



Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

Emotional privacy: a philosophical investigation of emotion recognition technology

Prégent, A.P.

Citation

Prégent, A. P. (2026, September 2). *Emotional privacy: a philosophical investigation of emotion recognition technology*. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/4309114>

Version: Publisher's Version

License: [Licence agreement concerning inclusion of doctoral thesis in the Institutional Repository of the University of Leiden](#)

Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/4309114>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

Stellingen

1. Fully functional emotion recognition technologies (ERTs) would not merely extend human perception but restructure the epistemic conditions of social interaction (Chapter 4).
2. The ethical risks of ERTs do not primarily stem from their current inaccuracies, but from their potential future accuracy.
3. The search for a single theory of emotions has obscured the functions on which competing theories often agree.
4. The sudden rise of affective computing has overshadowed decades of work in affective sciences on the complexity of emotions.
5. The ideal of total transparency is not a democratic virtue but a latent form of social control.
6. AI systems have revealed more about the limits of emotion frameworks than about emotions themselves.
7. The definition of “ethics principles” has never been expanded as much as in the age of AI.
8. In matters of social life, philosophical inquiry cannot remain detached from empirical realities without weakening its claims.
9. While the global dominance of English facilitates academic exchange, it simultaneously erodes the subtle textures of meaning that only culturally situated languages can sustain.
10. Wars depend on people fighting for the interests of their rulers rather than their own.