Talin Suciyan. Outcasting Armenians: Tanzimat of the provinces.

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defining element of Jewish identity. Saposnik writes that, for Ben-Gurion, Jewish wandering "had come to a close in one dramatic moment" (71) with the creation of Israel. It would have been interesting to delve deeper into the potential tension between the concept of incomplete redemption and articulations or redemption around the establishment of the state.

The intricacies of the relationship between redemptive ideas and land are evident also in a section dedicated to the Jewish Territorial Organization (ITO), founded in 1905 to find areas for Jewish settlement outside of Palestine. The ITO's leader, Israel Zangwill (formerly a Zionist), condemned Zionist settlement efforts in Palestine as unrealistic because of the Arab presence there. He also cautioned that due to the deep historical significance of Palestine for the Jews, settling the land would strengthen clerical forces in Judaism. The ITO defined its own redemptive aspirations as focused on the future, in contrast to the Zionist fixation on Palestine and subjugation to the past. The ITO, however, perceived its activities not only in pragmatic and instrumental terms and sought historical and cultural justifications for settlement schemes in regions like Mesopotamia and North Africa. Moreover, while Zangwill warned about the dangers of Jewish connection to Palestine, his critique confirmed the tenacity of that connection, although he was no longer a Zionist.

The discourse of redemption was central also to interactions between Zionism and non-Jewish actors. Zionist accounts ascribed redemptive qualities to the Balfour Declaration of 1917, in which Britain endorsed the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jews, and to the British conquest of Palestine at the end of World War I. One writer described the declaration as "a vision of the end of days" (124), and the Zionist movement declared a "Week of Redemption" and a "Redemption Day" to mark the transforming events. While some writers warned that Jews in Palestine might become tools of British imperialism, Zionist leader and writer Nahum Sokolow saw an intimate link between Zionist redemption and the redemptive intervention of British imperialism, which, he thought, would bring enlightenment and civilization to the degenerate Middle East. Sokolow spoke of those developments in universal terms of progress and human dignity, but it is not reported if he considered that the Palestinian Arabs viewed the Balfour Declaration as an injustice.

The events surrounding World War I demonstrate the intertwining of the political and religious spheres, as some in the Yishuv understood the transition from Ottoman to British rule as a deliverance from Muslim yoke for both Christians and Jews. Another expression of this intertwining was during the Zionist-Palestinian conflict over the Western Wall/al-Buraq in Jerusalem in 1928–1929, when Zionist writers and activists endowed the religious holy site with a new national meaning. After Israel gained control of the wall in 1967, it became the focus of an even more militarized version of redemption. In that connection, Saposnik importantly departs from earlier studies that emphasized Zionism's rejection of Jewish religious traditions, shedding light instead on the dialogue and blurred boundaries between old and new traditions.

Zionist images of redemption examined in this book grew out of a profound sense of crisis stemming from the rejection of Jews by European societies and the decline of religion as an all-encompassing meaning system among many European Jews. Based in early twenty-first-century Israel, Saposnik, too, seems to be motivated by a certain sense of crisis. He hopes that Zionism—or Israel—will overcome the forces threatening to turn it into exclusionary, internationally isolated, "militant chauvinism" (208), and rediscover within itself those redemptive visions aspiring for freedom, dignity, and humanity.

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Talin Suciyan. *Outcasting Armenians: Tanzimat of the Provinces*. Syracuse University Press, 2023. Pp. 304. Paper $34.95.

Talin Suciyan's book *Outcasting Armenians* challenges progressive and affirmative characteristics ascribed to the Tanzimat, such as reform and modernization, and focuses instead on how it repressed Armenians in southeastern and eastern Anatolia. This is a very welcome study. It revises our understanding of how areas populated by Kurds, Armenians, Syriacs, Assyrians, Chaldeans, and Rum interacted with the Tanzimat. It makes an important contribution to the fields of Ottoman and Armenian studies, and to how we understand the Tanzimat's effects on local, marginalized people, using petitions and other legal documents from the archives of the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople housed in the Nubar Library in Paris.

The rich details of daily life in local inhabitants' encounters with the Tanzimat, especially in the book's third and fourth chapters, demonstrate the—Suciyan would say purposeful—inability of the Tanzimat to alleviate Armenians' everyday oppression. The book shows how Armenians navigated local and central power structures, attempting to call on central authorities to mitigate oppression at the hands of local elites. Thus, how Armenians coped with the state's settlement of Circassians in or near their villages while experiencing severe economic hardship—evidenced by men's internal and international migration—illuminates the daily threats facing Armenians outside of Istanbul. What makes their stories especially poignant is their eventual destruction a few decades later.

Suciyan's "bottom-up historiography" (7) of centralization is therefore necessary while reminding the reader of the eventual Armenian Genocide.

But this does not render the genocide inevitable. It is the richness of the detail in Suciyan's records that undermines her argument that the Tanzimat not only hardened oppression toward Armenians but also helped lead to the genocide (175). Focusing on how the Tanzimat hardened oppression toward Armenians risks overshadowing not only the importance of how Armenians practiced the Tanzimat but also, as scholars such as Bedross Der Matossian show, larger moments of faith in revolution and constitutionalism—even in their ambiguities and failures.

An overarching argument of Suciyan's work is how the Tanzimat on purpose made Armenians "the weakest and most 'fragile' millet" (174). The Tanzimat reforms, she contends, brought the provinces under Istanbul's "temporal" control; its "methods of synchronization" destroyed "different temporalities and different methods of governance," further oppressing Armenians (3–4). Suciyan, however, does not explain how or why Kurds, Syriacs, Assyrians, Chaldeans, and Rum were not marginalized similarly. In addition, framing the Tanzimat as a uniforming vehicle that resulted in new forms of oppression stands at odds with the work of Masyuki Ueno and others who have invoked the Tanzimat's pluralization, and argued that subjects interpreted and utilized its languages and principles for their own gain.

I am in no way doubting the oppression experienced by Armenians in the provinces. But I wonder about the singularity of the oppressive experience that Suciyan seems to maintain throughout the book. For example, Suciyan profiles a woman from Evkere called Güldane, who wrote an impassioned petition to the Armenian patriarch in Istanbul. She wanted to annul her marriage to Krikor, who had abandoned her some ten years prior, so that her new relationship could be recognized as a legal marriage. It is unclear if the petition was ever answered. For Suciyan, this petition is "another proof of the impossibility of living in the villages of the provinces as a destitute woman." While Suciyan points to the increasing migration of women from the provinces to work in the cities in the west of the empire as one such indicator, I wonder what other readings might tell us. While Güldane is indeed destitute, she did practice the Tanzimat. Even Suciyan called her petition "powerful," mentioning the local signatories who testified to save Güldane's life (162). Was this not, therefore, an empowering petition? And did her practice not likewise contest social, sectarian, and patriarchal norms? Or would that have only been the case if these—social, patriarchal, and sectarian—institutions had ruled in her favor?

Suciyan successfully demonstrates how the Tanzimat offered new, additional methods of governance. But the fascinating case studies she provides do not quite indicate a difference of temporality of the provinces, but rather, issues of class. Yes, Kurdish *beg*s used the 1858 Land Code to appropriate and register lands that Armenians had formerly cultivated. But was it that they were Kurdish that enabled them to do so, or was it because they were *beg*s? Since the "the surge of complaints" that Suciyan mentions (63) were made by Armenians protesting these appropriations, can't this also be seen as consistent with how subjects throughout the empire participated in the Tanzimat? If so, how does this stand against Suciyan's argument that the Tanzimat denied the "coevalness of Armenians living in the provinces vis-à-vis the Ottoman and Armenian administrations of the capital" (63)?

By drawing from other works that discuss how class intersected with the 1858 Land Code, such as in Ottoman Palestine, where informal peasant landownership declined; in Amman, where the arrival of Circassian refuges led to the rise of "refugee elites"; or in Iraq, where the power of local tribal shaykhs declined, Suciyan could have connected the experiences of Armenians with other (unintentional) counterproductive examples of the Tanzimat. How Suciyan's Armenians used the language of the Tanzimat to assert themselves made them coeval with a wide variety of other Ottoman subjects including other peasants and other non-Muslims like Sephardi Jews. Yes, Suciyan's evidence convincingly challenges the sincerity of the Reform Edict's principles of equality, but she also demonstrates that Armenians were as pragmatic as other nonmajority groups. They preferred to petition the central authorities rather than local power elites, and all attempted to manage the "language" of the reforms to their benefit. That they were unsuccessful is neither surprising nor evidence of governmental intention. As subjects reoriented themselves and remade their relationship with the Ottoman authorities, they all also continued to be subject to the whims of Ottoman state authority, which continued to hold the ultimate monopoly of power.

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Michelle Tusan. *The Last Treaty: Lausanne and the End of the First World War in the Middle East*. Cambridge University Press, 2023. Pp. 348. Cloth $39.99.

During approximately the last 175 years, humanitarian groups have raced around the world trying to help civilian populations ravaged by war and other disasters. That this has become an accepted practice highlights one of the paradoxes of modern humanitarianism: Why does the world allow for the existence of