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A ‘Sunny Destination’ For Minority Groups? Dutch Emigration 1945–1965

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Abstract

The years 1945–1965 form a key period in the history of migration governance because the role of states increased, and NGOs (non-governmental organisations), IGOs (intergovernmental organisations) and the media became more involved in migration governance. In this period, the Dutch authorities strongly stimulated emigration. In this article, we focus on three groups of people whose emigration plans met with obstacles: Jews, Dutch people of colour and war-time collaborators. These groups were very different, but it is at the points at which their migrations were problematised that we can see how, when, by whom and why restrictions were introduced. Precisely the differences between the groups bring out key elements of the problematisation of emigration. Ideas about the desired composition of the Dutch population played a decisive role for all actors involved, despite the diversity in arguments that were used, and postwar ideals about human rights.

Keywords

emigration – social engineering – human rights – discrimination – governance – Netherlands

Introduction

The years 1945–1965 form a key period in the history of migration governance: the role of states increased, and more NGOs (non-governmental organisations) and IGOs (intergovernmental organisations) as well as the media became involved in migration governance. To analyse what happened and who played which role in this key moment in migration governance history, we look at three groups in the postwar Netherlands whose emigration was problematised: Jews, Dutch people of colour, and war-time collaborators. ‘Dutch people of colour’ refers to people from the (former) Dutch East Indies (current Indonesia). Most of them had a Dutch father or grandfather and – what was a legal term in the colony – a ‘native’ mother or grandmother. They were called repatriates, *Indische* Dutch, Eurasians, Indo-Europeans and Indo-Dutch. Here we use ‘repatriates’ because it was the term that was most used at the time. It emphasised return to the Netherlands, although most repatriates had never been there before. This article seeks to explain how, when, by whom and why the migration of the three groups was problematised, and how this relates to the ideals of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).

Historiography and Theory

In the immediate postwar period, several European countries introduced ‘assisted passage schemes’ whereby authorities paid for (part of) the emigrants’ trip. Assisted passage meant authorities could influence who left, and who stayed. This was a clear break with the prewar period, in which there was less state interest in those who left. Immigration policies were already selective before the Second World War. The US, for instance, did not want immigrants who were likely to become a public charge, people with a contagious disease, anarchists, communists, polygamists, prostitutes, pimps or ‘idiots’. It delegated the task of selecting migrants to the shipping companies.¹ After the war, state authorities strengthened their role in selection, paid attention to both immigrants and emigrants, and involved NGOs and IGOs in migration governance.²

1 T. Feys, ‘The visible hand of shipping interests in American migration policies 1815–1914,’ *Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis* 7:1 (2010) 38–62, 39–40.

2 Marlou Schrover and Tycho Walaardt, ‘Displaced persons, returnees and ‘unsuitables’: the Dutch selection of DPs (1945–1951),’ *Continuity and Change* 33 (2018) 1–28.

In the immediate postwar years, 31 million people were on the move within Europe.³ Europe had a pressing refugee problem, and this was seen as potentially politically destabilising: it was feared that desperate, poor people would turn to communism. The US hoped that an active European emigration policy would avert that danger. It was the justification for strong government interference in migration.⁴

Between 1946 and 1969, over 460,000 people out of a total population of ten million Dutch left for overseas destinations. The Dutch government and the governments of countries of destination developed a policy of multiple selection: countries of destination selected whom they wanted to accept, and the Netherlands tried to influence who left.⁵ In the Netherlands, governmental and private organisations (the so-called emigration centres, which were Catholic, Protestant or neutral) were jointly responsible for policymaking, implementation, administrative procedures and selection.⁶ In Australia, Canada and the US, private organisations selected, monitored, guided, supported and sponsored Dutch immigrants. At the intergovernmental level, the International Refugee Organization (IRO), played a role because it controlled the shipping capacity needed to move people to overseas destinations.⁷ IRO's successor, the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM), focussed on stimulating the emigration of surplus labourers from Western Europe. ICEM was a highly technocratic organisation, with strong connections to Dutch politicians and Dutch and international social scientists.⁸ ICEM members were the emigration and immigration countries, and ICEM had a crucial role in

3 M.Y.A. Zieck, *UNHCR and voluntary repatriation of refugees. A legal analysis* (Amsterdam 1997).

4 K. Salomon, *Refugees in the Cold War. Toward a new international refugee regime in the early postwar era* (Lund 1991).

5 Marijke van Faassen, *Polder en emigratie. Het Nederlandse emigratiebestel in internationaal perspectief 1945–1967* (Den Haag 2014); See also: Marlou Schrover and Marijke van Faassen, 'Invisibility and selectivity. Introduction to the special issue on Dutch overseas emigration in the nineteenth and twentieth century', *Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis* 7:2 (2010) 3–31.

6 These were: *Katholieke Centrale Emigratie Stichting, Christelijke Emigratie Centrale, Algemene Emigratie Centrale, Gereformeerde Stichting tot Bijstand van Emigranten en Geëmigreerden, Nederlands Zuid-Afrikaanse Vereniging*.

7 Nonja Peters, *Milk and honey but no gold: postwar migration to Western Australia 1945–1964* (Perth 2001).

8 Van Faassen, *Polder en emigratie*, chapter 3; Marijke van Faassen, Rik Hoekstra and Marijn Koolen, 'Fifty years of technocracy. International migration management as an evolving discourse coalition', *Journal of Digital History* 2:1 (2022) online <https://journalofdigitalhistory.org/en/article/VeaK58WBs82C?idx=118&layer=narrative&lh=695&pidx=118&pl=hermeneutics&y=30> (13 August 2024).

(discussing) selection. Underneath seemingly neutral, technocratic arguments for selection lay a discourse of 'planned modernisation', which was considered instrumental to a peaceful extension of the welfare state, but which contained a lot of social engineering.⁹

Research has shown that individuals can play a crucial role in migration governance.¹⁰ In this case, the Dutch technocrat B.W. (Bas) Haveman was a key figure. He features in over 2,000 newspaper articles on Dutch emigration. He was the Government Commissioner for Emigration, worked as a socioeconomic expert in the Dutch delegation to the United Nations (UN) and became a member of the Special Committee on Refugees and Displaced Persons, established by the UN's Economic and Social Council, which had the task of setting up the IRO. He was the fourth Director of ICEM (from 1961 to 1969). Haveman travelled to a large number of countries in order to explore and negotiate migration options.

This article relates to debates about the problematisation of migration.¹¹ It combines this with a governance approach, which means we include not only what state authorities did, but also look at the role of NGOs, IGOs and the media.¹² As this article will show, all these parties selected (or reported on) emigrants at the point in time when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) had been accepted and was celebrated as a milestone in the history of human rights. Article 1 of this declaration says that all human beings are born free and equal. Article 2 adds that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Article 13 gives everyone the right to leave any country.¹³ The selectivity that occurred sat uneasily with these ideas regarding equal rights. Based on source analysis, we try to establish how this balancing act was performed for the three most problematised groups.

9 Marijke van Faassen, 'Haveman, Bastiaan Wouter', in: Bob Reinalda, Kent J. Kille and Jaci Eisenberg (eds), *10 BIO, Biographical Dictionary of Secretaries-General of International Organizations* [ongoing online project] www.ru.nl/fm/iobio (13 August 2024); Van Faassen, Hoekstra, and Koolen, 'Fifty years', [24].

10 T.S. Vosters, *NGOs and refugees in European history. Assessing NGO influence on international refugee policymaking, 1919–1979* (Leiden 2022) Doctoral thesis Leiden University.

11 Marlou Schrover and Willem Schinkel, 'Introduction: the language of inclusion and exclusion in the context of immigration and integration', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36:7 (2013) 1123–1141.

12 Vosters, *NGOs and refugees in European history*; Marlou Schrover, Teuntje Voster and Irial Glynn, 'NGOs and West European migration governance (1860s until present)', *Journal of Migration History* 5:2 (2019) 189–217.

13 <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights> (30 July 2024).

Material and Method

There is a large debate on NGOs, IGOs and the media, and their influence on policy making and implementation.¹⁴ 'Measuring' influence is impossible, but we can trace who formulated which ideas, and how ideas were copied, reformulated, reused, adapted or adopted.¹⁵ Via this process of tracing we can analyse interactions between organisations, the media and policy makers.¹⁶

This article is based on material from Dutch Homeland Security and the Dutch IRO branch, archives of Dutch state authorities dealing with emigration¹⁷ and newspaper articles. The archive of Dutch Homeland Security Department (*Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst*, BVD) holds information on emigration organisations encouraging the migration of collaborators.¹⁸ The archive of the Dutch IRO branch contains information on its attempts to influence migration policies and practices, and to mediate in individual cases.¹⁹ The Dutch National Archives holds extensive correspondence between policy makers and a large number of claim makers.²⁰ The newspaper articles we used were published in the Netherlands, in the (former) colonies (the Dutch East Indies and Suriname),²¹ and in newspapers in destination countries. Over 100,000

14 Marlou Schrover and Tycho Walaardt, 'The influence of the media on politics and practices: Hungarian refugee resettlement in the Netherlands in 1956', *Journal of Migration History* 3 (2017) 22–53.

15 Vosters, *NGOs and refugees in European history*, 21.

16 Christine Trampusch and Bruno Palier, 'Between X and Y: how process tracing contributes to opening the black box of causality', *New Political Economy* 21:5 (2016) 437–454; Marlou Schrover and Saskia Bonjour, 'Public debate and policy-making', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41:9 (2015) 1475–1494.

17 For Parliamentary debates see: <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/uitgebreidzoeken/historisch>. To search this database of parliamentary papers words like 'emigra*' and related terms were used such as 'collabora*', in the case of wartime collaborators.

18 *Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst* BVD (Dutch Homeland Security Department), archive available via <http://stichtingargus.nl/bvd/index2.htm> (13 August 2024).

19 National Archives The Hague, The Netherlands (NL-HaNA) 2.05.31 Archive International Refugee Organization IRO.

20 Marijke van Faassen, *Emigratie 1945–1967* (2014). This is an extensive online research guide on emigration: <https://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/emigratie> (13 August 2024).

21 Newspaper articles were found mainly via the online database Delpher (www.delpher.nl/), which consists of a selection of digitised newspapers. For our search we used the Dutch word for emigration, and combinations of the word 'emigra*' and other relevant terms, like for instance 'Indisch*', 'repatria*' or 'Jood*'. Also, all persons mentioned in individual cases were looked up in newspapers. In addition to Dutch language newspapers, other collections of digitised newspapers were used such as <https://trove.nla.gov.au/> for Australia, as well as digitised US and Canadian newspapers and for instance the *Straits Times*: <https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/browse/straitstimes>.

newspaper articles appeared on emigration in Dutch language newspapers (including those published in the colonies) (figure 1). Some of these were of little use to us because they were short and for instance only reported on the departure of a migrant ship.²²

Some of the publications were part of Dutch state propaganda, with Dutch authorities facilitating trips by journalists. In 1953, 61 emigrants (including sixteen children and three babies) flew to Australia (rather than travelling by boat as was common at that time), and with them travelled seven journalists invited by the Dutch authorities to join the flight, in the hope that they would write positively about emigration.²³

There were about 80 articles on the emigration of wartime collaborators, 1,300 on repatriates, and 3,000 about Jews (half of the last set were relevant to this article). Numbers on specific cases are mentioned below when the cases are discussed.

Background

After the end of the Second World War, there was consensus that the Netherlands, with a population of ten million, was overpopulated. Dutch authorities financially supported the emigration of large families, small farmers, farmers' sons without land, the unemployed, the unskilled, bakers




FIGURE 1 Number of articles on emigration in Dutch language newspapers in the period under study.

SOURCE: DELPHER²⁴

²² *Limburgsch Dagblad* (11 January 1951) 7.

²³ Including journalists from *Margriet*, *NRC*, *De Tijd*, *De Volkskrant* and *Maasbode*. These were also mentioned in *Trouw* (22 September 1953). See also NL-HaNA 2.15.68 Archive Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (Archive MinSoc): Directie voor de Emigratie, inv.no. 1222 Bezoek van Nederlandse journalisten aan Australië: 1953–1954.

²⁴ www.delper.nl/ (11 August 2025).

and hairdressers.²⁵ The Dutch government feared a return of prewar levels of unemployment, and worried about the severe housing shortage. Shortly after the war, one in three Dutch people said they wanted to emigrate. People feared another war, Soviet occupation of the Netherlands and unemployment, with preferred destinations being Canada, Australia, the US and New Zealand. In some sectors, which were considered crucial for postwar reconstruction, such as mining and the steel industry, there were shortages of labour. 'Useful' people were encouraged to stay, while 'surplus' people were encouraged to leave, helped by subsidies.²⁶ In 1951, 27 per cent of emigrants qualified for an emigration subsidy, and in 1953, 29 million guilders (fifteen million euros) were spent on these subsidies.²⁷ Countries of destination did not want to only receive those people who could be missed; 'undesirable' migrants had to be matched by desirable ones, such as construction workers. Australia wanted workers and wanted to populate the country; Canada had similar economic and demographic reasons. It preferred farmers: 80 per cent of the Dutch immigrants had an agricultural background, while New Zealand and the US also welcomed Dutch immigrants, but restricted their entrance by quota.²⁸ Latin American countries were not popular among Dutch emigrants,²⁹ but Dutch authorities did try to stimulate group migrations to Brazil.³⁰

The Dutch government delegated the task of organising emigration to the 'emigration authorities', in which private (civil society) organisations held a majority. The emigration authorities provided language courses, distributed propaganda material and organised meetings for prospective migrants. They organised movie nights, women's gatherings, slide shows, talks and training

25 M. van Faassen, 'Min of meer misbaar. Naoorlogse emigratie vanuit Nederland: achtergronden en organisatie, particuliere motieven en overheidsproblemen, 1946–1967', in: S. Poldervaart, H. Willemsen and J.W. Schilt, *Van hot naar her. Nederlandse migratie, vroeger, nu en morgen* (Amsterdam 2001) 50–67, 61–65.

26 Van Faassen, 'Min of meer misbaar', 57.

27 G.Th.J. Delfgaauw, 'Emigratie als bijdrage tot vermindering van den bevolkingsdruk in Nederland', *De Economist* 101:5 (1953) 337–359, 359.

28 Joop Hartog and Rainer Winkelmann, 'Comparing migrants to non-migrants: the case of Dutch migration to New Zealand', *Journal of Population Economics* 16 (2003) 683–705, 684; Freda Hawkins, *Critical years in immigration. Canada and Australia compared* (Kingston and Montreal 1989) 35–36.

29 *Het nieuws: algemeen dagblad* (7 November 1946).

30 C.M.J. Dony, *Brazilië een emigratieland voor Nederlanders* (Porto Alegre 1956); W. van der Mast, *Praktijk en patroon van recente Nederlandse groepsemigraties* (Groningen 1963) 100–289; Frans Buysse, *De Zeeuwse gemeenschap van Holanda, Brazilië [1858–1982]. Een antropologische studie over integratie en identiteit* (Nijmegen 1984); Harald S. van der Straaten, *Hollandse pioniers in Brazilië* (Franeker 1988); Mari Smits, *Holambra, Geschiedenis van een Nederlandse toekomstdroom in de Braziliaanse werkelijkheid, 1948–1988* (Nijmegen 1990); C.H.L. Kiers-Pot, *Castrolanda 40 jaar 1951–1991* (Paraná 1991); Bart Sorgedragter, *Holandeses: Nederlandse landbouwkolonies in Brazilië* (Amsterdam 1991).

weekends or weeks.³¹ This preparation was a form of selection because it included a warning: not everybody is suitable for emigration.

Jews

Jews, who were trying to flee Nazi persecution before the Second World War, encountered severe restrictions; very few countries wanted to take in Jewish refugees.³² After the war, there were, rather surprisingly, still restrictions. International organisations, such as the IRO, asked countries to take at least some of the eleven million Displaced Persons (DPs) living in camps in Europe, but countries were reluctant to take Jewish DPs. In 1945, Jews formed four per cent of the DPs in camps; this increased to 25 per cent in 1947. The increase was in part due to the postwar arrival in the camps of Jews from Poland and the USSR, but it was also the result of the faster departure of non-Jewish DPs. Canada wanted Protestant DPs and only ten to fifteen per cent of the DPs could be Jewish.³³ In the US, the *Displaced Persons Act*, signed in 1948, made it possible for 400,000 DPs to immigrate, but this scheme also discriminated against Jews. In Australia, the government severely restricted the number of Jews (only six per cent of the DPs going to Australia were Jewish). An Australian member of parliament said that Australia should not be 'a dumping ground' for people whom 'Europe itself, in the course of 2,000 years, had not been able to absorb'.³⁴ In 1951, a Dutch newspaper article headed 'Are you of pure Arian stock?' reported that a Dutch Member of Parliament, Dirk de Loor (Labour Party / PvdA), had asked the Minister of Social Affairs, A.M. Joekes (PvdA), if it was true that migrants to Australia were asked if they were Jewish and if they had Jewish (grand)parents. A dozen newspaper articles appeared on De Loor's question (figure 2), and Joekes admitted the question was asked, but he denied it influenced the Jewish migrants' chance. The question in itself was not a violation of the Human Rights Convention, in his view, and he refused to discuss the issue with the Australians. Several newspapers published stories about individual Jews being denied permits for Australia for unexplained reasons.³⁵

31 *Friese Koerier* (26 July 1952); *Leeuwarder Courant* (15 April 1953); *De Tijd* (28 August 1953).

32 Vosters, *NGOs and refugees in European history*.

33 Schrover and Walaardt, 'Displaced persons, returnees and 'unsuitables'', 1–28.

34 Quoted by S.D. Rutland and S. Encel, 'No room at the inn: American responses to Australian immigration policies, 1946–54', *Patterns of Prejudice* 43:5 (2009) 497–518, 499. See also: E. Duyker, *The Dutch in Australia* (Melbourne 1987).

35 *Het Vrije Volk* (23 July 1951); *Het Parool* (20 July 1951); *Het Parool* (20 August 1951); *Het Vrije Volk* (21 August 1951); *De Telegraaf* (21 July 1951); *Nieuw Utrechtsch Dagblad* (23 August 1951); *Het Parool* (22 August 1951); *De Waarheid* (21 July 1951).

Australië:
„Für Juden
verboden”

DEN HAAG, 20 Juli — Het Tweede Kamerlid de heer De Loor (PvdA) heeft aan de Minister van Sociale Zaken de volgende schriftelijke vragen gesteld:

„1. Is het de minister bekend, dat Nederlanders, die naar Australië willen emigreren, moeten aangeven, of ze zijn „Jewish not Jewish” (Joods/niet Joods).

2. Is het de minister tevens bekend, dat navraag wordt gedaan naar de „pure aryan descent” (zuiver arische afstamming) tot en met de overgrootouders van de aanvragers voor emigratie.

3. Is de minister niet van oordeel, dat een dergelijk onderzoek naar geloof en ras van Nederlandse burgers noch in overeenstemming is met de Nederlandse wetten en tradities, noch met de door de Australische vertegenwoordigers in een algemene vergadering der Verenigde Naties aanvaarde „verklaring van de mensenrechten”?

4. Is de minister bereid geëigende stappen te nemen, welk er toe kunnen leiden, dat de Australische Regering bij het beoordelen van de Nederlandse onderdanen dergelijke criteria achterwege laat?”

Geruime tijd geleden hebben wij er reeds op gewezen, dat de Australische regering t.o.v. Joodse aspirant-emigranten rassendiscriminatie toepast.

Een van de redacteurs van „Het Vrije Volk”, die naar Australië wilde emigreren, werd gewelgerd omdat hij niet „rein-arijsch” was.

Zijn collega L. J. Kleijn maakt echter als emigratie-redacteur van „Het Vrije Volk” even vrolijk propaganda voor de „Australische democratie”.

FIGURE 2

Questions of De Loor to the minister of Social Affairs

SOURCE: *DE WAARHEID* (21 JULY 1951).

South Africa was not an attractive destination for European Jews. Its Prime Minister Daniël Malan (1948–1954; Nationalist Party), who introduced the Apartheid regime, was a supporter of anti-Semitism and the Third Reich during the war. After the war he encouraged immigration from Germany, including that of (former) Nazis.³⁶ He allowed an organisation to campaign for a postwar monument for Hitler, and for the immigration of ‘pure Aryan’ orphans. Dutch newspapers wrote about this.³⁷

³⁶ *Nieuw Israelietisch Weekblad* (20 May 1960).

³⁷ E.g. *De Zaanlander* (11 November 1949).

Of the 140,000 Jews, who had been living in the Netherlands shortly before the war, 101,800 did not survive the Holocaust, the lowest percentage of Jewish survivors of all West-European countries.³⁸ After the war, survivors still encountered anti-Semitism in the Netherlands;³⁹ their possessions – such as houses, businesses and shops – which had been taken from them during the war, were not returned to them after it, and Jewish children, who had survived the Holocaust in hiding, were not all returned to their family members.⁴⁰ German and Austrian Jews, who had fled to the Netherlands before the war, and who had been made stateless by the Nazi regime,⁴¹ were after the war regarded by Dutch authorities as simply Germans and Austrians, so grouped into the category of enemy aliens, and deprived of their possessions.⁴² They were detained in former Nazi concentration camps in the Netherlands, together with Dutch collaborators and Nazis,⁴³ while newspapers wrote that German and Austrian Jews living in the Netherlands should migrate to Palestine.⁴⁴ Dutch authorities allowed a small number of DPs to come to the Netherlands from camps in Germany, but in the selection disadvantaged Jews.⁴⁵ Jews in the Netherlands wanted to leave this hostile atmosphere, and between 1945 and 1951, 3,300 Jews left.⁴⁶ In 1947, for instance, a group of 32 Jews left for Latin America with the help of

38 B. Moore, *Victims and survivors. The Nazi persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands 1940–1945* (London 1997).

39 Martin Bossenbroek, *De Meelstreep. Terugkeer en opvang na de Tweede Wereldoorlog* (Amsterdam 2004); Dienke Hondius, *Terugkeer. Antisemitisme in Nederland rond de bevrijding* (Den Haag 1990) 87–103; Hetty Berg and Bart Wallet, *Wie niet weg is, is gezien. Joods Nederland na 1945* (Zwolle 2010) 29.

40 L. De Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog* deel 12 (Den Haag 1988) 57; Parliamentary Papers 1946–1947, 2 IV no.8, 51; Onderzoeksgids Oorlogsgetroffenen wo2, ‘Commissie voor Oorlogspiegelkinderen’, www.oorlogsgetroffenen.nl/archiefvormer/Commissie_Oorlogspiegelkinderen (13 August 2024); H. Blom et. al., *Geschiedenis van de Joden in Nederland* (Amsterdam 1995); Michal Citroen, *U wordt door niemand verwacht, Nederlandse Joden na kampen en onderduik* (Utrecht 1999); Bob Moore, *Slachtoffers en overlevenden: de Nazi-vervolgving van de Joden in Nederland* (Amsterdam 1998).

41 C.K. Berghuis, *Geheel ontdaan van onbaatzuchtigheid. Het Nederlandse toelatingsbeleid voor vluchtelingen en Displaced Persons van 1945 tot 1956* (Amsterdam 1999) 13.

42 *De Waarheid* (25 August 1945); Marieke Oprel, *The burden of nationality. Dutch citizenship policies towards German nationals in the aftermath of the Second World War (1944–1967)* (Amsterdam 2020); Marijke van Faassen and Marieke Oprel, ‘Paper trails to private lives. The performative power of card indexes through time and space’, in: Ida Nijenhuis et al. (eds), *Information and power in history. Towards a global approach* (London and New York 2020) 254–274.

43 *Veritas* (15 May 1945); *Het Vrije Volk* (3 July 1945).

44 *Het Parool* (2 June 1945).

45 Schrover and Walaardt, ‘Displaced persons, returnees and ‘unsuitables’, 1–28.

46 Berg and Wallet, *Wie niet weg is*.

the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS).⁴⁷ This migration was a continuation of a prewar Jewish migration scheme. Many Jews hoped to go to the US or Palestine, and some organisations in Palestine, like the *Irgun Olei Holland*, tried to convince Jews from the Netherlands to come. Prof. A. de Leeuw, who lived in Palestine, was advocating this. From October to December 1945, he visited the Netherlands and spoke with the Dutch Prime Minister Willem Schermerhorn (Labour Party PvdA). De Leeuw hoped that Schermerhorn would agree to his idea of encouraging Jewish emigration from the Netherlands to Palestine. In March 1946, 1,620 Jews had registered for migration to Palestine (ten per cent of them were Dutch, 40 per cent were stateless, the rest is unknown), and another 1,600 others were expected to register soon. The UK, which held the mandate over Palestine, restricted migration to the region however; shipping capacity was lacking and Jews in camps in Germany were given priority. After the creation of the state of Israel, migration became easier. Between 1948 and 1953, 4,492 Jews migrated from the Netherlands, of whom 1,500 went to Israel.⁴⁸ By 1962, there were only 25,000 Jews living in the Netherlands, and Dutch newspapers wrote that the community was too small to survive and suggested all Jews should leave for Israel.⁴⁹

In the immediate postwar years, the Dutch authorities, and others, rather surprisingly supported plans for the Freeland League for Jewish Territorial Colonization (established in 1937), to have stateless Jews migrate to the Dutch colony of Suriname.⁵⁰ The plan led to the publication of 400 articles in Dutch language newspapers and was seriously considered by the Dutch government.⁵¹

In 1945, there were 2,000 Jews in Suriname, from a total population of 200,000,⁵² with the Freeland League wanting to reallocate 50,000 to 100,000

47 *Nieuw Utrechtsch Dagblad* (3 September 1947).

48 Chaya Brasz, 'Expectations and realities of Dutch immigration to Palestine/Israel after the Shoah', *Jewish History* 8:1–2 (1994) 323–338; *Provinciale Overijsselsche en Zwolsche Courant* (27 April 1950); *De Gooi- en Eemlander* (27 April 1950).

49 *Het Parool* (16 February 1962); *Trouw* (16 January 1962); *Trouw* (31 January 1962); *Leeuwarder Courant* (10 March 1962); *De Tijd De Maasbode* (14 February 1962).

50 NL-HaNA 2.10.54 Archive: Ministerie van Koloniën en opvolgers: Dossierarchief 1945–1963 (MinCol), inv.no. 3560 Vereniging Nederland-Suriname (NEDSU) met onder meer als doel: Emigratie naar Suriname 1947–1951 Minutes of de Vereniging Nederland-Suriname 1947. Material on the Freeland League is grouped in this archive with that of the Vereniging Nederland-Suriname 1947 but they are two separate organisations.

51 Alexander Heldring *The Saramacca Project, a plan of Jewish colonization in Surinam* (Hilversum 2011); Laura Almagor, Een vergeten alternatief. Het Feeland League-plan voor Joodse kolonisatie van Suriname (Utrecht 2007) Masters Thesis The University of Utrecht; Laura Almagor, 'Fitting the Zeitgeist: Jewish territorialism and geopolitics, 1934–1960', *Contemporary European History* 27:3 (2018) 351–369.

52 *Amigoe di Curacao* (5 February 1947).

European Jews there. They would form a separate community and start new industries, which would not compete with existing industries, according to the League. The migrants would be carefully selected, with only physically fit people able to go, and there would be many intellectuals among the migrants, including doctors, the League said. Suriname society would benefit, the newspapers added.⁵³

The Freeland League plan built on an older plan, which the Dutch Zionist Union called the Mussert Plan. Anton Mussert was the leader of the prewar Dutch Nazi party *Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging* (NSB). In 1939, he published his plan to 'free' Europe from what he called, its 'Jewish burden'. He called for a European conference outside the League of Nations, where he hoped to convince France, Britain and the Netherlands to give up part of their possessions in British and French Guyana, and in Suriname. The people who lived there should be reallocated. European countries that wanted to 'rid' themselves of Jews should pay for the costs, as should the US, according to Mussert.⁵⁴ The plan, which he presented to Dutch newspapers and in speeches in the Dutch parliament, was met with scorn: Hitler was killing the Jews in Germany, and Mussert wanted to kill them by exposing them to tropical diseases and epidemics, newspapers wrote in 1938.⁵⁵

The Freeland League wanted to keep the 'Jewish community' intact, but Holocaust survivors could not stay where they were, according to the League. Boris Raptischinsky, the Dutch representative of the Freeland League, had originally alerted to the plan for a new community in Suriname. Raptischinsky wanted to speak to Dutch Prime Minister Schermerhorn, but the Dutch Zionist Union asked the Dutch authorities not to support the League's plan;⁵⁶ it had been made without consulting the Jewish community, the Zionist Union said,⁵⁷ who saw it as inhumane.⁵⁸ In Suriname, the plan was not received with enthusiasm.⁵⁹ There were no objections to the arrival of more Dutch Jews, but there were doubts regarding stateless Jews; Jews did not have a good reputation in Suriname, a Suriname newspaper wrote.⁶⁰ The Afro-Surinamese

53 *Friesch dagblad* (24 February 1947); *Algemeen Handelsblad* (1 July 1947); *De Tijd* (30 June 1947).

54 Anton Mussert. *The United States of Guiana. The Jewish national home* (Leiden 1939).

55 *Het Volksdagblad* (3 December 1938); *De Surinamer* (10 December 1938); *De West: nieuwsblad uit en voor Suriname* (7 December 1938).

56 *Trouw* (24 February 1947).

57 *De West: nieuwsblad uit en voor Suriname* (5 March 1947).

58 *Het nieuws: algemeen dagblad* (2 July 1947).

59 Parliamentary Papers, Verslag van de Parlementaire Commissie Suriname en de Nederlandsche Antillen nopens hare bevindingen. 443 Bijlage Handelingen Tweede Kamer 2 April 1947, 1–16.

60 *De West: nieuwsblad uit en voor Suriname* (19 May 1947); See also *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden* (24 February 1947).

population in part supported the plan, hoping that it might weaken the position of the Hindu-Surinamese, but a Surinamese newspaper warned that might not happen.⁶¹ The Dutch papers doubted if Jews would become farmers in Suriname, although they had proven in Palestine that they could be. The paper assumed Jews would stick together, connected by the misery they had suffered, and hold on to 'Eastern European habits'. They would not be able to adjust and would never feel Surinamese; they would form a powerful upper class supported by strong international organisations, the paper wrote, using antisemitic rhetoric. The new plan was to enable the migration of 30,000 stateless European Jews to Suriname, and in 1947 the Dutch government, the governor of Suriname, J.C. Brons, and I.N. Steinberg, president of the Freeland League, had agreed to the plan, newspapers wrote.⁶² In January 1948, Jews were ready to leave, according to the secretary of the Freeland League,⁶³ but a delay occurred.⁶⁴ Surinamese Jews protested that it would harm their position in their country because anti-Semitism might increase, and it was hard to imagine that Jews would still be willing to migrate to Suriname now that the state of Israel had been created.⁶⁵ Afro-Surinamese feared they would be thrown back into slavery by the arrival of a new powerful upper class, and the middle class feared they would be pushed out by the 'cunning Jew'. The newspaper presented a long list of disadvantages, but also two positive points: Suriname did need more people, and the costs of Jewish migration would be covered by Jewish organisations. The newspaper suggested that a small number might be welcome.⁶⁶

The material in Dutch government archives – including correspondence between Raptshinsky and the Dutch prime minister – provides a slightly different picture. Raptshinsky said that the maximum number would be 30,000, and that schools would teach in Yiddish and later also in Dutch. Jews could be an example to others; they might attract more immigrants to Suriname, but a disadvantage would be that stateless Jews could not be sent back.⁶⁷ In July 1947, Brons said to the Freeland League that the Dutch

61 *De West: nieuwsblad uit en voor Suriname* (18 April 1947).

62 *Nieuwsblad van Friesland* (6 August 1947); *De Gooi- en Eemlander* (5 August 1947); *Friesch dagblad* (5 August 1947); *Algemeen Handelsblad* (5 August 1947); *De Volkskrant* (7 May 1947); *Friesch dagblad* (9 August 1947).

63 *Trouw* (7 January 1948); *Het Vrije Volk* (20 February 1948).

64 *Nieuw Israelietisch Weekblad* (17 September 1948); *Nieuw Israelietisch Weekblad* (12 November 1948).

65 *Nieuw Israelietisch weekblad* (29 July 1949).

66 *De West: nieuwsblad uit en voor Suriname* (9 April 1947).

67 NL-HaNA 2.10.54 Archive MinCol Dossierarchief 1945–1963, inv.no. 11840 Freeland League for Jewish territorial colonisation te New York: Plannen tot immigratie van Joodse

government and Suriname authorities would support the plan, provided there was a sound budget and selection. Jewish immigrants could 'maintain their own culture and character', but should be willing to participate in Surinamese society. After the creation of the state of Israel and the protests by Zionists, the Dutch authorities, however, started to oppose the plan. Eastern European Jews had a bad reputation, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs said, repeating what newspapers had written earlier. In addition, the IRO would be unwilling to cooperate if only Jews were selected. Dutch authorities used the assumed IRO argument to strengthen their opposition, and the relationship between the Dutch authorities and the League deteriorated severely after that. The League continued to stress the point that promises had been made, while the Dutch authorities spoke of unabashed Jewish behaviour, which included threats, flattering and bribing.⁶⁸ Shortly afterwards the plans were put on hold.⁶⁹ In 1950, there were attempts to restart talks⁷⁰ because the Surinamese governor seemed interested,⁷¹ but in 1955, the correspondence between the League and governmental authorities stopped definitively.⁷²

Postwar Jewish emigration, including the Freeland League plan, is interesting because it showed the strong interference of the Dutch government and Surinamese authorities and that of organisations – the Freeland League predominantly – in planning and organising migrations and selecting migrants. The main interest of all non-Jewish actors seemed to be to push Jews out as much as possible, with arguments and ideas that were at least in part antisemitic.

kolonisten in Suriname 1946–1947 juni; NL-HaNA 2.05.117 Archive: Buitenlandse Zaken Code-archief 1945–1954 (Archive Ministry Foreign Affairs; MinForAff), inv.no. 12015 Plannen van de Freeland League for Jewish Territorial Colonization in New York om een Joodse kolonie op te richten, 1946–1950.

68 NL-HaNA 2.10.54 Archive MinCol Dossierarchief 1945–1963, inv.no. 11842 Freeland League for Jewish territorial colonisation te New York: Plannen tot immigratie van Joodse kolonisten in Suriname 1948 Apr.-Dec.

69 *Algemeen Handelsblad* (27 January 1949).

70 *Nieuw Israelietisch Weekblad* (8 September 1950).

71 *De Telegraaf* (27 September 1950).

72 NL-HaNA 2.10.54 Archive MinCol: Dossierarchief 1945–1963, inv.no. 11843 Freeland League for Jewish territorial colonisation te New York: Plannen tot immigratie van Joodse kolonisten in Suriname 1949–1953; NL-HaNA 2.03.01, Archive: Ministeries voor Algemeene Oorlogvoering van het Koninkrijk (AOK) en van Algemene Zaken (AZ): Kabinet van de Minister-President (KMP), (1924) 1942–1979 (1989) inv.no. 4691 Stukken betreffende de plannen tot het stichten van een kolonie voor Oosteuropese Joden en de vestiging van Indische Nederlanders in Suriname. 1946–1955.

Repatriates to the USA

In the period under study, 400,000 people came to the Netherlands from the former Dutch East Indies; they had Dutch citizenship and therefore the Dutch authorities had difficulties restricting their immigration. The Dutch authorities tried to stimulate their emigration from the Netherlands and integrated some of their organisations into the Dutch emigration governance system. In 1952, the Bureau for Emigration of Repatriates from Indonesia (BEGI), for instance, was a founding member of the General Emigration Centre (AEC) of which E.G.A. Lapré – also secretary of the BEGI – was director from 1954–1964.⁷³

The US was the preferred destination for all Dutch emigrants, including repatriates. Dutch interest in migration to the US was, however, much larger than the yearly US quota of 3,153 allowed. In 1952, there were 40,000 Dutch candidates on the US waiting list,⁷⁴ but how many of those were repatriates is unknown. The Dutch embassy in the US was involved in organising migration to the US, including that of repatriates, as was a large number of NGOs,⁷⁵ one being the Church World Service (CWS, part of the World Council of Churches, WCC) that was set up in 1946 and represented 30 Protestant churches. In 1959, the WCC office in New York held files on 6,500 Dutch repatriates who wanted to move to the US with its help. *De Telegraaf* published a moving story about the WCC's support to a Mr Brink, his wife and their five children. Brink had been an engineer in Borneo, until he was forced to leave for the Netherlands without anything to his name. He came to New Jersey where he found a job awaiting him, a house equipped with modern kitchen appliances and furnished by the Presbyterian church, and toys for his children. Brink planned to pay everything back as soon as he could.⁷⁶ It was one of many similar stories.

Apart from the WCC there was also the older National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC), which was created in 1920 in order to improve the treatment of Catholic immigrants.⁷⁷ In addition, there were other organisations such

73 AEC: <https://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/emigratie/gids/instelling/2160351018> (13 August 2024).

74 Wim Willems, *De uittocht uit Indië, 1945–1955. De geschiedenis van Indische Nederlanders* (Amsterdam 2001) 254.

75 Siem Boom and Eva van Geleuken (eds), *Ik wilde eigenlijk niet gaan. De repatriëring van Indische Nederlanders 1946–1964* (Den Haag 1993); Joost Coté and Loes Westerbeek (eds), *Recalling the Indies. Colonial culture and postcolonial identities* (Amsterdam 2005); Esther Captain, *Achter het Kawat was Nederland* (Kampen 2002).

76 *De Telegraaf* (21 November 1959).

77 Todd J. Scribner, "Not because they are Catholic, but because we are Catholic": the bishops' engagement with the migration issue in twentieth-century America, *The Catholic Historical Review* 101:1 (2015) 74–99, 80.

as the Netherlands Service Society (NESSO) and the Netherland Benevolent Society of California, which provided help to repatriates.

Immigrants to the US had to have a sponsor – an organisation or a private person – who guaranteed support and helped them to find work and housing. Sponsors were, in 80 per cent of the cases, American churches. The cws acted as a sponsor in 64 per cent of the cases and the NCWC in nineteen per cent, HIAS covered part of the rest. The sponsor system was used to ensure immigrants were not (non-church-going) communists. In the period 1953–1956 the *Refugee Relief Act* (RRA) made it possible for 15,000 to 17,000 extra Dutch people to migrate on top of the yearly Dutch quota.⁷⁸ The extra options were for war victims, victims of the 1953 North Sea Flood,⁷⁹ and repatriates.⁸⁰ The US defined repatriates as refugees, although they were already in a safe country (the Netherlands) and could have stayed there.⁸¹

Between 1958 and 1962 the US, under the *Pastore-Walter Act I* and *II*, gave out 6,272 additional visas for repatriates. There is debate about the total number of repatriates that migrated under this act, because they were not registered separately,⁸² but it is estimated that 60,000 repatriates came to the US between 1950 and 1970. Senator John O. Pastore and congressman F.E. Walter visited the Netherlands in 1956 and were struck by the situation of the repatriates.⁸³ A reader wrote to the *New York Times*:

⁷⁸ *Het Parool* (10 March 1955).

⁷⁹ The North Sea Flood of 1953 struck the Netherlands, Belgium, England and Scotland. The number of deaths was the highest in the Netherlands: 1,836.

⁸⁰ E. Koops, *De dynamiek van een emigratiecultuur. De emigratie van gereformeerden, hervormden en katholieken naar Noord-Amerika in vergelijkend perspectief (1947–1963)* (Hilversum 2010) 108.

⁸¹ B.R. Rijkschroeff, *Een ervaring rijker. De Indische immigranten in de Verenigde Staten van Amerika* (Delft 1989); Mari Smits, *Met kompas emigreren. Katholieken en het vraagstuk van de emigratie in Nederland (1946–1972)* (Den Haag 1989), 132–133; Fleur Langeveld, *Van Tempo Doeloe naar The Golden State. Een onderzoek naar de drijfveren van de betrokken instanties tijdens. Implementatie en uitvoering van de Pastore-Walter Act 1958–1962* (Leiden 2019) Masters Thesis Leiden University; Jeroen Dewulf, 'De stem van de Nederlands-Indische gemeenschap in de Verenigde Staten', *Biografie Bulletin* 20 (2010) 21–27, 24.

⁸² Hans van Amersfoort, *Immigration and the formation of minority groups: the Dutch experience 1945–1975* (Cambridge 1982) 87; Koops, *Dynamiek*, 109; *Het Vrije Volk* (30 June 1962); *De Telegraaf* (29 June 1962); Wim Willems, 'Displaced persons. De migratie naar America', in: Wim Willems (ed.), *Uit Indië geboren. Vier eeuwen familiegeschiedenis* (Zwolle 1997) 189; Willy Wanrooy et al., *Doubly uprooted: Dutch Indonesian refugees in the United States* (New York 1965) 4; Jeroen Dewulf, 'Tjalie Robinson and 'the American Tong Tong': framing a Eurasian identity in the American sixties', in: Jeroen Dewulf, Olf Praamstra and Michiel van Kempen (eds), *Shifting the compass: pluricontinental connections in Dutch colonial and post-colonial literature* (Cambridge 2013) 69–90, 73.

⁸³ R.A. Simons, Problems of Dutch nationals resettled in Los Angeles County under the Pastore-Walter Act and its amendment as seen by helping persons and representatives of

I'm sure that all of us are applauding his [Senator Walter's] successful plea [...] for admitting to the United States thousands of Dutch refugees from Indonesia. These victims of self-destructive Indonesian chauvinism could not be integrated without hardship into the economy of the overpopulated Netherlands.⁸⁴

US support agencies interviewed and screened all refugees – not only those from the Dutch East Indies – before departure. The representatives channelled part of the refugees towards the Dutch communities in the US, but repatriates did not join these existing Dutch-American communities and formed separate ones.⁸⁵

Applicants who wanted to move under the *Pastore-Walter Act* needed to have Dutch citizenship, they had to have been permanent residents of the Dutch East Indies, they should have left Indonesia after 1 January 1949, live in the Netherlands at the time of their application, and they should not have been able to travel under an alternative scheme.⁸⁶ A debate arose about 'mixedness', with the US authorities hoping that not more than ten per cent of the repatriates would be of 'mixed origin'. This was later denied, but the US authorities did indicate that applicants should have at least 50 per cent Dutch blood.⁸⁷

In the Netherlands, serious attempts were made to help the repatriates migrate to the US. Two priests, Father J. Karstens and Father J.A. Trum, were

helping organizations (Los Angeles 1963) Masters Thesis University of Southern California; Greta Kwik, *The Indos in Southern California* (New York 1989); H. Beaulieu-Boon, *So far away from home: engaging the silenced colonial. The Indies diaspora in North America* (Leiden 2009); Willems, *De uittocht uit Indië*; A. Tajuddin and J. Stern, 'From brown Dutchmen to Indo-Americans: changing identity of the Dutch Indonesian (Indo) diaspora in America', *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 28:4 (2015) 349–376.

84 *New York Times* (30 August 1958).

85 Richard Ferree Smith, 'Refugees', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 367 (September 1966) (Special issue: *The New Immigration*) 43–52; Kwik, *The Indos in Southern California*; B. Rijkschroeff, 'The Dutch-Indonesians in the United States: a case of double emigration', in: R. Kroes and H-O. Neuschäfer (eds), *The Dutch in North-America: their community and cultural continuity* (Amsterdam 1991) 422–440; Beaulieu-Boon, *So far away from home*.

86 NL-HaNA 2.1568, Archive MinSoc/ Archief van de Directie voor de Emigratie van het Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (1933) 1945–1994 (Archive MinSoc / Emigratie) inv.no. 2558 Uitvoering van het emigratieprogramma voor de toelating van gerepatrieerden naar de Verenigde Staten. 1958–1974.

87 NL-HaNA 2.15.68, Archive MinSoc /Emigratie inv.no. 2558–2564 Uitvoering van het emigratieprogramma voor de toelating van gerepatrieerden naar de Verenigde Staten. 1958–1974 Aan Dr. Ir. A.S. Tuinman van de plv. commissaris voor de Emigratie mr. J.A.U.A. van Grevenstein 2 December 1958.

assigned to help Dutch Catholic repatriates.⁸⁸ In 1956, the *Katholieke Centrale Emigratie Stichting* (the Catholic Central Emigration Foundation, KCES) sent Father Karstens as an assistant-bishop commissioner to the NCWC in New York to facilitate Catholic migration to the US.⁸⁹ He managed to get affidavits for 2,000 Catholic migrants, and a year later, KCES dispatched Father Trum to New York to arrange further affidavits. After his return to the Netherlands, Trum held talks throughout the country emphasising three points: 1. the US economy was experiencing a temporary setback, but it would soon recover; 2. repatriates as a rule spoke English well and therefore had good opportunities in American society; 3. southern states, because of anti-miscegenation laws, were not an option for the repatriates.⁹⁰ Haveman, who monitored the programme, withheld from Walter the information that the NCWC was not very successful in raising interest in migration among the repatriates.⁹¹

The Dutch government sent Wilhelmus Bekkers, coadjutor Bishop of the Dutch town of Den Bosch and 'emigrant bishop' (1959–1966) to the US, to stimulate migration, and paid for half of his trip.⁹² According to Bekkers, US sponsors showed signs of 'acceptance fatigue', but repatriates in the Netherlands should continue to try to find a sponsor, he added. They should not be afraid that they would be discriminated against because of their skin colour.⁹³ The repeated emphasis on discrimination based on skin colour, suggests that at least some repatriates felt they were discriminated against.

Dutch newspaper advertisements called on repatriates to apply for migration to the US. The *Katholieke Limburgse Emigratie Stichting* (a branch of KCES) advertised that information was provided every day in its office, in a pub and in church.⁹⁴ The Dutch government financed a radio documentary by the Dutch Catholic Broadcasting Organisation;⁹⁵ for this the journalist Leon Pagana travelled to the US and Canada, hoping to find sponsors to encourage

88 NL-HaNA 2.15.68 Archive MinSoc /Emigratie, inv.no. 2514, Jaarverslag 1955.

89 Koops, *Dynamiek*, 283.

90 *De Tijd De Maasbode* (13 April 1959).

91 NL-HaNA 2.15.68 Archive MinSoc /Emigratie, inv.no. 2560 Samenwerking met voluntary agence National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC) met betrekking tot de uitvoering van de Pastore-Walter Act. 1958–1961.

92 NL-HaNA 2.15.68 Archive MinSoc /Emigratie, inv.no. 2560 Samenwerking met voluntary agence National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC) met betrekking tot de uitvoering van de Pastore-Walter Act. 1958–1961; <https://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/emigratie/gids/instelling/1145207156?highlight=bekkers> (13 August 2024).

93 *De Tijd De Maasbode* (1 September 1959); *Nieuwe Haarlemsche courant* (1 September 1959).

94 *Limburgsch Dagblad* (5 January 1962).

95 Katholieke Radio Omroep; KRO.

repatriates to emigrate, helped by the NCWC.⁹⁶ In 1961, Dutch emigration centres asked film maker Jan van Hillo to shoot a movie about the success of the repatriates' migration to the US. It was called 'A spot in the sun' (*Een plaatsje in de zon*) and it emphasised that the repatriates would feel at home under the California sun. The film was shown in cinemas and hotels throughout the Netherlands.⁹⁷

Overall, it is surprising how many NGOs and people were involved in organising the migration of repatriates to the US, and how much time, money and effort was put into stimulating it. The Dutch authorities put resources into the stimulation of *all* potential emigrants, but in this case the efforts were extensive and they continued after interest in migration among the repatriates dwindled.

Repatriates to Australia

Australia's *Immigration Restriction Act* (1901), known as the White Australia Policy, restricted the immigration of non-whites. Australia was willing to receive some non-white migrants – of 'Non Pure European Origin (NPEO)' – but only in small numbers and only if they were fully subsidised by the Dutch government.⁹⁸ About 17,000 people migrated from the Dutch East Indies to Australia, but it is unclear how many of them were of 'mixed' parentage.⁹⁹ The numbers are not listed anywhere, as was the case for the US.¹⁰⁰ During the war, Australia had taken in 5,000 people from the Dutch East Indies as refugees.¹⁰¹ They were to return after the war since they were regarded as non-whites. After the war, people from Indonesia, including former Royal

96 NL-HaNA 2.15.68 Archive MinSoc /Emigratie inv.no. 2560 Samenwerking met voluntary agencie National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC) met betrekking tot de uitvoering van de Pastore-Walter Act. 1958–1961.

97 *Het Parool* (20 February 1962).

98 J. Coté and L. Westerbeek, *Recalling the Indies. Colonial culture and postcolonial identities* (Amsterdam 2003).

99 Willems, *De uittocht uit Indië*, 282.

100 W. Willems, 'Breaking down the white walls: the Dutch from Indonesia', in: N. Peters (ed.), *The Dutch Down-Under 1606–2006* (Crawley 2006), 145; J. Coté, 'The Indisch Dutch in post-war Australia', *Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis* 7:2 (2010) 103–125, 104.

101 N. Peters, *A touch of Dutch. Maritime, military, migration and mercantile. Connections on the western third 1616–2016* (Subiaco 2016); Willems, *De uittocht uit Indië*, 19; Coté, 'The Indisch Dutch'; J. Jupp, *From white Australia to Woomera* (Cambridge 2007); S. Horne, *The invisible immigrants: Dutch migrants in South Australia* (Adelaide 2011); Willems, 'Breaking down the white walls', 132–147.

Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL) soldiers, could settle in Australia under the Allied Ex-Servicemen's Scheme, if they had the 'right' percentage of European blood and if they looked 'white enough'.¹⁰² A selection officer decided if they passed a 60 per cent European and 40 per cent non-European appearance test. The selection officer also looked at family photographs and if more than one grandparent looked 'too' Indonesian, candidates were rejected.¹⁰³

The case of the O'Keefe family challenged Australia's white policy (figure 3) and it received a lot of media attention. In Dutch language newspapers (published in the Netherlands and in the Dutch East Indies) over 700 articles appeared on the O'Keefe case, while newspapers in Australia and elsewhere also paid extensive attention to it. In 1942, Annie and Samuel Jacob and their eight children were evacuated from the Dutch East Indies to Australia, as were many others. Samuel got a job in Melbourne with the Dutch secret intelligence service, but in 1944 he died on the job in a plane crash. After the war, his widow and her eight children did not want to return to the Dutch East Indies in the midst of the war of independence. In 1947, Annie Jacob married her landlord, a retired postal clerk named James O'Keefe, and through her marriage she got British citizenship. In 1949, the Australian authorities still planned to deport



FIGURE 3 James and Annie O'Keefe and seven of the eight children.

SOURCE: *HET PAROOL* (18 FEBRUARY 1949).

¹⁰² Willems, 'Breaking down the white walls', 136; Peters, *A touch of Dutch*, 220–221.

¹⁰³ Peters, *A touch of Dutch*, 221; Coté, 'The Indisch Dutch'.

her and her children, however she did not apply for a visa for Indonesia (which she had to do since she was now British), and the Dutch authorities could not grant her one if she did not apply.¹⁰⁴ According to the *Nieuwsblad voor Sumatra*, Annie O'Keefe could be deported, even if she did not agree,¹⁰⁵ but James O'Keefe hoped that the situation of two of the children would forestall deportation of the whole family. One of the daughters was seventeen and worked for the Dutch consulate in Melbourne; O'Keefe thought it was unlikely that she would be deported. The youngest son was five and born in Australia and as a result was an Australian subject; it was also unlikely that he would be deported. If the family was deported, O'Keefe would go with them, even though his doctor advised him not to for health reasons.¹⁰⁶ *The Daily Telegraph* started to collect money to enable the family to go to court,¹⁰⁷ and *Het Dagblad* wrote that the press and clergy in Australia had joined forces to protest against the deportation. A priest said Australia's white policy led to hatred and misunderstandings,¹⁰⁸ while the Archbishop of Melbourne called upon co-religionist Arthur Calwell, the Immigration Minister, to show mercy.¹⁰⁹ Calwell said, however, that he was simply clearing away the remnants of the war with this deportation, and, if he did not stick to the immigration laws, the country would fall prey to terrible disaster; living standards needed to be protected. Mrs O'Keefe and her eight children would be deported to Indonesia, or to an island in the Pacific Ocean, wherever they could be put ashore, the minister added.¹¹⁰ Sultan Hamid II, ruler over West Borneo, called the Australian policy 'feudal', adding he would evict all Australian citizens in the hope that other countries would follow his example. The Australian authorities responded that there were hardly any Australians in West Borneo, but an Australian journalist pointed out that China and India might follow the Sultan's example, and the number of Dutch people living there was considerable. The Dutch authorities stated that Mrs O'Keefe was a British citizen because of her marriage, and an Australian subject, so the case was no longer a Dutch responsibility. According to Calwell, the Indonesian government had to take back its people which had been forced upon Australia during the war. *Het Dagblad* praised the Sultan, who showed the Dutch how to

104 *Nieuwsblad voor Sumatra* (4 February 1949); *De Volkskrant* (18 February 1949); *Het Parool* (18 February 1949).

105 *Nieuwsblad voor Sumatra* (11 July 1949).

106 *Het Dagblad* (14 February 1949); *Het Parool* (8 April 1949).

107 *Locomotief* (12 February 1949); *Het Dagblad* (14 February 1949); *De Vrije Pers* (14 February 1949); *Het Vrije Volk* (16 February 1949); *Trouw* (14 February 1949); *Algemeen Dagblad* (16 February 1949).

108 *Het Dagblad* (1 February 1949).

109 *Locomotief* (1 February 1949).

110 *Het Dagblad* (5 February 1949); *Het Dagblad* (9 July 1949); *De Vrije Pers* (9 July 1949).

respond to the humiliating manner in which 'coloured' people were treated in Australia.¹¹¹ The O'Keefe's took their case to the High Court where it became the first successful legal challenge to the White Australia Policy.¹¹² *The New York Times* wrote:

Australia's almost sacrosanct 'White Australia' policy, with its restrictive immigration laws, can be set aside, it seems, if there is sufficient occasion. [...] Mrs. Annie O'Keefe, an Indonesian refugee, will not be deported but will be permitted to remain with her Australian husband. [...] It is good to know that Governments that are strict in some particular field can also be humane.¹¹³

Shortly afterwards, however, the Australian House of Representatives introduced a new bill that required the deportation of wartime refugees who had promised to leave Australia after the war.¹¹⁴

Haveman and his successors tried to encourage migration from the (former) Dutch East Indies to Australia, but this proved to be difficult.¹¹⁵ In 1963, A.M.J. Wewer, for instance, applied for migration to Australia. He was interviewed at the Australian immigration office in The Hague together with his fiancée, who had three (white) Dutch grandparents and one grandmother who was a 'native' of the Dutch East Indies. The application of the couple was denied for this reason, even though they would have paid for their own trip and Wewer had found work in Australia. Wewer's fiancée did not meet the policy criteria for permanent access to Australia, the authorities said. She was young (nineteen) and healthy, but she was a little darker skinned than most Dutch, provided they avoided the sun, according to Wewer.¹¹⁶ Wewer went to the press to protest against this discrimination, but the press showed little interest.¹¹⁷ However, in March 1963, the Dutch ambassador in Canberra managed to reach an agreement with Australia for a new emigration scheme, unilaterally funded by the Netherlands, called the Netherlands Emigration Service Agency Scheme (NESAS). It was intended, amongst other aims, to enable emigration to Australia for NPEOs, as their opportunities for emigration

111 *Het Dagblad* (7 February 1949).

112 *The Sydney Morning Herald* (19 March 1949); *The Kalgoorlie Miner* (19 March 1949).

113 *The New York Times* (8 February 1950).

114 *The New York Times* (7 July 1949).

115 *Het Parool* (3 May 1955).

116 *De Gooi- en Eemlander* (2 February 1963).

117 *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden* (16 January 1963).

to the US had ended. In 1966, Wewer did manage to migrate to Australia under NESAS.¹¹⁸

Overall, the Dutch authorities made efforts to increase the migration of small numbers of non-white Dutch to Australia; the media were supportive in the O'Keefe case, and emphasised injustice. However, the media and organisations were not very active claim makers after that. Discrimination was seen in the Netherlands as an internal Australian issue.

Repatriates to Canada

In 1953, the Dutch Minister of Social Affairs, J.G. Suurhoff (PvdA), made a trip to Canada to see how 80,000 Dutch migrants were doing. He did not encounter any failures; Dutch immigrants had a good reputation, he said.¹¹⁹ *De Telegraaf* mocked Suurhoff's enthusiasm: it was a wonder he returned to the Netherlands at all. Everything was better in Canada, *De Telegraaf* added, because the best Dutch people had migrated to there.¹²⁰

Canada also restricted the immigration of people from the (former) Dutch East Indies. A migration advocacy centre reported to the Catholic Emigration Foundation that people of mixed descent as a rule did not stand a chance to get into Canada. This policy was strictly confidential, according to Canadian authorities, but exceptions were made, depending on the 'degree of mixedness'.¹²¹

The so-called Haster Case (figure 4) generated a lot of attention in the Dutch press (over 500 articles), many of which were accompanied by pictures of the Haster family. Hans and Mary Haster applied for migration to Canada in 1952, but were rejected. They kept trying until 1955, when it became clear that they were rejected because Mary Haster was of so-called mixed parentage. According to Canadian immigration policy, people with Asian blood were only allowed to immigrate if they were married to a Canadian partner. Mary Haster

118 NL-HaNA 2.15.68 Archive MinSoc / Emigratie, inv.no. 1312, Ambassador to Government Commissioner, 27-03-1963; registration Wewer: NA/NT00335///Brisbane v-z/ Brisbane. NAA item ID 30090395 and NL-HaNA 2.05.159_emigratiekaarten gevormd door de Nederlandse consulaire vertegenwoordigingen in Australië, 1946-1991; 7-1405 Alfabetisch-lexicografisch ingericht kaartstelsel houdende informatie over geëmigreerde Nederlanders, kantoor Brisbane 1946-1991.

119 *Leeuwarder Courant* (8 September 1953).

120 *De Telegraaf* (9 September 1953).

121 NL-HaNA 2.15.68 Archive MinSoc / Emigratie, inv.no. 2022 Emigratieproblematiek aangaande Indische Nederlanders. 1950-1962 7 July 1952. Letter from Stichting Landverhuizing Nederland tot Katholieke Centrale Emigratiestichting.



FIGURE 4 Mary (24), Johan (25) and Yvonne Haster (2) say goodbye before flying to Canada.

SOURCE: *HET PAROOL* (16 JANUARY 1956).

was Dutch and married to a Dutch partner. The husband could come first, the authorities said, get Canadian citizenship after five years, and then send for his wife and daughter, or he should have known better and not have married a 'mixed-blooded' partner, the paper added.¹²² The parents of Hans Haster already lived in Canada with three of their sons, and they were approached by numerous people who asked what they could do to help. Canadian newspapers published a large number of articles on the rejection,¹²³ and Dutch language newspapers published in Indonesia pressed for change: the Dutch government should take a stand. Haveman, in response, openly declared that he wished immigration countries would change their attitudes. He said:

These people have received a European education. In their behaviour and attitudes, they are no different from me and my countrymen. The only disadvantage they have is that they have a beautiful sun toned skin

¹²² *Leeuwarder Courant* (10 December 1955); *Java-bode* (17 December 1955); *De Tijd* (10 December 1955).

¹²³ *Het Vrije Volk* (17 December 1955); *Het Vrije Volk* (9 December 1955); *De Telegraaf* (8 December 1955).

colour. It is hard that we – who daily think and speak about the free world – allow these practices in immigration.¹²⁴

More migration opportunities for the repatriates would solve 'our population problem', he added.¹²⁵ In December 1955, the Hasters got a telegram which said: 'Hans, Mary, an official message will follow but everything is okay. Take the first boat.' The Canadian Minister of Immigration had made an exception for Mary Haster, and Hans Haster's mother cried when she heard the good news.¹²⁶ The Hasters flew out on 15 January. The appeal via the press had made this migration possible, according to *De Volkskrant*,¹²⁷ and the press had played a crucial role, Hans Haster told *De Telegraaf*. After his parents had informed Canadian newspapers about the earlier rejections, their phone ran off the hook. Three lawyers had offered their services for free, and immigration agencies wanted to help.¹²⁸ After arriving in Toronto, Hans Haster said the whole issue had been a misunderstanding: Canada was a democratic country without racism.¹²⁹ Shortly afterwards, the Canadian Deputy Minister of Immigration, Lavel Fortier, visited The Hague to talk about the Haster case, where he gave a press conference in which he said Canada needed more people.¹³⁰ It was clear that Fortier feared the Haster case would harm the Canadian immigration programme.

There was, however, no change in policy. In 1956, Auke Wiersma and his fiancé Emmy Bouwmans, daughter of a highly decorated officer from the former Dutch East Indies, were rejected for migration to Canada. Both were young and healthy. A reason for the rejection was not given, but Auke Wiersma thought it was the mixed origin of his fiancé: her father was Dutch, but her maternal grandparents were African and Indonesian. Auke and Emmy were interviewed for over an hour at the Canadian Immigration Office in The Hague, and all questions related to race. The migration officer had said that there was no racial discrimination in Canada, but that they preferred it if whites did not marry non-whites.¹³¹ At an ICEM conference in Geneva, Haveman complained about this new case of racial discrimination.¹³²

124 *Algemeen Indisch dagblad: de Preangerbode* (15 March 1956).

125 *Algemeen Indisch dagblad: de Preangerbode* (15 March 1956).

126 *Het Vrije Volk* (19 December 1955); *Het Vrije Volk* (28 December 1955).

127 *De Volkskrant* (16 January 1956); *Leeuwarder Courant* (16 January 1956); *Trouw* (16 January 1956).

128 *De Telegraaf* (16 January 1956).

129 *Friese Koerier* (17 January 1956); *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden* (17 January 1956).

130 *Het Vrije Volk* (27 January 1956).

131 *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden* (13 April 1956); *Het Vrije Volk* (11 April 1956); *Friese Koerier* (12 April 1956); *Algemeen Dagblad* (12 April 1956).

132 *Het Vrije Volk* (11 April 1956).

In the Canadian case, Dutch authorities, Dutch organisations and the Dutch and Canadian press were outspoken in protesting against discriminatory practices. Efforts were made in individual cases, but unlike in Australia, there were no formal financial assistance schemes between the Dutch and Canadian authorities that could be employed unilaterally to cope with certain aspects of the white-only policy. Canadian authorities may have feared that news about these practices could jeopardise the desired immigration of white Dutch farmers.¹³³

Repatriates to South America (Including Suriname) and New Guinea

The Dutch authorities explored other migration options for repatriates, including to South Africa and Rhodesia. Suurhoff, in 1958, took a four-week trip, visiting these countries,¹³⁴ but before departure was pessimistic. It would be very difficult to find options for repatriates because hardly any country wanted to take 'mixed blooded' people.¹³⁵ South Africa offered to take 1,000 people from Indonesia, but had 'special demands'. It was not clear if the demands had to do with colour, but Suurhoff said it would be impossible to find 1,000 people who met the criteria.¹³⁶ Suurhoff's trip was presented as successful by the newspapers, but he did not find new options.

The Dutch authorities also tried to stimulate migration to Brazil.¹³⁷ From 1946 until 1959, 4,082 Dutch left for Brazil, and between 1953 and 1955, the same authorities made propaganda to encourage migration directly from Indonesia to Brazil, and offered classes in Portuguese.¹³⁸ In 1954, 707 people migrated from Indonesia, followed by 348 others in 1955.

¹³³ Van Faassen, *Polder en emigratie*, 160–161.

¹³⁴ *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden* (24 January 1958).

¹³⁵ *De Volkskrant* (23 January 1958); *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden* (23 January 1958); *Emmer Courant* (23 January 1958).

¹³⁶ *De Volkskrant* (26 February 1958); *Het Vrije Volk* (25 February 1958); *Het Vrije Volk* (6 February 1958).

¹³⁷ H. Hack, *Dutch group settlement in Brazil* (Amsterdam 1959) 21; NL-HaNA 2.27.01.02 Archive: Centraal Maatschappelijk Werkkantoor in Indonesië, 1954–1958 CAMWI inv.no. 104, Stukken betreffende verzoeken voor emigratie naar Brazilië, met overzichtsstaten van aanmeldingen; NL-HaNA 2.27.01.01 Archive: Raad voor Sociale aangelegenheden in Indonesië (RSAI), inv.no. 94 and 96; NL-HaNA 2.05.151 Archive: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken Nederlandse ambassade (Consulaat-Generaal) in Brazilië te Rio de Janeiro en te Sao Paulo, inv.no. 438 and 443; NL-HaNA 2.15.68 Archive: MinSoc / Emigratie, inv.no. 1515, 1570 and 1573; H. P. Linthorst Homan, *Rapport over de integratie van emigranten in de samenleving van het ontvangende land* (Den Haag 1957).

¹³⁸ NL-HaNA 2.15.68 Archive MinSoc / Emigratie, inv.no. 1515, Scholing van emigranten vanuit Indonesië: 1954–1958, inv. no. 1515, 26 October 1954.

In 1947, papers wrote that Brazil was a land full of promises, but it was not the promised land. A farmers' organisation sent a representative to Brazil to explore options; he stayed for three months and concluded that the atmosphere and culture were very different from those in the Netherlands. There was extreme wealth and extreme poverty, land was abundantly available, but roads were bad, the supply of gas and electricity failed, phones were malfunctioning, and there were no schools for miles around.¹³⁹

In 1950, Nibeg-Nederland (an organisation set up in the Dutch East Indies in 1945 to advocate for the rights of repatriates) wrote to the Minister of Social Affairs that it knew of several countries who objected to immigrants who were not of purely white descent.¹⁴⁰ This was a problem for 4,000 heads of families; it was not a large number and the group would not increase, according to Nibeg. The Dutch authorities answered that countries had the right to decide whom they wanted to receive, and the Minister of General Affairs acknowledged there was discrimination of Dutch people of non-pure European descent. In 1951 the Ministry of Social Affairs brought the issue to the attention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: maybe the ministry could contact Argentina, since that was one of the few countries that received coloured Dutch? But Argentina was not mentioned by others as an option, and the Minister of Social Affairs added that it should be emphasised that migrants had technical skills and no problem with the climate. Brazil decided the repatriates were Asians, and therefore could not be admitted. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, however, wrote to the Minister of General Affairs that Brazil said there was no colour bar. The predecessor of the Netherlands Emigration Service¹⁴¹ said there was no formal colour bar in Brazil, but in practice there were restrictions on the migration of coloured people. It was possible to get access if the mixed origin could be obscured. A representative of the Argentine government told the Minister of Foreign Affairs that there were objections to immigration of people with 'negro blood'. The repatriates were regarded as Asians, and in Argentina there was a policy of not allowing too many Asians into the country, but small numbers should not be a problem, if the applicant did not look too Asian. Argentina however preferred people of 'pure European blood'.¹⁴²

At one of the information meetings for potential emigrants in the Netherlands, a civil servant refused to hand a form to a person who looked

139 *De Volkskrant* (20 March 1947).

140 NL-HaNA 2.15.68 Archive MinSoc/ Emigratie, (1933) 1945–1994 inv.no. 2022 Emigratieproblematiek aangaande Indische Nederlanders 1950–1962.

141 *The Stichting Landverhuizing Nederland*.

142 NL-HaNA 2.15.68. Archive MinSoc/ Emigratie, (1933) 1945–1994, inv.no. 2022 Emigratieproblematiek aangaande Indische Nederlanders. 1950–1962.

non-Western in his eyes. It caused a bit of a row and more debate on where the repatriates could go: maybe the French were willing to let some into their colonies, since France itself could not provide enough people, the Labour Office suggested.¹⁴³

In 1951, newspapers wrote that repatriates would find Brazil attractive: there was space and the weather was appealing. According to Dutch newspapers, displaced repatriates were hankering for a place under the sun; the papers were reproducing a phrase that had been used regarding California. They would be able to grow tropical products in Brazil; nature, plants, houses and the types of people were the same as on Java and Sumatra, a newspaper wrote.¹⁴⁴ In 1952, a treaty was concluded between the Netherlands and Brazil: per month, 50 Dutch could migrate to Brazil, of whom twenty could be repatriates from the Netherlands or directly from Indonesia. The attaché of the High Commissionerate in Djakarta would select candidates. In the first few months, the Brazilian government would pay for food and housing, while the ICEM paid part of the trip.¹⁴⁵

In 1952, Haveman drafted a report which claimed that Brazil was refusing non-whites in practice; only those who looked not too dark might stand a chance of getting in. In the meantime, the situation of the roughly 90,000 Dutch people of colour who were still in Indonesia deteriorated. Young people joined gangs and showed amoral behaviour, according to the report, and Indonesian authorities might request the Dutch to repatriate these 'unwanted' subjects. This would be loss of face for the Dutch, and children in particular should be repatriated fast. The older people could perhaps go as a group to Brazil, New Caledonia, the New Hebrides, or French Africa and Madagascar, and money should be offered to those who were willing to take Indonesian citizenship.¹⁴⁶

In 1953, the first repatriates left for Brazil from the Netherlands. In that year, nine out of ten Dutch migrants to Brazil were of mixed parentage; this was far

143 NL-HaNA 2.15.68. Archive MinSoc/ Emigratie, (1933) 1945–1994, inv.no. 2022 Emigratieproblematiek aangaande Indische Nederlanders. 1950–1962; Directeur Generaal Arbeidsbureau aan Heren Directeuren-Inspecteur en Heren Directeuren der Gewestelijke Arbeidsbureau's (en ook aan Ministerie Sociale Zaken en Volksgezondheid Rijksarbeidsbureau) 21 maart 1952; Rapport omtrent de emigratiemogelijkheden voor de Indische Nederlander 2 April 1952.

144 *Nieuwe Courant* (31 October 1951); *Nieuwe Courant* (24 October 1951).

145 *Java-bode* (2 August 1954). <https://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/emigratie/gids/bijlage/wettenbilateraal#b8>.

146 NL-HaNA 2.15.68 Archive MinSoc/ Emigratie, (1933) 1945–1994 inv.no. 2022 Emigratieproblematiek aangaande Indische Nederlanders. 1950–1962.

more than the 40 per cent authorities had agreed upon earlier.¹⁴⁷ ICEM asked the Dutch authorities for information on how the Dutch were doing in Brazil, but it did not get an answer.¹⁴⁸ In 1954, papers wrote about frequent departures directly from Indonesia. According to the agreement between the Netherlands and Brazil, migrants had to be skilled workers from the metal, textile and chemical industry, and they had to know some Portuguese;¹⁴⁹ 600 repatriates had registered for migration to Brazil. The Dutch paid for their transport, and provided pocket money, while the Dutch consulate in Brazil arranged jobs and, in most cases, also housing.¹⁵⁰ The ICEM again asked for a report by Haveman on the Dutch in Brazil,¹⁵¹ and in 1954, he travelled there to see how 46 families, who had temporarily lived in the Netherlands before, were doing. They were fine, he concluded: all worked in farming, and they were profiting from the support of 500 Dutch missionaries who were working in Brazil.¹⁵² There was no racial discrimination in Brazil, he said.¹⁵³ In 1955, Dutch language newspapers in Indonesia wrote about another 36 people who had left Indonesia for Brazil; their migration was also successful. People who had lived in the tropics adjusted better to Brazilian society than people from the Netherlands, a Dutch newspaper published in Indonesia added.¹⁵⁴ Shortly afterwards people who had tried to migrate from Indonesia to Brazil complained in newspapers: none of the promises were true, there was no work, life was hard, and the Dutch provided no support.¹⁵⁵

The option of migration to Western New Guinea (West Papua), which did not become independent from the Netherlands like the rest of Indonesia did

147 *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden* (30 April 1953).

148 NL-HaNA 2.15.68 Archive MinSoc / Emigratie, (1933) 1945–1994, Ministry of Social Affairs, 1945–1994, S29, inv.no. 2663. Onderzoek van dr. Weizman en mr. M. Prieto van het Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration naar Zuid-Amerika in verband met de voorstellen van enkele Latijns-Amerikaanse landen om met ICEM-deskundigen kolonisatieplannen en -problemen te bespreken 1953–1957. 10 December 1953 Herzl Weizmann of ICEM to C. J. Van Doorn (office Government Commissioner for Emigration): provide information on Castro Colony in Brazil.

149 *Java-bode* (2 August 1954).

150 *Het nieuwsblad voor Sumatra* (1 September 1954); *Trouw* (24 August 1954).

151 NL-HaNA 2.15.68 Archive MinSoc/Emigratie (1933) 1945–1994, inv.no 859, 8 January 1954 Pierre Jacobson (ICEM) to Haveman; Haveman to Jacobson 29 January 1954.

152 *Limburgsch dagblad* (15 November 1954); *Het nieuwsblad voor Sumatra* (19 November 1954).

153 *'t Nieuws voor Kampen* 16–11–1954; NL-HaNA 2.15.68 Archive MinSoc/Emigratie (1933) 1945–1994, inv.no. 1597 Rassendiscriminatie in Brazilië.

154 *Algemeen Indisch dagblad* (25 April 1955).

155 *Amigoe di Curacao* (9 December 1955).

in 1949, was also explored.¹⁵⁶ The Indonesian government said New Guinea belonged to Indonesia since it had been part of the Dutch East Indies during colonisation. The Dutch authorities however said the Papuans had nothing in common with others in the archipelago, and therefore this part of the Dutch East Indies should remain a Dutch colony, until it was capable of self-government.¹⁵⁷ In 1957, the so-called New Guinea Question led to the expulsion of all Dutch who were still in Indonesia, and in 1962 New Guinea was transferred to Indonesia.

Shortly after the end of the Second World War, Dutch civilians and troops were sent to New Guinea to restore the colonial regime, train the Papuans to exercise their right of self-determination, and to prepare for the arrival of new immigrants.¹⁵⁸ These immigrants mostly had been unable to prove that they were Dutch and were thus unable to go to the Netherlands. Propagandists for the so-called 'New Guinea project' excepted 150,000 more people. In 1959 there were about 18,000 Europeans in New Guinea, of whom 11,000 were people of mixed origin from Indonesia.

In the 1950s, organisations in Indonesia started to advocate for migration to New Guinea as an option for Dutch people who could not stay in Indonesia.¹⁵⁹ People who had difficulty proving that they were Dutch, people whose migration was not financially supported by the Dutch authorities and who did not have their own money to travel, and those who did not have family in the Netherlands, could consider migration to New Guinea, organisations said. In 1948, *The Straits Times* (a Singapore paper) quoted an officer of the Netherlands Immigration Office in Singapore who said the repatriates would feel out of place in the Netherlands, and that they would be willing to go to

156 Guno Jones, *Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten en Nederlanders* (Amsterdam 2007) 156; Ulbe Bosma, 'Nederlands Nieuw-Guinea en de late Empire Builders', *Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis* 6:3 (2009) 2–25.

157 P.J. Drooglever, *Een daad van vrije keuze. De Papoea's van westelijk Nieuw-Guinea en de grenzen van het zelfbeschikkingsrecht* (Amsterdam 2005); *The Daily Telegraph* (3 June 1950).

158 J. van den Berg, 'De Deta-jongens op Nederlands Nieuw-Guinea', in: Wim Willems and Jaap de Moor (eds), *Het einde van Indië. Indische Nederlanders tijdens de Japanse bezetting en de dekolonisatie* (Den Haag 1995) 256–266; Hans Meijer, 'Door Ellende tot Armoe'. De Deta-jongens als kwartiermakers op Nieuw-Guinea (1950–1962), *Tijdschrift voor Sociale Geschiedenis* 24:4 (1998) 345–370; Hans Meijer, 'Het uitverkoren land'. De lotgevallen van de Indo Europese kolonisten op Nieuw-Guinea (1949–1962), *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 112:3 (1999) 253–284; Drooglever, *Daad van vrije keuze*, 717–726.

159 L. Rosen Jacobson, *'The Eurasian Question'. The colonial position and postcolonial options of colonial mixed ancestry groups from British India, Dutch East Indies and French Indochina compared* (Hilversum 2018).

New Guinea if they had the guarantee it would stay Dutch.¹⁶⁰ In New Guinea they would not want to live in a colonial 'in-between' position – between the coloniser and the colonised – as they had been in the Dutch East Indies during colonialism.¹⁶¹ The *Indian Daily Mail* wrote in 1946 that in New Guinea 'there would be no colour bar'.¹⁶² The *Washington Post* published an article that was almost verbatim the same under the heading: 'New Guinea, pesthole to Yanks, is "Canaan" to 250,000 Eurasians'.¹⁶³ Not only people from the Dutch East Indies but also those of so-called mixed parentage from British colonies such as Malaya, India, Ceylon and Burma wanted to make New Guinea their new homeland.¹⁶⁴ This hope lived on for years.¹⁶⁵

Dutch authorities were sceptical about the migration to New Guinea because the region could not accommodate the number of people that were planning to go, a telegram to the Minister of Justice said. The Dutch authorities would not help people to reallocate to New Guinea, but it would help people who arrived on their own initiative.¹⁶⁶

Repatriates also tried to migrate to Suriname, which was at the time still a Dutch colony. Quite a bit of attention was paid to a group of 180 so-called Tugunese, who lived on Java first, but who were in New Guinea in the 1960s (figure 5). The Tugunese were a closed Christian minority of mixed heritage (Portuguese, African, Indonesian, Dutch and Chinese). They were brought by plane to the Netherlands, and the Dutch authorities wanted them to migrate on to Suriname,¹⁶⁷ where they bought a plot of land for them. Over 300 newspaper articles were published on this small group of migrants, but their migration to Suriname failed and most returned to the Netherlands.¹⁶⁸ Attempts were also made to send other repatriates to Suriname. About 500 families could migrate,

160 *The Straits Times* (22 August 1948); Rosen Jacobson, *The Eurasian Question*.

161 Surie, 'De gerepatriceerden', 63.

162 *Indian Daily Mail* (30 October 1946).

163 *The Washington Post* (17 November 1946).

164 *The Singapore Free Press* (5 March 1948).

165 *The Irish Times* (16 May 1959).

166 NL-HaNA 2.05.189 Archive: Hoge Commissariaat van Nederland in Indonesië (Jakarta) inv.no. 442 Emigratie en transmigratie van kolonisten naar Nieuw-Guinea, 1949. Codetelegram voor Van Maarseveen persoonlijk van Lovink 12-11-1949 geheim.

167 NL-HaNA 2.03.01 Archive: Ministeries voor Algemeene Oorlogvoering van het Koninkrijk (AOK) en van Algemene Zaken (AZ): Kabinet van de Minister-President (KMP), (1924) 1942–1979 (1989) inv.no. 4692 Stukken betreffende de regeling van de toelating, de vestiging en het verblijf in Suriname van bevolkingsgroepen uit Indonesië en Nieuw-Guinea die nog de Indonesische nationaliteit bezitten.

168 *Gereformeerd Gezinsblad* (17 July 1967); *Tubantia* (21 September 1967); *Amigoe de Curacao* (15 July 1967); *Telegraaf* (6 April 1963).



FIGURE 5 Tugunese on the boat from the Netherlands to Suriname, 5 April 1963.

SOURCE: FOTOCOLLECTIE ANEFO, NL-HANA 2.24.01.03

preferably farmers and agricultural workers, and the Surinamese authorities were willing to collaborate in this experiment.¹⁶⁹

Overall, it is clear that the repatriates had great difficulties in migrating anywhere. The Dutch authorities made considerable efforts on behalf of *all* emigrants, and newspapers reported extensively on their predicament. However, the amount of time, money and energy that was specifically invested in getting the repatriates to go to, what were generally considered, unattractive destinations, does stand out. The authorities were very eager to stimulate them to emigrate, and this policy did not meet with criticism in the Netherlands.¹⁷⁰

169 NL-HaNA 2.10.54 Archive MinCol: Dossierarchief 1945–1963, inv.no 4679 Verzoek van de emigratiestichting “Quo Vadis” afdeling Soerabaja inzake transmigratie Indische Nederlanders naar de Nederlandse Antillen 1947–1949. Ministerie voor Uniezaken aan MP 21-9-1950.

170 Jones, *Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten en Nederlanders*, 157–158.

Dutch Collaborators

In July 1945, about 130,000 people in the Netherlands who were suspected of war crimes or collaboration with the Nazis (mostly members of the NSB), were arrested and placed in 130 internment camps in the Netherlands.¹⁷¹ It was impossible to punish all collaborators and internment camps were overcrowded. Camp life was, according to newspapers, also fortifying fascist ideas.¹⁷² Already in March 1945, before the end of the war, resistance newspapers started to write about what to do with the large groups of Dutch people who had collaborated with the Nazis.¹⁷³ In September 1945, *De Oranje Gids*, a resistance paper, suggested deporting 100,000 collaborators to New Guinea where they could work as forced labourers guarded by 1,000 soldiers.¹⁷⁴ *Brabants Centrum*, another resistance paper, ensured its readers that New Guinea would not be a penal colony.¹⁷⁵ Shortly afterwards, Prime Minister Schermerhorn presented the same plan, using the same words in an interview with the Associated Press. He said there were plans to deport 80,000 Dutch people who had collaborated with the Nazis to one of the Dutch colonies, adding it would not be a penal colony, but that it would relieve Dutch society of people nobody wanted in the Netherlands. Schermerhorn added that the collaborators themselves also wanted to leave.¹⁷⁶ *Het Parool* presented Schermerhorn's suggestion as a plan, which the authorities had decided upon,¹⁷⁷ and other newspapers wrote that an area called *Vogelkop* on New Guinea would be suitable, because hardly any people lived there. Life would be hard, and some might die, but life had been hard for all migrant pioneers in the past. The deportees would be provided with food, tools, seeds and barracks. They would be forced to do hard labour, but their children would grow up in freedom and would develop into good

171 Peter Romijn, *Snel, streng en rechtvaardig. Politiek beleid inzake de bestrafing en reclassering van 'foute' Nederlanders, 1945–1955* (Houten 1989) 175, 182, 235–274; *Algemeen Handelsblad* (5 September 1946); Guus Belinfante, *In plaats van Bijltjesdag. De geschiedenis van de Bijzondere Rechtspleging na de Tweede Wereldoorlog* (Assen 1978) 8–11, 617–624.

172 Belinfante, *In plaats van Bijltjesdag*, 580, 548–590.

173 Belinfante, *In plaats van Bijltjesdag*; K. Groen, *Landverraders, wat deden we met ze? Een documentatie over de bestrafing en berechting van NSB-ers en kollaborateurs en de zuivering van de pers, radio, kunst, bedrijfsleven na de tweede wereldoorlog* (Baarn 1974) 154–155; Romijn, *Snel*.

174 *De Oranje gids: voor: vrijheid, waarheid en recht* (27 March 1945).

175 *Brabant's centrum* (20 April 1945).

176 *Algemeen Handelsblad* (8 September 1945); *Provinciaal Noordbrabantsch Dagblad* (8 September 1945); *De Volkskrant* (8 September 1945); *Algemeen Handelsblad* (11 September 1945); *De Tijd* (8 September 1945).

177 *Het Parool* (11 September 1945).

people.¹⁷⁸ *Het Helmonds Dagblad* did not think that deportation to the colony was a good idea; the Papuans were taking their first steps on the road to civilisation, helped by Dutch missionaries, and they should not be exposed to a 'moral infection'. Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa would not want collaborators. Paraguay, Chile and Bolivia might be willing to take them, or else they could go to the 'Nazi paradise' of South West Africa, the paper suggested.¹⁷⁹ Argentina, with a fascist regime, was also an option.¹⁸⁰ Abyssinia was also mentioned, where the collaborators could be supervised by missionaries.¹⁸¹ According to *Het Helmonds Dagblad*, Suriname was not suitable: the Dutch who had migrated there in previous eras had mostly perished. Furthermore, it was highly unlikely that the Surinamese authorities would agree to this migration: 'we' could not dump the people we did not want on the colony, newspapers wrote.¹⁸²

The Dutch Minister of Reconstruction in 1946 suggested deporting 20,000 Dutch collaborators to the German island of Borkum (just across the Dutch-German border).¹⁸³ The island had been a bulwark of anti-Semitism already before Hitler came to power. After the war, the Dutch wanted to annex the island.¹⁸⁴ The 2,000 people who lived on the island were to be deported, and talks with the British, who held authority over the island, had started, newspapers wrote.¹⁸⁵ Only the so-called 'heavy' collaborators could be deported to the island,¹⁸⁶ but the German press criticised the plan,¹⁸⁷ and nothing came of it.¹⁸⁸

Shortly afterwards local papers reported that Argentine representatives were talking to Dutch NSB prisoners interned in a former Nazi concentration camp.¹⁸⁹ There were plans to facilitate the migration of 80 people.¹⁹⁰ In 1947, 119 'political delinquents' left for New Guinea; these were people who had been convicted, and who had volunteered to work for two years in New Guinea.

178 *De Tijd* (11 September 1945).

179 *Helmondsch Dagblad* (9 October 1945).

180 *Het Parool* (22 July 1946); *Nieuwe Apeldoornsche Courant* (26 July 1946).

181 *Algemeen Handelsblad* (8 April 1946).

182 *Helmondsch Dagblad* (15 September 1945).

183 Belinfante, *In plaats van Bijltjesdag*, 3–4.

184 *Het Parool* (15 November 1946).

185 *Het nieuws* (3 August 1946).

186 *Arnhemsche Courant* (3 August 1946); *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden* (1 August 1946).

187 *De Volkskrant* (30 October 1946).

188 F.J.F.M. Duynstee and J. Bosmans, *Parlementaire geschiedenis van Nederland 1, Het kabinet Schermerhorn-Drees*, (Assen 1977) 703–713.

189 *Het Parool* (22 July 1946); *Winschoter Courant* (29 July 1946).

190 *Nieuwe Apeldoornsche Courant* (26 July 1946); *De Heerenveensche koerier* (25 July 1946); *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden* (23 July 1946).

Family members were not allowed to accompany them, or to follow later. They were housed and fed, and were paid a modest wage; they would return to the Netherlands after working for two years and would not be interned again. This was not forced labour, colonisation or emigration, the newspapers emphasised.¹⁹¹ The plans to deport 80,000 collaborators to New Guinea was not realistic, but like the Borkum plan, it was seriously discussed by politicians and in newspapers, albeit briefly.

In 1946, an organisation was set up named *Nieuw Nederland in Zonnig Zuid-Amerika* (New Netherlands in Sunny South-America) which propagated migration to Suriname and other countries in Southern America. On 24 September 1946, a meeting was held in the Dutch town of Utrecht attended by 150 people, where a journalist told his audience that the Netherlands was full and pre-war unemployment would return. Brazil, which was the size of Europe, offered possibilities, and Suriname did as well: it was four and a half times the size of the Netherlands and had a population of 180,000. That was the same as the city of Utrecht. The speaker described Suriname and its possibilities in great detail. Dutch Homeland Security took interest in this organisation and concluded that it was not a communist organisation, but rather the opposite.¹⁹² The organisation seemed to be geared towards increasing migration options for war-time collaborators,¹⁹³ but its existence was short-lived and it fell apart due to internal disagreement and lack of means.

In the 1950s, the migration of collaborators also led to a different debate: people who wanted to migrate had to provide proof of good conduct, while people who had been convicted or were suspected of collaboration with the Nazis could not produce such proof.¹⁹⁴ Some people managed to migrate to South West Africa (Namibia) without proof,¹⁹⁵ but most countries did want such proof. The people who wanted to emigrate had to provide information about themselves, but employees of consulates, especially the Australian and US ones, also actively gathered information. Consular workers frequently

191 *Leeuwarder Courant* (19 June 1947); *Provinciale Drentsche en Asser Courant* (18 June 1947); *Arnhemsche Courant* (18 June 1947); *Trouw* (18 June 1947).

192 <http://stichtingargus.nl/bvd/inzagerechts.html> (Onderwerpsdossier Stichting Nieuw Nederland Zonnig Zuid Amerika) (13 August 2024).

193 Van Faassen, *Polder en emigratie*, 58; <https://resources.huuygens.knaw.nl/emigratie/gids/bijlage/overigeorganisaties>; <https://resources.huuygens.knaw.nl/emigratie/gids/instelling/2582847274?highlight=Zonnig> (13 August 2024).

194 Sieger Verhart, *NSB'ers niet gewenst? De emigratieproblematiek omtrent 'foute Nederlanders' in de periode 1945–1954* (Leiden 2010) Masters Thesis Leiden University.

195 Sieger Verhart, 'Dat lekkere vreemde land waar je met je blote voeten kan lopen'. De Nederlandse emigratie naar Zuid-West-Afrika (Namibië) in de twintigste eeuw (Leiden 2012) Masters Thesis Leiden University.

managed to get information about people who had been suspected of collaboration,¹⁹⁶ and in the Netherlands, people who were considered to be 'mild cases' had difficulties finding work.¹⁹⁷ In general, the Dutch authorities saw the unemployed as good candidates for emigration, but also wanted to avoid reputational damage of Dutch emigrants abroad.¹⁹⁸ The US and other countries of destination turned down candidates if they were not satisfied with the proof of good conduct that was provided; they not only asked if people had been convicted, but also if they were 'politically trustworthy'. This last point referred to war crimes, as well as to communism. All immigration authorities asked detailed information from the Dutch authorities, and at first they willingly provided it.¹⁹⁹ Over time, however, they became more lenient towards the so-called mild cases:²⁰⁰ people who had been members of the NSB, but who had stepped down halfway through the war for instance, should not be turned away as candidates for emigration.²⁰¹ The US authorities disagreed.

A rapid change of attitude in the press then took place, which was surprising. After plans for mass deportations of collaborators failed, the papers started to downplay what the collaborators had done. In 1950, *Het Vrije Volk* wrote that it was socially and morally unacceptable to release people into Dutch society who would not be able to find work, and who could not emigrate either.²⁰² In 1953, *De Volkskrant* added that it would be good to wipe clean criminal records this many years after the war.²⁰³ The Ministries of Internal Affairs and Justice in 1953 agreed.²⁰⁴ This would enable people who had been suspected of collaboration to emigrate willingly.²⁰⁵ According to *De Telegraaf*, pressure had been exercised on parliament to make this change and enable emigration.²⁰⁶ *Limburgsch Dagblad* considered the change important for potential emigrants.²⁰⁷

196 NL-HaNA 2.05.117 Archive MinForAff, 1945–1954, inv.no. 8646: 'Verstrekken van inlichtingen van Nederlanders aan vreemde vertegenwoordigers' (1945–1954).

197 A.L.C. Palies, *De politieke delinquent* (Assen 1948) 5, 38–39.

198 Van Faassen, 'Min of meer misbaar', 50–59; Van Faassen, *Polder en emigratie*, 58.

199 E.g. NL-HaNA, 2.05.117 Archive MinForAff, 1945–1954, inv.no. 8646: Brief van Directoraat-Generaal van de Bijzondere Rechtspleging, afdeling II bureau collaboratie aan het Amerikaans consulaat te Rotterdam, 27-11 1947.

200 Belinfante, *In plaats van bijltjesdag*, 580, 548–590; A.L.C. Palies, *De politieke delinquent* (Assen 1948) 5, 38–39.

201 Romijn, *Snel*, 235–274; Belinfante, *In plaats van bijltjesdag*, 617–624.

202 *Het Vrije Volk* (8 February 1950).

203 *De Volkskrant* (22 September 1953).

204 *Trouw* (22 September 1953).

205 *Het Vrije Volk* (23 September 1953).

206 *De Telegraaf* (23 September 1953).

207 *Limburgsch Dagblad* (26 September 1953).

In the case of the war-time collaborators, there was also a separate issue that led to debate: in the early 1950s, secret service officers from important destination countries, attached to their immigration offices in the Netherlands, conducted their own background checks (on Dutch territory) or asked for information from Dutch Homeland Security, as the Australians did. This data collection greatly annoyed the Dutch authorities, and Dutch Homeland Security although they willingly provided the requested judicial information, it was either incomplete, outdated or could be interpreted in a variety of ways.²⁰⁸ People were denied a visa for being convicted of stealing apples from the Nazis during the war, for instance. Dutch mayors were approached directly by the Australian authorities, and they also provided detailed personal information.²⁰⁹ The police provided foreign consulates with complete files on individuals, even on those who had not applied for emigration (yet).²¹⁰ The authorities of destination countries collected information on (potential) migrants from the Netherlands via a large number of routes and unofficial channels. More surprising though was that the US authorities interfered with Dutch migrations to Australia, and asked for files, interfering in a migration process that was none of their business. After protests from the Dutch side, the American authorities agreed to ask for less material and fewer details, but the Dutch authorities suspected that they agreed to this only because they had found other ways of collecting information. Further investigation showed that the American authorities had managed to get a full list of all Dutch people suspected of collaboration with the Nazis, and that they were gathering personal files, up to 300 per week sometimes.²¹¹ To avoid these practices in the future, the Dutch government created an agency for background research within the Netherlands Emigration Service, staffed by people from Dutch Homeland Security, to check the background of people who wanted to emigrate.

208 NL-HaNA, 2.05.117 Archive MinForAff, 1945–1954, inv.no. 8646: 'Verstrekken van inlichtingen van Nederlanders aan vreemde vertegenwoordigers' (1945–1954); Letter Boetzelaar, chef der directie algemene zaken buitenlandse zaken 1 feb 1954, Van B.W. Haveman.

209 NL-HaNA, 2.05.117 Archive MinForAff, 1945–1954, inv.no. 8646: 'Verstrekken van inlichtingen van Nederlanders aan vreemde vertegenwoordigers' (1945–1954); Memorandum from C. Adriaanse 4 November 1950.

210 NL-HaNA, 2.05.117 Archive MinForAff, 1945–1954, inv.no. 8646: 'Verstrekken van inlichtingen van Nederlanders aan vreemde vertegenwoordigers' (1945–1954); aan minister van Justitie van minister binnenlandse zaken maart 1949 no. 76928.

211 NL-HaNA, 2.05.117 Archive MinForAff, 1945–1954, inv.no. 8646: 'Verstrekken van inlichtingen van Nederlanders aan vreemde vertegenwoordigers' (1945–1954); Aantekeningen geen datum AZ 35785 Bijzondere Rechtspleging geeft informatie en Amerikanen werken tegen.

Overall, in the case of war-time collaborators, there were Dutch plans to ship them off in rather large numbers to unattractive destinations, including Suriname and New Guinea, the same countries that were mentioned in the case of the repatriates and the Jews. Such plans were highly unrealistic, although they were seriously discussed. In the case of collaborators, both the interference in the early 1950s of the authorities of destination countries, and the sharp change towards downplaying war crimes in the media, seemed surprising, but they were in fact in line with the international shift from denazification discussions to concerns about communism.²¹² After 1950–1951, destination countries had less objections to the arrival of war-time collaborators. The interference of foreign authorities in Dutch migration screening procedures was in line with the coordination between governments, but went further than the Dutch authorities appreciated.

Conclusion

Debates on the three groups discussed here were extensive and involved state authorities from a large number of countries, multiple organisations and the press. This article shows that policies were strongly geared towards those who – judging by the political arguments and public debates – apparently did not fit into what was considered ‘Dutch society’. Dutch authorities put a lot of time, money and energy into finding emigration options for Jews, Dutch people of colour and war-time collaborators. Such authorities, NGOs and IGOs and the media, presented or supported sometimes rather absurd plans, while the press and authorities barely protested against the restrictions Jews encountered, and favoured their emigration. Newspapers and the authorities also strongly supported plans for the emigration of repatriates either directly from Indonesia, or via the Netherlands to a large number of unlikely and unattractive places. Newspapers protested against racial discrimination especially in Canada, but less so in Australia and the US. In policies and in the media, there seems to have been a consensus that the repatriates would be happier anywhere – in a spot in the sun – but the Netherlands. In the case of war-time collaborators, the press, organisations and the authorities tried to make emigration possible by down-playing war time activities, after plans for deportations were discarded. Dutch authorities protested when the most important countries of destination sought to restrict options by trying to gather information. State authorities, NGOs, IGOs and the media overall largely supported the same ideas, and copied

²¹² Van Faassen, *Polder en emigratie*, 154.

each other's arguments. In the literature on Dutch emigration policies there is a lot of emphasis on stimulating the emigration of (young and fit) people with fewer chances in the Dutch labour market. This article shows that a lot of effort also went into actively encouraging the departure of people that the Netherlands wanted to get rid of for non-labour market related reasons: namely because of their religion, colour or political views. The spirit of the celebrated Human Rights Convention turned out to be no barrier against many of the prejudices of the pre-Second World War world.