brilliant base” for the solution of the Cyprus Question, deploring the United States for their “anti-Greek actions” “ignoring the demand of our Cypriot brothers for self-determination” and asserting that Washington’s only goal was to perpetuate the issue. The party went on to state that it was the duty of the left and the EDA specifically to declare again that, “the Cyprus Question cannot be solved according to the desires of the Greek people within the context of the ‘Holy Alliance’ of imperialist-colonizers.”¹¹⁸

Avgi had also repeated the party’s position on the issue, publishing an article with the title “With the people, not with the foreigners!” Cannon’s positions and statement, which praised the Karamanlis government and criticized the smaller parties of the opposition, were denounced: “The people do not speak with the foreigners anymore. But the people, full of bitterness and rage, turn against the political world, especially against the leadership and the members of opposition” which became “supernumerary of the national vassalage.”¹¹⁹

In October of 1955, General Papagos died and King Paul chose Konstantinos Karamanlis as his successor, to the clear chagrin of more obvious contenders. The king’s choice came as a surprise given Papagos’s own preference for Stefanos Stefanopoulos to be foreign minister. Karamanlis, although not drawn from the “charmed” circle of the Athenian political elite, had made his name as a hard-driving minister of public works.¹²⁰ The king’s choice aroused suspicion both in the government and opposition circles concerning the extent of the network and contacts Karamanlis had established in past years, a network strong enough to bring him to power with the consent of the Palace and the Americans.¹²¹ Karamanlis’ succession was, as Queen Frederica wrote in a letter to General Marshall, “as [if] the country had drunk a glass of champagne.”¹²² Karamanlis represented, having created the fame of a successful minister of the government, the demand for refreshing the political staff, distancing from the legacy of

¹¹⁷ Even Papandreou agreed with the American ambassador as far as the “Popular Fronts” were concerned, although he considered the statement to be an active intervention in Greek affairs.

¹¹⁸ Executive Committee of the EDA, “The US Interventions on the Cyprus Question,” January 28, 1956, pp. 9-10, in EDA, *The Policy of the EDA: Official Documents (Decisions – Announcements – Declarations of Representatives, 3.12.1956 – 20.9.1957)*, issue 20, Athens, 1957.

¹¹⁹ Avgi, April 5, 1955.

¹²⁰ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, p. 151; John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis, *Modern Greece: A History since 1821*, Wiley-Blackwell, Sussex, 2010, p. 132.

¹²¹ On Karamanlis’ rise to power, see Evanthis Chatzivasilou, *The Emergence of Konstantinos Karamanlis to Power, 1954-1956*, Pataki, Athens, 2001; Spyros Linardatos, *Ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 372-381 and Spyros Markezinis, *Modern Political History of Greece, 1952-1975*, vol. 3, Papyrus Publishing House, Athens, 1994, pp. 66-71.

¹²² Quoted in Elias Nikolakopoulos, *The Cachectic Democracy. Parties and Elections, 1946-1967*, Pataki, Athens, 7th ed., 2010 [2006], p. 192.

the National Schism (1915), and finally, a steady orientation to economic recovery. Furthermore, he represented a generation of new politicians who did not have strong ties with Great Britain and were almost exclusively turned to the United States.¹²³ However, Karamanlis's rise to power was considered by the EDA to be a choice in that it "was prepared and forced [upon the Greek people] by the British-Americans, by the anti-popular dictatorial circles and by all those who are terrified of the perspective of a popular verdict that will open the road to a truly national democratic and people-friendly change"¹²⁴ because, as previously noted, "the given solution heightens the governmental and the national crisis" and the anti-parliamentary way the new government came to power.¹²⁵

The new electoral law preparations were submitted to the Greek Parliament on the 25th of November in 1955. The government's most important measure was the revision of the simple majority system dating from 1954. The government referred to the law as a "majority electoral system with limited representation of the minority and proportional to the large precincts." According to the new electoral law, a simple majority was maintained in smaller constituencies, whereas in larger constituencies, with over three seats at stake, some were determined by proportional representation.¹²⁶ The talks and the final voting concerning the new electoral law were completed on the 19th of December in 1955. On February 19th, 1956, elections witnessed the appearance of Karamanlis's new party, the National Radical Union (ERE) and the first of future coalitions of the center under the name of Democratic Union. Five centrist parties, including the remnants of the conservative Populist Party and the EDA, took part in the coalition. Although the Democratic Union won 48.2 percent of the vote and the National Radical Union 47.3 percent, the latter secured 165 out of the 300 seats in Parliament. The true benefit of the 1956 elections, however, was reaped by the left which broke out from its ostracism and was legitimized in its partnership with the center forces. Henceforth the left would merge its own rhetoric with the anti-right parlance of the liberals.¹²⁷

The new election law, the unrest created by the emergence of Karamanlis, and the policies on the Cyprus Question made the political environment extremely tense. However, at the time the most likely electoral outcome was that the ERE would win a majority, leaving no space for the center parties unless they cooperated with the EDA, a proposal that the EDA had

¹²³ Ibid., p. 193; Evanthis Chatzivasilou, pp. 288-294 and 301-310.

¹²⁴ "Decision of the Executive Committee of EDA," October 8, 1955, p. 49, in Ibid.

¹²⁵ Spyros Linardatos, vol. 2, p. 382.

¹²⁶ John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis, p. 132; Elias Nikolakopoulos, pp. 196-214, in which he analyses the changes in the established election laws as well its relevance with the EDA.

¹²⁷ John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis, p. 133.

already made in the past. As was rightly argued, “in these elections, only two parties took part: the ERE and the coalition of all other parties of the opposition, i.e. a popular front comprised only six and a half years after the end of the civil war.”¹²⁸ Despite the efforts of the government, which, although indirectly, wished for the EDA to minimize its voting base, they managed to achieve the opposite result. The new election law made it impossible for all the other parties to compete with the ERE, and hence, as has been mentioned, made the EDA an important ally of all centrist parties. Moreover, the ERE failed to take into consideration the deep crisis within the center itself, a great percentage of which, especially left-centrist voters, switched their allegiance to the EDA.¹²⁹

The elections of 1956 gave the EDA greater confidence and trust in the future, and it was gaining a more prominent role in Greek political life through its successful collaboration with center parties, which afforded the EDA access to local organizations and different segments of the workforce. Victory at the polls owed much to the multi-sided struggle in the left wing. The EDA was struggling to maintain its legality, which was under challenge, and moreover, the notions of democratic freedom and stability also bore undertones of hegemony, while also serving as the backdrop onto which popular demands and claims were projected.

“Never before the uplift of the Cyprus Question did the readjustment of [Greek] foreign policy make such an impact”¹³⁰ and it was used by the EDA, through its leader Pasalidis, who set the tone of the EDA’s foreign policy throughout its existence. Pasalidis’ speech should be quoted at length because of its importance. He states that:

It is also true that the thoughts and policies of the government turn towards the same problem [the Cyprus Question]. It could not do otherwise, whether the government liked it or not. The question is, however, whether the thoughts and policies of the government about the Cyprus Question are the right ones, if they contribute to its promotion, if they serve the national interests. And we [the EDA] are obliged to note from the last month’s events and also, by the text of the government’s statements, that the thoughts and policies of the government not only fail to promote the Cyprus Question, but actually set out its demise the same way they [the government] dash the general national interest.¹³¹

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 197. For an excellent analysis of the talks among the parties as well as the elections results, see pp. 198-214; see also, Giannis Papadimitriou, *The Flash of the Left. Eight Concussive Electoral Contests: 1950-1967. EDA on the Political Proscenium*, Athens, Filistor, 2001, pp. 40-50.

¹²⁹ For more on the crisis within the center and the shifting allegiance of voters, and especially the EDA’s emergence as the main opposition, see the interesting analysis by Christoforos Vernardakis and Giannis Mavris.

¹³⁰ Spyros Linardatos, vol. 2, p. 339.

¹³¹ Ioannis Pasalidis, *CQGP*, April 5, 1956, vol. 2, p. 102.

He continues on to state:

[W]ith the Tripartite Conference of London and with the Makarios-Harding talks, today's and previous parties have accepted: 1) to turn the Cyprus Question from an international matter to one that concerns Greece, Great Britain, Turkey and NATO, leading to the wreckage of the talks and driving Archbishop Makarios, defenseless, to exile, and 2) to abandon the demand of self-determination....¹³²

The government's stance on Cyprus was seemingly echoed by all before the elections, but demonstrated not only that did it not move the problem high enough up the Greek political agenda, but also that it actually endangered the Cyprus Question. Pasalidis took the initiative to state openly that the EDA was willing to forget the past, a clear reference to Papagos's "oblivion of the past" as personally and peacefully promised to Pasalidis a few years previously. Papagos had assured Pasalidis that the government would do its best to proceed with "the oblivion of the past" and adopt a peaceful approach to the EDA. Attempts to dissolve the EDA were also abandoned after the EDA's official legal recognition as a political party in Greece by the dominant right-wing party.¹³³ The government of the ERE was accused of continuing the Greek Alarm policy of unconditional surrender to the interests of the Great Powers. Therefore, it was argued that Greece had to change its Cyprus policy, lest NATO, Great Britain and Turkey do so. Given the implausibility of this scenario, Greece had to adopt a more "aggressive" policy in order to press these countries towards a viable solution to the Cyprus Question. On the occasion of the government's allegation that it was not Greek foreign policy that was wrong but the British one, which was untrustworthy, Pasalidis stated:

This means, at least, nearsightedness on behalf of the government, and not of British diplomacy, as the Prime Minister asserts. British diplomacy is anything but shortsighted. It has great experience in [...] colonial issues, and of whether to retreat or to insist, depending on the occasion. [...] As long as, the [Greek] government cannot understand that a compromise of blind devotion to NATO and to British-Turkish friendship [...] will bring an impasse, in line with [our] higher national interests.¹³⁴

¹³² Ibid. The EDA's position was known since it was repeated again a few months prior on July 23, 1955, "Announcements of the Organization Committee of EDA on Cyprus," Athens, 23 July 1955, p. 29, in the EDA, *Decisions and Announcements of the General Council and of the Executive Committee of EDA on the Vital Problems of the People and the Country*, Athens, 1955.

¹³³ See the Greek newspapers dated November 26, 1952 and Spyros Linardatos, vol. 2, p. 21, for the talks between the two leaders.

¹³⁴ Ioannis Pasalidis, p. 103.

Pasalidis' address to the Greek Parliament concluded with some positions that the EDA believed would solve the Cyprus Question, or which could, at least, form the basis for just and healthy negotiations. For the EDA, the national policy on Cyprus meant: "a) official clear reset of the Cyprus Question on the grounds of self-determination, immediate and unconditional; b) internationalization on the grounds of the issues of self-determination of the people and the disturbance of world peace; and c) usage, without commitment or prior and blind obedience to NATO, of all appropriate and effective means."¹³⁵ Elsewhere, he concluded: "Unfortunately, for us [the EDA], the government has transformed Greece into a non-independent state."¹³⁶

De-Stalinization and the Critical Year of 1956: Relations with the EDA

During his life, Stalin held the role of ultimate arbiter between the Soviet Union and Eastern Union. He also had a large say on the speed of the changes introduced from above in Eastern European countries, with the noble exception of Yugoslavia, where Josif Broz Tito's (1892-1980) strong domestic position allowed the Yugoslav communists to defy Soviet directives.¹³⁷ In addition to Tito's Yugoslavia, there were also clashes with the Albania of Enver Hoxha (1908-1985) linked with the Sino-Soviet dispute, which got started in the 1950s and became an open split in the 1960s. Although not all communist parties could defy the Soviet Union, there were instances, like in Poland, where Wladyslaw Gomulka (1905-1982) managed to turn the weakness of the Polish Communist Party to his advantage. Gomulka, who in 1948 had been replaced as general secretary of the party and arrested in July 1951, was released from prison in 1954. Two months later, he managed to become the leader of Poland's Communists as First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) by turning to his advantage his imprisonment by Stalin.¹³⁸

The years between the death of Stalin and Khrushchev's Secret Speech were a time of reassessment for a number of those who had earlier enthusiastically embarked on what they perceived as "building socialism" in Eastern Europe.¹³⁹ The mid-1950s were, both for Poland and Hungary, a period of classical "revisionism." Dissenting voices started to emerge in both

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ioannis Pasalidis, May 23, 1956, *CQGP*, p. 229. During a previous session, Pasalidis, on the occasion of not revealing government "top secret" documents on Cyprus, accused the government of compromising. Ioannis Pasalidis, April 25, 1956, *CQGP*, p. 176.

¹³⁷ Archie Brown, *The Rise and Fall of Communism*, HarperCollins, New York, 2009, p. 267.

¹³⁸ Ray Taras, *Ideology in a Socialist State: Poland, 1956-1983*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984, pp. 47-48.

¹³⁹ Archie Brown, p. 268.

countries, criticizing the way communist doctrine was being interpreted. As a result, there was a rising tide of protests and increasing anti-Sovietism, and the “Polish October,” as it was called, started worrying both the Soviets and the Polish leadership. A few days later, disobedience to Soviet directives, demonstrations across the country and anti-Soviet sentiment made Khrushchev decide to embark on armed conflict in Poland. However, Gomulka offered the Soviet leaders the important reassurance “that Poland would remain a member of the international Communist movement and, most specifically, of the Warsaw Pact.”¹⁴⁰ The Soviet leadership accepted Gomulka’s offer and granted Poland relatively more independence. Gomulka’s pledge to follow a “Polish road to socialism,” reminiscent a decade after of Mehmet Ali Aybar’s “Turkish road to socialism,” was more in harmony with national traditions and preferences, and as a result made many Poles interpret the dramatic confrontation of 1956 as a sign that the end of the dictatorship was in sight. Upcoming events in Poland, however, were to defeat those hopes.

Hungary in 1956

This criticism of the “dogmatic” interpretation of communism and open defiance of the authorities in Poland in 1956 was a stimulus for protests in Hungary. A student demonstration in Budapest in support of Gomulka, asking for similar reforms in Hungary, was one of the events that sparked the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Five thousands students gathered at the Budapest Technological University on the 22nd of October and produced what amounted to a revolutionary manifesto.

The reaction in Hungary to the process of de-Stalinization in the USSR was essentially the same as in Poland, but the outcome was quite different. Imre Nagy (1896-1956), Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Hungary, put forward the “New Course” program in June of 1953. It was not a radical document, and resembled that of Walter Ulbricht’s in East Germany which had been adopted a fortnight earlier. Nagy pledged “to abolish the forced labor camps, to tear up the ‘kulak lists,’ to allow the peasants to leave the collective farms if they wanted to, and, to replace the previous stress on heavy industry with a concentration on the production of consumer goods and raising the standard of living.”¹⁴¹ The program was welcomed by the peasants, but Nagy was not allowed to continue with that policy.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 278.

¹⁴¹ Ben Fowkes, *Eastern Europe, 1945-1969: From Stalinism to Stagnation*, Pearson, London and New York, 2000, p. 57.

The dependence of the Hungarian communist regime on the Soviet Union was the reason behind this. Nagy's "New Course" was deemed to be revisionist and a deviation from the official line. Therefore, in January of 1955, during a visit of the Hungarian party delegation to Moscow, Nagy was accused of denigrating the party's leading role and denying the importance of the class struggle.¹⁴² Soon after, the "New Course" advocated by Nagy was abandoned, and Nagy himself was dismissed as prime minister and expelled from the party. Matyas Rakosi (1892-1971), the man responsible for the purges of approximately 350,000 officials and intellectuals during the period 1948-1956,¹⁴³ was chosen by the Soviets to lead Hungary. However, a group of sympathizers formed around Nagy and refused to participate in the new chain of command and policies.

In the meantime, the Secret Speech by Nikita Khrushchev provided an opportunity for all those dissident communist voices agitating for reform. Students and intellectuals gathered, soon to be followed by industrial workers also reacting to the status-quo. Political tension came to a head during the ceremony of the reburial of Laszlo Rajk (1909-1949), former minister of the interior and a communist politician who was executed in 1949 by the Stalin-backed Rakosi government and who had been transformed into a martyr and victim of Stalinist oppression. Since Tito was accepted again as a comrade in the internationalist communist movement, Rajk, and all those who offered their support to Tito in the past and were condemned for it, were also taken back into the fold.¹⁴⁴ During Rajk's reburial, Imre Nagy stood next to Rajk's widow assuring those around him that "soon it will be Stalinism that will finally be buried."¹⁴⁵

Erno Gero, a close associate of Rákosi, was instated as party leader in Rakosi's stead. Gero's rule however, was soon to be terminated after a fierce attack on the students and intellectuals condemning those who wrote the demands. Gero's speech enraged the population, who then took up more active and dynamic demonstrations that led to country-wide unrest, making the authorities unable to stop. Imre Nagy formed a "People's Patriotic Government" on the 27th of October and managed to persuade the other party leaders to agree to a truce and offer a change of policy, which was accepted by the insurgents and the parties. Nagy, under the impression that the Soviet leadership agreed to such a move, announced the

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 57. For a more analytical approach, see János M. Rainer, *Imre Nagy: A Biography*, trans. by Lyman H. Legters with a foreword by István Deák, I B Tauris, London and New York, 2009, pp. 64-73.

¹⁴³ "Purges" in Hungary were not necessarily the same as in the Soviet Union. In some cases it meant losing one's job, deportation, or resettling. Johanna Granville, *The First Domino: International Decision Making During the Hungarian Crisis of 1956*, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, 2004, p. 7.

¹⁴⁴ Geoffrey Swain, *Tito: A Biography*, I. B. Tauris, London and New York, 2011, p. 122.

¹⁴⁵ Archie Brown, p. 280.

end of the one-party system and formed a cabinet which also included leaders of the former Smallholders' Party.

Although the Soviets agreed to this the next day, they ultimately changed their mind, and sent troops back in to Hungary. Imre Nagy faced a dilemma: "either he could take charge of the restoration of party authority and destroy the revolution, or he could abandon the party and try to save the revolution."¹⁴⁶ He chose the latter. Nagy declared Hungary's neutrality and withdrew from the Warsaw Pact on the 1st of November. This triggered the Soviet invasion of Hungary, which after a week was under Soviet control under a new communist government set up by Janos Kadar.

The Soviet change of heart concerning the invasion in Hungary was, in large part, shaped by international developments concerning the Cold War. Firstly, Chinese leadership was pressing the Soviets, because, according to them, Imre Nagy was making too many concessions to non-communists and hence there was a danger of a capitalist restoration in Hungary. Secondly, and probably more importantly, were the developments in Egypt concerning the Suez Canal. Israel sent its forces into Egypt, and the next day the British and French governments sent an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel, demanding they cease their hostilities and ensure freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal. By losing Egypt to the West, the Soviets thought that their position in the Middle East "would receive a shattering blow, and that to abandon Hungary as well would be too much of a retreat in the face of the imperialists," in other words a sign of weakness on Soviet part that would allow the imperialists to attack.¹⁴⁷

In Greece at the time, the crisis that erupted in Eastern Europe became a point of varying interpretations. As regards the case of Poland, the bourgeois press sided whole-heartedly with Gomulka, but not for the sake of communism. The Greek bourgeois press thought that the example of Yugoslavia, which had been followed by Poland, could prompt other countries to claim and gain their independence¹⁴⁸ and thus limit the influence and power of the Soviet Union. While in the Polish case the stance of the bourgeois newspapers was clear, the Hungarian case presented a more complicated scenario. Hungary put the bourgeois newspapers in an awkward position, because Imre Nagy, on the one hand, was anti-Stalinist, and on the other hand, he called for the Soviet army to intervene and reinstate order. In subsequent days, the newspapers referred to thousands of victims, although the exact number

¹⁴⁶ Ben Fowkes, p. 60.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.; Archie Brown, p. 284.

¹⁴⁸ *Kathimerini*, October 23, 1956; *To Vima*, October 21, 1956; *Akropolis*, October 21, 1956.

varied among the newspapers, and praised the “incredible bravery of the Hungarian people” while at the same time celebrating the participation of non-communist ministers in the government.¹⁴⁹ As regards terminology, the bourgeois press used the words “rebellion” and “revolution” for the people’s actions, and for the Soviet response, they minced their words, using the term “intervention” instead of bluntly saying “invasion.”¹⁵⁰

Avgi, on the other hand, interpreted Gomulka’s rise to power to mean the “complete reinstatement of the socialist legitimacy.” The developments in Poland were considered to be a victory of the new liberal spirit that inspired the socialist world after the Twentieth Congress.”¹⁵¹ However, the Hungarian case was different. Although the EDA refrained from publishing a statement on the events, the party’s position was expressed through *Avgi*. Starting on the 25th of October, the newspaper devoted a lot of space, always on the front page, to the crisis in Hungary. The newspaper of the EDA ran a story which stated that “the counter-revolution in Hungary was suppressed”¹⁵² and that “reactionary fascist elements” were attempting to take advantage of the “desires of the Hungarian people.”¹⁵³ In a series of articles that ran for more than two weeks *Avgi* tried to present an “objective” account of the events in Hungary. On the 30th of October, *Avgi* devoted most of its space to the events in Hungary and to the events in Egypt. Furthermore, on the same date the newspaper ran a summary of the ideas of Italian communist leader Palmiro Togliatti, who characterized the crisis as “grievous events.” The account, however, was a clear sign of the position the EDA was taking. *Avgi*’s stance was made clearer on the 3rd of November when it referred to a new counter-revolution in Hungary. The next day, the newspaper of the EDA published an appeal of the Greek Committee for International Détente and Peace (EEDYE) to the member-states of the United Nations that linked the Cyprus Question with the Suez crisis, but the appeal made no mention of the events in Hungary. Referring to the latest Soviet invasion in Hungary on the 6th of November, the newspaper noted that “the counter-revolution was crushed” and placed emphasis on the “atrocities made by the counter-revolutionists.”¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁹ *Kathimerini*, October 27, 1956; *Akropolis*, October 28, 1956.

¹⁵⁰ For example, see the newspapers *Kathimerini*, October 25-27, 1956; *To Vima*, October 25-27, 1956; *Eleftheria*, October 25-27, 1956.

¹⁵¹ *Avgi*, October 23, 1956.

¹⁵² *Avgi*, October 26, 1956.

¹⁵³ *Avgi*, October 25, 1956.

¹⁵⁴ *Avgi*, November 6, 1956.

Indeed, the EDA sided completely with the Soviet account of events, as did the KKE.¹⁵⁵ At a meeting with the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Athens, I. Marchuk, EDA deputy Elias Eliou replied to Marchuk by saying that the EDA fully supported the positions of the Soviet Union. Eliou also noted an important issue for the Soviet leadership, that in Greece, the anti-Soviet “campaign” was much weaker than in other western countries, a state of affairs that, according to Eliou, came about because of “the actions of EDA.”¹⁵⁶ Eliou mentioned to the Soviet Secretary that attempts made by the reactionary forces of Greece to use the Hungarian crisis to boost anti-Soviet sentiment were halted by the EDA when the deputies of the party assured the government that it would turn the demonstrations into a rally for the self-determination of Cyprus.¹⁵⁷ The same opinion was expressed also by the chairperson of the EDA, Ioannis Pasalidis, during a meeting with the Czech ambassador Zilki and the Soviet charge d'affaires in Greece, G.E. Chebotarev, who defended the Soviet invasion in Hungary, by “offering help to the Hungarian people to suppress the counter-revolution.”¹⁵⁸ The lack of anti-Sovietism in Greece did not go unnoticed by US officials. In late 1956, the USIS observed that Greece was the only NATO member where no serious anti-Soviet manifestations had taken place in the wake of the invasion of Hungary.¹⁵⁹

The Soviet invasion in Hungary did not cause, as in other countries, a crisis in the communist movement itself. Perhaps the most insightful and truthful explanation was presented by Spyros Linardatos, a journalist and member of the EDA, who noted: “With the present atmosphere and psychology [that the attack in Suez and the developments in Cyprus caused] it was natural, at least for the leftists, not to turn against the Soviet Union, an ally during that period in the Cyprus Question. [...] Considering that during that period ‘the only enemy was colonialism,’ we were able to salve our consciousness and suppress our worries for all the tragedies that were taking place in Eastern Europe. The fact that the Soviet Union and other ‘socialist countries’ supported the Egyptians was enough for us to remain on their side.”¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁵ The Central Committee of the KKE congratulated the new Hungarian government of Janos Kadar on the 6th of November in 1956 through its review *Neos Kosmos* (*New World*). *Neos Kosmos*, vol. 11, November 1956, p. 81; KKE, *Official Documents, 1956-1961*, vol. 8, Syghroni Epohi, Athens, 1997, p. 143.

¹⁵⁶ *The Soviet Union and the Balkans during the 1950s and 1960s: Collection of Documents*, Paratiritis, Thessaloniki, 2009, p. 96. The text is dated November 24, 1956.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 98-99. The text is dated November 28, 1956.

¹⁵⁹ Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation: Political Culture, Irredentism and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece, 1945-1967*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2007, p. 210.

¹⁶⁰ Spyros Linardatos, *Politicians and Politics: 70 Years of Memories, Struggles, Documents*, Proskinio, Athens, 1999, p. 175.

The Suez Crisis

Apart from complete alignment with the Soviet position, there was another reason behind the EDA's "failure" to elaborate more on the Hungarian crisis. The Israeli attack on Egypt and the British intention to invade Suez¹⁶¹ made the situation more complicated. The improvement in relations between Egypt and Greece led Nasser to assure the Greek government in March of 1955 that he supported them in the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus.¹⁶² Since the Greeks took the Cyprus Question to the United Nations, Arab support for Cyprus at the United Nations was critical as regards Greece's position. Furthermore, the Greek government was counting on that support, having refused Britain's invitation to participate in the Suez conference in London and made it clear that their sympathies lay with Nasser throughout the crisis.¹⁶³ Therefore, the fact that Western powers used Cyprus to attack an Arab country, whose struggle was met with great sympathy by the Greek people, made even the Greek bourgeois push for a critical stance on the British, but hoping the US would come and save the day.¹⁶⁴ Generally, all the bourgeois press, with the exception of the conservative right-wing *Estia*, held a relatively critical stance as regards the British, but looked favorably on the Americans. *Avgi*, on the other hand, followed a different approach to the Suez crisis, as would be expected.

The Administrative Committee of the EDA, through a front-page article in *Avgi*, emphasized that the Greek people were on the side of the Egyptians. Furthermore, the party noted:

The British attack on Suez was a continuation, extension and expansion of the violent and bloody strategy the British imperialists exercise in Cyprus. [...] It has become obvious that the honest aspiration of self-determination of Cyprus is completely opposite with apolicy that considers the realization of self-determination within the context of the Greek alliances. Because, when we have as allies the

¹⁶¹ For the period before and after the Suez crisis, as well as the use of Cyprus as an base from which to launch attacks on Egypt, although briefly, see Robert McNamara, *Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle East, 1952-1967. From the Egyptian Revolution to Six Day War*, Frank Cass, London-Portland, 2003; see also Richard Toye and Nicholas Lawton, "'The Challenge of Co-Existence': The Labour Party, Affluence and the Cold War, 1951-64," pp. 145-166, in Paul Corthorn and Jonathan Davis (eds), *The British Labour Party and The Wider World. Domestic Politics, Internationalism and Foreign Policy*, I. B. Tauris, London-New York, 2008. For Turkish foreign policy on Suez, see the interesting article by Ayşegül Sever, "A Reluctant Partner of the US over Suez? Turkey and the Suez Crisis," pp. 123-132, in Simon C. Smith (ed), *Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2008.

¹⁶² Evanthis Chatzivasiliou, "The Suez Crisis, Cyprus and Greek Foreign Policy, 1956: A View from the British Archives," *Balkan Studies*, vol. 30, no. 1, 1989, pp. 107-129.

¹⁶³ Ayşegül Sever, p. 130.

¹⁶⁴ "The dangers" and "The role of England," *Kathimerini*, October 31, 1956.

colonialists, they intend to use Cyprus as base of operations of predatory raids and they never give up willingly their possessions.¹⁶⁵

The EDA was also against the participation of Greece at the Suez conference. For the EDA, it was a chance to emphasize its Cyprus policy, as this was reformulated in line with the new international developments and represented a direct link to the discussions that were taking place in what it would later lead to the Radcliffe's Proposals. The EDA accused the British administration in Cyprus of continuing terrorism and blamed the Karamanlis government for not "utilizing internationally the Cypriot struggle" and for "making the Arabs suspicious about the Cyprus Question [and] offering promises for bases."¹⁶⁶ In addition, he laid "the basic responsibility for the decisive demand of the Cypriot freedom" on the Greek government since "it is obvious that eventually, the Cyprus Question will be solved on an international, political and diplomatic level, where it is led by the heroic struggle of the Cypriot people."¹⁶⁷

Suez was instrumentalized by the EDA as an example:

The Cyprus Question, just as the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the devastation of the colonial positions in Egypt, can be solved, as has been shown. The prestige of the imperialist powers was never so low, weakened by the continuous blows of the hereto slaves. [The] EDA addresses the following message: The Cyprus Question can be solved, under the condition that Greece will take full responsibility for its handling; it will place the issue decisively in the context of the anti-colonial struggle and it will ask for support from everywhere, wherever it would be possible to find response.¹⁶⁸

The EDA proposed "a program of national politics for the salvation of the Cyprus Question" with the following points:

1. Greece has to identify fully its stance on the Suez issue with the stance of the Egyptian government of Nasser.
2. Make clear that it will not allow use of Greek soil and ports as bases for operations or even transit of the Anglo-Saxon and American military intimidation forces that had already been mobilized for intervention.

¹⁶⁵ Avgi, November 1, 1956.

¹⁶⁶ ASKI, "Announcement of the Organization Committee of EDA," August 11, 1956, *EDA Archive*, Box 34; see also Tasos Trikkas, p. 435.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ The Administrative Committee of the EDA made an announcement on the 22nd of September in 1956, repeating its positions.

3. Suspend the fulfillment of every allied obligation towards England and Turkey and refuse to participate in any common activity with these countries until the Cyprus Question is solved.
4. Take advantage of the Suez issue, and reap the potential the Montreaux Convention provides for Greece [...] in order to project actively the demand for the freedom of Cyprus to its oppressors.
5. Issue a clear statement that a free Cyprus will be declared a demilitarized island under international guarantees and therefore the installation of any base on its grounds will not be allowed, in order to address categorically the strategic concerns presented by the Turkish government and answer the legitimate questions of the Arab world.
6. Secure the broadest potential of diplomatic handling of the Cyprus Question and safeguard the security policy of the country in the broadening of its friendly relations to create an essential response against Turkish threats. Besides the exercise of Greek policy within NATO, as proposed by a large portion of the political world, the tightening of bonds should be ensured with anti-colonial forces and especially with the Arabic world; strengthen the friendship with Yugoslavia and broaden relations with Eastern countries and the Soviet Union, which stood as the most consistent supporter of the Cypriot struggle. All these can become potential means that the Greek government should utilize to be in a position to face the international conspiracy of the colonial forces and to promote the issue of Cypriot freedom.¹⁶⁹

The Suez crisis and its aftermath led the EDA, through its Organization Committee, to send another statement in support of the Arab countries. Notably, it reads:

The Cyprus Question can be solved, under the condition that Greece will take full responsibility for its handling, and it will incorporate the issue decisively in the context of anti-colonial struggle and it will ask for support from anywhere it can get it. The government is obliged to come forward with a clear statement that a free Cyprus will be announced as a demilitarized island under international guarantees, in order for answers to be presented to the strategic worries that have been formulated by the Turkish government, while also responding to concerns posed by the Arab world.¹⁷⁰

Additionally, the EDA blamed the Karamanlis government, which took over after Papagos' death, for the fact that "it [the government] didn't make the Cypriot Struggle

¹⁶⁹ Tasos Trikkas, p. 434.

¹⁷⁰ ASKI, "Statement of Organization Committee of EDA," *EDA Archive*, Box 34.

internationally productive” and “made Arabs suspicious about the case of Cypriot freedom as regards promises for bases.”

Despite the international crisis caused by the Suez incident, the issue of Cyprus, and the anti-colonial struggle in Algeria,¹⁷¹ the leader of the EDA expressed his optimism for “the peaceful co-existence of countries with different social systems [and] for the further establishment of world peace. [...] [T]he policy of independence against the strong, was strengthened, one might say, by this last international crisis.”¹⁷² Pasalidis didn’t refrain from referring to the Soviet contribution in that direction, while a Soviet contribution started, albeit cautiously, to take a more active part in the EDA’s rhetoric. In response to a question about Cyprus, he blamed “the British colonizers [who] become more and more insolent, abusing the fact that from the Greek official side there is no substantial reaction. Their plan is clear: to bend the Cypriots over time. And to that end – no matter how strange it may seem – the Greek government is helping them! [The Greek government] left unimproved the only chance that was presented for Cyprus, the British-French invasion of Egypt.”¹⁷³ Furthermore, even after the invasion, he continued to blame the government for not daring to demand the demilitarization of the island, although the government knew that by doing so it could gather all anti-colonial and liberal thinkers around the demand for the freedom of Cyprus.¹⁷⁴ On the contrary, it was argued that Greece assumed further commitments, i.e. for the Cyprus Question to be discussed in NATO. Acts like these helped British policy on Cyprus, enabling the proposal of Lord Radcliffe’s partition plan.¹⁷⁵

The EDA blamed the Karamanlis government for not taking advantage of the help it might have gained and for isolating the country, using the ideological cover of an alliance with the “free world.” The alliance with the “free world” and the “allied front,” in fact, left the country with no real allies, while at the same time it was the “allied front” that was the real enemy of *Enosis*. In January of 1957, a delegation of the Executive Committee of the EDA visited the president and the minister of the interior and developed its position. The delegation emphasized the

pointed American hostility on the occasion of the Radcliffe proposals, which does not limit itself to a simple objection to the

¹⁷¹ The Algerian war for decolonization started in 1954 and lasted until 1962.

¹⁷² Ioannis Pasalidis, “Interview in *Avgi*,” *Avgi*, December 23, 1956.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, emphasis as in the original.

¹⁷⁵ A similar partition was instigated by Lord Radcliffe in South Asia; see Lucy P. Chester, *Borders and Conflict in South Asia. The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the Partition of Punjab*, Manchester University Press, Great Britain, 2009.

Greek demand for the self-determination of Cyprus, but takes place as amid multi-sided blackmailing pressure against Greece, on the economic level (curtailment of help), and on the international level (fight against the UN recourse of the Cyprus Question, support to the Turkish navy to deteriorate even further the disadvantaged position of Greece, while at the same time the Turkish side threatens our national integrity). [Finally] blackmail is also the projection as a solution for the partition of the island of Cyprus and its acceptance on behalf of the US as a base for a solution of the Cyprus Question.¹⁷⁶

All these indicate that the so-called “free world” and the “allied front” were not allies of Greece and the Cyprus cause. “If our country was really an independent state,” Pasalidis stated in parliament, “if independent policy was put into practice, it would have real allies who would support us and the anti-colonial spirit would be turned to advantage. Now we are part of NATO as a stooge.”¹⁷⁷ In another session, he placed blame on both the government and the leading opposition party, Papandreou’s Liberals. On the one hand, the EDA accused the government of monopolizing foreign affairs and of deliberately not disclosing crucial documents because of its parliamentary majority. On the other hand, Pasalidis openly accused the liberals of thinking, falsely, that they could dominate opposition voices in the parliament.¹⁷⁸ In addition, the Greeks and the resistance in Cyprus felt much bitterness towards a government that abandoned without a fight the decision to raise the Cyprus Question at the UN. “This eagerness of the government is owed to the desire to cover the fact that the foundation of our foreign policy has collapsed.”¹⁷⁹

Despite the EDA’s proclamation of a readjustment of foreign policy, it did not take sides with the international socialist camp. The party chose “neutrality” as the best suitable foreign policy for Greece. “The simplification or the vassals of NATO or the Soviet bloc, is a gross propaganda scheme. There are many avenues of dissenting independent policy. There is also the possibility of the exercise of a dissenting policy within the frame of the same allies, as

¹⁷⁶ A copy of the note was sent to the leaders of all the parties and reprinted as “The Opinions of EDA on the Progress of the Cyprus Question,” pp. 11-14, in EDA, *The Policy of EDA: Official Documents (Decisions – Announcements – Declarations of Representatives, 3.12.1956 – 20.9.1957)*, issue 20, Athens, 1957; here pp. 11-12.

¹⁷⁷ Ioannis Pasalidis, *CQGP*, March 11, 1956, vol. 2, p. 30.

¹⁷⁸ Ioannis Pasalidis, *CQGP*, October 24, 1957, p. 154.

¹⁷⁹ Declaration of the leader of the EDA, Ioannis Pasalidis on February 23, 1957; Ioannis Pasalidis, “On the Decision of the Political Commission of the UN on the Cyprus Question,” p. 17, in the EDA, *The Policy of the EDA: Official Documents (Decisions – Announcements – Declarations of Representatives, 3.12.1956 – 20.9.1957)*, issue 20, Athens, 1957.

other countries, such as Norway, Denmark etc., do. There is neutrality. Egypt, Austria, Finland, Sweden.”¹⁸⁰ In other words neutrality was a “third way.”¹⁸¹

For the EDA, the Greek government’s passive stance of compromise and its inability to press the British on the issue of Makarios’ exile since March 1956 were the reasons behind the escalation of the violent uprising on Cyprus. In addition, the ERE’s domestic policy was seen as

... [preserving] the status of persecutions and [cultivating] intolerance and does not allow for the wide mobilization of all the Greeks for the moral and material support of the brothers of Cyprus. [The Greek government] also prohibited demonstrations by the Greek people and, when they were allowed, it transformed them into massacres. [...] [U]sing this strategy, the Government offers grounds to the British propaganda, which claims that the Cyprus Question is instigated by terrorists and fanaticized clergymen.¹⁸²

When Makarios was released, the Organization Committee of the EDA welcomed him and assured him that it would always be by his and his people’s side, and that it believed in the self-determination of the people of Cyprus. Moreover, the Cyprus Question was presented as “a struggle between freedom and the colonial spirit, which, unskillfully, is trying to cover itself under the slogan of ‘free world.’”¹⁸³ “The [Cyprus] Issue cannot flourish unless it becomes part of the anti-colonial struggle,” it was argued, and every compromise was taken to mean that the island would be used as a “military base against the anti-colonial struggle itself [...]” Therefore, the EDA believed that it was “of great importance that the trailblazing of a national line about Cyprus, where all the powers of that nation, both in free Greece and the occupied Cyprus, are mobilized.”¹⁸⁴

The new round of bombings in Cyprus forced Great Britain to invite Greece and Turkey to talk about how to prevent the continuation of such incidents, but any reference to the issue of self-determination was studiously avoided. It would not be an exaggeration to claim that, at that point, British policy sought to restrict the Cyprus Question to a Greek-Turkish conflict.

¹⁸⁰ Elias Eliou, *CQGP*, March 11, 1957.

¹⁸¹ Elias Eliou expressed the same views a year after claiming that “neutrality is a third way,” *CQGP*, December 14, 1958.

¹⁸² Vasilis Efraimidis, *CQGP*, May 24, 1956, vol. 2.

¹⁸³ Organization Committee of EDA, “The Opinions of EDA on the Cyprus Question,” April 28, 1957, p. 23, reprinted in the EDA, *The Policy of the EDA: Official Documents (Decisions – Announcements – Declarations of Representatives, 3.12.1956 – 20.9.1957)*, issue 20, Athens, 1957; the announcement was given also to the Archbishop Makarios after the committee’s visit.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

The Administrative Committee of the EDA declined the British invitation, claiming that it was

...a British maneuver inspired by the Americans designed to a) postpone and cancel all recourse indefinitely, b) provide time for the British imperialists to either suppress by force of weaponry or to emasculate, as they ineffectually hope, the struggles of the Cypriot people, c) secure the best possible strategic positions in the Mediterranean for the imperialistic powers, d) support recognition of the rights of the Turkish government, which does not represent the rights of the Turkish minority in Cyprus, to mingle and in addition, to go against the freedom of Cyprus and to thus apply the policy of “divide and rule.”¹⁸⁵

The statement, however, did not fail to rally against the “so-called *ethnikofrones* (national-minded) leaders” in Cyprus who implemented a “disruptive policy” and “are trying to turn the Cypriot people not to mass national-liberation struggles, but to isolated terrorist manifestations.”¹⁸⁶

The EDA was in favor of “immediate recourse to the UN” which would be supported by a “united leadership of all the patriotic forces of Cyprus” and have as its demand the “unconditional self-determination of the Cypriots prohibiting any concession to the British for bases and so on.” And that recourse would be “based on the united struggle of all Cypriots in cooperation with the Turkish minority that would benefit from freeing itself from the British yoke.”¹⁸⁷

The escalation of the struggle for liberation in Cyprus made the British request the immediate surrender of EOKA members and that they relinquish their weapons. The EOKA, on the other hand, after refusing to obey British orders, replied with attacks on strategic positions and on the houses of British officials. The British hanged three Cypriot fighters in response, causing outrage in Greece, although the Greek government had taken the necessary precautions to deter meetings and demonstrations. The government advised Grivas to accept the Radcliffe Plan of constitutional self-government, after, of course, it had been accepted by Makarios himself. On the other hand, the EDA’s response was the dissolution of the Anglo-Hellenic alliance. Pasalidis declared, “the government and its policy are in direct contravention with pan-Hellenic feeling. [The government] is also in direct opposition to the

¹⁸⁵ ASKI, “Statement of the Organization Committee of EDA,” July 1, 1955, *EDA Archive*, Box 34.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

content of the request of the leader of the EOKA, as this has been declared so far. [...] Only the government presents opposition to national unity, and it adulterated, and still does adulterate, the demand for Cypriot self-determination and only it [the government] has remained, and still remains, slavishly obedient to the irreconcilable ‘allies’ of NATO. [Therefore] its immediate removal from power has become a pan-national demand.”¹⁸⁸

The EDA’s Administrative Committee made a public declaration concerning Greek foreign policy, noting “Greece has to choose not between the East and the West, but between survival and total destruction. The policy followed so far is blind, goes against all rationality, represents the road to annihilation, and passes every intersection towards a real Greek foreign policy and maintenance of friendly relations with the Western world, all while our dominant rights are being broken down at the same time as they try to develop friendly relations with everyone.”¹⁸⁹ The EDA claimed that

... [the] pointed hostility of the Turkish government, guided by Great Britain and protected by the US, proves that the only existing dangers, the real and immediate ones, are coming from the members of the NATO alliance. Against those there is no protection offered by the foreign policy that it is followed. We put ourselves at risk, having full belief in and consciousness of the responsibility that in the case of any implementation of the threats posed by Turkey or England, our only hope and guarantee of our integrity and independence of the country will prove to be one from the North, similar to that which caused the respite of the Suez invasion or the other one that drove back the invasion in Syria.¹⁹⁰

The Seventh Plenary Session of the KKE and the Path to the 1958 Elections

In the meantime, in April of 1957 the Seventh Plenary of the KKE took place.¹⁹¹ As was mentioned, the period of de-Stalinization had already started and it was time for Zachariadis to be “dethroned.” His exile and expulsion from the party were decided in that session. The Seventh Plenary of the party was actually a continuation of the sixth, which itself marked the turning of the KKE towards greater co-operation with the EDA. It was decided that all illegal

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Extensive Statement of the Administrative Committee of the EDA, “The Issue of Reformulation of the Foreign policy of the Country,” September 22, 1957, pp. 37-44, here pp. 42-43, reprinted in the EDA, *The Policy of the EDA: Official Documents (Decisions – Announcements – Declarations of Representatives, 3.12.1956 – 20.9.1957)*, issue 20, Athens, 1957.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 39.

¹⁹¹ For the Seventh Plenary of the KKE, see Central Committee of the KKE, *The Seventh Broad Plenary of the Central Committee of KKE, 18-24 February 1957*, Syghroni Epohi, Athens, 2011 [reprint of the original, 1957]; see also Panos Dimitriou (ed), pp. 44-138, for documents on the talks about Zachariadis and the new leadership of the KKE.

communist branches should be dissolved and incorporated into the EDA.¹⁹² Despite the anti-Stalinist era, the KKE allied with the CPSU under Khrushchev and criticized Tito and Kardelj,¹⁹³ while in terms of Cyprus, the KKE rescinded the Eisenhower Doctrine (1957), according to which a country could request American economic assistance and/or aid from US military forces if it was being threatened by armed aggression from another state.¹⁹⁴ It asked for “self-determination of Cyprus without granting any military bases and without commitments, while providing the Turkish minority its rights” and a foreign policy of “peace and equal friendship.”¹⁹⁵ For the EDA, the Eisenhower Doctrine was a new “blow” to the independence of the country, to peace and to the parliamentary system. The Karamanlis government rushed to ally with the US president’s anti-Arabic and colonial doctrine in absentia of the Greek people, and to push the latter into ever-harder commitments.¹⁹⁶ However, the real winner proved to be Nasser, “who kept the canal, humiliated the colonialists, and balanced Cold War superpowers against one another, while securing his position as the undisputed leader of Arab nationalism.”¹⁹⁷

The summer of 1957 saw the Cyprus Question grind towards a stalemate. Greek as well as Cypriot foreign policy mistakes, along with American pressure on the British, led to a position in which Greece sought “guaranteed” independence of the island, while the British and the Turks threatened its partition.¹⁹⁸ The ever-growing power of the US, in contrast to British enfeeblement, was demonstrated in the rhetoric of the EDA, where again the Karamanlis government was “captured” in the American plans that promoted, at the same time, Turkish interests. “The government, although in favor of self-determination, is bound by its alliance to the US; the US has power, and this power is not based on justice. And when power is not based on justice, power becomes arbitrary. Did that great ally of yours [the US] have to state who is right, Greece or Turkey? You remain silent. Herein lies the EDA’s concern and worry. And how do you expect the government to respond? The government is

¹⁹² See Spyros Linardatos, *From Civil War to Junta*, vol. 3, p. 226; Panos Dimitriou (ed), pp. 110-112.

¹⁹³ Edvard Kardelj was Tito’s favorite theorist; for Tito’s ideas and policies concerning communism, the state and Soviet Union, see Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century*, Vintage, New York, 2000, pp. 273-277, esp. pp. 275-276.

¹⁹⁴ See, among many others, Ray Takeyh, *The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The US, Britain and Nasser's Egypt, 1953-57*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 2001; Carl L. Brown, *International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Game*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984, esp. pp. 198-220.

¹⁹⁵ Spyros Linardatos, vol. 3, p. 225.

¹⁹⁶ Pasalidis’ statement, “The Accession to the Eisenhower Doctrine,” May 3, 1957, p. 27-28, reprinted in the EDA, *The Policy of the EDA: Official Documents (Decisions – Announcements – Declarations of Representatives, 3.12.1956 – 20.9.1957)*, issue 20, Athens, 1957.

¹⁹⁷ John Lewin Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History*, The Penguin Press, New York, 2005, p. 128.

¹⁹⁸ Spyros Linardatos, p. 239.

captive in the agreements it signed and cannot stand up to it [the US], as we [the EDA] did since the beginning.”¹⁹⁹ “The US openly supports Turkey, when Turkey wants to ‘slice Cyprus up with a saber.’”²⁰⁰

As regards the atrocities committed against the Cypriot population, the EDA found fertile ground to openly accuse both the government and colonial powers for “instigating the Turkish brutalities in Nicosia.” The Cyprus Question, Eliou declared, was once more an issue of “national need” and he argued that it should unite the entire nation in the “sacred” cause of Cypriot self-determination.²⁰¹ The EDA’s suggestions were in vain, however, and two months later, the party accused the government of making poor decisions as regards Cyprus.²⁰² In addition, Pasalidis accused the government of lying to the Greek people and of compromising the Cyprus cause due to the fact he transformed Greece into a tributary country and thus the government could not decisively help the struggle for self-determination being carried out by the people of Cyprus.²⁰³ In another session, he attacked both the government and the leading opposition party, Papandreou’s liberals. On the one hand, the EDA accused the government of monopolizing foreign affairs and of deliberately not disclosing crucial documents because of its parliamentary majority. On the other hand, it accused the liberals of falsely thinking that they could dominate opposition voices in the Parliament.²⁰⁴ By the end of 1958, Pasalidis stated that the “Cyprus Question represented extreme dangers” not because of British and American policies but because the government believed that nothing could be done unless those two powers changed their policies, and he pointed out that “this is not the policy of the [Greek] nation.” The “policy of the [Greek] nation,” he argued, was the liberation of Cyprus through self-determination.²⁰⁵

The EDA as Leading Opposition

American leaders, keeping a close eye on Greek politics, became anxious regarding the influence of the left, and those feelings were compounded by the result of the Greek election

¹⁹⁹ Ioannis Pasalidis, *CQGP*, February 19, 1958, vol. 2, pp. 189-190.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

²⁰¹ Elias Eliou, *CQGP*, January 25, 1957, p. 5. Moreover, he called for the authorization of the police force of the UN in Cyprus to become a rallying pole for the whole nation, and argued that all parties and constituents from that day onwards should center on a common national policy on the Cyprus Question.

²⁰² Certain misgivings as regards government policies, however, were not introduced in the session, since according to article 78 of the Constitution there needed to be at least 20 signatures. The EDA’s proposal was signed only by 12. *CQGP*, March 6, 1957, p. 11.

²⁰³ Ioannis Pasalidis, *CQGP*, March 11, 1957, p. 30.

²⁰⁴ Ioannis Pasalidis, *CQGP*, October 24, 1957, p. 154.

²⁰⁵ Ioannis Pasalidis, *CQGP*, December 13, 1958, p. 280.

on the 11th of May. Karamanlis' ERE hung on to power, but the leftist EDA made major gains and became the leading opposition party. This resurrection of the post-civil war left was generally interpreted as setting the stage for a long-term crisis in which Cyprus was central.²⁰⁶

Antonis Brillakis' introductory statement at the EDA's First Pan-Hellenic Conference, and his harsh criticisms of the organization of the group (and, often, lack thereof), seemed to bear fruit. Since the formation of the EDA, Brillakis noted, "our strategy during the period of our programmatic positions and in the form of collaboration was not resilient [and] it did not pay off. This is obvious from the elections in 1951 and in 1952 [...]" and he attributed this to the fact that the role of the centrist parties was not properly calculated.²⁰⁷ He noted that after the elections of 1956 "although there was a correct orientation and clear policy [...] and clear strategy towards unity [...], actual unity remained stagnant." He argued that as a result of those deficiencies within the party, the EDA should be aware that "the opposition was not in a position to understand that for the national issue of Cyprus, as well as to put pressure on the government to give priority to a national salvation government, what was needed was a massive popular front, in which all consistent and active national forces would participate, regardless of party preference."²⁰⁸

Aside from the EDA's internal problems, another issue was the constant attempts by the government (with the assistance of the Liberal Party of George Papandreou) to change the electoral system and thus isolate the EDA and the latter's possible collaboration with the centrist parties. According to Karamanlis's official papers, the Minister of Interior of the ERE, D. Makris, met up with Papandreou, and after two months, they agreed on the amendment of the electoral system. During the same period, there were other talks concerning the same issue which took place between Sofoklis Venizelos and G. Rallis, who suggested that a system of "neighbor parties" would be better, as had been put into effect in France and Italy in order to isolate the communists.²⁰⁹ Pasalidis characterized as "conspiracy" the agreement between the two leaders and maintained that it was not possible to have irreproachable elections in Greece because the citizens were not free to express themselves. And, he continued, "those who vote for the EDA are driven into exile or are blacklisted and cannot find work." He concluded by saying that "those who are opening a pit for the EDA

²⁰⁶ Robert F. Holland, p. 248.

²⁰⁷ Antonis Brillakis, "The Problem of Unity of the National Forces of the Country," pp. 32-33, in the EDA, *First Pan-Hellenic Conference of the EDA*. Reprinted also in Elias Nikolakopoulos and Evdokia Olympitou (eds), *Antonis Brillakis: Paths and Quests of the Left after the Civil War*, Livanis and ASKI, Athens, 2010, pp. 137-151. The pages cited the references refer to the original text, which was used in the present study.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 35.

²⁰⁹ As quoted in Elias Nikolakopoulos, *The Cachectic Democracy*, p. 221.

will, eventually, fall into it themselves.”²¹⁰ On the other hand, the EDA and the smaller parties of the center, as well as some deputies of the Liberal Party, such as Mavros and Mitsotakis, heavily criticized the new electoral laws. The EDA’s negotiations with the smaller parties were perhaps the most important topic of the period before the elections. The amendment of the electoral laws before the elections would lead to a direct blow to the government of the ERE and would shake the position of Papandreou’s Liberal Party leading the opposition. However, talks between the EDA and the center parties without the Liberal Party bore no fruit.²¹¹

The EDA, which since 1956 had been a united political party, was substantially empowered by the constant crisis within the centrist parties, while at the same time the negative stance of the Western powers on the Cyprus Question and the positive position of the Soviet Union strengthened yet further the EDA’s popular appeal. As noted before, the removal of Zachariadis, the dissolution of the illegal branches of communist groups in Greece and the EDA’s incorporation into the legal mechanism all reinforced the party, which was the KKE’s main goal at the time.²¹² The international arena, and especially the domestic environment, made possible many alliances between the EDA and some center-left deputies and members, which granted the EDA broader appeal.

The ERE dominated the elections, as was expected, winning 171 seats in parliament and putting an end to the question of the hegemony of the right in Greece. However, what is noteworthy is that the EDA became the main opposition party for the first time in Greek history, relegating the Liberal Party to third place. The EDA received 24.43% of the votes and won 79 seats in parliament, 21 of those acquired through alliances.²¹³

In Cyprus, the EOKA had started attacking members of the left and trade unionists, creating a new crisis on the island. These attacks were interpreted as bringing the island one step closer to civil war, especially considering Grivas’ extreme anti-communist beliefs and actions during the Greek civil war.²¹⁴ As Grivas himself stated in his memoirs, “[...] we have to organize from now our policy against the AKEL. As the politicized people of Cyprus are disorganized, as is the case of the AKEL, they will be in no position to counter an organized

²¹⁰ Spyros Linardatos, p. 302.

²¹¹ See the discussion in Spyros Linardatos, pp. 308-312.

²¹² KKE, *Official Documents*, vol. 8, pp. 11-268; Nikolakopoulos, p. 230.

²¹³ Refugees’ support for the EDA played a crucial role in the election; see Nikolakopoulos, pp. 241-242.

²¹⁴ Alexis Alekou, *1948: The Greek Civil War and Cyprus*, Power Publishing, Nicosia, 2012.

party with a distinct program and policies.”²¹⁵ In March, the EOKA launched its struggle anew after a short pause during British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd’s visit to Athens and Ankara and his insistence on maintaining Turkish rights regarding the island of Cyprus. The EDA, on the other hand, making use of its new role as leader of the opposition, proposed a special parliamentary session on the brutalities of the Turkish Cypriots who had organized on Cyprus, although the government insisted on a session to deal with the programmatic principles in general.

The British deployment of Turkish Cypriots against the Greek Cypriots seemed to be working. In June, organized groups of Turkish Cypriots invaded Greek Cypriot neighborhoods and destroyed shops, killing five Greek Cypriots and injuring ten, but the Greek Cypriots managed this time to counter the attacks. However, skirmishes between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots continued unabated, causing many casualties on both sides.

Pasalidis reviewed the events and stated that “Turkish anti-Greek sentiments [were] driven by colonizers from London who organized and unleashed violence and devastation against our Greek brothers.” The aim of these criminal actions, he argued, was to “discourage any Greek resistance and terrorize the nation in Cyprus and in Greece.” “Let it be certain,” Pasalidis continued, “to all those who conspire against the freedom of Cyprus, that the nation will reply to the new manifestation of the colonizing attack with a more intense struggle for the unalienable rights of the Cyprus people for self-determination and *Enosis* with Mother Greece. The dramatic events in Istanbul and Izmir showed that our ‘allies’ are not even in a position to protect us from our allies; therefore, Greece should seek support from the Arab world and the Soviet Union.” Lastly, Pasalidis requested that a foreign policy be developed which would preserve national security and protect the national issue in Cyprus, but only – as the EDA always insisted – within the framework of the anti-colonial struggle.²¹⁶

On the 13th of June, Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu admitted indirectly that the only solution to the Cyprus Question was partition of the island so that both communities could live in peace. Zorlu’s statement came the same day as the disclosure by the Greek government that a new British plan was being prepared. At the same time, Foreign Ministers Zorlu and Averoff-Tositsas debated about who first proposed the idea of partition, which was, of course, willingly accepted by the British delegation.

²¹⁵ Grivas, *Memoirs*, p. 198; quoted also in Spyros Linardatos, p. 290, who believed that Cyprus was on the brink of civil war.

²¹⁶ Ioannis Pasalidis, *CQGP*, June 11, 1958, vol. 2, p. 192.

The new British plan was initiated by Macmillan, but it was rejected by Makarios, who had just returned from Egypt, where Nasser assured him that Cyprus would have Egypt's help and support. The EDA, on the other hand, accused the government of compromising and being unable to handle the situation, after the latter suggested in parliament its willingness to sign the agreement, which sought ways to resolve the Cyprus Question at all costs. However, the EDA leader noted that there were two ways to deal with the situation in which Greece and Cyprus found themselves: the first was capitulation, and the second was to fight.²¹⁷ In August of 1958, British Prime Minister Macmillan visited Athens in order to promote his plan for dividing the island, and in his discussions with Karamanlis, he did not accept any amendments of the main points of the plan. Karamanlis disputed the dichotomous points of the plan, especially the fact that the high commissioners in Cyprus were to be appointed by Greece and Turkey.

When the British Prime Minister returned from his trip to Ankara, where he found the Turkish government in full compliance with his plan, he announced to the Greek government that starting on the 1st of October in 1958 the Macmillan plan was to go into effect with or without Greek consent. The Greek government turned to the Secretary-General of NATO, Paul Henri Charles Spaak, claiming that the position of Greece in NATO would become problematic if the plan were to be implemented. To make the Macmillan plan seem more acceptable, British colonial authorities launched a wave of brutal violence against the Greek Cypriots, forcing Archbishop Theoklitos to call the British "cannibal Toryists" and to state that "it is high time we taught that national issues are not to be betrayed to so-called ideological interests or social systems."²¹⁸ It was a message that only the EDA accepted and agreed with, as indicated in an article in *Avgi*.²¹⁹

As terrorist incidents on the island continued in 1958 and 1959, the United States took a passive stance, and tried to avoid alienating either Turkey or Greece. The primary US interest was in limiting repercussions on NATO and averting escalation of tensions between Greece and Turkey.²²⁰ However, the involvement of the US, along with the British and NATO, had become more than obvious in their "triple partnership" with active participation of all parties involved, which led to Spaak's visit to Athens in September of 1958.

²¹⁷ Ioannis Pasalidis, *CQGP*, June 24, 1958, vol. 2, pp. 224-227; see also Spyros Linardatos, pp. 332-334.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 354 and Tasos Trikkas, p. 592.

²¹⁹ *Avgi*, September 20, 1958.

²²⁰ Theodore Couloumbis, *The United States, Greece and Turkey: the Troubled Triangle*, Praeger, New York, 1983, p. 28; Ellen B. Laipson, "Cyprus: A Quarter Century of US Policy," pp. 54-81, in John T.A. Koumoulides (ed), *Cyprus in Transition, 1960-1985*, Trigraph, London, 1986.

The London-Zurich Agreements

Karamanlis's statement, which brought the last session in the Greek Parliament before the beginning of the negotiations about Cyprus to an end, noted that: "We [Greece] are obliged to preserve our alliances in favor of the general interest and to conduct the struggle [for Cyprus] through these alliances" and he concluded that "I would be happy to take charge of closing the Cyprus Question, if there was a rational and honest proposal on behalf of the British government."²²¹ The intensive diplomatic efforts in the days that followed paved the way for the conference that took place outside Zurich in February of 1959, where negotiations between the Greek Foreign Minister Averoff-Tositsas and his Turkish counterpart Zorlu led to the signing of the London-Zurich Agreement.

As soon as the government representatives returned from Zurich, they claimed that "all the Greeks of Constantinople and all the Greeks of the diaspora" as well as "the Cypriot people, besides the leftists" sided with their efforts and were further accorded respect because of their policies.²²² The EDA fiercely criticized the government's policy both in parliament and through its newspaper *Avgi*.²²³ Eliou disputed the foreign minister's claims because they "lacked legitimacy." He went on to state that "Cyprus is neither a Republic, nor independent."²²⁴ The London-Zurich Agreement is, he wrote, "diabolical, it will create dead-ends and obstacles which Greece will come up against"²²⁵ and the constitutional status of Cyprus will be too "complicated" to function. In addition, he argued that the foreign military presence, the British, Greek and Turkish right to intervene, and the maintenance of British bases represented "collective occupation" of the island.

In addition, the EDA deputies seemed to adopt the official stereotypical historiographic approach, presenting the Turks as "eternally bad" and arguing that the consequences of any agreement on Greek-Turkish relations would be "tragic." "Nevertheless," Eliou continued, "it will not be tragic only in terms of relations *per se*, but as regards the security of the integrity of the independence of Greece as well."²²⁶ However, in the end the fierce criticism and fighting spirit unleashed on the government by the EDA deputy was toned down; it was stated

²²¹ Konstantinos Karamanlis, *CQGP*, December 14, 1958; the last session of the Parliament lasted for three days with three consecutive sessions.

²²² Evangelos Averoff-Tositsas, *CQGP*, February 25, 1959, vol. 3, pp. 22-23. The word Constantinople is preferred because most likely that would have been the word used instead of Istanbul if the speech had been given in English.

²²³ For the articles criticizing the Greek government concerning the London-Zurich Agreement, see the reports in *Avgi*, March 13, 1959 ff.

²²⁴ Elias Eliou, *CQGP*, February 25, 1959, p. 23.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*

that “[the agreement] is powerless and non-binding”²²⁷ and while it “may be interrupted, it did not eliminate the unalienable demand for the self-determination of Cyprus,”²²⁸ a position supported a few days later by the EDA deputies Michalis Kyrkos and Antonis Brillakis.²²⁹

As noted above, the EDA’s criticism was not limited to parliamentary proceedings, but was voiced in a booklet published about the agreement and through its newspaper, *Avgi*. According to the booklet, which presents an analysis of government policy even from before the signing of the agreements, “all the opposition parties condemned this agreement” but the “factitious governmental majority in parliament approved them.”²³⁰ The booklet is also quite revealing in many other respects as well.

In the booklet it was argued that the agreement, “while, in fact, prolonging colonial slavery in Cyprus, adulterated the pure anti-colonial character of the Cypriot struggle, which was to confront British colonial power” and therefore the issue no longer just concerned Cyprus and Great Britain.²³¹ The claim was made that the issue also concerned the Turkish state, and the fact that the return of “*Turkey to Cyprus creates a new status full of dangers, both for Cyprus and Greece.*”²³² Therefore, the EDA claimed, the London-Zurich Agreement did not provide a democratic solution to the issue. On the contrary, the EDA argued that the self-determination of the Cypriot people was eliminated and the agreement demonstrated the first victory of the British and the Turks. For that reason, it could be claimed that an independent state was born, but that signing the agreement was the actual signing of the partition of the island.

Avgi listed the main reasons why the EDA was against the London-Zurich Agreement. According to the newspaper, these were: 1) self-determination is eliminated forever; 2) there will be no independence, as Cyprus will be dependent upon the British, the Americans and the Turks; and 3) it cannot be considered to be democratic, because the will of the majority will be dependent upon the veto of Ankara.²³³ In another article, two days later, Eliou stated”

The capitulatory spirit of Zurich has a precedent in modern history, the spirit of Munich.²³⁴ Daladier and Chamberlain hoped that by

²²⁷ Ibid., p. 36.

²²⁸ Elias Eliou, *CQGP*, March 18, 1959, p. 153.

²²⁹ Michalis Kyrkos, *CQGP*, February 28, 1959, p. 131 and Antonis Brillakis, *CQGP*, February 28, 1959, p. 144, where they claim basically that “the Agreement should not be considered as final.”

²³⁰ EDA, *The Cyprus Question and the London-Zurich Agreement*, Athens, 1959, p. 17.

²³¹ Ibid., p. 18.

²³² Ibid., p. 19; emphasis as in the original.

²³³ *Avgi*, February 13, 1959.

²³⁴ Eliou was referring to the Munich Agreement, according to which there was a settlement permitting Nazi Germany’s annexation of portions of Czechoslovakia along the country’s borders mainly inhabited by German speakers.

accepting humiliation they would avoid war. But they got both humiliation and war. And only the alliance of all the national forces, independently from political differences, in France and in England, ranging from the extreme right to the extreme left, only the alliance of the “anti-Munichists” saved the honor of those people. Here also those who signed the Zurich [agreement] believe that by accepting humiliation they will resolve a “disturbing issue.” It is obvious that they are opening up an issue that is much more dangerous than the familiar Turkish blackmail and threats of war. Therefore, as it is a matter of national salvation, national forces should stand united against the spirit of Zurich.²³⁵

However, the EDA continued its criticism of the Karamanlis government for not disclosing the documents concerning the London-Zurich Agreement. According to Pasalidis, the government’s claim that it was rushed and therefore could not keep records on the agreement indicate the lies that the government told to the people, because, in fact, the Karamanlis government was working on behalf of NATO. Moreover, he argued that “it is customary for a matter to be discussed in parliament first, and then for agreements to be signed. In the case of Cyprus, the reverse happened.”²³⁶

EOKA – AKEL – EDA

During the final years of the 1950s, the situation in Cyprus started to become more intense on the Greek-Cypriot side, between the EOKA and the communists. The situation reached the point that Makarios himself stated that at such crucial times, the Cypriot people should not come into conflict because that worked for the benefit of British colonialism. The EDA Administrative Committee urged the Cypriot people “to redeem decisively and immediately the indecomposable front of freedom [...]” “The oppressor,” it noted “does everything he can to break the will of the people who struggle for freedom in Cyprus and uses agents to achieve this.”²³⁷ The EDA requested “the leaders of all the parties of the Cypriot people to promote unity, adopt the plea of Makarios, and create an administrative scheme of National Unity.” It also called on the Greek government to exercise “intense and effective pressure, in order to stave off the impending disunity which would lead to the interment of the Cyprus case.”

The AKEL, which was banned by the British administration, reacted coolly to Grivas’ provocations. On the 8th of February in 1958, the Central Committee of AKEL declared that

²³⁵ Elias Eliou, “To the Zurichists the Anti-Zurichists,” *Avgi*, February 15, 1959.

²³⁶ Ioannis Pasalidis, *CQGP*, March 22, 1960, p. 159. During that session, it was disclosed by the Foreign Minister, Aferoff-Tositsas, that the government was in a hurry to sign the agreements.

²³⁷ Announcement of the Administrative Committee of EDA, January 24, 1958.

“the target of the organized slanderous campaign and the murderous extinction of honest, fighting members of the AKEL is none other than the extinction of the AKEL, the dissolution of popular organizations, the elimination of every democratic thought and political trend and the domination of the EOKA as the only political organization of Cyprus.” The declaration ended with a plea “to every Cypriot patriot, from the Ethnarchy to the professional and other organizations” to stay “away from the road of fratricide and from any action that leads to the division of forces.” Although the EOKA continued to purge itself of any left-leaning members through murder, the AKEL remained on the side of “mass popular struggle.”²³⁸

Elias Eliou described Cyprus in an interview as “an island surrounded on all sides” that

...can be isolated by the naval force of the dominating power, and cannot evolve a tactical armed liberating struggle to win a military confrontation. The small and flexible armed groups that were used 40 years ago in the liberation struggles of Ireland are worth mentioning in the struggle for freedom, as they keep the matter in world affairs. But it is not the only way to struggle. Mass political struggle, with demonstrations and strikes that constitute the issue of Cyprus, an issue for all the Cypriot people without exception, is according to me the basic form of an ongoing struggle.²³⁹

The EDA, whose standing had risen since the elections of 1958, intervened in the continued murder of leftists, and Pasalidis, Brillakis, and Evaggelidis met with Makarios, who was in Athens at that time. Although Makarios’ statement was not what had been expected, the EDA believed that it would help bring an end to hostile actions. Moreover, the EDA had abandoned their rigid and maximalist policy and supported “full self-determination within a scheduled and legitimate timeframe.” The EDA supported Makarios’ announcement: “the solution is single, the application of self-determination on the island. Therefore, we will be willing to accept a transitory period, after which the Cypriot people will freely decide about their future.”²⁴⁰

On the other hand, Britain’s plan proposed partition of the island as the solution. The EDA’s response to the plan was pointedly negative: “the British plan, worse than any other before, outweighs every optimistic prediction and consists, along with Turkish acts of violence, of a principle of real and legal application of the idea of partition, and therefore, it is rejected by the entire nation.”

²³⁸ Quoted in Tasos Trikkas, vol. 1, p. 579.

²³⁹ Elias Eliou, *Avgi*, January 1, 1956.

²⁴⁰ Ziartidis as quoted in Trikkas, p. 581.

The Greek government supported the self-government of Cyprus as the best possible solution, but stated its opposition to the Macmillan plan, which it said would create a kind of a “triple co-government.” Pasalidis, the EDA leader, described the response of the government to the British plan as:

A continuation of its foreign policy and especially on the Cyprus Question. Because, on the one hand, it rejects the British plan, but typically abandons the pan-national sentiment of self-determination within a scheduled and legitimate time-frame. The government begs for British mastery and for indefinite self-government. [...] [T]he rejection, therefore, of the British plan ends up being almost identical to its acceptance.²⁴¹

Since the beginning of 1957, the EDA had found fertile ground to openly blame the blame on not only the government but also colonial powers that “instigated the Turkish brutalities in Nicosia.” The EDA, after two years but now in accordance with AKEL, accepted the possibility of self-government as an intermediary stage to the solution to the Cyprus Question. However, its justified opposition to the Zurich negotiations and to London would bring the party back to its older maximalist line of “Self-determination – *Enosis*.”

The Cyprus Question, Eliou again declared, was one of “national need” that should unite the whole nation around the “sacred” cause of Cypriot self-determination. Moreover, he called for the authorized police force of the UN in Cyprus to become the rallying point for the whole nation and for the parties to formulate henceforth a common national policy on the Cyprus Question.²⁴² The EDA’s suggestions were in vain, however, and two months later the EDA again accused the government of making poor decisions concerning Cyprus.²⁴³ In addition, Pasalidis accused the government of lying to the Greek people and of compromising on Cyprus by transforming Greece into a tributary, a slave country that was thus unable to decisively help the struggle for self-determination carried out by the people of Cyprus. By the end of 1958, Pasalidis stated that the “Cyprus Question involves extreme dangers,” not because of British and US positions, he said, but because of a Greek government that believes nothing can be done unless those two powers change their policies, and he pointed out that

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Elias Eliou, *CQGP*, January 25, 1957, vol. 2, p. 5.

²⁴³ The certain misgivings regarding government policies, however, were not introduced in the session to be debated, since according to article 78 of the Constitution, it needed at least 20 signatures. The EDA’s proposal was signed only by 12; *CQGP*, March 6, 1957, p. 11.

“this is not the policy of the [Greek] Nation” and that the “policy of the [Greek] Nation” is the liberation of Cyprus through self-determination.²⁴⁴

The “Violence and Vote-Rigging” Elections of 1961

In accordance with the London-Zurich Agreements, a constitution, together with two further Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee, were drafted and agreed upon in Zurich on the 11th of February in 1960, and Cyprus was accordingly proclaimed an independent state on the 16th of August in the same year. Although Cyprus had become a republic, it represented a form of independence without a real state. Sir Hugh Foot aptly summed up what was really happening when he spoke of the transition “from colonial rule to Agreement rule.”²⁴⁵ However, Greek and Turkish relations did not take the expected path, and the cooperation between Athens and Ankara “did not blossom into the overall relationship of special amity which the Greek and Turkish leaders [had] so sanguinely predicted. On the contrary, as time passed, it tended to fade away.”²⁴⁶ After the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, Britain’s stake was reduced from “Cyprus as a base” to “bases in Cyprus,” while American activity in the Mediterranean, which was more than obvious at the time, considered the Republic of Cyprus to be a bulwark against communism and offered political stability and strong economic development.²⁴⁷

In the meantime, the First Congress of the EDA took place from November 28th to December 2nd in 1959. Despite the efforts of the government to prevent the Congress (intense police pressure backed by para-military groups) the meeting was massive. In his opening speech, President Pasalidis stated, “those who govern thought that using violence will drown out our voice, the voice of the people, and that they would prevent the success of the Congress [...]. They don’t know our people well! The pressure that they put on us merely strengthened resolve and increased the eagerness in our ranks.”²⁴⁸ Among the issues discussed and decided upon at the Congress was the democratization of public life of the country, the collaboration of all its patriotic forces, the removal of Karamanlis’ government and a change of policy. As one of the leading members of the EDA testified, this was the turning point

²⁴⁴ Ioannis Pasalidis, *CQGP*, December 13, 1958, p. 280.

²⁴⁵ As quoted in Robert F. Holland, p. 331.

²⁴⁶ Stephen Xydis, *Cyprus: Reluctant Republic*, Mouton, The Hague, 1973, p. 478; quoted also in *Ibid.*, p. 331.

²⁴⁷ The US offered \$20 million in aid for the first three years of Cypriot independence. They also supported cultural and educational programs that strengthened conservative political groups to balance the growing popularity of leftist organizations on the island, which concerned US officials; Ellen B. Laipson, p. 58.

²⁴⁸ As quoted in Giannis Papadimitriou, p. 76. State repression was also criticized by Elias Tsirimokos, who was invited by the EDA as the president of “Democratic Union.” A fuller, but still not complete account, of such parastate activities and organizations can be found in Spyros Linardatos, pp. 479-484. These activities will be discussed more thoroughly in a later chapter.

towards a more combative party and hence was the most important characteristic of the Congress.²⁴⁹

The pressure put the government can be better understood if we consider what analysts call the existing “polarization”²⁵⁰ between the ERE and EDA, which has been described as the most important feature of the post-February elections until 1961. Moreover, specific choices in domestic politics were made and defined because of this “polarization.” The polarization refers to a reinstatement of the civil war division between the *ethnikofrones* and *non-ethnikofrones* and is reminiscent of the psychological states that predominated during the civil war.

Indeed, after the elections and because of their results, some mechanisms were activated in order to counter the EDA, while an “informal” committee was also constituted, in which the main ideological representatives of the “anti-communist camp” participated.²⁵¹ The polarization was also driven by the further disintegration of the center, and especially Papandreou’s Liberal Party, which favored the view of uniting all ERE and EDA forces. As was expected, the harsh measures of repression unleashed on the left resulted in explosions and arson attacks at the party’s offices in small cities, and within a few months, 175 of EDA’s members were exiled or imprisoned. However, the most important and explosive incident, because of its symbolic character, was the arrest on the 5th of December in 1958 of Manolis Glezos, who was accused of meeting and having contact with Koligiannis, the communist leader who took the place of Zachariadis.²⁵²

Again, the polarization and its direct manifestations (arrests, exiles, etc.) aimed at limiting the EDA’s influence as much as possible and widening the gap between *ethnikofrones* and *non-ethnikofrones* in the forthcoming municipal elections on the 5th of April in 1959, and this would define the political spectrum of the period to follow. Despite the extreme measures and the censorship imposed by the government, and just a few weeks after the London-Zurich

²⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 78.

²⁵⁰ Elias Nikolakopoulos, *Parties and Parliamentary Election in Greece, 1946-1964*, EKKE, Athens, 3rd edition 2000 [1985], p. 255; Elias Nikolakopoulos, *The Cachectic Democracy*, Ibid., p. 256; Christoforos Vernadakis and Giannis Mavris, Ibid., p. 218.

²⁵¹ Some of the participants were Savvas Konstantopoulos, seen by many as the “theoretician of the Greek Junta,” as well as Giorgos Georgalas and Aggelos Prokopiou.

²⁵² For an account of the anti-EDA incidents that took place, see Elias Nikolakopoulos, *The Cachectic Democracy*, p. 256; Spyros Linardatos, vol. 3, pp. 371-383 and pp. 460-464; G. Voultepsis, *Case: Manolis Glezos*, EDA, Athens, 1960 as quoted in Nikolakopoulos, fn. 88 and Tasos Vournas, *History of Modern Greece*, vol. 6, Tolidis Brothers, n.d., pp. 145-149.

Agreements, the EDA lost much of its supporting base but managed to dominate in two of the three large Athenian municipalities (with populations over 40,000).²⁵³

However, the government measures against the EDA only intensified over the following months, while the polarized domestic politics were reminiscent of the 1940s. The anti-communist struggle, as well as the experience of the recent civil war, came once again into the spotlight and became the primary goal of the state mechanism.²⁵⁴ The division of the past resurfaced to define the terms under which the conflict between the “two worlds,” the left and the right, would be conducted. Meanwhile, fragmentation in the parties of the center had started, and it seemed that it would only worsen when the New Agricultural Movement Party and 12 members of the Democratic Union Party of Tsirimokos allied with the EDA. The fragmentation of the center left a vacuum for their members, who sought shelter in the mechanism of the EDA.

In the meantime, the EDA had to contend with the further “communistization” of the party, as this was decided upon at its First Congress.²⁵⁵ Pasalidis strongly criticized the decision made at the Congress, and denounced the “communistization” policy to the Political Bureau of the KKE: “You made the EDA a communist party. [...] Instead of empowering and broadening the EDA in 1958, you created different parties. Organizationally, you rescinded everywhere, on all the organs and the allies. You made them communistic. You made *Avgi* communistic.”²⁵⁶ From that point forward, the EDA became a legal KKE in which the top-rank posts were dominated only by KKE members aside from Pasalidis, and was organized along the lines of a communist model. For the first time since 1947, a leading KKE mechanism was functioning legally and dominating the EDA, a process that culminated and was officially put into effect with the election of 25 leading members of the KKE Central Committee and the participation of seven EDA deputies in the Eighth KKE Congress in Romania in the summer of 1961.²⁵⁷

²⁵³ Nikaia and Keratsini won by the EDA, and Kallithea by the ERE. Elias Nikolakopoulos, pp. 257-263, esp. 259.

²⁵⁴ “State mechanism” here refers to the anti-communist camp, which was comprised not only of the government of the ERE but also all the “national” parties of the center. For the political discourses of all the parties concerning the 1940s, see the interesting study by Eleni Paschaloudi, *A War without End. The 1940s in the Political Discourse, 1950-1967*, Epikentro, Thessaloniki, 2010; the EDA’s use of the past will be analyzed comparatively with the Turkish case in the final chapter of this study.

²⁵⁵ The EDA, *The First Congress of the EDA*, 28.11 – 2.12.1959, Athens, 1959; see also before, pp. 86-87.

²⁵⁶ Panos Dimitriou (ed), p. 253 and Nikolakopoulos, p. 262.

²⁵⁷ See the excellent analysis by Ioanna Papathanassiou, “Limits and Potential in the incorporation during the pro-dictatorial EDA.”

Greece had been preparing for elections since the beginning of the year. The Greek government was in complete alignment and cooperation with the Palace and the Americans, who had kept a keen eye on the Greek left since their success in the 1958 elections. Because of the rising influence of the left since the elections in 1958 and the general instability in the country, the Americans and the young successor to the throne, Constantine, were pursuing an electoral system that would keep the ERE in power, or, in the worst case scenario, secure the emergence of a center party, or, as it was called among the Americans, a “national opposition” party. Specifically, the government recommended that center parties adopt the system and in return, the government would share seats in parliament with them.

The Americans, along with the Greek government and the Palace, believed that the formula of “relative parties,” a singular system that had been used in the municipal elections in France, would prove quite successful in countering communism. According to the terms of that system, it is extremely difficult for party combinations to participate in the second allocation of votes due to the high threshold determined by the system. Thus, a combination by the left would not be able to participate in the second round. The American Embassy, commenting on the system, stated in a report that “it is the best system in order to counter the internal communist danger. Additionally, it will bring back in power the current government and strengthen the national opposition”²⁵⁸ while the CIA station chief, Locke Campbell, took on the responsibility of persuading the young politician and son of George Papandreou, Andreas, to play a part in this. However, Andreas Papandreou refused to take part in the CIA’s plans and even protested, claiming that Campbell practically threatened him.²⁵⁹ Soon after this incident, Campbell was relocated.

The EDA, for its part, continued the policy of seeking alliances and approached all the anti-right parties. The party claimed, “the policy of vassalage is responsible” for the present situation in the country and “for the Cold War, for the hunger, for the policy of exile being utilized by the foreign-driven Right in the interest of the domestic oligarchy and the foreign predatory monopolies of exploitation.” However, these policies, according to the decisions made at the party’s Fifth Synod, “are being brought to a halt by the ever-growing opposition of the people.”²⁶⁰ “Therefore, a simple *pan-national* model is required; this is the unity of all the democratic forces of the people for the common struggle for change” and all genuine

²⁵⁸ Quoted in Alexis Papachelas, *The Rape of the Greek Democracy: The American Factor, 1947-1967*, 6th ed, Estia, Athens, 1997, p. 72.

²⁵⁹ Alexis Papachelas, pp. 72-73.

²⁶⁰ ASKI, “Fifth Synod of EDA,” *EDA Archive*, Box, 13, folder 4.

allies of the front were called upon to conduct a *national dialogue*.²⁶¹ That call resulted in the creation of the PAME (Pan-Democratic Agricultural Front of Greece), a coalition between the EDA and the National Agricultural Party. This strategic move aimed at uniting the forces of the center and the left, not just for the upcoming elections but for future ones as well, and to press Papandreou to take sides with the EDA and leave aside anti-communist and anti-EDA positions.²⁶² However, despite the party's efforts to counter the ERE and by extension, to ally with the center, debates about such cooperation were revived within the party. The issue caused much friction in the party, because, as it was guessed that even before 1961, the EDA's compromises and concessions to the center would have to be great.²⁶³

George Papandreou and the "Relentless Struggle"

The outcome of the elections indicated a clear majority for the ERE with 176 seats and 50.8 percent of the vote. The Center Union, in coalition with Spyros Markezinis's Progressive Party, secured 100 seats and EDA received only 24. The aftermath of the elections was dominated by a storm of accusations of electoral fraud against the government. Papandreou literally reinvented himself, and he was elevated into a symbol of democratic solidarity. The opposition's demand for new and fair elections was animated by its characterization as the "relentless struggle."²⁶⁴ However, in addition to the removal of the Karamanlis government, there was another element of great importance in the program of the EK: to reduce and isolate the power of the left. Thus, the relentless struggle carried in its core a dual-front struggle, against both the right and the left.²⁶⁵ Furthermore, in this context a reduction of US aid could easily create the impression that the Americans favored the overthrow of Karamanlis.²⁶⁶

George Papandreou formed the EK on the 19th of September in 1961. It was a coalition of small centrist parties without any clear ideological program, but it came to fill the vacuum left

²⁶¹ EDA, *Program of Patriotic Alliance*, Approved by the Administrative Committee during the Fifth Synod of EDA, pp. 1-4.

²⁶² In his speech to the National Council of EDA, Eliou stated, "indeed, the emergence of the cooperating scheme, of PAME, as the main force will vindicate the propriety of our strategy of unity and press the leadership of the center to do after the elections that which it refused to do before." ASKI, "Elias Eliou Speech in the National Council of EDA, 23-24.9.1961," *EDA Archive*, Box 11.2, folder 1.

²⁶³ For the Seventh Synod of EDA, see ASKI, "Seventh Synod of EDA," March 3-7, 1962, *EDA Archive*, Box 13, folder 5; for an analytical summary on the talks during the Synod, see Tasos Trikkas, vol. 2, pp. 882-886.

²⁶⁴ John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis, p. 137. For Papandreou's "relentless struggle," see Spyros Linardatos, vol. 4, pp. 92-99, 102-106, 182-185, 223-226, 309-317; see also the contributions in Manolis Vasilakis (ed), *From the 'Relentless' Struggle to Dictatorship*, Papazisis and K. Mitsotakis Institute, Athens, 2009 and Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation*, p. 143 ff.

²⁶⁵ Tasos Trikkas, vol. 2, p. 908.

²⁶⁶ Evanthis Chatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War: Frontline State, 1952-1967*, Routledge, London and New York, 2006, p. 91.

by the KKE after the Civil War, after which the largest part of the EAM was not represented. Throughout this period the KKE was unable to regain this representation apart from a partial and fragmented representation through the EDA. In other words, there was a constant and significant gap in the representation of the masses at least until 1961, when the EK was established and took over that role, whereby it would become the party's electoral base for its rise to power in the future.²⁶⁷ Furthermore, in the midst of political unrest, right-wing thugs collaborating with the *parakratos*²⁶⁸ in Thessaloniki killed Grigoris Lambrakis, a deputy of the EDA, at an abortive peace rally.²⁶⁹ Lambrakis' fame preceded him because of his athletic skills and medical work (often, pro-bono) and because of the formation of the EEDYE, in which he participated as vice president at international pacifist meetings and demonstrations. These factors forced Karamanlis to resign on the 11th of June in 1963.

The party of the EDA perceived the "relentless struggle" of Papandreou, although reluctantly at first, as a genuine act for the democratization of the country and "democratic resistance."²⁷⁰ As it was noted during the Second Congress of the party, "the stance of the EDA, together with its effects on the masses, also contributed greatly to keeping the leadership of the center in line with the 'relentless struggle.'"²⁷¹ Since, as Antonis Brillakis stated during the Second Congress of the party, "the struggle against the electoral coup and the party of the *ethnikofrones* was conducted in the streets, and not only in the parliament as it had happened in the past,"²⁷² the EDA had to seek alliances with the mass movement and contribute to its expansion. Thus, the EDA would be in position to strengthen its efforts and increase its influence to counter the "dual-front" struggle by the EK.²⁷³

The above situation is exemplified quite eloquently by Pasalidis in his speech at the Congress, a speech that is quite revealing in many respects. He stated that:

The experience of a series of united demonstrations by our people and the youth promotes the idea that the "dual-front" struggle against the EK represents an obstacle to the struggle for democratization.... [It] also promotes the authority of the coup. [...] The EDA, preserving all the precautions and the disagreements concerning the EK foreign

²⁶⁷ Christoforos Vernardakis and Giannis Mavris, p. 109 ff.

²⁶⁸ *Parakratos* cannot be translated adequately unless we attempt to do it periphrastically. The closest term is like its Turkish equivalent *derin devlet*, meaning "deep state."

²⁶⁹ Tasos Trikkas, pp. 987-1001; Giannis Voultepsis, *The Lambrakis' Case*, 2 vols., Alkyon, Athens, 1998 and Spyros Linardatos, *From Civil War to Junta.*, vol. 4, pp. 226-236 and pp. 252-274.

²⁷⁰ Leonidas Kyrkos, *What Left?*, Odysseas, Athens, 1987, p. 72; quoted also in Tasos Trikkas, p. 935.

²⁷¹ Second Congress of EDA, "Announcement of the Administrative Committee of EDA," *EDA Archive*, Box 7, folder 2.

²⁷² ASKI, Second Congress of the EDA, *EDA Archive*, Boxes 5 – 7.

²⁷³ Tasos Trikkas, p. 936.

policy, and noting the lack of specific solutions in G. Papandreou's speech, believes that the framework of that address presents a basis for the struggle against the authority of the coup. [...].²⁷⁴

The EDA saw the electoral percentages of 1958 decrease rapidly. The party's electoral losses can be explained by the rising influence of the EK and the mobilization of state apparatuses, which started even before the elections. Those identified as the culprits of fraud were army officers who co-operated with the police in the "Pericles Plan." The collaboration between the government, the army, the secret service and the Palace was a plan to unite the national front against the left. However, the EDA was tipped off about the plan and published it in *Avgi*.²⁷⁵ A few days earlier, at the Acropol theatre in Athens, the EDA, through its Executive Committee, openly accused the government of preparing an electoral coup.²⁷⁶ The plan was designed to target only the left, but the ensuing violence affected members of the EK party as well. In this way, Papandreou, who a few days earlier had stated, "we need a little violence," went to the Palace to complain. King Paul assured him that the "violence was meant only for the left, and therefore there's no need to worry."²⁷⁷

Due to the extreme violence, Eliou raised the question in parliament on February 13, 1963, and that question would lead to a bitter verbal conflict between Eliou and ERE's Papadopoulos.²⁷⁸ Later, however, the verbal conflict turned into a fist fight between members of the ERE and EDA, Brillakis and Lambrakis. The latter would meet a tragic end two months later when the *parakratos* conspired murderously against him. Lambrakis' initiative, under the guidance of the EDA, established the EEDYE. He participated in pacifist meetings and demonstrations despite frequent threats against his life.

Starting in the early 1960s, the student movement took on major proportions following the 1961 elections. Student activists stopped focusing on purely educational issues and became the linchpin of a political struggle aimed at breaking the monopoly of the three successive right-wing governments that had ruled the country since 1952. Prompted by the arbitrary use

²⁷⁴ ASKI, "Psalidis' Speech in the Second Pan-Hellenic Conference of EDA," *EDA Archive*, Box 7, folder 2; see also EDA, *The Second Pan-Hellenic Conference of EDA. Official Documents*, EDA, Athens, 1963; Tasos Trikas, p. 937; for the talks of the conventioners during the conference, such as Sideris, Tzivras, Moraitis, Dromazos and others, see ASKI, *EDA Archive*, Box 7, folder 3.

²⁷⁵ *Avgi*, September 17, 1961 and September 19, 1961; as Nikolakopoulos rightly observes, the long text cited in *Avgi* is quite different from the final text of the Pericles plan; see also the EDA, *The Black Bible*, EDA, Athens, 1962, esp. pp. 37-50 in which the EDA analyzes both the environment of the elections and the Pericles plan.

²⁷⁶ "The gathering at Acropol," p. 37, in EDA, *The Black Bible*.

²⁷⁷ Spyros Linardatos, vol. 3, p. 74.

²⁷⁸ Papadopoulos, who was known to have collaborated with the German occupation, said: "You will be buried," to which Eliou replied: "The fascists who worked with the Germans continue today under the guise of democracy to apply fascist methods." As quoted in Tasos Trikas, p. 987

of police force, including the frequent invasion of university campuses, student activism gained momentum by advocating democracy in university administration and in access to knowledge.²⁷⁹ This was the “114 movement,” the name of which refers to the article of the 1952 Constitution according to which citizens themselves guarantee the implementation of the constitution. Student activists interpreted this article “as giving citizens the right to act in situations in which a government is not respectful of the constitution.”²⁸⁰ This movement was coupled with demand in the early 1960s to increase government funding for education. The main slogan of the students was “15 percent,” the amount of the budget for educational expenses that they demanded the government spend.²⁸¹ Students took the opportunity to juxtapose the “15 percent” for education, also the “dowry to education,” with the tax imposed to pay for Princess Sofia’s dowry in her marriage to the Spanish prince Juan Carlos de Bourbon in 1962.

In April of 1963, the Greek “Bertrand Russell Youth Committee on Nuclear Disarmament” was established. It organized the First Pacifist Rally from Marathon to Athens, in which many demonstrators were arrested and the rally was disbanded upon police intervention. Lambrakis was the only one who finished the rally, as he had political immunity. He held the banner with the peace symbol, the one he had previously held up during the Aldermaston rally in the United Kingdom while protesting near the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE). The murder²⁸² of Lambrakis led to a coalition of the Democratic Youth of the EDA and the Lambrakis’ Youth, which had been established by the famous artist Mikis Theodorakis.

The Last Period of the Pre-Dictatorial EDA and Cyprus: 1963 – 1967

In Cyprus, Makarios’ constitutional proposals, the Thirteen points (the right of veto of the president and the vice-president of the republic was to be abolished; the proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the composition of public service and of the forces of the republic, i.e. the police and the army, were to be modified in proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots; the numerical strength of the security forces and of the army was to be determined by law and not by agreement between the

²⁷⁹ Kostis Kometis, p. 15.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ Ibid., p. 16.

²⁸² For the reasons behind the murder and the pattern of this killing, see Evi Gkotsaridis, “Who Will Help Me to Get Rid of this Man?” Grigoris Lambrakis and the Non-Aligned Peace Movement in Post-Civil War Greece: 1951–1964.” *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, vol. 30, no. 2, 2012, pp. 299-338.

president and the vice-president of the republic, etc.), were made without consulting the Greek government, and most importantly, without notifying the vice-president of the republic, Dr. Fazıl Küçük. This decision sent tremors through the newly established and relatively viable unitary state. Makarios' initiative suggests that he either had not accepted the agreements, or that he could not resist the strong pressure put on him by those in nationalist circles from the Greek Cypriot and Greek elite. However, considering the statement he had made in 1960 that "the struggle is not over. The end of the armed struggle marks the beginning of new Greek struggles for consolidating the gains and further augmenting and exploiting them,"²⁸³ the first claim seems more convincing.

It did not take long for the sporadic incidents occurring on the island to develop into a serious conflict between the two communities. The foreign minister, replying to a question raised by two EDA deputies, Eliou and Kyrkos, argued rightly that such problems were bound to happen, but he expressed his optimism that they would be resolved soon, and assured them that the government was doing its best to bring the communities closer.²⁸⁴ However, Tositsas was only correct in saying that it was normal for the newly established Cyprus Republic to face such problems. On the other hand, however, the ERE seriously underestimated the dimensions of the events and how they were about to be used by the Greek-Cypriot community to undermine the Cyprus Republic and acquire further privileges, and by extension, minimize the privileges of Turkish Cypriots and change the latter's status from an "ethnic community" to a minority. In addition, another grave miscalculation by the government was the fact that it doubted the likelihood of a Turkish invasion when questioned on that threat in parliament by EDA members. Tositsas responded, "Threats of an armed invasion by Turkish forces in Cyprus lack any credibility or sincerity. [...]"²⁸⁵

Although the Karamanlis government, which was still in power, warned Makarios that such a move would jeopardize not only the Greek-Turkish and Greek-NATO relations, meaning relations with the US and also relations between Greece and Cyprus, they ignored the Greek government. Karamanlis would soon resign after his handling of the Cyprus Question, and this was expedited by the student movement's growth following Lambrakis' murder, and ultimately the government was left in the hands of Papandreou. Papandreou, who

²⁸³ Makarios' speech in Nicosia, March 31, 1960, *Konstantinos Karamanlis Archives*, vol. 4, pp. 267-268 as quoted in Stefanidis, p. 143.

²⁸⁴ Evangelos Averoff-Tositsas, *CQGP*, 20 February 1962, vol. 3, pp. 164-165.

²⁸⁵ Tositsas replied to the question raised by Eliou, Brillakis, Iliopoulos, Chiotakis, Efraimidis, and Kyrkos on February 17, 1962; Evangelos Averoff-Tositsas, *CQGP*, April 4, 1962, p. 165.

was in agreement with the ERE's policy on Cyprus, seemed to adopt a different policy and denounced the agreements as "a crime against the nation."²⁸⁶

The EK, with Papandreou at the helm, was charting its own position on the Cyprus Question "with a recent tradition of patriotic rhetoric and rhetorical intransigence, which might have helped cover the internal differences within the party itself, but they were not pushing for a practical alternative policy."²⁸⁷ The EK policy on Cyprus, after it came to power temporarily with the help of the EDA in November 1963, left the impression that an amendment of the agreements was one possible scenario, although Makarios soon put a halt to that.

During this phase of intense political strife, Papandreou all but repudiated his earlier qualified consent to the Zurich-London agreements. Following the 1963 constitutional breakdown and the outbreak of violence in Cyprus in December of 1963, he denounced the settlement of 1959,²⁸⁸ and in the electoral year of 1963, attacks against "the sellout of Zurich" were seen as a means of bolstering a rising political force. For that reason, Papandreou strongly criticized the 1959 Zurich and London agreements, and he even said in parliament that the military aspect of the agreements (namely, the stationing in Cyprus of Turkish troops, along with a Greek contingent) was "a blasphemy against the eternity of Hellenism."²⁸⁹ Henceforth, Papandreou essentially supported the abrogation of the agreements, particularly as regards their guarantees against *Enosis*. Cyprus, Papandreou declared, was entitled to unfettered independence including the right of self-determination. Papandreou, however, asserted that the term self-determination was a "disturbing" term at the international level, and he contended that *Enosis* was the Cypriot people's right.²⁹⁰

Soon after, Papandreou openly expressed support for the struggle for *Enosis* that was launched anew on the island and adopted the doctrine of the "national center." Papandreou needed to formulate a new strategy that would take into account both Makarios' constitutional proposals and the intention of Makarios to undertake initiatives that were carried out with the exclusion of Greece. This new strategy was called the doctrine of "national center," and

²⁸⁶ George Papandreou, *CQGP*, April 4, 1964, p. 180; for Papandreou's contradictory policies, see Stefanidis, pp. 146. Even Foreign Minister Averoff-Tositsas stated that "today we should candidly acknowledge that the agreements do not deliver." Averoff-Tositsas, *CQGP*, February 2, 1964, p. 175-176.

²⁸⁷ Evanthis Chatzivasilou, "The Cyprus Question, Summer 1964: Internal Perspectives of the National Issues," p. 308, in Alkis Rigos, Serafim Seferiades and Evanthis Chatzivasilou (eds), *The "Short" 1960s: Institutional Framework, Party Strategies, Social Conflicts, Cultural Fermentation*, Kastaniotis, Athens, 2008

²⁸⁸ George Papandreou, *CQGP*, April 4, 1964, vol. 3, p. 180; Ioannis D. Stefanidis, p. 146.

²⁸⁹ Evanthis Chatzivasilou, *Greece and the Cold War*, p. 131.

²⁹⁰ George Papandreou, *CQGP*, May 12, 1964, vol. 3, p. 206; Ioannis D. Stefanidis.

George Papandreou first expressed this to Archbishop Makarios in a letter dating from the 25th of February, 1964:

In the very meaning of the unity of Hellenism, and because of the increased responsibilities of Athens as the center of Hellenism, I wish to declare my fervent desire that full and constant contact and co-ordination exist between us. If circumstances call for it, there could even be an agreed disagreement.²⁹¹

Makarios had no problem with this. On March 1st, he replied that he certainly wished for co-ordination with Athens: “For I believe, as you do, that the Greek nation is a united total, of which a part is Cyprus, looking towards Athens as the center of united Hellenism.”²⁹² Nevertheless, in practice the archbishop continued to act as he pleased. In April, without notifying Athens, Cyprus government forces attacked the Turkish-Cypriot enclave of St. Hilarion, dragging Greece and Turkey again towards the verge of war.

Support for the non-aligned leader Makarios from the Soviets, who declared their opposition to any kind of intervention on the island of Cyprus, alarmed the US State Department, which was distraught by the possibility that Cyprus could become “a Cuba of the Mediterranean.” Moreover, US policy was focusing on the fact that if the Cyprus Question were raised at the UN, it might bring about the isolation of Turkey and represent a success of the Cyprus government concerning the island’s self-determination, or even hint at the encouragement of Soviet interests to “boot out” the US and Great Britain from their bases in Cyprus.²⁹³

On the other hand, the Turkish government did not seem willing to ease tensions, and since the issue had been raised at the UN, Makarios’ move seemed to be vindicated. Although the decision made by the UN had demanded that all countries to abstain from any kind of intervention in Cyprus, anti-American sentiment and pressure felt by the Turkish government by both left and right factions alike caused the government to increase its efforts; as a result, Turkish forces bombed Nicosia and threatened a military invasion. However, Lyndon Johnson, Kennedy’s successor in power, brought this to a halt in a letter, notifying Ankara that if the invasion was carried out, the US would not provide assistance to Turkey in the case of a Soviet attack. This intervention on behalf of the US president showed that “firstly,

²⁹¹ Evanthis Chatzivasiliou, “The Cyprus Question, Summer 1964: Internal Perspectives of the National Issues,” p. 309; Stefanidis.

²⁹² Evanthis Chatzivasiliou, *Greece and the Cold War*, p. 132; Archbishop Makarios III, *Collected Texts of Archbishop Makarios III*, vol. 6, Foundation of Archbishop Makarios III, Nicosia, 1996, pp. 194–200.

²⁹³ Spyros Linardatos, p. 373 and Tasos Trikkas, p. 1096.

[Greece] did not have the potential for a military triumph and to impose *Enosis*, while [Turkey] had suffered a serious political defeat.”²⁹⁴ This foreshadowed a more active intervention by the US in Greek and Turkish politics and another proposed solution to the Cyprus Question, which was the true intention of the US.

Although supportive of Papandreou’s candidacy in the elections, the EDA remained critical of the EK’s Cyprus policy, as stated at the party’s *Fifth Synod* on the 10th of January in 1964.²⁹⁵

The EK party, represented by its vice president and foreign minister, showed some cold-war signs identifying the northern borders of Greece with those of NATO. It [the EK] maintained high military expenses and called on NATO to take charge of the defense of the country. This is a full identification with the ERE’s foreign policy. [...] It has become obvious by now that the status created by the deceitful agreements of Zurich cannot be maintained any longer. The Cypriots, after much hesitation on behalf of Makarios, mapped the right way: they appealed to the UN for the abolition of the guarantee agreements and the amendment of the constitution. [...] Once more however, the Greek government, of the center this time, blocked it and helped the colonial and friendly to Turkey, NATO with the issue [...].²⁹⁶

Pasalidis also sent a message to Archbishop Makarios reassuring the Cypriot people that “We [the EDA] stand by the side of the Cypriot government, which resists the presence of NATO’s armed forces on the island. [...] The EDA demands the denunciation of the London-Zurich Agreements and of any NATO attempts at intervention, and supports recourse to the UN and the complete self-determination of the Cypriot people.”²⁹⁷

According to the EDA, George Papandreou and his party perpetuated the ERE’s policies and belief that a solution would be found through NATO. The EDA, on the other hand, believed that the sooner the Greek government understood the dangers inherent in such a move, the better the national interests of Greece would be served. It was argued that ceasing to believe in NATO would stop the “insolence of imperialist Turkey.” Deputy Merkouris, addressing parliament, stated, “it is time for the myth of the Greek-Turkish friendship to stop.” The claim was made that Greek-Turkish friendship was a myth because of the

²⁹⁴ Evanthis Chatzivasilou, “The Cyprus Question, Summer 1964: Internal Perspectives of the National Issues,” p. 311.

²⁹⁵ ASKI, Fifth Synod of EDA, *EDA Archive*, Box 14, folder 4.

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ ASKI, “Pasalidis’ message to Makarios,” January 31, 1964, *EDA Archive*, Box 693 and *Avgi*, January 31, 1964; also quoted in Tasos Trikkas, p. 1097.

“extermination of the Greeks in Constantinople and they [the Turks] conspire against the integrity of Greece” and because of Turkish threats in 1957 to take over the Aegean islands.²⁹⁸ In this way, it was argued that the only country that actually believed in and showed the good faith needed for that friendship to work was Greece. Turkish politics and diplomacy were driven by the Allies, Merkouris asserted, and therefore potential negotiations concerning Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus Question were impossible.²⁹⁹

In the summer of 1964 negotiations started with the aim of reaching a settlement that would provide for the union of Cyprus with Greece in exchange for the annexation or lease of the Cypriot Karpass peninsula to Turkey. This became known as the Acheson Plan. It was known that Makarios opposed such a proposal, and another attack was launched against the Turkish Cypriot enclave in Mansura, thus embarrassing the Papandreou government, which had assured the Turks and the Americans that the island would remain calm. Papandreou sent an angry message to Makarios and to George Grivas, the leader of the Greek forces on the island: “We agree on certain issues and then you do otherwise.”³⁰⁰

The Greek prime minister reacted with another letter to Makarios on the 29th of August, restating the national center doctrine and reassuring Greek Cypriots that in the case of an unprovoked Turkish invasion, *Enosis* would be proclaimed by the Greek and the Cypriot parliaments, and that “Greece, with all its forces, will stand by Cyprus.” At the same time, an important question emerged; who would be responsible for deciding the response to a Turkish invasion? Papandreou provided the following answer:

In that case, Greece [...] will either refuse to participate [in a war] and its absence will be judged as national treason; or it will participate because it will be miserably dragged into it [...] This, Your Beatitude, cannot go on. In earlier days [...] we had agreed that the leadership of Hellenism, and the political and military initiative, should belong to Athens, which co-ordinates the struggle. But today we are not talking merely of a theoretical case. According to our decisions, which have also been made public, *an armed conflict between Turkey and Cyprus will immediately lead Greece into the war*. And war is too big an issue for Greece to allow itself to be dragged into it, by the initiatives of others [...] I therefore ask that in the future our agreement must be respected fully and always. [This agreement] twice has already been violated. *No decision will be made in Cyprus, leading directly or indirectly to hostilities, without prior consultation and agreement with us*. If we agree, all will be good. If we disagree, Athens’ view must prevail, because Athens bears the responsibility for all Hellenism. In

²⁹⁸ Spyros Merkouris, *CQGP*, March 31, 1964, p. 171.

²⁹⁹ Elias Eliou, *CQGP*, April 24, 1964, p. 200.

³⁰⁰ Evanthia Chatzivasilou, *Greece and the Cold War*, p. 133.

that case, if Nicosia persists in its disagreement, this disagreement will be, honestly and in a manly way, announced to the Nation. And each will take his responsibilities and the consequences before the Nation.³⁰¹

Makarios agreed to Papandreou's and Athens' leading role, but reserved the right to disagree with a decision that would go against the interests of Cyprus and its people.

The EDA criticized Papandreou, but at the same time urged him to "talk outright." The EDA's Executive Committee suggested a "national contract" between all political forces, "full utilization of the support provided by independent and socialist countries," and Greek recourse to the UN.³⁰² Pervasive anti-American sentiment, now common not only among the left but also among the right and center, resulted in a situation in which the population as a whole took a more neutral, or perhaps even Soviet-friendly approach. Soviet interest in Cyprus peaked after February of 1964 and President Khrushchev sent a message to President Johnson saying, "the USSR cannot stand indifferent towards the situation that is taking place in the Republic of Cyprus." The EDA warned Papandreou not to confuse "a nationalist vision with the aspirations of imperialist powers"³⁰³ and stated that what the US really sought from its NATO alliance was to transform the island into a base for nuclear testing.³⁰⁴ Papandreou, for his part, tried to tame anti-American sentiment, which was increasing day by day, and youth demonstrated in the streets in support of Cyprus and against the US.³⁰⁵

The Cyprus Question was a central pillar of the party's political agenda, and the EDA was trying to increase its presence on the nationwide political agenda. However, the EDA's rhetoric was lacking in that it did not attempt to analyze the political games played by Papandreou, and perhaps, more importantly, it failed to analyze the domestic dynamics and problems that were being created on Cyprus. Thus, the EDA limited itself to well-known positions and expressed its satisfaction with disengagement from the Zurich-London Agreements, while warning the government about the dangers that a compromise with the British and the Americans would be brought about for both Greece and Cyprus.

Under the pressure of the struggle of the people of Cyprus and Greece, the framework of the London-Zurich Agreements was abandoned, and

³⁰¹ As quoted in Ibid., pp. 133-134.

³⁰² As quoted in Evanthis Chatzivasiliou, "The Cyprus Question, Summer 1964: Internal Options of the National Issues," p. 316, in Alkis Rigos.

³⁰³ Ioannis D. Stefanidis, "Irredentism in the 1960s," p. 293, in Ibid; for a fuller account of irredentism and Greek political culture, see also Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation*, esp. pp. 109-142.

³⁰⁴ Elias Eliou, *CQGP*, November 25, 1964, p. 258.

³⁰⁵ There were also declarations against the visit of the American 6th fleet in Greek ports, and the government was forced to postpone the visit, and the "Voice of America" stopped broadcasting.

the idea of partition and the “federated” state was avoided. [...] Now the danger arising from the government line of compromise is increasing because the Americans and British imperialists press for unacceptable propositions to be accepted, as the population exchange of the Greeks of Istanbul and of course the Patriarchate... In addition, there is an increasing danger of the undermining of the unity of the Cyprus people as well, brought about in the name of “anti-communism,” behind which are concealed the interests of the American and the British imperialists.³⁰⁶

EDA representatives in parliament called for the immediate repudiation of the agreements and the application of self-determination. Notably, the floor leader of the EDA, Elias Eliou, urged the government to disassociate itself from NATO. In addition, the anti-Turkish political rhetoric of the EDA was apparent, which however, as Eliou clearly stated, was not aimed at the Turkish people but at their government, which launched a policy similar to the September events in Istanbul in order to blackmail Greece and force NATO into political concessions.³⁰⁷

Stefanidis rightly argues that the EDA sought to combine “nationalist fervor with its own agenda on domestic and foreign issues.”³⁰⁸ This was not the first time, however, since the hegemonic *ethnikofron* mindset left no space for a left-wing ideology to flourish, leaving the leftist movement trying to find ways to incorporate itself anew in the political and social life of the country. This does not mean, however, that the left adopted and identified with the hegemonic ideology of the state, but rather that the party laced national rhetoric with anti-colonial overtones, and Cyprus played a part in this as well; eventually this would lead to the “national democratic change” that the party had agitated for since its establishment. In light of that, the EDA had always supported a “patriotic alliance” of all the democratic forces of the country, and the EDA’s quest for alliances with and support for the EK remained in place. When Papandreou’s intentions to renegotiate with NATO became evident, however, the EDA distanced itself from centrist policy, declaring “our party underlines that our government owes, based on the fighting spirit and the mobilization of the Greek and Cypriot people, to adhere to the national line of the defense of Cypriot freedom.”³⁰⁹ Then, more than ever, the EDA began linking the anti-colonial struggle of Cyprus with the international anti-colonial

³⁰⁶ Statement of the Executive Committee of the EDA, ASKI, *Sixth Synod of EDA*, 9-12 May 1964, *EDA Archive*, Box 14, folder 5.

³⁰⁷ Elias Eliou, *CQGP*, April 24, 1964, pp. 196-201; Elias Eliou, *CQGP*, May 12, 1964, pp. 203-204; Elias Eliou, *CQGP*, July 3, 1964, pp. 225-228; Elias Eliou, *CQGP*, November 25, 1964, p. 253; for a summary of the EDA’s policy in 1964, see also Ioannis Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation*, p. 147.

³⁰⁸ Ioannis Stefanidis, *Ibid.*, p. 153.

³⁰⁹ ASKI, “Seventh Synod of EDA,” *EDA Archive*, Box 14, folder 6; Tasos Trikkas.

movement that was growing worldwide through the wars in Vietnam, Laos and Congo.³¹⁰ However, the EK had shown signs of “democratizing” the country and presenting a “staunch barrier against the fascist right.” Therefore, the EDA expressed its support for the government since “there is [at least] a reaction against the foreign imperialists, as far as Cyprus and other foreign issues are concerned.” The EDA’s support, however, was not offered “loosely, but to fight against the coup and for the self-determination of Cyprus....”³¹¹

A Shift in Soviet Foreign Policy

As the Greek government announced its decision to participate as one of the core countries of NATO’s nuclear group, the Executive Committee of the EDA saw this as “a disastrous act that runs against national interests” and moreover that it would cause socialist and Arab countries to repeal their support for the Cyprus cause.³¹² In addition to that turn of events, something else occurred that would have dire consequences for the left in Greece and Cyprus. As was noted earlier, the Soviet Union had supported the Cyprus cause of self-determination. However, in the winter of 1964/5, the Soviet Union, acting according with a domestic solution on the “national issue,” changed its foreign policy in favor of a “federal” solution. This shift of Soviet foreign policy alarmed even the KKE, which sent a delegation to Moscow to present its positions and argue why the Soviet Union should adhere to the position of self-determination. As the memoirs of Grigoris Farakos, and especially those of Panos Dimitriou, indicate, the Soviet reply was more along the lines of “generalities” than a position with a strong counterargument. The KKE delegation presented its opposition to the Soviet leadership’s opinion that there were “two equivalent ethnic communities (one with an overwhelming majority, the Greek one, and a Turkish minority).” In addition, the KKE defended the view that “the utilization of the federal solution would actually mean the active division of the island and the abolition of the unity of the Cyprus Republic.”³¹³

Indeed, the Soviet Union, through the Moscow-based newspaper *Izvestia*,³¹⁴ announced its position on a federal solution in Cyprus. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko’s announcement

³¹⁰ See for example Ch. Odysseos, “The Cyprus Question in the Light of the British-American Contradictions,” *Helliniki Aristera*, no. 6, January 1964, pp. 28-33; Chronicle, “International and Financial News,” *Helliniki Aristera*, no. 8-9, March-April 1964, pp. 73-83.

³¹¹ ASKI, “Seventh Synod of EDA.”

³¹² Statement of the Executive Committee of EDA, November 12, 1964.

³¹³ Two of the most prominent figures of the KKE. Panos Dimitriou, *De Profundis*, Themelio, Athens, 1993, p. 253 ff.; see also Spyros Linardatos, vol. 5, pp. 120-126 and Tasos Trikkas, pp. 1163-1171.

³¹⁴ The announcement was made in *Izvestia* on January 21, 1965. Trikkas notes that the announcement was not made through the head of the Higher Soviet Pontgorny in Ankara in an attempt to calm the public opinion in Greece because of the pressure of the Greek left.

caused great anxiety in Greece and Turkey, and was considered to be a retreat from the previous support for the Cyprus cause. As was expected, right-wing circles tried to use the Soviet shift in accusations against the EDA. The EDA's Executive Committee convened to discuss the issue and unanimously declined the Gromyko proposal, asking for the preservation of the solution of self-determination. At the same time, the AKEL voted in favor of self-determination and criticized the Soviet stance more harshly, as it also did for the KKE Politburo. For the first time, the EDA, KKE and AKEL were in concert,³¹⁵ turning against the "international center."

The EDA stated in the next day's edition of *Avgi* that:

In the declarations of the Soviet foreign minister there is an emphasis on regular Soviet support for self-determination and the integrity of Cyprus, the peaceful solution of the Cyprus Question and the right of the Cypriots to choose their fate without foreign interventions. [...] There are, however, in these declarations, opinions that are referring to the extent of the application of the principle of self-determination and to the potentiality of the internal readjustment of the state in the form of federation, which are susceptible to interpretations with which the EDA does not agree [...] It is the obligation of the Greek government to eventually adopt an independent foreign policy [...].³¹⁶

The decisions made by the party and the article have dual meanings: domestically, they marked an attempt to counter claims of betrayal made by the right, while internationally they were not in concert with the Soviet line and this had to be stated in order to force the Soviets to return to the position of self-determination. In addition, the stance of the Greek left signified their distance from the communist "international center" which later also partly marked a split within the Greek Left.

The Soviet shift in policy can be explained only through Soviet fears of an ongoing policy of *Enosis*/NATO-ization of Cyprus, which had already been taken into the orbit of American interests via the British after the Acheson plan in 1964.³¹⁷ In order for the Soviet Union to prevent that scenario, it chose to suggest a federal solution to Cyprus to ease the reactions of

³¹⁵ Based on the account of Takis Benas' interview in Lefteris Mavroeidis (ed), pp. 153-155.

³¹⁶ "EDA: Independence, Self-Determination," *Avgi*, January 22, 1965. See also a partial reproduction of an interview with the secretary of the KKE in *Avgi*, January 23, 1965. The KKE claimed that the Soviet position did not reflect the present conditions of Cyprus. The AKEL, through its newspaper, *Charavgi* (*Daybreak*), on January 23, 1965 declared that a federal solution could not be approved by the AKEL and the people of Cyprus.

³¹⁷ "The UN does not know the language of *Enosis*. The UN only knows the language of independence and demilitarization of Cyprus. It is also known that there are attempts under the slogan of *Enosis* to cover the partition of the island. That is the well-known Acheson plan." Leonidas Kyrkos, *CQGP*, June 24, 1965, vol. 3, p. 281.

Turkey. However, Eliou had already foreseen such possible reactions and the increasing anti-Soviet sentiment that the stance of Moscow might bring about. Even in August of 1964 Eliou warned about the “clumsiness” of the Soviets, which might instigate a rising tide of anti-Soviet feelings and a shift in public opinion in favor of Americanism and perhaps deal a possibly fatal blow to the AKEL.³¹⁸

A few days after the Soviet announcement in *Izvestia*, the EDA formulated a more complete and coherent stance on the issue, which was presented to the government on the 30th of January in 1965 and published in *Avgi*. The proposal consisted of six points in reply to Gromyko’s plan. The EDA’s first point was that “the Cyprus Question was an issue of self-determination, not of secession, and therefore, it is up to Cyprus to decide. [...] Second, the London-Zurich Agreements should be abolished; all non-Cypriot military troops should be removed from the island, and the military bases should be destroyed. Moreover, the exchange of lands is out of the question. [...] Third, this recognition should not exclude the exercise of the right of self-determination. [...] Fourth, there is a Turkish minority and we, along with the people of Cyprus, reject the idea of creating a federate entity. We strongly believe, however, that all the rights of the minority should be ratified by international organizations [...] Five, in the event of a Turkish invasion, we propose that the Great Powers – the permanent members of the Security Council (USA, Great Britain, France) –state that they oppose such an action, along with the Soviet Union. Six, the EDA believes that an official declaration should be made in which Greece shall adopt the need for demilitarization and that in the event of *Enosis* shall propose to carry out international action [...] that would promote the issue. The distancing of Greece from the nuclear group in NATO would be of extreme assistance.”³¹⁹

In the meantime, the US was doing its best to continue negotiations about Cyprus. Galo Plaza, a UN mediator since 1964, was charged with promoting a peaceful solution and a settlement with the representatives of the two communities in Cyprus and with the governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the UN (the last three being the guarantor powers of Cyprus’ independence, according to the constitution). Plaza’s report opposed any kind of partition or federation or return to the London-Zurich Agreement’s status, but his report was opposed by Turkey. Still unresolved, even after Plaza’s carefully written report, the Cyprus problem was again brought before the UN General Assembly, which showed that the Cyprus cause was approaching closure, especially after the independent countries’

³¹⁸ ASKI, “Report of Elias Eliou on the occasion of the Soviet proposals,” *EDA Archive*, Box 479.

³¹⁹ *Avgi*, January 30, 1965; see also Tasos Trikkas, pp. 1169-1170.

favorable vote and Soviet support in the discussions. However, the Soviet Union abstained during the voting, disappointing for the second time the Greek-Cypriots, Greece, and especially the EDA.

The Generals' Coup

In addition to the attempts by the left to minimize anti-communist attacks, *ethnikofron* circles in Greece used Soviet policy in Cyprus and the Cyprus Question *per se*³²⁰ to curb pro-Soviet sentiment that was starting to flourish in Greece and subsequently opened the way for American officers' participation in the military coup d'état in April of 1967.

The internal conflict that was brought about in the government of the EK owing to the personal choices of the prime minister to appoint his son Andreas Papandreou to a government position despite the fact that he didn't have any experience, along with the voting down of the Novas candidacy for the presidency of the Parliament and the handling of the Cyprus Question all combined to cause a distancing of the Mitsotakis-led group of EK members, who allied with the ERE, a political event that that would be remembered in Greek history as "Apostasy" (*Apostasia*).³²¹ The harsh attacks on George Papandreou by the Palace and the ERE and the "apostates," i.e. the Mitsotakis group, led him to resign without first quelling the inner conflict within the party.

The Palace, on the other hand, had already started its own anti-communist scheme using the Soviet stance on Cyprus to blacken the left and create a pro-American environment in Greece.³²² The Palace also worked against the government of the EK and in particular against George Papandreou, who represented a broad demand for radical transformation. Although the EK had made much progress towards the democratization of the country, it left two crucial issues unresolved, the first of which was the army. The changes that were made had a clearly compromising character while not substantially changing the structure and influence of the army. The second issue was the democratization of trade unionism. The trade unions of the left were not allowed to participate in the General Confederation of Greek Workers

³²⁰ Kostas Tsoukalas, *The Greek Tragedy: From Liberation to the Generals*, Livanis, Athens, 1981, p. 152.

³²¹ The terms *Apostasia*, *Iouliana* (July Events) or the Royal Coup are used to describe the political crisis in Greece that centered on the resignation on July 15, 1965 of Prime Minister George Papandreou and the appointment by King Constantine II of successive Prime Ministers from Papandreou's own party, the EK, to replace him. Those defectors from the EK were branded by Papandreou's sympathizers as the *Apostates* (renegades). The *Apostasia* heralded a prolonged period of political instability, which weakened the fragile post-Civil War order and ultimately led to the establishment of a military regime in 1967.

³²² King Constantine, who succeeded his father Paul, made a speech blaming communism and "historical atheism" for the situation, while the EDA criticized the King's speech for using "cold-war polemic" and raised the question of the active involvement of the Palace in the political life of the country.

(GSEE). It was also banned from the 15th Congress of GSEE and was put into a temporary administration.³²³

The Palace had already made contact with the US to discuss a possible overthrow of the government. Since the elections of 1963, the process of “de-Karamanlisization” had resulted in many members of the ERE and Karamanlis’ himself being put on trial and had retained Papandreou’s spirit of “relentless struggle,” but transformed royal concerns into fear of political overthrow.³²⁴ Indeed, Papandreou was unable to counter the attacks associated with the EDA on the latter’s demand to bring Karamanlis to trial for the administrative anomalies in the Public Power Corporation of Greece. Although the EK government voted in favor of the limitation of actions against the Karamanlis government in June of 1965, it was already too late. The following month a new incident dominated the political scene, this time more fiercely than before. King Constantine asked Papandreou to bring the ASPIDA case to trial: the case involved a *para-kratos* organization including politicians, including Andreas Papandreou and high-ranking generals, who sought to overthrow the government. Papandreou did not offer any objections to the King’s demand, but he also decided to bring justice to the “Pericles case,”³²⁵ which had involved the military in the elections of 1961. This brought about a clash between the King and Papandreou, which ultimately caused severe political instability in the country. Following an acrimonious public exchange of correspondences, Papandreou offered his resignation. The king accepted it and set about implementing a strategy of trying to split the EK. The coalition of the EK lacked a proper structure and the king succeeded against a background of massive demonstrations, and Papandreou, who was actively involved, called the July 1965 events a “royal putsch” to match Karamanlis’s “electoral putsch” of 1961.³²⁶

After Papandreou’s resignation, a series of caretaker governments came and went in the subsequent months. Finally, on the 24th of September in 1965, Stefanos Stefanopoulos and 45 dissidents, supported by the ERE and Markezinis, won a vote of confidence by 152 to 148.³²⁷ However, the government, which was comprised of defectors from the Center Union, the “apostates” as they were bitterly denounced by the party faithful, clearly lacked

³²³ Elias Nikolakopoulos, *The Cachectic Democracy*, p. 343.

³²⁴ Based on the personal archives of Konstantinos Karamanlis, vol. 6, pp. 193 ff. as quoted in Konstantina Botsiou, “The Beginning of the End of the Royalism: Crown and Hegemony Crisis in the 1960s,” p. 113, in Alkis Rigos, Serafim Seferiades, Evanthis Chatzivasilou (eds), *Ibid.*; the EDA, on the other hand, chose not to “attack” the King in order to avoid causing a provocation. Spyros Linardatos, vol. 5, p. 224.

³²⁵ See Spyros Linardatos, vol. 4, pp. 39 ff.

³²⁶ Richard Clogg, p. 161.

³²⁷ John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis, p. 140.

legitimacy.³²⁸ The involvement of the Palace in governance had become patently obvious by that time, since it had assumed the role of the main regulator of the Greek political system, trying desperately to build, unsuccessfully, a proper government. As a result, however, the King had managed to become a symbol of division. The state was rudderless and adrift, and chaos dominated the political scene. Constantine finally called for elections in May of 1967, and an overwhelming EK victory seemed certain. Fearful of the consequences, especially a likely purge of the military of hard-line right-wingers, a group of junior officers took action. On the morning of April 21, 1967, operation “Prometheus” was put into action and the government of Greece was taken over through a junta carried out by colonels.³²⁹

The Responsibilities of the Left

The mutual distrust between the KKE and EDA lingered for years, even after the illegal communist organizations were absorbed into the EDA. For the KKE, the center of decision-making still lay with their illegal organization. In other words, the KKE was “not giving up the ‘self-evident right’ to ‘guide’ the EDA from abroad, sidestepping both the political organs and the party polity of the EDA.”³³⁰ This situation, as Vernadakis correctly observes, created a dualism³³¹ of “political centers” within the leftist movement in Greece, with a number of consequences.³³² The debate within the EDA³³³ on transforming the party into a “Marxist-Leninist” group and providing the only de facto legitimization of the communist movement³³⁴ and a return to “normalcy” aimed precisely at the extinction of this dualism, which was becoming obvious both to the leftists and the communists in the country.

There was a conflict between the two “centers” and in order for the KKE to retain control over the communists in Greece, it decided in 1963 to allow the Interior Office of the Central

³²⁸ Richard Clogg, p. 162.

³²⁹ Thomas W. Galant, *Modern Greece: Brief Histories*, Arnold, London, 2001, p. 196; Richard Clogg; John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis.

³³⁰ Christoforos Vernadakis, “EDA and KKE during the 1960s. The Ideological, Political and Organizational ‘Dualism’ of the Traditional Left and their Influence upon the July 1965 Events crisis” in *From the ‘Adamant Struggle’ to Dictatorship*, Papazisis with the collaboration of The Konstantinos Mitsotakis Institute, Athens, 2009; “For the leadership of KKE, the main blow after the defeat of 1949 and the moving of the leadership abroad was how to guide the movement in Greece by reorganizing the party along political lines but without running the risk of creating a political current capable of ignoring its [the leadership’s] authority and acting in accordance with the political and organizational needs of the times.” Tasos Vournas, p. 12.

³³¹ The first person to refer to the “dualism” of the left was Aggelos Elefantis, “1951-1967: EDA-KKE. The Two Organizational Faces of the Left,” *O Politis*, issue 83, December 2000.

³³² The first gained its legalization from the Greek communists who were abroad, and the second from the masses, and especially the student movement, which become politicized to the social oppression of the 1960s.

³³³ For the EDA’s lack of a strategy see Leonidas Kyrkos, *Subversively. Against Yesterday and Tomorrow*, 3rd ed., Proskinio, Athens, 1995, pp. 186-187.

³³⁴ Christoforos Vernadakis.

Committee of the party to control both the EDA and the Lambrakis Youth, which was leaning towards the legal representative of the leftist movement. In addition, a few months before the “July Events” of 1965, during the 8th Plenary of the KKE Central Committee, the 1958 decision was withdrawn and it was decided anew that the establishment of party organizations would function “from within, from outside and at the same time” as those of the EDA.³³⁵

The EDA, as a party grounded in the reality of the day, tried to propose a solution to save the country from the crisis, although it would entail a compromise on its behalf by helping the official bourgeois forces of the country. The Executive Committee of the EDA thus proposed five points that it believed would save the country.³³⁶ The most important of these was an amnesty for the monarchy, limiting its powers and putting the Palace in the service of the government, despite popular feeling and its ideology. However, the EDA failed to back the proposal fully, since the power of the demonstrations of the youth movement and the masses had started to tire and become passive.³³⁷ On the other hand, the KKE, clearly oblivious to the situation in Greece, did not oppose the report, believing that another point should be made: the legalization of the KKE, both *de jure* and *de facto*.

Both the EDA and KKE failed to build strong political bulwarks or to create social and political coalitions even with the bourgeois groups and parties that would be able to make political stability possible. The internal problems of the Greek left absorbed all the efforts of the movement, while, at the same time the Cyprus Question was being replaced by the vast number of domestic problems. The open call made by leading EDA figures for a “broad anti-dictatorial front”³³⁸ as well as a warning³³⁹ concerning an imminent military coup were in vain, since the generals had already made preparations for the coup.

³³⁵ For an analytical account of this, see the interesting article by Ioanna Papathanasiou, “‘The Parliament is Interlocked... Deviation is Accomplished...’ – Left Illusions on the Eve of the Coup D’état of 21st April,” pp. 183-203, in Alkis Rigos, Serafim Seferiadis, Evanthis Chatzivasilioni (eds), *Ibid.*; Christoforos Vernadakis, *Ibid.*

³³⁶ *Avgi*, February 8, 1965. The report is reproduced in Leonidas Kyrkos, index 1, pp. 259-262.

³³⁷ “Our [EDA’s] last effort to gather during that stage was in Kavala, which ended in a fiasco.” Leonidas Kyrkos, p. 188.

³³⁸ Leonidas Kyrkos, “Anti-Dictatorial Front: People’s Response,” *Helliniki Aristera*, issue 7, November 1966; see also ASKI, *EDA Archive*, Box 15, folder 4 for Nikos Karras’ statement on behalf of the Executive Committee of the EDA.

³³⁹ Elias Eliou was the first person who had foreseen not only the coup but who would also become the dictator. See the articles in *Avgi* penned by leading EDA figures in the months leading up to the Junta.