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Shadow orders: clandestine non-state power in the international system

Bastrup-Birk, J.T.N.

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CHAPTER 2 – Clandestine non-state actors and the state

Having introduced the notion of clandestine non-state actor groups in the previous chapter, it is now appropriate to examine the determinant characteristic of these same actors, namely their position in relation to the state. As Norma Rossi explains, one cannot investigate these actors “in isolation or outside of their relation with their licit counterparts (i.e., states),” because “it is precisely this duel between violent [or] illicit actors and the licit other that is constructive of their identities.”⁶⁹ Indeed, clandestine non-state actors differ from other influential non-state actors such as multinational corporations or large non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in that they dispute (or, at the very least, actively encroach on) the state’s authority and functions, either as their *raison d’être*, or as a means of reaching their strategic objectives. Their choice of clandestine *modus operandi* therefore flows directly from their position as political or economic actors involved in a competitive, adversarial or co-optive relationship with the state as well as their lack of formal recognition by the latter. It follows that these actors can only really be conceptualised when situated against state-centric paradigms as well as notions of sovereignty and legitimate authority. Certainly, much of the literature describing different types of non-state groups tends to use the concept of the state as a benchmark for both explaining – and assessing the legitimacy of – clandestine non-state actors. For this reason, any attempt at situating these actors within the international system must similarly start with an understanding of the dominant theoretical lens through which these actors are viewed. This chapter therefore starts by briefly exposing the concept of the sovereign state as the guiding principle used to describe the international order and those participating within it. It then offers a challenge to that same paradigm, introducing an alternative theoretical lens through which to conceptualise political mobilisation and the pursuit of power.

2.1 Non-state actors, sovereignty and the state

Although the International Relations scholars have often (and arguably erroneously) pointed to the role of the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which followed the Thirty Years’ War, in enshrining the notion of territorial sovereignty and state coexistence within an international order, the idea holds deeper roots.⁷⁰ Indeed, the concept of sovereignty, to no small degree, stemmed from an acceptance amongst influential Renaissance era theorists of the role of royal power and the state’s authority, with philosophers and jurists such as Jean Bodin (1530-1596) emphasising the king’s supreme internal authority as well as external autonomy.⁷¹ In many respects, the idea of internal order and stability being the prerogative of a sovereign ruler continued the line of tradition of Medieval Christian jurisprudence, with the likes of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) arguing that war could only be waged with the consent of a relevant authority such as a prince, and not by “private persons.”⁷² Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), who had witnessed the English Civil War, further contributed to the evolution of the concept, famously arguing in *Leviathan* (1651) that man existed in a ‘natural’ state of anarchy and concluding that the maintenance of order – and, accordingly, peace – was contingent upon an overarching power’s ability to keep individuals in check (or ‘awe’).⁷³ Writing around

⁶⁹ N. Rossi, *Breaking the nexus: conceptualising ‘illicit sovereigns’: A study of the relation between the Sicilian Mafia and Italian State*, in H. Carrapico, D. Irrera and B. Tupman (eds.), *Criminals and Terrorists in Partnership: Unholy Alliance*, Routledge, Abingdon: Routledge, 2016, pp. 299-319.

⁷⁰ See for example A. Oslander, *Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth*, International Organization, Vol. 55, Issue 2, Spring 2001, pp. 251-287.

⁷¹ See for example S. Holmes, *Jean Bodin: The Paradox of Sovereignty and the Privatization of Religion*, Nomos, Vol. 30, 1988, pp. 5-45; and J. E. Thompson, *State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Empirical Research*, International Studies Quarterly Vol. 39, No. 2, June 1995, pp. 213-233.

⁷² Aquinas also stressed the importance of both ‘just cause’ and ‘right intention’ in the conduct of war. See for example G. M. Reichberg, *Thomas Aquinas on War and Peace*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

⁷³ Individuals were therefore required to subordinate themselves to that same power.

the same time as Hobbes, the Dutch jurist, philosopher and natural law theorist Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) questioned the “absolute right to rebellion,” whilst rejecting the idea that it was “permissible for the people to restrain and punish kings whenever they made a bad use of their power.”⁷⁴

Thus emerged a strong normative and legal precedent for viewing sovereign states and their kings as the only the legitimate authorities and, accordingly, as the principal architects of the international system.⁷⁵ The king’s synonymous relationship with sovereignty would later lead Michel Foucault to argue that even in modern times, “the representation of power remains under the spell of the [sovereign] monarchy.”⁷⁶ Admittedly, the absolute power and rights of the sovereign (and, therefore, state) had been questioned by influential Enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke (1632-1704) who advocated for a social contract between individuals and the sovereign that kept the latter accountable for violations of individual natural rights.⁷⁷ Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) subsequently introduced the idea of ‘limited sovereignty’ in which the actions of the state and political institutions ought to reflect the general will.⁷⁸ However, this debate focused on the relationship between individuals and the state, rather than querying the latter’s existence. Inevitably, perhaps, sovereignty thus remained the central axiom guiding the emergence of the modern nation state in the 19th century.⁷⁹

Writing in the early 20th century, Max Weber added to both the traditional notion of royal sovereignty and the Marxist paradigm of power stemming from control over the means of production by defining the state as a “human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”⁸⁰ The modern state, according to Weber, differed from feudalism (where lords and vassals retained the ability to exercise power) to the extent that it appropriated the functions of political organisation, including violence, and established the legitimacy of its rule.⁸¹ Thus, Webber argued, any other actor wishing to wield violence would need to be licensed or controlled by states.⁸² Writing in the early years of the Weimar Republic, Carl Schmitt resurrected Hobbes’ line of argument by positing that the functioning legal order fundamentally depended on sovereign authority with the power to interpret and apply rules and legislation to individual cases.⁸³ The characteristics

⁷⁴ ‘Hugo Grotius’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, December 16, 2005, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/grotius/#NatuLaw>.

⁷⁵ Given its European origins, the modern state also tended to assume the characteristics of ‘nations’ (or, indeed, nation states) characterised by relative homogeneity as well as collective consciousness and identify to the point that, as David McCrone observes, “the ‘nation’ is usually a synonym for the state.” See D. McCrone, *The Sociology of Nationalism*, New York: Routledge, 1998, p.7.

⁷⁶ J. Spieker, *Foucault and Hobbes on Politics, Security, and War*, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 36, No.3, Sage Publications, August 2011, pp. 187-199.

⁷⁷ Also of relevance is John Locke’s additional argument that revolt against the political authority may be justified if the latter fails to protect those same rights (more specifically, the right to life, liberty and property).

⁷⁸ See for example P. J. Kain, *Rousseau, the General Will, and Individual Liberty*, History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3, June 1990, pp. 315-334.

⁷⁹ S. Besson, *Sovereignty*, Max Planck Encyclopaedias of International Law, Oxford Public International Law, April 2011, <https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1472>.

⁸⁰ M. Weber, *Politics as a vocation*, in H. H Gerth and C. W. Mills (eds), *From Max Weber: essays in sociology*, New York City (NY): Oxford University Press, 1948, p.78.

⁸¹ A. Munro, *State Monopoly on Violence, Political Science and Sociology*, Britannica, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/state-monopoly-on-violence>.

⁸² J. Torpey, *Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate “Means of Movement”*, *Sociological Theory*, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1998, p. 239.

⁸³ C. Schmitt, *Political Theology (Translated by G. Schwab)*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985. See also D. Dyzenhaus, *Legality and Legitimacy. Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller in Weimar*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 35-101.

of sovereignty were further examined by more contemporary thinkers. Building on Webber's notion of monopoly over power, Charles Tilly famously opined that "war made the state, and the state made war,"⁸⁴ adding that "preparation for war created the internal structures of the states within it."⁸⁵ According to Michael Mann, such a monopoly was at heart of the "autonomous power" of the state and the application of military force both domestically and internationally.⁸⁶

Both Weber's and Mann's respective accounts of (sovereign) state power extended beyond the monopoly over force. Weber, for example, highlighted professionalisation, including via modern bureaucracies, as a central function of state power, whilst Mann pointed to the 'infrastructural' power of the state connected to its "institutional capability to exercise control and implement policy choices within the territory it claims to govern."⁸⁷ Mann further dissected state administration as constituting "a division of labour between the state's main institutions, which is coordinated centrally," as well as control over "coinage, and weights and measures, allowing commodities to be exchanged under an ultimate guarantee of value by the state."⁸⁸ Adopting a similar line of reasoning, Anthony Giddens underscored the ability to raise taxes (including on wealth generated by industrial production) and a recognition of a state's borders by other states as the key characteristics of the modern sovereign nation state construct.⁸⁹ In a similar vein to Mann, he also stressed that its power was derived from "a set of institutional forms of governance maintaining administrative monopoly over a territory, its rule being sanctioned by law."⁹⁰ Summing up these converging arguments, Michael Fowler and Julie Bunk conclude that "all sovereign states, it might be observed, have territory, people and a government," even while conceding that "cogent standards do not seem to exist either in law or in practice for the dimensions, number of people, or form of government that might be required of a sovereign state."⁹¹

However, this relative lack of definitional clarity or consensus around the specific functions of the sovereign state has not diminished its position as the fundamental concept underpinning international law, alongside notions of statehood and territorial jurisdiction. It was perhaps inevitable, therefore, that the United Nations was conceived in 1945 as a state-based system emphasising sovereign equality and supreme authority within states' own territory. Similarly, the state-centric paradigm was extended to the realm of warfare, which was predominantly viewed as the prerogative of governments and their professional militaries.⁹² Bruce Kapferer explains that "the very institution of the state is widely conceived of as inseparable from war" to the extent that peace occurs within its borders and that "this very peace may be the condition for its potential for war with those other states and social formations outside of it."⁹³ The central Clausewitzian axiom that war constitutes a continuation of politics (or, indeed, policy) by other means may also have resulted in the widely held assumption that these same policies

⁸⁴ C. Tilly, *Reflections on the History of European State Making*, in C. Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975, p. 42.

⁸⁵ C. Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 900–1992*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1990, p.76.

⁸⁶ M. Mann, *The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results*, *European Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1984, pp. 185–213.

⁸⁷ H. Soifer and M. vom Hau, *Unpacking the Strength of the State: The Utility of State Infrastructural Power*, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol. 43, No.3, December 2008, p.220.

⁸⁸ M. Mann, p.193.

⁸⁹ A. Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990, pp.72-73

⁹⁰ A. Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, London: Routledge, 1985, p. 21.

⁹¹ M. R. Fowler and J. M. Bunk, *What Constitutes the Sovereign State?*, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 4, October 1996, p. 381.

⁹² Throughout history, this was at times referred to as the Royal Prerogative. See for example 'The Royal War Prerogative: an executive function', United Kingdom Parliament, <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmpublicadm/1891/189105.htm>.

⁹³ B. Kapferer, *State, Sovereignty, War, and Civil Violence in Emerging Global Realities*, *Social Analysis*, Vol. 48, Issue 1, Spring 2004, p.64

advanced through warfare were those of states.⁹⁴ Perhaps inevitably, the state-centric paradigm *de facto* amounted to placing non-state actors seeking political gains through armed means in a conceptually inferior position, with such approaches being considered illegitimate based on both normative values and legal definitions of legitimate rule and authority.⁹⁵

The West's dominant role in reinforcing the sovereign state paradigm continues to be felt within the contemporary discipline of International Relations where the state constitutes the primary unit of analysis for explaining the dynamics at play within the international system. Here, state-wielded power is viewed as the driving force shaping the global order. The classical Realist Hans Morgenthau, perhaps the most influential twentieth century International Relations thinker, thus argued that international affairs were fundamentally a product of states pursuing their own national interests.⁹⁶ Neo (or structural) Realists such as Kenneth Waltz and Hedley Bull expanded on the notion by pointing to the ways in which state interactions were shaped by the anarchic structure of international society.⁹⁷ Whilst constructivists of the likes of Ted Hopf provide some helpful nuance, arguing that anarchy is both a subjective concept and one that can be perceived as an "imagined community",⁹⁸ such arguments are primarily used to describe variations between states (such as in their perceptions of, or approach to, arms control or trade), rather than giving a wider cast of actors a role on the international stage.⁹⁹ Even the Realists' traditional opponent – Liberals – use state-based nomenclature when making their case for the importance of cooperation, norms, and strong institutions as the means towards achieving shared prosperity. The underpinning rationale for this trend is captured rather well by David Lake who argues that state-centric International Relations theories are those that are assumed "to best explain the patterns and trends of world politics, including when violence is more or less likely, when economic interdependence will rise or fall...[and] critical problems of international relations effectively and parsimoniously."¹⁰⁰

2.2 Challenges to the state-centric paradigm

The legalistic notion of sovereignty that was crafted in Europe has never been a universally accepted one, however. Even at the height of the European colonial era, alternative political dynamics and constructs were at play elsewhere in the world. Matthew Erie, for example, describes how China was confused by the behaviour and demands of the British at the time of the mid-19th century Opium Wars.¹⁰¹ Here, China's Qing empire considered itself the cultural centre of the known world and viewed order as being established through the 'suasion of the emperor', rather than as a product of international laws, external sovereign claims and projections of force. The British, conversely, did not consider the Qing dynasty a sovereign

⁹⁴ Clausewitz did recognise the utility of non-state actors in the conduct of war, but more as instruments of state-led military campaigns.

⁹⁵ Similarly, state-free political communities (so-called 'ungoverned' spaces) are still generally perceived as a failure of statecraft.

⁹⁶ See H. J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954. H. Milner, *The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique*, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1991, pp. 67–85.

⁹⁷ A. Watson, *Hedley Bull, States Systems and International Societies*, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2, April 1987, pp. 147–153. R. Jervis, *Realism in the Study of World Politics*, *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4, 1998, pp. 971–991.

⁹⁸ T. Hopf, *The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory*, *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1998, p.174.

⁹⁹ M. Dorman, *Realist and Constructivist Approaches to Anarchy*, *E-International Relations*, August 2011, p.2, <https://www.e-ir.info/2011/08/29/realist-and-constructivist-approaches-to-anarchy/>.

¹⁰⁰ D. A. Lake, *The State in International Relations*, in C. Reus-Smit and D. Snidal (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p.56.

¹⁰¹ M. Erie, *Sovereignty, Internationalism, and the Chinese In-Between*, *East-West Centre Working Papers* No.2, February 2004, pp.10-11.

state, subsequently establishing extraterritorial rights in China.¹⁰² In most of the Islamic world, meanwhile, the concept of 'rule' often flowed from divine, rather than human-constructed notions of sovereignty,¹⁰³ whilst the Ottoman Empire resembled more of a blend of different traditions and influences, evolving through reforms to acquire characteristics of the western 'state' despite power remaining in the hands of the Sultan.¹⁰⁴ There are, in turn, at least two considerations that flow from this historical context. The first of these is that even at the state level, alternative traditions and notions of what constitutes statehood and sovereignty are conceivable. The second is that the concepts of 'rule' and 'power' extend far beyond the realm of the (western-defined) sovereign state. It therefore follows that these same dynamics should, at least theoretically, equally apply to levels of political organisation situated *below* that of the 'state'.¹⁰⁵

Certainly, clandestine non-state actors of all denominations would argue that they are equally – if not more – capable of ruling than the government of the day, emphasising their direct connections to local territories and contrasting their own position with that of the state. Their narratives and manifestos often centre on alternative notions of 'true' legitimacy secured via the consent of local constituencies and shaped by their ability to step in where the state is failing to provide essential functions and basic services. Such groups would fundamentally question the idea that territory can only be governed by central or even devolved state institutions, pointing to the many contexts around the world in which non-state groups are in *de facto* control of large swathes of territory. Thus, by the end of World War I, armed non-state actor groups were sprawled out across former German, Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman imperial domains to the extent that, as Ariel Ahrām, explains, "communist forces had taken over Bavaria and were rising in other German cities [...] even as Weber lectured in Munich in 1919."¹⁰⁶ At the time of writing, examples of such localised forms of governance and control span across continents in contexts such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Burma, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Venezuela, Yemen and Somalia (to name just a few). Such claims, moreover, do not rest solely with violent insurgencies operating in war-torn countries. Organised criminal groups have also often asserted claims of legitimacy, including via the provision of sought-after goods and services that could not otherwise be acquired by the local populace. Admittedly, criminal groups do perhaps differ in-so-far as they may well seek to pursue power and rule through co-optation and infiltration, rather than the removal of formal state architectures, but this essentially amounts to a difference in tactics rather than strategy. Moreover, their defining feature – involvement in criminal activities – is one that is positioned entirely around the notion of breaking or deviating from state-formulated (and therefore 'sovereign') laws.¹⁰⁷

Similar arguments can also be found within the theoretical debate. William Reno's concept of 'shadow states' describes the erosion of the traditional nation state in favour of clandestine economies, protection rackets and freelancing politicians "who have jettisoned the pretences of seeking legitimacy."¹⁰⁸ Discussing the rise of organised crime-corruption networks, Phil Williams similarly posits that organised crime–corruption networks can be understood

¹⁰² The notion of political autonomy for the non-Chinese therefore constituted an alien concept for the country. The experience would be seminal over the course of the next decades in both fomenting Chinese nationalism and shaping its views on self-determination.

¹⁰³ A notion exemplified in its purest form through the traditional notion of the Caliph.

¹⁰⁴ See for example M. Sariyannis, *Ruler and state, state and society in Ottoman political thought*, Turkish Historical Review 4, January 2013, pp. 83-117.

¹⁰⁵ This argument would perhaps also support Aristotle's original claim that man is by nature a 'political animal'.

¹⁰⁶ A. I. Ahrām, *Armed Non-State Actors and the Challenge of 21st-Century State Building*, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 20, Fall 2019, p.35.

¹⁰⁷ See for example J. L. Albin and J. S. McIlwain, *Deconstructing Organized Crime: A Historical and Theoretical Study*, London. McFarland & Company Inc., 2012, p. 12.

¹⁰⁸ W. Reno, *Clandestine Economies, Violence and States in Africa*, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 2, Spring 2000, p. 437.

conceptually as the “virus of the modern state, circumventing and breaking down [its] natural defences.”¹⁰⁹ Taking an ethnographic viewpoint, Carolyn Nordstrom builds on this idea through the notion of ‘shadow networks’, which “comprise a significant section of the world’s economy, and thus of the world’s power grids.”¹¹⁰ Diane Davis goes further, discussing the idea of ‘spatialities’ of irregular actors characterised by “alternative networks of coercion, allegiance, and reciprocity that challenge old forms and scales of sovereignty” as well as patterns of “power, authority, independence and self-governance unfolding on a variety of territorial scales both smaller and larger than the nation state.”¹¹¹ Reflecting on the rise of both transnational terrorist and criminal organisations and adopting a somewhat dystopian view, Hilary Matfess and Michael Miklaucic argue that “illicit [non-state] networked organisations are challenging the fundamental principles of sovereignty that undergird the international system.”¹¹² This cumulative line of argument is brought to its logical conclusion by Dimitrios Katsikas who posits that the “world is witnessing an array of governance functions taking place away from the territorial cradle of political authority [that is] the nation state.”¹¹³ As a result, Katsikas adds, “non-state actors are increasingly assuming an active part in the design and construction of the international framework of global governance.”¹¹⁴ Ahram agrees, noting that relationships with and between clandestine non-states actors “are not contrary to political order; rather, they are fundamentally constitutive of that order.”¹¹⁵

Interestingly, in some of his later work, Charles Tilly concedes that violence is not so much a function of the nation state but instead exists along a continuum that also includes banditry, piracy, organised crime and gang rivalry.¹¹⁶ Expanding the argument, André Bossard argues that the phenomenon of organised crime is “as much political as legal,” whilst taking advantage of “all forms of progress, especially in international transport [...] telecommunications and computers.”¹¹⁷ Manuel Castells similarly highlights the extent to which “global crime, the networking of powerful organisations, and their associates, in shared activities throughout the planet, [...] profoundly affects international economies, politics, societies, security, and, ultimately, societies at large.”¹¹⁸ This reflects earlier writings, such as those of Emile Durkheim who, in *The Division of Labor in Society* (1893), offered a sociological addition to this paradigm by theorising that criminal activities could destabilise established social orders by demonstrating a departure from established norms and conventions.¹¹⁹ In a similar vein, Susan Strange emphasises organised crime’s established presence in world markets as well as the displacement of power by “private enterprise in finance, industry and trade” which, in

¹⁰⁹ P. Williams, *Transnational Organized Crime and the State*, in R. B. Hall and T. J. Bierstecker (eds.), *The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.170.

¹¹⁰ C. Nordstrom, *Shadows and Sovereigns*, Theory, Culture and Society, SAGE, Vol. 17, No. 4, August 2000, p. 38.

¹¹¹ D. E. Davis, *Irregular Armed Forces, Shifting Patterns of Commitment, and Fragmented Sovereignty in the Developing World*, Theory and Society, Vol. 39, No. 3/4, May 2010, p.397.

¹¹² H. Matfess and M. Miklaucic (eds.), *Beyond Convergence: World Without Order*, Centre for Complex Operations, Institute for National Strategic Studies, October 2016, p. ix.

¹¹³ D. Katsikas, *Non-state authority and global governance*, Review of International Studies, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 36, pp. 112-113.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵ A. I. Ahram, p. 35.

¹¹⁶ C. Tilly, *War Making and State Making as Organized Crime*, in P. Evans et al. (eds), *Bringing the state Back*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 170.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹¹⁸ M. Castells, *End of Millennium*, London: Blackwell, 1996, p.166.

¹¹⁹ See A. Policante, *Hostis Humani Generis: Pirates and Empires from Antiquity until Today*, Goldsmiths College, December 2012, p.164.

turn, “are now more powerful than the state to whom ultimate political authority over society and economy is supposed to belong.”¹²⁰

Criticisms of both the traditional notion and consequences of sovereignty have not been limited to solely clandestine actors. For example, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye argued that transnational non-state actors could have interests that ran counter to those of their ‘host’ countries and that played an important role in the international system by facilitating the movement of money, people and information across borders.¹²¹ Samuel Huntington, whose ‘clash of civilisations’ theory would later gain significant traction, posited in the early nineteen seventies that transnational (non-state) organisations were those that conducted operations in two or more countries, optimised their strategies to penetrate specific territories and demonstrated a tendency towards performing specialised functions such as investing money or, critically, conducting hostile activity.¹²² Two decades later, James Rosenau took the idea further, suggesting that international relations conducted by governments had in some instances been supplemented by interactions between private individuals and groups.¹²³ Describing the broader cast list of post-Cold War non-state actor groups, Tadashi Yamamoto opined that modern, instantaneous communications had “weakened the comparative advantage that diplomats and foreign policy bureaucrats used to enjoy.”¹²⁴ Writing in the early two thousands, Ronnie Lipschutz, added that “the growth of transnational forces and processes [had] rendered the nation state increasingly permeable to all kinds of flows, ideas and behaviours” leading to “political fragmentation and atomism within states” and “establishing new modes of ‘citizenship’ within and among these new international forms.”¹²⁵

Even Realist paradigms, it might be argued, can be reframed to account for non-state forms of political organisation. Take Morgenthau’s first principle, namely that “politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.”¹²⁶ Here, Morgenthau builds on Nietzsche’s claim that there is “a will to power wherever there is life” and that therefore, man’s quest for power lies at the centre of international relations.¹²⁷ In building his argument, Morgenthau thus jumps straight from the individual level to the state level based on the assumption that this constitutes “the unit which carries out its impulses at the international stage.”¹²⁸ This however ignores the possibility that the fundamental forces driving state behaviours could also manifest themselves at the *meso* level and be applied to sub-state forms of political organisation that exist *between* the individual and state levels and in which, therefore, groups might also be capable of pursuing external (or indeed

¹²⁰ S. Strong, *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusions of Power in the World Economy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 4.

¹²¹ *Ibid*, p. 4.

¹²² Huntington also developed a useful typology of twelve organisations. These were public and private; national and international; profit-making and charitable; civil and military; religious and secular; and benign and nefarious. He argued that whilst these organisations may, at first glance, have little in common, they all in fact had a centrally directed bureaucracy. See S. Huntington, *Transnational Organisations in World Politics*, World Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3, April 1973, pp. 332-368.

¹²³ J. N. Rosenau, *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World*, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 1997.

¹²⁴ T. Yamamoto, *The Growing Role of Non-State Actors in International Affairs*, Japan Center for International Exchange, 1995, p. 45.

¹²⁵ R. Lipschutz, *Members Only? Citizenship and Civic Value in a Time of Globalisation*, in D. N. Nelson and L. Neak (eds.), *Global Society in Transition*, New York, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.137.

¹²⁶ H. J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Fifth Edition, (Revised), New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, pp. 4-15.

¹²⁷ See G. W. Cunningham, *On Nietzsche's Doctrine of the Will to Power*, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 28, No. 5, September 1919, pp. 479-490.

¹²⁸ A. H. Pashkhanlou, *Comparing and Contrasting Classical Realism and Neo-Realism*, E-International Relations, July 2009, <https://www.e-ir.info/2009/07/23/comparing-and-contrasting-classical-realism-and-neo-realism>.

'international') interests. Mann thus admits that "the state is nothing in itself: it is merely the embodiment of physical force in society"¹²⁹ and that "the varied techniques of power [...], military, economic and ideological [...] are characteristic of all social relationships."¹³⁰ Instead, these simply reflect "the growth of human beings' increasing capacities for collective social mobilisation of resources."¹³¹ In other words, if the pursuit of power and social organisation are inherent to human nature, these should theoretically be observable within *all* political contexts, regardless of the level of analysis.¹³²

Similarly, Neorealist accounts centred around the notions of anarchy could arguably be extended to the sub-state level in-so-far as non-state actors often thrive within anarchic systems, establishing forms of localised governance and order within these same contexts. Kenneth Waltz's own proposed yardstick for measuring power – a combination of "size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence" – might equally be applied to areas ruled by non-state actor originations (the latter of whom have proved capable of erecting their own systems of governance).¹³³ Perhaps for this reason, Waltz himself was forced to concede that "states are not and never have been the only international actors."¹³⁴ Thus, some theorists have been attracted to the notion of neo-medievalism in which the dynamics of the international system are compared to those of high medieval Europe when neither the church nor states exercised full sovereign control over territory. In such a construct, political authority is exercised by a web of overlapping social entities and non-territorial agents of different denominations – city states, non-state enclaves, principalities, and religious entities.¹³⁵

Meanwhile, the Constructivist school of International Relations theory, forged out of seminal works such as Nicholas Onuf's *World of Our Making* (1989),¹³⁶ Friedrich Kratochwill's *Rules, Norms and Decisions* (1989),¹³⁷ and Alexander Wendt's *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999), depicts an international system that is socially constructed and therefore rooted in shared ideas, norms and identities.¹³⁸ This conceptualisation of state interests as being a product of social interaction and consciousness allows a wider set of cultural influences and actors to play a role in shaping the worldviews that underpin global politics. In theory, Constructivism therefore opens a window for non-state actors – including, in this case, violent or criminal organisations – to contribute to forging the attitudes exhibited on the world stage. However, despite its more flexible ontology and although helpful in accounting for a gamut of factors and protagonists, the theory retains the state as its primary unit of analysis without fully testing how its core assumptions might be applied to 'lower' political orders.¹³⁹

¹²⁹ M. Mann, p. 186.

¹³⁰ Ibid, p. 193.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Perhaps for this reason, Nicolas Onuf questions the validity of the similarly state-centric Just War theory tradition, suggesting that it "unduly simplifies the complex relations of authority in today's world." See V. Morkevicius, Review: *Re-Thinking Legitimate Authority: Incorporating Nonstate Actors into the Just War Framework*, *International Studies Review*, Vol. 16, No. 1, March 2014, pp. 158.

¹³³ K. N. Waltz, *The Emerging Structure of International Politics*, *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2, Fall 1993, p. 50.

¹³⁴ K. N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1979, pp. 93-94.

¹³⁵ J. Friedrichs, *The Meaning of New Medievalism*, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 7, Issue 4, Dec 2001, pp. 475-501.

¹³⁶ N. G. Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and rule in social theory and international relations*, Columbia (SC): University of South Carolina Press, 1989.

¹³⁷ F. V. Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms and Decisions, On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

¹³⁸ A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

¹³⁹ See also I. Erbas, *Constructivist Approach in Foreign Policy and in International Relations*, *Journal of Positive Psychology*, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2022, pp.5087-5096.

Ultimately thus, attempts at challenging the supremacy of the state as the fundamental building block of the international system have faced significant conceptual and theoretical hurdles. Such accounts have been forced to use the state as a 'differentiation' point of departure – thus resigning themselves to its theoretical dominance from the outset. Indeed, a truly alternative construct to that of state-based international system would need to both entirely and successfully avoid state-centric nomenclature and comparisons. At the same time, it is clear from the historical context and from the literature that state-centric theories and views of the world fail to explain the increasing mobilisation and organisation of sub-state political forces as well as the way in which these entities are increasingly able to connect with one another in a globalised, technologically connected world. Clandestine actors, in so far, as they actively seek to shape, create or re-engineer social and political structures, thus offer a particularly valuable analytical window into an alternative international 'order' in which these same forces are channelled in pursuit of different aims. It is also possible that in doing so, they are shaping new norms and attitudes as well as challenging traditional notions relating to which political entities can interact within an ever-adapting international system. In this respect, they may well act as a 'vanguard' (to borrow a term often used by Ernesto 'Che' Guevara) not only for political ideologies, but also for wider systemic change at the global level.