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An insight in European trade networks: The commercial relationship between Amsterdam and Lisbon, 1580-1710

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de kostbaarste prijsschepen uit de Derde Engelse Oorlog. Slechts zes van de acht opgebrachte prijzen worden dus in de officiële stukken vermeld.

Als we op basis van venduveilingen in de Republiek de op Mijsters naam geregistreerde opbrengst berekenen, komen we op slechts vier prijzen uit. Drie tijdens de reis waar het journaal over handelt en één tijdens de daaropvolgende tocht. Daarmee zou Mijster volgens het onderzoek van Quak in de grote hoofdmoot van kapers zitten die minder dan vijf prijzen opbrachten. Toch maakte Mijster tijdens de Derde Engelse Oorlog ten minste dertien schepen buit. Voorzichtigheid moet dus worden betracht bij de interpretatie van bestaande gegevens.

Afsluitend keren we terug naar de eerder gestelde vraag: heeft Mijster zich aan de door de overheid gestelde richtlijnen voor commissievaart gehouden? Het antwoord kan kort zijn: nee! Naast fraude bij het opbrengen van een schip in La Coruña heeft hij zich schuldig gemaakt aan overtreding van de plakaten. In het voorjaar van 1673 had hij binnen moeten zijn, maar hij arriveerde pas eind juni in Zeeland. Oorlogshandelingen tussen de Nederlandse en de gecombineerde Engels-Franse vloot hadden toen al plaatsgevonden.

RUUD PAESIE (1956) studeerde politicologie en geneeskunde aan de Universiteit Nijmegen. Tussen 1991 en 1994 was hij medewerker van de AAO (Afdeling Archeologie Onderwater) en betrokken bij het onderzoek naar een laat-Romeinse brug in de Maas bij Cuijk. Daarna verbleef hij langdurig in het buitenland, waaronder de Maldiven, waar hij in 1997 het in 1726 gestrande Zeeuwse VOC-schip *Ravesteyn* lokaliseerde. Hierover publiceerde hij in 1999. In 2002 verscheen een tweede publicatie over het VOC-fluitschip *Stavenisse*, dat in 1686 voor de kust van Zuid-Afrika verging. In 2008 promoveerde hij aan de Universiteit Leiden op een onderzoek naar de illegale goederen- en slavenhandel op West-Afrika tijdens het achttiende-eeuwse handelsmonopolie van de West-Indische Compagnie. Hij publiceert over uiteenlopende maritiem-historische onderwerpen.

An insight in European trade networks

The commercial relationship between Amsterdam and Lisbon, 1580-1710

CÁTIA ANTUNES

INTRODUCTION

European trading networks in the Early Modern period were important mechanisms of globalisation. Bilateral socio-economic relationships between cities and especially between ports were the central factor of global interactions throughout the Early Modern world, since bilateral economic relationships were globalising agents and simultaneously the result of global decision-making processes. This essay focuses on the latter aspect by looking into the commercial relationship between Amsterdam and Lisbon in the period 1580-1710.¹

The first step toward understanding how the co-operation between Amsterdam and Lisbon grew into interdependency is to analyse the available trade routes connecting these two cities. Secondly, the geographical origin of the traded goods will show to what extent both cities could rely on each other with regard to acquiring goods missing from their own networks. As a third step, the general fluctuations in trade and what these fluctuations meant for the relationship will be discussed.

In order to understand the relationship between Amsterdam and Lisbon, we need to realise the significance of the chosen chronology. The period up to 1640 is particularly important because both the Northern Provinces of the Netherlands, by then already claiming the status of Republic of the Seven United Provinces of the Netherlands, and Portugal were under the sway of the Habsburg empire in Europe. So the first question one should ask is to which extent did the status of break-away province on behalf of the Republic, and of integral part of the Habsburg empire, on

1 The concept of historical globalisation in connection to the Amsterdam-Lisbon relations has been fully exploited in C. Antunes, *Globalisation in the Early Modern period: the economic relationship between Amsterdam and Lisbon, 1640-1705* (Amsterdam 2004) and more recently in C. Antunes, *Lisboa e Amesterdão, 1640-1705. Um caso de globalização na História Moderna* (Lisbon 2009).

behalf of Portugal, influence the economic relationship between these two ports? The second question that needs to be answered is when Portugal did break away from the Habsburg Empire in 1640, what kind of consequences did the restoration of the Portuguese independence had on the relationship with the Dutch Republic? In order to answer these questions, we will start by looking into the shipping routes shaping the commercial relationship between Amsterdam and Lisbon.

SHIPPING ROUTES

An extensive analysis of the Amsterdam notarial archives has revealed that there were four main routes to reach Lisbon. The simplest contracts disclose a direct route from Amsterdam to Lisbon and straight back, or alternatively via one other port. For example, in 1586, Herman Rodenborgh agreed with Jan Jacobsz Truts that the latter would take *De Swaert Kat* from Amsterdam to Lisbon. Skipper Truts was to load his ship with 60 *last* of barley, for which he would be given 8 *ducats* per *last* brought to Lisbon.²

The second route involved contracts that demanded a tour around different Portuguese ports. The ship had to call at Lisbon, either to unload goods, or to load a full or partial return cargo. This is illustrated by the contract signed between Jan van Groeneweg and Allert Janssen on November 7, 1594. Skipper Janssen accepted to take *Die Drie Coningen* from Amsterdam to Lisbon, calling at Porto and Viana. In the return voyage from Lisbon to Amsterdam, the ship was to call at Setubal. Different destinations imposed different costs. The cargo to be unloaded at Porto and Viana was to cost 29 *guilders* per *last*, the freight to Lisbon should not exceed 28 *guilders* per *last* and to Setubal no more than 29 *guilders* per *last*.³

The third route can be seen as a port-to-port journey. A ship left from Amsterdam, stopped at different ports on the French or Spanish Northern coasts or at English ports and then sailed to Lisbon. The use of this route reinforced contacts between Amsterdam, the Northern coasts of France and Spain, England and Lisbon by providing mechanisms of control over the inter-European Atlantic transportation system. A good example of the port-to-port journey using the French coast as a contact point is the contract between Pieter Lintgens and Gerrit Hendricxsen. Hendricxsen agreed on August 3, 1595, to take *Die Gelderse Bloem* from Amsterdam to Danzig or Königsberg, call at La Rochelle and finish his trip in Lisbon. The skipper would receive 40 *guilders* per *last* of rye and barley delivered in the different ports.⁴

2 Gemeentearchief Amsterdam (GAA), Notarieel Archief (NA), 42, 82.

3 GAA, NA, 68, 36.

4 GAA, NA, 72, 29.

The connection with Spain is obvious from contracts like the one signed on October 13, 1593. Albrecht Sijmonss Jonckheijn and Dirk Woutersss agreed to send *Die Blauwe Duijff*, equipped with eight heavy pieces of artillery of about 1600 pounds and six light pieces of artillery, to Lisbon. The crew of eight men was to take the ship first to Lisbon, then sail to S. Lucas de Barrameda and from there to Genoa, Leghorn or Venice. Woutersss would get 4 ½ *ducats* per *last* of grain delivered in Lisbon. This price increased to 5 ½ *ducats* per *last* for grain delivered at S. Lucas de Barrameda, going up to 20 ½ *ducats* in Genoa, 21 ½ *ducats* in Leghorn and 28 *ducats* in Venice.⁵

English ports were also frequented. That can be exemplified by the contract between Jeronimo Nunes da Costa and Jan Cornelisz settled on April 24, 1651. The skipper had to sail the *Den Ouder Hellrand* to Dartmouth, where he was expected to load cod from Newfoundland. The fish was to be unloaded at Lisbon after which the ship returned to Amsterdam. The total freight cost was not to exceed 2900 *guilders*.⁶

The fourth and last route was the one that connected the Baltic and Scandinavia with Lisbon. Ships were bound for the Baltic and/or Scandinavia, then on to Lisbon (without stopping at Amsterdam), and finally back to Amsterdam. This route was also used in the reverse direction. The ship could be bound for Lisbon, return straight to the Baltic and/or Scandinavia and finally arrive in Amsterdam. On November 30, 1594, Albrecht Sijmonss Jonckheijn hired Wijnout Pietersen, who was to take *Die Blauwe Haen* from Amsterdam to Riga, sail to Lisbon and Setubal, return to Danzig, Königsberg or Riga, and finish his trip in Amsterdam. The total price of the freight did not go beyond 34 ½ *guilders* per *last*.⁷ On June 13, 1659, Pieter Ellart de Weer and Jaspas Vinckell in partnership hired Jan Claesz Hil, skipper of *De Blauwe Lelij*, to go to Bergen (Norway) and from there to Lisbon. If, by any chance, the skipper could not fully load at Lisbon, then he was to complete the rest of the cargo with salt from Setubal.⁸

These four trade routes point at two different types of trade. There was the trade that connected Amsterdam and Lisbon directly, which will be referred to as bilateral hereafter, and the trade with a more inter-European character. The bilateral trade can be subdivided in the inter-urban trade solely between Amsterdam and Lisbon, and the inter-national trade involving Amsterdam-Lisbon-Portuguese ports, which can be considered as Dutch-Portuguese trade. In any case, both the inter-urban and inter-national bilateral trade had Amsterdam and Lisbon as a focal point. The products involved in the bilateral transactions were acquired throughout Amsterdam's and Lisbon's networks and re-exported at both ends of the route. The second type of

5 GAA, NA, 64, 1v. This contract specifies that the value of 1 *ducat* was equal to 11 Spanish *reals*.

6 GAA, NA, 1534, 253-254.

7 GAA, NA, 68, 79.

8 GAA, NA, 1540, 44.

trade shows a more inter-European character. The Dutch transport system was the most efficient in Europe during the seventeenth century and the Republic controlled a large section of the freight market. Not surprisingly, Amsterdam was able to connect to Lisbon in a more indirect way, by using its inter-European networks. The final goal was that products, kept in Amsterdam for transformation or re-export, could be readily sent from production outlets to the consumption markets.

The bilateral relationship and the inter-European relationship can be misleading terms for describing relationships with regard to the trade of certain goods. The fact that these contacts existed on a European level does not mean that all traded goods were of European origin.

PRODUCTS

The study of the exchanged products has led to the evaluation of three major areas of information. The origin of the products, most of the products were acquired throughout the two cities' networks, and, secondly, the strategic importance of each product in the bilateral relationship. Finally, the inter-urban network character of some of the goods and the implication hereof for the enforcement of network interdependencies.

The number of products under scrutiny is large. Often, the ships leaving Amsterdam took mixed cargoes. The combination of the loaded products was the net result of the geographical origin of each of those products. Scandinavian and Baltic products were often loaded together, either because the original contract specified a complementary freight to be taken to Lisbon, or because the merchant in Amsterdam tried to provide all the consumption goods required by Lisbon. The same procedure was followed with Dutch products or other north Atlantic goods freighted in Amsterdam but collected elsewhere in Europe.

The diversity of goods required for the continuing journey as well as the return freight was enormous. So we divide our analysis of the cargos into two different categories: European goods and colonial goods. Both categories will be considered according to their geographical origin and their weight within the general network system.

EUROPEAN PRODUCTS

The products of European origin were mainly bulk goods. They were either agricultural products or manufactures and were obtained from urban markets, hinterlands and through the European networks. The relative value of these products deter-

mined the degree of dependency Amsterdam and Lisbon had developed for their consumption. This degree of dependency had two levels. The first level was urban. The cities needed some products for the urban market and the possible lack thereof affected an area no further than the urban hinterland. The second level of dependency was on an inter-network level. Amsterdam and Lisbon used their distribution mechanisms to bring essential goods to their networks. If the supply was interrupted, the geographical impact was in this case greater. Deficiencies in supply at the second level risked destroying a network, threatening therefore the whole balance achieved by inter-network and inter-urban contacts, jeopardising the role of the city as a centre.

Horses were a major import item during periods of war.⁹ They were essential to the European cavalries by contributing to the growing success armies in European battlefields. Although horses were difficult to feed and keep, they were key elements in a war, as they were further used to maintain the logistics of the whole army, by transporting food, clothing and heavy weaponry between the main supplying zones and the front line.¹⁰

During the 1640s Lisbon became a consumption market for foreign horses. The national output of horses was too low to fulfil the needs of an ongoing war as it is clear by the order issued by the Council of War on June 21, 1641 that horses had to be imported to provide for the foreign troops operating in the country and to serve the Portuguese troops engaged in the Restoration war.¹¹

The demands of the Council of War were addressed with the help of Tristão de Mendonça Furtado, Portuguese ambassador in The Hague, and Willem Rouzé, his representative in Amsterdam. Furtado and Rouzé arranged with Pieter Trip, Claas Jansz Clopper, Gabriel Marselis de Jonge and Laurens de Geer, all prominent merchants in Amsterdam that Trip & Co was to send four hundred horses to Portugal. The contract specified that each horse cost 24 *cruzados*, and that the maintenance of the animals on board were the full responsibility of Trip & Co. The total of 9600 *cruzados* was to be paid through bills of exchange. The solvency had to be guaranteed with silver or gold payments.¹²

9 P. Edwards, *The horse trade of Tudor and Stuart England* (Cambridge 1988); D. Roche & D. Reyter (eds.), *Les écuriers du XVIe au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris 1998); G. Bankoff & S. Swart et al, *Breeds of empire: the invention of the horse in Southeast Asia and Southern Africa, 1500-1950* (Copenhagen 2007); P. Edwards, *Horse and man in Early Modern England* (London 2007).

10 Some examples of contracts mentioning trade on horses: GAA, NA, see appendix 1.

11 Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais/Torre do Tombo (IAN/TT), *Manuscritos da Livraria*, Maço 1, no. 178.

12 GAA, NA, 1555, 1353. See also: V. Rau, *A embaixada de Tristão de Mendonça Furtado e os arquivos holandeses*, *Separata Anais*, 2 serie, vol. 8 (Lisbon 1958) 128-129.

Periods of war were essential for the European horse markets. But the periods prior to conflicts were also of importance. The build up to the War of Spanish Succession during the 1690s accelerated demand. In two letters, dated March 8, 1695 and August 24, 1695, Francisco de Sousa Pacheco, Portuguese ambassador in The Hague, confirmed that two shipments of horses were to be sent to Lisbon. As a part of those shipments, private buyers, among them the king and the Marquis of Cascais had ordered respectively four and 32 horses.¹³

Amsterdam was certainly one of the larger exporters of horses, since it used its hinterland and connections with the northern German states to serve the needs of the Europeans markets. The horses were often transported with other goods to smaller regional ports and then on to Amsterdam, or, alternatively, directly to Amsterdam itself. From there, Amsterdam distributed horses all over Europe.

Weapons and ammunition were often shipped together with the horses. Amsterdam was one of the largest gateways for weaponry during the seventeenth century. The city's output was enormous, although raw materials were scarce and know-how had to be imported from other manufacturing centres, leaving the States General with enough incentive to institutionally support the production of warfare materials.¹⁴

Similar to the export of horses, weapons were especially a common item in the contracts of the 1640s, 1690s, and the 1700s.¹⁵ Amsterdam frequently exported large amounts of weapons of all calibres, as well as ammunition, gunpowder and swords. The main difference between the practices in the 1640s and those in the 1690s and 1700s was the source of the requests. In the 1640s, the king usually sent a request to the Portuguese ambassador in The Hague, who then submitted that request to the States General. The latter then authorized the Admiralty to let the weapons depart from Amsterdam. With that authorization, the ambassador contracted private merchants, who were then responsible for the loading and transportation of the weapons to Lisbon.

By the 1690s, the process was less complex. The king requested his ambassador in The Hague to acquire weapons, which he did by asking for a passport from the States General. Once obtained the passport, the ambassador would send it to the Portuguese consul in Amsterdam, usually a member of the Portuguese Jewish com-

13 IAN/TT, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Livro 798 68-69, 97-100.

14 M. Ebben, *Zilver, brood en kogels voor de koning. Kredietverlening door Portugese bankiers aan de Spaanse kroon, 1621-1665* (Leiden 1996); P. W. Klein, *De Trippen in de 17e eeuw: een studie over het ondernemersgedrag op de Hollandse stapelmarkt* (London 1999); P. Edwards, *Dealing in death: the arms trade and the British Civil wars, 38-52* (Stroud 2000); M. de Jong, 'Staat van Oorlog'. *Wapenbedrijf en militaire hervorming in de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden, 1585-1621* (Amsterdam 2005).

15 Some examples of contracts mentioning trade on weapons: GAA, NA, see appendix 1.

munity, who took the responsibility for the shipping of the weapons individually or through partnerships in Amsterdam and Lisbon.

TABLE 1 Ships sent as military aid by the States General to Portugal after request by John IV, 1641

Ships and Captains		Weaponry		
<i>Ships</i>	<i>Captains</i>	<i>Canons</i>	<i>Muskets</i>	<i>Grenades</i>
Rooden Leeuw	Vlugh	37	48	150
St. Andries	Hendrik Steuver	36	20	150
St. Martijn	Frans Touw	30	12	75
Den Engel	Gabriel Jan Slaers	28	20	75
St. Jacob	Cornelius van Vliet	26	20	75
D'Ofterhande Abraham	Gerrit Brackman	20	14	75
De Jongen Prins	Gillis Leendertsz.	24	12	50
	Jacob Peter Tolck	38	20	150
De Drie Helden	Davids Rons Cornelisz	36	24	75
De Hoop	Waznar van Rimpоз	28	12	50
Den Engel	Cornelius Evertsz. de Liefer	30	20	50
De Gouwen Leeuw	Jacob Laurensz.	25	12	50
De Neptunus	Lauwols Karchosz	20	12	50
De Haes	Michiel de Ruijter	24	12	150
De Swaen	Gerrit van Lansz	32	12	75
Den Pellicanen	Pieter Florisz.	32	12	75
Vlissingen	Pieter van Gorcum	20	12	50
Total		486	294	1425

Source: Nationaal Archief, Archief van de Staten Generaal, Lias Portugal, 7010-1, 15 August 1641.

The differences between the import requests from mid- and late-seventeenth century are better understood after reviewing the following episodes. On July 4, 1641, Tristão de Mendonça Furtado, Portuguese ambassador in The Hague and Willem Rouzé, his business advisor, agreed with Trip & Co – the same associates who had supplied him with horses and who were well known in the Republic for their involvement in the manufacturing and trade of weapons – to supply Furtado with 250.000 *guilders* worth of warfare materials. Besides the amount of free capital needed to purchase the materials Furtado wanted, Trip & Co had to meet specifications on quantity and quality, as for instance 100.000 *guilders* worth of five different types of weapons and 50.000 *guilders* worth of ammunition. Furtado and Rouzé took the risk of the shipment, and as soon as the goods were in Lisbon, Furtado had

to provide Trip & Co with a bill of exchange for 120.000 *cruzados*, to be paid later in gold or silver.¹⁶

In that same summer, on August 15, 1641 the States General issued a list of ships leaving for Lisbon with military aid. The fleet was to help John IV to keep the Portuguese independence from Spain.¹⁷

In the 1690s, diplomatic personnel played a pivotal role in the export-import of war materials. On February 7, 1694, the ambassador Pacheco wrote to the Portuguese Secretary of State, Monteiro Paim saying that the States General had refused to give him a passport for saltpetre, an essential raw material for the production of gunpowder. But the States General had been generous enough to allow him to sign a contract with someone to take 150.000 *libras* of gunpowder to Lisbon.¹⁸ This was a clear sign that, though the States General was willing to arm Portugal, it was far from willing to give up its manufacturing and export position to aid Portuguese gunpowder production by providing indispensable saltpetre.

At the beginning of the Spring that same year, Mendes de Foios Pereira, a high official at the Court in Lisbon, wrote to Pacheco, ordering him to obtain permission from the States General to send weapons to Lisbon. This permission was needed as Francisco Garcia de Lima and Henrique Venartine had the responsibility for the shipment of 15.000 *quintais*¹⁹ of gunpowder into Lisbon. A freight contract was settled with João Baptista van Bree in Amsterdam. The idea was that Pacheco would send the States General's consent to Van Bree in Amsterdam so that the latter could send the required goods to Lima and Venartine.²⁰

By 1704, Portugal was preparing for a heavy participation in the War of Spanish Succession. Pacheco wrote at the time to the Court saying that Willem Loot and the Chitty & Quintin Co had been sending weaponry to Lisbon. However, the latter was unable to send the last of 100.000 *libras* agreed upon because European demand was rapidly increasing. Therefore, Pacheco refused to allow Loot and Chitty & Quintin to send the freighted ships via England for fear that part of the cargo would be left in England.²¹

The war materials arriving at Lisbon were used in the European context, although part of the cargoes was shipped overseas to territories under Portuguese control that were active in the fight against other European powers. Ironically, Amsterdam was

selling war materials to Lisbon, which were re-exported overseas to fight the Dutch throughout the world. On January 27, 1646 for example, two ships left Lisbon heading for Brazil and calling at the Cape Verde Islands where they left twenty *quintais* of gunpowder and some weapons to provide the Portuguese forces with new supplies.²² In another instance, on March 16, 1646, the king used twenty *quintais* of gunpowder, ammunition and weapons to send to Brazil.²³ On July 7, the king issued a new order to send 4000 *cruzados*-worth of men and ammunition to Maranhão and Pará, two *capitanias* in Brazil fighting for their liberation from the Dutch.²⁴ In the autumn and winter, the king ordered the shipment of ammunition to Brazil²⁵ and of soldiers, weapons and ammunition, respectively.²⁶

A second range of products essential to both cities was timber and shipbuilding materials imported from the Baltic, Scandinavia and the German states.²⁷ Timber was in high demand in Portugal due to war and the need for shipbuilding. War called for large amounts of wood to build carts, assaulting structures and maintain the royal fleets. There were three fleets that needed to be kept. The *Carreira da Índia* fleet, which headed for Asia required systematic repairs and replacement of ships due to the heavy losses endured at the hands of the Dutch and the English. The fleets stationed or en-route to the South Atlantic were one other element in the timber trade. After the creation of the *Companhia Geral do Comércio do Brasil* John IV extended regular armed convoys to Brazil. In the difficult years of 1640-1654, when the Portuguese in Brazil tried to fight the Dutch presence in the Northeast, the Brazilian trade suffered tremendous losses and the company often needed new ships to supplement its ranks.²⁸ The king also needed wood for the European war fleet that had to maintain a constant state of readiness to defend the maritime front against North African and Turkish corsairs, English, French and Dutch privateers.

A good example of the high demand for wood is the royal request to Duarte Nunes da Costa, Portuguese consul in Amsterdam, dated July 20, 1646. He was asked to buy as much wood as he could possibly find because the king was in great need of new ships.²⁹ Another example of the importance of the wood exports is the news sent by Mendes Foios Pereira to Pacheco on October 10, 1693. Pereira informed Pacheco that the wooden planks that the latter had freighted in Amsterdam

16 GAA, NA, 1555, 1329-1331. See also: V. Rau, *A embaixada* 124-128.

17 T. H. Milo, 'Het Nederlands hulpeskader voor Portugal (1641)', *Varia Historica. Aangeboden aan Professor Doctor A. W. Byvanck ter gelegenheid van zijn zeventigste verjaardag door de historische kring te Leiden* (Assen 1954) 165-176.

18 IAN/TT, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Livro 798 31v-32.

19 One quintal equals four arrobas. Each arroba equals 15 kilograms. 1 quintal = 60 kg.

20 IAN/TT, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Caixa 814, 16 March 1694.

21 IAN/TT, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 814, 78v-79.

22 IAN/TT, Manuscritos da Livraria, 1148, 2.

23 IAN/TT, Manuscritos da Livraria, 1148, 22.

24 IAN/TT, Manuscritos da Livraria, 1148, 36.

25 IAN/TT, Manuscritos da Livraria, 1148, 46.

26 IAN/TT, Manuscritos da Livraria, 1148, 52.

27 GAA, NA, see appendix 1.

28 L. F. Costa, *O comércio do Atlântico e a Companhia Geral do Comércio do Brasil (1580-1663)* (Lisbon 2002), 2 vols.

29 IAN/TT, Manuscritos da Livraria, 1148, 35.

had arrived. The freight had been loaded on *Juffrouw Philips en Elizabeth*. The captain had bought the planks from representatives of the firm Georg Ernst Renus & Co in Scandinavia and handed them over to Herman Lann in Lisbon, who sold the wooden planks to the royal warehouses.³⁰

Obtaining a passport from the States General that allowed export of any kind of wood was a legal requirement as wood had a high strategic value for the Dutch economy since Amsterdam's shipyards (including the Zaan area) needed large supplies of timber in response to the demands of the war fleets controlled by the Admiralty, upon request of the Dutch East and West India Companies and private commercial fleets.

With increasing demand for wood in Lisbon, the call for other shipbuilding materials such as ropes, sails, anchors, navigation instruments and maps grew as well. As for wood, these materials were also in high demand by the Amsterdam shipbuilding industry. Due to this competition, exports were not always easy to organise. For example, on August 2, 1641 Tristão de Mendonça Furtado and Willem Rouzé organized a shipment of ropes and anchors to the Court.³¹

In summary, the trade in timber and shipbuilding materials was constant during 65 years. The continuous demand for these goods in Amsterdam and Lisbon caused scarcity. The States General solved the potentially harmful competition for these scarce resources by requiring passports to regulate exports.

Salt and grain were associated trades. Salt was essential to the Dutch, Baltic and Scandinavian economies since salt was vital for the Northern European fishing fleets.³² The largest export harbours of Portuguese salt were Lisbon, Setubal and Aveiro.³³ It is difficult to make a full evaluation of the salt exports from Lisbon, since the city itself did not produce any. All the production came from the surrounding areas flooded by the Tagus river. However, it seems clear that the salt from Lisbon was reserved exclusively for trade and therefore it must have been used to partly supply cargo for the ships being unloaded in the harbour.

The salt exported from Setubal or Lisbon was mainly sent to Amsterdam. After arrival, part of the imports was usually kept in the city to provide for urban con-

sumption, for re-export to the hinterland, for the Dutch fisheries, while the other part was re-exported to the Baltic and Scandinavia.

Just as salt was of extreme importance to the Northern European economies, grain was a vital item for the survival of most southern and Atlantic cities. The periods of draught in Sicily and the North African grain producing areas damaged the balance between grain production and consumption in Southern and Atlantic Europe.³⁴ Portugal was no exception since the kingdom had a history of failing grain production. Lisbon had little option but to rely on foreign imports that arrived from the North, mainly from or via Amsterdam. But even with foreign imports, Lisbon had a difficult task in controlling grain supplies, as there were several demand markets in the city, all of them relying on what came from abroad. That was the case of the urban market, encompassing the urban population and the royal entourage, and the hinterland.

The second set of demands came from the overseas markets due to the need of supplying the commercial and war fleets operating in Asia, the South Atlantic and in Europe with logistics for crews and soldiers, as well as with grain cargos to supply the colonies.³⁵

Lisbon had yet a third drain on grain imports: the army. During periods of war both the national and foreign armies had to be fed. The problem was not only the amount of grain required by the different regiments, but also the transport and distribution logistics of the supplies between the port and the front line.

Lisbon's heavy grain demands were satisfied by increasing imports from the Baltic, assuming Amsterdam the role of link between production outlets and consumption markets. In dire times, central authorities would abolish all the import taxes due on rye and barley entering the country through maritime ports for significant periods of time.³⁶

The last two European products worth mentioning are cod and cloth.³⁷ Cod from Newfoundland was popular in the Portuguese markets, being mostly re-exported by England. Internal turmoil, a transport system that could not compete with the Dutch system and several Iberian embargoes against English ships, merchants and products were the main reasons why English ports had great difficulty in bringing the cod to the Portuguese markets. The Dutch solved this problem by commanding the advantage of excellent freight contract terms and an efficient insurance system that could be used by Amsterdam's merchants to freight ships to go to Lisbon via England where cod was to be loaded. Later in the seventeenth century, with the

30 IAN/TT, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Caixa 814, 10 October 1693.

31 GAA, NA, 1555, 1391. See also: V. Rau, *A embaixada* 136-138.

32 GAA, NA, see appendix 1.

33 C. Antunes, 'The commercial relationship between Amsterdam and the Portuguese salt-exporting ports: Aveiro and Setubal, 1580-1715', *Journal of Early Modern History*, 12 (2008) 25-53; C. Antunes, 'Aveiro and Setubal, 1580-1680: competition and integration of the Portuguese salt ports in the northern European markets', *A articulação do sal português aos circuitos mundiais. Antigos e novos consumos. The articulation of Portuguese salt with worldwide routes. Port and new consumption trends* (Porto 2008) 161-182.

34 GAA, NA, see appendix 1.

35 For more information about the regulation of Portuguese war and defence fleets see: J. A. P. Ferreira, *Certas providências régias respeitantes à guarda da costa do Reino e ao comércio ultramarino no século de Quinhentos* (Porto 1967).

36 IAN/TT, Índice Geral de Leis, Livro 4, 181. Decree by king John IV, September 16, 1646.

37 GAA, NA, see appendix 1.

growing English competition in Europe, the Dutch lost part of this trade. Although it is not clear when exactly the English took over the market, at the beginning of the eighteenth century the cod trade was fully in the hands of the English.³⁸

In summary, the importance of certain European products to the trade between Amsterdam and Lisbon has been demonstrated. The complementary nature of the products provided the different networks with sufficient stability to keep up operating individually. But their individual stability did not determine the strength of the network. This strength was determined rather by their collective inter-dependency. For example, the inter-dependency between salt supplies to the Baltic and grain supplies to Lisbon did not only support the Amsterdam-Baltic network, but also the Amsterdam-Lisbon bilateral relationship. The balance and complementary needs within and between the networks provided ports their economically dominant position, by increasing their role as gateways.

COLONIAL PRODUCTS

At a first glance, Amsterdam may appear to have had a better position than Lisbon in the trade between the two cities, when only the European products are considered. However, if colonial goods are taken into account, Lisbon matched Amsterdam's exports due to the strategic value of some of these products.

There are no registers of colonial goods leaving Amsterdam heading for Lisbon. The only exception is the saltpetre, brought by the VOC ships and used to make gunpowder. Lisbon, however, exported a great deal of colonial products to Amsterdam, such as tobacco, tropical woods and sugar from Brazil and precious stones from Asia. In general, Lisbon's re-export of colonial products implied that the national market was saturated with colonial goods and thus Lisbon ensured that the rest was re-exported to other consumer markets, mainly in North and Central Europe.³⁹

Lisbon had a weak transport system, so foreign ships were indispensable for these exports. Products were often illegally exported and trade was enabled through personal partnerships and family networks. The responsibility for the transport was frequently put in the hands of captains and the deliveries in Amsterdam were strictly personal. This degree of secrecy and semi-illegality did not make either exporters in

38 Norway was also a source of codfish. However, we did not see any contracts relating the codfish production of Norway with Portugal.

39 C. Antunes, 'Sea and land: the integration of the Dutch and the Portuguese urban hinterlands in the European maritime system during the seventeenth century', in S. Cavaciocchi, *Ricchezza del mare, ricchezza dal mare secc. XIII-XVIII* (Prato 2006) 115-145.

the colonies, re-exporters in Lisbon, nor importers in Amsterdam to give up on what seems to have been a risky activity.⁴⁰

Together with this illegal or semi-legal trade in precious stones, there was also the legal trade in stones and bullion. They were often used in times of war to pay the officers of the Dutch fleets. This bullion and stones were given to Dutch officers in Lisbon and other Iberian ports to pay for their services. These products were then brought back to the main Dutch ports, including Amsterdam, where they were then exchanged for currency.⁴¹

In summary, products of European origin, being either agricultural or manufactured, mainly dictated Amsterdam's input in the trade relationship with Lisbon. This input was a direct result of Amsterdam's dominant position in the contacts between the different European networks. Lisbon had much less input in the European products, the exception being the traditional agricultural products sent to the urban market by the hinterland. Products of colonial origin were Lisbon's main input in the trade relationship. After the Dutch defeat in Brazil in 1654, Lisbon became the largest re-export port of Brazilian tobacco, wood and sugar.

The input of Lisbon in the trade relationship with Amsterdam was a risky one. Due to its dependency on the extra-European networks, factors as war, diplomacy and overseas competition could easily disrupt the balance of these networks. Such disruptions were a potential threat to Lisbon's position in Europe and often caused serious general trade deficits between the city and its European counterparts. Just as the healthy balance and complementary nature of Amsterdam's European networks were vital to keep the city's European position, so were they for Lisbon and its inter-continental partners.

SHIPPING


We turn now to the levels of shipping involved in the relationship between Amsterdam and Lisbon.

Graph 1 shows the general trend of shipping between 1580 and 1710. Looking at this representation, we can see a difference in shipping patterns before and after 1640.

40 GAA, NA, see appendix 1.

41 J. R. Bruijn, *De Admiraliteit van Amsterdam in rustige jaren, 1713-1751. Regenten en financiën, schepen en zeevarenden* (Amsterdam 1970) 74-75.

GRAPH 1 Shipping Amsterdam-Lisbon, 1580-1710



Source: GAA, NA.

1580-1640

Graph 1 suggests that shipping levels between Amsterdam and Lisbon started slowly to increase in the beginning of the 1590s, booming up to 1598. The end of the sixteenth century marks a sudden period of steep crisis and slow recoveries, being 1606 the lowest point after the slow beginning of the late 1580s. After 1609 the graph shows a recovery until 1621, though the shipping values never reached the rates of 1598. Again, after 1622, shipping levels drop dramatically and serious recovery can only be noted after the mid-1630s.

In the late 1560s several of the Spanish provinces in the Northern Netherlands revolted against the might of Philip II. The revolt developed rapidly from a local protest into an open war for complete independence from Spanish Habsburg rule. As a result, during the 1570s and the 1580s, the Northern Provinces were confronted with very serious difficulties, while the Southern Provinces, and especially Antwerp, prospered.

By 1585, however, the situation of the Republic improved significantly. The siege of Antwerp by the Spanish troops as part of the war effort against the Northern Provinces and the expansion of Protestantism drove merchants and businessmen out of the city into a Diaspora around northern European cities like Hamburg and Lübeck. The growing stabilisation of the military and economic situation in the Northern provinces allied with the opening of the urban hinterlands to the central

German states unlocked the inland waterways after 1588 allowing the Antwerp Diaspora into the ports of West Frisia, Holland and Zealand.⁴²

The opening of the inland connections and therefore the improvement of the hinterland capacity of the Dutch cities as well as the immigration of capital and skills into the Republic launched the Northern Provinces into a new age. The better economic position achieved by these developments helped to finance the war against Philip II. Besides conquering valuable terrain to Philip II's troops, Dutch rebels were able to successfully control the Schelde and the Ems rivers, imposing an effective blockade to the Flemish towns in Spanish hands.⁴³

While Philip II was counting heavy losses in the North due to the loss of territories and commercial wealth generated in the Dutch and Flemish towns, he was marking important progresses in the Southwest. After claiming the Portuguese throne in 1580, he was able to bring under the same royal administration the two largest commercial empires at the time. Both Portuguese and Spanish colonies were now in the hands of the Habsburgs.

The growth of Philip II's power in Iberia and overseas did not mean that he could afford a commercial war in two fronts. Madrid was confronted with a difficult decision. On the one hand, the maintenance of the embargo on Dutch ships and products as retaliation to the revolt of the Northern Provinces, threatened the well-being of the Flemish cities. On the other hand, the blockade imposed on English products and merchants drove Madrid into a double war front impossible to win.

Madrid faced the dilemma and chose to lift all restrictions on Dutch products, ships and merchants operating in and from Iberia, though keeping the immediate blockade and restrictions against the English. The beginning of the 1590s was therefore the turning point to the Northern Provinces. The opening of the Iberian markets to Dutch trade and merchants was to become the major reason for Dutch dominance in the first half of the seventeenth century. The attractive colonial markets of the Portuguese and Spanish ports gave the Dutch ports the opportunity to work as entrepôts. This new role as redistributors of colonial products gave the Republic the upper hand on the Baltic and the Russian trades, where the English suffered heavy losses

42 C. Lesger, *Hoorn als stedelijk knooppunt. Stedensystemen tijdens de late middeleeuwen en vroegmoderne tijd* (Hilversum 1990); C. Lesger, *Handel in Amsterdam ten tijde van de Opstand. Kooplieden, commerciële expansie en verandering in de ruimtelijke economie van Nederland, ca. 1550-ca. 1630* (Hilversum 2001); O. Gelderblom, *Zuid-Nederlandse kooplieden en de opkomst van de Amsterdamse stapelmarkt* (Hilversum 2000).

43 J. I. Israel, *Dutch primacy in the world trade, 1585-1740* (Oxford 1989) 38-79; Israel, *Empires and entrepôts: the Dutch, the Spanish monarchy and the Jews, 1585-1806* (London 1990) 135-141; Israel, 'The "New History" versus "Traditional History" in interpreting Dutch world trade primacy', in *Bijdragen en Mededelingen tot de Geschiedenis van Nederland (BMGN)* 106 (1991) 469-479.

due to the Dutch ability to trade rich colonial products by bulk cargoes. Furthermore, the de-escalation of the Dutch-Spanish conflict allowed freight prices to decrease based on lower insurance rates. The competitive advantage of Dutch products and transport system became enormous.

We may argue that Philip II's plan to intervene in France in 1590 allowed the Dutch enough room to commercially expand. They became the middlemen in the Mediterranean, the Western Atlantic ports, the Baltic and the White Sea areas.⁴⁴ But Dutch success was met with little sympathy by Philip II who decided that Iberia could not bear the burden of Dutch expansion any longer and in 1598 decided to close all the Iberian ports to Dutch traders and products by imposing a whole new set of embargos.

Philip III's decision was ill advised. Instead of forcing the Dutch back into their commercial outlets in northern Europe, the Habsburg monarchy gave an extra incentive to the Republic, whose inability to fetch high value colonial products in the Iberian markets to balance the bulk trade in the North, 'forced' an expansion loop in Asia, Africa and America, with the consequent creation of the chartered companies. Therefore, the redistribution of colonial products imported from Iberia became less important given the Dutch capacity to gather colonial products within the boundaries of its new imperial aspirations.⁴⁵

The success of the Dutch expansion overseas played against the first intentions of the Spanish crown, who attempted to cut off the Dutch rich trade supplies by isolating Dutch businessmen from the Iberian ports. When direct imports by the Dutch through the VOC and private enterprise in the Atlantic was successful, there was little Philip III could do but try to stop Dutch expansion overseas. In his view, the best way of doing that was to reopen Iberian ports to Dutch interests.

The Twelve Years Truce (1609-1621) was a prosperous period to the Dutch-Iberian trade in general, and particularly to the Amsterdam-Lisbon relations. The end of the European embargos on Dutch business came to a halt and bilateral contacts were re-established all over Iberia. If this new phase was extremely positive to Dutch entrepreneurship in Europe, they lost most of their successes in the Atlantic, especially in the Caribbean. But those losses were easily compensated by the Dutch re-entering the Iberian markets and through even more competitive freight rates. The insurance rates had fallen once more due to the truce, on the one hand, and to the slow down on the privateering campaigns by Flemish ports against Dutch ships and products, on the other hand.⁴⁶

44 M. van Tielhof, *The 'mother of all trades'. The Baltic grain trade in Amsterdam from the late 16 to the early 19 century* (Leiden 2002).

45 F. S. Gaastra, *De Geschiedenis van de VOC* (Zutphen 2002).

46 Israel, *Dutch Primacy* 80-120.

The hostilities between the Spanish Habsburg empire and the Republic resumed in 1621. The maritime blockades against Dutch business and entrepreneurs were again set in place and the Dutch returned to their policy of strict sealing off the Flemish port activities. The situation was to remain tense until the end the Peace of Westphalia and the Congress of Munster (1648).

The 1620s were marked by a general crisis. Amsterdam traded less with Lisbon given all the prohibitions imposed by Madrid, whilst the colonial empire was again threatened by a new surge of Dutch expansion in the Atlantic. However, the ports of Zeeland were also winners of the new situation created in the 1620s. While Amsterdam and Lisbon were declining steeply, Middelburg and Vlissingen were growing at the expense of the Flemish ports, once again cut from their normal functions by the blockades imposed by the Dutch war fleets. Nonetheless, Dutch fisheries were seriously cut off from the Iberian salt reserves and unable to fetch salt from the Caribbean by Spanish royal decision. Therefore, Dutch fisheries came close to ruin as did the Portuguese salt trade from Lisbon, Setubal and Aveiro.

The crisis of the 1620s in Portugal remained until after the Restoration (1640). Amsterdam, though, recovered soon after the end of the decade. With the European trading networks made expensive and sometimes inaccessible to Dutch ships and products, Dutch entrepreneurs turned their attention to traditional commercial routes, especially the ones connecting the manufacturing and commercial centres of Holland and Zeeland to the German hinterland. By the mid-1630s, the Dutch had partly recovered their European position at the expense of the war effort in central Europe, whilst the Portuguese ports were left to deal with lesser exports and a large colonial empire in dire need of military and logistic defence.

1640-1710

The commercial relationship between Amsterdam and Lisbon changed after 1640. Graph 1 shows a notably high level of trade during the 1640s because of the break with the Habsburgs, which meant that Portuguese ports were no longer under the same rule as Spanish ports and therefore all the legislation on trade restrictions and embargoes was no longer enforced.

Two main reasons explain the high level of bilateral trade during the 1640s after the Portuguese harbours opened for business: military aid and the necessity for general supplies. The demand for weapons, ammunition and horses to face a possible full-scale war against Spain increased Lisbon's demand for war supplies, mostly imported from Amsterdam. This threat also put the grain producing provinces near the Spanish border under severe pressure. The possibility of a lower grain production in those eastern provinces, combined with a historical grain deficit put Lisbon in the

position of the national supply intermediary between the European grain producing areas and the other Portuguese cities. But access to the European grain market was not fully open to the Portuguese capital. The lack of a strong merchant fleet and some difficulties in obtaining investments opened the door to fruitful co-operation with Amsterdam, which had access to the Baltic grain market and to a powerful merchant fleet that could regularly supply Lisbon and other European cities.

The prosperity of the 1640s, due to trade in military aid and grain came to a halt during the 1650s. The Congress of Munster (1648) had offered Spain and the Republic the opportunity to sign a peace treaty and to give up the Dutch-Portuguese alliance against Spain. The French put pressure on Spanish military resources by financing the revolt in Catalonia thereby postponing a full-scale Spanish invasion of Portugal, which decreased pressure on the Portuguese borders. Last but not least, the Portuguese royal effort to encourage higher levels of weapon and gunpowder production by supporting the prospecting of new mines, combined with the creation of better legislation to protect the factory of Barcarena on the outskirts of Lisbon, contributed to a decrease on the trade on weapons between both cities.

The ships loaded with grain often returned with salt, sugar, tobacco, wine, fruit, olive oil, and some highly valued Asian goods. Although the grain kept arriving, the colonial exports fell. The Portuguese-Dutch wars in Brazil had left the sugar production areas partially ruined and a slow recovery was only evident after 1654. Lisbon was obviously unable to keep up her share of exports, but Amsterdam was also in no position to maintain the export levels of the 1640s. One reason was a crisis of confidence amongst merchants and investors that spread throughout the city. Brazil was lost in 1654 and fears of a total war against Portugal meant that higher risks had to be taken in order to ship goods into Lisbon. Moreover, the all-too-common maritime wars (against England, for instance) of this decade left merchants with the feeling crisis was to ensue.

By the end of the dark 1650s, a more positive outlook emerged and the Amsterdam-Lisbon partnership revived. The signing of the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659 between Spain and France meant that Spain was free to engage in a full-scale war with Portugal. Thus the royal house needed to arm itself with arms traditionally imported from Amsterdam.

The 1660s witnessed the recovery of the import of weapons, functioning Lisbon as a bridge between Amsterdam, the producing market, and the border provinces, where the war against Spain was being fought. War in the Eastern provinces was also the reason for higher grain imports because the largest producer of grain, the province of Alentejo, had been in the path of the armies fighting the restoration wars for 20 years. Lisbon was therefore under severe strain to obtain enough grain to supply the army, the inland and urban markets, the commercial and war fleets and the colonies.

The recovery during the 1660s was linked to one other development. By 1661, it was clear that Portugal was ready to sign a permanent peace treaty with the Republic. One of the pending issues delaying comprehensive peace was the compensation demanded by the WIC for damages in Brazil. For the first time, at the highest level, the Portuguese offered four million *cruzados* in salt dues, sugar and tobacco as compensation payment. This was enough for merchants and businessmen to regain some confidence in future trade. Although the salt to be paid as WIC damage claims had to be collected at Setubal, the Amsterdam-Setubal trip often incorporated Lisbon as port of call.⁴⁷

The beginning of 1668 still bore a good omen for a prosperous future. Amsterdam was ready to increase the freights to Portugal, in general, and to Lisbon and Setubal in particular, and Lisbon was ready to recover some of the economic momentum lost during the previous decade. But, the Portuguese-Spanish peace agreement signed in 1668 brought a decade of recovery to an end. The end of the war with Spain meant that Lisbon did not need as many warfare imports from Amsterdam as before.

During the early 1670s the European balance between Spain, France and England came to an end. In 1672, French armies invaded a large territory in the Low Countries, including several provinces and cities of The Netherlands. The year was known in Dutch history as 'the year of disaster'. Amsterdam was not invaded, but all the disruption in the hinterland and the permanent threat of occupation left the city leaders in a difficult position. The relationship between Amsterdam and Lisbon was not to improve before the end of the war in 1678.

In Lisbon, the difficulties of trade with Amsterdam were also felt. Ships were arriving only sporadically in the beginning of the 1670s and there was only some recovery in the end of the decade. This recovery was mainly the consequence of the Dutch ability to slowly drive the French lines further away from the big cities.

The military disturbances around Amsterdam and king Peter II's mercantilist laws to sponsor national textile industry were enough to keep Amsterdam's and Lisbon's trade partnership in abeyance. The salt dues to compensate the WIC were not enough to prevent a period of crisis.

Even though quite serious, the crisis during the 1670s did not reach the enormous proportions of that in the 1650s. The main difference between the two crises was that in the 1670s the disturbances in the partnership were of external origin,

47 IAN/TT, Núcleo Antigo, 897, Maço 3, no. 5, 9; See also: J. F. B. de Castro, *Collecção dos tratados, convenções, contratos e actos públicos entre a coroa de Portugal e as mais potencias desde 1640 até ao presente*, vol. 1 (Lisbon 1856) 260-293. Peace treaty signed between Afonso VI and the States General, signed in The Hague on August, 6, 1661, by the Portuguese ambassador in The Hague, Henrique de Sousa Tavares, Count of Miranda, and rectified by the regent Queen on May, 24, 1662.

while the troubles in the 1650s were directly linked to the Dutch-Portuguese 'Cold War' attitude.

The recovery during the 1680s was based on the salt payments agreed upon between the Portuguese king and the States General that were to be collected from Setubal, though the original freights were often first bound for Lisbon. The Portuguese capital also profited from this salt trade with Setubal, since the salt payments allowed all sorts of goods to arrive in Lisbon via the convoy system. Olive oil, fruit, wine, cork and wool were slowly making their way to the North, joined by the tobacco, sugar, Brazilian wood and precious stones. In the opposite direction, Amsterdam provided grain, wood, weaponry, and luxury textiles.

The breaking out of the Nine Years' War in 1689 brought serious threats to the Amsterdam-Lisbon relationship because political and maritime powers in Europe were as divided as ever. However, the Amsterdam-Lisbon relationship was hardly affected. Portugal remained neutral and harbours were kept opened for trade.

After the crisis of the 1670s, the Amsterdam-Lisbon trade was to grow for at least another twenty years. The recovery from the crisis during the 1680s was soon followed by a period of slow but steady growth, which culminated in an explosive increase during the first decade of the eighteenth century. The extreme growth of trade in the beginning of the eighteenth century had two origins. Firstly, Europe's resumption of war. The prelude to the War of Spanish Succession as well as the first years of the war was extraordinarily beneficial for the Amsterdam-Lisbon contacts. Ships were loaded with war materials, soldiers, and supplies and then sent to Lisbon to help the Portuguese to organise the deployment of an allied army by the Spanish border. The ships were loaded for the return journey with an increasing amount of colonial goods such as sugar, tobacco and tropical woods, but also with large amounts of nationally produced raw materials such as cork and wool.

A second reason for the commercial explosion during the beginning of the eighteenth century was the Treaty of Methuen.⁴⁸ Originally signed with England in 1703, it soon became a diplomatic weapon in the hands of the States General. By the end of 1704, the Dutch had also obtained their Methuen.⁴⁹ The economic implications of the Treaty of Methuen were enormous. England and the Republic agreed to import

48 IAN/TT, Manuscritos da Livraria, 234, s/f; See also: J. F. B. de Castro, *Collecção dos tratados, convenções, contratos e actos publicos celebrados entre a coroa de Portugal e as mais potencias desde 1640 até ao presente*, vol.2 (Lisbon 1856), s/p. Commercial treaty between Peter II, king of Portugal, and Anne, Queen of England.

49 IAN/TT, Núcleo Antigo, 897, Maço 3, no. 5, 11; See also: J. F. B. de Castro, *Collecção dos tratados, convenções, contratos e actos publicos celebrados entre a coroa de Portugal e as mais potencias desde 1640 até ao presente*, vol.2 (Lisbon 1856), s/p. Treaty on the export of Dutch cloth and Portuguese wines, signed in Lisbon by Roque Monteiro Paim, aid of the Queen regent, Catharine of England, and the States General, ratified in The Hague on November, 20, 1705.

Portuguese wine, reducing the taxes on the import of this product by one-third and Portugal, in return, agreed to open all harbours to northern textile exports.

In summary, the number of ships leaving Amsterdam to go to Lisbon fluctuated depending on the general political, economic and military situation in Europe. Periods of war were, in this case, quite favourable for the Amsterdam-Lisbon bilateral trade relationship. However, periods of bilateral unrest influenced the way Amsterdam and Lisbon conducted business, trade being one of the reflections of that business relationship.

CONCLUSION

The study of bilateral relationships is important to understand the way trade networks operated throughout history. This article has showed that the development of the commercial relationship between Amsterdam and Lisbon was conditioned by the decision-making processes of political and military authorities. These decisions had a heavy impact on the fluctuation of trade, the routes chosen and the products traded by individual merchants.

We were able to see that the Dutch and Portuguese temporary inclusion in the Habsburg Empire was not as damaging as one might expect. Although Madrid's decisions were often taken according to the needs of the empire, Amsterdam and Lisbon were able to profit from those decisions, even when they were in principle against Dutch and Portuguese interests.

Dutch and Portuguese independence were only recognised in 1648 and 1668, respectively. However, it is clear that after the declaration of the Portuguese independence in 1640, the United Provinces and Portugal were forced to solve their quarrels and negotiate their loyalties outside the Habsburg framework. This negotiation was not always easy. Although Amsterdam and the United Provinces were willing to compromise, considering the potential presented by direct access to the Portuguese overseas empire, European competition, headed by England and France tried by all means capture for itself what the Dutch had achieved. Lisbon, Portugal and the overseas empire were one of the many areas of influence to be disputed during the second half of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century. After the end of the War of Spanish Succession, Amsterdam and the Dutch had lost their advantage in almost all the European trading networks and their winnings overseas were being heavily disputed by English and French commercial and war fleets. Lisbon, Portugal and the overseas empire ended up falling under the sphere of influence of London.

APPENDIX 1

List of notarial deeds used for the completion of this article about the transaction of specific products, available at GAA (Gemeentearchief Amsterdam), collection NA (Notarial Archives).

Products	Notarial Book	Date	Products	Notarial Book	Date
Horses	1555B	22-05-1642	Grain	216	21-10-1620
	1531	28-06-1647		674	17-02-1637
	1536	24-10-1653		676	25-11-1637
	1540	11-10-1660		677	05-03-1638
	7157	05-10-1703		677	08-03-1638
Weapons	1498	07-11-1638	Tobacco	701	09-09-1636
	1571	06-05-1643		1989	22-03-1645
	1569	18-12-1642		1530	01-10-1646
	2188B	02-10-1649		1535	01-08-1651
	5873	30-12-1699		1536	24-10-1653
	2941	06-09-1701		1539	31-08-1657
	3352	01-10-1701		1127	12-11-1658
	5291	26-02-1703		1543	18-02-1666
	2943	12-11-1704		6562	06-10-1701
	4203	27-02-1705		5887	31-01-1703
Wood	6029	04-09-1705	Sugar	646A	04-05-1623
	165	22-09-1620		640	08-03-1634
	216	26-10-1620		732A	05-02-1641
	220	22-04-1623		2993	14-09-1661
	646B	18-04-1624		5880	19-05-1701
	762	28-03-1635		3351	09-06-1701
	671	17-10-1635		4986	15-10-1701
	1588	26-03-1645		6565	01-02-1703
	1989	23-03-1649		646B	09-03-1624
	1589	04-11-1651		634	12-04-1627
	1538	27-07-1655		941	09-01-1631
	1537	02-03-1657		408	05-10-1633
	1540	03-08-1660		640	08-03-1634
	5287	27-04-1701		1051	06-12-1638
	5290	28-07-1702		1528	18-03-1644
	7274	09-07-1703		1077	07-11-1645
	5296	08-08-1705		2191	14-09-1651

Products	Notarial Book	Date	Products	Notarial Book	Date
Shipbuilding materials	160	07-02-1620	Precious Stones	1536	21-02-1653
	155	28-07-1620		1537	27-05-1654
	164	27-08-1620		2993	14-09-1661
	1569	07-05-1642		2219A	06-07-1665
	2188B	02-10-1649		2250A	22-09-1676
	2902	18-09-1670		5293	27-02-1704
	3352	01-10-1701		3235	23-09-1678
	6869	16-01-1704		3686	09-05-1680
	3364	17-09-1704		3692	21-08-1684
	3367	19-09-1705		3225	14-03-1695
Salt	677	13-11-1637	Tropical Wood	6006	27-04-1699
	1053	04-11-1638		2943	08-01-1704
	1576	24-07-1641		6026	10-10-1704
	1531	28-06-1647		408	05-10-1633
	1989	15-12-1651		1537	06-07-1655
	1536	23-03-1654		2993	14-09-1661
	3225	06-06-1676		2791	15-10-1669
	5287	27-04-1701		3352	01-10-1701
	6903	27-05-1701		3358	11-02-1702
	5292	09-07-1703		6564	23-11-1702
	7276	14-07-1704		5296	06-08-1705
	5897	03-08-1705			

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