The political economy of immigration and welfare state reform: a collection of comparative political and economic essays on human mobility and social protection
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Citation

5 | Intra-EU Labour Migration and Attitudes Towards the Welfare State

ABSTRACT

This paper seeks to explore how intra-EU labour migration affects attitudes towards the welfare state. Through the use of multilevel models and the European Social Survey, I test attitudes towards welfare state effort in light of increasing intra-EU labour mobility and aim to further understanding regarding the processes that may be leading to the adjustment of EU welfare systems as EU mobility intensifies. The mechanism behind this relationship remains unknown because indicators specifically for intra-EU labour mobility have not previously been available. Using the EU-LFS we create a new indicator for Central and Eastern European labour mobility to test alongside foreign-born, an indicator for the general level of immigration. The results show no direct influence of CEE labour mobility on attitudes towards redistribution, but instead a positive and significant relationship for general levels of immigration, providing some evidence in favour of the compensation hypothesis and intergroup contact theory. Moreover, for CEE labour mobility the unemployment rate is an important interaction, we find that at high levels of CEE labour migration and unemployment that there is a moderating effect on preferences for redistribution suggesting that an individual's desire for compensation may only extend so far.

Keywords: intra-EU labour mobility, immigration, social policy attitudes, welfare state

5.1   Introduction

Since the 2004 expansion of the European Union (EU) and the two follow-ing rounds of enlargement in 2007 and 2013, mobility around the EU has increased considerably in a relatively short period of time. Between 2003 and 2016, the percentage of EU citizens living in an EU Member State other than the one they were born in has almost tripled from 1.3 to 3.8 percent of the EU-28 population (Cappelen & Peters, 2018; Eurostat, 2016). The total foreign-born figure across the EU in 2016 was 10.7 percent up from 8.6 per-cent in 2005 (Eurostat, 2016; Münz, 2006) indicating that much of the overall growth can be accounted for by increasing intra-EU mobility. However, these averages mask the considerable heterogeneity across Member States. For example, nearly half of Luxembourg's population is foreign-born, whilst Poland's foreign-born make up less than two percent of the total population. Moreover, most of those foreign-born in Luxembourg are made up of other EU citizens, while for Sweden and the United Kingdom the majority of immigration is made up by non-EU nationals (Eurostat, 2016).

These developments in intra-EU mobility are important because a number of scholars have argued that increasing immigration and ethnic diversity undermines the societal legitimacy and sustainability of the welfare state (Alesina, Glaeser, & Sacerdote, 2001; van Oorschot, 2008). As Freeman puts it "the individuals who agree to share according to need have to experience a sense of solidarity that comes from common membership in some human community" (Freeman, 1986, p.52). This anti-solidarity hypothesis, the notion that generous welfare states are challenged by immigration because it erodes the sense of solidarity between citizens, has been largely based on results from the US context and generalised to the European one. However, more recent literature has not necessarily found this to be the case and in certain instances found the opposite effect could also be possible (Fenwick, 2019; Gaston & Rajaguru, 2013). Hence, scholars have started to look to other mechanisms, such as the compensation hypothesis, cultural threat, and welfare chauvinism, to explain the effects noted in Europe (Burgoon, Koster & van Egmond, 2012; Cappelen & Peters, 2017; Heath & Richards, 2020; Lipsmeyer, Philips & Whitten, 2017; Negash & Van Vliet, 2024; Walter, 2017).

This paper seeks to complement that literature through exploring the valid-ity of the compensation hypothesis as an explanation for how immigration, in particular Central and Eastern European labour mobility, might have altered support for the welfare state in European countries traditionally on the receiving end of immigration. It focuses on redistributive preferences in light of deepening and widening EU mobility and consequently further-ing understanding on the processes that can lead to the adjustment of EU welfare systems. Moreover, this paper sits within the broader literature

aiming to understand how certain micro- and macro-level factors can cause changes in support for redistribution[1].

First, I test whether intra-EU labour mobility has a direct influence on preferences for redistribution by distinguishing between different categories of immigration and exploring whether or not they affect support for redistribution in different ways. I use the typical indicator of 'foreign-born as percentage of the population' to test the effect of general level of immigration, alongside which I test a more specific type of mobility using an innovative indicator for mobile labour from the post-2004 expansion Member States[2] developed using the EU-LFS (Fenwick, 2021). Uncovering this previously hidden population allows us to directly study the role that increased intra-EU labour mobility post-2004 may have had on social policy preferences. Second, I test the two key assumptions of the compensation hypothesis: (1) that increased mobility increases individual job insecurity and (2) increased job insecurity in turn increases preferences for redistribution. These two mechanisms within the compensation hypothesis are fundamental assumptions to its functioning and can be tested independently in order to augment the analysis alongside the broader argument mentioned above.

This article is structured as follows, first I provide a brief overview of the literature and posit our hypotheses in light of this review. Next, the data and methods are discussed before presenting the results and analysis. Finally, some final remarks are provided and the broader implications of the findings considered.

5.2   Immigration and redistributive preferences

Previous literature is generally split into two camps that argue for opposing directional influences between increasing immigration and individual policy preferences for redistribution, either expansion or retrenchment of the welfare state. In the case of retrenchment, a number of causal mechanisms through which immigration may erode support for social protection are proposed. For example, cultural threat and the anti-solidarity hypothesis theorise that changes in the cultural make-up of society may weaken the solidarity between individuals and thus the support for a risk-pooling mechanism across society (Heath & Richards, 2020; van Oorschot, 2008). The financial threat theory argues that natives may consider migrants overrepresented in their receipt of benefits and thus placing too much pressure on public services so question the sustainability of the welfare state (Magni,

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[1]   e.g., Svallfors (1997), Alesina and Angelitos (2005), Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), Dallinger (2010), Epple and Romer (1991), Moene and Wallerstein (2001).

[2]   Which, for simplicity, we refer to from this point onwards as Central and Eastern European (CEE) labour mobility.

2021). Similarly, the welfare chauvinism theory posits that if an individual considers migrants as 'undeserving' of welfare support they may wish to ring-fence benefits for natives (van Oorschot, 2000), while keeping benefits generous for the in-group at the exclusion of the out-group (Cappelen & Peters, 2017). Alternatively, other authors have found support for social protection may actually be bolstered due to a desire for increased compensation for the economic threat that migrants pose to a native individual's feeling of job or income security (Fenwick, 2019; Römer, 2023; Walter, 2010; 2017). In the following section, we discuss these micro-mechanisms alongside complementary social psychology theories such as in-group/out-group and contact theory in order to develop our hypotheses.

5.2.1   Societal solidarity and redistributive preferences

The anti-solidarity hypothesis contends that the causal link between immigration and redistributive preferences is grounded in the concept of solidarity. Traditionally, welfare states have been developed over time and built on a foundation of solidarity between citizens who formulate boundaries around shared social identities such as race, ethnicity, or language. As a result, increasing ethnic heterogeneity, which changes this balance, can erode this foundation of solidarity and consequently citizens' support for the welfare state (Burgoon & Rooduijn, 2021; Alesina & Glaeser, 2004; Alesina et al., 2001). In the US context, Alesina and Glaeser convincingly argue that ethnic diversity and lower solidarity relative to Europe is a crucial factor for explaining why the US does not have a welfare state similar to those found in Europe. However, whether or not this means that an increase in a particular sub-set of the population or a reduction in the homogeneity of society leads to an erosion in support for the welfare state is not yet clear.

In Europe, Mau and Burkhardt (2009) examine the anti-solidarity hypothesis and the role of ethnic diversity in determining support for the welfare state and find that increasing ethnic diversity may have a weak, negative association with support for the welfare state but certain contextual controls such as welfare regime, GDP, and unemployment are more important. Similarly, after using three different measurements for immigration and testing a number of different welfare attitudes from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), Brady and Finnigan (2014) do not find any robust evidence to support the anti-solidarity hypothesis. Rather, they conclude that net migration and changes in the percentage of foreign-born have positive effects on welfare attitudes and that the compensation and welfare chauvinism hypotheses provide greater explanatory potential and should be explored further.

The welfare chauvinism hypothesis is another causal micro-mechanism which argues that solidarity between citizens is important for shaping the boundaries of the welfare state. However, instead of citizens calling for full-scale retrenchment of the welfare state as a result of rising immigration,

as the anti-solidarity hypothesis suggests, that native-born residents may instead call for the ring-fencing of benefits from foreign-born residents in order to maintain generous benefits for native-born residents (Eger, 2010; Eger & Breznau, 2017; Hjorth, 2016; Larsen, 2011, 2020; Negash & van Vliet, 2024; van der Meer & Reeskens, 2021; van der Waal, de Koster, & van Oorschot, 2013). Generally, it is accepted that the public tend to have the least amount of solidarity towards migrants in comparison with the elderly, sick and disabled people, and the unemployed (van Oorschot, 2008), and as a result people often consider immigrants to be less deserving of welfare support than natives (Ford, 2015; Magni, 2021; Cabeza Martínez, 2023).

This is closely linked to social psychology and theories on group membership, social identity, and how individuals in society associate themselves as members of an in-group while assigning those who are 'different' to themselves as part of the out-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). One theory is that members of the in-group (the native-born population) seek to exclude those in the out-group (the foreign-born population) (Cappelen & Midtbø, 2016). Moreover, those who are considered 'out' are more likely to be viewed as a threat and as a result tend to be treated less positively (out-group animosity) than those considered to be 'in' (in-group favouritism) (Larsen, 2020; Magni, 2021).

Using ESS data from 2008/09, Cappelen and Peters (2017) test the welfare chauvinism hypothesis and in-group/out-group theory in the context of intra-EU migration. They find evidence that countries with greater intra-EU migration have lower levels of welfare chauvinism and consequently contend that intergroup contact theory may better explain the effect that intra-EU migration may have on attitudes towards the welfare state. Intergroup contact theory proposes that more frequent contact with the out-group can increase tolerance, reduce prejudice, and diminish anti-immigrant sentiments (Cappelen & Peters, 2017; Heath et al., 2020). Thus, a larger share of immigrants in a population should decrease perceived group threat and not lead to exclusionary or retrenchment preferences for social protection. Indeed, Mutz (2002) finds that the more diverse an individual's social network, the greater their tolerance and understanding towards those who have opposing political views. On the other hand, based on data from the Netherlands, Van Der Meer and Reeskens (2021) find that diverse neighbourhoods lower support for redistribution with the out-group and not the in-group, thus arguing that immigration in this context has a considerable effect on welfare chauvinism.

Crucially, these relationships are likely to be highly dependent on other national contexts, such as levels of immigration or the generosity of benefits and the welfare regime type (Burgoon & Rooduijn, 2021; Dallinger, 2010), as individuals respond to the contexts in which they find themselves. For example, using ESS survey data and a survey experiment conducted in Italy, Magni (2021) states that selective solidarity or welfare chauvinism

is triggered by inequality, arguing that natives may be more supportive of redistribution only if migrants are excluded from sharing equally in those benefits. Additionally, Eick and Larsen (2022) test how the set-up of a social programme affects public attitudes towards the exclusion of migrants and find that the public are more reluctant to include migrants in cash transfer programmes than in-kind services to cover social risks.

5.2.2   Job insecurity and compensation

Another competing micro-level theory is the compensation hypothesis, which argues that as an individual's economic risk increases from exposure to economic openness and further globalisation, then they are more likely to express preferences for welfare state expansion to compensate for those increased risks and support more generous social policies at the ballot box (Marx, 2014; Paskov & Koster, 2014; Rodrik, 1998; Vlandas & Halikiopoulou, 2021; Walter, 2010, 2017). Walter (2017) builds on this and states that individuals' perceptions of labour market risk and policy preferences are also dependent on their skill level. Analysing cross-national survey data from 16 European countries, the empirical analysis shows that exposure to globalisation affects high- and low-skilled individuals differently, with exposure decreasing risk perceptions and demands for social protection for the former group and increasing risk perceptions and demands for social protection amongst the latter.

When adapted to immigration (Emmenegger, Marx, & Schraff, 2015; Fenwick, 2019; Finseraas, 2008; Gaston & Rajaguru, 2013), the compensation hypothesis supposes that job insecurity for native workers stems from increased competition in the labour market, particularly in occupations where natives may develop highly specific skills with low transferability and in the event of an economic shock (Pardos-Prado & Xena, 2019), and issues such as social dumping, i.e. when employers undermine collective agreements made with the native labour force by exploiting foreign labourers who are often willing to work longer hours for reduced wages (Brady & Finnigan, 2014). In addition, when exploring the validity of the compensation hypothesis, Finseraas (2008) argues that even those with negative sentiments toward immigration might not be less, but more, likely to support welfare redistribution out of a desire to protect themselves and/or their "own" native group. Indeed, those who are exposed to the risk of income or job loss (Cusack, Iversen, & Rehm, 2006), and those concerned about fellow (native) citizens with financial problems (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003) have been found to be more likely to support redistribution.

Using survey data from 17 European countries, Burgoon et al. (2012) demonstrate that when an individual works in an occupation that has a relatively higher share of foreign-born workers, this can increase an individual's perceived economic insecurity and as a result spurs greater support for government redistribution. Whereas they find that exposure to the

foreign-born population at the national- or macro-level has little effect on support. Thus, a more immediate and personal experience of immigration may have a more relevant effect on support for government redistribution than national-level immigration. However, the two measures – foreign-born as a percentage of the population and the proportion of foreign-born of total employment in each occupation are highly correlated (0.98) and so it would perhaps be surprising to find opposite effects for these two indicators. Following on from this, Burgoon and Rooduijn (2021) show how both the anti-solidarity hypothesis and the compensation hypothesis may be present at the same time and that the prevailing mechanism depends strongly on the macro-level context of the country. They found that anti-immigrant sentiments are likely tied to lower support for government redistribution when a respondent's country faces more immigration, has relatively generous levels of welfare provision, and when immigrants are drawing proportionately more upon the welfare state than natives.

5.2.3 Different effects for different groups?

Alongside the national context interacting with the way immigration may alter attitudes towards the welfare state, it would be entirely reasonable to expect that different types of movement influence attitudes towards social protection in diverse ways. It could be that the defining characteristics of the migrant population or of the migrants themselves may alter preferences. As such, perceptions or stereotypes of hypothetical or potential policy beneficiaries can shape the concerns and politics surrounding that policy (Schneider & Ingram, 1993). Consequently, the way researchers choose to operationalise migration and various forms of mobility are thus likely to have an effect on the results and interpretations of studies.

The argument, however, is often formulated in terms of the threat that immigration presents and the resulting response from an individual. For example, opposition to immigration or specific migrant groups typically increases as the social distance[3] does. This may vary depending on the type of threat, such as symbolic threat expressed as the fear of loss of culture, values and norms, and the national identity of the host society or economic threat like the loss of a job or earnings, and then the level of threat (minimal or great) attributed to immigrants (Bogardus, 1947; Davidov et al., 2020, Heath et al., 2020). The type of threat attributed to migrants can then have a resulting impact on various social policy preferences. Haselswerdt (2021) shows that when individuals in the US are primed to think about different types of threats, either economic or symbolic threat, this results in different assumptions as to whether a social welfare policy will benefit immigrants to

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3   Social distance is a concept from social psychology. It illustrates the distance between individuals or social groups in society, which can increase or decrease as members of a group feel closer or more removed from members of another group dependent on various characteristics, prejudices, and/or perceived likenesses, for example.

the exclusion of a native-born US citizen. Moreover, the author found that fiscal or economic threat had a more substantial effect than cultural threat and was strongest in areas with low concentrations of Hispanic residents, which could also be evidence in favour of intergroup contact theory.

In addition, the public have group-specific concerns and associate different types of migrants with different types of threats. Hellwig and Sinno (2017) use survey data from the United Kingdom (UK) and find that Muslim immigrants trigger concerns regarding cultural change and security, while Eastern Europeans prompt economic and crime related concerns. Furthermore, using survey data from Sweden, Hjorth (2016) shows that when a welfare recipient is mentioned as Bulgarian vs Dutch, an individual's opposition to cross-border welfare rights increases by 6 percentage points. Hence, the nationality of a welfare recipient appears to play a role in conditioning public support for the welfare state (Blinder, 2015; Hellwig & Sinno, 2017; Hjorth, 2016; Jørgensen & Thomsen, 2016). The effect is conditional on the type of migration that individuals are exposed to, as each type of migration comes with its own type of risk and thus elicits a different response.

On the other hand, Cappelen and Peters (2018) explore the role of intra-EU mobility and its role in shaping attitudes towards the welfare state. They state that this particular group of mobile EU citizens have been the recipient of many attacks by the media and politicians for undercutting wages and taking advantage of the welfare state. As such it would be expected that natives would wish to remove access to benefits for this particular group. However, because EU member states are unable to discriminate against resident EU nationals in the field of social security, then the consequence of that inability to discriminate is that there will instead be a negative effect on individual attitudes towards overall redistribution.

In light of this, I seek to operationalise a very specific type of migration, CEE labour mobility, in order to better understand how this has influenced job insecurity and preferences for redistribution. I theorise that CEE labour migrants affect subjective job security more acutely than general indicators of migration, as this particular type of mobility is more likely to prompt economic concerns than others (Hellwig & Sinno, 2017) and expect CEE labour migrants to increase subjective job insecurity. I test this in two ways: first, with support for redistribution as the dependent variable, I interact CEE labour mobility with the unemployment rate, and second, through directly testing the effect of CEE labour mobility on a measure of subjective job insecurity.

5.2.4   Theoretical Conceptualisation and Hypotheses

Figure 5.1 aims to provide a visualisation of how the theoretical concepts presented in the literature review interact with each other and ultimately provide a holistic overview of the mechanisms through which immigra-

tion may influence social policy preferences. Figure 5.1 takes two concepts discussed in the literature: (1) Social Distance and (2) Perceived Deservingness and combines them with the notion of 'Difficulty to Exclude', namely how easy or difficult is it to exclude an immigrant from accessing welfare programmes, in order to present the idea that the way they interact will determine the prevailing mechanism. Social Distance (close/distant) and Perceived Deservingness (high/low) are on the x-axis, and Difficulty to Exclude is on the y-axis. Therefore, an immigrant that is easy to exclude from the welfare state and for whom the perceived deservingness is low, or the social distance is distant, then the likely prevailing mechanism for determining attitudes towards redistribution is welfare chauvinism. In other words, a native will express a preference for ring-fencing benefits for natives because the migrant is easy to exclude from accessing welfare, they feel little to no solidarity towards that migrant, and/or they feel they are not deserving of receiving welfare. Equally, an immigrant that is close in social distance and/or a native feels is deserving of welfare and is therefore easy to extend solidarity to but is difficult to ring-fence benefits from (an EU mobile citizen with the right to access the social welfare systems of their host nations, for example) may mean that the prevailing mechanism influencing preferences is the compensation hypothesis.

Figure 5.1: Theoretical conceptualisation of the role different types of mobility may have on redistribution preferences

This theoretical conceptualisation stemming from the literature review guides the hypotheses I make next and assess in this chapter. Below are the two key hypotheses that are tested.

H1: CEE mobility as a percentage of the labour force is positively associated with support for redistribution through increasing individual job insecurity.

H2: Foreign-born as a percentage of the population has a neutral effect on support for redistribution because it is such a general measure and contains many different types of mobility so that positive and negative mechanisms cancel each other out, not because there is no association between immigration and social policy preferences.

5.3   Method

I explore how two different categories of movement – one general and one more specific – are associated with attitudes towards redistribution and how these migration indicators are related to job insecurity and preferences towards redistribution. After testing the direct link between immigration and preferences for redistribution, I aim to further assess the link between immigration and job insecurity through immigration's intersectional relationship with the unemployment rate. As a rise in the unemployment rate can be considered an external source of job insecurity, I test the way this interacts with the indicator for CEE labour mobility and foreign-born. In the additional checks section, I also test subjective job insecurity and subjective poverty risk as dependent variables. Plus, I use an indicator for welfare chauvinism.

To analyse individual preferences towards redistribution I use two different multilevel models, multilevel ordered logit and multilevel logit, to test our hypotheses. I explicitly model a multilevel structure with individuals nested in countries, because I want to control for the micro-level individual characteristics and macro-level contextual factors that can shape preferences. Multilevel modelling allows us to account for the hierarchical structure of our research question and data. Moreover, to allow for variation of dependent variable I use a random-slope model. The individual-level analysis uses data from the 2016 round (wave 8) of the European Social Survey (ESS). This wave is particularly relevant as, as well as following recovery from the 2008 financial crisis, it has a special module on welfare attitudes allowing us to explore a number of avenues related to redistribution preferences. I use data on 13 European countries: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. These are the countries that are both in the round of the 2016 ESS and that I was able to create indicators for labour migration in the EU-LFS.

I use several survey questions with categorical responses as our dependent variables, which comes with a number of caveats. It is important to point out that the distance between the categories, for example the gap between disagree and strongly disagree and the gap between agree and strongly agree, may not be equal. Additionally, I attach values to these categories in order to use them within the regression, but the values themselves do not mean anything, only the order in which they are placed matters (Cappelen & Peters, 2018). So, when the value of 5 is assigned to strongly agree and the value of 1 to strongly disagree, a positive coefficient will mean a greater probability of agreeing with the question in the dependent variable.

5.4   DATA

5.4.1   Dependent Variables

The dependent variables are all drawn from survey questions in the European Social Survey (ESS), round 8 (2016). The ESS is a high-quality, harmonised cross-national individual level survey that provides us with a number of useful questions for measuring attitudes towards redistribution. I follow precedent and primarily use the survey question "Please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statement: The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels" (ESS, 2008a: A3, Q.B30: 26) to denote an individual's attitude towards redistribution. The respondents can answer on a scale from 1 to 5, which I recoded so that 1 = strongly disagree; 2 = somewhat disagree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 4 = somewhat agree; and 5 = strongly agree. The proxy is not perfect, the question is broad, unspecific and does not indicate how redistribution should be achieved, for example through higher taxation, direct transfers, or more services (Dallinger, 2022, Margalit & Raviv, 2024). Consequently, our interpretation follows that of the researchers before us who argue that it is a good question to assess attitudes towards a general principle and ideal of fairness and equality rather than a focus on specific practical concerns, detailed policy preferences or an inclination to vote for a specific political party (Burgoon et al., 2012; Cappelen et al., 2018).

I test in the additional checks section the influence that the two indicators of mobility have on subjective job insecurity as it is a small piece of the puzzle. Again, following precedent, I use the question "How likely is it that during the next 12 months you will be unemployed and looking for work for at least four consecutive weeks?" (ESS, 2016). The respondents could choose between five options, 1= not at all likely; 2 = not very likely; 3 = likely; 4 = very likely; 5 = not working/not looking for work/never worked, which is recoded into a dummy variable for simplicity in order to indicate whether or not an individual expressed job insecurity. I also check for influence on welfare chauvinism, whether social benefits are considered a strain on the

economy, subjective poverty risk, and whether the respondent would be more likely to vote to leave the EU following the example of additional checks set by Burgoon, Koster, and van Egmond (2012). These variables are closely linked to our hypotheses and may help us identify the underlying causal mechanisms. They are defined using the relevant questions in the ESS. For welfare chauvinism the question "Thinking of people coming to live in [country] from other countries, when do you think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here?" (ESS, 2016) is used, with the responses being 1 = immediately on arrival; 2 = after a year, whether or not have worked; 3 = after worked and paid taxes at least a year; 4 = once they have become a citizen; and 5 = they should never get the same rights. For social benefits are considered a strain on the economy, the question "Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree that social benefits and services in [country] place too great a strain on the economy?" (ESS, 2016) is used, with the responses being 1 = strongly disagree; 2 = somewhat disagree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 4 = somewhat agree; 5 = strongly agree. For subjective poverty risk, the question "During the next 12 months how likely is it that there will be some periods when you don't have enough money to cover your household necessities?" (ESS, 2016) is used, with the responses being 1= not at all likely; 2 = not very likely; 3 = likely; 4 = very likely. For vote to leave the EU, the question "Imagine there were a referendum in [country] tomorrow about membership of the European Union. Would you vote for [country] to remain a member of the European Union or to leave the European Union?" (ESS, 2016) is used, with the responses being 1 = Remain a member of the European Union; 2 = Leave the European Union.

5.4.2   Explanatory Variables

In the following section, I discuss the two different indicators for mobility and elaborate on the operationalisation of our indicator for CEE labour migration and the challenges faced during its creation. First, I use a traditional indicator for general level of immigration, foreign-born as a percentage of the population (Burgoon, 2014; Burgoon et al., 2012; Gaston & Rajaguru, 2013; Mau & Burkhardt, 2009; Soroka et al., 2016; Soroka, Johnston, & Banting, 2006). This allows us to make reasonable comparisons to previous literature using different survey rounds of the ESS but similar data and methods. Second, the key novelty of this paper is the use of an innovative indicator for one aspect of intra-EU mobility, labour migration from the post-2004 EU member states, to look at the influence of post-2004 intra-EU labour migration and build further on the arguments of previous researchers. I created this indicator for CEE labour migration in order to provide a more nuanced view of migration and social protection. Although the two explanatory variables are measured slightly differently, one as a percentage of the population and the other as a percentage of the labour force, both are at the country level and identify migrants or mobile citizens as those who are foreign-born.

The indicator for CEE labour migration has been created using the EU-LFS, a large-scale household sample survey. I use information on country of birth and labour force status to identify labour migrants from Central and Eastern European countries and have created a time series indicator for the years 2004-2016 (Fenwick, 2021). For this article, however, I utilise the data from 2015 in our analysis. I constructed the variable as a percentage of the labour force for theoretical reasons as the chapter focuses on the effect of recent intra-EU mobility on labour market insecurity and by constructing this indicator as a percentage of the labour force then this is more clearly expressed. There are some limitations to the created indicator; in particular, the data for Germany relies on citizenship as Germany has anonymised country of birth data for the EU-LFS[4]. Other restrictions are as a result of limitations of the EU-LFS and household survey data in general, such as the underrepresentation and non-response of migrants.

Volume of migration varies quite considerably from country to country. In several countries, Central and Eastern European labour migration is on the rise and each year makes up a larger proportion of the labour force. The United Kingdom especially has seen a large increase in labour migration from Central and Eastern European member states. A likely reason is because the UK was one of only three EU countries that decided to not impose labour market restrictions (the 2-3-2 rule) on citizens from the 2004 EU enlargement countries and the language is widely spoken across other European nations making the job market more accessible.

Finally, I augment the individual level data with a number of indicators to describe the macro context of the countries included in our sample. These are listed below in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1: Independent Variables

Variable	Measure	N	Mean	SD	Source
Mobility					
CEE labour mobility	Labour migrants from EU–13 countries as a percentage of the labour force, 2015				EU-LFS (2017)
Foreign-born	Foreign-born as a percentage of the population				OECD (2017b)
Demographic					
Age	Age of respondent, calculated				ESS (2016)
Gender (Dummy)	Gender of respondent (Female = 1)				ESS (2016)
Foreign-born	Respondent is born outside of the reporting country				ESS (2016)

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4   The drawbacks of which are discussed in Fenwick 2021.

Variable	Measure	N	Mean	SD	Source
Socioeconomic					
University (Dummy)	Respondent reports having higher-level degree (Degree = 1)				ESS (2016)
Income feeling	Respondent's subjective financial satisfaction				ESS (2016)
Unemployment (Dummy)	Ever unemployed and seeking work for a period more than three months (Yes=1)				ESS (2016)
Job insecurity	Respondent's self-reported likelihood of becoming unemployed and looking for work within the next 12 months for at least four consecutive weeks on a 4-point scale (Very unlikely=1; Very likely=4)				ESS (2016)
Union membership	Respondent reports (ever) being a member of a trade union or similar organisation				ESS (2016)
Sociocultural					
Ideological position	Self-reported placement on a 11-point scale (1=left; 10=right)				ESS (2016)
Religiosity	Self-reported religiosity on an 11-point scale				ESS (2016)
Contextual					
Log of GDP per capita	GDP per capita, constant prices & OECD base year – 2010				OECD (2017c)
Unemployment rate	The share of the labour force that is without work but available for and seeking employment				World Bank (2017)
Social spending as a % of GDP	Aggregated social expenditures as a percentage of GDP				OECD (2017d)

5.5   Empirical Analysis

Table 5.2 displays the multilevel ordered logit models for the dependent variable 'the government should take steps to reduce differences in incomes' indicating general attitudes towards redistribution. It presents six different mixed effects models, I first introduce a model using only micro-level factors and build up to including several contextual-level factors, testing the two different immigration indicators both separately and together, as well as testing an alternative control for welfare state generosity. The coefficients represent the log-odds of being in a higher category of the dependent variable relative to all lower categories. For example, a positive and significant coefficient indicates that as the independent variable

increases, the log-odds of choosing a higher category (greater support for redistribution) also increases.

Model 1 shows the results for a full range of micro-level factors that are considered important influences on an individual's attitude towards redistribution. I find a number of results for the control variables that are consistent with previous literature (Burgoon et al., 2012). For example, having experienced a spell of unemployment lasting three months or more means an individual is more likely to agree with the statement above, while having a right-leaning ideology means that one is more likely to disagree with the statement. Additionally, if you are female, you are more likely to agree, while feeling financially well-off means that you are more likely to disagree. Importantly, the analysis finds a significant and positive association between job insecurity and preferences for redistribution. Consequently, when an individual expresses job insecurity, then the log-odds of being in a higher category/more supportive of government redistribution increase versus those who feel more job secure. The effects of the control variables stay consistent across all the Models in Table 5.2.

In Model 2, I add three macro-level controls to test what contextual level variables play a role in affecting attitudes towards redistribution. The analysis shows that GDP per capita and the unemployment rate are key influences on attitudes towards redistribution and that they have opposite effects. GDP per capita is statistically significant and negative, suggesting that on average individuals in richer countries are more likely to disagree with the statement, aligning with earlier literature which finds that demand for redistribution reduces as economic prosperity increases (Dallinger, 2010). In addition, individuals in countries with higher levels of unemployment are more likely to agree with the statement. This result continues to provide evidence towards the idea that job insecurity can influence individual attitudes towards redistribution. On average, a poorer country with higher unemployment, which is suggestive of more uncertainty in the labour market, will be more supportive of the concept of redistribution. In addition, social spending is not associated with attitudes on redistribution, despite previous researchers hypothesising that a country with higher levels of spending or generosity garners more support for redistribution. As a robustness test to check whether the problem is the operationalisation of 'generosity', I utilise the unemployment replacement rate (Model 3) and find no change. The coefficient for the welfare state remains insignificant and there are no changes to any of the other independent variables. Moreover, the significant result for job insecurity remains after including the contextual level controls. Moving forward, religiosity and generosity are dropped from the specifications as they are consistently insignificant and do not affect the other results when excluded.

Table 5.2: Immigration and Redistribution

Model number:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Title:	Full micro	Full Macro	Welfare State Test	Foreign-Born	CEE	Foreign-Born + CEE
Model Method:	Ordered Logit	Ordered Logit	Ordered Logit	Ordered Logit	Ordered Logit	Ordered Logit
Dependent:	Redistribution	Redistribution	Redistribution	Redistribution	Redistribution	Redistribution
Age	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***	0.19***	0.19***	0.19***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Foreign-born	−0.04	−0.03	−0.03	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
University degree	−0.23***	−0.23***	−0.23***	−0.22***	−0.22***	−0.22***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Income feeling	−0.26***	−0.26***	−0.26***	−0.26***	−0.26***	−0.26***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Job insecurity	0.15**	0.15**	0.15**	0.15**	0.15**	0.15**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Unemployment spell	0.21***	0.20***	0.20***	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Trade union member	0.27***	0.27***	0.27***	0.27***	0.27***	0.27***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Left-right scale	−0.20***	−0.21***	−0.21***	−0.21***	−0.21***	−0.21***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Religiosity	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01			
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)			
GDP per capita$_{t-1}$		−0.86**	−0.85***	−1.21**	−1.20**	−1.60***
		(0.43)	(0.32)	(0.48)	(0.50)	(0.51)
Unemployment rate$_{t-1}$		0.03**	0.03**	0.03**	0.02	0.02
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Social Spending$_{t-1}$		0.00				
		(0.02)				
Unemployment replacement rate$_{t-1}$			0.00			
			(0.00)			
Foreign-born$_{t-1}$				0.02**		0.02**
				(0.01)		(0.01)
CEE Labour Migration					0.04	0.04
					(0.03)	(0.03)
Cut 1	−5.46***	−14.25***	−13.92***	−17.78***	−17.86***	−21.76***
	(0.11)	(4.88)	(3.41)	(4.98)	(5.32)	(5.37)
Cut 2	−3.50***	−12.29**	−11.96***	−15.82***	−15.90***	−19.80***
	(0.11)	(4.86)	(3.41)	(4.98)	(5.31)	(5.36)
Cut 3	−2.47***	−11.26**	−10.92***	−14.79***	−14.87***	−18.77***
	(0.11)	(4.85)	(3.40)	(4.96)	(5.30)	(5.36)
Cut 4	−0.25*	−9.04*	−8.71**	−12.57**	−12.65**	−16.55***
	(0.14)	(4.83)	(3.40)	(4.97)	(5.29)	(5.34)
N	15549	15549	15549	15549	15549	15549
Clusters	13	13	13	13	13	13
Log pseudolikelihood	−19263.28	−19256.58	−19256.10	−19258.36	−19258.20	−19256.95

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

In Model 4, I test the direct relationship between foreign-born as a percentage of the population and attitudes towards the welfare state through including the indicator in our main model. The analysis finds that the general indicator of migration has a direct association with preferences for redistribution, higher levels of foreign-born increase the likelihood of supporting redistribution. Model 5 tests the indicator for CEE labour migration and finds no effect and Model 6 combines the two indicators to ensure that any result in Model 5 is not as a result of excluding an indicator for general level of immigration. In both Models, CEE labour migration is insignificant, there is no direct influence of this specific type of migration on attitudes towards redistribution. However, it is possible that this type of migration may influence a different part of the causal mechanisms of the compensation hypothesis, or that there is an indirect influence through the unemployment rate, presented in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3 presents the marginal effects of our two migration indicators when interacted with the unemployment rate. Model 7 presents the results for foreign-born interacted with the unemployment rate and excluding GDP per capita (due to concerns about degrees of freedom), while Model 8 reintroduces GDP per capita as a robustness test. I follow the same procedure for CEE labour migration, Model 9 excludes GDP per capita while Model 10 includes it. In Model 11 I include both migration indicators. For foreign-born as a percentage of the population, there seems to be a minor relationship using the interaction variable, however this does not hold up when GDP per capita is reintroduced. For CEE labour migration, this interaction with unemployment appears to be more important.

The analysis finds that at high levels of CEE labour migration and unemployment that there is a moderating effect on preferences for redistribution – the coefficient for CEE labour migration is positive while the interaction is negative. This suggests that an individual's concerns for compensation may only extend so far and that beyond a certain limit or threshold of immigration and unemployment, then there are alternate mechanisms (e.g. anti-solidarity, symbolic and/or economic threat) driving preferences. It may be that the compensation hypothesis cannot explain attitudes in EU states that have high levels of both CEE labour migration and unemployment – although this combination is rare. To explore this in more detail I plot marginal effects graph for Model 9 (see Figure 5.2).

*Table 5.3: The Marginal Effects of Foreign-Born and CEE Labour Migration*

Model number:	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Title:	Foreign-born & Unemployment	Foreign-born & Unemployment + GDP per capita	CEE migration & Unemployment	CEE migration & Unemployment + GDP per capita	CEE migration, Foreign-born & Unemployment
Model Method:	Ordered Logit	Ordered Logit	Ordered Logit	Ordered Logit	Ordered Logit
Dependent:	Redistribution	Redistribution	Redistribution	Redistribution	Redistribution
Age	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	0.19***	0.19***	0.19***	0.19***	0.19***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Foreign-born	–0.05	–0.05	–0.05	–0.05	–0.05
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
University degree	–0.22***	–0.22***	–0.22***	–0.22***	–0.22***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Income feeling	–0.26***	–0.26***	–0.26***	–0.26***	–0.26***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Job insecurity	0.15**	0.15**	0.15**	0.15**	0.15**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Unemployment spell	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Trade union member	0.27***	0.27***	0.27***	0.27***	0.27***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Left-right scale	–0.21***	–0.21***	–0.21***	–0.21***	–0.21***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP per capita$_{t-1}$		–1.07**		–0.50	
		(0.49)		(0.52)	
Unemployment rate$_{t-1}$	0.17**	0.07	0.17***	0.13**	0.18***
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Foreign-born$_{t-1}$	0.06*	0.04			0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)			(0.01)
Foreign-born X Unemployment rate	–0.01**	–0.00			
	(0.00)	(0.00)			
CEE labour migration			0.34***	0.27**	0.35***
			(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
CEE labour migration X Unemployment rate			–0.04***	–0.03**	–0.04***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Cut 1	–4.23***	–15.96***	–3.86***	–9.50*	–3.78***
	(0.51)	(5.23)	(0.42)	(5.73)	(0.47)
Cut 2	–2.27***	–14.00***	–1.90***	–7.53	–1.82***
	(0.54)	(5.24)	(0.41)	(5.68)	(0.45)
Cut 3	–1.24**	–12.97**	–0.86**	–6.50	–0.78*
	(0.56)	(5.24)	(0.43)	(5.68)	(0.47)
Cut 4	0.98*	–10.75**	1.35***	–4.28	1.43***
	(0.59)	(5.26)	(0.46)	(5.68)	(0.50)
N	15549	15549	15549	15549	15549
Clusters	13	13	13	13	13
Log pseudolikelihood	–19260.36	–19258.18	–19256.94	–19256.44	–19256.88

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Figure 5.2 displays the average marginal effects of CEE labour migration on the probability of the five outcomes at different levels of unemployment with 95% confidence intervals. From the graph, one can see that the marginal effects matter most regarding the probability of 'agreeing' with the statement regarding redistribution. At higher levels of unemployment and CEE labour migration the average probability of responding with 'agree', all else remaining equal, is significantly reduced. The initial effect suggests some evidence in favour of the compensation hypothesis, but then at high levels of CEE labour mobility and unemployment the relationship becomes negative. It may be that individuals in a more unstable economic environment, high levels of unemployment are generally associated with downturns in the economy, are somewhat more concerned about the financial burden on the welfare state. For the other outcomes, there are no significant changes.

Figure 5.2: Average Marginal Effects of CEE Labour Migration with 95% Cis

5.6   ADDITIONAL CHECKS

For examining how attitudes towards social policy are influenced by foreign-born and CEE labour migration, I also test some related variables alongside our main analysis that may help identify the mechanisms behind our hypotheses. I follow the example set by Burgoon et al., 2012 and present a similar table (Table 5.4) where the headline results for the two indicators of immigration are presented for each dependent variable. I explore six related dependent variables to help understand the nuanced relationships between immigration and attitudes towards social policy: (1) subjective unemployment risk, (2) welfare chauvinism, (3) fiscal efficiency, (4) subjective poverty risk, and (5) the likelihood of voting yes to leaving the EU.

Table 5.4: Additional checks for Foreign-born and CEE labour migration

Dependent	Foreign-born		CEE Labour Migration	
	Expected	*Actual*	*Expected*	*Actual*
Subjective unemployment risk	Neutral to Positive	0.02** (0.01)	Neutral to Positive	−0.03 (0.03)
Chauvinism	Neutral to Positive	−0.05*** (0.02)	Neutral	−0.01 (0.06)
Social benefits are a strain on the economy	Neutral to Positive	0.02 (0.02)	Neutral	0.05 (0.06)
Subjective poverty risk	Neutral to Positive	0.001 (0.02)	Neutral to Positive	0.09* (0.05)
Leave EU	Neutral	−0.02 (0.02)	Strong Positive	0.03 (0.07)

Each row is a different dependent variable, and the columns depict the expected and actual results for foreign-born and CEE labour migration, respectively. Not shown are the control variables, which follow the standards set in this article's previous models. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

For subjective unemployment risk, the coefficient for foreign-born is positive and statistically significant, indicating that increases in the percentage of foreign-born is associated with a higher perceived risk of unemployment. This result echoes findings from Burgoon et al. (2012) and Dustmann and Preston (2007), which contend that an increase in foreign-born residents can heighten concerns about job security among native populations. In contrast, the effect of CEE labour migration on subjective unemployment risk is not statistically significant. This suggests that the impact of CEE labour mobility on perceived unemployment risk is less pronounced or potentially moderated by other factors.

Contrary to expectations, I find that the relationship between foreign-born and welfare chauvinism is negative and significant, suggesting that foreign-born immigration is associated with reduced support for exclusive welfare benefits for natives. Our findings align with Burgoon et al. (2012) who observed that increased interaction with immigrants could lead to improved intergroup relations and reduced exclusivity in welfare support. Similar to Cappelen and Peters (2017) who find that countries with greater intra-EU mobility have lower levels of welfare chauvinism, I do not find a statistically significant relationship between CEE labour mobility and welfare chauvinism.

For social benefits as a strain on the economy; both foreign-born and CEE labour migration show non-significant effects on the perception that social benefits strain the economy. The non-significant effects of both foreign-born and CEE labour migration on perceptions of social benefits as a strain on the economy support the idea that immigration's impact on perceptions of the sustainability of the welfare state may not be as pronounced as often

suggested. It may be that other factors, such as economic conditions and the level of generosity of social policies, might be more important for determining these perceptions.

On the other hand, CEE labour mobility has a positive and significant association with subjective poverty risk. This finding aligns with the hypothesis that CEE labour mobility might exacerbate concerns about wealth and poverty, reflecting concerns regarding greater competition for economic resources aligning with Dustmann et al. (2010), who found that specific types of migration could heighten concerns about poverty and economic resources. However, there is no effect for foreign-born on subjective poverty risk.

Finally, neither indicator for immigration is associated with a greater likelihood of voting to leave the EU, which suggests that other factors, such as broader political sentiments and economic conditions, might play a more critical role in shaping EU exit preferences and that migration alone and immigration may not be as decisive a factor in Eurosceptic attitudes as previously thought. This resonates with Colantone and Stanig (2018) who also find no association between immigration and support for Leave but instead show that the vote for Leave was higher in regions hit harder by economic globalisation and driven by the general economic situation of their region and absence of effective compensation.

Next, in Table 5.5 the dependent variable is the degree to which an individual expresses job insecurity (the first assumption in the compensation hypothesis) and I use the same explanatory variables as in the main analysis in order to explore which micro-level factors are important for predicting job insecurity. Model 12 presents an ordered logit model with support for redistribution as the dependent variable and Models 13-16, using the same sample as Model 12 for ease of comparison, all show logit models with subjective job insecurity as the dependent variable. There are some key differences between the two dependent variables, such as those who are younger are more likely to express greater levels of job insecurity than those who are older, whereas age is not such a crucial factor for determining preferences for redistribution. This is unsurprising, as often levels of youth unemployment are double that of the general population. Moreover, while being foreign-born has no influence on whether your likelihood of agreeing with the statement on redistribution, it is an important predictor of whether or not someone is likely to express job insecurity. Again, this is reflected in the fact that the foreign-born population usually have higher rates of unemployment than the native-born. Furthermore, in Model 16 the analysis shows that general levels of immigration, as measured by foreign-born as a percentage of the population, have a positive and significant association with job insecurity. When levels of foreign-born are higher, individuals are more likely to express feelings of job insecurity. In Table 5.5, the analysis finds that general levels of immigration, as measured by foreign-born as a percentage of the

population, are more important for understand changes in subjective job insecurity than the more specific indicator for CEE labour mobility.

Table 5.5: Immigration and Job Insecurity

Model number:	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Title:	*Restricted sample*	*Base line*	*Foreign-born*	*CEE*	*CEE+*
Model:	*Ordered Logit*	*Logit*	*Logit*	*Logit*	*Logit*
Dependent:	*Redistribution*	*Insecurity*	*Insecurity*	*Insecurity*	*Insecurity*
Age	0.00	−0.02***	−0.02***	−0.02***	−0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	0.21***	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Foreign-born	−0.06	0.53***	0.52***	0.53***	0.52***
	(0.06)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
University degree	−0.22***	−0.13	−0.13	−0.13	−0.13
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Income feeling	−0.28***	−0.64***	−0.64***	−0.64***	−0.64***
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Unemployment spell	0.18**	0.84***	0.84***	0.84***	0.84***
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Trade union member	0.25***	−0.10	−0.09	−0.10	−0.10
	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Left-right scale	0.29***	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP per capita$_{t-1}$	−0.24***	0.68***	0.23	0.83**	0.44*
	(0.03)	(0.22)	(0.17)	(0.34)	(0.24)
Unemployment	−0.01	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***
rate$_{t-1}$	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Social Spending$_{t-1}$					
Unemployment		0.01			
replacement rate$_{t-1}$		(0.00)			
Foreign-born$_{t-1}$			0.02**		0.02**
			(0.01)		(0.01)
CEE Labour				−0.03	−0.02
Migration				(0.03)	(0.02)
N	11434	11458	11458	11458	11458
Clusters	13	13	13	13	13
Log Likelihood	−14487.071	−4074.3329	−4074.1771	−4074.7685	−4073.9249

Overall, these results indicate that different forms of migration have varying impacts on attitudes towards social policy. The differential effects underscore the complexity of migration's influence on public opinion, highlighting the importance of considering the specific characteristics of migrant groups when analysing policy attitudes and emphasising the need for tailored policy responses that address the diverse concerns of different populations.

5.7 Conclusion

This paper aims to contribute to the growing literature on immigration and social policy preferences through exploring how immigration is related to attitudes towards redistribution. Using multilevel ordered logit models to include both micro- and macro-level factors and two different measures for immigration (foreign-born as percentage of the population to test the effect of general level of immigration and Central and Eastern European labour mobility), the paper finds somewhat varied results between these two different migration indicators.

Similar to Cappelen and Peters (2017, 2018) and Brady and Finnigan (2014), the analysis finds a positive and significant relationship between general levels of immigration and support for redistribution, suggesting that there may indeed be some evidence in favour of the compensation hypothesis and intergroup contact theory (more frequent contact with the out-group can increase tolerance, reduce prejudice, and diminish anti-immigrant sentiments). Consequently, a larger share of immigrants in a population could decrease perceived group threat and reduce the likelihood of exclusionary or retrenchment social policy preferences. Supporting this theory, when the dependent variable is replaced with an indicator for welfare chauvinism, I find a negative association, suggesting that at higher levels of immigration, people are less likely to support ring-fencing benefits, contrary to the expectations of some of the literature (e.g., Eger and Breznau, 2017; Negash and van Vliet, 2024; van der Meer and Reeskens, 2021). Moreover, the analysis finds that foreign-born as a percentage of the population does not significantly affect perceptions of social benefits as a strain on the economy or subjective poverty risk.

When the CEE labour mobility is tested in the analysis, there is no significant, direct effect on preferences for redistribution. However, the analysis of interaction effects reveals that CEE labour mobility is more complexly linked to preferences for redistribution. At higher levels of unemployment and CEE labour mobility the average probability of responding with 'agree' to the idea that government should take steps to reduce inequality, all else remaining equal, is significantly reduced. The initial effect of CEE labour mobility is positive suggesting some evidence in favour of the compensa-

tion hypothesis, but then I find that at high levels of CEE labour mobility and unemployment the relationship becomes negative. It may be that individuals in a more unstable economic environment are somewhat more concerned about the financial burden on the welfare state. Furthermore, CEE labour mobility shows a positive association with perceived poverty risk (as CEE labour migration increases, so does an individual's belief that they may not be able to cover household necessities) but does not significantly affect welfare chauvinism or perceptions of social benefits as a strain on the economy. The possibility that multiple mechanisms are at work resonates with Naumann and Stoetzer (2017) who argue that the effect of immigration on attitudes towards the welfare state varies across groups within society.

When the analysis breaks down the compensation hypothesis into its two component parts: (1) that increased mobility increases individual job insecurity and (2) increased job insecurity in turn increases preferences for redistribution, it finds evidence that increased mobility does increase individual job insecurity and a positive association between job insecurity and support for redistribution. This aligns with previous research (e.g., Burgoon et. al, 2012, Hellwig and Sinno, 2017), reinforcing the idea that personal economic vulnerability drives greater support for redistributive policies and that CEE labour mobility especially may prompt economic concerns for individuals.

Ultimately, these findings continue to support the idea that broader economic conditions play a crucial role in shaping attitudes towards income redistribution (e.g., Burgoon and Rooduijn, 2021) and immigration may only somewhat modify some of these already well-established relationships (e.g., Walter, 2010). In addition, this analysis contributes to the broader debate on migration and redistribution by underscoring the nuanced impacts of different types of migration and economic conditions on public opinion. The results challenge simplistic views of migration's impact on welfare state attitudes and highlight the importance of considering both direct and indirect effects. The interaction findings indicate that while migration might influence redistribution preferences, this relationship is mediated by broader economic conditions, particularly unemployment. By advancing our understanding of these dynamics, this chapter contributes valuable evidence to inform policymakers and contribute to a more nuanced public debate on immigration and social policy, highlighting the importance of considering specific migration patterns and contextual factors when addressing migration-related policy challenges. Additionally, the mixed results emphasise the need for a more refined understanding of migration's impacts, particularly by considering both the type of migration and the broader socio-economic context.