




Conclusion

Blurring the Future

REGURGITATING THE PAST

The Science Centre Singapore in Jurong East is a centre for disseminating scientific knowledge. However, its outdoor waterworks exhibition, consisting of several water pipes which shoot out water and the smell of chlorine which hangs in the air, makes it clear that their target audience is small children. I was there to see a talk from Immanuel Koh, Assistant Professor in both Architecture and Sustainable Design (ASD) and Design and Artificial Intelligence (DAI) at the Singapore University of Technology and Design (SUTD). He was there to present as part of the Science Centre's monthly Science Café. That evening, I was ushered into the Science Centre café, from which I assume parents usually watch their children play in the waterworks exhibit. I took my seat and was offered a complimentary beer, which along with a buffet dinner came as part of the ticket price.

On that evening it was clear that the event's target audience was a little older than the Science Centre's usual clientele. Most of the audience seemed to be young professionals, and as we waited for the event to start, the crowd was treated to a DJ playing electronic music. This included *Insomnia* by Faithless. As the DJ played, a screen behind him cycled through AI generated images of futuristic buildings which looked much like the skyline of Singapore. Behind the images of skyscrapers, the “digital rain” made famous by the *Matrix* movies fell past in green columns. I remember thinking at the time that it was strange that in trying to evoke the “future” the event organisers had selected a song from 1995, and visuals from a movie released in 1999.

However, as Mark Fisher (2012) argues, this should come as no surprise given how electronic music has become an aesthetic of futurism. As he puts it, “If electronic music was “futuristic,” it was in the same sense that fonts are “gothic”— the futuristic now connoted a settled set of concepts, affects, and associations” (Fisher 2012, 16). As a result, thirty-year-old music gets used at an AI event to connote the future.

Throughout my time in Singapore, and throughout this thesis, I have found that the ‘future’ is often constructed in dialogue with the past like Fisher describes. Further, as I have argued, AI systems, which abound in Singapore, tend to regurgitate what appears in their database. With the state and AI strongly asserting a future based on a particular past, we might assume that Singaporean Muslims imagine those futures too. But

do they? This conclusion aims to answer that question by asking “What futures are imagined by Muslims in a Singapore dominated by AI enabled technologies and their regurgitative futurities?”.

Contingent Futures

Prominent Islamic futurists like Ziauddin Sardar and Sohail Inayatullah have lamented the fixation on the past in Islamic futurism. As Inayatullah argues “A living prophet with a geographically bounded state – that remains the vision of future for many Muslims...social and political ‘progress’ has focussed on returning to the ideal perfect era” (Inayatullah 2005, 1195). Meanwhile, Sardar was even more strident claiming that, “Contemporary Muslim societies prefer to look back, wallow in nostalgia for the “golden past” rather than plan and work towards a vibrant future” (Sardar 2006, 572). Yet, perhaps ironically, in Sardar’s own account of Islam’s potential future he harks back to examples of the Prophet showing foresight and quotes this verse of the Quran “Beware of what lies before and behind you, so that you may be given mercy” (36:45). Even in attempts to explicitly look forward in time, it can be difficult not to be drawn back to the past.

This pattern of the past shaping the future is also clear in the narratives of the Singaporean state. As this thesis has repeatedly mentioned, the fear of racial violence like the riots seen in the 1950s and 60s, still plays a significant role in the management of race within Singapore. As Chua (2003), Abdullah (2016), and Babcock (2023) have shown, the violence of the past is forcefully brought into the present through policies of multi-racialism, SMI, and CMIO, wherein race must be carefully managed and identity categories consciously separated. These concerns about racial disorder are then projected into the future, where they are imagined as proximate danger. As the Preeti and Subhas parody song called “K. Muthusamy” and its resultant fallout show, even talking about race is perceived as an attack on racial harmony which inevitably leads to the violence of the past.

Simultaneously, the history of 1960s race riots is intertwined with Singapore’s former relationship to Malaysia. The link with Malaysia continues to haunt Singapore and motivates its emphasis on the “imperative to be smart” (Calder 2016). Since the separation from Malaysia, Singapore’s vulnerabilities, both economic and military, have been emphasised. This focus on economic survivalism in part motivates the move to become an AI hub for Southeast Asia. With limited natural resources and population,

which prevent it becoming a production centre, Singapore has understandably focused on becoming an intelligence economy. However, even as Singapore turns toward emerging technologies and the future, these choices have an eye towards its peninsular past.

As I argued in Chapter 2 of this thesis, Singaporean techno-anxieties and governance processes deriving from state narratives of the past fit neatly with an AI epistemology. As Aradau and Blanke (2022) show, AI systems claim to be able to work across scale by decomposing individuals into data points, which can later be recomposed as an “average” citizen. This fits neatly with the multi-racial policies of the state which categorise identities which seek to consciously manage racial differences, due to anxieties about past racial violence. This datafication also fits with the country's emphasis on neoliberal governance. This neoliberal governance style emphasises making rational decisions based “on datasets and forecasts [that] sustain the economic rationality of efficiency, performance and quantitative deliverables proper of neoliberal economics” (Cardullo 2021, 17). These are exactly the kinds of claims the Singaporean state, via the State-Owned Enterprise AI Singapore, makes about AI, describing it as “just data fed to maths.” Even within the proclamations of a “new” kind of governance lurk the policy priorities of the PAP which date to the 1960s. AI here emerges as a regurgitation of the neoliberal past, and its promises.

Claims about AI objectivity are also claims about the predictability of the future. As Chapter 2 showed, through this process of “feeding data to maths”, AI Singapore claimed it could predict anything, from the price of HDB apartments to who would default on their loan. However, as they demonstrated, these future predictions relied heavily on historic data. As they described at the event, these systems are designed using a process of back propagation wherein the input data is tweaked until the system is about to produce answers which match known answers. For example, an AI might be trained on data from the 90s to predict HDB prices in 2000. Therefore, the epistemology of AI operates on the assumption that the future will be like the past. Even predicting the future with futuristic AI technology leaves one foot in the past through its ties to historic data.

Furthermore, as explored in Chapter 4 of this thesis, LLMs like ChatGPT are built on archives of data. By viewing the datasets which empower AI systems, we can ask the same kinds of questions that historians have asked of archives since the early 2000s (Schwartz and Cook 2002).

Namely, what is included and excluded within these supposed “objective” repositories and who has power over these choices (Carter 2004). When reading for the fictions ChatGPT perpetuates my participants argued that AI was simply regurgitating MUIS talking points. For example, ChatGPT talked about a future Muslim community in Singapore which was “more visible and active in society”, something which my interlocutors rightly pointed out sounded like it came directly from the SMI. A replication of PAP anxieties about racial harmony. So long as Singaporean Muslims are asked to become modern and active, they will never be considered full citizens. To quote one of my annotators “why can’t the hijab be modern?”. Consequently, not only do LLMs draw on the past by regurgitating an average of its archive, but they also resign the Muslim community to the past. A past often presented by the state, with the Muslim community on a linear path towards being “modern” Singaporean citizens, but never quite arriving.

However, as Rosa (2016) argues, it should come as no surprise that technologies repeat the ideals of the society which create them. As he argues, technology does not lead to the societal speed up that we all experience, but rather technology responds to the demands of capitalism. Likewise, the categorising logics of AI systems are not a coincidental aspect, nor do they reshape approaches to governance. Rather AI systems, like all technologies, respond to the historical, political, and social conditions which produce them. AI creates and reifies racial differences because, especially in Singapore, historically this is how race has been governed.

MUIS as the state’s intermediary with the Muslim community is also part of this paradigm. As this thesis explored in Chapter 3, MUIS is trapped in an authority bind. It is caught between its desire to support the community, and its administrative responsibility to carry out government policy. Consequently, MUIS has turned to AI as a possible remedy, a way to increase the speed of their responses to community needs and reassert authority via AIs perceived objectivity. Yet, whenever I spoke to my interlocutors, members of the organisation and lay believers alike, they wanted to discuss past the mis-steps of MUIS rather than AI technology. Many of my interlocutors even acknowledged the authority bind MUIS is in. They were well aware that MUIS pronouncements were proxies for PAP rhetoric. However, it was this relationship that undermined MUIS, and the associated history of PAP discrimination against Muslims. Whether AI can be the solution to MUIS’ authority bind remains to be seen as their AI Fatwa Bot project comes to fruition.

However, as the works of Bunt (2003, 2018), Solahudin and Fukhu-roji (2019), and Selby and Sayeed (2023) show, religious authority within digital spaces has tended to follow existing patterns of authority. Whilst emerging technologies create new ways to interact and new intermediaries between religious institutions and lay believers, the sites of power have remained consistent. Despite early concerns in the academic literature that the internet would undermine traditional centres of religious power (Eickelman and Piscatori, 1997; Robinson, 2009), it has become clear that digital technologies both recreate the ideas of the past and reaffirm authority relations. As Selby and Sayeed (2023) showed, even in the marketplace of ideas online, believers still gravitated towards the brand names of existing religious authority. As Bunt argues in the conclusion of his early work on Islam and the internet:

“By seeing it as part of the process, it may be that the technology will become so natural that it is ignored altogether, being seamless with the extracts from the Qur’an that were inscribed on rocks and skins and memorised in the minds of believers” (Bunt 2003, 211).

Perhaps AI will follow the pattern of the technologies which preceded it and the authority of MUIS will operate much as it has in the past, despite the intervention of AI systems. I am reminded of a comment from my interlocutor when I asked if he suspected that Friday sermons were being written with ChatGPT, “I would feel, honestly, because of where the quality of the sermons is today there would be no difference.”

This may all seem to point to a foreclosed future, one with a narrative weight so strong that it is hard to imagine otherwise. If the future is so rigidly defined by the past, then surely the future is already written. The narrative of Singapore’s future is certainly powerfully asserted by the PAP government. The state’s focus is on averting crises, whether that be economic, military, or the flaring of racial tensions. That vision is also enacted by its intermediaries with citizens, like MUIS or AISG, who in turn regurgitate state concerns about racial violence and economic precarity, respectively. It is also entrenched by the technologies of AI which affirm existing narratives through the regurgitation of its own archive. All of these futures produced by the state, its intermediaries, and technology reaffirm a particular narrative of the past and therefore produce particular visions of the future. We might expect then that Singaporean Muslims imagine a future defined by the confines of state narratives, an AI future.

However, even in the case of MUIS, we see how the application of these narratives becomes blurry. Abdul acknowledged that his role within the organisation was to implement AI technology, despite his personal, theoretical, and theological misgivings. As he fatalistically put it “AI is here so we have to use it.” Yet, he still found ways in his work to mitigate its influences by trying to create a curriculum in which people would be trained to understand how AI works and its limitations. Within MUIS itself there are different views and approaches to the questions of AI and engagement with the state. This fact even sometimes frustrated my interlocutors who criticised the organisation’s lack of consistency. Even if MUIS were monolithic and consistent, the Muslim community certainly is not, and how these narratives are received differs widely. As Bear (2016) argues, foreclosed futures can be overturned simply by reaching for alternative narratives. What the inconsistency of MUIS points to is how ‘clear’ narratives about the future asserted by the state quickly become messy when applied in reality.

Likewise, it has been argued since at least the Macy Conferences, which laid down the foundations of cybernetics and AI, that technologies face the same problem. Whenever the outputs of digital technologies leave the reified spaces of computing and enter messy reality, their inability to account for context becomes clear. For example, as Hayles (1999) shows, the information theory of Shannon and Wiener treated words as non-contextual with their meaning remaining static regardless of the situation. This allowed for efficient transfer of information across mediums, but it is easy to imagine how this limits the accuracy of that data.

The members of the Macy Conferences certainly saw this as a flaw and spent many years attempting to propose an alternative. Despite these attempts, reified metaphors like decontextualised word meanings, have become central to the development of AI technologies (van Rooij et al 2024). It is for this reason that Amoore (2020), in her book *Cloud Ethics*, has argued that regardless of ethical guidelines, algorithms will continue to produce biased outputs as they move from the reified space of metaphor into complex reality. Her argument has thus far been born out, as algorithmic systems produced by governments continue to produce biased outcomes despite the application of ethical frameworks.

When I met with two artist researchers in the final phase of my fieldwork, I asked them if an alternative future was possible in Singapore. They responded immediately and almost in unison, “There must be!”

and “There is no future! We are creating it now.” Despite seeming to contradict, they agreed, that the future did not exist. What is called “future” in Singapore is just a narrative, one which the two of them called a ‘vulnerability’ narrative, where we must use AI or Singapore will be in danger. However, as they pointed out, this risk does not yet exist, and therefore, another narrative can be chosen to shape our action in the present. It is in this blurry space, between clean narratives and messy application where the future can be contested. Whilst the past inevitably shapes the future, perhaps that future can be pluralised by reaching for different pasts not included within the central narrative.

Blurring the Future

This is not a thesis about Islamic futures. As explored in my note on positionality, I am non-Muslim and not Singaporean. I therefore have neither the authority nor inclination to speak on what technology will mean for Islam, or how Islam as a religion ought to respond to AI. My view is that attempting to define an Islamic future in Singapore would require me to apply theological meaning to what my interlocutors told me. In so doing, I would be asserting my vision, and narrative, over their experiences. Consequently, I engage directly with theological ideas only when my interlocutors explicitly refer to them. Therefore, this is a thesis about how my Muslim interlocutors imagine the future of Singapore. Whilst this was a methodological and ethical decision, I would argue that taking this emic approach to interpreting my interlocutors’ ideas has bearing on the theoretical conclusions of this thesis.

Focusing on individual professions of faith naturally gives rise to questions about the nature of Islam. These are questions which have been central to the anthropology of Islam since the 1960s. At that time, Geertz argued that for all Muslims, common Islamic concepts help to “render the strange familiar, the paradoxical logical, the anomalous, given recognised, if eccentric, ways of Allah, natural” (Geertz 1968, 101). Whilst this argument is compelling, and the universality of Islam is an important tenet of many Muslims’ faith, I also agree with El-Zein (1977) that presenting Islam as a monolith in this way opens up Muslims to criticism for discontinuity or inauthenticity. El-Zein, therefore, proposed an ‘Islams’ approach to researching the faith in which different expressions of the faith emerge based on their cultural milieu.

In this debate, I find myself drawn to the work of Talal Asad. In 2009, he reflected on the development of his ideas about religion. As a young man,

he had contrasted the faith of his father, an intellectual who converted to Islam for its liberatory and political potential, with the faith of his mother who had no formal education. He argues that he interpreted this difference as her life having a lack, because she did not critically engage with her faith. However, as he began to understand Islam as a discursive tradition, he saw his mother's faith differently, writing

“My mother didn't intellectualize her religion, but by that I don't wish to say that she was 'a blind follower'. Her prayers, recitations, and fasting were intended neither for other people to decode nor for enhancing her own experience; they were addressed to her God” (Asad 2009, 4).

The contrast between his mother and father was not a question of intensity or intention, or of engagement, but rather a difference in what parts of their religiosity they chose to dialogue with. From this perspective, there is no contradiction in Islam being articulated differently. There is one Islam, but it is not monolithic, because each Muslim is in dialogue with different aspects of the faith. Each person reaches for different narratives of the past to define their present and future.

I would argue that it is via this perspective that the future can be conceptualised as pluralistic whilst simultaneously being contingent on the past. However, we can see that past as either monolithic, as in the PAPs presentation of the past, or as pluralistic. As I argued in Chapter 5, “act blur, live longer”, bani, Nurul and Iskandar resisted the state category of ‘Muslim’ by blurring how they performed their religiosity in public art performances. By being unclear publicly, they allowed themselves to act in ways that transcended the categories imposed by the state. While AI, as this thesis argues, decomposes individuals into data points which can later be recomposed into the ‘average’ citizen, the works of these artists resist the limitations of the SMI and CMIO. In this blurring they are able to reach for narratives beyond the Singaporean mainstream. bani seeks a more syncretistic Islam, Iskandar one which transcends space, and Nurul one in which women are allowed to transcend the binary of oppressed and liberated.

In their works, each of these artists reach for a different past which is not included in the official narrative. In bani's work he reflects on the history of syncretic practices which have long been an aspect of Islam in South-east Asia, but which are branded as ‘un-Islamic’ by MUIS. Nurul reflects

on how Muslim women have been represented in images, and how these images perpetuate a colonial gaze which continues to influence Singaporean politics. Iskandar, meanwhile, returns to a time in Singaporean history when the city's mosques were not controlled centrally by MUIS and therefore reflected the aesthetic diversity of Singapore's Muslim community. Each of these approaches to the past have something different to tell us about the future of the Muslim community. By being in dialogue with different pasts, they are able to blur the foreclosed future.

Likewise, in Chapter 6, when confronted by the pervasiveness of electrical sound around Singapore, my interlocutors did not imagine the foreclosed futures of Singapore when listening to electromagnetic sound. This is because, unlike within state narratives, my interlocutors once again reflected on different pasts. In Iskandar's past, Malaysia is not a threat and proximate danger, but rather a separated lover. From this perspective he is able to speculate on a future which is tranquil and foregrounds connection. When he mentions this quiet Singaporean future he reflects on a moment during the pandemic when Malaysian workers who failed to make it back before the border closed waved to their family at the causeway between Singapore and Johor. A moment of connection within separation. Wan also reflected a different past, remembering a time on Ubin Island when the Orang Pulau community lived there communally. In these events Wan makes the Orang Pulau community of the past, present in the absence of a mosque. A past which resists the pervasive idea that Singapore is purely a nation of immigrants (Chua 2003, 59). LC on the other hand remained in the present but focused on different aspects of the Muslim community. Perhaps not perfect, but still a community of warmth. An idea which resists the suggestion from MUIS, via the state, that the Muslim community still needs development to become 'good' citizens (Barr 2013).

These futures still refer to the past. However, what differs is the pasts which motivate them. Each of these imaginings of Singapore, from bani to Wan, relies on and is in dialogue with a different past. This is in contrast to the mainstream future which is based on a singular history of Singapore. A history that likewise does not appear in AI databases because they trend towards the hegemonic narratives asserted by the state. As the historians Hong and Huang put it, "a Martian with only the official script would think that there is only one political movement- the PAP; two important personalities in Singapore- Stamford Raffles and Lee Kuan Yew; and three dates- 1819, 1942 and 1965- that are worth remem-

bering’” (Hong and Huang 2008, 15). By complicating this official past my interlocutors were able to blur the foreclosed future. To paraphrase Iskandar, the path to the future suddenly less resembles train tracks, and more those innocuous jungle markings.

It could be argued that these futures are too idealistic. They picture a Singapore which cannot be reached, but with them comes a kind of melancholic acceptance. As Iskandar put it when discussing his work *nur*, “[it] alludes to that sense of impossibility, or of a melancholic dream, a utopia which will never materialize”. However, whilst these futures are not the likely ones, reflecting on alternative possibilities and temporalities can help make sense of the quotidian domination of the state (Nuruddin 2006). Even through these idealistic, melancholic futures there is an opportunity to reclaim both the past and the future.

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

One major limitation of my research is its timing. Whilst LLMs were big news in 2023 when I conducted fieldwork, their use by the general public had not yet become diffuse. My interlocutors often knew a lot about AI, but the majority said they had only used LLMs like ChatGPT once or twice, and even fewer had used them in a religious context. Similarly, MUIS was only just beginning its AI project, the AI Fatwa Bot, and I only met with its development team in my final weeks in Singapore. What becomes of that project will certainly have a significant bearing on the future of the Muslim community in Singapore. Whether for good or ill remains to be seen, and future research on this topic would add much to this thesis.

As a consequence of being early, I rarely got the opportunity to witness my interlocutors engaging with AI systems. There was not much talk at that time of critical prompt engineering in Singapore, and what there was had not really filtered into the lives of my interlocutors. As a consequence, my research focuses more on observing outputs produced by ChatGPT and other AI systems. However, I maintain that focusing on what a system produces still provides valuable insight on how that system works. To quote Stafford Beer, “The purpose of a system is what it does⁹⁴” (Beer 2012). What I present here is what ChatGPT did at the time,

94 Beer, S (2012) “What is Cybernetics? Conference by Stafford Beer.” . Accessed: 16 December 2025.

not what users could potentially make it do, although the latter would make for compelling future research that could further expand ideas of blurring through user input.

Finally, it might well be argued that my interlocutors are not wholly representative of the Muslim community in Singapore, made up as they are of Ustaz, artists and activists. This is true. Many more perspectives make up the Singaporean community, and here, I have barely scratched the surface. However, as I argued in my note on positionality, I did not aim for completeness, but rather to engage in dialogue with the people I met. I wanted, therefore, to represent their position, one which is resistant to the idea of an AI future. Their positions are not representative of Singapore, where an AI-future is the hegemonic one. They are, as Foucault-Welles (2014) might refer to them, outliers. But this does not negate the importance of their perspectives, which continue to be valuable to the conversation on Singapore's future. Exploring other outlier perspectives, not included in this thesis, would also be a potential site of future research.

Speaking of Foucault-Welles (2014), her argument that marginalised voices can be found in the outliers of big data speaks to a tension caused by AI enabled urban governance which I hope to explore in future research. A foundational argument of this thesis is that because AI is based on an average representation of its huge databases, it can fail to represent diversity and idiosyncrasy. The promise from AI evangelists is that more data will solve this problem. I have argued throughout this thesis that this is just another deferred future – a future which is promised but never arrives. However, Foucault-Welles (2014) gave me pause. What if, as she suggests, we looked at the outliers of big data? Then we could see idiosyncratic parts of larger communities in ways we never had before.

The question this raises is, what if marginalised groups do not want to be seen? As the trans activists and writers, who I refer to in Chapter 5 of this thesis, point out, visibility is a double-edged sword (Cárdenas 2017). Visibility can lead to greater representation, and more legibility by the state. However, being made legible to the state can also make marginalised groups vulnerable to its violence. The question then, is if those outliers wish to be seen in the big data. As AI enabled technologies such as facial recognition software become more ubiquitous, being visible may no longer be a choice. Whilst I touch on this question in the latter half of my thesis through the concept of blurring, I aim in future research to dig

deeper into these questions of visibility and legibility. Can we preserve the right to opacity within data saturated governance structures?

What Future do Muslims Imagine in AI Dominated Singapore?

One of the primary tensions in researching the future is that, as Sardar argues, “the future does not really exist. It is a time that has yet to be reached” (Sardar 2006, 564). The only way we ever experience the future is in our imaginations, and what we imagine is based on the past. Consequently, the future is directly tied to the past. It would be easy to conclude that the future is entirely contingent. However, most anthropologists of the future warn against this as too deterministic. The future does not exist yet, so whilst it reflects on what has already passed, it is still open and up for grabs.

We could make a similar kind of argument about the Muslim community. There is no singular Muslim community. As Asad argues, Islam is a discursive tradition that is in constant flux. What aspect of the tradition a believer engages in may shift and change based on the time and context (Asad 2009). As I have shown, my interlocutors emphasised different aspects of their identity, of their religion, and of their history in their imaginings of the future.

Furthermore, as I argued in the methods chapter of this thesis, AI is a similarly blurry concept. What AI is depends on the context. It could be an ideology, an epistemology, an infrastructure, an archive, or an imaginary. Not only that, but it is also a sprawling multi-national mega-structure. Just as what “Islam” and “the future” mean depends on what parts of those terms you interact with; AI is a concept which means different things based on where you stand.

I might conclude then that the question “what futures are imagined by Muslims in a Singapore dominated by AI enabled technologies?” is not coherent. It would be reasonable to ask, “what future? What Muslim and what AI?” And yet, just like I argued about the state, most of my Singaporean interlocutors understand the question. This is partly because the Singaporean state has so successfully asserted its vision for AI and the future. In the state narrative, AI is a way to ensure the economic prosperity of Singapore, whilst simultaneously creating policies which can work for all citizens at all scales. It is promised that in the future, Singapore will be a fully automated Island where citizens’ needs are met

before they realise, they have them (Koay 2017). However, these futures are tied to a neoliberal, colonial past where all Singaporeans are classified by race, and where Muslim Singaporeans in particular are marginalised. Even though this question evokes many blurry concepts, all my interlocutors had experienced the ways in which state narratives of past, present, and future impacted their everyday lives.

By re-engaging with different pasts, my interlocutors manage to complicate the smooth, clean, 'objective' narrative of AI futures asserted by the state. By exploring these alternative narratives, I have tried to show how whilst all futures are contingent on the past, they are not necessarily foreclosed, because which past to engage with remains open. Consequently, possible futures proliferate endlessly. Each Muslim in Singapore, in dialogue with a different past, a distinct part of Islam and another aspect of AI, generating a unique alternative future. As Escobar argues quoting the Zapatista movement "Queremos un mundo donde quepan muchos mundos (We want a world where many worlds fit) (Escobar 2019, 16). Ultimately, the singular 'future' is just another reified metaphor which stands in for the blurriness of lived reality.

What futures are imagined by Muslims in a Singapore dominated by AI enabled technologies? They are blurry, multiple, and only a handful of them were presented here. Consequently, they all resist the foreclosed futures proposed by the Singaporean state, the PAP, and the AI enabled Smart Nation.