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The French Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE)

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CHAPTER 47

THE FRENCH *DIRECTION GENERALE DE LA SECURITE EXTERIEURE* (DGSE)

DAMIEN VAN PUYVELDE

INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides an overview of France's foreign intelligence agency: the *Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure* (DGSE). The DGSE is France's most prominent intelligence agency, yet its activities remain largely shrouded in mystery. Readers may remember the Rainbow Warrior affair, when DGSE officers sank Greenpeace's flagship in 1985, resulting in the death of a photographer. Others might recognize the agency from the popular TV series *The Bureau*, which depicts the lives of undercover DGSE officers working in contemporary hotspots. These vignettes are interesting and tell us something about the DGSE, but on their own they paint a very partial picture.

France is a middle power with considerable influence on the global stage. It holds permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and is a key player in European integration. It is a nuclear power with a robust and active military apparatus. France is also one of the largest economies in the world. The DGSE plays an important, though under-researched, role in informing and implementing French foreign policy, thus shaping world affairs. This role deserves more scholarly scrutiny.

Barring some exceptions, the DGSE archives and those from its predecessor agency – the *Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage* (SDECE, 1946-1982),

remain classified. Yet legal texts, parliamentary reports, memoirs and published collections of interviews, as well as journalistic coverage provide a sound foundation to write about the DGSE. This chapter leverages these sources to show how the DGSE has adapted to changes in its environment, both at home and abroad, from its inception in 1982 to today (2024). The first section provides a brief historical overview of the DGSE origins, from the Second World War to 1982 when the SDECE was renamed DGSE. The second section situates the agency within the French intelligence community and outlines its current organization. The third section provides an overview of key activities. The chapter ends with a discussion of contemporary debates about the accountability regime and public communications of the DGSE.

HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS

French leaders have a long tradition of using intelligence to inform political and military decision. Just like with other Western states, foreign intelligence initially developed through military institutions, and its importance became most apparent during the First and Second World Wars (Jackson and Laurent, forthcoming). The modern origins of the DGSE can be traced back to the Second World War. The defeat of 1940 and the occupation that followed acted as a catalyst. The Armistice split the French intelligence community, with many officers staying in France and working for the Vichy services (sometimes covertly pursuing the fight against the axis). On the other side of the Channel, General de Gaulle and his Free French government established a dedicated intelligence agency - the *Bureau Central de Renseignement et d'Action* (BCRA) – which developed covert paramilitary capabilities to support the resistance (Albertelli). When de Gaulle became the undisputed leader of Free France in 1943, the capabilities developed in Great Britain were merged with those from Vichy officers who had rallied North Africa and were integrated within a new agency – the *Direction Générale des Services Spéciaux* (DGSS) – responsible for human and technical collection, analysis and

action, and placed under the civilian control of a provisional government. This was a turning point. for the first time France had a dedicated foreign intelligence capability reporting to a civilian and not a military authority. The agency also brought together multiple core intelligence activities and disciplines thus laying the foundation of an “integrated model,” which continues to be a defining feature of the DGSE.

Following the liberation, geopolitical and institutional changes prompted de Gaulle to establish a new foreign intelligence agency: the *Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-espionnage* (SDECE) in 1946. Like its predecessor, the SDECE brought together disparate capabilities: technical and human intelligence, counterintelligence and security, and covert action. For the first time in modern history, France had a peacetime foreign intelligence agency directly accountable to a civilian authority. Yet the distance between the SDECE and policymakers limited its influence on French foreign and security policy. the agency nevertheless gained operational experience as France addressed the breakdown of its colonial empire in Indochina and Algeria. The service, and particularly its paramilitary cadre, played an important role in supporting France’s counterinsurgency effort during the First Indochina war from 1946 to 1954 (Le Page 2012). When intercommunal violence escalated into a full-blown war of independence in Algeria (1954-1962), the SDECE supported the surveillance of enemy activities, and covertly infiltrated and disrupted insurgent networks linked to the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN). At the higher end of the spectrum of violence, paramilitary officers engaged in sabotage and homicide operations against insurgents and their supporters (Van Puyvelde 2022). When de Gaulle eventually decided to grant Algeria its independence, some of these SDECE operators set up a clandestine group to pursue the fight for French Algeria by all means - *Organisation de l’Armée Secrète* (OAS) – thus damaging the reputation of their institution (Laurent 2012, 233-34).

Another scandal soon arose, the Ben Barka affair, further straining the relationship between French leaders and their foreign intelligence apparatus. Mehdi Ben Barka, a prominent Moroccan opposition leader living in exile in France, vanished in central Paris on October 29, 1965. Many observers believed Moroccan intelligence was behind his disappearance, possibly with some French support. Although no conclusive evidence linked the SDECE to the incident, the agency faced significant blame. In response to the scandal, President de Gaulle dismissed SDECE director Paul Jacquier and relocated the agency's line of authority from the Prime Minister to the Ministry of Armed Forces, thereby reducing its prominence within the state apparatus (Laurent 2023, 477). The DGSE remains to this day a part of the Ministry of Armed forces, even though it is not a military agency.

De Gaulle's vision of grandeur aimed to carve out an independent path for France to assert its interests and power on the global stage. This vision was particularly visible in West and Central Africa, where the SDECE found much room to maneuver during the Cold War. France's extensive colonial history profoundly shaped local elites and institutions. Following a wave of independences in the 1960s, France signed a series of police and military cooperation agreements to accompany – and control – its former colonies. The SDECE established dozens of liaison posts to institutionalize its presence and maintain close ties with local security and political elites (Powell 2020, 18). SDECE officers leveraged these networks to conduct a wide array of intelligence gathering and influence operations on the continent. Propaganda, economic, political and paramilitary actions aimed to support friendly parties or regimes and destabilize unfriendly ones (Bat 2015; Bat, 2016).

Unified under de Gaulle's leadership, the center-right dominated French politics for forty years. In 1981, François Mitterrand became the first left-wing president of France's Fifth Republic (1958-today). The inclusion of communist party figures in his initial government, raised concerns within the intelligence community and the transatlantic alliance. Socialists had

previously criticized intelligence missions and methods, associating them with infringements on the rule of law (Vadillo 2008, 588). Upon gaining power, the socialists faced governance challenges they had barely anticipated. President Mitterrand appointed an outsider, Pierre Marion, to lead the SDECE. Political change opened an opportunity for reform, which materialized in a 1982 decree that renamed the SDECE to the DGSE. Despite the new name, the agency's missions and position remained unchanged. Over the following decades, the DGSE progressively adapted to changes in the domestic and international political environments, playing an increasingly prominent and visible role in French foreign and security policymaking.

ORGANIZATION

The DGSE is a leading agency of the French intelligence community. This community is organized around two “circles” (Premier Ministre 2014). The first circle of core agencies includes the DGSE, France’s domestic intelligence agency the Directorate General for Interior Security (DGSI), the Directorate for Military Intelligence (DRM), the Directorate for Security and Defense Intelligence (DRSD), the National Directorate for Customs Intelligence and Investigations (DNRED), and the Unit for Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (TRACFIN). The DGSE, DRM and DRSD are part of the Ministry of Armed Forces, DGSI belongs to the Ministry of Interior, DNRED and TRACFIN to the Ministry of Economy and Finances. Altogether this “first circle” brings together around 14,000 employees (Cornevin 2022). Together with the National Coordinator for Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (which reports directly to the French Presidency), the Inspectorate of the Intelligence Services and the Intelligence Academy (both of which report to the Prime Minister), these services form the French intelligence community). The fact that the CNRLT reports to the Presidency is important. This positioning helped to settle historical tensions resulting from the executive

diarchy between the head of state (the President) and head of government (the Prime Minister) in favor of the former. In the French political system, the Prime Minister heads and coordinates the government and the administration. Yet, when it comes to foreign policy, defense and security issues, the President is, more often than not, the key decisionmaker. Beside this community, a broader range of government agencies such as the Paris Police Prefecture or the research section of the Gendarmerie, referred to as the “second circle”, are also entrusted with intelligence missions (Commission nationale de contrôle des techniques de renseignement 2022a).

Administratively speaking, the DGSE is placed under the administrative control of the Ministry of Armed Forces. This position can give the impression that the agency is primarily a military institution; that is not the case. The DGSE is a civilian agency that reports to political and not military authorities. While the Ministry administratively hosts the DGSE and provides most of its funding, agency leaders often report directly to the President and his advisers (Silberzahn 1995, 103-104). Most of its personnel has been civilian for several decades and the current proportion of military personnel has fluctuated around 25 percent for over a decade (Laurent 2023; Assemblée Nationale 2019).

The 1982 decree that established the DGSE identifies two key missions: “to research and exploit information of interest to the security of France,” and “to detect and disrupt, outside the national territory, espionage activities directed against French interests in order to prevent their consequences” (Président de la République 1982). This mission extends far beyond the Ministry of Armed Forces' scope. The DGSE caters to various governmental needs, with its consumers spread across key offices, including the Ministries of Armed Forces and Foreign Affairs, as well as the Prime Minister's and President's services. On particularly sensitive operational matters, the agency reports directly to the President, who serves as head of state and chief of the armed forces.

Just like its American counterpart, the DGSE has long been organized into directorates, whose number stabilized at five from 1989 onward. The intelligence directorate (*Direction du Renseignement* or DR) was responsible for HUMINT collection, as well as the exploitation of all source intelligence. These functions meant it was largely considered as the most powerful directorate. The *Technical directorate* (DT) hosted the agency SIGINT capabilities. The *operations directorate* (DO) was the most militarized directorate, in charge of covert operations, which in the French conception include both covert collection and more direct actions to influence the state of the world. The *strategy directorate* (DS) sought to better link the DGSE to its consumers in the French state apparatus, and international partners. As its name indicates, the administration directorate (DA) provides organizational support including in human resources, formation, finances, real estate and logistics (Ministère de la défense 2015). Altogether the DGSE is expected to employ around 7,800 personnel by 2025 (Assemblée Nationale 2020a). In 2023, women represented 28 percent of the agency's workforce (Eschapasse 2023).

In 2022, Director General (DG) Bernard Emié – a career diplomat who led the agency for several years – secured political support to implement the agency's most significant reorganization in the last 30 years. This reform comes at a time when the agency has also benefited from a growing budget for over a decade. That year, the agency's budget passed the €1 billion Euro mark for the first time. This increase is largely explained by investments in technical capabilities, and a much-anticipated move to new headquarters at Fort Neuf de Vincennes in the East of Paris in 2030 (Ministère de l'Economie 2021; Intelligence online 2023).

Confronting a range of transversal threats such as terrorism, leaders felt the traditional division of labor around directorates created silos that constrained the flow of information within the DGSE and with its customers (Notin 2024, 11). Head of directorates competed for

access to decision-makers, with the Director of Intelligence often leading the pack, sometimes even challenging the Director General. Many felt the agency was not sufficiently integrated. Controversially, the 2022 reform disbanded the intelligence directorate, which was merged with the directorate for strategy to form a new General Secretariat for Analysis and Strategy (SGAS). The SGAS is now fully in charge of analysis and serves as the main interface with DGSE's consumers and partners. The reform moved the collection capabilities of the DR to a new Directorate of Intelligence Collection and Operations (DRO, where the R stands for *recherche*) (Intelligence online 2022). In practice this brings these collection capabilities closer to the more militarized part of the agency that conduct covert actions. The reform also rebranded the DT into a Technical and Innovation Directorate. The DA remains largely unchanged (Ministère des armées 2022). Finally, to take stock of the transversal nature of many contemporary threats, the reform established a series of mission centers that focus and orient human and technical means on key threats and issues including counter-proliferation, counterterrorism, economic security, foreign policy intelligence (Annuaire des services publics 2023). Figure 1 below presents the latest DGSE organigram. The extent to which this new organization will last remains to be seen.




Figure 1. DGSE organigram, 2024

ACTIVITIES

The DGSE is an “integrated service” in the sense that it brings together HUMINT, TECHINT, and operational research. Operational research, which the French consider as a collection discipline, refers to intelligence gathered through direct observations, document theft, and other field activities. This is the senior French authority on SIGINT. This integration sets the DGSE apart from some of its partners. In Great Britain, for example, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) handles HUMINT and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) manages SIGINT. Within the DGSE, integration means operations officers and analysts have access to in-house technical resources to support their missions. Conversely, HUMINT and operational research capabilities enhance SIGINT, for example by mapping networks of individuals for targeting (Assemblée Nationale 2016, 857). The DGSE is also integrated in the sense that it engages in the full range of intelligence activities: from

collection and analysis to dissemination of intelligence (Bauer and Dupuis-Danon 2018, 156). French law also authorizes the agency “to carry out, within the framework of its attributions, any action entrusted to it by the Government” (Code de la défense 2024). In practice, the agency holds a national monopoly on covert HUMINT operations abroad.

The DGSE focuses on the full spectrum of foreign threats to national security, from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to the fight against terrorism and international crime, to the defense of France’s economic interests. Geographically, the agency primarily concentrates on an arc of crisis extending from Mauritania to Central Asia. Focusing on counter-terrorism, some of the agency’s HUMINT efforts focused on Lebanon in the 1980s, where the growing influence of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Hezbollah posed a threat to French interests (Marion 1991, 139-40). By the early 1990s, the Algerian *Groupe Islamique Armé* (GIA) had become a primary concern (Silberzahn 1995, 241, 295). In the mid-2000s, the agency redirected some of its technical and human collection capabilities toward the Sahel where it anticipated growing instability and terrorist presence (Notin 2024, 93-100). By the mid-2010s, SIGINT capabilities helped to track several hundred French citizens and Francophone fighters who had left for Syria (Assemblée Nationale, 2016, 865; Follorou 2016).

DGSE culture puts operations at the center. Unlike in the United States, analyst is not a career position at the DGSE. Officers typically start their career as analysts before they move on to roles closer to the field or in management positions (“L’art du renseignement,” 42-43). That said, analyst represent about a quarter of the workforce and the agency produces thousands of notes a year. DG Cousseran (1999 to 2002) recalls reports focused on evaluating sources, identifying targets and providing context for raw intelligence, while leaving geopolitical analyses to the foreign service officers (Bauer and Dupuis-Danon 2018, 146). One interesting example is the DGSE production in the lead up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The agency reportedly painted a more complex picture than its anglophone partners. A counterproliferation

officer who joined the agency in the late 1990s explains “we did not have sufficiently conclusive and reliable intelligence to say that Saddam Hussein is restarting a chemical or biological program” (Notin 2024, 54). President Chirac (2011, 267) notes that he “did not, at that time, have any proof of the existence of such weapons in Iraq”. On both sides of the Atlantic, this event demonstrated the importance of foreign intelligence can play in major foreign policy decisions.

The DGSE conducts a broad range of covert actions (*opérations clandestines*), from information operations to political and paramilitary action. The French conception of these operations readily merges covert action and covert intelligence collection. François Mermet, who headed the DGSE from 1988 to 1989, recalls a successful operation that obtained a sample of the coating of a Soviet submarine (Bauer and Dupuis-Danon 2018, 81). During the same period, the agency’s paramilitary branch – the *Service Action* – trained combat leaders and supplied weapons to select mujahedeen groups in Afghanistan (Marion 1991, 144). The DGSE pursued its support to Ahmad Shah Massoud and maintained a presence in Afghanistan after the end of the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989). This was particularly helpful in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks (Guisnel and Korn-Brzoza 2014, 242; Notin 2017). In recent years, the agency’s paramilitary branch has expanded its role in hostage rescue operations, securing a series of successes that further demonstrated its relevance to top policymakers (Cousseran and Hayez 2017, 185, 193). In one particularly painful failure, dozens of operators from the *Service Action* failed to rescue one of their own – Dennis Alex. Two operators were killed in action and al-Shabaab militants executed Alex during the raid, after he had spent more than three years in captivity (Guisnel 2019, 94-111). At the top of the spectrum of violence, the DGSE has been actively engaged in multiple assassinations throughout its history, specifically in the context of the wars in Afghanistan, Syria and the French intervention in the Sahel. In such instances, the agency can take a leading role or more secondary one, supporting operators from

its own Service Action, the French Special Forces, or allied airstrikes (Nouzille 2015; Bauer and Dupuis-Danon 2018, 214-15).

BALANCING SECRECY AND TRANSPARENCY

Throughout much of its history, the DGSE functioned in a legal grey area, which challenged France's commitment to liberal democratic principles. The emergence of a public policy on intelligence in the last two decades, has been accompanied by a reinforcement of democratic accountability. This movement of democratization can be traced to the establishment of a Parliamentary delegation to intelligence (*Délégation Parlementaire au Renseignement* or DPR) in 2007. The authority of this group of deputies and senators was reinforced in 2013, empowering them to conduct more meaningful oversight and publish more comprehensive reports (Laurent 2015, 372-96). Despite these improvements, the delegation's power remains limited, not least because it has no authority to oversee ongoing operations (Chopin and Oudet 2019, 214).

Beside this delegation, an independent administrative authority controls the use of intelligence techniques: the National Commission for the Control of Intelligence Techniques (CNCTR). This commission brings together two deputies and two senators, four judicial officers and a technical expert. In 2015, the French Parliament passed an important reform that established a more comprehensive legal basis for core intelligence activities including interceptions. Interceptions are now more traceable, and the data can only be retained for specific periods of time. Citizens can refer their case to the CNCTR to verify the correct implementation of interception techniques (Assemblée Nationale 2015a, 2015b, 2021b). The CNCTR controls the use of these techniques both *a priori* by providing advice on their proportionality to the Prime Minister, and *a posteriori* (Commission nationale de contrôle des techniques de renseignement 2022b). In 2019, the CNCTR controlled the DGSE 33 times

(Assemblée Nationale 2020b, 52). Bernard Emié, who led the DGSE at the time, found this control “preponderant and demanding” (Follorou, 2018).

Over the last two decades the agency has also started to come out of its shell. In the 1990s, DG Silberzahn (1989-1993) gave a couple of interviews to French daily *Le Monde* (Editor 1991 and 1993) and opened the doors of the agency to a short documentary (Meidinger 1991). Following the rise of the terrorist threat on the political agenda – particularly in the two decades following September 11 – the French government started to invest more heavily in intelligence, thus prompting the DGSE to assume a more public role. In 2010, the agency nominated its first-ever communication officer “to show the role of intelligence in securing France and French people” (Guisnel and Korn-Brzoza 2014, 516). The agency now has a communication cell that is attached to the DG and is also in charge of relations with the legislature. This communication cell rose to prominence following the success of the TV show *The Bureau*, not least because the DGSE allowed members of the production team to visit its headquarters and meet with select officers (Blistène 2022, 143-44). This access was a key ingredient to develop the verisimilitude of the show. The TV show was a resounding success that conveyed the image of a modern service. DG Emié recalls that when he first met Director of the CIA Michael Pompeo on the seventh floor of the agency headquarters in Langley, Pompeo’s first words were “Here’s the chief of *The Bureau* !” (Le Fur and Wasjman 2019). Internally and domestically, the DGSE also put a strong emphasis on its Second World War heritage during Emié’s tenure, especially through a focus on the BCRA (Musée de l'Ordre de la Libération 2022). The narrative the agency pushed forward drew a parallel between DGSE officers and the fight for France’s liberation, even formalizing a filiation between the two communities. This is not incorrect, but the agency’s historical legacy is more complex and includes elements who served under the Vichy regime.

Research on France's cold war foreign intelligence agency, the SDECE (1946-1982), and the DGSE remains rare. Most of the archives that are publicly available relate to the Second World War, as well as France's wars in Indochina and Algeria. One rare exception is a box of DGSE reports on the Rwandan civil war (1990-1994) following the work of a commission of enquiry established by President Hollande (Research commission on the French Archives Related to Rwanda and the Tutsi Genocide 2021). Persistent researchers are sometimes able to obtain derogations to consult select classified files, but this remains exceptional and provides – at best – a partial lens into the agency's more recent history. DGSE's efforts to consolidate its academic outreach have not yet materialized into more systematic efforts such as the CIA historical collections and the publications of its Centre for the Study of Intelligence, or the authorized histories favored by the British services (Van Puyvelde 2022).

Officially, the DGSE does not communicate about its operations. There are, however, some rare exceptions. In September 2013, President Hollande decided to declassify a national intelligence synthesis on Syrian chemical attacks, following American and British refusal to conduct air strikes in Syria. The declassified report, based intelligence from the DGSE, provides background on the history, nature, delivery means, command and control of Syria's chemical program and confirms a chemical attack on April 21, 2013, in the outskirts of Damas. The document refers to the analysis of biomedical samples gathered “in conditions verified by our services” which confirm the use of Sarin gas (Government of France 2013). The assessment pins responsibility on the Syrian regime and discusses its intentions. In an interview he gave years later, Hollande explained: “When the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime was revealed, a controversy arose over the veracity of the use and the perpetrator. It was crucial for us to demonstrate that our information was reliable – and it was corroborated by others. In my opinion, it was undoubtedly necessary to tell the French in order to avoid a repeat of the second Iraq war and work towards the legitimacy of an intervention. I therefore decided to make this

information public” (Vadillo and Papaemmanuel 2019, 163). More recently, the DGSE’s public silence in the lead up to and following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 shows that the agency continues to focus on informing top-level policymakers, not the broader public.

CONCLUSION

The DGSE has undergone much change since its inception in 1982 and the Rainbow warrior fiasco of 1985. Over the last three decades the agency has experienced two major reorganizations, with the most recent still prompting internal adjustments. Although the DGSE cannot match the resources of its American and Chinese counterparts, increased funding has enabled it to update and adapt its capabilities to the evolving international environment. While the terrorist threat has dominated the security agenda for the past two decades, the DGSE’s remit and expertise extend far beyond. As a member of the security council, a nuclear power, and one of the world’s largest economies, France has global ambitions and responsibilities. Its historical ties to over a dozen African countries likely continue to command a significant portion of the DGSE’s budget. In the coming decade, we can anticipate that more resources will continue to be directed eastward, focusing on Russia’s war in Ukraine as well as on the rise of China.

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