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## **From socialism via anti-imperialism to nationalism : EDA-TIP : socialist contest over Cyprus**

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## **Chapter 2**

### **Background and Framework**

#### **Brief History of the Greek and Turkish Communist Movements and the Cyprus Question**

This study aims to present an account of the Greek and Turkish leftist movements as well as their relation to and policies on the Cyprus Question. In order to do this, however, first a brief account will be given of the emergence and formation of the left in these two countries. The purpose of this background information is to provide a fuller account of these cases but not go into an in-depth account, as that would lead to a completely different study. The nature of this chapter is informative, and by no means does it offer a complete account, as the reality surrounding the evolution of the left in Greece and Turkey is quite complex. This chapter will then conclude with a sketch of the Cyprus Question. The goal in the following sections is to present the necessary framework for all the developments concerning the thorny issue of Cyprus, including incidents that took place in Cyprus or concern Cyprus, and even decisions that were made elsewhere but were still remotely associated with Cyprus and the left.

#### **2.1 Brief Overview of the Greek Left until 1951**

During the nineteenth century in Greece, and in the entire Balkan region for that matter, the impact of the industrial revolution was almost non-existent, and therefore the development of a strong working-class movement appeared unlikely. Of course, there were political struggles carried out by the people, but they tended to be spontaneous in nature. Trade union activity in the Greek state made its appearance around 1880 whilst socialist thought started to acquire relative gravity only in the early years of the nineteenth century.<sup>1</sup> One of the first attempts was the founding of the “Workers’ Union of Printers” in Athens (1882), and after that unions of engineers, electro-technicians and railway workers emerged, although they retained the organizational form of guilds and acted more or less as “mutual supporting treasuries.”<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, compared with other European experiences, Greek working-class consciousness

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<sup>1</sup> For the first Greek socialist experiences, see Avraam Benaroya, *The First Experience of the Greek Proletariat*, Enallaktikes Ekdoseis, Athens, 1986 including the article by Georges Haupt, “Contribution to the History of Federation” and Giorgos Leontaritis, *The Greek Socialist Movement During WWI*, Exantas, Athens, 1978.

<sup>2</sup> Panagiotis Noutsos, “Greece,” pp. 439-453, here p. 442, in Marcel van der Linden and Jürgen Rojahn (eds), *The Formation of Labour Movements, 1870-1914: An International Perspective*, vol. 1, Brill, Leiden, 1990. See also Noutsos’ elaborative account of the formation of the first socialist parties in Greece in Panagiotis Noutsos, *The Socialist Thought in Greece, 1875-1974*, vol. 2, part 1 (1907-1925), Gnosi, Athens, 1991.

took shape relatively late and developed slowly.<sup>3</sup> In the formation of Greek working-class consciousness, one movement, while not Greek, played a significant role and that was the Jewish organization La Fédération Socialiste Ouvrière, or also known just as the Federation, because soon after its establishment, Salonica (Thessaloniki) was incorporated into Greece (1912). The Federation was established by Avraam Benaroya (1887-1979) in Thessaloniki, still an Ottoman province at the time, in 1909, after the Young Turk Revolution. The groups' Marxist approach, although ideologically limited, led to a considerable revolutionary impact.<sup>4</sup> Unlike other parties which were organized along ethnic lines, the Federation was a cross-community group, and for that reason, the Ottoman authorities allowed it to exist. Even after the incorporation of Thessaloniki into Greece, Benaroya objected to the idea of dividing the city along ethnic lines.

The experience of World War I polarized Greek society and, despite all the ills the war caused, it freed new social forces and was dynamic in opening new perspectives for the left, resulting at the same time in a blow to old-fashioned hierarchies by introducing Greece to modernity.<sup>5</sup> The Balkan Wars brought socialist activities to a halt but the integration of multinational Macedonia into the Greek state provided a broader field of action and rejuvenated socialist activity.<sup>6</sup> In early 1915, the First Pan-Hellenic Socialist Congress took place, including *Federacion* and other socialist groups and newspapers, although no concrete decisions were made.

A few months after the October Revolution, and under its direct influence, the SEKE (Socialist Workers' Party of Greece/*Sosialistiko Ergatiko Komma Elladas*) was established. Believing that the revolution would spread to the Balkans, the party criticized the national conflicts that were occurring, along with the new outbreaks of war in Ukraine and Asia Minor, and envisioned a federal union of the peoples of the Balkans. SEKE was also the first institution that stood against the royal institution and was in favor of the democratization of the legislature and executive and judicial authorities; in other words, the party was in favor of the establishment of popular sovereignty as a transition stage to socialism.<sup>7</sup> One of the most

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<sup>3</sup> Antonis Brillakis, *The Greek Communist Movement: History – Crisis – Perspectives*, Exantas, Athens, 1980, pp. 91-92.

<sup>4</sup> See Paul Dumont, "A Jewish, Socialist and Ottoman Organisation: the Workers' Federation of Thessaloniki," pp. 49-76, in Erik-Jan Zürcher and Mete Tunçay (eds), *Socialism and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1923*, IB Tauris, London and New York, 1994.

<sup>5</sup> Spyros Marketos, "The Greek Left," p. 125, in Christos Chajiosif (ed), *History of the Twentieth Century Greece. The Inter-War Years, 1922-1940*, vol. B2, Vivliorama, Athens, 2003.

<sup>6</sup> Alexandros Dagkas, "The Communist Party of Greece – The Greek Section of Communist International," p. 157, in Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Spyros Marketos, "The Greek Left," p. 132, in Ibid; KKE, *The Official Documents: 1918-1924*, vol. 1, Synhroni Epohi, Athens, 1974, p. 7.

important decisions that SEKE made during its early years was that it did not support the Asia Minor campaign, characterizing it as an imperialistic and opportunistic war serving the interests of the Greek ruling class and the Great Powers of the period, mainly Great Britain and France, who sought to win the war against the Kemalist movement in Anatolia.<sup>8</sup> The members of SEKE fought for the ousting of the king and stood in favor of peaceful negotiations with the Turks, and one of the most fundamental principles that was staunchly followed was the principle of self-determination, especially as regards Cyprus.<sup>9</sup> Revolutionary defeatism came about because the Asia Minor campaign led to a wave of suppression against its members, whose lives were thrust into a state of semi-illegality. Eventually, the renaming of SEKE during its Third Congress to the KKE (Communist Party of Greece/*Kommounistiko Komma Elladas*) changed the political scene of the country, which was dominated by the Venizelist Liberal Party and the King's Royal Party. The party fully accepted the terms of the Communist International and started a process that was referred to as "bolshevization."<sup>10</sup> By that time, the bipolar scheme of "national restoration and shaking off any 'foreign' tutelage was enlisted in the framework of the principle of the self-determination of the 'nationalities' until they were separated and united in a 'Balkan Communist Federation,' where there was to be neither 'foreign' nor 'national' tutelage."<sup>11</sup>

Cyprus was part of both right-wing and left-wing national agendas. Shortly after Cyprus became a Crown colony (1925), *Rizospastis* (*Radical*), the official newspaper of KKE down to the present day, published the decision of the Executive Central Committee of the party, according to which it was announced that "the national question" had acquired "greater significance" than ever before because of the arbitrary actions carried out under the auspices of British imperialism against the people of Cyprus.<sup>12</sup> This decision carried exceptional significance for two reasons. First, it was the first time, at least publicly, that the KKE referred to "Greek minorities" when it was referring to the "national question," as they were claimed to be oppressed by the same oppressing/colonial/capitalist forces. Second, the

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<sup>8</sup> Philip Carabott, "The Greek 'Communists' and the Asia Minor Campaign," Centre for Asia Minor Studies Bulletin, vol. 9, Athens, 1992, pp. 99-118.

<sup>9</sup> Philip Carabott, "The Position of the Communist Party of Greece on the Cyprus Question During the Period of the Venizelist 'Bourgeoisie', 1925-1931," p. 155, in Giorgos Kazamias and Petros Papapolyviou (eds), *Eleftherios Venizelos and Cyprus*, Kastanioti, Athens, 2008.

<sup>10</sup> See Panagiotis Noutsos, *Socialist Thought in Greece, 1926-1955*. vol. 3, Gnosi, Athens, 1992.

<sup>11</sup> Philip Carabott, p. 157; see also, Ben Fowkes, "To Make the Nation or to Break It: Communist Dilemmas in Two Interwar Multinational States," pp. 206-225, in Norman LaPorte, Kevin Morgan and Matthew Worley (eds), *Bolshevism, Stalinism and the Comintern. Perspectives on Stalinization, 1917-53*, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2008.

<sup>12</sup> *Rizospastis*, "Cyprus was Declared Colony. The Amendments Turn in Favour of the British Interest," May 3, 1925, p. 6; see also, Philip Carabott, p. 158 for a lengthier reference to the text.

decision was important because in the internationalist context of the time, the adoption and utilization of the principle of self-determination had partially become a one-way road.<sup>13</sup> Although it wasn't explicitly stated, the KKE sided with the establishment of a socialist democracy of soviets (councils) in Cyprus. At the same time, aiming to expose the "shameful role of the Greek bourgeoisie," the KKE rejected *en masse* the demand of *Enosis*, to which it didn't even make reference.<sup>14</sup>

Another political decision made by the party, one whose impact reverberated into the following decades and provided the groundwork for the Greek bourgeoisie to pass anti-communist laws and disseminate propaganda against the left, was its stand on a "United and Independent Macedonia and Thrace," a policy that was adopted in 1924 under the direction of the Communist International. This position was part of the Communist International agenda concerning the Balkans and one of its goals was the armed rebellion of Bulgaria and the spread of rebellion throughout the entire region. Despite the differences of opinion within the party,<sup>15</sup> the KKE decided, mainly out of fear of isolation from the Communist International, to support the latter's decision. By 1935, when it had become clear that it was the wrong stand to take, it was already too late and the party's decision proved to be catastrophic, as it led to a series of anti-communist propaganda laws, as well as problematic characterizations, such as the use of the word "Slavs" to refer to communists. A series of suppressive measures ensued that from the end of the 1920s into the early 1930s drove the communist movement into hiatus; of course, that does not mean that it stopped being the main revolutionary force in the country, as it had a sizeable amount of supporters and, most importantly, clear anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist goals.<sup>16</sup> Still, the Metaxas dictatorship banned the party in 1936 and imprisoned many of the party members or sent them into exile on isolated islands in the Aegean. By 1940, the security police had proved extremely successful in dismantling the KKE organization.<sup>17</sup>

When World War II broke out and Italy declared war on Greece, after the famous "No" proclaimed by Metaxas,<sup>18</sup> Nikos Zachariadis (1903-1973), the General Secretary of the KKE

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 158

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> For more on opposition within the communist movement, see Kostas Paloukis, "The 'Left Opposition' within the KKE," pp. 203-243, in Christos Chajiosif (ed), Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Antonis Brillakis, p. 98

<sup>17</sup> Ioanna Papathanassiou argues that the general crisis in the Western European Communist parties also played a role. Ioanna Papathanassiou, "The Communist Party of Greece in front of the Challenges of History, 1940-1945," p. 82, in Christos Chajiosif (ed), *History of the Twentieth Century Greece. WW II – Occupation – Resistance, 1940-1945*, C2, Vivliorama, Athens, 2007.

<sup>18</sup> "No" refers to the Metaxas response to the Mussolini dictatorship when the latter requested the surrender of Greece to its administration. Today, "No" Day is celebrated as a "national" day.

who was in prison at the time, called on all Greeks to fight fascism together with the Metaxas administration and battle the occupying forces by transforming Greece into a “national liberation struggle front.”<sup>19</sup> The following month, in November of 1940, after the Greek army marched to the interior of Albania, is a period that is referred to as the *Albanian Epos* in left-wing political thought because of the bravery showed by the soldiers; Zachariadis changed the line of rhetoric and referred to the fight in Albania as an anti-imperialist struggle, and called on communists and the Greek people to side “with all their power and without posing any hesitation” with the Metaxas government and join the war the latter was waging.<sup>20</sup>

By the following year, when German troops invaded Greece,<sup>21</sup> the KKE, after negotiating with other leftist groups, urged the creation of the National Liberation Front (EAM), which along with other groups, many of them belonging to the right, organized the resistance against the German and Italian occupying forces. Soon after, the struggle was declared to be “national” in an effort on behalf of the left to show that the left-wing elements that were fighting the occupying forces were not foreign-driven or “Slav” as mentioned above, but on the contrary were deemed to be “national and patriotic” and on the side of the people.<sup>22</sup> By the time Greece was liberated in October of 1944, the KKE, and more generally leftist forces, came out victorious with a strong supporting base but the Greek tragedy was far from over, as the domestic situation in Greece began deteriorating.

In November of 1944, tensions between the EAM and right-wing, nationalist and western-oriented republican forces, which were supported by Great Britain, escalated. In May of that year, it was decided at the Lebanon Conference that a Greek Government of National Unity should be formed under the leadership of George Papandreou (1888-1968). A National Charter was also unanimously decided upon, which stipulated the main issues that had to be dealt with during the period of transition to liberation.<sup>23</sup> However, soon after that a confrontation emerged. Due to disagreements regarding the disarmament of ELAS (Greek People's Liberation Army/*Ellinikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos*), the EAM's military wing, but not all military groups, opted to create a national army, and on December 1<sup>st</sup>, the

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<sup>19</sup> Nikos Zachariadis, “Open Letter of Zachariadis to the People of Greece,” October 31, 1940 <http://www.marxists.org/ellinika/archive/zachariadis/1940/10/31.htm> (accessed February 4, 2014).

<sup>20</sup> On the change of rhetoric on behalf of the KKE and Zachariadis, see the elaborative analysis in Ioanna Papathanassiou, p. 86 ff.

<sup>21</sup> On the German Occupation of Greece, see, Hagen Fleischer, *Im Kreuzschatten der Mächte: Griechenland 1941–44. Okkupation, Resistance, Kollaboration*. Peter Lang, Frankfurt, 1986 (translated into Greek as *Crown and Swastika. Greece of Occupation and Resistance*), Papazisis, Athens, 2 vols., 1988/1995.

<sup>22</sup> Aggelos Elefantis, “The Resistance Phenomenon in Hitler's Europe,” p. 14, in Aggelos Elefantis, *They Took Athens from Us*, Vivliorama, Athens, 2003.

<sup>23</sup> Mark Mazower (ed), *After the War Was Over: Reconstructing the Family, Nation, and State in Greece, 1943-1960*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2000.

EAMite ministers resigned. The EAM organized a demonstration in Athens on December 3, 1944 against the state's actions and British interference, the aim of which was primarily to counter and limit communist influence in the interior of the country.<sup>24</sup> The police fired upon the demonstration and hence transformed it into a bloody conflict.<sup>25</sup> The *Dekemvriana* (December Events) marked the beginning of the Greek Civil War that lasted until 1949. The outcome was the complete devastation of the country, as usually occurs during civil wars, both economically and socially, as well as politically; the consequences of the war were attributed to the KKE and the left in general. After that, the left tried to prove its patriotism and demonstrate that it was a genuinely national force serving the interests of the country. The KKE became legal again in 1974 but in the meantime the left managed to be represented legally through the EDA (1951-1967).

## 2.2 Brief Overview of the Turkish Left until 1961

Signs of socialism can be traced back to the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, but these weren't significant enough to represent an ideologically fully formed communist/socialist movement. Actually, these groups tended to be ethnically determined rather than being based on class.<sup>26</sup> In brief, the communist and socialist movement in Turkey dates back in the time of the constitutional revolution of July 1908 and the activities of a small group gathered around Huseyin Hilmi (1855?–1922). In 1910, they founded the *Osmanlı Sosyalist Fırkası* (Ottoman Socialist Party), which was more liberal than socialist. The following year, a branch of the party, led by Dr. Refik Nevzad, was active in Paris, where he published a newspaper, *Beşeriyet* (Humanity), a direct translation of the French newspaper *l'Humanite*.<sup>27</sup> Huseyin Hilmi himself was exiled in Anatolia after the Unionist coup in 1913 and returned to Istanbul only after the armistice of October in 1918. His next endeavor in left-wing party politics was the founding of the *Türkiye Sosyalist Fırkası* (Turkish Socialist Party) and the publication of the newspaper *İdrak* (Insight), and he also organized a series of strikes in Istanbul. He was murdered in 1922.

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<sup>24</sup> Thanasis Sfikas, *The British Labour Government and the Greek Civil War 1945-1949: The Imperialism of "Non-Intervention"*, Keele University Press, 1994.

<sup>25</sup> See the analysis and the reactions of the British public opinion in John Sakkas, *Britain and the Greek Civil War, 1944-1949: British Imperialism, Public Opinion and the Coming of the Cold War*, Peleus, Verlag Franz Philipp Rutzen, 2013, p. 23 ff.

<sup>26</sup> A characteristic that is generally agreed upon. See the contributions of Erik-Jan Zürcher and Mete Tunçay (eds).

<sup>27</sup> See the brief summary presented by Erik-Jan Zürcher in Erik-Jan Zürcher and Mete Tunçay (eds), pp. 205-207.

Following WWI, a group of Spartakists founded the *Türkiye İşci ve Çiftçi Partisi* (Turkish Workers' and Peasants' Party) in Berlin and published the newspaper *Kurtuluş* (Liberation). The newspaper was closed down in 1919 but the group continued its activities in secrecy. When the group returned to Istanbul, Dr. Şefik Hüsnü Değmer (1887-1959) joined them and became the driving force behind the party, which was the first truly Marxist party in Turkey.

Other Turkish communist activities originated in Russia among Turkish war prisoners. The TKP (*Türkiye Komünist Partisi*/Turkish Communist Party) was established by a Turkish émigré group under the leadership of Mustafa Suphi (1883-1921), a former Unionist himself, in Baku in June of 1920, and became a member party of the Communist International. In 1919 and 1920, Mustafa Suphi acted as the head of the propaganda bureau of the Third International in Turkistan, and his group participated in the Baku Congress of September 1920, promoting the TKP as a significant force in the anti-imperialist fight against colonialism and semi-colonialism.<sup>28</sup> The essential aim of the Congress was to initiate an anti-imperialist platform among countries in the East. The importance of support for national liberation movements like the one led by Mustafa Kemal was stated repeatedly. It is interesting to note that the spirit of a united front against “the foreign imperialist yoke” was further strengthened by a declaration from the isolated figure of Enver Pasha (1881-1922), and an enthusiastic speech was given by an official representative of the Ankara government.<sup>29</sup>

As part of the Comintern strategy, pro-Soviet communists offered solidarity with the anti-imperialist national liberation movements in the East. For the Bolsheviks, the October Revolution had built a bridge between the “enlightened” West and the “enslaved” East, which provided the basis for an appeal by the Soviet leadership to people under colonial rule at the Comintern-sponsored Congress of Peoples of the East in Baku, Azerbaijan, in September of 1920. After that, the Comintern set up the Council of Propaganda and Actions of the Peoples of the East headquartered in Baku. In this way, the Bolsheviks established numerous links with Muslims in the East, and many Asian revolutionaries were trained in the Soviet Union, all of which had profound consequences for the West.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> The TKP remained active under the leadership of Mustafa Suphi in Ankara, Istanbul, and Eskisehir. According to articles 2 and 3 of the party program, its stated aim was to establish Bolshevik principles in Turkey. George S. Harris, *The Communists and the Kadro Movement: Shaping Ideology in Atatürk's Turkey*, The ISIS Press, Istanbul, 2002, pp. 90-95.

<sup>29</sup> Bülent Gökay, *Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920-1991*, Routledge, London and New York, 2006, pp. 22-23.

<sup>30</sup> Ben Fowkes and Bülent Gökay, “Unholy Alliance: Muslims and Communists – An Introduction,” *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, vol. 25, no. 1, 2009, p. 8.

Compared to international standards, the TKP had little influence.<sup>31</sup> Its success was hindered by the political framework surrounding its establishment. In other words, it did not gather mass membership because of the nationalistic Kemalist movement, which had already become dominant by that time.<sup>32</sup> However, Mustafa Kemal and his circle seem to have been alarmed by its existence, as they did not want any challenges to the leadership of the revolutionary movement in Anatolia. The party showed its willingness to support the Turkish struggle for independence against the allied forces, and the party leadership tried hard to move its headquarters from Baku to Anatolia in order to join the Turkish national liberation struggle and broaden the party base among the Anatolian population, but Mustafa Suphi and 14 other members drowned under mysterious circumstances, in which Kemalist participation is commonly accepted as fact. The TKP members were granted permission from the Ankara government in the summer of 1920 to shift their center to Ankara, but there is still much controversy surrounding the subject. This event crippled the TKP in such a way that from then on, the party played a marginal role in Turkish politics. In particular, during the years 1925 to 1945, the TKP was not able to reach out to workers and become a party of any significance. All party members could do was distribute pamphlets and discuss communist theories among themselves, and generally the authorities were easily able to arrest them.<sup>33</sup>

Left-wing and communist activities also gained momentum in Anatolia during the national liberation struggle (1919-1922), as the leadership sought an alliance with the new Soviet government to obtain support for the Turkish resistance against the allied occupation. The Green Army (*Yeşil Ordu*) and its political wing in the National Assembly, the People's Group (*Halk Zümresi*) and the Peoples Communist Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası*), were the other main radical organizations in that period inspired by the Russian Revolution, and they were established in Ankara. None of the communist groups, however, wielded enough influence and power to be a visible partner in the leadership of the national liberation struggle and their activities in Anatolia came to an end by the spring of 1921.<sup>34</sup>

After the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, relations between Turkey and the USSR developed in certain peculiar ways. Turkey was the first example of a nation fighting an anti-imperialist war after 1917, and the Soviets, driven by Leninist ideas, supported the

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<sup>31</sup> Ahmet Samim, "The Left," p.150, in Irvin C. Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak (eds), *Turkey in Transition. New Perspectives*, Oxford University Press, Oxford – New York, 1987.

<sup>32</sup> Çağlar Keyder, "The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy," p. 32, in Irvin C. Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak (eds), Şerif Mardin, "Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 2, no. 3, 1971, pp. 197-211.

<sup>33</sup> Ahmet Samim, p. 151; Emre Kanık, *The Unfulfilled Potential of the Turkish Workers Party*, MA Thesis, Utrecht University, 2007, p. 3.

<sup>34</sup> Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar, 1908–1925*, vol. 1, İletisim, İstanbul, 2009.

Turkish struggle. Accordingly, they decided to overlook Suphi and his friends and advised their few Turkish comrades in the Comintern that the anti-imperialism of Atatürk and his progressive policies made him a leader that deserved to be supported.

Şefik Hüsnü's group led a communist movement in Istanbul and began publishing the journal *Aydınlık* (*Enlightenment*) following the murder of Suphi and the other TKP leaders and the dissolution of communist activity in Anatolia. After the founding of Kemalist Turkey, the leaders set about creating a Turkish nation and a modern state. Although Kemalist discourses were quite anti-imperialist, their aim was to create a Western style democracy to drive the country towards "contemporary civilization." In this process, the TKP leadership continued to provide critical support for the leadership of the new Kemalist regime against "reactionary" and "feudal" elements and "imperialist" forces. However, the party would ultimately be banned by state authorities. Using the Kurdish rebellion in 1925 as an excuse, the Turkish government passed a Law on the Maintenance of Order (*Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu*), which granted the government extraordinary powers, on the basis of *irtica*.<sup>35</sup> Communist support of the government was insufficient to save party publications, and the party itself, whose leaders included Şefik Hüsnü, were arrested and imprisoned in 1927.<sup>36</sup> The ban remained in force until the end of the Second World War and members of the communist and socialist movement were subject to harassment by the authorities. The detentions in 1927 were made possible because of information given to the police by Vedat Nedim Tör, one of the future leading intellectuals of *Kadro*, who was opposed to the interventions of the Comintern. He supported the liquidation of the TKP in favor of the Kemalist Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP, Republican People's Party).

The extreme Kemalist suppression not only of the left but across a broader spectrum of society forced the communist movement underground, while others turned Kemalist overtime and compromised their ideas. Kemalist policy concerning control of the Turkish state was instrumental in eliminating all oppositional voices, apart from a brief period when the government allowed an opposition party to be formed which had the potential to challenge the regime.<sup>37</sup> In addition, in the early 1930s, as noted above, some of the former members of the

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<sup>35</sup> Umut Azak, *Islam and Secularism in Turkey. Kemalism, Religion and the Nation State*, IB Tauris, London – New York, 2010, p. 22; Erik-Jan Zürcher, *Turkey. A Modern History*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed, IB Tauris, London – New York, 2004, p. 171-172.

<sup>36</sup> On that point, see George S. Harris, *The Origins of Communism in Turkey*, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, 1967, pp. 97-148.

<sup>37</sup> On Kemalist totalitarian tendencies see, Erik-Jan Zürcher, pp. 179-181. Opposition parties were allowed to form but were quickly closed down, and these included the Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*) established in 1924 and headed by Kazım Karabekir, and the Free Republican Party

TKP distanced themselves from communism and sided with the Kemalist regime. The most notable of these was the circle around the journal *Kadro*, founded by Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Vedat Nedim Tör, Burhan Asaf Belge, İsmail Hüsrev Tökin, and Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, all of whom, with the exception of Karaosmanoğlu, were former members of the TKP. The journal sought to provide the ideological depth the regime needed and had a profound impact on the leftist movement concerning the interpretation of Kemalism as a leftist ideological point of reference.

The end of the war resulted in a lifting of repressive measures and initiated a relative “relaxation” of the strong war and pre-war regime and a turn towards more “democratic” policies. The Association Law represented the legal means for new political parties to be established, and this made it possible for two leftist parties to form. The first one was the TSP (*Türkiye Sosyalist Partisi*/Turkish Socialist Party)<sup>38</sup> which established on the 14<sup>th</sup> of May in 1946 by a lawyer, Esat Adil Mustecaplıoğlu, and the TSEKP (*Türkiye Sosyalist Emekçi ve Köylü Partisi*/Socialist Party of Turkish Workers and Peasants) which was established on the 20<sup>th</sup> of June in 1946 by the well-known labor activist Şefik Hüsnü. Attempts to unite the two parties, however, failed. Both parties were initially permitted to exist but were eventually banned in December 1946, with the arrest of 43 leaders (including Şefik Hüsnü) and members of the TSEKP.

In 1950, for the first time in Turkish history a party consisting of former members of the Kemalist CHP, known as the Democratic Party (DP, Demokrat Parti), managed to obtain a landslide victory in national elections and dominate the Turkish political scene for a decade. The Menderes era, named after the leader of the DP, Adnan Menderes (1899-1961), was seen as a “counter-revolution” in the eyes of the left, because the Democrats were internationally pro-imperialist, subservient to the United States, eager to grant capitalism popular support, and culturally conservative.<sup>39</sup> The DP decade of power coincided with the emergence of the Cold War. The Menderes era brought Turkey closer to the West in the sense that under the DP administration, Turkey became a staunch ally of the West through participation in Western agreements and associations, such as NATO, which it joined in 1952. After that point, Turkey made several decisions that were in accordance with Western, and more specifically, with

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(*Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*, SCF) in 1930 and headed by Fethi Okyar, a trusted friend of Mustafa Kemal. Both parties were closed down because they threatened the authority of the Kemalist regime and its party-state.

<sup>38</sup> See the articles by Özgür Gökmen, “Çok-Partili Rejime Geçerken Sol: Türkiye Sosyalizminin Unutulmuş Partisi,” *Toplum ve Bilim*, 78, 1998, pp. 161-186 and idem, “Esat Adil Müstecaplıoğlu,” pp. 940-947, in Murat Gültekinçil (ed), *Sol, Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, Vol. 8, İletişim, İstanbul, 2007.

<sup>39</sup> Ahmet Samim, p. 152.

American interests and signed many agreements with the United States,<sup>40</sup> turning Turkey into what some people called a “little America.”<sup>41</sup>

Regardless of the validity of interpretations of the left, what became evident was the fact that the left proved unsuccessful in grasping the moment and creating the conditions and dynamism needed for a new communist movement. Furthermore, the strict measures of the Menderes government, which adopted a McCarthy-style campaign against the left that led to the arrest of leading figure Şefik Hüsnü, made matters even worse for the leftist movement in the 1950s.<sup>42</sup>

### 2.3 A Brief Overview of the Cyprus Question

The issues related to the island of Cyprus, which while quite small led to major problems, have affected the so-called motherlands of Turkey and Greece as well as the “colony-motherland” of Britain, in addition to the people living on the island and the populations of the motherlands. After three centuries of Ottoman rule, Cyprus entered a colonial phase that ensured the island’s role as a bone of contention between rival nationalisms, particularly those of the Greeks and the Turks.<sup>43</sup>

The Cyprus Question is essentially a legacy of the Eastern Question, the diplomatic and political problems posed by the decay of the Ottoman Empire. One of the British Empire’s most obsessive preoccupations was with Russia, and particularly with the latter’s usually hostile attitude towards the Ottoman Empire. The British motive for waging the Crimean War against Russia was essentially to help preserve British hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean by combating Russia’s desire to weaken Ottoman power.<sup>44</sup> Even after the war, Russia continued to put territorial pressure on the Ottoman Empire, and Russia defeated the Ottomans in 1877, ultimately reaching the gates of Constantinople. The terms of the Treaty of San Stefano, which was concluded between the Russians and the Ottomans, were greatly advantageous to the former, including, for example, the establishment of a large and independent pro-Russian Bulgaria. This resulted in British diplomatic intervention and actions

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<sup>40</sup> Nikos Christofis, “Turkey,” in Frank Jacob (ed), *Peripheries of the Cold War/Peripherien des Kalten Krieges*, Comparative Studies from a Global Perspective, Vol. 3, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg, 2014 (forthcoming).

<sup>41</sup> Hamit Bozarslan, *Histoire de la Turquie Contemporaine*, La Découverte, Paris, 2004, p. 50.

<sup>42</sup> For the period 1946-1960 as regards left-wing activities see, Jacob M. Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, Brill, Leiden, 1974, pp. 113-121.

<sup>43</sup> Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Isle of Discord. Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem*, Hurst & Company, London, 1999, p. 1.

<sup>44</sup> William Mallinson, *Cyprus: A Modern History*, IB Tauris, London and New York, 2008, p. 10.

which led to the “Great Eastern Crisis” and the Congress of Berlin in 1878.<sup>45</sup> It became obvious to the British that the Ottoman Empire was no longer as a reliable power, and that, apart from staving off Russian advances, Britain would have to watch over Anatolia.

In that context, the Porte agreed “to assign the Island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England”<sup>46</sup> in exchange for the latter’s services. Cyprus was placed under British administration and because of its strategic position<sup>47</sup> the island became a pawn of the Grand Game, as it came to be known, in the rivalry between two of the largest powers of the nineteenth century, Great Britain and Russia.<sup>48</sup> Under the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, Turkey formally ceded Cyprus to Britain, which declared it to be a Crown colony in 1925. In article 16 of the treaty, Turkey agreed to renounce all claims to territories under its former jurisdiction.<sup>49</sup> The island of Cyprus was left out of the arrangements made in the Treaty of Lausanne because it had been annexed by Britain in 1914 when Turkey entered the war and it was not involved in the population exchanges that subsequently occurred. British control brought fundamental changes to the island and its people. The “high-modernist”<sup>50</sup> colonial administration restructured the entire society with reforms that were completely alien to the local population as they were in direct opposition to local customs and traditions.<sup>51</sup> As the British decided to remain in Cyprus, those reforms were seen as being necessary to encourage economic development of the island so they could justify their presence there, especially in light of an offer in 1915 to cede it to Greece<sup>52</sup> and thus alleviate Cypriot grievances, which Greek Cypriot political elites were trying to manipulate and capitalize on in the pursuit of their *Enosis* agenda.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Thomas Ehrlich, *Cyprus, 1958-1967*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1974, pp. 1-2.

<sup>47</sup> For the first period of the British Colonial Administration and the strategic importance of Cyprus, see the elaborative analysis by Andrekos Varnava, *British Imperialism in Cyprus, 1878-1915: the Inconsequential Possession*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2009.

<sup>48</sup> Heinz Richter, “The Grand Game, the Balkans, the Congress of Berlin and Cyprus,” pp. 11-17, in Hubert Faustmann and Nicos Peristianis (eds), *Britain in Cyprus. Colonialism and Post-Colonialism, 1878-2006*, Bibliopolis, Mannheim – Möhnesee, 2006.

<sup>49</sup> William Mallinson, p. 11; Erik-Jan Zürcher, p. 162.

<sup>50</sup> James C. Scott, *Seeing Like A State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, Yale University Press, 1998.

<sup>51</sup> Kyriacos C. Markides, *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1977, p. 6.

<sup>52</sup> C. M. Woodhouse, “The Offer of Cyprus, October 1915,” pp. 82-86, in Constantinos Svolopoulos (ed), *Greece and Great Britain during World War I*, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki, 1985.

<sup>53</sup> George S. Georgiades, *A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus 1918-1926*, Cyprus Research Centre, Nicosia, 1979; Peter Clarke and Andrekos Varnava, “Accounting in Cyprus during the Last Four Decades of British Rule: Post-World War I to Independence (1918-1960),” *Accounting History*, vol. 18, no. 3, 2013, p. 298.

The British offer of Cyprus to Greece was made, however, within the context of the strategic alliances and policies of World War I. When Turkey sided with Germany in the war, Britain formally annexed the island, although it had discussed ceding it to Greece at the end of 1912 in return for a base on the Ionian Islands. In 1915, Britain offered to cede Cyprus if Greece agreed to be an ally in the war. Inducing Greece to join the Entente emerged as a matter of extreme urgency, since it provided the most efficient means of stabilizing the Balkan front and getting aid to Serbia (which was threatened by Bulgaria) via Greek troops. To these ends, the British government resorted to using Cyprus as an enticement.<sup>54</sup> Britain did not fulfill Greece's request, however, which was made at the Versailles negotiations in 1919, to give up the island on the grounds that Greece joined the war in 1917. The entire process concerning the British offers, up until the rejection of secession of the island, indicate that such a move on behalf of the colonial administration of the island would never have actually happened. In contrast, they reveal that those moves were the result of pressures of wartime conditions. Expectations for *Enosis*, however, had nevertheless been raised.

In governing the island, the British relied from the start on the exploitation of differences of interest between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot political elites. The Greek Cypriot elite and the church leadership on the island had already started to formulate an agenda that would fulfill the aspirations to unite with motherland Greece, *Enosis*, at the end of the nineteenth century. The ideology behind the national drive was the so-called *Megali Idea* (Great Idea),<sup>55</sup> the Greek irredentist concept of unifying every Hellenic population and territory which they regarded as Greek into the new national state. This expansionist and in some ways chauvinistic concept (in many of the claimed territories there were few people who actually thought of themselves as being Greek) sought to recreate the Byzantine Empire, conceived exclusively in Greek-Orthodox terms.<sup>56</sup> In other words, the *Megali Idea* was a strong manifestation of Greek nationalism that sought to resolve the problem of the nation-state.<sup>57</sup>

Almost all segments of Cypriot society shared the aspiration of *Enosis*, except for the KKK (*Communist Party of Cyprus/Kommounistiko Komma Kyprou*), at least in its early years, after it emerged as a party in August of 1926. However, it should be pointed out that despite an increase in the drive for *Enosis*, the demands of the new nationalists did not constitute a

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<sup>54</sup> Robert Holland and Diana Markides, *The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean 1850–1960*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, p. 177 ff.

<sup>55</sup> On *Megali Idea*, see among many, the recent study by Vasilis Kremmydas, *The Megali Idea. Transformations of a National Ideology*, Typothyto, Athens, 2010.

<sup>56</sup> Hubert Faustmann, *Divide and Quit? The History of British Colonial Rule in Cyprus 1878 – 1960 Including a Special Survey of the Transitional Period, February 1959 - August 1960*, Mateo, Mannheim, 1999, pp. 15-16

<sup>57</sup> Elli Skopetea, *The Model Kingdom and the Great Idea: Aspects of the National Question in Greece, 1830-1880*, Polytropo, Athens, 1988, p. 257.

threat to British rule, and the same held true for Turkish Cypriots. The nationalist sentiments of the people were carefully kept within the framework of cooperation with the colonial ruler and friendship between Greece and Britain. Up until the 1920s, nationalist opposition was rather mild and hence it was tolerated by the colonial powers. Cypriot national demands did not go beyond resolutions and verbal claims, and remained strictly within the framework of legality.<sup>58</sup>

On the other hand, the Muslim population of the island, which was living peacefully along with the local Christians,<sup>59</sup> faced some changes that undermined their status with the advent of the colonial administration and the abolition of the *millet* system. Having lost their dominant status, the Turkish Cypriots surrendered most of their autonomy to the colonial leadership in order to safeguard the somewhat preferential treatment they enjoyed as a religious community.<sup>60</sup> Indeed, Turkish Cypriot loyalty to the colonial administration seems to have been a means of protecting themselves as citizens of the dissolving Ottoman Empire and they sought refuge under British rule, especially after the annexation of Cyprus by Great Britain and the increasing entrenchment of the Greek Cypriot nationalist agenda of *Enosis*.<sup>61</sup> In light of these events, the Turkish Cypriots, especially the new generation of Turkish Cypriots, found in the cult of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the myth of motherland Turkey the admiration and national identification the community needed to counter Greek Cypriot nationalism on the island. Actually, it was this same generation of Turkish Cypriots who imbued the Turkish Cypriot community with a sense of Turkish nationalism which drove them to resist *Enosis* first and later to fight for partition of the island.<sup>62</sup>

This relatively peaceful setting came to an end when political violence erupted in 1931. Such incidents had never occurred prior to that time, and as such, the British falsely assumed that plans for *Enosis* had faded away and that the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 would produce a definite settlement. This sentiment was shared to a great extent by both the Greek and

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid., p. 22.

<sup>59</sup> A population census conducted in 1832 recorded 198 Christian villages, 92 Muslim villages and 172 mixed villages. Quoted in Niyazi Kızılyürek, "The Turkish Cypriot Community and Rethinking of Cyprus," p. 228, in Michalis S. Michael and Anastasios Tamis (eds), *Cyprus in the Modern World*, Vaniyas Press, Thessaloniki, 2005 [in English].

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., p. 229.

<sup>61</sup> In the words of the famous Turkish Cypriot sociologist, Niyazi Berkes, "The Turkish Cypriots were lost and afraid of Greek domination," as quoted in Ibid., p. 233. On the development of Turkish Cypriot nationalism, see Nevzat Altay, *Nationalism Amongst the Turks of Cyprus: the First Wave*, Oulu University Press, Oulu, 2005.

<sup>62</sup> One of the most elaborative analyses on the relationship between Kemalism and Cyprus can be found in Sia Anagnostopoulou, *Turkish Modernization. Islam and Turkish Cypriots in the Mazy Path of Kemalism*, Vivliorama, Athens, 2004, pp. 105 ff.; Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kıskaçında Kıbrıs*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2002.

Turkish governments as well, not just by the British. Due to economic grievances<sup>63</sup> and the irredentist agenda of *Enosis*, spontaneous violent incidents occurred in October 1931 and the Government House was set aflame when the situation got out of hand. These incidents are known in Cypriot historiography as the *Oktovriana*<sup>64</sup> (October unrests) and mark the authoritarian form of British rule that followed. With the rebellion of 1931, the popularity of *Enosis* and Greek nationalism was clearly visible among members of the Greek Cypriot community.<sup>65</sup> Until the 1950s, Greek Cypriot nationalism developed slowly because it lacked the support of the Greek motherland, and instability on the mainland caused by clashes between the power-grabbing efforts of the right and the left was one of the reasons for this apparent indifference. However, the clashes between the right and left turned out to be effective in Greek Cypriot politics, as the church<sup>66</sup> and the AKEL (Progressive Party of Working People) that abandoned the name KKK in 1941 would confront each other, offering two different types of nationalisms; the former would be more stringent, while the latter would offer more chances for a moderate form of nationalism. But the moderate style of AKEL did not deny the existence of a dominant ethnic group, and in 1943 the General Secretary of the party mentioned the importance of the majority in democracies, which in this case entailed the necessity of union of the island with the Greek mainland.<sup>67</sup>

After World War II, the creation of a new environment in the international arena came about with the establishment of international organizations led by the United Nations. This prompted proclamations of independence and greater respect for human rights, all of which reinforced the Greek Cypriot demand for the right to self-determination which would eventually lead to *Enosis* with Greece. Indeed, the 1950s were the years in which the concept of *Enosis* reached its zenith.

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<sup>63</sup> Economic factors should be taken into consideration as regards the escalation of unrest. By 1931, the impact of the economic depression of 1929 had reached Cyprus. Exports dropped by 25% and the agricultural sector and the mining industry were badly hit. Shops were closed down and the peasants were unable to pay their debts to banks and usurers. The government's revenue dropped below pre-1929 levels and at the end of 1930 the budget had a deficit of 70,000GBP. In short, mass unemployment and mass impoverishment was prevalent, just as it was all around the world at the time. See Heinz Richter, "Benevolent Autocracy, 1931-1945," pp. 133-134, in Hubert Faustmann and Nicos Peristianis (ed).

<sup>64</sup> For the October events, see Ronald Storrs, *Orientalism*, Nicholson and Watson, London, 1939, p. 31ff; Robert Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, pp. 1-7; George S. Georgiades, *Cyprus and the Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs: The Causes of the 1931 Crisis*, Cyprus Research Center, Nicosia, 1985.

<sup>65</sup> Niyazi Kızılyürek, p. 81.

<sup>66</sup> One of the best treatments of the institution of the church can be found in Sia Anagnostopoulou, "The Church of Cyprus and its "Ethnarchic" Role: 1878-1960," pp. 179-225, in Sia Anagnostopoulou, *The Passage from the Ottoman Empire to the Nation-States. A Long and Difficult Process: The Greek Case*, The Isis Press, Istanbul, 2004.

<sup>67</sup> Niyazi Kızılyürek, p. 94.

Archbishop Makarios III (1913-1977), whose lay name was Michael Mouskos, returned from Boston to Cyprus in 1948 in order to act as the Bishopric of Kition (June 13, 1948). Makarios's arrival coincided with a political climate in which nationalism in Cyprus was gaining ground, but it was not, however, able to control the Greek Cypriot community in a universal and in an unambiguous way.<sup>68</sup> He succeeded Archbishop Makarios II as Makarios III and became the first President of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960. In order to lend an international dimension to the Cyprus Question and persuade Greece to take a more active stance in the international arena so they could stake their claim to the right of self-determination,<sup>69</sup> Makarios formally proposed a referendum on *Enosis* in the *Ethnarchy* (church) and *Ethnarchy* Council. When it was decided that the *Ethnarchy* Council would be founded with the Archbishop at its head, Makarios proposed the creation of a much more flexible executive instrument based on the model of a modern political party. In this way, the Office of the *Ethnarchy* (Political Office or Committee of the *Ethnarchy*) was created with Makarios himself as president,<sup>70</sup> thus acquiring both religious and political power. His proposal was accepted and on the 5<sup>th</sup> of December, the Cyprus *Ethnarchy* announced that it would hold a plebiscite but also give the British the opportunity to organize it themselves. Archbishop Makarios II took over the leadership of the nationalist movement and became the main force behind the organization of the plebiscite, which resulted with a vote in which 95.7% (or 215,108 votes) were in favor of *Enosis*, but the results of the plebiscite were not accepted by the British as their validity was questioned.

The Turkish Cypriots voted for their own candidates in the municipal elections of 1943. Shortly after the elections, in April of the same year, prominent Turkish Cypriots, including Dr. Fazıl Küçük, Necmi Avkıran, Fadıl Korkut and Mehmet Rüstem, together with 76 Turkish Cypriot notables (including the head of the EVKAF department, Münir Bey), formed KATAK (*Kıbrıs Adası Türk Azınlığı Kurumu*/The Association of the Turkish Minority in Cyprus). It supported the maintenance of the colonial status quo to counteract the Greek Cypriot demand for *Enosis*, while also pushing for closer relations with Turkey.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> For the most recent and well-balanced, elaborative account of Archbishop Makarios III, see Sia Anagnostopoulou, "Makarios III, 1950-1977: Creating the *Ethnarchic* State," pp. 240-292, in Andrekos Varnava and Michalis N. Michael (eds), *The Archbishops of Cyprus in the Modern Age: The Changing Role of the Archbishop-Ethnarch, their Identities and Politics*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne, 2013.

<sup>69</sup> Yannis N. Kranidiotis, *The Cyprus Problem, 1960-1974*, Themelio, Athens, 1984, p. 28.

<sup>70</sup> Sia Anagnostopoulou, "Makarios III, 1950-1977: Creating the *Ethnarchic* State," p. 243, in *Ibid.*

<sup>71</sup> Jeanette Choisi, "The Turkish Cypriot Élite - Its Social Function and Legitimization," *The Cyprus Review*, vol. 5, no.2, 1993, pp. 7-32.

The British position during this period was characterized by an intransigent stance on the issue. During the visit of the foreign minister, Anthony Eden, to Greece in 1954, the Greek government tried to include Cyprus on the agenda, but Eden refused to discuss it. A few months later, the minister of state for the British colonies, Hopkinson, replied in a debate about Cyprus that there were certain territories in the Commonwealth “which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent.”<sup>72</sup> British fears were based on the conviction that ceding Cyprus to Greece would upset the British position in the Middle East while also empowering anti-colonial sentiment and movements.

On his behalf, Makarios, in May of 1952, visited Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria, partly ministering to Orthodox communities but more particularly scouting out a government to sponsor *Enosis* at the United Nations – the real purpose here being to humiliate Greece into doing so herself.<sup>73</sup> Makarios’ visit to the Arab world, which was still smarting from the disastrous war with Israel in 1948/9, afforded him his first glimpse of unbridled anti-Westernism and provided the kernel for a “non-aligned” philosophy which was to powerfully influence him in future years. Indeed, later in April of 1955, just a few days after the launch of the anti-colonial struggle in Cyprus, Makarios sought support from the states in Asia and Africa that were participating in the Bandung Conference in Indonesia.

The aims stated at the conference were geared towards promoting Afro-Asian economic and cultural cooperation and opposing colonialist or neocolonialist activities. At Bandung, the delegates of the twenty-nine countries set up the institutional basis of what was to become the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, which was formally initiated in 1961. Leaders in attendance included Nasser, Nehru, Sukarno, Nkrumah, and Tito, the odd-man-out in geographical terms. Makarios’ purpose was clear: “We [will] go to Bandung to watch the Afro-Asian conference and meet exemplary personalities of the anti-colonial world and ask for their support in our struggle.”<sup>74</sup> Makarios was welcomed with honors at the conference, but there were no discussions concerning Cyprus, as the issue was not included on the agenda.

The Non-Aligned Movement represented an attempt to create a new power bloc, the “Third World,” in the face of the increasingly polarized global situation as regards the first world, the West, and the second world, the Soviet bloc, during the Cold War.<sup>75</sup> The British Colonial

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<sup>72</sup> Spyros Linardatos, “Cyprus Until Independence,” p. 275, in A. Xydi, K. Chajiargyri and S. Linardatos (eds), *Makarios and His Allies*, Gutenberg, Athens, 1972; Nikos Kranidiotis, *Difficult Years: Cyprus 1950-1960*, Estia, Athens, 1981, p. 67.

<sup>73</sup> Robert Holland, p. 28

<sup>74</sup> Ploutis Servas, *The Cyprus Question: Responsibilities*, vol. 1, Grammi, Athens, 1980, pp. 222-223; Spyros Linardatos, *From Civil War to Junta*, vol. 2, Papazisis, Athens, 1977, p. 287.

<sup>75</sup> Robert J. C. Young, *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction*, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2001, p. 192.

Administration, as well as the United States, both of which sought to increase their control over the Middle East, were alarmed by the increasing influence of anti-colonial sentiment and also by the rise of communism in the broader region of the Middle East. Both the United States and the Soviet Union shared the belief that local communist parties provided additional means of gaining support for Soviet positions, promulgating Soviet ideas, and augmenting Soviet influence.<sup>76</sup>

For example, Gamel Abdul Nasser's revolution in 1952 in Egypt against a compliant monarchy changed the entire region. In 1954, he assumed full political control and negotiated the withdrawal of British troops. His major intervention, and the achievement of real independence for Egypt, however, came in 1956. Distrustful of Nasser's nationalist regime, the US and UK decided against financing the Aswan Dam, and Nasser responded by nationalizing the Suez Canal. The Suez Crisis, in which the Israelis, British and French successfully invaded Egypt but were forced to withdraw after pressure from the US and the USSR, for the British at least marked the first moment of clear colonial defeat in the modern period.<sup>77</sup> Overnight, the Suez Crisis turned Nasser into an international hero across three continents, and he became one of the undisputed leaders of the non-aligned nations and gained widespread admiration and respect.

Furthermore, most of the Arab world was in possession of elements that would grant anti-colonialism additional influence and dynamism. With the exception of the Sudanese Communist Party, all the major communist parties were founded under the aegis of the Comintern. All looked to a global communist movement dominated by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) for political and ideological leadership and material support.<sup>78</sup> The acceptance of Soviet orthodoxy came with the uncritical acceptance of the canons of Soviet Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism and a concomitant failure to formulate independent social analyses of the specific conditions in the Arab world.<sup>79</sup>

The death of Stalin coincided with the intensification of the process of decolonization and the concomitant growth of non-communist, socialist, and nationalist movements and governments. In the Arab world, this process brought about the toppling of the "old order," and apart from Egypt, this also occurred in Syria (1954–1956) and Iraq (1958) along with the launching of an armed struggle against colonial occupation in Algeria (1954), all of which

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<sup>76</sup> Galia Golan, *Soviet Policies in the Middle East: From World War II to Gorbachev*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 1990, p. 216.

<sup>77</sup> Robert J. C. Young, p. 190.

<sup>78</sup> Galia Golan, pp. 210-217.

<sup>79</sup> Tareq Y. Ismael, *The Communist Movement in the Arab World*, Routledge, London and New York, 2005.

fundamentally transformed the social, political, and strategic character of the region. The intensification of the anti-colonial, anti-imperialist struggle brought with it the emergence of significant non-communist socialist nationalistic groups such as Nasserism, Ba'athism, and the Algerian *Front de Liberation National* (FLN). In their conceptions of socialism, such groups threatened to co-opt the Arab communists' political programs and the latter's potential popular constituency.<sup>80</sup> Moreover, with their nationalism, such groups stood in stark contrast to the internationalist, anti-nationalist Arab communists and as such had far more popular appeal among the fervently nationalist Arab masses. Throughout the 1950s, Arab communist parties were challenged and weakened by both Ba'athist and Nasserite movements. They were condemned for their unproductive adherence to an ossified Stalinist dogma and to the Soviet developmental model at a time when the non-communist Arab left, in contrast, was questioning the relevance of Marxist analyses in the Arab world, warning against strategies of national liberation which supported cooperation with the nascent Arab bourgeoisie and stressing that each Arab country had its own unique revolutionary potential.<sup>81</sup>

In Cyprus, Greek Cypriot pressure on the Greek government drove Greece to internationalize the issue of Cyprus for the first time in 1954. However, until 1954 all appeals to the UN were met with staunch opposition and never managed to acquire the needed support. Western powers, mainly Great Britain and the US, opposed the idea of internationalization, claiming that the issue was beyond the purview of the UN, an approach that sought to distance the Soviet Union even further from Cyprus.<sup>82</sup> This negative stance taken by the British fanned the flames of the Greek irredentist agenda of *Enosis*, which sought to find a solution outside of British-Greek relations.

Nasser's support for Makarios, as well as the support of countries of the Non-Alignment Movement, in addition to Soviet backing, coincided with the anti-colonial struggle in Cyprus and proved to be a core cause of major problems for the colonial and imperialist powers. They in turn rushed to propose a conference in London with the purpose of stirring up trouble between Greece and Turkey in order to ensure that the British retained control over the island.<sup>83</sup> The tripartite conference took place between the 29<sup>th</sup> of August and the 7<sup>th</sup> of September in London. Greek Foreign Minister Stefanos Stefanopoulos (1898-1982) and his Turkish counterpart, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu (1910-1961), represented their respective countries.

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<sup>80</sup> Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Claude Nicolet, "Anglo-American Relations and the End of Colonialism in Cyprus," pp. 61-72, in Vasilis Fouskas and Heinz A. Richter (eds), *Cyprus and Europe: the Long Way Back*, Bibliopolis, Mohnesse, 2003.

<sup>83</sup> William Mallinson, p. 135.

Harold Macmillan presided over the discussions. Notably, however, the Cypriots themselves were absent from the conference. The British intentions in calling the conference were clearly not altruistic; on the contrary, this was a prime example of the colonial policy of “divide and rule.” The main instigator of the idea appears to have been the permanent undersecretary of the Foreign Office. On June 26<sup>th</sup>, he noted:

I have always been attracted by the idea of 3 Power Conference, simply because I seriously believe that it would seriously embarrass the Greek Government. And if such a conference were held, I should not produce any British plan or proposal until a Greek–Turkish deadlock has been defined [...].

And I repeat: I shall not produce any British plan until a Greek–Turkish difference has been exposed.<sup>84</sup>

The conference discussions collapsed on the 7<sup>th</sup> of September following events in Istanbul in 1955, which were referred to as the *Events of 6-7 September (6-7 Eylül Olayları)*. These events were the outcome of the combination of the following: first, the increasing state of crisis in Turkey which was brought about by the authoritarian administration of Menderes; and second, the distrust of the Turkish government as regards British intentions. Zorlu was aware that the British were simply using them to counterbalance Greek claims and that they might drop them as soon as their objective had been achieved. In the end, those events took place because of increasing Turkish nationalism in relation to Cyprus. In the Cold War environment, extreme forms of anti-communism gathered both Islamists and Pan-Turkists into the same camp. The Association for Fighting Communism in Turkey (*Türkiye Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği*) was gaining power while at the same time eliminating the fine line between Kemalist nationalists and Pan-Turkists as it constructed its anti-communist discourse on the invisibility of the “enemy,” posited as communists.

The discourse employed by the Association concerning Cyprus was more vigorous than that employed against Hellenism. Their allegation was that the vast majority of Greek Cypriots were communists and that they would turn Cyprus over to the Soviet Union. Taking into consideration the abovementioned issue, the Menderes government decided to take a more active stance on Cyprus. On the 28<sup>th</sup> of August in 1954, the day before the London Conference, Menderes called a meeting of the members of the Association for Cyprus is Turkish (*Kıbrıs Türktür Derneği*), an association influenced by the Association for Fighting Communism (both of which shared a similar political agenda, i.e. irredentism and anti-

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<sup>84</sup> Quoted in Ibid., p. 24.

communism), and he suggested that branches be opened all around Turkey, through which the Turkish government would “assist and not obstruct” the efforts of the association. Soon branches were opened throughout Turkey, and they had such a powerful influence that after representatives visited Fazıl Küçük in Cyprus, he named his party after the association.<sup>85</sup>

The association spread false news as a means of provocation, such as for example rumors concerning anticipated massacres in Cyprus. In reference to these “massacres,” Menderes stated:

These rumors about the very possibility of serious events taking place in the next couple of days are the cause our concerns. We do not want to believe any of this and do not want to think that they will become true. But it has been repeatedly stated and declared that the 28<sup>th</sup> of August will be a day of massacres for our friends in Cyprus... Unfortunately, today we are in such a position that these scenarios have to be seriously considered.<sup>86</sup>

As the Cyprus crisis approached a climax during the London Conference on the 6<sup>th</sup> of September, news of violent anti-Greek (*Rum*) riots in Istanbul and Izmir reached London. On the 7<sup>th</sup> of September, the President of Turkey, Celal Bayar (1883-1986), made an official declaration stating that there was a communist plot behind the pogrom,<sup>87</sup> trying to hide the active role that the Menderes government played in engineering the events.

The failure of the conference gave the British further cause to clamp down, and in turn the Greek government decided to lobby to get Cyprus on the UN agenda. However, Britain’s attempt to prevent the issue of Cyprus from reaching the United Nations Security Council proved successful. Furthermore, the London Conference had another effect in that it marked a turning point at the international level, as Britain had made Greece and Turkey recognized partners in the Cyprus dispute.

On the negative side, on the island itself the Greek Cypriot community acted as if they were the sole inhabitants of the island, ignoring the diversity of the island population and the existence of the Turkish Cypriot minority. The ethnic predominance of Greeks on Cyprus, which facilitated the expansion of Greek nationalism, resulted in the oversight, even “oblivion,” of the existence of the Muslim community and a concomitant loss of importance for neighboring Turkey. This led to false interpretations and approaches concerning the Turkish Cypriot community, seen mainly as the representative of Turkish politics on the

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<sup>85</sup> See the analytical account in Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kışkacında Kıbrıs*.

<sup>86</sup> Quoted in Ali Tuna Kuyucu, “Ethno-Religious ‘Unmixing’ of ‘Turkey’: 6-7 September Riots as a Case in Turkish Nationalism,” *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 11, no. 3, 2005, p. 376.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

island.<sup>88</sup> Because of the unstable atmosphere, events escalated and casualties mounted. As a result, Field Marshall Harding was sent as governor to handle the situation. Murders fueled by nationalist anti-communism and anti-Turkish sentiment prompted by the EOKA leader, General Grivas, further deteriorated relations between the two communities,<sup>89</sup> and as a response to Greek Cypriot EOKA, Turkish Cypriots founded the TMT (*Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı*/Turkish Defense Organization)<sup>90</sup> with Rauf Denktaş as its leader.<sup>91</sup> Harding was of the opinion that if self-government would secure the interests of all the communities, the situation on the island could change. After many long debates at the Ethnarchy Council, Archbishop Makarios for the first time agreed to negotiate, but General Grivas feared that sabotage of the negotiations precluded any chance of agreement as a series of massive explosions occurred in Nicosia when the Colonial Secretary arrived. Grivas' actions led the British to deport Archbishop Makarios and his more intransigent enemy, the Bishop of Kyrenia, to the Seychelles, where they were detained for a year and then allowed to return to Europe but not to Cyprus, while pressing ahead with the constitutional commissioner, Lord Radcliffe. Radcliffe suggested that the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots should exercise their right to self-determination separately, which meant in practical terms a "double *Enosis*."<sup>92</sup> As expected, interpretations of and approaches to Radcliffe's proposals varied: Turkey accepted the proposals, Greece officially rejected them and Makarios refused to be involved.<sup>93</sup>

In the meantime, in January of 1957 Harold Macmillan succeeded Anthony Eden as Prime Minister of Great Britain at a time when British prestige in the Middle East was at its lowest ebb. Macmillan's stance was a revision of the belief that Cyprus was needed to support British military clout in the region. It was thought that bases on Cyprus would be sufficient to safeguard British interests in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. The primary item of interest was the Baghdad Pact, an alliance formed a few days after EOKA started terror

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<sup>88</sup> For different interpretations and analysis on that point, see Sia Anagnostopoulou, "Republic of Cyprus, A Mirror of Multiple Reflections: Turkey and Turkish Cypriot Community, 1960-1983," pp. 295-327, in Chrisostomos Perikleous, *50 Years of Cyprus Republic. A Painful Process*, Papazisis, Athens, 2010.

<sup>89</sup> Michael Attalides, *Cyprus. Nationalism and International Politics*, Bibliopolis, Mohnesse, 2003; Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Cyprus: The Impasse of Nationalisms*, Mavri Lista, Athens, 1999.

<sup>90</sup> On the violence for the period 1955-1964, see the newspapers articles in the *Cyprus Critical History Archive* in <http://www.ccha-ahdr.info/>.

<sup>91</sup> On Rauf Denktaş and his policy concerning the Turkish Cypriots, see Niyazi Kızılyürek, "Rauf Denktaş: Fear and Nationalism in the Turkish Cypriot Community," pp. 175-193, in Ayhan Aktar, Niyazi Kızılyürek, Umut Özkırımlı (eds), *Nationalism in the Troubled Triangle: Cyprus, Greece and Turkey*, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstone, 2010.

<sup>92</sup> Yannis N. Kranidiotis, p. 31.

<sup>93</sup> Ahmet Gazioğlu, *İngiliz İdaresinde Kıbrıs*, Ekin Basımevi, İstanbul, 1960, pp. 121-125.

operations in April of 1955, and it included Turkey; the aim of the pact was to protect British military and political power in the Middle East against the Soviets as well as against the interference of the United States in a region that had traditionally been a British concern.<sup>94</sup>

The MacMillan initiative did not, however, go as planned, and in just over a year of trying to “withdraw” from Cyprus, all that Macmillan’s government had achieved was the strengthening of Ankara’s position. Menderes’ government demanded a military base on the island and a veto on any interim constitution, and ruled out long-term settlements short of partition. The British offered Turkey a constitutional plan, which envisaged communal self-determination after a period of self-government, but Ankara rejected the offer. Thus, in May of 1958 the MacMillan “Partnership Plan” was devised, which provided for continued British sovereignty unless a tri-condominium was accepted, along with Greek and Turkish representation in the Cyprus government and a constitution with separate houses of representatives for each community.<sup>95</sup> In other words, the “Partnership Plan” aimed to divide the island into three parts: Greek, Turkish and British.

The future of Cyprus was sealed in 1959. Cyprus was an issue that, according to Western powers, Greece and Turkey should resolve through a Western alliance. In the Cold War environment, Cyprus was seen as a bulwark against communism and a control point for the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Therefore, for the Western powers the drive by Greek Cypriots for a solution based on the right of self-determination and the continuing EOKA struggle meant only one thing: instability in the region of the Mediterranean and the Middle East and within the NATO alliance, since Greek-Turkish relations were tattered.

In 1958 and 1959, developments in the international arena, as well as threats against Greek national interests due to the turbulent situation in Cyprus, including a possible Greek-Turkish conflict, forced Greece to seek out a solution to the Cyprus Question. *Enosis*’ compatibility with Greek national interests started to be questioned by Greek leaders, including the leader of the EOKA, General Grivas. In fact, Greek opinion shifted in the other direction, as *Enosis* began to be seen as a potential threat to national security and the interest of Hellenism. Greek nationalism started to shun *Enosis* as a notion that worked against national interests, “...and in accepting the independence of Cyprus as an expression of national interest, theoretically gave up any element that might risk the revitalization of Greek irredentism and the distant

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<sup>94</sup> Andrekos Varnava, “Reinterpreting Macmillan’s Cyprus Policy, 1957-1960,” *The Cyprus Review*, vol. 22, no. 1, 2010, p. 87.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 92.

Greek-Turkish conflict of 1919-1922.”<sup>96</sup> *Enosis*, as a thing of the past, “a remnant of Greek irredentism,” was buried through Cypriot independence; in short, Cyprus was, in terms of the modernization of Greek nationalism, outside its parameters.<sup>97</sup>

After lengthy discussions, the governments of Karamanlis and Menderes accepted the solution proposed by the Western powers in the London-Zurich Agreements. Those agreements were the first in Cyprus history to be signed in the presence of the so-called “motherlands” of Greece and Turkey and Britain, and marked a historical decision for the three parties as it was stated that they “are part of the issue and they will continue being so.” Both communities on the island had now been granted the opportunity to define themselves as a part of the two mainlands. The Greek Cypriot identity again turned towards Greece and Hellenism, as the political elite believed that “*Enosis* will be delayed” but “it will happen.” This delay occurred because the agreements gave both groups “mutual dependency” in the case of a possible problem, although this political reality represented an attempt to strike a balance between Turkish and Greek Cypriots without dismissing the balance between Greece and Turkey. This balance would grant Turkish Cypriots “many privileges” in the eyes of the Greek Cypriots, who in turn would try to “fix” this “political mistake” so that “historical justice” could mete out.<sup>98</sup> The bi-communal structure of independent Cyprus contradicted the values of Greek nationalism and its historical goal of *Enosis*. This in turn encouraged Greek Cypriots in their struggle against the Zurich-London Agreement and the constitution, as the Akritas plan sought to invalidate them and open the way for *Enosis* to begin by changing the constitution. This triggered the 1963 constitutional crisis, in which Greek Cypriots saw their Turkish counterparts as a minority on the island and essentially inconsequential.

The relatively stable Cyprus Republic was soon to be put to the test. Makarios, representing the general sentiment of the Greek Cypriot community, strongly believed that the Agreement had led to wrongdoing against his compatriots. This sentiment was accompanied by a series of constitutional, economic and tax problems that the newly established Cyprus Republic had to contend with and led the Greek Cypriot elite to propose 13 amendments to improve organization of the state.<sup>99</sup> Oddly enough, these amendments were not turned down

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<sup>96</sup> See the elaborative analysis in Sia Anagnostopoulou, “The Complexities of Greek Nationalism in its Cypriot Version,” pp. 194-196, in Ayhan Aktar, Niyazi Kızılyürek, Umut Özkırımlı (eds).

<sup>97</sup> Ibid., p. 196.

<sup>98</sup> Niyazi Kızılyürek, p. 39.

<sup>99</sup> These included: abolishment of the right of veto of the president and the vice-president of the Republic, and the vice-president of the republic to serve as deputy for or replace the president of the Republic in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties, and as a consequence, therefore, all the constitutional

by the vice president, who was a Turkish Cypriot, based on the stipulations of the London-Zurich Agreements, but by the Turkish state.<sup>100</sup> This triggered much unrest between the two communities and military organizations mainly where villages were burned down and civilians were killed.<sup>101</sup> These clashes highlighted the clear division of the communities as civilians had to relocate to “safer” areas, in other words areas that had been “cleared of the others.”<sup>102</sup> This supported the idea of *Enosis* and *Taksim* by suggesting the “impossibility of living together again” and empowered extreme nationalist politicians and organizations. This, in turn, sparked a new round of inter-communal violence in December of 1963, in what is known in Turkish and Turkish Cypriot literature as *Kanlı Noel* (Bloody Christmas) in reference to the violence that erupted on the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> of December in 1963 between the two communities.<sup>103</sup> The ensuing violence and escalating distrust reinforced sentiments of isolation and an implosion of the constitutional order, effectively terminating the Republic

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provisions regarding joint action by the president and the vice-president of the Republic were to be modified accordingly; the Greek president of the House of Representatives and its Turkish vice-president were to be elected by the House as a whole and not in the way that the president was elected by the Greek members of the House and the vice-president by the Turkish members of the House; the vice-president of the House of Representatives was to serve as deputy for or replace the president of the House in the case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties; the constitutional provisions regarding a separate majority for enactment of laws by the House of Representatives was to be abolished; the constitutional provision regarding the establishment of separate Municipalities in the five main towns were to be abolished. Additionally, provisions were to be in the following way: (a) The Municipal Council in each of the aforesaid five towns shall consist of Greek and Turkish Councilors in proportion to the number of the Greek and Turkish inhabitants of such towns by whom they shall be elected respectively. (b) In the budget of each of such aforesaid towns, after deducting any expenditures required for common services, a percentage of the balance proportionate to the number of the Turkish inhabitants of that town shall be earmarked and disposed of in accordance with the wishes of the Turkish councilors; the constitutional provision regarding courts consisting of Greek judges to try Greeks and of Turkish judges to try Turks and of mixed courts consisting of Greek and Turkish Judges to try cases where the litigants are Greeks and Turks were to be abolished; the division of the security forces into police and gendarmerie were to be abolished, (provisions to be made in case the head of the police is a Greek the deputy head was to be a Turk and vice versa); the numerical strength of the security forces and of the army was to be determined by law and not by agreement between the president and the vice-president of the Republic; the proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the composition of the public service and of the forces of the Republic, i.e. the police and the army, was to be modified in proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots; the number of the members of the public service commission was to be reduced from ten to either five or seven; all the decisions of the public service commission were to be taken by simple majority. If there was an allegation of discrimination on the unanimous request either of the Greek or of the Turkish members of the commission, its chairman was to be bound to refer the matter to the Supreme Constitutional Court; the Greek communal chamber was to be abolished.

<sup>100</sup> Joseph S. Joseph, “Post-Colonial Period, 1960-1974: Expectations and Failures,” p. 44, in Michalis S. Michael and Anastasios M. Tamis (eds), *Cyprus in the Modern World*, Vaniyas Press, Thessaloniki, 2005.

<sup>101</sup> Richard Patrick notes that of the 287 Greeks Cypriots killed during from 1955 to 1960, 60 died at the hands of Turkish Cypriots, 106 were killed by security forces and at least 112 by EOKA, while Turkish Cypriots were killed by Greek Cypriots and 7 by the British. [...] [F]rom 1963 to 1967, 219 Greek Cypriots were killed by Turkish Cypriots and 420 Turkish Cypriots by Greek Cypriots. This is still one of the best accounts of Greek and Turkish Cypriot casualties, violence and conflict: Richard Patrick, *Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict, 1963-1971*, edited by J. H. Bater and R. Preston, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, 1976.

<sup>102</sup> Nicosia was divided after the intercommunal clashes, before the legal division of the island, at a time when the polarizations of the quarters had become clearer and the villages lost their hybrid natures.

<sup>103</sup> On inter-communal violence, see Richard Patrick, pp. 45-88.

that had been founded just a few years earlier. This period of unrest marked the ultimate breakdown in the political and social compact between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots that has beset the island to this day.

The escalation of inter-communal incidents was so intense that even UN forces seemed unable to put a stop to them.<sup>104</sup> What the British Colonial Administration managed to succeed in doing, however, was gather all of the concerned parties on the 15<sup>th</sup> of January in 1964 in London in order to assess the situation and find a solution that would be viable for all guarantor powers. At the same time, the crisis revealed the inability of the British to play a role in Cyprus and in peacekeeping on the island, especially after the failure of the London Conference.<sup>105</sup> Since that time, the British played a side role on the issue in the international arena, in a way even deferring to the US, the participation of which, through NATO, was also supported by Turkey, which believed that negotiations and a ceasefire would thereby be easier to achieve. The rejection of the NATO forces by Makarios on the 4<sup>th</sup> of February in 1964 seemed to be a setback to İsmet İnönü's policy.<sup>106</sup> Despite this, UNFICYP, the United Nations force in Cyprus, was formed following a UN resolution on March 4, 1964.

Although the inter-communal conflict came to an end in Nicosia, this was not the case with other cities, such as Limassol. In view of the continuation of the crisis and the loss of the lives of Turkish Cypriots, Ankara announced its intention to land troops on the island to secure the safety of the Turkish Cypriot community. İnönü notified the US about the planned landing, which was to proceed regardless of the weather. Two days before the planned date, however, US President Lyndon Johnson sent a letter, penned by US Secretary of State Dean Rusk, threatening that the US would not provide Turkey with any assistance in the case of Soviet aggression if the proposed landing were to go ahead. This move caused an outbreak of anti-American sentiment in Turkey,<sup>107</sup> as the letter was intentionally leaked to the press. Four months later, Turkish officials visited their Soviet counterparts in Moscow and discussed the situation in Cyprus and more generally the future relations of the two countries. After the

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<sup>104</sup> Hasan Kösebalaban claims that the situation escalated even further when Makarios issued a memorandum asking Greece and Turkey to withdraw from the island. He presents no evidence however, to support his argument. Hasan Kösebalaban, *Turkish Foreign Policy. Islam, Nationalism and Globalization*, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstone, 2011, p. 94.

<sup>105</sup> Claude Nicolet, "British Policy towards Cyprus, 1960-1974: A Tale of Failure or Impotence?," *The Cyprus Review*, vol. 13, no. 1, 2001, p. 91.

<sup>106</sup> Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World. Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, University Press of America, Lanham Maryland, 1988, p. 65.

<sup>107</sup> Later in this study a further discussion will be made concerning the importance of the Johnson Letter for both countries.

visit, a joint Turkish-Soviet communiqué was issued, acknowledging the rights of the two communities.<sup>108</sup>

The Turkish move to open talks with the Soviet Union mobilized the US, which, in order to deny the Soviets a foothold in Cyprus, started a diplomatic initiative led by former Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, who would serve as President Johnson's mediator in the summer of 1964; this initiative was launched upon the agreement of both İnönü and the Greek premier George Papandreou. At the Geneva conference, which was held in August of 1964 under UN auspices, Cypriot representatives were not present. Greece and Turkey negotiated on their behalf and in the "interest" of the two Cypriot communities. However, the escalating violence that had been ongoing since mid-1964 continued until Turkish aerial bombings that took place in August of the same year.<sup>109</sup> The violent conflicts and attacks by the Greek Cypriots in Erenköy/Kokkina, a strategic place for Turkish Cypriots, was an attempt to undermine the efforts made by Dean Acheson, the American representative in Geneva. For the supporters of *Enosis*, who were aware of the international environment and developments, the Acheson plan, and mainly the second Acheson plan (August 1964), was a great opportunity. Its failure was attributed to Makarios, who rejected the plan on the grounds that it was a "partition in disguise" and adopted the slogan "unsullied *Enosis*." In other words, without making any concessions to the Turkish Cypriots, this stance was seen by the Greek leadership as indicating that Makarios had, in reality, abandoned *Enosis*.<sup>110</sup>

In subsequent years, the conflict continued unabated, and the two major attempts to settle the conflict by outside mediation, the Acheson plan and the UN mediator's report of the 26<sup>th</sup> of March in 1965, failed. To make matters worse, relations on the island, as well as between Greece and Turkey, deteriorated further in April of 1967 when a military junta took control of Greece. Seven months later, in November, another short but jolting crisis made Cyprus a flashpoint in international politics and brought Greece and Turkey again to the brink of war. Unlike the American intervention back in 1964, this time President Johnson sent Cyrus Vance with a direct order: "Do what you have to do to stop the war. If you need anything, let me know."<sup>111</sup> This time the American envoy satisfied most of the Turkish demands to balance out the situation, taking into account the past experience of the 1964. Although peace was

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<sup>108</sup> Hasan Kösebalaban, *Ibid.*, p. 95; on Soviet-Turkish relations, see Erel Tellal, "SSCB'yle İlişkiler," pp. 499-552, in Baskın Oran (ed), *Türk Dış Politikası – Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, vol I, İletişim, İstanbul, 2001.

<sup>109</sup> Hasan Kösebalaban, p. 96; for more analytical discussions on Süha Bölükbaşı, pp. 81-90; see also Alexis Heraclides, *The Cyprus Question: Conflict and Solution*, Sideris, Athens, 2002, pp. 120-121.

<sup>110</sup> Alexis Heraclides, p. 109.

<sup>111</sup> As quoted in Joseph S. Joseph, p. 47, in Michalis S. Michael and Anastasios Tamis (eds).

achieved, the same cannot be claimed for the broader ethnic conflict on the island. Following a seven-year period of tension and hostility with Makarios, the Greek military regime attempted to overthrow him by staging a bloody coup against the Cypriot president that brought to power an extremist pro-*Enosis* puppet regime.<sup>112</sup> Turkey reacted fiercely to the military intervention of Athens by invading Cyprus and occupying 37% of the island. The Turkish invasion took place on July 20, 1974, with a second offensive in August. After 1974, however, the issue entered a new phase, and even today, the Cyprus Question is still one of the world's unresolved ethnic conflicts.

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<sup>112</sup> Ibid., p. 48.