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Institutional bricolage and the (Re)shaping of communal land tenure arrangements: Two contrasting cases in upland and lowland Northeastern Laos

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the factors shaping communal land tenure and livelihood practices in two villages in Houaphan province, Northeastern Laos. It employs the concept of institutional bricolage to show how local actors combine communal tenure, state intervention, donor programs and local power relations to (re)shape formal rules and day-to-day land tenure and livelihood practices. In particular, it highlights how state territorial strategies in lowland and upland rural spaces have differently shaped state interventions in communal land use and access, producing hybrid forms of communal land management rules and practices. The two cases highlight different processes by which communal tenure is eroded or adapted in the process of state incorporation, raising questions about competing authorities over land and the interests and objectives of different actors in land administration. The village cases illustrate how local communities' (in)ability to shape, adapt, and reproduce institutional rules and arrangements pertaining to access and use of communal land is closely interlinked with: 1) how farm households perceive communal land tenure in relation to their livelihood options and farming strategies; 2) how power relations among local communities and between local communities and state actors shape decision-making processes and distributional outcomes; and 3) the role of the state in sustaining and advancing its control over land and how this changes over time.

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1. Introduction

Customary or community-based tenure systems play a key role in global land governance, shaping how land and natural resources are allocated, used, accessed and transferred among rural communities worldwide. In Laos, much of the country's forest and farmland is held under customary tenure arrangements, often only partially recognized by the state's formal legal frameworks (Baird and Shoemaker, 2007; Lestrelin, 2011). These lands, communally and/or individually used and managed, play a crucial role in sustaining the livelihoods and well-being of individual households and the entire community (Fujita and Phanvilay, 2008; Keovilignavong and Suhardiman, 2019). In a study of more than 20 villages covering five provinces in Laos, communal land systems were found to exist among all ethnic groups in both uplands and lowlands, and to include a variety of different land types (e.g. for-

est, agriculture, swidden, cultural and religious land) with diverse tenure arrangements (Seidel et al., 2007).

Communal land tenure systems are often thought of as being steeped in the past, having evolved and adapted over a long period of time independently from the state. The term "customary tenure" invokes the idea of "traditional" rights to land and natural resources rooted in customs and practices of indigenous and local communities, as opposed to statutory tenure usually introduced during the colonial period (FAO, 2002). Yet, in Laos as in other parts of the world, statutory and customary coexist over the same physical space, often resulting in overlapping rights, contradictory rules, and competing authorities. Rather than being clearly delimited and mutually exclusive, "customary and statutory are usually intertwined in complex mosaics of resource tenure systems" (Cotula, 2007: 85). In Laos, statutory and customary systems have interacted throughout key historical periods that marked significant shifts in the country's land relations – from colonialism, war, and socialism, to market reforms and the pursuit of economic growth through foreign investments in land. The country's geographical and agro-ecological diversity means that the extent and

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type of interventions impacting customary and community-based tenure and resource access varies considerably across the national territory.

Much of the literature highlights how communal land in Laos and neighboring countries has come under increasing threat as a result of various government policies, market forces and other pressures, resulting in a breakdown of traditional rules and practices, and conflict between communities and outsiders as well as within communities. Communal land tenure systems, however, are themselves often imagined as existing and evolving separately from the state and wider influences. Depictions of communal and ancestral lands as normatively different from and existing in opposition to state spaces of extraction has been central to Indigenous peoples struggle for self-determination. Similarly, communal land titles are often depicted by civil society groups and state institutions alike as providing protections not only for traditional swidden system but also from market forces and modern forms of production (Baird, 2013; Milne, 2013; Flower, 2018). In Cambodia, the right to apply for communal land title is contingent on communities proving 'indigeneity', resulting in ahistorical depictions of culture. As argued by Baird (2013), tying "indigenous" identities to certain traditional agricultural practices in order to attain communal land rights boxes in indigenous peoples and denies them opportunities for change (see also Forsyth and Walker, 2008).

Various scholars have highlighted the need to move beyond the kind of dualistic thinking that leads to unhelpful and static distinctions between 'custom' and 'the state', 'formal' and 'informal', 'traditional' and 'modern', emphasizing instead how there is often a dynamic interplay between state authority, local power relations and intergroup resource competition (Lavigne-Delville, 2000; Cleaver, 2012). In this article, we too want to eschew these false polarizations by examining the complex and diverse ways the state has and continues to actively shape communal land tenure arrangements in Laos at times with unpredictable consequences, and by positioning communal land as an integral part of state building processes. We do so without losing sight of farmers' agency and the key role diverse community actors play in negotiating the rules and norms of communal land use and access, the role of donor programs, and various contextual factors (e.g. agroecology, community characteristics, local political history) that shape how communal land is negotiated and adapted by different actors. Overall, we seek to demonstrate how communal land tenure is coproduced between communities, state and other actors (e.g. donors) through processes of bricolage (Cleaver and de Koning, 2015), how these result in hybrid governance arrangements, and how such arrangements imply changes in property rights regimes (North, 1990; Libecap, 1989).

We take two distinct cases of communal land tenure in Houaphan province – a communal rice paddy arrangement in a low-lying valley and an upland village where shifting cultivation practices dominate – to illustrate how communal land tenure arrangements and practices change, are adapted or eroded. In doing so, we explore key factors that shape communal land tenure arrangements as local actors negotiate state intervention, donor programs and local power relations to reconfigure formal rules and day-to-day land tenure and livelihood practices. Our comparative cases illustrate how state perceptions of and interventions in the governance of communal land tenure in agro-forestry upland landscapes and rice paddy lowlands of Houaphan, are connected to state formation processes and the revolutionary origins of the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR). It also brings to light the crucial role played by local communities in (re)shaping local institutional arrangements pertaining to land use and allocation, and how people's (in)ability to negotiate land use arrangements are rooted in power relations, both within communities, and between communities and the state.

The paper contributes to current discussions concerning the ambiguity over communal land ownership in Laos, where the legal distinction between communal and state land continues to challenge efforts to strengthen the recognition of customary tenure. Recent reform efforts such as the National Land Law revision recognize the existence of communal and traditional forms of land use, but maintain substantial discretion for the state in terms of how these lands are formally recognized. This has prompted observers to say that communal land titling in Laos represents a "delegated management model" (Andersen 2011, 1), whereby the state continues to claim ownership of the land on behalf of the community. In this paper, we want to move beyond these generalized concepts and illustrate with examples how communal land tenure often reflects hybrid governance arrangements where state, community and other actors interact to influence the overall shaping of rules and practices through processes of institutional bricolage. Here, we look at the way in which local tenure institutions evolve and change over time and how power relationships – both within communities and between communities and the state – condition the scope for negotiation and adaptation of rules and practices.

2. Institutional dynamics and power relations (re)shaping lowland and upland governance regimes

Scholarship on the commons has long focused on the role and nature of institutions shaping individual and collective behavior and patterns of resource access and control. Commons scholars have emphasized the importance of understanding the context in which rules shaping and local institutional arrangements take place, and their implications for collective action (Ostrom, 2000; Agrawal, 2014; Agrawal and Benson, 2011). Critical institutionalism scholars have questioned some of the rational choice assumptions underlying mainstream institutional thinking (Cleaver and de Koning, 2015), viewing institutions to be less purposeful, partial and ad-hoc. They instead stress the complexity of institutions, showing how they are embedded in social life, histories, cultures and materialities, as well as wider frames of governance. Building on these points, we view local tenure institutions as intertwined in wider social relations and historical trajectories, where rules, norms and practices are shaped by power relations, social hierarchies and political-economic dynamics.

Scholars have discussed complex institutional landscapes and arrangements shaping lowland (Newby et al., 2020; Evans, 1990) and upland farming systems (Lestrelin et al., 2012; Scott, 2009) in Laos, while introducing a variety of concepts to better understand how context specific institutional dynamics emerge, are sustained and reproduced. In this article, we apply the concept of institutional bricolage to show how diverse local actors reconfigure institutional arrangements governing how communal land is allocated, used and managed at inter-household and village level respectively. In the process of reworking existing institutional arrangements, actors innovate and negotiate adjustments to communal land use arrangements to fit local circumstances, but they do so within the limits of available resources, social circumstances and power dynamics. As stated by Cleaver and de Koning (2015: 4): "Institutional bricolage is a process through which people, consciously and non-consciously assemble or reshape institutional arrangements, drawing on whatever materials and resources are available, regardless of their original purpose."

Examining the room for maneuver that actors have to negotiate and adjust "the rules of the game" (North, 1990) requires paying attention to a wide range of power relations that constrain or enable people's use and access to land and resources. Here, we find it useful to situate processes of institutional bricolage within Ribot

and Peluso's (2003) theory of access, which is concerned with understanding the multiplicity of ways in which people derive benefits from resources. By focusing on people's "ability to derive benefits" from resources, as distinct from the property theory's more narrow focus on *rights*, Ribot and Peluso bring attention to a wider array of mechanisms, processes and social relationships that configure resource access beyond just relations of property. Different "bundles of power" – made up of material, cultural, and political-economic strands – shapes people's ability to benefit from resources.

Drawing on this literature, we approach power as a dynamic process of relations between actors, understood as an omnipresent, fluid social construct that defines interactions within and among different groups. Or, as Foucault explains (1980: 98): "[power] is never localized here or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organization." Importantly, power and access relations are always changing, depending on an individual or groups' position within various social relationships and wider governance contexts. Institutions are thus also "arrangements between people which are reproduced and regularized across time and space and which are subject to constant processes of evolution and change" (Cleaver, 2012: 7).

In our research, access and use of communal land, and ability to shape and adapt rules and practices, is shaped by power relations among community members as well as between communities, the state, and external actors such as international donors. Communities are composed of heterogeneous individuals, families and households with different societal, economic, ethnic and gendered background. Other, important factors of social differentiation in the villages examined include age, size of family (labor), settlement history in the village and connections to the Party. These statuses shape and are shaped by social and power interrelations, which in turn condition people's ability to access and benefit from land and related resources.

Power relations within communities (or horizontal power relations) are produced and reproduced in the interactions of individuals, households and groups within the village level, as well as through interactions with external actors and 'centers of power' (e.g. state actors, project staff) (Ramcilovic-Suominen and Kotilainen, 2020). In some cases, the insider/outsider identity of individuals is not so clear-cut, such as in the case of local village head (*nai baan*) and the Village Committee, which in Laos holds rule-making and decision-making power over rural lands. On the one hand, the Village Committee can be seen as an administrative extension of the State at the local level. On the other hand, however, Village Committee members are also residents of the village, and embody various other identities as farmers, relatives and neighbors, and thus can also hold views and opinions that are more in line with local interests and concerns. These ambiguities and tensions are returned to in the case studies; suffice to say that local power relations in the village are embedded within wider relations with the state.

3. Research methodology

We conducted in-depth case study research (Burawoy, 1991; Yin, 1994) in Navit village, Viengxay district and Pa Khom village, Khouan district, both located in Houaphan province, Laos, in respectively October and November 2019. We selected the two villages upon request from The Agro Biodiversity Initiative (TABI) to better understand how communal land tenure arrangements have evolved over time in relation to the introduction of various government policy instruments (e.g. land use planning), while comparing the upland with the lowland context. When we speak of the low-

land context, we refer merely to pockets of lowland agricultural valley in adjacent to the village's upland areas. Houaphan province was selected because customary tenure systems are still relatively strong in some areas of the uplands, and has communal paddy land systems in the lowland valleys linked to its unique geography, agro-ecology and political history as the birthplace of the LPRP. Communal land tenure systems are hugely diverse across different geographies and ethnic groups. However, the selected cases could be said to be somewhat representative of the kind of state interventions in land governance in the lowlands and upland areas of Houaphan province. One key factor that sets Pa Khom apart from other upland villages in Houaphan and other parts of the country is that it still has relative abundant land which allows villagers to apply a 10-year rotation schedule for shifting cultivation.

The field research aimed at unpacking local institutional arrangements pertaining to communal land tenure and understand how such arrangements are (re)shaped by government policies and interventions. We focused on three elements: 1) local institutional arrangements pertaining to the allocation and use of communal land and how rules are shaped, adapted and negotiated among various actors in response to internal and external pressures; 2) how farm households perceive communal land tenure in relation to their livelihood options and farming strategies; and 3) how processes of rules shaping are rooted in existing power relations, embedded in various forms and reflections of the state in respectively upland and lowland agriculture systems.

We conducted a series of focus group discussions, followed by in-depth semi-structured interviews with selected households in each of the two villages. In Navit village, we conducted seven focus group discussions with Village Committee members, village elders, Lao Women Union, labor union, youth group, as well as poor and wealthy households who also happened to be recent and original settlers. In Pa Khom village, we conducted 4 focus group discussions with the Village Committee members, village elders, women's group and an all-village group meeting. These focus group discussions were later complemented with in-depth semi-structured interviews with selected individual households ($n = 13$ in Navit and $n = 8$ in Pa Khom) to better understand farm household's views and strategies, how these are derived from their access to resources and existing power relations, and how the state is manifested in changes to communal land tenure arrangements and practices over time. We interviewed some members of the household together with the head of the households. The small sample size of interviewed households represents a reasonable proportion of the total households in each village, with both villages having small population size. Households were selected based on their farming characteristics in relation to access to farmland, size of households, labor availability, and their involvement in (re)shaping local institutional arrangements pertaining to communal land tenure. For Navit village in particular, farm households were also selected based on their status as original and/or recent settlers, poor or wealthy households, and connection with the Village Committee or the lack thereof.

Placing this primary data in the wider context of land governance in Laos, we link our field data with ongoing policy discussions on communal land at national level. We also conducted interviews with officials from the Provincial Agriculture and Forestry Office (PAFO) in Houaphan. These interviews focused on understanding why and how the provincial government aims to maintain communal paddy land structures in Viengxay District as a resemblance of the state's political legitimacy. The state's interest continued interference in communal land governance in the lowland rice valleys of Viengxay was thus investigated as an example of how the Lao state exploits the revolutionary memory of the region as an ideological resource for the legitimization of the LPRP, and how this contrast to the state's view and treatment of communal land in the uplands of the province.

4. Background to the case studies

Houaphan province is a peripheral upland area with pockets of lowland paddy agriculture in low-lying valleys. Largely rural and economically marginal, its diverse ethnic population relies mainly on shifting cultivation, despite efforts by the Lao government over the past several decades to eradicate or stabilize this form of agriculture, which it sees as 'backward' and poverty entrenching. Like other upland areas in Laos, Houaphan has long been a target of rural development programs by the state and international development agencies marked by efforts to regularize agriculture as well as increase the legibility and permanence of settlement. Since the late 1970s, the government has pursued a range of territorial strategies intended to bring remote ethnic minority communities within the orbit of state power, and in so doing has forced adjustment to or directly undermined community-based tenure systems. These include internal resettlement from upland to lowland areas (Baird and Shoemaker, 2007; Evrard and Goudineau, 2004), stabilization or eradication of swidden cultivation, and various land use planning programs that while securing tenure on permanent farmland plots also (re)allocated large swathes of forest or fallow land for commercial production (Lestrelin et al., 2012; Broegaard et al., 2017).

With regional and global integration, crop booms in rubber, maize and other cash crops has seen large-scale investments in land flow across the border from Vietnam in search of land (Cole, 2019) creating the image of Laos as a resource frontier (Barney, 2009). During the boom decade of 2000s, the granting of state land concessions to private investors for agriculture, tree plantations, and other commercial ventures became the dominant articulation of the government's policy of 'turning land into capital', resulting in widespread dispossession of people from the land to which they hold customary claims (Baird, 2011; Kenney-Lazar, 2012; Kenney-Lazar et al., 2018). Transnational investments in land, in turn, have served as a mechanism enabling the state to consolidate territorial control and authority in the upland peripheries (Dwyer, 2014).

While embroiled in upland development politics, Houaphan province is simultaneously known as birthplace of the contemporary Lao nation state, which is politically and economically dominated by ethnic Lao. Strategically located in the mountainous Laos-Vietnamese borderlands, Houaphan along with Phongsaly, became "liberated zones" (*khet potpoi*) controlled by communist forces following the signing of the first Geneva Convention in 1954 that led to the dismantling of French Indochina. Viengxay District in Houaphan soon after became the headquarters of the Lao Pathet communist leaders who sheltered in caves during seven long years of US bombing campaigns during "America's Secret War" against the spread of communism. After the signing of the Vientiane Peace Treaty in 1973, a coalition government was formed between the Royal Lao government and the Pathet Lao, and Viengxay became the provisional capital of the "liberated zone" with administrative buildings and ministries built in the vicinity of the caves where the leaders had previously sheltered (Tappe, 2011). In mid 1975, however, the Pathet Lao swiftly took control of the government and the leaders of the renamed Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) marched to Vientiane to proclaim the establishment of the Lao People's Democratic Party (Lao PDR). After 1975, Viengxay became the site of the most notorious "re-education" camps in the country and the area fell into isolation and secrecy (Khamkeo, 2006). Nowadays, this dark side of Viengxay's history is not part of the official history recounted to tourists visiting the caves. Instead, Viengxay is etched in official state historiography as a key site of revolutionary struggle and heroism in the context of ideological nation building (Tappe, 2011).

5. Communal land tenure regime in Navit and Pa Khom villages

5.1. Navit village: Lao People's revolutionary Party model village

Navit village is located in the Nam Song River valley plains of Viengxay District, 35 km east of Houaphan's provincial capital of Sam Neua. It is a predominantly ethnic Red Tai village comprising 73 households (357 people). Lowland paddy fields and terraces dominate the Viengxay valley landscape, making it a rather unique agro-ecological area in a region otherwise known for its roughed forested mountains and upland farming practices. A distinctive feature of the land tenure system in Navit village – also present in other villages in Viengxay district – is that paddy fields are under a communal arrangement.

These communal arrangements for paddy cultivation are based on traditional customary systems that developed among Lao-Tai communities in adaption to the ecological conditions of upland valleys in the Lao-Vietnam borderlands (for Laos, see Tappe, 2018; Evans, 2000; for Vietnam see Mellac, 2011; Sikor and Truong, 2002). An early account of these systems is provided by the French missionary Antoine Bourlet (Anthropos, 1906), who describes a peculiar form of "socialism" in the upland valleys of Houaphan, where paddy land is held collectively by the village and reallocated every few years based on household size. Today, however, the communal paddy systems are closely bound up with Viengxay's more recent political history as the place where communist leaders of the Pathet Lao took shelter in caves during the American bombing campaigns that culminated in the LPRP taking power in 1975 (Tappe, 2011).

Following the communist takeover, Navit village was established as an agricultural cooperative in 1976, which incorporated all existing village land – communal rice paddy land as well as some privately held upland plots – into the collective. The village hamlet of Napha, located 4–5 km away, was also merged together with Navit village, incorporating their communal rice paddy land into the collective property of the cooperative. The cooperative therefore superimposed a new commons regime over an existing one, obliging all farm households to work together on demarcated land areas as an agricultural collective, thus reorganizing peasant labor and production.

By the early 1980s it was clear that the collectivist experiment in Laos had failed. Even before the cooperative in Navit village was officially dissolved in 1985, farmers had already started reverting to family farming and reclaiming their privately held upland plots. In 1983, Napha villagers requested and were granted permission to return to their original village site in order to be closer to their paddy fields, and the administration their communal paddy land was separated from the Navit village cooperative.¹ In 1986, the remaining land in the cooperative was officially reallocated to individual households, but without abandoning communal aspect of the system so that village paddy land remained classified as communal or collective land. Land allocation was based on the rules and criteria set out by the Village Committee, which specified that communal paddy land would be reallocated periodically to households (initially every three years) according to the total number of household members, their age groups (number of laborers and dependents), and the average rice production per year (1,050 kg/household) that each family was expected to produce from their land. Thus, the allocation and management of paddy land in Navit village largely reverted to pre-1975 arrangements. A key difference is that the Village

¹ In 2007, Napha was again merged with Navit following the government's village consolidation policy. While they are both under a single village administrative body, management and administration of their respective communal paddy land areas has remained separate.

Committee became the main institutional body responsible for making decisions on the use, allocation and management of communal land under Laos' new State-Party structure, and as formally assigned by the provincial and district authorities.

From the time the cooperative was dissolved in 1985 up until 2017, the rules and criteria for household allocation of communal paddy land were renegotiated four times, leading to modifications over time (see Table 1). At first, paddy land was reallocated to households every three years. In 1997, land allocation was extended to five years so as to reduce the administrative burden on the Village Committee to allocate land. In 2007, the period of land allocation was put back to three years, following a series of complaints from households who argued that reallocation needed to occur more frequently to account for changes in the number of households, their size and composition, as well as complaints related to poor soil quality, unfavorable location and low rice yields of plots allocated. This reversion to a three-year allocation cycle did not, however, reduce the grievances that continued to multiply in the decade that followed, making land allocations increasingly difficult to manage.

Land allocation became more complex and contested in light of changing socio-economic dynamics within and outside the village. Firstly, demographic change made it difficult to apply the criteria for land allocation based on household size and composition. One aspect of this is population growth and the question of land access for new generations and their families. Another aspect is increasing mobility of household members who left the village to study and seek employment in urban centers such as Sam Neua, Luang Prabang and Vientiane capital. These dynamics are associated with broader processes of agrarian change whereby rural households have become multi-sited and stretched over space in response to growing opportunities for members (especially younger ones) to earn incomes outside of agriculture (Rigg, 2013). Secondly, since 2009 Navit villagers comprise of both original settlers, or households who lived in the village since it was established or settled in the years following the wars; and more recent settlers, who arrived in the village in the late 2000 s. The recent settlers are ethnic Khmu and they move in small numbers (5–10 households) voluntarily, and are thus not part of village consolidation efforts. While recent settlers came from neighboring villages and moved to Navit voluntarily to gain better access to the road and school for their children, their arrival has also changed the dynamic in communal land allocation. As recent settlers, they were entitled to be allocated farmland from the village communal land, but only poor-quality land including land that nobody had claimed was made available, creating a fault line and process of social differentiation between original and recent settlers. Thirdly, intensive approaches to increasing agricultural output require households to make greater investments (capital, labor, technology) to maintain land productivity. However, households with the capacity for making such investments claimed they lacked incentive for making land "improvements" as their plots could be reallocated to another family and in return, they might receive land that had not been adequately managed. As a result, village paddy land experienced land degradation and declines in rice yields.

In response to these growing challenges, in 2017 the Navit village committee proposed a new arrangement to allocate the communal paddy land to households on an indefinite long-term basis. This decision, which required the approval of district and provincial agricultural and forestry officials, put an end to land reallocation in Navit. Although the allocation of land on a long-term basis has not benefited households equally (as examined in subsequent sections), all households interviewed, including recent settlers, poor households, and women, nevertheless agree that it was the right decision to make as it has given families greater control over their land, in turn providing an incentive for some households to

Table 1

Land use allocation in Navit village.

Year	Land allocation arrangement for communal paddy land
1976–1985	collectivization
1986–1996	Land allocated every 3 years
1997–2007	Land allocated every 5 years
2007–2017	Land allocated every 3 years
2017–present	Long term allocation (indefinitely)

Source: Authors' compilation.

invest in land improvements. Moreover, as many residents explained, it helped to reduce the disputes that resulted from land allocation which were becoming "unmanageable". Like with other communally tenured resources (such as wood resin trees in North-eastern Cambodia, see Baird, 2009), land tenure in Navit village is private in practice, but the community still retains some management rights that provide certain checks. A key one is that according to the Lao Law, households must continue to cultivate their rice paddy land in order to retain rights over it. If left idle for three consecutive years, they risk the land being reallocated to another household who has the labor and capital to work it. While the communal structure gives land use rights to group members to the exclusion of outsiders (Hall et al., 2011), the way decisions were made on land allocation even within the original settlers themselves, has led to distributional injustice, resulting in inter-household conflict. At the same time, as explored in subsequent sections, the communal structure is increasingly perceived as placing unreasonable limitations on people's individual land rights since Navit villagers cannot sell, transfer, lease, or mortgage their land.

5.2. Pa Khom village: A Sam Sang model village

Pa Khom is a remote upland village located in Khouan district in the southeastern corner of Houaphan province. Villagers identify as ethnic Lao Buddhists and all 25 households in the village are connected through ties of kinship or marriage. The communal land tenure system is adapted to an upland agro-ecology and centers on the practice of shifting cultivation. Every year, farmers clear and burn an area of forestland for rice and other crop cultivation. After one year, they leave the land fallow to allow forest vegetation to naturally regenerate before returning to cultivate the same land area. In contrast to Navit village, where the communal land tenure system was (re)established in connection with the agricultural collectivization program in the context of lowland paddy, the land tenure system in Pa Khom has until recent years evolved rather independently from the state. As explained by villagers, everything they know about swidden cultivation they "inherited from their forefathers", which they trace to a group of families that migrated from another village and settled in Pa Khom around 120 years ago.² More recently, however, a land use planning process undertaken by an international development project in collaboration with the government has changed the organization of shifting cultivation in the village, setting new rules and conditions for land use and access (see also Suhardiman and Scurrah, 2021).

² It is quite unusual for a Lao ethnic village to have developed and maintained traditional land use practices and associated customary institutions around swidden agriculture. Although many ethnic Lao practice swidden agriculture either as a supplementary activity to lowland paddy cultivation or as their main source of livelihood, they are not known to have historical, cultural or religious connections with swidden agriculture, as do, for example, the Khmu and other Austroasiatic ethnic groups. Our observations in the field indicate that religious practices and beliefs in Pa Khom village are a mix of Buddhist and animist traditions, suggesting a history of inter-ethnic relations and exchange (see Tappe 2018 and Tappe 2019).

As part of Sam Sang (“Three-builds”) policy defined by the Central Party Committee,³ Pa Khom village development is set to follow the national government’s objectives and socio-economic development strategies. These include: 1) restoring forest cover to 70 percent of the country as stated in the National Master Plan for Land Allocation (GoL, 2018), and 2) improving village socio-economic development to reduce the number of poor districts in the country. District development plans prepared under the Sam Sang policy identified land use planning as a priority for villages in Khouan district in order to pursue the dual objectives of poverty reduction and forest protection by (re)allocating and zoning village land. Land use planning processes in Pa Khom village took place in 2011–2017 as part of The Agro-biodiversity Initiative (TABI)⁴, a program led by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) and funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC).

What is distinctive about this village is not that land use planning has taken place, but that it has not taken place earlier. Land use planning has been a feature of rural development interventions in Laos for at least 25 years, aimed in part at formalizing village land use rights over limited agricultural parcels, but with the effect of making upland areas more legible and controllable by state authorities. While land use practices in Pa Khom have continuously evolved in response to various internal and external pressures, the village has not been subject to earlier land and forest allocation programs that reduced available land for swidden cultivation. Largely because of its remote location, poor road condition, and thus limited expansion in commercial agriculture, Pa Khom village has maintained its character as a small and relative homogenous village unit. Its low population to land ratio still allows for swidden rotational cycles with long fallow periods – previously between 10 and 12 years but now fixed at 9 years by the TABI land use plan.

Collaborating with Houaphan provincial and Khouan district governments as the implementing agencies, TABI designed land use planning processes in Pa Khom village as a means to reduce deforestation while also making shifting cultivation less spread throughout the village. To achieve this, TABI uses an approach (sometimes used in traditional swidden systems) that clusters upland swidden plots into defined cultivation zones. This limited burning to one area, makes swidden cultivation look more ‘tidy’ than fallows scattered through the landscape (Heinimann et al., 2017), and also reduces edge impacts on swidden fields. The land use plan divided upland areas in Pa Khom village into nine different ‘cultivation zones’, requiring all households to cultivate each zone together in sequence every year as per the new defined rules and regulations (see Fig. 1). A key consequence of the new ‘clustered’ rotation system is that it limits people’s movement and choice of specific field locations for swidden cultivation. This raises the question of whether clustering can be done without reducing households’ rice production and food security, something we return to in the following sections.

³ Issued as a Politburo Resolution in 2012, Sam Sang policy has three main dimensions: 1) it is a political manifesto that seeks to entrench the power of the Lao PDR regime through targeted dissemination of Party resolutions and government policies at local levels; 2) an approach to decentralization that aims to strengthen the capacity of local authorities by purportedly delegating more responsibilities, functions and resources to local administrations; and 3) a national targeted development program focusing on income generation and commercial production.

⁴ TABI’s objective is to ensure sustainable and equitable use of agriculture and forest land by and for local users through the development of forest and agricultural land zonation and management plans at village level. From 2011 to 2017 TABI implemented participatory Forest and Agriculture Land Use Planning, Allocation and Management (pFALUPAM) at the village and cluster village levels in Luang Prabang, Xiengkhouang, and Houaphan provinces. Centering on participatory development and community-based approaches, TABI’s pFALUPAM has delineated village boundaries, developed agricultural land use and forest cover maps, developed plans for village forest and agriculture management zones (FLUMZ) as well as rules and regulations surrounding the different land use in these zones.

6. Farmers’ view on communal land tenure

6.1. Linking communal land tenure with farm households’ farming strategies

In Navit village, households cultivate their lowland paddy fields on an individual or family basis. While relatives sometimes help each other in terms of labor exchanges, provision of agricultural inputs and agricultural equipment, in general households work individually on their paddy land. Thus, while households share a piece of farmland in the village communal land area, in practice they cultivate their paddy land rather independently from each other. Reflecting these social relations of production, communal land tenure in Navit is widely seen by villagers as little more than a collection of privately tenured paddy fields. As one local resident put it: “We know that officially our farmland is part of the communal land. In practice, however, everyone cultivates their land individually, without much interaction with one another” (interview, October 2019). The shift from periodic to long-term land allocation in 2017 has instilled a greater sense of household “ownership” or exclusive use rights over a particular field plots, but as explained by the same farmer, “it does not change the fact that we still cannot sell our land” (interview, October 2019).

Consequently, the majority of households view communal land tenure arrangements as mainly as a set of rules and obligations they have to follow, regardless of whether they benefit or hinder their farming and wider livelihood strategies. Households are required to abide by land allocation rules defined and applied by Village Committee, regardless of whether or not they think these are (un)fair, for example, in cases when households belonging to more recent settlers have been allocated plots of poor soil quality and/or prone to flooding. As explained by a recent settler: “I did not see any benefit from the periodic land reallocation because our family would always get allocated land with poor soil conditions (e.g. flooded area), while other more established families would continue to access the better quality farmland” (interview, October 2019). Meanwhile, wealthier households and those belong to original settlers also did not see many benefits from having their rice fields reallocated every 3–5 years either, especially if they had invested in the land (e.g. fertilizers, technology and maintenance of bunds).

Seeing fewer benefits compared to costs of maintaining the communal land designation, villagers in Navit have proposed to forego the communal land designation in favor of private land titles. Villagers outline several reasons for wanting private title. Firstly, they are convinced that obtaining private land titles is the only way they will be able to rule out the possibility of their land being transferred to another household in the future. Many believe individual title provides the tenure security needed to ensure their land is legally inherited by their (grand)children. As shared by one of the original settlers: “My wife and I are in our 70 s now. We still cultivate rice now, because that is the only way we can keep our land use rights. Our children are not interested in farming. If the status of the village’s farmlands remains communal, we will not be able to transfer our land use rights to our (grand)children” (interview, October 2019). Secondly, as some farmers are getting older, they would like to rent out their paddy land through tenancy agreements to minimize labor expenses while still ensuring sufficient rice production. Thirdly, Navit villages’ proximity to urban centers and its location on a major provincial road linking Sam Neua to the Vietnamese border is gradually increasing the value of land in the area. This, along with the diversification of income sources and increased mobility, has changed people’s perceptions of their land from being solely an asset for agricultural production to a commodity of its own right. Both wealthy and poor households now view their land as potential capital that could be mobilized if




Fig. 1. Land use plan in Pa Khom village, Source: The Agro Biodiversity Initiative (TABI, 2018).

private land titles were issued, as this would allow them to take advantage of land's exchange value as collateral to obtain credit via a loan from the bank or through outright sale. This illustrates how the status of communal land no longer reflects households' livelihood strategies or aspirations. As noted by an elderly farmer from the village: "Nowadays, our youth is not so keen to do heavy labor for farming. They would rather complete their education and get a job somewhere else. Hence, it is important that we can sell our land plots in case we need to pay for their education or raise capital to invest in other things such as setting up a small shop or other business" (interview, October 2019).

Irrespective differences in the size and quality of household's paddy land, wealth status and political connections, all the men and women we interviewed in Navit expressed a desire to transfer the communal land designation to private titles. Even Village Committee members privately support the idea of dissolving the communal land structure. However, villagers' requests to be granted individual land titles have to this date been denied by district and provincial officials who insist that communal paddy land in Navit village – and in Viengxay district more broadly – must be "preserved" as a form of national cultural heritage. As explained by an official from PAFO: "We do not want people in Navit village to sell the land and move away... the land would be bought by outsiders or foreigners for some activity... We want to keep and protect the revolutionary families who fought and defended the country against the foreign aggressors and who sacrificed to help lead the Party to victory... this national heritage in Viengxay should be preserved so it can be passed on to future generations" (interview, October 2019).

These "protective" measures for families referred to by the provincial official are not about granting recognition of communities' historical claims to land, nor do they reflect residents' livelihood strategies and aspirations. Rather, they serve to reinforce the assumption of state authority over communal land, its uses, and its claimants based on a relatively recent convergence of historical circumstances. Rooted in old customary practices, the communal paddy land system in Navit was repurposed by the state following the collectivization program that formalized communal land under new institutional arrangements controlled by the Party-State. As expressed by PAFO official: "We all know that the collectivization program has failed. Hence, communal land arrangements and practices in Viengxay serves to illustrate the state's continued success and harmony with the people" (interview, November 2019).

While in Navit village communal land tenure survives largely on the basis of its symbolic value linked to the state's political legitimacy, and is rather disconnected with local land use practices, in Pa Khom village, communal land tenure forms an integral part of households' farming strategies.

When Pa Khom village was first settled, households established land claims to upland swidden fields by being the first to clear and cultivate patches of primary forest. At present, all households maintain rights over their individual swidden plots, returning after the fallow period to cultivate the same patch of land. Thus, while some households are wealthier than others (e.g. those with more cattle), all households have long-term claims over particular swidden fields that have been passed down through generations. When these plots are not cultivated, fallows become communal areas where all households have rights to graze their cattle or collect forest products. Households can also establish temporary (one year) claims to swidden plots by "borrowing" land from another household who is not using it that year. These temporary land claims can become permanent if a household "borrows" the same piece of land for more than two consecutive swidden cycles. As explained by a farmer in Pa Khom: "As land is abundant in the area, each household can claim as many farmlands as they want, but they

must cultivate the land if they are to keep this claim and not leave it fallow for a long period of time. This ensures that land claims are made based on a household's farming needs and their labor availability, rather than an interest to accumulate land and wealth" (interview, November 2019).

While all households maintain use rights over specific swidden plots, the community also has management rights because farmers collectively decide which land area to clear for swidden each year. Here, communal land tenure reflects social relations that are based on mutual interdependence, as swidden cultivation is undertaken as a group activity and thus requires significant coordination. Land use and allocation is discussed and agreed together by all villagers, regardless of their position as Village Committee members or their connections with the LPRP: "Before we start our swidden cultivation in March/April each year, all villagers will go to the field together to select their respective fields and a meeting will be held to make sure all households have access to sufficient land of good quality. Usually some households will need to "borrow" land or adjust land boundaries" to accommodate everyone (interview, November 2019).

Since the TABI land use plan has limited yearly swidden cultivation to particular zones, some households face the situation of having only poor quality swidden plots in that year's designated zone. But while some households may lack plots of land with good soil quality in a particular zone, other households may have multiple plots of good quality land and lack sufficient labor to cultivate all of it. Households that have better quality plots will thus "lend" land to other farmers, knowing that they will in turn help them with their farming activities. As explained by a young father: "I moved here from another village, so we cultivate land that my wife inherited. We have a large plot of land in this year's cultivation zone [Zone 3]. At present, however, we can only cultivate a third of the land as my wife has to look after our three children and I am the only laborer. Hence, we lend the remaining part of the land to other households, who then supported us with their labor" (interview, November 2019). These institutional arrangements pertaining to land use and access, and labor exchange, have been reproduced and reassembled to maximize households' continued access to good quality land for swidden cultivation in the face of new restrictions introduced by TABI's cultivation zones.

Thus, unlike in Navit village, where communal land tenure hardly gives any added value to households' farming strategies, in Pa Khom, communal land tenure arrangements are fundamental to agricultural production and food security, including through land use/sharing arrangements and labor exchanges. Here, communal land tenure is more than just a rule or obligation to follow and carry out but becomes an integral part of farm households' farming strategies. Most importantly, communal land tenure arrangements are rooted in the villagers' views and conceptions of what is fair, and how they negotiate and operationalize this in relation to their access to and rights to use the land. Hence, communal land tenure resembles hybrid governance rooted in both the state's interventions and farmers' informed decisions to ensure each household's food security. While there are some generational differences, with some younger people seeing communal land as potentially inhibiting the sale of land if a family moves away from the village, at the time of conducting fieldwork this was not a big enough concern to have changed land tenure arrangements.

6.2. Unpacking local institutional arrangements and power relations

In Navit village, rules and local institutional arrangements pertaining to the allocation of communal land are defined following a centralized approach, focusing on the role of the Village Committee throughout the whole process of land selection, distribution, and allocation. The village rules specify that the selection and alloca-

tion of communal land prioritizes households that: 1) belong to the Village Committee members; and 2) are the original settlers of the village whose lands were incorporated into the agricultural cooperative which then became part of the communal land area post-collectivization (Navit Village Committee, 2015).

According to the rules, members of the Village Committee (4–5 families) would have the first priority to choose and select the plots of land they would like to use for their farming activities, followed by farm households who originated from and still reside in the village. Thus, while a village meeting was held every 3–5 years to allocate paddy land plots to individual households, actual decision-making pertaining to land allocation took place before the meetings. Households could only select plots of land that were not yet selected by Village Committee members and their relatives. Similarly, a few poorer households that settled in Navit village in the past 10 years could not choose any plots of land but would have to wait to see if there was any remaining piece of land they could be allocated after all of the original settlers received their plot allocation. In all cases, the land they received was of poor soil quality and subject to flooding and erosion. As shared by one of the farmers: “As newcomer in the village we are always the last to get land allocation. As most good lands are already allocated to other households, we have no choice but to accept a poor quality piece of land located in the area that floods annually” (interview, October 2019). Moreover, some of these households lost part of their land during the expansion of the main road and installation of electricity posts without receiving any compensation. As reflected by one local resident, “The government informed us that we have rights to use the land, but the land belongs to the government” (interview, October 2019). These households expressed that they must nevertheless continue to maintain their land plots and pay tax on them each year or else they would be required to return the land to the Village Committee if they ceased to cultivate it.

Local institutional arrangements pertaining to the allocation of communal land in Navit is rooted in power relations between Village Committee members, the original settlers, and more recently settled households. While such arrangements are formally defined in rules and regulations, in practice, many perceived these as unfair, as they have resulted in unequal access to and distribution of the best quality farmland. Village Committee members always had access to the best plots of land (e.g. soil quality, location, access to water) as the land selection/allocation mechanism centered on fulfilling their needs first, above other households' needs. Based on the rule to prioritize, Village Committee members and their families could occupy the best land plots by exchanging their respective land plots among themselves during allocation periods, while still complying with the official rule of periodic reallocation. Hence, the very idea to introduce a reallocation mechanism as a means to distribute farm plots more equally among households never materialized. This is because decision-making processes surrounding the selection and allocation of these individual farm plots followed the rules that prioritized Village Committee members vis-à-vis other households.

This resonates strongly with the land allocation rules for the communal paddy system described by the French missionary, Antoine Bourlet, during the colonial period: “The *Thao's* [or village chief's] share [of land] is always chosen in the most fertile place and measures a larger area than that of other inhabitants” (Anthropos, 1906: 523). Indeed, Bourlet describes a “socialism that resembles feudalism”, whereby the village chief and other elite families benefit from special rights and privileges while ordinary villagers are burdened with taxes and corvées. The communal paddy land system (re)established by the Party post-collectivization thus formalized pre-existing power structures at the village level revealing how past institutional arrangements are reproduced and assimilated by powerful actors in the process of state formation. Village

Committee membership is controlled and regulated through a selection system involving the central state, provincial and district government, but most importantly defined by their connection with the LPRP. While the prioritization of rules in land (re)allocation directly advantaged Village Committee members, it serves the state's interest to secure control over land through the implementation of policies that puts state agents (e.g. Village Committee members) at the forefront of decisions.

The institutional arrangements pertaining to the allocation and use of communal land are defined following formal regulations, which were at least initially applied rather rigidly, although they later loosened up, as shown by the recent discarding of the periodic land reallocation system. While households have exerted pressure and successfully negotiated changes in time intervals for land allocation, eventually leading to long-term land allocation, the scope of issues to be negotiated that might lead to more equitable outcomes has remained limited. For example, while the rules for land allocation strictly refer to the size of households and plots, little consideration was given on soil suitability, often resulting in larger households getting low yield production from their relatively large agriculture land, and small households getting higher yields from their comparatively smaller paddy fields. As noted by a farmer in Navit: “We received a larger piece of land because we are a big family. However, the land has low soil fertility and is also located in a flood prone area, resulting in lower yield production” (interview, October 2019). Furthermore, measurement for land size was not always done accurately, resulting in some households getting bigger/smaller land than they were supposed to. Yet, households could not demand more accurate measurement to be done, as this would mean opposing particular regulations defined by the village authority. As said by a farmer in Navit: “When village authority staff is the one measuring the size of the to be allocated land, we cannot say they measure it inaccurately because this could be interpreted as farmers not respecting and trusting the village government's authority” (interview, October 2019). Nor could they propose to abolish the current rule to prioritize land allocation for village committee members because this would challenge the village authority's decision-making power. Similarly, farm households who arrived later had no bargaining power because they depend on other households to have any access to land at all and also for their livelihoods (e.g. as farm laborers).

At the same time, the Village Committee itself is embedded in wider power structures where higher levels of state authority with different interests and priorities have decision-making power over land use and allocation. The Village Committee has had to seek approval from the district and provincial authorities to implement any major changes to rules and regulations governing communal land – as in the case of the decision to allocate communal land to individual households on a long-term basis. In this case, Village Committee members played an important mediating role in bringing about a compromise between local residents seeking greater control over their individual paddy land on the one hand, and local authorities wanting to maintain the land under a communal structure, on the other.

In contrast to Navit, access to upland rice fields in Pa Khom village is regulated through a more inclusive bottom-up approach involving every farm household in the village. Prior to the implementation of the TABI land use plan, villagers practiced shifting cultivation in three separate groups, each composed of around 8 households. Each group used to be responsible for selecting which land to clear for that year's swidden cultivation, the location and distribution of household plots within the area, and decisions regarding agricultural activities and the organization of labor within the group. The TABI land use plan changed this organization as it divided all upland swidden in the village into 9 fixed cultivation zones, requiring the whole village to cultivate Zone 1 together,

then move to cultivate Zone 2 the next year, Zone 3 the year after, and so on. The clustering of swidden cultivation inevitably centralized decision making to the village committee which became the main body responsible for coordinating the internal organization of swidden production in each year's zone among all village households. However, this did not reduce the level of participation of households in decision-making.

To ensure that each household has access to land with the best possible soil condition within each year's defined zone, households rely on land use sharing arrangements at inter-household and village level. Farm households that only have plots with poor quality land in a particular zone will try to borrow land from others with better soil condition. As some households will have more than one plot of land in a particular zone, and insufficient labor to cultivate all the plots in the zone, they will select the best land for themselves and lend the remaining plots to others who want to cultivate it. Similarly, if a household has a good plot of fertile land, others will circle around their land to stay close to it, requiring various adjustments in plot boundaries to both minimize and distribute the risk of a low rice yield. Households are happy to lend others land they do not cultivate because they perceive that all households in the village have the right to cultivate land they do not use, bearing in mind its status as both individual and communal. While households that borrow land are not obliged to pay monetary compensation, they will return the favor by making labor contributions to the lending household if and when they require it.

Since the reorganization of village swidden production into distinct cultivation zones demands more coordination effort, the practice of land borrowing and lending has become institutionalized at the village level. Each year in March, before the next upland rice cultivation season begins in April, the village committee organizes a village meeting to ensure that every household has access to sufficient land for their family's food security. Prior to this meeting, villagers will go together to visit the designated zone where they will cultivate their upland rice that year. During this visit they observe the land and soil condition and negotiate possible land use arrangements with others, to ensure that each household has a good enough piece of land that year. Men and women join together on this first group visit to the upland swidden cultivation zone to make sure that arrangements on plot locations and boundaries are made to everyone's satisfaction. This has been an important institutional adaptation enabling Pak Khom villagers to conform to the new upland zoning restrictions introduced by TABI's land use plan, while minimizing and distributing the risks associated with the reduction of viable plots to cultivate.

Key in shaping this willingness to collaborate is how labor exchanges are embedded in land use sharing arrangements. Labor exchange is linked with land use allocation mechanisms (e.g. the practice of borrowing and lending land) through a social system of reciprocity, rather than fixed obligation. As access to land is interlinked with access to labor (and vice versa), dependency relations between different households tend to be more balanced. Households with large upland rice fields may also depend on households with small amounts of land but which have a larger labor force. Farm households with large amounts of land and a large labor force are in a better position, but still depend on others for overall land use allocation each year. Farm households' view of communal land is thus very much linked with how they perceive their access to individual farm plots as being either an integral part of the communal tenure system or a stand-alone unit of production; how such plots are (un)fairly distributed among the different households in the village; and people's ability to access and influence decision-making processes regarding the allocation and use of their communal land. Here, farm households not only include and operationalize the conception of fairness as key foundation for defining land tenure arrangement in terms of access to land,

amidst changes brought by the zoning system, but also extended it as an integral part of their farming strategies (e.g. land-labor relations). Thus, communal land tenure arrangement resembles not only local community's ability to come up with a new set of agreed rules, but also a form of hybrid governance mechanisms, where such rules evolved and are being coproduced through interactions among various farm households, and between local communities and the state.

7. Conclusion

In this article, we have shown how communal land tenure arrangements are coproduced by both the state and local communities through complex interactions over time and are embedded in power relations. Our case studies illustrate that while changes in property rights regimes are determined by political entities [as well as] the conflicting economic interests and bargaining strength of those affected (Libecap, 1989; Davis and North, 1971), the way various actors and institutions perceive these interests and bargaining strength are far from homogenous and not limited to economic profits alone. Local communities and state actors negotiate communal land tenure arrangements through their individual and collective efforts to reconfigure rules, mechanisms, and practices that shape land use, access and control, albeit with different and sometimes conflicting rationales, resulting in multiple outcomes.

Important clues for why communal land continues to hold such sway in Navit village, even as individual titling is prioritized by the government, are to be found in the local political history of Houaphan as one of the first "liberated zones" of the Lao revolutionary struggles, and the state's ongoing exploitation of Viengxay as an ideological resource for the legitimization of the LPRP. Indeed, Navit represents an unusual case whereby a communal tenure system is being artificially maintained by government policy in the face of supportive economic and social conditions and pressures that encourage individualization of land (c.f. Fitzpatrick, 2005).

This contrasts to the state's approach to communal land systems in the peripheral uplands, where local histories of insecurity and underdevelopment have articulated with contemporary political economies of resource extraction and commercialization in an effort to assimilate and modernize ethnic minorities and reduce or eliminate shifting cultivation. Mapping exercises such as TABI's pFALUPAM, while more participatory and responsive to upland livelihoods than earlier land and forest allocation programs, are nevertheless still instruments "enabling people and their land claims to become visible to government and donors...[as well as] enabling government and donors to cohere in the production of property and governable subjects" (Lund, 2011: 893).

Despite differences in the types of state intervention on communal land in the two cases, both resulted in the creation of hybrid forms of communal arrangements, where village-level rules and official government regulations interact. At times, this interaction has led to a convergence of state and local rules and practices through various adaptations and accommodations; but other times, they have clashed and created friction. Overall, the two cases highlight different processes by which communal tenure is eroded or adapted in the process of state incorporation, and how various local and state actors (re)negotiate communal land tenure rules and arrangements through institutional bricolage. Here, changes in property rights regimes follow neither a set of standardized economic principles (Mahoney, 2005) nor clear pathways for institutional evolution, but are shaped by different actors' changing views on communal land tenure which in turn are linked to much wider historical, political, economic and social dimensions and meanings of land.

Our case studies unpack the different kinds of power relations (e.g. between recent and original settlers, between the Village Committee members and other villagers in Navit village as well as between households with large number of laborers and those lacking it in Pa Khom village) that influence peoples' access to land and their (in)ability to adjust and adapt local institutional arrangements through the process of institutional bricolage. It shows how communal land arrangements have been shaped by different configurations of power among local communities, and between local communities and government authorities (e.g. Village Committee, district and provincial government). Most importantly, it shows how the processes of institutional bricolage is key to understand how communal land tenure is closely interlinked with state formation processes. The way communal land tenure is practiced and perceived by individual farm households is very much rooted in local communities' (in)ability to ensure fair institutional rules and arrangements surrounding land allocation and use, and vice versa.

CRedit authorship contribution statement

Diana Suhardiman: Conceptualization, Formal analysis, Funding acquisition, Investigation, Methodology, Writing –original draft.
Natalia Scurrah: Conceptualization, Formal analysis, Investigation, Writing –review & editing.

Declaration of Competing Interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

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