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
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First-hand experience: a Polybian motif in nineteenth-century German historiography

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ABSTRACT

How important is it for historians to have first-hand experience of political or military affairs? Up until the eighteenth century, historians often followed Polybius in welcoming experience in public affairs as advantageous to understanding the intricacies of military practice and political decision-making. But what happened to this 'Polybian motif' in an age of professionalization, when students of history could no longer be expected to have gained prior experience in politics or the military? In exploring this question, the article focuses on military history in nineteenth-century Germany, where academic historians were sometimes strongly criticized for lacking military experience. Did the prevalence of this criticism indicate a need for historians to possess first-hand experience, at least in military matters? The article argues that the appeal to first-hand experience can be better understood as a form of boundary work, exercised by military officers intent on maintaining the authority of the Historical Section of the Great General Staff on all matters military. Their use of the Polybian motif against civilian historians was more polemical than functional. It was used to attack authors, not to impose standards. Consequently, the persistence of the Polybian motif was primarily a rhetorical one.

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Introduction

In 1822, the German historian and Prussian emissary to the Vatican, Barthold Georg Niebuhr, hired Franz Lieber as his private secretary and tutor for his five-year-old son, Marcus.¹ Taking advantage of his proximity to a scholar of great renown, Lieber, a talented young man with wide-ranging interests,² made notes of almost all of their conversations, publishing them in book form after Niebuhr's death. Was it surprising that these exchanges repeatedly turned to issues of military history? Despite his tender age, Lieber had fought in the Battle of Waterloo as well as in Greece, where he had joined the 1821 uprising against the Ottomans.³ So, when he heard Niebuhr, the author of a *Römische Geschichte* (Roman History, 2 vols., 1811–12), complain that people were

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writing histories of ancient Rome without having first-hand political experience – ‘No one can write a history of this great people without being a statesman, and a practical one too’ – Lieber seized the opportunity to ask whether military history writing, likewise, required military experience.⁴ Niebuhr answered:

Roman history can be understood by a statesman who is not a general, but not by a general who is no statesman; for it is the growth of the law which constitutes the essential part of Roman history. Military knowledge, in a considerable degree, is always necessary, I admit; but then this may be obtained without one’s being necessarily a soldier.⁵

This was an interestingly ambiguous answer. On the one hand, it repeated the time-honoured argument, most famously made by Polybius in the second century BCE, that historians must have participated in public affairs to understand the intricacies and dilemmas of political decision-making.⁶ Around 1800, this argument still had the status of a commonplace both within and outside the German historiographical tradition. Edward Gibbon, for one, claimed that ‘the eight sessions that I sat in parliament’ had been ‘a school of civil prudence’, adding that his military experience, too, had been indispensable for his historical work (‘The captain of the Hampshire grenadiers . . . has not been useless to the historian of the Roman empire’).⁷ A great admirer of Gibbon, Niebuhr made a similar point in declaring that one has ‘to know civil life by personal observation in order to understand such states as those of antiquity’.⁸ On the other hand, Niebuhr seemed to regard military knowledge as of a different order: he apparently did not believe that historians must have entered the battlefield themselves to be able to understand military strategy or tactics. Did this proviso stem from Niebuhr’s own failed attempts to join the Prussian armed forces in 1813?⁹ Or did it reflect an understanding of history-writing in which sources of the kind that Niebuhr tirelessly collected during his years in Italy were acquiring greater epistemological weight than personal experience?¹⁰

While Niebuhr, in the early decades of the nineteenth century, still insisted on the need for both ‘strenuous research and knowledge gained in the most diverse variety of matters and affairs’,¹¹ there is reason to assume that the second requirement lost much of its force with the establishment of an academic historical profession in Germany in the mid-nineteenth century.¹² How could 18-year-old students of history, enrolled in university study right after their *Gymnasium Abitur*, be expected to have obtained first-hand experience of practical affairs? Or how could *Privatdozenten* hoping to secure a professorial appointment immerse themselves in political life with an academic system that forced them to focus on research and teaching? After the mid-nineteenth century, careers like that of Hartwig Floto, who was a family tutor and served a stint in the military before becoming Jacob Burckhardt’s successor as professor of history in Basel, became highly exceptional.¹³ Nonetheless, the ‘Polybian motif’, as we call it, disappeared neither from historians’ own discourse nor from the repertoire of arguments that critics of historical professionalism drew upon. As late as the 1890s, there were voices claiming that ‘the legal historian can afford to lack a sense of law just as little as the art historian can lack artistic sense’, with others maintaining ‘that military-political education and experience are the best training [*Vorbildung*] for those with a talent for writing history’.¹⁴ Moreover, when border conflicts between history and neighbouring fields touched on issues of competence – to what extent were historians able to write a history of Prussia’s wars? – the Polybian motif was seldom far away. Military officers in particular continued

to remind civilian historians that training in historical exercises (*historische Übungen*) was not sufficient for understanding the intricacies of military strategy. All this is strongly reminiscent of the ancient historian's categorical claim:

It is impossible for someone with no experience of the business of war to write well on military operations, or for someone with no experience in political trials and tribulations to write well on politics. And when history is written by the book-learned, without experience or liveliness, the work loses all its value.¹⁵

If this article examines how, where and why the 'Polybian motif' persisted in nineteenth-century Germany, it does so against the background of an early-modern tradition of Polybius-inspired musings on the value of first-hand experience. As Arnaldo Momigliano and others have shown, humanist scholars in Italy and Northern Europe alike had admired Polybius as a military historian whose strategic insights some scholars had even believed to be applicable to early-modern warfare.¹⁶ These insights, in turn, had almost invariably been attributed to Polybius' *empeiria* (experience) and impatience with armchair scholarship as practised by Timaeus.¹⁷ When nineteenth-century authors praised 'Polybius' military gaze', 'the wealth of his political and military experience' or his 'free and broad view of military conditions', and counted him among 'the most informed professionals in the tactics and soldiering of their age', they kept this early-modern trope alive.¹⁸ For them just as for humanists in earlier centuries, Polybius' name signified the confident judgement afforded by first-hand experience, similar to how Ranke's name around mid-century became shorthand for 'objective' history writing.¹⁹ The opposite, however, was not the case: authors could lament the blindness of philologists lacking military experience without invoking Polybius.²⁰ In an age that saw classical historiographical models (Thucydides, Tacitus) gradually giving way to modern ones (Niebuhr, Ranke, Theodor Mommsen), this was perhaps unsurprising.²¹ However, even if direct references to Polybius became rare – 'Polybian motif' was not an actor's category – the idea that first-hand experience was needed for writing military history persisted.

Mapping this persistence in nineteenth-century Germany is not an end in itself: it allows us to contribute to recent discussions of scholarly personae in nineteenth-century historiography.²² 'Personae' is a technical term, introduced by Lorraine Daston and Otto Sibum, for models of how to be a scholar (a historian, in our case).²³ In nineteenth-century Europe, such models were usually described in terms of virtues such as objectivity, precision, loyalty and patriotism. A good historian was said to be capable of dispassionate analysis, meticulous source criticism, inspiring lecturing or patriotic enthusiasm – with scholars and non-scholars alike engaging in ongoing debate about the relative importance of these qualities.²⁴ While historiographical research on this virtue discourse has done much to enhance our understanding of the demands that nineteenth-century historians had to meet, it is important to keep in mind that virtues were not all that mattered. Technical skills, such as foreign-language reading proficiency and palaeographic competency, also were essential for anyone aspiring to a career in historical studies. In addition, political orientation and religious affiliation often significantly affected historians' standing among their peers and chances of career advancement.²⁵ It is in this context that this article draws attention to yet another, so far understudied, factor: the value assigned to first-hand experience of life outside of the university. What happened to this Polybian motif in an age of professionalization? If military officers

continued to criticize academic historians for being inexperienced in military matters, did the prevalence of this criticism indicate a need for historians to possess first-hand experience, at least in technical matters, in addition to virtues, skills and a political-confessional profile compatible with the preferences of their employers? Or was there something different at stake in these polemics?

Germany is an appropriate case study for exploring this question, not because the country led the way in professionalizing historical scholarship (as older studies liked to say), but rather because the institutionalization of historical studies in nineteenth-century German universities prompted fierce debate about historians' responsibilities, the persona of the *Wissenschaftler*, and the boundaries of the historical discipline.²⁶ As we shall see, it was mostly within boundary disputes of this kind that the Polybian motif proved useful, especially to military historians, who in Germany usually worked outside of the academic world. In addition, it so happens that nineteenth-century German examples feature prominently in the existing literature on scholarly personae, virtues and vices.²⁷ To compare the demand for first-hand experience with the well-documented expectation that historians be honest, impartial and loyal to their country, it is helpful to stay with Niebuhr, Ranke, Mommsen and their fellow countrymen.

The value of experience: Gustav Köhler vs. Arnold Busson

We begin with a case study to show what the discourse of first-hand experience looked like in practice. In 1880, the German-Austrian historian Arnold Busson, who at the time held a chair at Innsbruck, triggered the anger of a high-ranking Prussian officer, Lieutenant General Gustav Köhler. The reason was a study of the Battle on the Marchfeld (1278) in which Busson dared to point out the poor evidential base of some of the existing literature on the topic. Like his former teachers Georg Waitz and Julius Ficker, both of whom were known for their meticulous primary-source research, Busson believed that historical knowledge should be based on a 'thorough examination of source material'.²⁸ This standard, typical for the ethos of the emerging historical discipline in nineteenth-century Europe, made him dismissive not only of the work of self-trained historians like Ludwig Schmid, but also of a recent article by Köhler, with which Busson declared himself 'to disagree in matters of source criticism'.²⁹ Throughout the article, the Innsbruck historian described Köhler's claims regarding the battle as 'erroneous', 'not warranted' or 'merely conjectural'.³⁰ Other typical comments were 'not handed down', 'reported nowhere', 'is not in the sources', 'not reported in any source' and 'cannot be proven in any way from the sources'.³¹ On top of that, Busson criticized Köhler's lack of appreciation for the different kinds of sources he was working with, while questioning the legitimacy of some of the inferences that Köhler had drawn from the material.³² All this culminated in a principled rejection of Köhler's attempt to reconstruct the course of the battle:

At the risk of becoming too detailed, I have dwelled on these details to show that Köhler, too, did not succeed in solving the task he set for himself, namely to outline in detail the course of the battle at Dürnkrut. Our source material is not sufficient for this, and according to my view of the tasks of critical historical research, there is nothing left but to admit with resignation that we are unable to infer from the available sources [*der vorhandenen Überlieferung*] an image of the order of battle of the two armies and the course of the battle itself that can claim to be 'historical'.³³

Köhler's answer did not take long. To some extent, the Prussian officer was prepared to accept Busson's research standards, judging by his argument that the *Chronicon Colmariense*, on which he had heavily relied, was more trustworthy than his opponent had acknowledged. The overall tone of his rejoinder, however, was one of outright dissatisfaction with Busson's *Resultatlosigkeit* (lack of results).³⁴ If Busson's 'very strict source criticism' forced him to profess ignorance about the actual state of affairs at the Marchfeld battlefield, then this was clear proof that historians needed more than philological competence. What Busson lacked, in Köhler's eyes, was military experience: 'Anyone who has not learned to feel militarily what is right or wrong cannot follow the course of a battle. It would be difficult for Busson to do so for any other battle.'³⁵ Köhler, in other words, did not deny the importance of source criticism but maintained, pace Busson, that *militärisch empfinden* was essential for determining the plausibility of historical accounts and for inferring from them the most likely course of battle.

In the course of the ensuing controversy,³⁶ this Polybian motif played a central role. Although Busson, in response to Köhler, argued that 'the differences existing between us have nothing to do with military experience', he felt compelled to add that such experience was not nearly as important as professional source criticism:

Incidentally, this deficiency, which most colleagues share with me, is not that bad. Just like me, the trained soldier who deals with the Battle of Dürnkrut will have to get as much clarity as possible from the sources about the course of events. In general, the chance that the trained historian will be superior to the soldier in criticizing and using these sources will richly compensate for the advantage that the soldier claims to have because he has learned to feel militarily what is right and wrong.³⁷

This set off a chain of further accusations, with Köhler challenging Busson's priorities on the ground that one cannot assess the historical reliability of sources pertaining to warfare without some basic 'military understanding' and Busson, in turn, taking recourse to the methodological standards of his profession (though not without noting, somewhat annoyed, that an 'accusation made by a high-ranking military officer against a civilian' was likely to impress many readers – a remark testifying to the high standing of military officers in German and Austrian society).³⁸ Interestingly, what Köhler took away from the controversy was that he had proven his point. In the third volume (1887) of his handbook on medieval military history, he stated self-assuredly: 'As I already pointed out to Busson, . . . military understanding is absolutely necessary for source criticism of war-related events.'³⁹ Köhler even seized the opportunity to level the same charge at other historians, such as Charles Oman, the future Chichele Professor of Modern History at Oxford, who had dared to criticize Köhler's 'tactical deductions' and 'proneness to go beyond his authorities in drawing conclusions.'⁴⁰ Köhler retorted: 'Since I was in active service for 41 years, have experience of war and the benefit of extensive study of military history, against which Mr Oman can bring to bear absolutely nothing but his own prejudice, I believe that the reader's trust will be my way inclined.'⁴¹

So, despite Niebuhr's assurance in the 1820s that first-hand military experience was not required for historians, Köhler kept insisting that it took 'military understanding' and an 'ability to imagine oneself in the combat situation' to write the history of warfare.⁴² Apparently, in matters military, the Polybian motif had not yet disappeared. First-hand experience of war could still be presented as a prerequisite for an insightful treatment of

military history. But there were other, specific reasons why the military establishment of Köhler's age valued historical studies written by officers, and why they had a comparatively low opinion of military history produced by civilian scholars like Busson and Oman.

Why the importance of military experience?

Traditionally, the study of past wars was the domain of professional soldiers. In the intellectual world of nineteenth-century Germany, military history was seen as an integral part of military science, not as a subfield of history.⁴³ Officers laid claim to this part of the past, not out of dogmatic adherence to Polybius' methodological prescriptions, but out of a need for useful knowledge and educational material.⁴⁴ Military history provided an apparatus of relevant examples and principles to supplement personal experience of contemporary warfare. Military thinkers stressed that a well-rounded training for officers required a combination of both. In times of peace, however, when battlefield experience could not be obtained, history's importance as a teaching tool proportionally grew. The second-best way to learn the soldier's art was through the study of military history, 'the master teacher, which works not with theory but only with the power of actual events.'⁴⁵ Since 1824, the official home of military-historical research in Prussia was therefore the Historical Section of the Great General Staff (GGS), renamed the *Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung* (War History Section, hereafter KA) in 1871.

The role of military history in officer training determined the way it was conducted by the KA. Firstly, it had to provide practical lessons for a modern military. This meant it had to insist on the universality of decisive factors – the 'laws' of historical warfare – to demonstrate the continued relevance of past military methods to the challenges of the present, even if that meant ignoring or glossing over historical realities.⁴⁶ Secondly, it had to combine these universal principles in definitive accounts of historical warfare that would persuade both officers and lay readers of the correctness of GGS analysis and the resulting strategic and tactical doctrine. This was essential both to train reliable proponents of that doctrine, and to assure wider audiences that the country was in safe hands as long as the GGS managed its wars.⁴⁷ These demands on staff military history incentivized officers to promulgate the view that only trained professionals like themselves could have a true understanding of the subject – indeed, that the experienced soldier's understanding of warfare in history was intuitive, based on his exposure to and familiarity with the universal principles of war. By the same token, the purpose of KA historical work predisposed officers to reject parallel efforts by civilian scholars. The core tenets of historicism undermined the usefulness of lessons from military history. Worse, any academic challenge to the KA's conclusions might threaten the absolute authority of the GGS on military matters. The purposes of scholars of military history within and outside the armed forces were in direct conflict. If a civilian historian wrote anything about war, and especially about the periods and wars that were of particular interest to the KA, officers could not afford to set it aside as a strictly academic endeavour.⁴⁸

There was a further, more methodological facet to officers' reservations about academic military history, related not but identical to the issue of military experience. Since the GGS drew on the past to provide training scenarios and inform exercises, its historical accounts needed to have all the features necessary to resemble a modern military

operation. In particular, they needed to be accompanied by maps.⁴⁹ All staff exercises and plans were based on detailed maps; officers were taught to take the availability of such maps for granted. Their production was one of the GGS' principal activities. Episodes from past wars that were used to teach practical lessons needed to be abstracted similarly if they were to form an effective substitute for real military experience. Moreover, since GGS doctrine had an increasingly single-minded focus on the annihilation of the enemy in pitched battle, the education of officers in military history relied more and more on the study of such engagements in their discrete space and time, which in turn made maps the essential supporting instrument.

Maps of this kind could only be produced through autopsy and careful measurement of the terrain. Exploring the environment of historical events was therefore essential to staff military history. In theory, such personal inspection of former sites of battle could be justified with an appeal to Polybius, who had stressed the importance of familiarity with the landscapes, cities and battlefields where historical events unfolded.⁵⁰ However, visiting a battlefield should not be confused with the first-hand experience that Polybius recognized as a pillar of historical inquiry. Autopsy was a means for creating accurate maps, whereas experience served a higher goal: understanding the intricacies of war. Everyone, in principle, could visit battlefields (as evidenced by the growing popularity of battlefield tourism as a leisure activity for educated Europeans after the Battle of Waterloo).⁵¹ First-hand military experience, by contrast, was a privilege of soldiers who had served in times of war. Inspection of battlefields was, therefore, at best a substitute for personal experience.

Nonetheless, autopsy resembled the Polybian motif in that it divided military historians and their civilian counterparts. To be sure, the latter sometimes also travelled to the places where the histories they were writing had taken place: this practice has been documented, for instance, for Theodor Fontane and Reinhold Pauli.⁵² The philologist Hermann Köchly would never return from his first journey to Italy and Greece in 1876, but his tombstone proudly records that he saw Athens before he died.⁵³ Yet such expeditions could be described as signs of unusual dedication to the historian's craft, and there is little to suggest that they were ever treated as a requirement. In any case, these travels may have been undertaken just to gain a general impression of a place, not for the systematic investigation of significant sites. In the early 1900s, Johannes Kromayer travelled around the Mediterranean to explore and map ancient battlefields, but Wilamowitz' positive review of his work spoke more generally – and romantically – about the merit of savouring 'mountain and stream and forest' in a region that had changed little since antiquity.⁵⁴

Kromayer's expeditions indicate that military history makes a somewhat exceptional case. The work of the KA persuaded Kromayer that maps were an essential part of military studies,⁵⁵ and that topographical information allowed ambiguous literary source material to be tested against measurable realities. Writing in 1893, the philologist Adolf Bauer had already pointed to battlefield survey as 'a very important tool of factual criticism [*Sachkritik*]' that could revolutionize the study of ancient warfare.⁵⁶ Since detailed maps of the ancient world did not exist – except in the rare cases where military officers had helped to produce them⁵⁷ – historians who saw the potential of this method would have to travel to historical sites in person. A radical voice like Julius Beloch was not afraid to frame this as indispensable: 'One should really only write about a battle when

one has seen the battlefield for oneself.⁵⁸ German scholars embraced Colonel Eugène Stoffel's exploration of the battlefields of Caesar's campaign in Gaul and George Grundy's pioneering 1890s topographical studies of ancient Greek battle sites; they criticized colleagues like Hans Delbrück for their failure to make use of such studies.⁵⁹ Kromayer's four-volume, five-tome series, *Antike Schlachtfelder: Bausteine zu einer antiken Kriegsgeschichte* (Ancient Battlefields: Building Blocks for a History of Ancient War, 1903–31), was supported by both the German and the Austrian General Staff, as well as the Prussian and Viennese Academies of Sciences, as a welcome injection of new factual knowledge into debates on ancient warfare.

Even so, it was a common theme of such scholarship that merely seeing the terrain was not the same as understanding its military significance. As said above, autopsy was not identical to first-hand experience. As an anonymous reviewer wrote tellingly of Stoffel, 'his dual identity as a true scholar and as a soldier with experience of war guarantee the significance of his work.'⁶⁰ Kromayer's series of volumes was authoritative, not because he had gone to see ancient battlefields, but because he had done so in the company of officers, who advised him both on the techniques of topographical survey and on the interpretation of events in the landscape. Where possible, Kromayer underlined the weight of their contribution: 'It is the merit of the two gentlemen who accompanied me to have immediately recognized with military gaze that the position which you find indicated here is the only possible one, but at once a highly suitable one.'⁶¹ Their *militarische Blick* added crucial depth to their survey of the terrain. Academic historians like Kromayer acknowledged that no civilian scholar could see a historic battlefield like these officers did. They had neither the tools nor the instincts they needed to reach the same insights themselves. It followed, however, that no civilian scholar's study of military history could be expected to meet the standards set by the GGS.

Soldiers versus scholars

By and large, the response of the academy to the military establishment's claim to military history was to yield the subject to officers.⁶² Kromayer was hardly the first to concede that professional soldiers might be better equipped to research past warfare; it was a common refrain of earlier scholars of ancient warfare in particular that the work of their own colleagues was hopelessly antiquarian and lacking in practical and technical understanding. Their authors may have been excellent scholars, but they lacked the expertise to describe and analyse military matters.⁶³ Hans Delbrück therefore considered those historians fortunate who, like Delbrück himself, had done military service in their youth and gained first-hand experience of war.⁶⁴ One reviewer would later praise Delbrück for his 'habit of regarding medieval problems from a modern soldier's point of view', which 'saves him from the characteristic defects of that of the mere student.'⁶⁵ Recognition of these 'characteristic defects' led to something like an 'unwritten division of labour' between academic historians and soldier-scholars.⁶⁶ Many of the former would concentrate on the political circumstances, causes and outcomes of conflicts, but would leave it to the professionals to discuss military operations and battles, thus avoiding the risk of error and censure from officers.

This demarcation of subject areas is the reason why military history was not recognized as a subfield of the academic study of history. Although historians were often critical of the historical work of soldier-scholars – liable to handle sources uncritically and impose

modern concepts on the past – they remained unwilling to appoint or acknowledge any of their peers as a specialist in military history. Delbrück's request to be habilitated as such in 1881 was turned down by a panel of distinguished Berlin scholars. If there even was any merit in studying the subject at a university, this panel argued, it should not be the responsibility of a civilian scholar, but an officer trained in the methods of the GGS.⁶⁷ Delbrück would only be permitted to teach under the banner of 'general and world history'. Forty years later, he would make another attempt to create a chair in military history at Berlin. His memorandum to the philosophy faculty directly addressed the question of experience, warning his colleagues against the notion 'that an experienced soldier with a historical education would have it any easier than a painter or an architect who tried to become an academic teacher of art history'. Teaching history, even the history of war, ought to be a job for a trained historian. But Delbrück's request was again denied.⁶⁸ Military history was not the business of historians at a university, and senior scholars had no wish to provoke the ire of the GGS by claiming the specialism for themselves.

Still, many scholars of history took an interest in military matters. Both within the academy and among credentialled circles like the Gymnasium teachers, there were those who ventured to write about the history of war. Some of these scholars argued that military history could not be left out of any general picture of past societies; military institutions, practices and operations were inextricably intertwined with other aspects of the past.⁶⁹ Similarly, it would have been difficult for historians to write about figures like Caesar or Napoleon without devoting some attention to their military achievements. Others were drawn to the topic in its own right. Kromayer once told Otto Schultz that he chose to focus on ancient warfare simply 'because I enjoy it', just as Schultz enjoyed studying coins.⁷⁰

The result was what we might call border conflicts between the academy and the army, as officers asserted what they would and would not suffer civilians to write. The case of Köhler and Busson, detailed above, demonstrates how these controversies prominently featured claims to expertise, experience and instinct, in which the Polybian motif loomed large. Officers would not accept that anyone without their training and experience could have valid insights into the military history of any period. They defended their turf against such intruders. Already in the 1830s, an anonymous reviewer had criticized Johann Gustav Droysen's treatment of Alexander the Great along these lines:

If [Droysen] had provided himself with better information about ancient and modern warfare, and if he had discussed a number of points with well-educated officers, he would have avoided many pitfalls which he inevitably fell into as a result of insufficient knowledge of military matters.⁷¹

The inclination of soldiers to sniff out historians' errors to prove their point made it difficult for academic scholars to write about warfare without provoking a response. As another anonymous author expressed the military historian's situation cogently in a review of Hans Delbrück's *Geschichte der Kriegskunst*:

He must know what and how the soldier thinks, feels, speaks and acts, and – as paradoxically as it sounds: that the eternal principles of war, that the true soldierly feeling, that the core causes of success and failure have remained the same through the ages, does not make the job of the military historian easier, but harder; for when, despite all historical erudition, even just a little military amateurism is still evident, the soldier will soon find out, become suspicious and distrustful, and will tend to reject the work in its entirety.⁷²

Surprisingly, this reviewer went on to assert that military historians should *not* be required to have military experience. Their mission was to acquire the necessary knowledge through study, like historians in other thematic fields. But it is difficult to see how the military knowledge of the 'mere student' would pass muster among an officer class whose expertise was so avowedly intuitive and proprietary. The professional would always reserve the right to dismiss the layman's views. Delbrück's own discussion of the wider problem of writing the history of other people's profession deserves to be quoted at length:

For the historian, the difficulty of every such specialist history lies in the acquisition of sufficient technical knowledge. We may believe that a literary historian is able to immerse himself fully in the process of the production of poetry, but it is already more difficult to believe that an art historian may completely master the art of painting or construction, or an economic historian that of agriculture, manufacturing, and trade. One obviously does not demand that they themselves paint Madonnas, build cathedrals, steer the plough, or found colonies, but insofar as one does not demand this, the practitioner who is confident of these abilities or even practices them will still retain an edge over the historian and will regard him with a certain suspicion. Achilles owes his glory to Homer; but would he not nevertheless have exclaimed, on reading this or that verse, 'it is plain to see that you are a poet, and that you have not hurled your spear yourself at the head of the Myrmidons!'⁷³

This passage and the reviewer's elaboration cited above are attempts to explain the psychology behind the Polybian motif. They suggest that professional status and first-hand experience were markers, not resources: they distinguished those with valid opinions from those without. The uniquely exalted status of officers in Imperial Germany made them especially likely to insist on that distinction and to cast doubt on all military history written by civilians. By the time he wrote this passage, Delbrück knew from experience that no amount of erudition or academic acumen was likely to put such doubts to rest.

Delbrück, as we have seen, aspired to become Germany's first academic military historian. He believed that he could bridge the divide between historians and soldier-scholars by combining his own training as a historian with a thorough study of contemporary military science. If neither side believed that the other had all the tools to do the subject justice, he reasoned, the only way forward was to unite the best practices of both worlds. The failure of this idea is well documented.⁷⁴ Delbrück would never receive official recognition from either the army or the academy, even if many people in both camps read and respected his work. Scholars persisted in their rejection of military history as an academic subdiscipline. Officers, meanwhile, necessarily perceived his claim to greater authority in military history as a threat.

The friction between Delbrück and the military establishment found its main expression in the so-called Strategy Dispute (*Strategiestreit*). Delbrück's critical review of KA work spawned a decades-long controversy over the correct interpretation of the generalship and strategy of Frederick the Great. As Sven Lange put it, 'the KA in their publications forced the military methods of the Prussian king into the corset of their strategic principles': Frederick's achievements were used to legitimize the GGS doctrine of preventive war and decisive battle, whether this reflected the historical record or not.⁷⁵ In his review of a KA study published in 1878, Delbrück pointed out that Frederick's military writings actually seemed to advocate the *avoidance* of battle and the adoption of

a strategy of attrition, which Clausewitz had already identified as an alternative to the strategy of annihilation.⁷⁶ Delbrück himself would later trace the general outrage provoked by this claim.⁷⁷ Objections were raised by leading academic historians like Droysen, Heinrich von Sybel and Heinrich von Treitschke, but the more forceful response inevitably came from the KA itself. In the eyes of its officers, Delbrück had not only besmirched the reputation of a national hero and injured the army's pride, but implicitly questioned the GGS's understanding of strategy. For more than 40 years, they would reassert again and again that Frederick was indeed a proponent of their timeless doctrine, and that Delbrück had it all wrong.

Superficially, the dispute revolved around nothing more than conflicting interpretations of historical texts. But its course was set to a large extent by the clash between Delbrück's obstinate, combative personality and the inability of the GGS to compromise on its position.⁷⁸ These factors turned it into a dispute about boundaries of authority. Delbrück insisted that the question of Frederick's strategy was historical in nature, and therefore best understood by an academic historian specializing in military history.⁷⁹ His opponents may have accepted in principle that the historical work of the KA was open to discussion,⁸⁰ but they were not receptive to any fundamental criticism from a *Zivilstrategie* like Delbrück. Unsurprisingly, they immediately reached for a variant of the Polybian motif. 'Delbrück is not a professional soldier', Colmar von der Goltz noted on the first page of the first KA rejoinder, contextualizing the criticism that would follow:

When the non-military man [*Nichtmilitär*] lets his point of view be described as 'military-technical', and goes on to address the proven professional with the tone of an instructor, it is at least to be demanded that he actually brings to light some unimpeachable observations.⁸¹

After a few pages of critical notes, the future Field Marshal repeated the same proud sentiment regarding Delbrück's review: 'Perhaps the remarks attached [to these points] will go some way towards making him a little more careful in the future, when he feels called upon again to instruct military men in military matters.'⁸²

Later contributions regularly drew the same line in the sand. In 1883, GGS officer Rudolf von Caemmerer delivered a lecture on Frederick the Great to the Military Society of Berlin. In the context of his lecture, he could not discuss Delbrück's view on the subject in any detail; 'however', he stressed, 'in no case should we professionals [*Männer vom Fach*] assent' when the implication of such a view was to discredit the notion of decisive battle.⁸³ The following year, Dobrogost von Malachowski published his rebuttal of Delbrück's position, in which he asserted that he, 'and with me, all the professionals who have already cast their vote in this matter', retained their belief in the prescient genius of the eighteenth-century king.⁸⁴ In his memoir, published in 1927, Friedrich von Bernhardt would reflect on the enduring conflict with Delbrück and his entourage of 'civil scholars' (*Zivilgelehrten*): 'At any rate, it was a tall order to want to understand Clausewitz better than the army had always understood him.'⁸⁵

It should be said that these responses did not appeal directly to first-hand experience. Officers may have recognized the weakness of that argument against Delbrück, who had fought in the Franco-Prussian War. As the decades since the last European war went by, Delbrück himself was not shy to point out that some of his opponents in the military establishment had learned their profession entirely in peacetime.⁸⁶ Instead, soldier-scholars adjusted the Polybian argument by presenting their authority on military

matters as inherent to their profession. They understood war because it was their business. How could book-learned historians write the history of warfare better than the practitioners?

Malachowski's discussion of the methodological problem went somewhat deeper. He recognized that *both* sides were accusing the other of going beyond their area of expertise – whether the soldiers who wrote history or the historian who interpreted strategy. Malachowski cast the dispute in the frame of the ancient story behind the phrase *ne sutor ultra crepidam* ('cobbler, keep to your last'): on receiving criticism from a cobbler, a painter corrected the boots in his painting, which inspired the cobbler to offer his less justified opinion on other parts of the work.⁸⁷ Delbrück and the KA merely disagreed over which of them was the diligent painter and which was the overconfident cobbler. But if Delbrück insisted on casting himself as the painter, Malachowski argued, he ought to listen to experts and 'repaint his boot', since his analysis involved a comparison to modern military methods. After all, it was not as easy to master the art of war from private study as Delbrück liked to suppose:

No theory, not even the excellent one of Clausewitz, can completely exhaust the infinite variety of actual occurrences; but even if a theory could do this, in its application to the evaluation of individual cases it would still depend before all else on the ability to subsume it under the correct category to make the diagnosis. It is well known that this is extraordinarily difficult; many and efficient practical exercises are best for this.⁸⁸

Malachowski concluded with the remark that he did not believe it was impossible for a historian to develop an understanding of strategy through careful study, as long as he maintained a proper respect for the complexity of the subject. Whether it was actually likely that an academic historian's work on military history would ever be acceptable to him or his colleagues is open to question. Yet his discussion hinted at several ways historians might attempt to meet the challenge.

Consequences

Delbrück's characteristic response to scrutiny from officers was to take the offensive, insisting that it was historians, not soldiers, who had supreme authority in the production of history. Other academic historians sought a more conciliatory path. Nineteenth-century historical work reveals several approaches that allowed scholars to pursue research into historical warfare while avoiding border conflicts with the military establishment. These approaches demonstrate the extent to which the Polybian motif was internalized, but they also show the limits of its power.

Most reminiscent of the broader 'division of labor' between army and academy was the occasional assurance that the author would limit himself to subject matter that would not exceed a civilian's expertise. Even within handbooks on warfare in particular historical periods, scholars might exclude coverage of naval warfare, or outsource it to other experts, because they were prepared to concede that they did not have the experience or knowledge to do it justice.⁸⁹ In the same way, scholars might present a careful demarcation of their main subject to avoid claiming authority where they did not have personal experience. The Gymnasium teacher Rudolf Schneider gave a remarkable example of such a disclaimer in his study of heavy infantry tactics in the Hellenistic period:

It should not be feared that I will treat things here of which a philologist understands nothing. It is not my intention to judge battle plans or to offer recipes for unfailingly winning battles, but only to speak of elementary tactics, for which the knowledge of a man who has done military service and teaches physical education is entirely sufficient. Where I have occasionally exceeded these limits due to the demands of my study, the reader will never find fault with the authorities on which I could rely.⁹⁰

In a few sentences, Schneider managed to stress his own experience with warfare and physical training while still acknowledging that it did not make him the equal of professional soldiers in tactical judgement. Where his experience failed, he supplemented it by relying on soldier-scholars with greater credentials. The authorities he alluded to in this passage can be identified from his footnotes as Wilhelm Rüstow and Max Jähns – both Prussian officers and prolific authors on military history and theory, the latter directly under the auspices of the GGS.

Schneider, then, tapped the published work of military authors for the necessary expertise. But since officers took a professional interest in military history, they might also be persuaded to make a more active contribution. Droysen's anonymous reviewer, cited above, complained that the historian did not have the expertise to cover his subject, but suggested that this problem might have been overcome by consulting some professionals. Droysen seems to have taken this advice to heart: in the final years of his life, he would draw frequently on the expertise of GGS officer Friedrich von Bernhardt, who was a close friend of his youngest son Hans.⁹¹ The act of including officers in the research process suggests a recognition of the value of their practical knowledge – or, from a more cynical point of view, a desire to forestall likely criticism from soldiers. If Delbrück was right to identify the Polybian motif as little more than a marker of an exclusive in-group, that in-group might be mollified by the knowledge that a representative of their profession had been duly consulted. The mere reference to input from officers could therefore go some way towards legitimizing military history. Hans Delbrück, who wished to be seen as a specialist in his own right, nevertheless took care to stress that his time as a tutor at the imperial court (1874–79) had given him the opportunity to pick the brains of many high-ranking officers. In the preface to his *Geschichte der Kriegskunst*, he thanked the crown prince (Friedrich III) for the honour, and listed the names of a Field Marshal, five generals, two colonels and a major.⁹² Two of these men, Heinrich von Geißler and Bernhard Boie, were officers of the GGS, and therefore likely familiar with the production of officially sanctioned staff military history. The mention of their names was clearly meant to reassure officers who doubted Delbrück's own expertise.

More persuasive than consultation was outright collaboration between officers and academic scholars. The template for such collaborative projects was set in the 1850s by Wilhelm Rüstow and the philologist Hermann Köchly. Displaced by the failed revolutions of 1848, the pair met in Zurich and produced multiple works on ancient warfare that combined Köchly's philological skills with Rüstow's practical knowledge of soldiering. To rise above the inadequacy of existing studies, they argued, it was necessary 'to join together soldier and philologist, which one will hardly ever find combined in a single person'. Only the constant mutual application of both forms of expertise could prevent errors resulting from ignorance or lack of professional instincts and produce military histories that were academically rigorous, reliable and useful.⁹³ This model seems to have satisfied critics in both camps. Military readers accepted Rüstow and Köchly's handbook

on Greek warfare as a substantial contribution.⁹⁴ Academic reviewers, too, praised and endorsed their approach:

To demand that philologists have expert knowledge in all directions of life would far exceed human capabilities. We should be all the more delighted to greet a work such as this one, for the preparation of which the knowledgeable soldier has joined together with the philologist with expertise on the sources and language.⁹⁵

The handbooks and source editions Köchly and Rüstow wrote together offered a solution to the problem of experience and military history; they set the standard for the study of ancient warfare for generations.

We have already mentioned one later revival of this concept. Johannes Kromayer's battle-field survey project was supported by professional soldiers deliberately assigned to the task by the armed forces of various European states. Kromayer developed a particularly tight working relationship with the Austrian artillery officer Georg Veith, who had already published some of his own work on ancient warfare, and who would advise and contribute to Kromayer's academic work from 1907 until his death in 1925. The final product of their collaboration was a volume on Greek and Roman warfare for the all-encompassing *Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaften* – a standard work of which the lion's share was written by Veith and other officers.⁹⁶ Again, the collaborative project was well received from the start. Among its specific advantages over the rival works of Hans Delbrück was the integration of the aforementioned 'military gaze' of experienced officers.⁹⁷

Within an academic environment subject to criticism from officers, collaborative studies like these could receive special recognition as the product of an ideal combination of erudition, training and experience. Even so, they do not seem to have started a wider trend. The philologist Adolf Bauer speculated that this might be because the aims of soldiers and scholars ultimately diverged too much. The former were interested in practical lessons for officers, which made them impatient with the gaps and complexities of the historical record; the latter balked at the notion that history should provide such lessons in the first place.⁹⁸ The two groups of researchers did not just represent different professional backgrounds but pursued different ends, which often rendered their output incompatible.⁹⁹

Another explanation might be the lack of institutional enthusiasm for collaborative projects. The response of most academic scholars to the scrutiny of officers was to avoid the topic of military history altogether. Why would they encourage scholars to liaise with the military establishment, when it was far easier to let the GGS take ownership of research in this field? It was only the internal challenge posed by a provocative figure like Delbrück – as controversial within the academy as he was with the GGS – that could bring academic institutions to put their weight behind Kromayer's topographical studies.¹⁰⁰ Those who wished to write about the history of warfare could find ways to make their work more palatable, but the most common consequence of the logic of the Polybian motif was for historians to leave well enough alone.

Conclusion

What was at stake, then, in the discourse of first-hand experience as used by German military officers in the later decades of the nineteenth century was not a historiographical requirement but a claim to expertise. This is to say, on the one

hand, that personal experience on the battlefield, though often presented as a *sine qua non* for the writing of military history, did not serve as a requirement that authors were expected to meet. Most commentators recognized the practical impossibility of such a demand in a world where academic scholarship was just as much a lifelong vocation as soldiering. Moreover, as the decades since the Franco-Prussian War went by, even the number of KA officers that could claim such expertise quickly diminished. This suggests, on the other hand, that when military professionals continued to trot out the Polybian motif, as they did until at least the early twentieth century, they had other reasons for doing so. As this article has argued, their appeal to first-hand experience can best be understood as a form of boundary work. Since the KA wrote military history for the practical purpose of training officers, it could not abide dissenting views on the topic from civilian scholars. This is why the KA consistently dismissed the work of historians venturing into military territory for lacking a grounding in practice. The use of the Polybian motif, then, was often polemical rather than functional. It was used to attack authors, not to impose standards.

Although a comparison of military experience with first-hand experience of politics, law, or art falls outside the scope of this article, the foregoing suggests a reason why the Polybian motif persisted with particular intensity in the field of military history. While most political, legal and art historians found an institutional home in universities, the GSS claimed absolute authority over the writing of military history. This implied a need for border policing, at least as long as the GSS wanted military history to serve the educational needs of aspiring officers. There were, in other words, practical needs as well as institutional interests that contributed to the persistence of the Polybian motif in the field of military history. Meanwhile, Polybius himself was rarely quoted anymore. In the period covered in this article, the ties between the Polybian motif and its name-giver were largely severed, despite the fact that first-hand experience remained central to Polybius' reputation among those familiar with his work (ancient historians and philologists, most notably). When military historians invoked the Polybian motif, they did so not to show Polybius' relevance to modern warfare, as Justus Lipsius had done in sixteenth-century Europe,¹⁰¹ but to demarcate the boundaries between military and civilian history-writing.

Given this rhetorical use of the Polybian motif, the question of whether first-hand experience was a historiographical requirement of the same order as virtues and skills must be answered in the negative. As long as historians did not concern themselves with military themes, they could, in line with Niebuhr's answer to Lieber, do very well without first-hand experience. At the same time, the appeal to experience resembled historians' polemical use of virtue and vice terms ('vice-charging') in that it mattered particularly in border situations. Never did historians dismiss dogmatism, speculation and political bias as fiercely as when they felt a need to mark their professional distance from theologians, philosophers or politicians.¹⁰² In that sense, there was nothing special about Köhler criticizing Busson for his inexperience in matters military, or KA officers rejecting Delbrück's claims to expertise. Like the discourse of virtue and vice, the Polybian motif was mobilized to monitor the boundaries between professions and applied polemically to scholars who tried to cross them. Professionalization, therefore, did not deprive the Polybian motif of its relevance but, on the contrary, contributed to its persistence.

Notes

1. Niebuhr, *Lebensnachrichten*, vol. 2, 497.
2. Weiss, "Americanization of Franz Lieber," 274–6.
3. Lieber, *Tagebuch meines Aufenthaltes*; and Lieber, "Personal Reminiscences."
4. Lieber, *Reminiscences of an Intercourse*, 62.
5. *Ibid.*, 62–3.
6. Polybius, *Histories* 12.25e, 12.25g.1–2, 12.28.1–5.
7. Gibbon, "Memoirs," 97.
8. Lieber, *Reminiscences*, 61.
9. Niebuhr, *Lebensnachrichten*, vol. 1. 477–8.
10. On Niebuhr's hunt for sources, which resulted in some spectacular discoveries, see Varvaro, 'Glücksstern' Niebuhrs.
11. Barthold Georg Niebuhr to Johann Wolfgang Goethe, November 10, 1811, in [Niebuhr], *Briefe Barthold Georg Niebuhrs*, vol. 2, 235. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are ours.
12. On which see, e.g. Torstendahl, *Rise and Propagation*; Porciani and Tollebeek, *Setting the Standards*.
13. Paul, "Historical Studies."
14. Jhering, *Entwicklungsgeschichte*, 12; and Bauer, "Ansichten des Thukydides," 420.
15. Polybius, *Histories* 12.25g.1-2; for military experience in particular, see also 12.27.8, 12.28a.8. The theme is explored in depth in Moore, *Polybius*, 7–34.
16. Momigliano, "Polybius' Reappearance"; and Momigliano, *Polybius*; De Landtsheer, "Justus Lipsius."
17. On other, more recent strands in Polybius' reception history, see Burke, "Survey," 143–5.
18. Bauer, "Zweimalige Angriff," 273; Bernhardt, *Grundriss*, 460; Jähns, *Handbuch*, 91; Kromayer, *Antike Schlachtfelder*, 14–15, 266; and See also Nitzsch, *Polybius*, 99.
19. Henz, *Leopold von Ranke*, 152–86.
20. Wilms, *Schlacht bei Cannae*, 1, 3.
21. Momigliano, "Place of Ancient Historiography," 144–5.
22. Garritzen, *Reimagining the Historian*; Niskanen and Barany, *Gender, Embodiment*; and Paul, *How to Be a Historian*.
23. Daston and Sibum, "Introduction"; and see also Algazi, "Exemplum and Wundertier."
24. Eskildsen, "Virtues of History"; Paul, "Germanic Loyalty"; Paul, "Virtues of a Good Historian"; and, see also, more broadly, Engberts, *Scholarly Virtues*.
25. See, e.g. Grill, *Konfession und Geschichtswissenschaft*; and Brechenmacher, *Großdeutsche Geschichtsschreibung*.
26. Paul, "Historical Studies"; and Paul, "Virtues of a Good Historian."
27. Eskildsen, "Virtues of History"; Paul, "Germanic Loyalty"; Paul, "Virtues of a Good Historian"; and see also, more broadly, Engberts, *Scholarly Virtues*.
28. Busson, "Krieg von 1278," 3.
29. *Ibid.*, 4, referring to Köhler, "Schlacht auf dem Marchfelde."
30. Busson, "Krieg von 1278," 63 n. 2, 28 n. 2, 26 n. 1.
31. *Ibid.*, 26 n. 3, 31 n. 1, 35 n. 1, 61 n. 2, 145.
32. *Ibid.*, 127, 132.
33. *Ibid.*, 132–3.
34. Köhler, "Schlacht auf dem Marchfelde: Zweiter Nachtrag," 254.
35. *Ibid.*, 251, 260.
36. On which see Ottner, "Zwischen Referat und Recension," 58–9.
37. Busson, "Schlacht bei Dürnkrot," 504.
38. [Köhler], "Köhler gegen Busson," 163; and Busson, "Untitled Rejoinder," 173.
39. Köhler, *Entwicklung des Kriegswesens*, xiv.
40. Oman, "Art of War," 5.
41. Köhler, *Entwicklung des Kriegswesens*, xxxviii.
42. *Ibid.*, xvi; see further vol. 3/2, xii, xx–xxv.

43. Salewski, "Preußischen Militärgeschichtsschreibung," 48–52; Echevarria, "Heroic History," 573–4; Konijnendijk, *Between Miltiades and Moltke*, 10–18. So, for instance, Wilhelm Soltau's review of Hans Delbrück's comparative historical study, *Die Perserkriege und die Burgunderkriege*, appeared in the *Deutsche Literaturzeitung* (1888) in the section 'military science'.
44. See the insightful discussion in Engberg-Pedersen, *Empire of Chance*, 103–45.
45. Alfred von Waldersee, Chief of the GGS from 1888–91, cited in Bucholz, *Moltke, Schlieffen*, 99. See further *Ibid.*, 90, 188; Umbreit, "Preußisch-deutschen Militärgeschichtsschreibung," 18; Salewski, "Preußischen Militärgeschichtsschreibung," 52; Raschke, *Politisierende Generalstab*, 36; and Raulff, "Politik als Passion," xx–xxi.
46. Wohlfell, "Wehr-, Kriegs- oder Militärgeschichte?" 167; Bucholz, *Moltke*, 187–9; Echevarria, "Heroic History," 583; and Larson, "Max Jähns," 351.
47. Salewski, "Preußischen Militärgeschichtsschreibung," 66; Bucholz, *Moltke*, 236–8; and Lange, *Hans Delbrück*, 51, 73.
48. Bernhardi, *Delbrück*, 7–9; Buchfinck, "Delbrücks Lehre," 43–4; and see further Konijnendijk, *Between Miltiades and Moltke*, 53–5.
49. On which see Engberg-Pedersen, *Empire of Chance*, 146–83.
50. Polybius, *Histories* 12.25e.1, 12.25h.1, 12.27.1; Marincola, *Authority and Tradition*, 72. Polybius at least suggests that he practised what he preached when he alludes to the errors in Ephorus' account of the second battle of Mantinea, noting that familiarity with the ground would have prevented them (12.25f.4–6).
51. Atherton, *Britons and their Battlefields*, 186–241; and Seaton, "War and Thanatourism."
52. L[ehmann], "Review," col. 625; and Frensdorff, *Reinhold Pauli*, 14.
53. Böckel, *Hermann Köchly*, 398–419.
54. Wilamowitz-Möllendorf, "Review," 257–9. Note Kromayer himself on the timelessness of the Greek landscape: *Antike Schlachtfelder*, vol. 1, 4–5.
55. Kromayer, *Antike Schlachtfelder*, 1; and for the discussion that follows, see further Konijnendijk, *Between Miltiades and Moltke*, 78–83.
56. Bauer, "Griechischen Altertümer," 285.
57. Marchand, *Down from Olympus*, 173, 192–3; cf. Köhler, *Entwicklung des Kriegswesens*, xi–xii, who based his views on the battle of Tannenberg on both autopsy and survey by the GGS.
58. Beloch, "Review," 345; see also Nischer, "Georg Veith," 89–90; and Huttner, "Johannes Kromayer," 411–12.
59. Kromayer, "Review"; Kromayer, *Antike Schlachtfelder*, 1, 257; Kromayer, "Griechischen Schlachtfelderstudien," 1, 21 n. 1; Oehler, "Review" (1901); Wilamowitz-Möllendorf, "Review," 257; Beloch, "Review," 345–6.
60. N. N., "Review," 3.
61. Kromayer, "Schlacht von Sellasia," 205; and similarly Kromayer, "Georg Veith," 126.
62. This and the following section both draw on and develop the overall argument of Konijnendijk, *Between Miltiades and Moltke*.
63. For example: Rüstow and Köchly, *Geschichte des griechischen Kriegswesens*, iv–vi, and its review by Samuel Hoffmann; Delbrück, "Etwas Kriegsgeschichtliches," 608–10; Bauer, "Review," 107; Bauer, "Ansichten," 425; Bauer, "Griechischen Altertümer," 284.
64. Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst*, vi.
65. Tout, "Review," 344.
66. Bucholz, *Moltke*, 81–2; and Bucholz, "Hans Delbrück (1848–1929)," 207.
67. Konijnendijk, *Between Miltiades and Moltke*, 16, 56 (with bibliography).
68. Bucholz, *Hans Delbrück*, 139–41.
69. Bauer, "Griechischen Altertümer," 272; and Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst*, v.
70. Schultz, "Johannes Kromayer," 50; and Delbrück, "Etwas Kriegsgeschichtliches," 606–7 stressed the broad appeal of military history among lay readers.
71. D., "Review," 255.

72. R., "Review."
73. Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst*, vi.
74. Konijnendijk, *Between Miltiades and Moltke*, 48–58 (with bibliography); see esp. Arden Bucholz, "Hans Delbrück and Modern Military History"; Craig, "Delbrück"; Schleier, "Hans Delbrück"; Lange, *Hans Delbrück*; and Raulff, "Politik als Passion."
75. Lange, *Hans Delbrück*, 73–9. The following paragraphs build on his detailed study of the dispute.
76. Delbrück, "Review," 29–32.
77. Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst*, vol. 4, 439–43.
78. Lange, *Hans Delbrück*, 80–1. On Delbrück's abrasive personality, see further Craig, "Delbrück," 343; Bucholz, "Hans Delbrück (1848–1929)," 210; Heilen, "Der Mann," 409–11; Lüdtke, *Hans Delbrück*, 40; and on the GGS's corresponding inflexibility, see Bernhardi, *Delbrück*, 87, 108, and generally Konijnendijk, *Between Miltiades and Moltke*, 53–5.
79. Lange, *Hans Delbrück*, 87–91.
80. Goltz, "Antikritik," 292; and Bernhardi, *Delbrück*, 8.
81. Goltz, "Antikritik," 292.
82. *Ibid.*, 297.
83. Caemmerer, *Friedrich des Großen*, 4.
84. Malachowski, "Methodische Kriegführung," 216.
85. Bernhardi, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 133; and for more analysis on the fundamental disagreement about Clausewitz from a participant in the dispute, see Caemmerer, *Entwicklung der strategischen Wissenschaft*, 59–66.
86. Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst*, vol. 1 (2nd ed. 1908), v.
87. Malachowski, "Methodische Kriegführung," 219.
88. *Ibid.*, 220.
89. For example: Rüstow and Köchly, *Geschichte des griechischen Kriegswesens*, viii; Bauer, "Kriegsaltertümer," 332; Droysen, *Heerwesen und Kriegführung*, vi; and Kromayer and Veith, *Heerwesen und Kriegführung*, 163–208, 609–26.
90. Schneider, *Legion und Phalanx*, Vorwort.
91. Bernhardi, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 5, 81.
92. Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst*, viii–ix.
93. Rüstow and Köchly, *Geschichte des griechischen Kriegswesens*, vi–ix.
94. Troschke, *Militair-Litteratur seit den Befreiungskriegen*, 219.
95. Hoffmann, "Review," col. 473; see similarly Bergk, "Review," 425; and Müller, "Review," 94.
96. Kromayer and Veith, *Heerwesen und Kriegführung*; and see also Konijnendijk, "Who Wrote Kromayer's Survey?"
97. Oehler, "Review," col. 566 (1903); and Wilamowitz-Möllendorf, "Review," 257.
98. Bauer, "Griechischen Altertümer," 284–5.
99. Salewski, "Preußischen Militärgeschichtsschreibung," 51.
100. Konijnendijk, *Between Miltiades and Moltke*, 80–3.
101. De Landtsheer, "Justus Lipsius."
102. Ten Hagen and Paul, "Icarus Flight of Speculation"; and Paul, "I Am Not a Politician."

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