Language policy and planning of Amazigh languages in Morocco: a study of the language ideology of the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture (IRCAM)

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1. INTRODUCTION

"Cette situation est déterminée par la contradiction entre les forces du maintien et celles du changement, i.e., le conflit entre les facteurs qui tendent à préserver le berbère et ceux qui conduisent à sa perte." In an article published in 1995, Professor Ahmed Boukous, one of the most influential Amazigh[1] linguists of our time, described the sociolinguistic situation of the Amazigh language in Morocco as being in a state between maintenance and change. While pointing to the situation of Amazigh, Boukous explained the vitality of the language, emphasizing that "elle représente la langue maternelle des Berbères, qui l'emploient comme moyen de communication privilégié dans leur vie quotidienne."[2]

Years later, Boukous underwent a dramatic shift in his view of the Amazigh language. He began to discuss Amazigh, a language he had once regarded as endowed with vitality, within the context of language endangerment. In his 2012 book *Revitalisation de la langue amazighe: Défis, enjeux et stratégies*, he analyzed the situation of the Amazigh language in Morocco as "marquée autant par le danger d'extinction convoyé par un processus historique impérieux."[3] The imperative to maintain the language and prevent its shift thus transformed into the necessity for its revitalization to mitigate the threat of language death.

Amidst the opposite viewpoints regarding the state of the Amazigh language, whether it is in vitality or in danger of death, it is challenging to discern an equally dramatic shift in the practice of the Amazigh language in Morocco. Its status as a mother tongue and an important means of communication remains largely unchanged. Here, we can safely assume that the shift between the Amazigh language being considered either vital or at risk of death is not primarily associated with a change in language practice. Instead, it pertains more to a shift in language ideology or a

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[1] While the term "Berber" is still employed in an objective manner within academic contexts, I consistently use the term "Amazigh" and its related forms, such as "Imazighen" for Berbers, when referring to the language, the people, and its derivatives, except in cases of quotations and specific references.

[2] Boukous, A. (1995a). La langue berbère: Maintien et changement. *International journal of the sociology of language, 1995*(112), 9-28.

[3] Boukous, A. (2012). *Revitalisation de la langue amazighe: Défis, enjeux et stratégies*. IRCAM. p. 8.

transformation in ideologies about language. The new ideologies concerning Amazigh languages, which are the central focus of this thesis, are primarily associated with the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture (Institut royal de la culture amazighe, IRCAM), an institute established in 2001 and currently chaired by Boukous, serving as the facility for language policy and planning for Amazigh language(s) in Morocco.

Before delving into details, this introductory chapter will present the theoretical foundations, including language ideology and language policy and planning. It will then provide an overview of Morocco's languages and the situation of Amazigh, along with its related policies and planning. Following an explanation of the methodology, the chapter concludes with an outline of the thesis structure.

1.1. Language Ideology

A widely accepted definition of language ideology, articulated by Kathryn A. Woolard, describes it as "a mediating link between social forms and forms of talk."[4] This definition underscores the role of language ideology as a mediator, intervening in the established relationship between language practice and social structures, influencing both ends. As a type of ideology, it shares essential characteristics with other ideologies. While not entirely illusory or embodying "false consciousness," as famously phrased by Friedrich Engels[5], it is widely agreed that ideologies derive from social and experiential origins[6], sometimes including misrecognitions or distorted notions that contradict scientific observations. Thus, in performing its mediating roles, language ideologies cannot be purely descriptive like "knowledge"; instead, they utilize their control over cognitions and evaluations to enhance logical coherence and persuasive power, effectively fulfilling certain mediating aims.[7] This will be further explored in the analysis of IRCAM.

The interaction between language ideology and the two mediated ends, language

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[4] Woolard, K. A. (1998). Introduction: Language ideology as a field of inquiry. In Schieffelin, B. B., Woolard, K. A., & Kroskrity, P. V. (Eds.). (1998). *Language ideologies: Practice and theory*. Oxford University Press, 3-50.

[5] Eagleton, T. (1991). *Ideology: An Introduction*. Verso. p. 89.

[6] Woolard, K. A. (1998). p. 6.

[7] For the four essential features of ideology, namely cognitive power; evaluative power; action orientation; and logical coherence, see Mullins, W. A. (1972). On the concept of ideology in political science. *American political science review*, *66*(2), 498-510.

and social structure, is complex. Importantly, in the mutual influence between language ideology and language structure, the "misrecognitions" that may occur in ideology do not necessarily hinder its power of influence. As Alan Rumsey posits, partly as a result of these related misrecognitions, "might not the linguistic system gradually change so as to approximate that for which it was misrecognized?"[8] As for the social aspect, language ideology links language with various facets including identity, aesthetics, morality, and epistemology, impacting essential social institutions such as religious rituals, child socialization, gender relations, the nation-state, education, and legal systems.[9] Among these aspects, the focus of this thesis lies on identity and nation-state related issues. Two particular language ideologies will be elaborated upon in this chapter, namely the standard language ideology and the one nation–one language ideology.

1.2. Standard Language Ideology and One Nation–One Language Ideology

The standard language ideology is characterized by certain principles, notably the notion that languages are internally uniform and distinct entities. When languages are identified and distinguished from others, they often undergo a standardization process.[10] Standardization is better understood as an ideology because a standard language is a conceptual construct rather than a concrete reality. It represents a set of abstract norms that actual usage may adhere to with varying degrees of conformity.[11] This ideology stands in stark contrast to the polynomic or pluricentric language ideology, which responds positively to linguistic variation and recognizes that no single linguistic norm is inherently correct.[12]

Language standardization matured hand in hand with the subsequent emergence of nation-states, where the ideology of one nation–one language, or simply national

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[8] Rumsey, A. (1990). Wording, meaning, and linguistic ideology. *American anthropologist, 92*(2), 346-361.
[9] Woolard, K. A. (1998). p. 3.
[10] Horner, K., & Weber, J. J. (2018). *Introducing multilingualism: A social approach*. Routledge. p. 21.
[11] Milroy, J., & Milroy, L. (1985). *Authority in language: Investigating language prescription and standardization*. Routldge & Kegan Paul. pp. 22-23.
[12] Horner, K., & Weber, J. J. (2018). p. 77.

language ideology, plays a crucial role.[13] People who adhere to this ideology consider the contingent link between language and national identity significant and typically hold negative attitudes towards hybrid linguistic varieties, perceiving linguistic and cultural heterogeneity as a threat not only to the national language but also to national identity.[14] This ideology shares a positive attitude towards language homogeneity similar to standard language ideology, as it believes that the optimal societal structure is one characterized by linguistic and cultural uniformity, thereby eliminating centrifugal and potentially dangerous differences.[15] The standard and national language ideologies, while advocating for the existence of a homogeneous standard and/or national language, also leave room for discussion regarding how to address actual language variations, such as whether they should be tolerated or eliminated.

In the following section, I will introduce the historical development of these ideologies, focusing primarily on the Italian, French, German, and Arabic contexts—cases that have directly or indirectly influenced language ideologies concerning the Amazigh languages. The aim is to highlight their significance in modern nationalist discourse and examine the ideological groundwork that has shaped language ideologies regarding Amazigh.

1.2.1. The Social Functions of Language in Antiquity

The standard and national language ideologies are closely linked to the social functions of language. George C. Barker categorizes these social functions into two main aspects: Firstly, language delineates the collective identity of a group, termed the group-defining function. Secondly, language establishes and maintains social relations within the group, known as the group-relating function.[16] Or in the words of Mikhail Bakhtin, this is described as the centrifugal and centripetal forces of

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[13] Costa, J., De Korne, H., & Lane, P. (2018). Standardising minority languages: Reinventing peripheral languages in the 21st century. In *Standardizing minority languages*. Routledge, 1-23.

[14] May, S. (2005). Language rights: Moving the debate forward. *Journal of sociolinguistics, 9*(3), 319-347; Horner, K., & Weber, J. J. (2018). p. 23.

[15] Blommaert, J., & Verschueren, J. (2005). The role of language in European nationalist ideologies. In *Language & peace*. Routledge, 163-188.

[16] Barker, G. C. (1945). The social functions of language. *ETC: A review of general semantics*, 228-234.

language.[17]

The group-defining function of language has a long tradition in human history. In ancient Greece, non-Greek speakers were referred to as *Barbaros*, emphasizing the nascent Greek nation's attempt to construct otherness and define its own identity; a widely spread theory suggests that the Slavs were defined as "the people of the word," emphasizing the role of language in their identity.[18] Since at least the ninth century Abbasid Empire, Arabic has played a significant role in delineating Arab identity from non-Arabs, or *A'jam*, which means those "who do not speak Arabic correctly or clearly."[19] Similar attempts at self-definition can be considered as precedents for descriptive language ideologies that associate language with identity.

The group-relating function of language has also been utilized since early times, particularly in the process of state-building. In ancient Rome, Marcus Tullius Cicero mentioned language, along with rights and "many other things," as important factors uniting the community.[20] Meanwhile, as the national language ideology typically correlates with the standard one, Cicero also displayed an early example of quasi-standard ideology by attempting to elevate the pleasant speech of Rome to the status of an educated standard, while suppressing the language characteristics of the rural periphery, which he deemed as harsh.[21] Similar nascent standard language ideologies can be traced back even earlier to Ancient Greece.[22]

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[17] Bakhtin, M. M. (1981). *The dialogic imagination: Four essays* (M. Holquist & C. Emerson, Trans., M. Holquist, Eds.). University of Texas Press. Austin. p. xix.

[18] Mesiarkin, A. (2017). The name of the Slavs: Etymology and meaning. *Петербургские славянские и балканские исследования*, (1 (21)), 3-20.

[19] Webb, P. (2016). *Imagining the Arabs: Arab identity and the rise of Islam*. Edinburgh University Press. pp. 178-179. See also Christys, A. (2003). The history of Ibn Habib and ethnogenesis in Al-Andalus. In Corradini, R., Diesenberger, M., & Reimitz, H. (Eds.). *The construction of communities in the early middle ages*. Brill, 323-348. p. 344.

[20] Cicero, M. T. (1852). *The orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero. Literally translated by C. D Yonge* (Vol. 1). London: Henry G. Bohn. p. 536.

[21] Adams, J. N. (2003). "Romanitas" and the Latin language. *The classical quarterly, 53*(1), 184-205.

[22] Colvin, S. (2016). The Greek Koine and the logic of a standard language. In *Standard languages and language standards–Greek, past and present*. Routledge, 33-46.

1.2.2. The Italian Case: An Early Expression of the Standard Language Ideology

Standard language ideology played a particularly important role in the modern era and language standardization is widely regarded as the linguistic aspect of modernity. This perspective, as expressed by Susan Gal, proposes that standardized systems are a component of an "axis of modernity," representing a set of "modern" values—such as universality, rationality, and progress—which are opposed to values such as particularity, emotion, and tradition. Positioned on the "modern" side of this spectrum, standardized languages assert their superiority over other forms of language within the same community. [23] From this perspective, language standardization begins aligning with the origin of modernity in the late 16th century, a historical period characterized by a scientific, taxonomic project that posits the necessity of developing "a unique, decontextualized view of nature" to attain certain, definitive knowledge.[24] Consequently, there emerged a demand for language standardization to create a form of language that is "decontextualized, neutral, widely accessible, and learnable."[25]

This led to early language standardization efforts aimed at shaping these decontextualized languages, closely tied to the emergence and development of language academies in Europe. The first among them was the *Accademia della Crusca*, established in 1583 in Florence with the aim of "separating the flour (the good language) from the bran (the bad language)," or more specifically, formalizing the already dominant position of the Florentine dialect as the model for Italian.[26] The ideology at the inception of the academy was more aligned with those of classical times. One of its prominent founding members, Lionardo Salviati, believed that the superior softness of Florentine speech provided such an exquisite pleasure to all who spoke it that it would soon become universally accepted throughout the Italian Peninsula.[27] However, its modernity became evident shortly after its establishment

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[23] Gal, S. (2018). Visions and revisions of minority languages. In *Standardizing minority languages*. Routledge, 222-242.

[24] Slaughter, M. M. (1982). *Universal languages and scientific taxonomy in the seventeenth century*. Cambridge University Press. p. 85.

[25] Costa, J., De Korne, H., & Lane, P. (2018). See also Gal, S., & Woolard, K. A. (2014). Constructing languages and publics authority and representation. In *Languages and publics*. Routledge, 1-12.

[26] https://accademiadellacrusca.it/en/contenuti/origins-and-foundation/7525 (accessed May 3, 2024)

[27] Tosi, A. (2011). The Accademia della Crusca in Italy: Past and present. *Language*

with the introduction of scientific neologisms by Galileo Galilei, a member of the academy since 1605, who was committed to using Italian rather than Latin to reach a wider audience.[28]

1.2.3. The French Case: A Strong Expression of the One Nation–One Language Ideology

A similar standard ideology with modern connotations was more clearly expressed later in 1635 within the French context with the establishment of the *Académie française*. Its mission was explicitly stated as follows: "La principale fonction de l'Académie sera de travailler, avec tout le soin et toute la diligence possibles, à donner des règles certaines à notre langue et à la rendre pure, éloquente et capable de traiter les arts et les sciences. (Article 24 des statuts)" However, unlike the *Accademia della Crusca*, the *Académie française*, as a project ordained by the monarchy, became as much political as academic from the beginning. Cardinal Richelieu, who initiated the academy, was the chief minister during the reign of King Louis XIII of France, a period that witnessed the formation of a more centralized French kingdom. The academy was part of the centralization effort and served as one of Richelieu's instruments for internal unification of the kingdom, embodying the group-relating function of language.[29] The close relationship between standard language ideology and national language ideology was thus more clearly manifested.

Nevertheless, the establishment of the *Académie française* did not radically change language practices in the kingdom for the following one and a half centuries, as the usage of regional languages in France remained vibrant, until significant political and social changes were brought about by the Revolution. The nascent, more centralized republic had the imperative to further impose the French language across the country as a symbol of national identity. Furthermore, there was an urgent need to use the standardized national French language to disseminate the new laws and ideas of the revolution. Since linguistic issues were merely instrumental to this pressing need, regional languages were simultaneously promoted for this purpose at the beginning of the revolution. For instance, in 1790, the Constitution stipulated that all

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policy, 10, 289-303.

[28] *Ibid.*

[29] According to the introduction of the Academy on its official website, https://www.academie francaise.fr/linstitution/les-missions (accessed May 3, 2024)

decrees would be translated into all regional languages, displayed, and read in public places. However, due to a lack of translators and the high costs of translations, the project did not last long.[30]

In contrast, imposing a homogeneous language not only met the practical needs of the revolution but also embodied its spirit, as French, once exclusive to nobles and elites, now belonged to all citizens, signifying equality and freedom. This idea was eloquently articulated by Henri Grégoire, one of the most prominent leaders of the revolution, in 1794, as he inquired: "Si notre idiôme a reçu un tel accueil des tyrans et des cours, à qui la France monarchique donnoit des théâtres, des pompons, des modes & des manières, quel accueil ne doit-il pas se promettre de la part des peuples, à qui la France républicaine révèle leurs droits en leur ouvrant la route de la liberté?"[31] Notably, Henri Grégoire not only championed imposing the standard national language, but also showed great hostility to regional languages, as reflected in the titel of the same article "Rapport sur la nécessité et les moyens d'anéantir les patois et d'universaliser l'usage de la langue française". According to him, the previous tolerance towards regional languages and translation efforts should be completely halted, making room for the dissemination of "une foule d'opuscules patriotiques, qui contiendront des notions simples & lumineuses" in a more standardized French language.

This heightened version of standard language ideology and one nation–one language ideology advocating not only for a standard national language but also for the elimination of language variations, was described by Marie-Clémence Perrot as arising from a defensive situation. In 1793, the Republic faced numerous external and internal threats, particularly from the federalist and royalist movements, where regional languages were seen as carriers of the counter-revolutionary spirit. Therefore, the decision to eliminate patois was aimed more at reaffirming the "one and indivisible" Republic and was "less a question of propagating than of defending the Revolution".[32]

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[30] For this paragraph, see Perrot, M. C. (1997). La politique linguistique pendant la révolution française. *Mots. Les langages du politique, 52*(1), 158-167.
[31] Grégoire, H. (1794). *Rapport sur la nécessité et les moyens d'anéantir les patois et d'universaliser l'usage de la langue française.* Paris: Convention Nationale.
[32] Perrot, M. C. (1997).

1.2.4. The German Case: "One Language-One Nation" Ideology as a Precondition

Such ideologies were not exclusive to France and can also be observed, for example, in the German context. In 1617, the German *Fruchtbringende Gesellschaft* was founded, modeled after the *Accademia della Crusca*, by Prince Ludwig of Anhalt-Köthen, who was a member of the latter.[33] The merits of Modern High German were later promoted by Baroque literary and linguistic societies, facilitating its emergence as a written language. With the rise of German nationalism, by the late 18th century, Modern High German had essentially become established as a standard national language.[34] The ideological debate over whether to eliminate or tolerate regional languages also existed in the German context. For instance, Johann Christoph Gottsched (1700-1766) insisted in his German grammar that one ought to abstain from using provincialisms.[35] In contrast, Jacob Grimm (1785-1863), while acknowledging the importance of a standard, unified written German language as a reminder of shared German descent and as an indispensable medium for the German community, also cherished the value of German dialectal mother tongues.[36]

Despite the similarities mentioned above, there is a significant difference between German and French language ideologies. Unlike France and England, which were unified states governed by monarchs, Germany in the early modern era remained a loose confederation of hundreds of semi-autonomous states. As a result, the Anglo-Franco style of political nationalism—where Ernest Renan famously used the metaphor of viewing the nation as a "daily plebiscite"—did not have the foundation to develop.[37] In contrast, a romantic nationalism, or cultural nationalism, emerged in the German intellectual tradition with language at the heart of it.

This ideology, embodying the group-defining function of language, can be traced

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[33] Pfalzgraf, F. (2009). Linguistic purism in the history of the German language. *Landmarks in the history of the German language*, 137-168.

[34] Lobin, H. (2021). Alles muss raus! Der lange kampf gegen die fremdwörter. https://www.goethe.de/prj/ger/de/kre/spk/22302864.html (accessed May 3, 2024)

[35] Pfalzgraf, F. (2009).

[36] Norberg, J. (2022). *The brothers Grimm and the making of German nationalism*. Cambridge University Press. p. 142-151.

[37] Renan, E. (1882). Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?. Conférence faite en Sorbonne, le 11 mars 1882.

back to the theories of Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803). Herder suggested that a people (*Volk*) is defined by its possession of a distinctive language, which is essential for its national identity and spirit. His primary focus was on the connection between language and *Volk*, conveyed by the phrase, "Nur durch die Sprache wird ein Volk (only through the language a people becomes)." [38] As Frederick Barnard explains: "Language to Herder was the essential criterion of a human being, at once a cultural and a socio-political rallying force. It is also the key-concept in Herder's notion of nationalism."[39] Unlike political nationalism, this ideology offers a culture-oriented interpretation of the people and the nation. It emphasizes not the nation-state as a pre-condition, but rather the "national spirit" (*Volksgeist*) and its manifestations in literature and folklore, the native language, and history, which become the focal points of nationalism.[40]

While language constitutes merely one facet of national identity alongside factors like history, culture, and religion, it has a unique status. People who adhere to this ideology generally believe, as described by Jan Blommaert and Jef Verschueren, that "just as feathers can predict features such as beaks, eggs, and the ability to fly in birds, a specific language can similarly be predictive of a distinct history and culture."[41] This ideological link establishes language as the foremost parameter of a nation and consequently implies that groups distinguished solely on the basis of a distinct language are described as real ethnic groups. Conversely, the absence of a distinct language tends to cast doubts on the legitimacy of ascription to nationhood.[42]

1.2.5. The Arabic Case: An Integrated Development

All the aforementioned European language-ideological traditions, including the

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[38] Bauman, R., & Briggs, C. L. (2003). Voices of modernity: *Language ideologies and the politics of inequality* (No. 21). Cambridge University Press. p. 169; Herder, J. G. (1877). *Sämtliche werke* (Vol. 18, B. L. Suphan, Ed.). Georg Olms. (Original work published 1877). p. 387.

[39] Barnard, F. M. (1959). The Hebrews and Herder's political creed. *The modern language review*, 533-546. p. 540.

[40] Kohn, H. (2017). *The idea of nationalism: A study in its origins and background*. Routledge. p. 5.

[41] Blommaert, J., & Verschueren, J. (2005). The role of language in European nationalist ideologies. In *Language & peace*. Routledge, 163-188.

[42] *Ibid.*

standard language ideology, the one nation–one language ideology, the hostile ideology towards language variations generated by the former two, and the ideology of "one language-one nation" in cultural nationalism, were exported during the colonial era and left a significant impact on the colonized regions. An early example of this influence can be seen in the Arab world.

The emergence and development of Modern Standard Arabic were triggered by the colonial encounter of Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798. At that time, besides colloquial Arabic used by people in daily life, Classical Arabic, as the language of religion, was the formal literary language. It was, however, only written by a small elite on traditional Muslim science and had long lost its status to Turkish high culture in the Ottoman Empire. [43] The brief Napoleon invasion brought an intensive awareness of new science, technologies, and ideas to Arabic speakers and the ruling elites. During the subsequent Egyptian regime under Muhammad Ali (reign 1805–1848), who initiated the modernization process of the country in a bid to become an independent regional power, the development of the Arabic language gained new momentum with the help of government-sponsored education, translation, and publication projects, in which Arabic played a major role alongside Turkish and French.[44]

One of the most notable developments in the Arabic language starting from this period was the influx of a large number of borrowings from European languages concerning new scientific terms and political and cultural concepts, especially from Italian, French, and later English. Previously, the borrowing pools of written Arabic were dominated by languages such as Persian, Turkish, and Greek for expressing "new" concepts.[45] This new expansion of borrowings significantly contributed to the vocabulary changes in the Arabic language, marking one of the most striking differences between Classical Arabic and Modern Standard Arabic.[46]

These new borrowings soon prompted responses, reflecting a significant ideology of purism incorporated into the Arabic standardization process. The ideology

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[43] Newman, D. (2013). The Arabic literary language: The Nahda (and beyond). In J. Owens (Ed.), *The Oxford handbook of Arabic linguistics*. Oxford University Press.

[44] Heyworth-Dunne, J. (1938). *An introduction to the history of education in modern Egypt*. Luzac & Co. pp. 196-199.

[45] Kossmann, M. (2013a). Borrowing. In J. Owens (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of Arabic linguistics. Oxford University Press.

[46] Newman, D. (2013).

of purism is usually driven by a general fear of foreign (cultural) elements, often in response to *perceived* foreign invasion or cultural decline, regardless of whether these threats are actually taking place.[47] This ideology tends to emerge during periods of rapid social change, as was the case in the Arabic world in the 19th century, and is closely intertwined with the standard language ideology and the one nation–one language ideology.[48]

Consequently, just as the *Académie française* initially aimed to make the French language "pure, eloquent, and capable of dealing with the arts and sciences," the Arabic language academies and associations that began to emerge from the mid-19th century, modeled on the *Académie française*, prioritized coining Arabic words to ward off Western loanwords.[49] These efforts produced mixed results. On one hand, the academies, mostly based in Cairo and Damascus, were numerous and competitive, lacking a central authority for coining neologisms.[50] This fragmentation hindered the unification of Arabic technical and scientific terminology, resulting in the persistence of many loanwords in the technical sphere. On the other hand, despite a significant absolute number of loanwords in standard Arabic, their usage rate is relatively low beyond the technical sphere. Maarten Kossmann explains this as both ideological and sociolinguistic. Sociolinguistically, the diglossic situation of standard and colloquial Arabic made the use of the former more closely monitored, while ideologically, the standard and purism language ideologies exerted a significant influence.[51]

The aforementioned developments of the Arabic language constitute an indispensable part of what would later be termed the *Nahda*, or the cultural movement of the "Arab Renaissance," which spanned roughly the second half of the 19th century and the early 20th century. As standard language ideology and the one nation–one language ideology tend to mature hand in hand, the latter also found early expression in the Arabic context during the *Nahda*, with Lebanese Christians playing an important role. Simultaneous to the colonial encounter influencing Egypt, Lebanese Christians became familiar with modern European ideas through religious links. For

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[47] Langer, N., & Davies, W. (2005). An Introduction to linguistic purism. in *Linguistic purism in the Germanic languages*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1-17.
[48] Horner, K., & Weber, J. J. (2018). p. 25.
[49] Newman, D. (2013).
[50] *Ibid.*
[51] Kossmann, M. (2013a).

example, the influential Arabic scholar, writer, and translator Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq (1805-1887), a Lebanese Maronite Christian by birth, traveled to England in 1848 to help in the translation of the New Testament into Arabic and then went to Paris, where he stayed for several years.[52] Starting in the 1860s, he suggested establishing a French-style language academy to regulate and preserve the "purity" of the Arabic language and began writing its grammar.[53]

Another influential intellectual, Butrus al-Bustani (1819–1883), shared a similar background and experience to al-Shidyaq. Born into a Lebanese Christian family, he initially assisted American Protestant missionaries in translating the Bible into Arabic. Later in his career, he dedicated himself to creating an Arabic dictionary and encyclopedia, as well as editing periodicals. In the words of Albert Hourani, all of these endeavors made important contributions to the development of Modern Standard Arabic into "a language true to its past in grammar and idiom, but made capable of expressing simply, precisely, and directly the concepts of modern thought."[54] Apart from these embodiments of standard language ideology, al-Bustani also possessed a national language ideology, as demonstrated by the name of the school he founded in 1863, *al-Madrasa al-Waṭaniyya*, or the National School, where the Arabic language and modern sciences were taught.

The National School was an important part of al-Bustani's nationalist project in the wake of the sectarian violence at the time in Lebanon and Syria. It was the first secular school in the Arab world, maintaining a multi-confessional student body and faculty. For al-Bustani, the Arabic language was not religious but a secular and national language that united its speakers, who also shared a common culture and history. The cultural nationalism and the one nation–one language ideologies were clearly expressed in al-Bustani's plea: "You all drink one water, breathe one air. Your language which you speak, your earth on which you walk, your welfare and your customs are all one."[55] Through the efforts of al-Bustani and other Christian Arab intellectuals of the time, such as Nasif al-Yaziji and Ibrahim al-Yaziji, Arabic not only

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[52] Hourani, A. (2013). *Arabic thought in the liberal age, 1798–1939*. Cambridge University Press. p. 98.

[53] Newman, D. (2013).; Shidyāq, A. F. (1891). *A practical grammar of the Arabic language: With interlineal reading lessons, dialogues and vocabulary*. B. Quaritch.

[54] Hourani, A. (2013). p. 100.

[55] Sheehi, S. (2012). Butrus al-Bustani: Syria's ideologue of the age. In *The origins of Syrian nationhood: Histories, pioneers and identity*. Routledge, 57-78.

became a secular language of modern science and technology but also a secular language of Arabness.

The idea was not restricted to Christians, especially towards the start of the 20th century. At that time, awakened awakened Arabness swiftly evolved into a movement with a broad network of associations, parties, secret societies, and clubs advocating for reforms and decentralization throughout the Arab provinces of the empire, and calling for Arabic to be recognized as an official language.[56] One of the most active participants in the movement, the Homs-born and Istanbul-educated activist 'Abd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi, once emphatically expressed his national language ideology: "This Arab race has its characteristics in the unity of language, customs, interests, and tendencies that have emphasized Arab rights still ignored to this hour. For that reason, we, as Ottomans, demanded to have an effective share in the administration of the affairs of the empire, and to expose, as Arabs, special demands with reference to our nationalism and status."[57]

However, these advocations of Arab nationalism did not immediately become influential among the Arab majority in the late Ottoman Empire. On the one hand, Arab activists, initially inspired by the restoration of the Ottoman constitution, were soon brutally suppressed by the governing Committee of Union and Progress, with al-Zahrawi himself executed.[58] On the other hand, the majority of the Muslim Arab intellectual elite still embraced Ottomanism and generally cherished the Islamic *Umma*. Many even viewed Arab nationalism as a Christian project, critically rebuking that "Arabic shall not be Christianized."[59] The situation only changed with the fall of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. This shift can be exemplified by the experience of Sati' al-Husri (1880-1968), the influential director general of education of the Hashemite Kingdom of Iraq.

Born to a Syrian family of the traditional Ottoman Arab elite, al-Husri was a renowned educational officer of the empire who was trained in Istanbul, worked in

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[56] Tarabein, A. (1991). 'Abd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi: The career and thought of an Arab nationalist. In Khalidi, R., Anderson, L., Muslih, M. Y., & Simon, R. S. (Eds.). (1991). *The origins of Arab nationalism*. Columbia University Press, 97-119. p. 99.

[57] Al-Khatib, M. (1913), *al-mu'tamar al-'arabi al-awwal* (The first Arab congress), pp. 17-18. Quoted in Tarabein, A. (1991). p. 103.

[58] Tarabein, A. (1991). p. 109.

[59] Dawn, C. E. (1961). From Ottomanism to Arabism: The origin of an ideology. *The review of politics, 23*(3), 378-400.

the Balkans, and once held the position of head of the teacher training school (*darülmuallimin*), where he played an important role in the educational modernization process of the empire.[60] In the first half of his life, al-Husri adhered to the ideology of Ottomanism, which sought to unify Turks and Arabs, and hardly spoke about Arab nationalism. However, as Ernest Dawn stated, "Arabism won its first success, and a complete success, when the failure of the Ottoman Empire in World War I left the dominant faction of the Arab elite with no alternative to Arabism."[61] Al-Husri was a member of this elite, and significantly contributed to the success of this Arabism.

The aforementioned language ideologies from the French and German traditions can all be found in the Arab nationalism developed by al-Husri. In 1919, as the head of the education committee of the short-lived Arab Kingdom of Syria under King Faisal I, he became involved in setting up the Arab Science Academy in Damascus (*al-Majma'a al-'Ilmī al-'Arabī bi Dimashq*), patterned after the *Académie Française*.[62] After following Faysal to Iraq in 1920 and resuming as the director general of education, al-Husri's ideology became more influencial. Patterning to cultural nationalism, al-Husri presented the Arab *Umma* in a secular, nationalist mode as united by language and history, stating that "the language is the soul and the life of the nation, history is its memory and its consciousness."[63] For him, a nation is not an Anglo-Franco style political "daily plebiscite," but rather something truly existing, more aligned with the German conceptualization. The ideology is described by Albert Hourani as, "a man is, or is not, an Arab whether he wants to be or not," which means that the Arab nation consists of all who speak Arabic as their mother tongue, "no more, no less."[64]

Sati' al-Husri recommended that the Iraqi curriculum be based in Arabic rather than Turkish. He stressed the importance of a concentration on classical Arabic

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[60] Cleveland, W. L. (1971). *The making of an Arab nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the life and thought of Sati' Al-Husri*. Princeton University Press. pp. 12-46.

[61] Dawn, C. E. (1962). The rise of Arabism in Syria. *Middle east journal, 16*(2), 145-168.

[62] Khoury, S. (2016). *Instituting renaissance: The early work of the Arab academy of science in Damascus, 1919-1930*. The George Washington University. pp. 204-207.

[63] Quoted in Tibi, B. (1981). *Arab nationalism: A critical enquiry*. (M. Farouk-Sluglett & P. Sluglett, Eds. and Trans.). Macmillan. p.122.

[64] Hourani, A. (2013). p. 313.

grammar and reading and aimed to achieve national regional unity through the use of standard Arabic to the exclusion of local dialects. [65] Similar language ideology showing hostility against dialects in the Arabic context can still be found in recent times. For example, in 2008, Mazin al-Mubarak, an Arabic scholar and a member of the Language Academy in Syria, called for a reinforcement of the status of Standard Arabic and advocated for a gradual eradication of the use of colloquial Arabic in Syria.[66] However, in general, similar ideologies cannot be considered as influential or applicable in the Arabic world, where the diglossic situation between Standard and Colloquial Arabic is firmly established, with the latter dominating most aspects of daily life. That said, the standard language ideology and the one nation–one language ideology have also been significantly successful. Standard Arabic has deeply integrated into all levels of society throughout the Arab world. It is used in both written and spoken forms, both nationally and internationally, representing a true revival of the Arabic language.[67]

Furthermore, ideologically, despite diverse language practices across all Arabic countries, Arabic remains the sole and exclusive official language in the majority of cases.[68] This was also the case of independent Morocco until the changes to the consitution in 2011, which gave official recognition to Amazigh (see Chapter Two).

1.3. Language Policy and Planning

The fact that standardized Arabic achieved ideological success as the sole official language in practically multilingual countries, with similar cases in different contexts, is of interest to the coherent academic field known as Language Policy and Planning (LPP). The name Language Policy and Planning is problematic, as it is used inconsistently. Sometimes language policy is considered the overall framework with planning as an aspect of it, while at other times language planning is the main focus

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[65] Simon, R. S. (1986). The teaching of history in Iraq before the Rashid Ali coup of 1941. *Middle eastern studies*, *22*(1), 37-51.
[66] Bassiouney, R. (2009). *Arabic sociolinguistics*. Edinburgh University Press. p. 202.
[67] Newman, D. (2013).; Shraybom-Shivtiel, S. (1995). The role of the colloquial in the renaissance of standard Arabic Language as a mirror of social change. In Izre'el, S., & Drory, R. (Eds.). *Language and culture in the Near East*. Brill, 207-215.
[68] Bassiouney, R. (2009). p. 211.

with policies as different aspects of the planning practice. Moreover, a recent trend uses the term language management, as it is believed to more precisely capture the nature of the phenomenon.[69]

I will continue using the term LPP but bear in mind its disputes and limitations. One reason for this choice is to avoid ambiguity. The term language management is used mainly to differentiate between simple and organized management, in which the simple one means "the speaker can manage individual features or aspects of his or her own or of his or her interlocutor's discourse here and now."[70] It is an important notion but generally not the focus of this thesis, especially considering that management is used in the name of the *Centre de l'aménagement linguistique* (CAL) of IRCAM, which is one of the focuses of this thesis, with the meaning of organized management which is directed and systematic.

Though there is no universal definition or approach to LPP, as the field highly depends on and varies according to context, scholars typically engage with the influential model by Bernard Spolsky, who posits that language policy comprises three interrelated but independently describable components: practice, beliefs, and management.[71]

Language practices refer to the observable behaviors and choices regarding language use – essentially, what people actually do. This includes the specific linguistic features they select and the variety of language they use regularly or typically. Language beliefs are largely equivalent to the term language ideologies. Language management, also known as language planning, operates on the assumption that language practices and beliefs can be influenced and altered. It typically involves deliberate efforts by language managers to change the language practices and/or ideologies of a targeted speech community.

Language management generally involves four types of planning: status, corpus, acquisition, and prestige planning. As proposed by Heinz Kloss, status planning aims to regulate the societal status and functional range of a language or variety, such as designating a language as official.[72] Corpus planning, also known as "language

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[69] Spolsky, B. (2009). *Language management*. Cambridge University Press. pp. 4-5.

[70] Nekvapil, J., & Nekula, M. (2006). On language management in multinational companies in the Czech Republic. *Current issues in language planning*, 7(2-3), 307-327.

[71] Spolsky, B. (2004). *Language policy*. Cambridge university press.

[72] Kloss, H. (1968). Notes concerning a language–nation typology. In J. A. Fishman,

cultivation," involves creating new forms, modifying existing ones, or selecting from alternative forms in a spoken or written code. It is closely related to language standardization, including the development and reform of writing systems and spelling, various aspects of purism, and the modernization of the lexicon, particularly the selection and coinage of new words to address modern life and technology.[73]

Among the other two discernible types of planning, acquisition planning aims to increase the number of users of a language or variety. More pertinent to educational plans, acquisition planning involves topics such as literacy, multilingual education, and creating integrated approaches to language teaching and learning in the school context.[74] Prestige planning, as suggested by Harald Haarmann, is based on the understanding that any language planning effort must be supported by a favorable psychological background among the people. This positive perception is essential for the effective implementation of planning goals and is ultimately the most crucial factor for the long-term success of the planning. Prestige planning, functioning on language beliefs or ideologies, operates at four levels, resulting in promoting the mental image of a certain language or variety by governments, by agencies, by groups, or by individuals.[75]

This last point is particularly noteworthy as it aligns with the significant shift in the LPP field away from the classic language planning model of the 1960s and 70s, which operated on the premise that language planning occurred solely at the nation-state level and aimed to influence the development of the entire society.[76] Later

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C. A. Ferguson, & J. Das Gupta (Eds.). *Language problems of developing nations*. New York: Wiley, 69-85.

[73] Spolsky, B. (2011). Language academies and other language management agencies. *Language policy, 10*(4), 285-287. For "language cultivation" named by the Prague linguistic school see Prague School. (1973). General principles for the cultivation of good language (P. L. Garvin, Trans.). In J. Rubin & R. Shuy (Eds.), *Language planning: Current issues and research*. Georgetown University Press, 102–111.

[74] Hogan-Brun, G., Robinson, C., & Thonhauser, I. (2013). Acquisition planning. *The encyclopedia of applied linguistics*, 1-9.; Cooper, R. L. (1989). *Language planning and social change*. Cambridge university press.

[75] Haarmann, H. (1990). Language planning in the light of a general theory of language: A methodological framework. *International journal of the sociology of language* 86, 103–26.; See also Ager, D. (2005). Image and prestige planning. *Current issues in language planning, 6*(1), 1-43.

[76] Jernudd, B. & Nekvapil, J. (2011). History of the field: A sketch. In *The*

scholars generally view this as an incomplete perspective, since language planners or managers are not limited to the nation-state level but also operate at the levels of organizations, schools, families, individuals, etc. This is also the advantage of the term "language cultivation" over planning, as it not only asks the question how languages are planned by higher authorities but also addresses personal concerns, such as "How well can I perform in the standard variety?"[77]

Acknowledging the diversity of planners, it is necessary to pin down the focus of this thesis, which is on language activists and language academies. According to Bernard Spolsky, language activists, as significant participants in LPP, are "individuals and groups whose ideology is clearest in support of the maintenance, revival, or spread of a threatened target language."[78] This is the case with IRCAM, the language academy where activists are faced with the practical need for the "maintenance" of Amazigh in Morocco and aim for the ideological "revitalization" of the language. Spolsky also reminds us that at a lower level, "activists attempt to influence existing, former, or potential speakers of the language to continue its use and to persuade government to support their plans." This suggestion reveals two important aspects: activists target twofold, aiming at both speakers and the government, and language beliefs or ideologies play a crucial role in their influence, as the views of speakers and governments are what matter most.[79]

Therefore, it is the more ideologically related status planning that matters most to activists and academics as they participate. As Spolsky states, "their (activists) linguicentrism enables them to concentrate their mobilizing efforts on a single goal, the status of a language,"[80] and notes that "proclaiming status is usually the first goal of an academy."[81] It is especially so in the LPP model of Reversing Language Shift (RLS) when activists prioritize the need for language maintenance. In this context, status planning, which aims to "allocate societal resources in such ways as to foster the use of language in more (and more important) societal functions," takes precedence, while corpus planning, which usually involves "constructing

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Cambridge handbook of language policy. Cambridge University Press, 16-36.

[77] Spolsky, B. (2009). *Language management*. Cambridge University Press. p. 13.

[78] *Ibid.* p. 204.

[79] *Ibid.*

[80] *Ibid.* p. 205.

[81] Spolsky, B. (2011). p. 286.

orthographies and written grammars for previously oral language traditions," becomes instrumental in fulfilling the goals of status planning.[82]

However, recognizing corpus planning more as a method rather than the ultimate aim in an activism-oriented LPP model does not mean it is less important. On the contrary, the corpus of language is typically the only aspect activists and academies have direct control over. And it is sometimes the ideologies embodied in corpus planning that they strive to get accepted by both the government and speakers. This is the case of IRCAM, as we will see, whose corpus planning is more akin to ideological planning than to practical planning, as the theoretical standard language it plans has a significant distance from speakers' actual usage and has always faced difficulties in acceptance.

In addition to corpus planning, IRCAM has been involved in other aspects, including status planning (such as the constitutional recognition of the Amazigh language in Morocco, which the establishment of IRCAM itself was part of the process), acquisition planning (such as the inclusion of teaching Amazigh in the Moroccan educational system), and prestige planning (the increased usage of Amazigh varieties in urban areas and the significantly improved image of the language), where it strives to exert influence and has made important contributions.

Spolsky highlights the significance of studies about language academies by stating: "We need to know how successful government language agencies are in influencing language practices and what language management techniques have proved to be effective."[83] However, this thesis will not be outcome-oriented, focusing on measuring the success of LPP implementation by a language academy. Instead, it will examine IRCAM's planning efforts, with an emphasis on the ideologies behind them. It contributes to the field of LPP by presenting a case where politically driven planning efforts are not primarily shaped by the agency of speakers but by state considerations. This thesis explores how such political needs triggered a post-naturalist language ideology, which Kathryn A. Woolard refers to as "project authenticity,"[84] leading to a series of planning efforts that are significantly detached

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[82] Fishman, J. A. (1991). *Reversing language shift: Theoretical and empirical foundations of assistance to threatened languages*. Multilingual matters. p. 338.
[83] Spolsky, B. (2011). p. 287.
[84] Woolard, K. A. (2016). *Singular and plural: Ideologies of linguistic authority in 21st century Catalonia*. Oxford University Press. pp. 38, 296.

from the actual language practices of speakers and are difficult to interpret through traditional language ideologies.

1.4. Languages of Morocco and the Situation of Amazigh

The Moroccan constitution of 2011 states that "L'arabe demeure la langue officielle de l'État. L'Etat oeuvre à la protection et au développement de la langue arabe, ainsi qu'à la promotion de son utilisation. De même, l'amazighe constitue une langue officielle de l'État, en tant que patrimoine commun à tous les Marocains sans exception" (Arabic remains the official language of the State. The State works to protect and develop the Arabic language, as well as to promote its use. Similarly, Amazigh is an official language of the State, as a common heritage for all Moroccans without exception).[85] Arabic and Amazigh are thus recognized by the state as two official languages.

In practice, people living in the realm of the Moroccan kingdom typically use either the vernacular Moroccan Arabic, known as Darija, a Maghrebi Arabic dialect, or one of the Amazigh varieties as their mother tongue. Moroccan Arabic, serving as the lingua franca of the country, is spoken by most native Amazigh speakers as a second, or second first language, while the acquisition of Amazigh by Arabic speakers is rare. Native speakers of both languages need to acquire Standard Arabic to achieve literacy (with the literacy rate for adults aged 15 and above relatively low at 77%, according to UNESCO statistics in 2022).[86] French (and Spanish in certain areas) has been another important literacy language in the country since the colonial era. Although it was meant to be phased out under the Arabization policy initiated shortly after Morocco's independence in the early 1960s, French, as a prestigious foreign language, continues to hold a strong position in various domains such as economy, science, and technology.[87] The language situation in Morocco means that it is a prerequisite for any native Amazigh speakers to learn at least a second language,

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[85] Secrétariat général du gouvernement, Direction de l'Imprimerie Officielle, Royaume du Maroc. (2011). *La Constitution*. Série "Documentation Juridique Marocaine", Dahir n° 1-11-91, 30 juillet 2011.

[86] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS?locations=MA (accessed January 21, 2024)

[87] Ennaji, M. (2013). Language contact, Arabization policy and education in Morocco. In *Language contact and language conflict in Arabic*. Routledge, 88-106.

Moroccan Arabic, to achieve social integration on a supraregional level, and a third language, Standard Arabic, to become literate in their own country.

Though their exact number is not known, Amazigh speakers in Morocco probably comprise approximately one-third of the Moroccan population.[88] Towards the lower end of the statistical spectrum, the *Haut Commissariat au Plan* (HCP), the main producer of official statistics in Morocco, reported the percentage as 28% in 2004, 26.7% in 2014, and 25% in 2024.[89] However, both the results and, especially, the decreasing trend have been deemed highly doubtful and faced severe criticism.[90] As for the higher end, the linguist Moha Ennaji suggested that approximately half of the population of Morocco speaks Amazigh as a mother tongue.[91] This high percentage is seldom echoed by other mainstream estimations. When translated into absolute numbers, even a low estimate by the HCP in 2014 shows that 9,037,481 people in Morocco are native Amazigh speakers, making it the country with the largest Amazigh-speaking population in the world.[92]

Nonetheless, it is important to understand that the term Amazigh does not denote a homogeneous, mutually intelligible language. Instead, Amazigh is more accurately understood as a language family rather than a single language. Languages of the family are spoken across a vast yet discontinuous region stretching roughly from the Atlantic coast to western Egypt, and from the Mediterranean to the Niger River. The distances between certain Amazigh varieties are substantial and vary. To quote Maarten Kossmann, for example, "the differences between Zenaga and Tarifiyt are certainly not smaller than those between Romanian and French, and the differences between Tarifiyt and Figuig Berber may be comparable to those between Spanish and Portuguese."[93] In this thesis, I will not go further into the complex issue of Amazigh

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[88] For an analysis of the number of Amazigh speakers in Morocco, see Kossmann, M. (2013b). *The Arabic influence on northern Berber*. Brill. pp. 32-33.

[89] https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2024/12/167085/moroccos-language-dilemma-benmoussa-says-92-speak-darija-only-25-amazigh/ (accessed February 27, 2025)

[90] https://medias24.com/2015/10/16/lircam-denonce-les-chiffres-du-hcp-sur-lutilisation-de-lamazigh/ (accessed January 23, 2024)

[91] Ennaji, M. (2005). *Multilingualism, cultural identity, and education in Morocco*. Springer Science & Business Media. p. 74.

[92] http://rgphentableaux.hcp.ma/Home/ (accessed September 10, 2024) The Number comes from 26.7% of the legal population of Morocco, 33,848,242.

[93] Kossmann, M. (2013b). p. 17.

classification. Instead I will use the widely used names of Amazigh varieties without specifying whether they are languages or dialects.

Amazigh varieties in Morocco are generally categorized into three main groups: Tarifiyt, Central Moroccan Amazigh, and Tashelhiyt. Tarifiyt, spoken by around 4% of the Moroccan population, is found in the northeast of the country, in the Rif region.[94] It features considerable dialectal diversity internally and and is linguistically closest to Amazigh varieties to the southeast and east, extending towards and across the Algerian border.[95]

Central Moroccan Amazigh, or "Tamazight" in the narrow sense of the term (not referring to all Amazigh languages), is mainly found in the Middle Atlas region, hence it is also known as Middle Atlas Amazigh. However, due to its spread beyond the geographic Middle Atlas, Central Moroccan Amazigh is a less ambiguous name.[96] It is spoken by approximately 13% of the Moroccan population across a vast area spanning from the Taza corridor to Demnate and Ouarzazate, and from Tiflet to Tafilalt. Central Moroccan Amazigh is characterized by relatively high internal linguistic variation, with varieties that can be further classified into northern and southern groups.[97]

Tashelhiyt is the most widely spoken Amazigh variety in Morocco. It is used in the southwestern region, by approximately 15% of the Moroccan population. It covers a large geographical area extending from the western part of the High Atlas to the Souss plain, and from the Anti-Atlas to the pre-Saharan zone south of the mountains. Though there is serious local variation within Tashelhiyt, speakers of various dialects understand each other well.[98] All three main Amazigh varieties in Morocco are vigorous languages, used locally in most aspects of life except in domains where writing is concerned.

During the half century after Morocco's independence, with the implementation of the Arabization policy aiming to phase out the influence of the French language

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[94] Mourigh, K., & Kossmann, M. (2019). *An introduction to Tarifiyt Berber (Nador, Morocco)*. Ugarit-Verlag. pp. 11-12.

[95] *Ibid*.

[96] Kossmann, M. (2013b). p. 20-21.

[97] Taïfi, M. (1991). *Dictionnaire tamazight-français: Parlers du Maroc central*. L'Harmattan-Awal. Introduction. I-II.

[98] El Mountassir, A. (1999). *Initiation au tachelhit: Langue berbère du sud du Maroc*. L'Asiathèque-maison des langues du monde. p. 14.

from the colonial era, the "one nation–one language" ideology of Arabic gained dominance, regardless of the multilingual situation long established in the country. As both the 1962 and 1996 constitutions stated: "Le Royaume du Maroc, Etat musulman souverain, dont la langue officielle est l'arabe, constitue une partie du Grand Maghreb (Arabe)."[99] The Amazigh language was thus officially ignored for decades in the country.

Moreover, the Arabization policy and the gap it created between language ideology and practice coincided with the rapid urbanization of the country, with the percentage of the urban population rising from 29% in 1960 to 65% in 2022.[100] Amazigh generally failed to integrate into this critical urbanization process[101], greatly exacerbating a situation described by Amazigh activists as: "Des millions de berbérophones vivent en étrangers dans leur propre pays. Le ressentiment qu'ils en éprouvent est plus fort qu'il n'aurait été s'ils vivaient un véritable exil" (Millions of Berber speakers live as strangers in their own country. The resentment they feel is stronger than it would have been if they were living in true exile).[102]

1.5. Language Policy and Planning for Amazigh

With general information regarding LPP and the Amazigh language in Morocco presented, I will introduce in this section the existing works focusing on LPP of Amazigh languages, particularly concerning language planning issues. Related research initially gained prominence in studies focusing on the Kabyle variety in Algeria, with Chaker (1983; 1985) providing systematic reflections.[103] Achab (2013)

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[99] It is interesting to note that the 1996 version added the "*Arabe*" after "*Grand Maghreb*" which was previously seen as a default. See https://mjp.univ-perp.fr/constit/ma1962.htm#pr and https://mjp.univ-perp.fr/constit/ma1996.htm#:~:text=Le%20Royaume%20du%20Maroc%2C%20%C3%89tat,r%C3%A9alisation%20de%20l'unit%C3%A9%20africaine (accessed March 9, 2024)

[100] The World Bank's data: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?locations=MA (accessed March 9, 2024)

[101] Kossmann, M. (2013b). p. 38.

[102] From the Berber (Amazigh) Manifesto. http://www.mondeberbere.com/chafik_berber-manifesto.html (accessed March 17, 2024)

[103] Chaker, S. (1983). De la linguistique descriptive à la linguistique appliquée: Un

provides a thorough review of the development of Amazigh neologism from the beginning of Amazigh activism in Algeria to recent times. Many of the neologisms documented are found in the dictionary compiled by IRCAM.[104] In Morocco, the initial focus was on orthography, as discussed by Elmedlaoui (1999), and on specialized vocabularies, such as educaional terms compiled by Belaid (1993), and legal terms compiled by Afulay et al. (1996).[105]

For the standardization issue of Moroccan Amazigh varieties, two trends exist. One proposes the standardization of regional varieties, as suggested, for example, by Lafkioui (2002), based on the case of Riffian, where it is stated that "il faudrait essayer de construire une koinè dialectale représentative pour chaque grande région."[106] While the approach has been supported by many scholars, as demonstrated by Chaker (1998) and exemplified by the relatively successful case of Kabyle in Algeria, there is a lack of an implementing entity in Morocco, and related literature on this subject is scarce.[107] Sadiqi & Ennaji (2004) can be interpreted as an example of work in this direction as it aims at being a "descriptive simplified" grammar of Amazigh. According to its authors, it is based on, but not limited to, the variaties of Azilal and Beni Mellal region, and meant as a starting point for the standardization of the language.[108] It does not specify the direction and outcome of this standardization, but reflects the southern varieties of Central Moroccan Amazigh more than any other

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tournant dans le domaine berbère. *Tafsut-Etudes et débats*, (01), 57-63.; Chaker, S. (1985). La planification linguistique dans le domaine berbère: Une normalisation pan-berbère est-elle possible?. *Tafsut-Etudes et débats*, (02), 81-91.

[104] Achab, R. (2013). *L'aménagement du lexique berbère de 1945 à nos jours*. Editions Achab.

[105] Elmedlaoui, M. (1999). *Principes d'orthographe berbère: en graphie arabe ou latine*. Université Mohamed I, Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines d'Oujda.; Belaid, B. (1993). *Tamawalt usegmi: Vocabulaire de l'éducation, français-tamazight*. Rabat: Imprimerie Najah El Jadida.; Afulay, A., Fouad, L., & Adghirni, A. (1996). *Amawal azerfan: Lexique juridique français-amazighe*. Rabat: Imperial.

[106] Lafkioui, M. (2002). Le rifain et son orthographe: entre variation et uniformisation. In D. Caubet, S. Chaker, & J. Sibille (Eds.). *Codification des langues de France*. L'Harmattan, 355-366.

[107] Chaker, S. (1998). Orientations générales pour l'aménagement de la langue berbère: Urgence et réalisme. *Atelier aménagement linguistique de la langue berbère*. INALCO.

[108] Sadiqi, F., & Ennaji, M. (2004). *A grammar of Amazigh*. Pars Lettres 25. Publications of the Faculty of Letters Dhar El Mehraz, Fès.

varieties.

The other trend, codifying a standard Moroccan Amazigh based on all three main Moroccan varieties, has been implemented at the official level in Morocco by IRCAM. Several theoretical works on the issue have been published. Ameur et al. (2004) is the first didactic manual by CAL, addressing the urgent need to incorporate the teaching of the Amazigh language into the Moroccan educational system. This applied-oriented work adopts a highly interventionist approach, sometimes prescribing the replacement of specific features of Amazigh varieties so that "la forme de base qui est d'ailleurs 'pan-amazighe'"can be restored.[109]

Boukhris et al. (2008) explains the grammar of standard Moroccan Amazigh in more detail. As the strategy aiming to ensure the unity of the language, it stated that "on retient comme outils ou morphèmes fondamentaux ce qui est commun aux différentes variétés ou ce qui est le plus fréquent." Meanwhile, it commits itself to safeguarding the grammatical richness of the language and to leaving room for variation.[110] This combination of the principles of unity and pluralism sometimes leads to ambiguity regarding its criteria and implementation, and further examination is needed to understand how it works.

As an example, in prescribing the system of conditional subordination, Boukhris et al. (2008) generally follows the common feature of Amazigh varieties to differentiate between hypothetical and counterfactual conditions. To accommodate variations, it provides multiple conjunctions, including *mala (mla), mri (mr), ig (igh), mk (km), mud, mta* all translated as "if." Among these, *ig (igh)* and *mk (km)* indicate hypothetical conditions ("une condition dans le futur"), while *mud* and *mta* denote counterfactual conditions ("une hypothèse dans le passé"). However, when it comes to *mala (mla)*, the conjunction does not serve to indicate different conditions. Instead, the sentence relies solely on verb conjugations to convey the meaning, as demonstrated in the two examples provided: "*Mala (mla) ad iddu ghr babas ad kis mungh* ("If he goes to his father, I will accompany him"); *Mala (mla) idda ghr babas ad kis mungh* ("If he had gone to his father, I would have accompanied him").[111]

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[109] Ameur. M., Bouhjar. A., Boukhris. F., Boukous. A., Boumalk. A., Elmedlaoui M., Iazzi. E. & Souifi. H. (2004). *Initiation à la langue amazighe*. IRCAM. p. 21.

[110] Boukhris, F., Boumalk, A., El Houssaïn. M, & Souifi, H. (2008). *La nouvelle grammaire de l'amazighe*. IRCAM. pp. 12-13.

[111] *Ibid.* p. 181.

This loss of function in *mala (mla)* to differentiate between hypothetical and counterfactual conditions contrasts with actual language practices. In Tarifiyt, it is exclusively used as a hypothetical conjugation.[112] Conversely, in Tashelhiyt, where *mla* is also found, its usage is similar to *mta* in exclusively introducing the counterfactual subordinate clause.[113] Thus, the grammar accords with the description that in Amazigh varieties in Morocco, *mala (mla)* can either be a hypothetical or counterfactual conjunction, while at the same time, it suggests that the appearance of this conjunction cannot immediately indicate the nature of the following subordinate clause, which is generally not the case in Amazigh varieties. So it leaves questions regarding the criteria for applying the principle of unity and that of leaving room for variations in the standard Amazigh, which need further exploration.

Another question partly shown in the same example is that, if the natural correspondence between the aforementioned conjunctions in individual Amazigh varieties is not specified, along with other linguistic aspects where pluralism is applied, it will be deemed legitimate to mix different features of different varieties in one sentence or context in standard Amazigh, as long as they are not specifically ruled out. This leads to the consideration that the usage of the homogeneous standard Moroccan Amazigh might be unpredictable and even more heterogeneous than Amazigh varieties. Paradoxically, any approach to reduce these random combinations would entail a focus on the grammars of specific varieties, which IRCAM considers undesirable.

The principle of pluralism is more readily understandable when applied to vocabulary planning. Ameur et al. (2017) is a comprehensive Amazigh-French-Arabic dictionary that aims to collect vocabularies from all Amazigh varieties in Morocco. It views all collected vocabularies as belonging to a common resource of "Moroccan Amazigh," which were previously scattered across different dialect descriptions. When collected together, the dialectal or geographical origins of the vocabularies are deliberately omitted in the dictionary to align with the overall language planning strategy of IRCAM.[114] Notably, although it embraces the richness of Amazigh

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[112] Mourigh, K., & Kossmann, M. (2019). p. 115.

[113] Aspinion, R. (1953). *Apprenons le berbère: Initiation aux dialectes chleuhs*. Eds Felix Moncho. p. 303.

[114] Ameur, M., Ansar, K., Boumalk, A., El Azrak, N., Laabdelaoui, R., & Souifi, H. (2017). *Dictionnaire général de la langue amazighe*. IRCAM. p. 5.

varieties, the dictionary excludes the vast majority of Arabic loanwords, which are ubiquitous and important in the language practice of all Amazigh varieties. This phenomenon is also of interest in the ideological examinations of this thesis.

Additionally, IRCAM published Taïfi (2016), a substantial dictionary that expands the work of the same author's 1991 dictionary for central Moroccan Amazigh to encompass the "parlers du Maroc."[115] In comparison to IRCAM's dictionary, it agrees that the system of Amazigh needs to be reconstituted. However, it differs in that it does not avoid showcasing the contact between Arabic and Amazigh.[116] In spite of this presence of Arabic-related words in the dictionary, IRCAM described it in its communications as "embracing the vision of the institute in terms of standardization of Amazigh."[117]

Among other important works regarding standard Moroccan Amazigh, Laabdelaoui et al. (2012) presents a conjugation manual for the language. Initially, the work compiled 10,000 verbs from various Moroccan varieties. Subsequently, the authors pruned this collection by excluding repetitions and "non-integrated loans," resulting in a condensed list of 3584 words. These verbs are categorized into 31 types of conjugation, each accompanied by illustrative examples.[118] Ameur et al. (2010) focuses on IRCAM's planning of the Neo-Tifinagh script, intended for official use in writing standard Moroccan Amazigh. It includes a discussion of the history and historical significance of the alphabet from IRCAM's perspective.[119]

Additionally, there is a wealth of literature on sociolinguistics, focusing on Amazigh issues as part of the overall research landscape in Morocco. Ennaji (2005) examines the sociolinguistic history and situation in Morocco, emphasizing the impact of multilingualism, with Amazigh playing an indispensable role, on the cultural

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[115] Taïfi, M. (2016). *Dictionnaire raisonné berbère-français: Parlers du Maroc*. IRCAM.

[116] Taïfi, M., & Pognan, P. (2011). Un dictionnaire en tant que corpus: Traitements informatiques du dictionnaire raisonné berbère–français de Miloud Taïfi. *Les ressources langagières: Construction et exploitation*, 33-51.

[117] https://www.ircam.ma/index.php/fr/actualites/nouvelle-publication-dictionnaire-raisonne-berbere-fran%C3%A7ais-parlers-du-maroc (accessed June 1, 2024)

[118] Laabdelaoui, R., Boumalk, A., Iazzi, E. M., Souifi, H., & Ansar, K. (2012). *Manuel de conjugaison de l'amazighe*. IRCAM.

[119] Ameur, M., Bouhajar, A., Boukhris, F., Boukous, A., Boumalk, A., Elmedlaoui, M., & Iazzi, E. M. (2010). *Amazigh script and orthography* (Arabic version). IRCAM.

identity of the country.[120] Abbassi (1977) provides a comprehensive study on a similar topic of multilingualism in Morocco, based on the situation before some significant changes occurred in the status of Amazigh. Despite this, his detailed research on diglossia and code-switching, where Amazigh has a presence, still provides valuable insights.[121] Sadiqi (2003) examines languages in Morocco within the framework of gender studies. The study investigates the functioning of concepts such as monolingualism, code-switching, and illiteracy within the social life and language practices of the country, particularly focusing on gender issues.[122]

Boukous (1995) conducts sociolinguistic and sociocultural studies of Morocco, examining its language market within the framework of Bourdieu's propositions on symbolic production. The analysis focuses on the competitive relationships between Amazigh, Arabic (both dialectal and standard), French, and Spanish in the Moroccan language market. The work reveals the mechanisms by which certain languages constitute symbolic capital, enabling their speakers to benefit from both material and symbolic profits and privileges in Morocco. According to this study, Amazigh represents the least well-off language in this competition, as it not only competes at a disadvantage as "une langue faible" alongside dialectal Arabic against "les langues fortes" (standard Arabic and French) but also faces internal competition. In this competition, the Amazigh-speaking communities established in urban areas are subject to a process of "linguistic assimilation," particularly among the younger generations, in favor of dialectal Arabic.[123]

This analysis of the Moroccan language market, especially the predicament of Amazigh, is largely inherited in Boukous (2012), which discusses measures to counter the "attrition-death" of the Amazigh language and guide its "revitalization" in Morocco. Considering the author's tenure as the rector of IRCAM for more than twenty years, this work can be regarded as an important guiding influence on the LPP efforts led by the institute, showcasing the ideology of IRCAM in a concentrated

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[120] Ennaji, M. (2005). *Multilingualism, cultural identity, and education in Morocco*. Springer Science & Business Media.

[121] Abbassi, A. (1977). *A Sociolinguistic Analysis of Multilingualism in Morocco*. (Doctoral dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin).

[122] Sadiqi, F. (2003). *Women, gender and language in Morocco*. Brill.

[123] Boukous, A. (1995b). *Société, langues et cultures au Maroc: Enjeux symboliques*. Faculté des lettres et des sciences humaines-Rabat.

manner.[124] Boukous (2018) continues these discussions, addressing more recent developments in the Moroccan language market.[125]

In addition, several studies focusing on the LPP of the Amazigh language in Morocco itself can also be found. Nachef (2016) primarily focuses on the acquisition planning of the Amazigh language in Morocco. After providing information regarding status planning and corpus planning of standard Moroccan Amazigh, the work thoroughly examines its implementation and promotion in the educational field. This is done through analysis of interviews, questionnaires, documents, and publications, presenting achievements and predicaments in both standardization and teaching aspects of the Amazigh language in Morocco.[126]

Abouzaid (2011) is a study on a similar topic that examines the progress of the Amazigh teaching project in Morocco during the period of 2007-2011. The work provides insights into a landscape where the acquisition planning of the Amazigh language still encounters uncertainties, even after gaining new status, thereby negatively impacting the complex corpus planning of the standard Moroccan Amazigh by IRCAM. Among the obstacles identified, it highlights the challenge of acceptance of standard Amazigh in the Rif region and the emergence of a diglossic situation between the standard Amazigh taught at schools and the spoken Amazigh varieties.[127] Additionally, Abrous (2017) offers a comprehensive comparison of acquisition planning for Amazigh between Morocco and Algeria.[128]

In addition to acquisition planning, Iazzi (2018) addresses the corpus planning of standard Moroccan Amazigh, with a focus on phonological and morphological aspects. As a long-time member of IRCAM, the author extensively reconstructs the

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[124] Boukous, A. (2012). *Revitalisation de la langue amazighe: Défis, enjeux et stratégies*. IRCAM.

[125] Boukous, A. (2018). *Essais de politique et d'aménagement linguistiques.* IRCAM.

[126] Nachef, L. (2016). *Normativisation et enseignement de la langue amazighe au Maroc: État des lieux, méthodes et réalisations* (Doctoral dissertation, Université de Lyon).

[127] Abouzaid, M. (2011). *Politique linguistique éducative à l'égard de l'amazighe (berbère) au Maroc: Des choix sociolinguistiques et didactiques à leur mise en pratique* (Doctoral dissertation, Université Stendhal-Grenoble III).

[128] Abrous, N. (2017). *L'enseignement du berbère: Analyse comparée Algérie/Maroc* (Doctoral dissertation, Aix-Marseille Université).

planning process of standard Moroccan Amazigh, providing important insights into how the "polynomic" strategy is actually implemented in the corpus planning endeavor.[129]

1.6. Methodology

In order to study an ideology comprehensively, discourse holds a privileged position, as the sole medium through which one can directly probe patterns of meaning.[130] Ideologies are often not explicitly presented in socially constitutive and conditioned discourse. Instead, discourse may manifest perceptions, evaluations, and aims influenced by ideologies. In other words, discourse may not straightforwardly convey ideologies, but it subtly reflects them and serves as a medium through which (and in which) ideologies are reproduced.[131] Hence, there is a crucial need for Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as a method to render these ideologies more visible and transparent.

The term "critical" in this thesis implies a meticulous examination of the concepts contained within the discourse of IRCAM. These conceptions will be scrutinized within their contexts and will not be left unquestioned based solely on their literal, general, or intuitive interpretations. Through these studies, the thesis aims to provide a critical or analytical description of the language ideologies of IRCAM, rather than adopting a prescriptive stance. While some scholars argue that CDA should propose changes and suggest corrections to specific discourses, this thesis deliberately avoids that approach.[132]

As for the sources of discourse, I will mainly rely on the official publications of IRCAM, as well as articles, addresses, and published interviews by its members on various topics. For general activities of IRCAM and how related information is

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[129] Iazzi, E. M. (2018). *Norme et variations en amazighe marocain (aspects morpho-phonologiques)-Pour une approche polynomique de l'aménagement linguistique* (Doctoral dissertation, Ibn Zohr University, Agadir).

[130] Verschueren, J. (2012). *Ideology in language use: Pragmatic guidelines for empirical research*. Cambridge University Press. p. 18.

[131] Blommaert, J., & Bulcaen, C. (2000). Critical discourse analysis. *Annual review of anthropology, 29*(1), 447-466.

[132] For a prescriptive stance of CDA, see Toolan, M. (1997). What is critical discourse analysis and why are people saying such terrible things about it? *Language and literature, 6*(2), 83-103.

presented, I will consult the official *Bulletin d'information* of IRCAM (*Inghmisn n usinag*) and its *Rapport d'activité* each year. For discourse presenting the ideologies of IRCAM in a relatively direct way, I will mainly rely on the works of Professor Ahmed Boukous, especially *Revitalisation de la langue amazighe : Défis, enjeux et stratégies* (2012), as well as those by other previous and current members of IRCAM. I will pay special attention to the introduction and conclusion parts of relevant works where ideological discourse is usually concentrated. The publications of IRCAM's *Centre de l'aménagement linguistique* (CAL), through which the language ideologies of IRCAM are translated into language planning practices, are a central focus in the thesis. These informative sources include, for example *Initiation à la langue amazighe* (2004), *La nouvelle grammaire de l'amazighe* (2008), and *Dictionnaire Général de la Langue Amazighe* (2017), as well its online version *DGLAi*.

The practical usage of standard Moroccan Amazigh will serve as another important discourse containing the ideologies of the institute. This discourse reveals planning methods, linguistic preferences, and ideologies that might not have been explicitly addressed in detail through systematic linguistic prescriptions. Among other resources, the series of IRCAM's textbooks for standard Moroccan Amazigh, *Tifawin a tamazight*, will be of vital importance. A more detailed introduction to IRCAM and CAL publications, which will serve as sources for this discourse, was provided earlier in this section.

During the analysis of relevant discourse, I will specifically focus on any discrepancies that may arise among the aforementioned sources when discussing similar topics. This approach will enable me to identify personal perspectives and the consistent ideologies of the institute, while also monitoring shifts and developments in its ideologies over time.

1.7. Chapter Outlines

The thesis is organized into seven chapters. Chapter Two provides a brief history of the development of Amazigh nationalism and the Amazigh cultural movement, focusing on two of their most important linguistic expressions: the Tifinagh script and neologisms. This aims to show the historical and intellectual path that led to the establishment of IRCAM. Chapter Three will examine IRCAM itself, particularly its first year when the structure was formulated, and the initial ideology of IRCAM during the rectorate of Professor Mohamed Chafik, focusing on his historical and

linguistic ideologies. It will then investigate the development and new features introduced under the rectorate of Professor Ahmed Boukous.

Next, in Chapter Four, I will explore how IRCAM began its LPP practice by influencing the acquisition planning of Amazigh in Morocco, with standard Moroccan Amazigh at the same time becoming the central notion of its corpus planning. In response to both Moroccan nationalism and Amazigh nationalism, IRCAM's standard Moroccan Amazigh holds the inevitable trait of homogeneity, which entails an effort to merge the three main Moroccan Amazigh dialects. The emphasis will be on how this notion was implemented through the adoption of the Neo-Tifinagh script and how this innovative planning method is justified within the mainstream framework of Amazigh language planning, which focuses on regional dialects.

The fact that the innovatively coined standard Moroccan Amazigh of IRCAM is not specifically based on any Amazigh variety that people actually use gives it an inherent problem of acceptance. Even if accepted, the potential spread of the language will inevitably lead to a new diglossic situation, which is widely deemed undesirable. These issues necessitate the justification of the planning method with sound arguments. From this point, I will examine how the language ideologies of IRCAM were designed to address these questions, considering the very nature of ideology, which has power over cognition and evaluation and needs to be logically coherent to maintain persuasiveness.

In Chapter Five, I will discuss Ahmed Boukous's conception of the "death" of the Amazigh language and its subsequent "revitalization." I will explore how the language practices of Amazigh speakers in Morocco were characterized as the "dialectalization" of a language that should have been homogeneous and perceived as "dying," thus necessitating change rather than maintenance of the situation. The planning of a new Moroccan Amazigh is consequently viewed as a sign of language revitalization, a justified concept associated with language rights, commonly encouraged by supranational organizations and frequently referenced by language activists in language management.[133] The problem persists in that, while some Amazigh varieties are indeed endangered, the overall situation of Amazigh varieties, especially in Morocco, hardly aligns with the traditional notion of language death and revitalization discussions.[134] This brings us to the discussion of IRCAM's ideology

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[133] Spolsky, B. (2009). p. 204.
[134] Kossmann, M. (2013b). pp. 34-35.

of "language attrition" in the latter half of the chapter, where I will study how the theories on language attrition as an individual phenomenon are connected with the "language attrition" of IRCAM as an inclusive concept in explaining broader undesirable situations within Amazigh languages, which illustrate the "dying process" of the language as a whole. I will then show how the ideology of purism is deepened as part of Ahmed Boukous's comprehensive discourse on "attrition-death" ideologies, leading to IRCAM's decision to exclude nearly all Arabic loanwords from standard Moroccan Amazigh.

In Chapter Six, I will explore IRCAM's "polynomic" approach to language planning. By analyzing its meaning and implementation in lexical planning, language teaching and morphological planning, I aim to understand the essence of this polynomic ideology and its connection with IRCAM's fundamental aim of achieving language homogeneity. I will argue that IRCAM's "polynomic" ideology is fundamentally different from its original meaning as a concept. Instead, it serves as an ideological tool mediating between IRCAM's vision of a homogeneous standard Amazigh and the diverse linguistic practices in Morocco, ultimately supporting the standard language ideology by integrating variations.