



Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

Narrating Europe's future history through collective memory and emotions: the EU and NATO's enlargement decisions after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022

Terzi, Ö.; Gürkan, S.

Citation

Terzi, Ö., & Gürkan, S. (2026). Narrating Europe's future history through collective memory and emotions: the EU and NATO's enlargement decisions after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. *Journal Of Contemporary European Studies*, 1-19. doi:10.1080/14782804.2026.2642718

Version: Publisher's Version
License: [Creative Commons CC BY 4.0 license](#)
Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/4308163>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).



Narrating Europe's future history through collective memory and emotions: the EU and NATO's enlargement decisions after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022

Özlem Terzi & Seda Gürkan

To cite this article: Özlem Terzi & Seda Gürkan (15 Mar 2026): Narrating Europe's future history through collective memory and emotions: the EU and NATO's enlargement decisions after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, DOI: [10.1080/14782804.2026.2642718](https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2026.2642718)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2026.2642718>



© 2026 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.



Published online: 15 Mar 2026.



[Submit your article to this journal](#)



Article views: 4



[View related articles](#)



[View Crossmark data](#)

Narrating Europe's future history through collective memory and emotions: the EU and NATO's enlargement decisions after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022

Özlem Terzi^a and Seda Gürkan^b

^aPolitical Science and Public Administration, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands; ^bThe Institute of Security and Global Affairs, Leiden University, The Hague, Netherlands

ABSTRACT

Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the EU granted candidacy status to Ukraine, Moldova, and later Georgia. NATO decided to expand to Finland and Sweden. In this article, we explain how the emotions-memory nexus has enabled both organizations' decisions to enlarge. By introducing a rhetorical mechanism that enables the institutions to take action, we explain the role of emotions-memory nexus in bringing about the simultaneous enlargement decisions of the EU and NATO between 2022 and 2024 in the face of Russian aggression in Ukraine. Employing emotion discourse analysis to assess the official statements, conclusions and adopted documents of the EU and NATO, the article concludes that referrals to a shared past is scarce in the current enlargement decisions coupled with a strategic amnesia about the EU's neighbourhood policy and past decisions on candidacy processes. We find that the EU decision to announce a revival of enlargement policy to include Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia mainly focused on values and norms through an inward-looking process, due to internal deliberations of the EU, whereas NATO's enlargement decision was taken by an outward-facing process, i.e. underlining, vis-à-vis third countries (externally), the mission of NATO for providing security in Europe.

ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 30 May 2025
Accepted 2 March 2026

KEYWORDS

EU enlargement; NATO enlargement; memory; emotions in European foreign policy; EU Foreign Policy

Introduction

Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Ukraine applied for EU membership within a week after the attack, and Moldova applied in March 2022. On 23 June 2022, the European Council (2022) granted candidate status to both.¹ The following month, the accession negotiations of Albania and North Macedonia were officially opened, ending the dormant phase in these countries' accession process. In December 2023, the European Council decided to grant Georgia candidate status, and it also extended candidacy to Bosnia and Herzegovina, signalling a revival of the EU's enlargement policy.

Amid heightened security concerns due to Russia's attack on Ukraine, both Finland and Sweden applied to join NATO in May 2022 and NATO invited both countries to join at its

CONTACT Özlem Terzi  o.terzi@vu.nl  Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, Amsterdam 1081 HV, The Netherlands

© 2026 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.

Madrid Summit in June 2022. Finland became NATO's 31st member in April 2023, and Sweden became the 32nd member on 7 March 2024. Furthermore, Ukraine applied for NATO membership in September 2022 and at the July 2024 Washington Summit, building on decisions taken at the 2022 Madrid Summit and 2023 Vilnius Summit, the allies reaffirmed that 'Ukraine's future is in NATO'. The decision to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance would be taken when Allies could agree and the conditions could be met.²

In the face of membership requests, both the EU and NATO managed to adopt a united position in a very short period of time. In both cases, the decision to enlarge was strongly coupled with remembrances from Europe's past: The return of war to Europe and the revival of Russia's imperial expansion was the reasoning for the EU to revitalise its enlargement policy, while the return of the Russian threat paved the way for Finland and Sweden to become members of NATO. In the face of a threat (and outside aggression), both of these regional organizations have re-drawn the regional lines about who belongs in them. Through a comparative study of the enlargement decisions of EU and NATO, as regional organisations with different purposes, we investigate in this article how the interaction between emotions and -memory enabled these decisions in the face of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

We argue in this article that emotion-memory nexus is crucial for understanding the legitimisation of policy (in)action in regional organisations, in this case their enlargement decisions. Regional organisations are constructs of history not only with respect to their functions and memberships, but also with respect to the future they envisage to bring about. For instance, the EU's enlargement in 2004 was justified as a tool for transforming its immediate vicinity (Grabbe 2006; Keukeleire and Delreux 2022; Smith 1999), but also for extending solidarity to the Central and Eastern European countries to overcome Cold War division of Europe (Sjursen 2006; Sjursen 2002; Smith 2017). References to memory and the use of emotions were also present in NATO's previous enlargement decisions. While the expansion of NATO in the 1990s and afterwards was driven by those countries' desire for membership as the utmost security guarantee against Russian domination in the region, the proponents of expansion in the West, both in the US and in the EU, presented this as the expansion of the zone of democracy and free market (building bonds of affinity), and the unification of Europe, which would help to stabilise these countries (by serving the emotional needs of security of these countries). The proponents of enlargement also argued that this expansion was beneficial for Russia. Accordingly, enlargement would not make new fault lines in Europe, closer to Russia's borders (Radu 1997; Rubinstein 1998), but it would ensure the return of the CEECs back to Europe, appealing to feelings of historical (in)justice to these nations (Kurth 1997). The expansion of NATO was also presented as 'expanding the area of Europe where wars do not happen' (Kydd 2001, 802), making an implicit reference to the war-torn history of Europe, and now inclusion in a zone of peace. Therefore, during both EU and NATO enlargements in the early 2000s, the emotion – memory nexus drew on narratives of past injustices and the unintended, resented division of Europe during the Cold War – divisions that enlargement was meant to overcome in a moment of impending peace after the Cold War.

This pattern, however, did not fully extend to the EU's enlargement trajectory toward the Western Balkan countries. There, the emotion-memory nexus presented the legacy of war as an obstacle to EU enlargement and overcoming the residuals of war was

a precondition for potential candidates to be announced as candidates. This discourse on the 'war as an obstacle' needed to be altered before decisions on continuing the accession process could be taken by EU institutions, especially in the Commission's country reports and the Council Conclusions (Terzi 2021). Moreover, the previous Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2014, as a result of which Russia had claimed a significant portion of land, had led to sanctions on Russia, but not to a decision to enlarge either of these institutions. In the same vein, previous NATO enlargements after 2004 were about shared values and strategic interests, in particular upgrading the new members' security institutions or providing them with political stability (see for example NATO Istanbul Summit Communiqué (NATO 2004), paragraph 26 and Bucharest Summit declaration (NATO 2008), paragraphs 18 and 19), whereas for Finland and Sweden the decision for their accession is indeed protecting them against Russian aggression. Moreover, with Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the decision to enlarge NATO and the decision to reinvigorate the enlargement process and to announce Ukraine and Moldova (and later Georgia for a short while) as EU candidate countries were taken very rapidly, marking a rupture with the past pace of decisions.

As this short overview of past enlargement decisions illustrates, the emotion-memory nexus was always present in justifying these regional organisations' decisions, but worked differently: it enabled both NATO and the EU to accept new members in the case of CEECs accession, whereas it constrained enlargement decisions of the EU to the Western Balkans.

Against this backdrop, this article explores how emotions related to past experiences (the emotion-memory nexus), has contributed to these two institutions' decisions to enlarge their community in response to renewed Russian aggression. Moreover, we look into how similar or different the role of the emotion-memory nexus has been in enabling the reinvigoration of the enlargement process (for the EU) or an enlargement decision (for NATO). In other words, the paper seeks to respond to the following question: 'what has been the role of the emotion-memory nexus that have led to the 2022 decisions of EU and NATO to enlarge in the face of Russian aggression?'

Drawing on the emotions literature in IR, and a sociological understanding of emotions (Frijda 2007; Stets and Turner 2005) and memory (J. Olick and Robbins 1998), the article presents a comparative study on the role of the emotions-memory nexus in framing enlargement decisions. Building on Gürkan and Terzi (2024)'s enabling and constraining mechanisms through which emotions play a role in bringing about action or inaction in foreign policy, we focus in this article on the enabling mechanism (as the decision to enlarge the EU and NATO was taken) and bring in the concept of memory to investigate the role of the emotion memory-nexus in these institutions' decisions to enlarge.³

We employ emotion discourse analysis (EDA) as developed by Koschut (2018) to answer the research question. EDA requires as its first step the selection of documents and other sources of data that will be used for the analysis. As the second step of EDA, we mapped the emotions expressed as well as the memories enacted by these institutions and identified how emotions and memory interact in institutional actors' discourse. As the final step of EDA, we traced the implications of the memory-emotions nexus justifying these two institutions enlargement decision.

In terms of the selection of documents, we focus on both organisations' primary documents issued since February 2022, when the war in Ukraine started until June 2024

for NATO, when the final Communiqué emphasized the future membership perspective for Ukraine and until October 2024 for the EU, when the EU decided to stop the enlargement process for Georgia. These include (extraordinary) European Council and Council conclusions for the EU and Summit Communiqués for NATO. Within this time frame, we include also the speeches by the (former) Secretary-General of NATO Jens Stoltenberg, and the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen and the (former) High Representative Josep Borrell as declarations by formal representatives of these institutions. We selected these speeches for two reasons. First, they are the products of these institutions' bureaucratic machinery, hence they are well-thought, commonly agreed texts. Second, they are pronounced by the official representatives of these institutions on behalf of these institutions. Therefore, the emotions and memory references we identify in the speeches are institutionally expressed and collectively agreed upon discourses rather than individually felt emotions.

This article is structured in the following way: First we present our framework for analysing the role of the emotion-memory nexus in the EU and NATO enlargement decisions. Second, we elaborate further on how we have used emotion discourse analysis as our main methods of analysis. Third, we take a comparative presentation of the data from EU and NATO decisions to enlarge after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine with a focus on emotions and memory framing enlargement decisions. We conclude by a reflection on our findings from this comparative analysis about how similar or different the emotion-memory nexus has worked in the enlargement decisions of these two regional organisations.

Emotion-memory nexus in regional institutions' enlargement decisions

In this article, we adopt a sociological approach to emotions as well as to memory. Drawing on Mercer (2014: 516), we define emotions as 'a feeling that has intrinsic importance to an actor in some relationship with an entity'. We use the term collective memory to refer to 'public discourses about the past as wholes or ... narratives and images of the past that speak in the name of the collective' (Olick 2007, 33). For the purposes of analysis in this article we also make use of the concept of 'regions of memory', defined by Olick (2015: xii) as 'discursive arenas above the level of the nation state but not fully universal' and 'challenging state-centric theory in the study of memory'. This understanding considers regions as 'spaces for memory dynamics' (Lewis and Wawrzyniak 2022, 2). Shared histories, memories, and emotions stemming from these lived experiences are crucial in shaping the form that regional institutions take as well as in determining who belongs in them (Selleslaghs and Van Langenhove 2020). In 'regions of memory' not everyone shares the same memories but discourses regarding the collective memories about the same events are connected (Lewis and Wawrzyniak 2022, 5). Thus, (regions of) memory helps with 'the identification and operations of regions themselves' (Olick 2022, 239). How history is remembered in the region has a lot to do with the existence of these regional institutions, their *raison d'être* - for example to deter a certain shared enemy (as in the case of NATO), to overcome past hostilities among members (as in the case of the EU) or to facilitate cooperation towards certain shared goals (like the Council of Europe) -, as well as the existence or absence of a collective identity. However, what constitutes a region changes in time, since many regions are re-defined throughout history (Hemmer and

Katzenstein 2002). This goes hand in hand with how the past is then remembered serving the needs of the present (Olick 2007). Other recent European examples of this would be the enlargement decisions of EU and NATO in early 2000s as explained above and how each of these decisions have been enabled with a reference to shared history and shared future (Terzi 2021). Berenskötter (2023) underlines that these memories constitute identities by creating a shared and (inter) subjective ‘sense of being in time’, giving meaning to our past, telling us who we have been in that past and where we are coming from, while a memory itself is open to modification, contestation and manipulation both from within and from the outside.

While regions are closely related to memories, memories are also ‘sources of emotions’ (Berenskötter 2023, 19). The way we remember the past is associated with how we have felt about these events. Collective memory, in particular, how the past is being remembered and narrated, shapes ‘emotional entitlements and obligations’ (Gustafsson and Hall 2021, 977). In this way, historical narratives condition the expression of some emotions, and impose emotional obligations on the community members. On the other hand, collective memory can only perform its community-building function or reorder relations both within the community *and* between the community and the outsiders if it is underpinned by emotions (Subotić and Zarakol 2020, 104). Klymenko and Siddi (2020) count, among others, application of historical analogies like lessons learned from earlier experiences, construction of historical narratives with moral claims, marginalisation of and forgetting of the past and securitisation of historical memory as mechanisms through which history influences foreign policy. This is why collective emotions expressed by international organisations (and their leaders as representatives) are key for understanding how institutional actors construct intra- and inter-community relations by bridging the past, present (Gürkan 2024; Terzi 2021) and even the future (Berenskötter 2023).

For the purposes of our analysis it is important to see the future-making aspect of enlargement decisions of regional organisations that integrate new members into an existing community with which newcomers face a common future based on a shared purpose and identity. The conditions that give shape to these regional institutions as well as the eventual structure within these institutions link history and how it is remembered (memory) today *with* certain emotions like hope, resentment, friendship, animosity, sense of shared duty towards each other, or shared feelings of fear or enmity towards certain outsiders, defining the emotional obligations among members of a regional organisation as well as an emotional boundary towards the outside. This is how we define the ‘emotion-memory nexus’ in this article.

For the comparative analysis of the role of the emotion-nexus in the enlargement decisions of EU and NATO, we adapt the framework of analysis previously developed by Gürkan and Terzi (2024). According to that framework of analysis,⁴ the eventual decision to reinvigorate the enlargement process of the EU by announcing Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia as candidate countries and to expand NATO to include Finland and Sweden are the policy ‘actions’ adopted by these institutions as they radically depart from earlier policy decisions. In this article, we trace the process backwards to see how the emotions-memory nexus worked to enable these decisions. To do so we proceed in three steps: 1. we map emotions and memory (which emotions and what memories are enacted?); 2. we identify the interaction of memory and emotions in the official communications of these two

institutions (how do emotions and memory interact with each other?); and 3. we trace the rhetorical mechanism leading emotion-memory nexus to these institutions' enlargement decision.

Even though both the EU and NATO are regional institutions built in the aftermath of the Second World War, their rationale for bringing peace to Europe is different. They differ in their missions, their decision-making procedures, their modes of governance, their role in European politics and in their institutional structures. The EU blends supranational and intergovernmental characteristics and aims at overcoming the long history of wars in (western) Europe by way of integration, and is built on a complex institutional structure. The *raison d'être* of the EU rests on the aim of overcoming European history of wars as it played out until its founding. Due to its complex institutional structure as well as its founding mission being the overcoming of historical enmities between its member states, the EU's decision processes are deliberative and inward-looking with a focus on its norms and identity. NATO, on the other hand, has been a security and defence alliance against an (emerging) outside threat, the Soviet Union. After the end of the Cold War, it has evolved into a peacekeeper serving to stabilize other regional threats to peace and security. Its aim is to secure peace in Europe by collective self-defence and deterrence, which is by definition future-oriented and outward-facing.

In accordance with their distinct natures, we expect the EU and NATO to adopt different framings of justifications for enlarging in the face of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. While both organisations' justifications play a crucial role in advancing enlargement decisions, especially in moments of uncertainty, when institutional actors tend to remind community members of the values and interests that the community upholds, and why a particular course of action – rather than another – should be pursued, because of their differences, we expect that their justificatory narratives will diverge. For the EU, that would be the rationale of integrating new members that embrace the community's norms and values *within* the Union for peace and security while maintaining the cohesion of the community. In the case of NATO the rationale would be maintaining the security of its members (and to be members) against an *outside* threat. Looking at the processes for an enlargement decision at both institutions, we would expect the one in the EU to be much more *internally deliberative* between the Commission, Council and the European Parliament on the justification for enlargement, putting forward the community's values and identity-related justifications, such as norms of belonging.⁵ Additionally, such deliberations would also have both EU member states (i.e. community members) and the public opinion in member states as the main audience (Toshkov et al. 2014). In the case of NATO, decisions are usually taken behind closed doors in intergovernmental setting (North Atlantic Council) through consensus. We expect the justifications for the enlargement decision in the Secretary- General speeches and Summit communiqués to be *externally focused*, emphasising the organisation's role and responsibilities in the broader international environment. Hence, focusing mostly on the need to enlarge NATO to ensure regional security and stability. As visualised in Figure 1, we expect the emotions-memory nexus to work in two different dimensions in the process leading to the decision to enlarge these two organisations. While defining who belongs to the community and who does not operates as an inward-looking dimension of enlargement decisions, the rhetorical justifications of security and deterrence for the region operates as an outward-facing dimension of the enabling mechanism (Figure 1)




Figure 1. Enabling mechanism of a policy action.
Created by the authors.

In the analysis of these two organizations' enlargement decisions, we take intra-institutional deliberations on whether to enlarge or not, identity-related questions such as who should belong and why, coupled with reflections on own identity and values as inward-looking aspects of an enlargement decision. On the other hand, we take deliberations on a regional or global role or mission statements as outward-facing aspects of the enabling mechanism (as exemplified in Table 1).

This does not mean that inward-looking aspects are not experienced in NATO decision-making and that outward-facing aspects do not impact EU decisions. We argue that when analysing how the enabling mechanism worked in these institutions, attention should be paid to these two different aspects while tracing the impact of the emotion-history nexus on the enlargement decision eventually taken. Before proceeding with analysing our data, we elaborate below on our steps of analysis.

Method

We have conducted an Emotion Discourse Analysis⁶ (EDA) of the official documents of these two organisations and the public speeches of their leaders. Our dataset consists of the Enlargement Strategy papers produced by the European Commission, the Council conclusions on enlargement, or on war in Ukraine, European Council conclusions on the same topics, resolutions of the European Parliament, and speeches by Ursula von der Leyen and Josep Borrell between February 2022 and October 2024 (marking the last significant decision on EU enlargement policy at the time of writing of this article) and NATO Communiqués adopted within this time frame. The documents analysed for NATO include all the speeches, interviews and press conferences delivered by the (former) NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on NATO's enlargement between February 2022 and June 2024; five NATO Summit Communiqués (Virtual Extraordinary Summit, February NATO (2022a); Statement by NATO Heads of State and Government, March NATO (2022d); Madrid Summit Declaration, June (NATO 2022b); Vilnius Summit Declaration, July NATO (2023); Washington Summit

Table 1 Inward-looking and forward-facing justifications in the enabling mechanism of enlargement

	Focus	Audience	Justification of enlargement	Example of justification
Inward-looking Outward-facing	Community values	Community members	Values, identity, belonging to the community	"Ukraine belongs to European family"
	Regional/ international security	Outsiders	Security of members (to-be-members), security of the region	"Welcoming Finland and Sweden into the Alliance will make them safer, NATO stronger, and the Euro-Atlantic area more secure".

Created by the authors.

Declaration, July (NATO 2024); and NATO's Strategic Concept adopted in June NATO (2022c).

In the analysis of these documents, we proceeded in three steps. The first step of the analysis focuses on mapping emotions officially expressed and memories officially enacted in the discourses of NATO and EU documents; and the second step consists of identifying how emotions and memory have interacted with each other in this discourse. Historical events get marked by certain emotions like fear, anger or happiness at the time of their occurrence. When humans (and institutions) look back, they remember whether these events were welcome events or events regretted whose re-occurrence should be prevented. When similar events happen in the present, these emotions are evoked. However, the new situation may need to be institutionally appraised in a different way, taking into consideration the circumstances it has now taken place in, for example, why war in former Yugoslavia and the one in Ukraine are appraised differently. These two events in different times in history may or may not be assessed as similar, due to the institutional actors involved or surrounding circumstances having changed between then and now. And therefore, these two events may or may not evoke the same emotions. In some circumstances, this may result in a re-assessment of the older event or a change in the way this older event is now remembered, which may involve selective remembrance or purposeful forgetting as well as a change in the emotions affiliated to the past event. Here, it is important to identify which emotions are invoked, which memories are selected to be remembered. Thus, the second step in the analysis consists of uncovering the interaction of emotions and memories in official (institutional) statements (which emotions are attached to which memories?). The third step of the analysis focuses on which aspects of the rhetorical enabling mechanism links the interaction of memory and emotions (the emotion-memory nexus in Figure 1) to the policy action, i.e. the decision to enlarge the two institutions.

On this basis, we reflect on the different dimensions of the enabling mechanism through which the emotion-memory nexus has led to the EU's and NATO's enlargement decisions.

EU and NATO enlargement decisions in the face of Russian aggression in Ukraine

The attack by Russia on Ukraine on 24 February 2022 sparked an immediate emotional response from the West which included fear, resentment, anger vis-à-vis Russia, but also sympathy and solidarity with Ukraine (Gürkan and Terzi 2024). In the two sections that follow we focus on the reactions from the EU and NATO separately and then compare our findings in the conclusions. In both sub-sections we map which emotions and memories are evoked, how they interact in official communications, and through which aspects of the enabling mechanism the emerging emotion-memory nexus has been linked to the enlargement decision.

European Union on the membership of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia:

The attack on Ukraine by Russia was declared to be one of the 'darkest hours for Europe' by the EU High Representative (HR) Josep Borrell (2022), evoking gloom. In her address to

the EP the President of the European Commission Von der Leyen (2022) stated that ‘a people that stands up so bravely for our European values belongs in our European family’, which indicated also an implied sense of duty towards Ukraine and Ukrainians, indicating amity and sympathy for their cause of remaining an independent European country. There was no referral to history or invocation of the past with reference to Ukraine in such texts.

The historical references made by the European Parliament (2022a) for example were to the many international documents signed or adopted together with the Soviet Union or Russia, going as far back as to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, stressing also the Paris Charter of 1990, and the Budapest memorandum, in which Ukraine and others were guaranteed protection from a nuclear threat. The memories evoked were not of the relations with Ukraine but those with Russia. All these commitments that cultivated the earlier positive relations with Russia were now violated by Russia, indicating betrayal and creating resentment and anger.

Except referrals to Russia and the history of relations with Russia, calls of solidarity by the EP (see for instance EP 2022a) were mostly inward-looking, reminding member states in the Council of their responsibility and moral obligations of solidarity with those member states closest to the Russian threat and also with Ukraine, which was now seen as part of the in-group, while creating a defensive protective border to be worked up from the inside against the threatening outsider. The Versailles Declaration (2022) adopted by the European Council on 10–11 March was also strong in its emotional language calling on Russia by stating that ‘two weeks ago Russia brought war back to Europe’. This is not passive voice, neither has war returned to Europe. Russia had (actively) brought war back to Europe. The Declaration was very clear on who was guilty on this. It talks about ‘unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine’, ‘unspeakable suffering’, ‘commitment’ and ‘determination’ on the side of the EU as well as its ‘readiness’ for further sanctions. Despite being neutral on the application by Moldova and Georgia, the Declaration stated that ‘*Ukraine belongs in our European family*’, and that ‘the EU will support Ukraine in pursuing its European path’ (Versailles Declaration 2022: 2) This document also stated that ‘Russia’s war of aggression constitutes a *tectonic shift in European history*’ (Versailles Declaration 2022: 3), aiming to shape how today should be narrated in the future, delineating who now belongs with us and who does not, also paving the way for changing the course for policies on enlargement and on European security.

These initial documents adopted shortly after the start of the war in Ukraine demonstrate that the emotions-memory nexus worked with more historical references to the disruption of the order of peaceful relations with Russia after the end of the Cold War, than a shared history with Ukraine. These relations could have been declared to be disrupted also in 2008 or in 2014, rather than in 2022, but this also demonstrates a process of souring relations that eventually culminates in 2022. The relationships with Ukraine after the start of Russian aggression was framed with references to shared values and responsibility to ensure its European belonging.

Setting another example of the EU’s inter-institutional deliberations towards reinvigorating the enlargement process, the Commission’s opinion concluded that ‘Ukraine is a European State which has given ample proof of its adherence to the values on which the European Union is founded’ (European Commission 2022a). These remarks convey a message of Ukraine not only belonging in Europe and in the EU, but also a sentiment of

satisfaction with Ukraine's normative performance. However, the emotions- memory nexus crafting the future relationship with Ukraine under these new circumstances has worked in an unprecedented manner that involves amnesia about EU's earlier policies:

The Commission did not refer to the fact that the country was partly under occupation of Russian forces, even when issues like the rule of law were being addressed. So the war and occupation are not registered as forces impeding the capacity of the central government in Ukraine to enforce the rule of law, for example. This is striking when we remember that the peaceful resolution of disputes and good neighbourly relations with neighbours as well as overcoming of hostilities among communities were significant criteria for not only CEEC but also for Western Balkan countries. So, the Commission had an intended *silence* about the impact of war or *amnesia* about its earlier practices of presenting lesser tensions in neighbourly relations in other cases as obstacles in the European paths of other candidates. This forgetting of the past policies enables the change of enlargement policy to now include Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.

The EP (2022b) resolution underlines the *cost of non-enlargement* as a *massive strategic cost* which 'can undermine security and stability on our continent', linking these peoples' desire to belonging in the EU to 'fear' and 'cost'. It also states that 'granting of candidate status would send a strong message of *hope and solidarity* to the citizens of the three countries ...'. The current resistance of these countries to Russian aggression is seen as the proof of their belonging in the EU despite decades-long non-compliance with approximations awaited in the existing institutional relationship within the neighbourhood policy. Thus, the Russian aggression in Ukraine has re-defined the current and future rhetoric on how today's developments will be seen, while also facilitating a reassessment of decades long performance of these countries under the neighbourhood policy to facilitate their inclusion in a re-awakened enlargement policy.

Building on the Commission's opinions (2022a, 2022b) and the support from the EP (2022b), the European Council (2023) decided to open the accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova and declared Georgia a candidate country. Two and a half years after the start of the war in Ukraine, the 2024 enlargement package of the Commission justified the reinvigorated tempo of the enlargement policy by underlining the many benefits it will bring for the EU, with a strictly rational and non-emotional tone (European Commission 2024). Due to democratic backsliding in Georgia, the October 2024 European Council decided to de facto end the accession process of Georgia, despite reiterating its support for the Georgian people on their European path (European Council 2024).

The emotion memory nexus in the case of the EU has worked to re-assess the relationship of the EU not only with Russia but also primarily with Ukraine and also with Moldova and Georgia, contextualising this latter relationship within the experience of Russian aggression on Ukraine. Due to the internal procedures involved in declaring a country as candidate, the decision by the EU to reinvigorate the enlargement policy has mostly been an *inward-looking process* for the EU. Various documents delineated who belongs and who does not, based mostly on values and also upon perception of threat and fear from the aggressor. These included a mission statement of standing in solidarity against this aggression, which needed to rely on an institutional amnesia about past conditionality in the enlargement policy about having good neighbourly relations and overcoming legacy of past wars. The many referrals at the start of this process to the resented

disruption of peaceful relations with Russia has been the outward-facing aspect of EU's enlargement process, during which Russia was explicitly blamed for bringing about the conditions of war back to Europe, which necessitated on the side of the EU to show solidarity with the victim.

NATO on the membership applications of Finland, Sweden and Ukraine

This section shifts the focus to NATO's narrative surrounding the enlargement of the Alliance in the aftermath of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and examines how the emotions-memory nexus was used in NATO's justifications for enlargement. The emotion discourse analysis of the data indicates that NATO's narrative on enlargement in relation to Finland, Sweden, and Ukraine since 2022 has made references to history in two specific instances. First, since the start of the war, NATO documents and the Secretary-General have consistently referred to NATO's past enlargements as a historic success, as well as to its previous decisions regarding its open-door policy. These references can be interpreted as an indication of NATO's commitment to pursuing future enlargements. In this context, references to past success in expanding the Alliance serve as a tool for shaping the future: we accomplished this in the past, and we can do it again in the future (see NATO Secretary General, 12 June 2022e; 15 May 2022a; 24 March 2022c). In the construction of this collective future, pride in past achievements of NATO in unifying the continent strengthens current emotions, namely the determination to continue NATO's open-door policy:

Hardly any decision [referring to NATO's enlargement after the Cold War] in modern history has changed Europe more profoundly. NATO enlargement unified Europe in a way that was previously unthinkable. Paved the way for EU integration. And brought peace and prosperity across the continent. Allies showed clarity and determination then. *As we must continue to do now.* (emphasis added, NATO Secretary General (2024) at the NATO 75th Anniversary Celebratory Event in Washington, 9 July)

Second, in justifying both the Allies' response to Russian aggression and NATO's decision to pursue open-door policy, references to the post-World War II agreed world order, including the Helsinki Final Act, have been frequently mentioned. These references serve, on one hand, to emphasize Russia's responsibility, guilt, and betrayal in violating agreed norms, and on the other hand, to underscore the determination to preserve post-WWII principles, in particular the right of each country to decide its future accession to NATO. This is best exemplified in the following quote by NATO Secretary General during the Kultaranta Talks in Finland in June 2022e:

Putin's ambitions go beyond Ukraine. [...] These demands amount to the complete re-write of the European security order, enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act. One of the main principles in the Helsinki Final Act is the right of each nation to choose its own path. This is exactly what President Putin is openly contesting. He is trying to establish an alternative world order [...] You, as Finns, know only too well the consequences of such a world order. You defend your rights as a sovereign nation, and you have made your free choice to apply for NATO membership. I truly welcome this brave decision. (NATO Secretary General, 12 June 2022e; see also NATO Secretary General, 29 November 2022b)

In this way, in the case of NATO, references to history and accompanying emotions (i.e. pride in relation to past enlargements, determination to preserve post-WWII principles) are used in an outward-facing manner to justify policy decisions.

While collective memory about the shared past with Sweden, Finland and Ukraine is not used to justify NATO's enlargement to these three countries, emotions are used both to give meaning to current events *and* to construct a collective future (history in the making). Negative emotions such as anger against Russia or the feeling of being betrayed by Russia, and positive emotions, such as solidarity, sympathy and pride (in relation to Ukraine) construct current emotional boundaries between norm breakers (Russia) and the victim (Ukraine), and justify NATO's response for supporting Ukraine against Russia (on this see, for example, NATO Secretary General 9 March [2022f](#); 12 June [2022e](#)). In the case of Sweden and Finland's membership applications, emotions are rarely used explicitly, and the decision to enlarge NATO to these countries is justified on the basis of purely security arguments rather than identity-based arguments or shared history:

Welcoming Finland and Sweden into the Alliance will make them safer, NATO stronger, and the Euro-Atlantic area more secure. [...] Finland and Sweden joining NATO is important for Finland and Sweden, but it's also important for NATO and particularly the Baltic countries. (NATO Secretary General, 28 June [2022a](#))

As this excerpt illustrates, the enlargement to these two countries is not legitimized through memory. Instead, the sense of lack of security in the present (securitization of the present) and the Alliance's search to restore its loss of power (in the face of Russia's aggression) by accepting new members drive NATO's narrative. In this way, present feelings of insecurity construct the Alliance's future.

In all three cases (Finland, Sweden and Ukraine), NATO's narrative on engaging with these countries emphasizes unity, friendship and belonging to the European family (see, for example, NATO Secretary General, 15 May [2022a](#)). However, in the case of Ukraine, NATO's narrative on enlargement remains more ambiguous. On the one hand, after the war, NATO has reiterated its commitment to its previous decision taken in 2008 Bucharest Summit, which stated that Ukraine (and Georgia) would eventually become members. On the other hand, it has refrained from offering a clear membership perspective to Ukraine. The nuances in NATO's approach to Ukraine compared to Finland and Sweden have been clearly recognized by NATO Secretary General:

I strongly believe that Ukraine is in a different position than Finland and Sweden are. Finland and Sweden are long term partners of NATO, we have consensus in the Alliance on inviting them to become members, we made that decision at the Summit in Madrid in May. What we see in Ukraine is a war going on and the top priority is therefore to provide military support to Ukraine. (NATO Secretary General, 29 November [2022a](#))

In a nutshell, NATO's narrative on enlargement (to Finland and Sweden, and the recognition of Ukraine's aspirations to join the Alliance) is justified through security needs for both the Alliance and these countries rather than through references to history. However, references to successful memories of past enlargements help to narrate the future, and these historical references are used together with the emotion of pride. In this way, emotion-memory nexus (pride about NATO's past achievements in enlargement) reconstructs NATO's current (and future) mission of safeguarding stability and security in Europe. This emphasis on NATO's mission in safeguarding the security of its allies (and

its future members) indicates the presence of an outward-facing aspect of the enabling mechanism that leads to the policy decision. Lastly, various emotions – NATO’s solidarity with Ukraine (NATO Secretary General 9 March 2022b, 2022f), anger against Russia’s war of aggression (NATO 25 February 2022c), determination to deter Russia (NATO Secretary General 12 June 2022d) – constructed the Alliance’s future by justifying historical decisions, namely the accession of Finland and Sweden and the reaffirmation of NATO’s open-door policy to Ukraine.

Conclusion

This article has focused on the question ‘what has been the role of the emotion-memory nexus that have led to the 2022 decisions of EU and NATO to enlarge in the face of Russian aggression?’ We have found both differences and similarities in the path to enlargement decisions of EU and NATO as a response to Russian aggression.

For both the EU and NATO enlargement decisions, the ‘feeling of insecurity’ dominated both enlargement decisions after the start of war in 2022. In both enlargement decisions, the emotion-memory nexus turns out similarly in two ways: 1. Making sense of the memory of relations with Russia and with Ukraine and 2. The explicit aim of making sense of today in such a way that it shapes the future of relationship with Russia and Ukraine. The post-Cold War period’s peaceful order is now violated with Russia’s attack on Ukraine, which is claimed to be a ‘tectonic shift in European history’ (Versailles Declaration 2022), and which has evoked anger and resentment. This claim of a tectonic shift demonstrates that there is a new emotion-memory nexus in the making as demonstrated in Figure 1, aiming to shape how today will be referred to in the future. In this future, Ukraine is clearly defined as belonging to the EU, aiming to ignite hope for the future of Ukraine, whereas the EU’s institutional discourse was more neutral on Moldova and Georgia.

Linking these findings to the framework of analysis we have developed with Figure 1 and exemplified in Table 1, a shared history of earlier relations with Ukraine (and with Moldova and Georgia) for the EU or with Finland and Sweden for NATO have not shaped the decision to enlarge, but the new emotion-memory nexus aiming to shape how today should be remembered in the future has. The discourse on ‘sense of kinship’ and the ‘moral duty to enlarge’, which was also used in the enlargement processes of these two institutions in early 2000s is now made with reference to the current events creating a future-oriented emotional obligation to stand in solidarity with Ukraine and the member states facing the threat of Russian aggression.

Moreover, the above analysis of the EU and NATO documents also demonstrates a significant difference in how the enabling mechanism has worked in these two instances: The discourse employed in EU documents is much more inward looking, due to the required internal procedures, reflecting on their own history of relations with Russia, Ukraine and Moldova, re-contextualising the relationship with these countries with respect to shared norms and values. The EU has been enhancing solidarity with this new ingroup of countries in the face of Russian aggression. Whereas the NATO Communiques, documents and speeches were much more outward-facing, emphasizing NATO’s contribution to building peace and stability in Europe and underlining its mission

and role in providing security – demonstrating to both friends and foes what NATO stands for.

The EU documents regarding enlargement to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia were limited in their emotion-memory nexus to a 30-year period post-1990. This 30-year period was recalled as a period of these countries' gaining some trajectory of closer relations with the EU. No reflection was made on the earlier EU statements about the (Eastern) Neighbourhood Policy regarding Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus being designed for those who would remain neighbours rather than future members (European Commission 2003). The EU also conveniently forgot about earlier principles that ongoing conflicts or remnants of it need to be resolved before candidates can become members (European Commission 1993).

The findings from the NATO case demonstrate that emotions are used to erect emotional boundaries between us (Allies) and Russia. Ukraine, Sweden and Finland are considered 'as one of us'. Emotions are also used to underline the new mission of NATO, justifying a set of actions (NATO's changing defence posture, aid to Ukraine). References to history (past enlargements) are used only to emphasise the success of NATO's role in providing security in Europe and the continuation of NATO's open-door policy as part of its inclusive identity based on shared values. NATO's enlargement to Sweden and Finland is justified in terms of security (more security for acceding countries, more security for NATO and more security for Allies). NATO's prospect to enlarge to Ukraine is justified in terms of sovereign nations' decision to decide their own security arrangements. Emotions (anger, sadness, decisiveness, solidarity) construct the Alliance's future by leading to historical decisions (accession of Finland and Sweden) and consolidating NATO's open-door policy (to Ukraine).

This article has focused on the enlargement processes of two significantly different regional organisations of Europe at a very particular time in their history, for the first time taking place during a period of war (potentially) targeting the newcomers. The different dimensions that the emotion-memory nexus has worked in these cases support the conceptualisation about the role of memory in future-making (Berenskötter 2023) and in shaping regional identities (Olick 2022) in these two organisations. In the face of future events to come, the enlargement processes will be significant to analyse as another process of re-making of regions. Further comparative studies in other regions and membership dynamics of such regional organisations during turbulent times in their history would highlight different aspects of how the emotion-memory nexus in a particular region contributes to (re-)definition of regions and influences the structuration of regional organisations. Furthermore, analysing the politics of emotions, and politics of memory – namely analysing whose emotions and memories matter, when, and why in inter-institutional relations and in multilateral organisations – during critical times for regional politics would also be an interesting avenue for future research.

Notes

1. Georgia also applied for EU membership in March 2022 together with Moldova but was only granted candidate status in December 2023.

2. In response to Ukraine's aspirations for NATO membership, Allies agreed at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Ukraine will become a member of NATO. In September 2022, Ukraine reiterated its request for NATO membership, which has been recognized by the Allies at the 2022 Madrid, 2023 Vilnius and 2024 Washington Summits (see NATO official website: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm).
3. For the EU, we take as the 'enlargement decision', the decision to reinvigorate enlargement policy and to include Ukraine and Moldova (and later for a short period Georgia) in the accession process by announcing them as candidate countries.
4. Gürkan and Terzi (2024) investigate the mechanisms that link expressed emotions by the EU institutions to policy action or inaction. They argue that once triggered in the face of a given situation, emotions lead either to policy action, i.e. a novel policy decision or action that goes beyond the business-as-usual, facilitated through an enabling mechanism or they nevertheless lead to policy inaction being hindered by a constraining mechanism. For a detailed description of these enabling and constraining mechanisms in EU Foreign Policy please see their article (Gürkan and Terzi 2024).
5. Terzi (2021) explains these norms of belonging as the required emotional discourse in the EU institutions' decisions on the enlargement policy.
6. as defined by Koschut (2018) and as explained in the introduction part of this article.

Author contributions

CRedit: **Özlem Terzi:** Conceptualization, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Project administration, Visualization, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing; **Seda Gürkan:** Conceptualization, Formal analysis, Funding acquisition, Investigation, Methodology, Project administration, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Funding

For Seda Gürkan, this research was supported by the Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap, [EUMOTIONS Role of Emotions in EU Foreign Policy] and it was undertaken within the framework of the research project EUMOTIONS (The Role of Emotions in EU Foreign Policy).

References

- Berenskötter, F. 2023. "Memory, Identity and Its Politics." In *Handbook on the Politics of Memory*, edited by M. Mälksoo, 18–30. Cheltenham Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Borrell, J. 2022. "Press Statement by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell on Russia's Aggression Against Ukraine." February 24. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_22_1324.
- European Commission. 1993. "Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership." In *Brussel, 13 June COM(93) 313 Final. Commission Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership* -, Publications Office of the EU.
- European Commission. (2003). *Communication on Wider Europe- Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Our Relations with Our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*, Final 104, 11 March, COM.
- European Commission. 2022a. *Commission Opinion on Ukraine's Application for Membership of the European Union*, 407. Brussels, COM (2022) Final. June 17.

- European Commission. 2022b. Commission Opinion on Moldova's Application for Membership of the European Union, Brussels, COM (2022) June 17) 406 Final.
- European Commission. (2024). 2024 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, Brussel, 30 October, COM Final 690.
- European Council. 2022. *Conclusions on Ukraine, the Membership Applications of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia and External Relations*, 611/22. June 23.
- European Council. 2023. "Conclusions." Brussels, 15 December, EUCO 20/23.
- European Council. 2024. "Conclusions." Brussels. October 17, EUCO 25/24.
- European Parliament. 2022a. "Resolution on Russian Aggression Against Ukraine, 1 March, P9_TA (2022)0052.
- European Parliament. 2022b. "Resolution on the Candidate Status of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, 23 June, P9_TA(2022) 0249.
- Frijda, N. 2007. *The Laws of Emotion*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Grabbe, H. 2006. *The EU's Transformative Power: Europeanisation Through Conditionality on Central and Eastern Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Gürkan, S. 2024. "Constructing an 'Emotional Community' In Times of Crisis: The EU's Response to Russia's Invasion of Ukraine in 2022." *Journal of European Integration* 46 (5): 635–659. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2024.2360703>.
- Gürkan, S., and Ö. Terzi. 2024. "Emotions in EU Foreign Policy – When and How Do They Matter?" *Journal of European Integration* 46 (5): 575–596. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2024.2360697>.
- Gustafsson, K., and T. H. Hall. 2021. "The Politics of Emotions in International Relations: Who Gets to Feel What, Whose Emotions Matter, and the "History Problem" In Sino-Japanese Relations." *International Studies Quarterly* 65 (4): 973–984. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqab071>.
- Hemmer, C., and P. J. Katzenstein. 2002. "Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism." *International Organization* 56 (3): 575–607. <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081802760199890>.
- Keukeleire, S., and T. Delreux. 2022. *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Klymenko, L., and M. Siddi. 2020. "Exploring the Link Between Historical Memory and Foreign Policy: An Introduction." *International Politics* 57 (6): 945–953. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00269-x>.
- Koschut, S. 2018. "Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International Relations." In *Researching Emotions in International Relations: Methodological Perspectives on the Emotional Turn*, edited by Maeva Clément and Eric Sanger, 277–301. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kurth, J. 1997. "NATO Expansion and the Idea of the West." *Orbis* 41 (4): 155–167. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0030-4387\(97\)90005-3](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0030-4387(97)90005-3). Fall.
- Kydd, A. 2001. "Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement." *International Organization* 55 (4): 801–828. <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081801317193600>.
- Lewis, S., and J. Wawrzyniak. 2022. "Introduction: Regions of Memory in Theory." In *Regions of Memory: Transnational Formations*, edited by S. Lewis, 1–16. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mercer, J. 2014. "Feeling Like a State: Social Emotion and Identity." *International Theory* 6 (3): 515–535. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971914000244>.
- NATO. 2004. "Istanbul Summit Communiqué, Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, <https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm>.
- NATO. 2008. "Bucharest Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on." 3 April 2008, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm.
- NATO. 2022a. "Extraordinary Virtual Summit of NATO Heads of State and Government, Available at Extraordinary Virtual Summit of NATO Heads of State and Government." 25 February 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/events_192464.htm.
- NATO. 2022b. "Madrid Summit Declaration, Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Madrid 29." Accessed June, 2022. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_196951.htm.

- NATO. 2022c. "NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_210907.htm.
- NATO. 2022d. "Statement by NATO Heads of State and Government." Brussels. 24 March 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_193719.htm.
- NATO. 2023. "Vilnius Summit Communiqué, Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Vilnius." 11 July 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm.
- NATO. 2024. "Washington Summit Declaration, Issued by the NATO Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in." Washington, D.C. 10 July 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm.
- NATO Secretary General. 2022a. "Joint Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg (Remote from Brussels) and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany." Annalena Baerbock following the informal meetings of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Berlin. 15 May 2022. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_195129.htm?selectedLocale=en.
- NATO Secretary General. 2022c. "Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Following the Extraordinary Summit of NATO Heads of State and Government." 24 March 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_193613.htm?selectedLocale=en.
- NATO Secretary General. 2022d. "Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Following the Trilateral Meeting Between Türkiye, Finland and Sweden". 28 June 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_197253.htm?selectedLocale=en.
- NATO Secretary General. 2022e. "Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Kultaranta Talks in Finland." 12 June 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_196300.htm.
- NATO Secretary General. 2022f. "Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Ottawa Conference on Security and Defence." Accessed March 9, 2022. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_193055.htm.
- NATO Secretary General. 2024. "Secretary General Celebrates NATO's 75th Anniversary with Allied Leaders on the Eve of the Washington Summit." 9 July 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_227459.htm.
- Olick, J.K. 2007. *The Politics of Regret: On Collective Memory and Historical Responsibility*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Olick, J. K. 2015. "Foreword." In *Memory and Change in Europe*, edited by M. Pakier and J. Wawrzyniak, ix–xii. New York and Oxford: Berghahn.
- Olick, J. K. 2022. "Afterword: The Discourse of Regions." In *Regions of Memory: Transnational Formations*, edited by S. Lewis, 235–239. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Olick, J., and J. Robbins. 1998. "Social Memory Studies: From "Collective Memory" to Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices." *Annual Reviews of Sociology* 24 (1): 105–140. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.105>.
- Radu, M. 1997. "Why Eastern and Central Europe Look West." *Orbis* 41 (1): 39–57. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0030-4387\(97\)90088-0](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0030-4387(97)90088-0). Winter.
- Rubinstein, A. 1998. "NATO Enlargement vs American Interests." *Orbis* 42 (1): 37–48. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0030-4387\(98\)90049-7](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0030-4387(98)90049-7). Winter.
- Selleslaghs, J., and L. Van Langenhove. 2020. "The Rise of Regions: Introduction to Regional Integration & Organisations." In *The Changing Global Order*, edited by M. O. Hosli and J. Selleslaghs, 147–162. Cham: Springer.
- Sjursen, H. 2002. "Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40 (3): 491–513.
- Sjursen, H. 2006. "Introduction: Enlargement and the Nature of EU Polity." In *Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in Search of Identity*, edited by H. Sjursen, 1–15. London and New York: Routledge.
- Smith, K. E. 1999. *The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

- Smith, K. E. 2017. "Enlargement, the Neighbourhood and European Order." In *International Relations and the European Union*, edited by C. Hill, M. Smith, and S. Vanhoonacker, 316–340. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stets, J. H., and J. E. Turner. 2005. *The Sociology of Emotions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Subotic, J., and A. Zarakol. 2020. "Hierarchies, Emotions and Memory in International Relations." In *The Power of Emotion in World Politics*, edited by S. Koschut, 100–112. London and New York: Routledge.
- Terzi, Ö. 2021. "Norms of Belonging: Emotion Discourse as a Factor Determining Future 'Europeans.'" *Global Affairs* 7 (2): 139–155. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2021.1927794>.
- Toshkov, D., E. Kortenska, A. Dimitrova, and A. Fagan. 2014. "The 'Old' and the 'New' Europeans: Analyses of Public Opinion on EU Enlargement in Review." Maxcap Working Paper no 2, at: https://userpage.fu-berlin.de/kfgeu/maxcap/system/files/maxcap_wp_02.pdf.
- Versailles Declaration Adopted at the Informal Meeting of the Heads of State or Government, 2022 20220311-versailles-declaration-en.pdf (europa.eu).
- Von der Leyen, U. 2022. "Speech at the European Parliament Plenary on the Russian Aggression Against Ukraine", 1 March, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/speech_22_1483/SPEECH_22_1483_EN.pdf.