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Adversarial conventional arms control in Europe: the quest for peace

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Citation
Lippert, W. E. (2025, October 16). *Adversarial conventional arms control in Europe: the quest for peace*. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/1887/4270747

Version:	Publisher's Version
License:	Licence agreement concerning inclusion of doctoral thesis in the Institutional Repository of the University of Leiden
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Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

Appendix A: Chapter 4 – Status Quo Tables

*Table A 1: Assessment of historical periods, general geopolitical perceptions, and the number of agreements signed in each period**

Historic Time Period	Years	Geopolitical Perception	Number of Agreements	Explanation
First interwar period	1919-1932	Optimistic	14	The Allied powers which crafted many of the CAC agreeements had a positive view of the world order, due to a belief that no state sought to have another major war in Europe, and the establishment of the League of Nations. However, in specific areas of Europe, there was substantial post-war instability; mainly Eastern Europe driven in part by concerns of Bolshevik expansionism.
Second interwar period	1933-1939	Negative	3	Nationalism was rising again, and the Allied powers were becoming concerned about instability and militarism throughout Europe.
World War Two peace agreements	1944-1948**	Optimistic	7	The Allied powers were optimistic because of the establishment of the United Nations, defeat of the Axis and militant nationalism, and belief that another world war was unlikely because the Second World War had been so destructive.
Cold War	1948-1986	Negative	3	States, especially the US and Soviet Union, had a pessimistic view about the European geopolitical situation as they sought military and political supremacy.
End of Cold War	1987-1991	Optimistic	3	Détente, reforms in the Soviet Union, significant reductions in military capability, and quickly improving diplomatic relations between the East and West created an optimistic atmosphere of cooperation and peace.
Post-Cold War	1991-2001	Optimistic	5	There was broad optimism across Europe due to the establishment of many democracies, free-market economies, and general liberalism.
Post-9/11	2001-2014	Negative	1	The post-911 world temporary brought cooperation between rising rivals, but differing perspectives of how to combat terrorism, disagreements over major security issues such as Kosovo, Libya, and Syria led to poorer diplomatic relations between Russia and NATO/EU.
Post-Crimea/East Ukraine	2014-present	Negative	1	The 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in Eastern Ukraine substantially reduced the cooperative relationship between the EU/NATO and Russia.
Total			**37**	

Source: Authors' research and analysis

* This summation differs from the study's case dataset, as the dataset consolidates the World War One and Two peace treaties, while this summation separates them to offer a better picture of CAC agreement perceptions.
** The 1940 Finnish agreement is included in post- WW2 peace agreements, and the 1947 Russo-Finnish agreement is included separately. Each set of agreements related to surrender and peace is consolidated as one treaty per Axis member.

Table A 2: CAC agreement dataset

Full Name	Short Name	Year	Status
Post World War One Peace Treaties*	WW1	1919	Not valid
The Svalbard (Spitsbergen) Treaty	Spitsbergen	1920	In force
Finnish-Russian Dorpat/Tartu Agreement	Tartu	1920	Not valid
Åland Island Convention	Åland	1921	In force
Russo-Finnish Helsinki Agreement	Helsinki1922	1922	Not valid
Washington Naval Treaty	WashNav	1922	Not valid
Lausanne Agreements of 1923	Lausanne	1923	Replaced
East Aegean Agreements	Aegean	1923, 1947 (and others)	In force
Thrace Convention	Thrace	1923	Not valid
Statute of the Tangiers Zone	Tangiers	1923/1928	Not valid
First London Naval Treaty	London1930	1930	Not valid
Anglo-German Naval Treaty	Anglo-German	1935	Not valid
Montreux Convention of the Straits	Montreux	1936	In force
Second London Naval Treaty	London1936	1936	Not valid
The Moscow Treaty (Finland and Russia) of 1940	Moscow1940	1940	Not valid
World War Two peace agreements*	WW2	1945	Not valid
Dodecanese demilitarization agreement**	Dodecanese1947	1947	Not valid
Western European Union Protocol No. IV Agency of Western European Union for the Control of Armaments	WEU	1954	Not valid
Cyprus (UN Security Zone Establishment)	Cyprus	1964/1974	In force
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty	INF	1987	Not valid
Final Settlement for Germany	Germany1990	1990	In force
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty	CFE	1990	Suspended
Agreement on the principles for a peaceful settlement of the armed conflict in the Dniester region of the Republic of Moldova	Transdnistria	1992	In force

Subregional Arms Control (Balkans)	Balkans	1996	In force
Belfast Agreement	Belfast	1998	In force
Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force ("KFOR") and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia	Kosovo	1999	Not valid
Adaptation of the CFE Treaty	A/CFE	1999	Signed but not ratified (did not enter into force)
Six-Point Peace Plan for Georgia	Georgia	2008	In force
Minsk Agreements	Minsk	2015	Not valid

Source: Authors' research and analysis

* The world war peace agreements are consolidated into one set for each war because the Allied leaders used similar approaches in the agreements.
** Although this agreement is part of the 1947 Peace Agreement with Italy (a WW2 peace agreement), it is included separately because of its implications for Turkish-Greek relations and stability.

Table A 3: Expected outcome determination

	Is the geopolitical order anticipated to remain or be more stable and peaceful ? 1=yes	Does the more powerful state/bloc view the current ratio viewed as dangerously unstable? 1=yes	Can states afford to compete to maintain the ratio? 1=No (they cannot afford because there is a resource shortage)	Status quo change or not (ratio reduction for the stronger party); 1 = ratio change	Brief explanation
Model	Geopolitical Order Stable	Balance Stabilization Danger	Resource Shortage	Expected Outcome	
A	0	1	1	1	The world is viewed as geopolitically unstable, but there are also fears that the current ratio is unstable (first strike instability), and the lead state finds it difficult to afford arms racing. Thus, on the one hand states need a continency capability to deal with unforeseen problems, but this capability may be destabilizing. Continued arms racing is not affordable, so reducing the ratio brings near-term stability and cost savings.
B	0	1	0	0	The geopolitical situation is unstable, and the military balance is unstable (first strike instability). There is no resource shortage, so the stronger state may be willing to live with the balance instability because of fears of broader geopolitical challenges, and they can afford any arms racing.
C	0	0	0	0	There are fears of global instability and geopolitical competition, the military balance is stable, and there are no resource constraints which together offer no incentives for altering the status quo. Reductions will save money, but there is no pressing need to reduce the military balance advantage for cost reasons.
D	1	0	0	0	A stable (positive) or improving geopolitical order, with a stable force ratio and no shortage of resources to support that ratio (i.e. states can afford their existing militaries) will not result in a change to the status quo (ratio reduction). While reductions will save money, but there is no no need to decrease the military balance advantage for cost reasons.
E	1	1	1	1	States that view the geopolitical order optimistically will feel less threatened overall and will need to be prepared for less contingencies compared to a less stable geopolitical order. Yet states view the

					current ratio with one or several rivals as destabilizing, because it is resulting in or may result in arms racing and is offensively unstable ("first-strike"). Resource constraints encourage them to accept reductions to the lowest possible level (maintaining the current ratio is difficult to afford). Thus, the more powerful state will accept a reduction in their relative military power (change in the military balance status quo).
F	1	0	1	1	The geopolitical situation is good or improving, but there is no pressing need to change the ratio because it is viewed as stable. Nonetheless, cost pressures encourage greater reductions in the ratio (as long as these keep the ratio stable). Thus, the more powerful state will accept a reduction in their relative military power (change in the military balance status quo).
G	0	0	1	0	The geopolitical order may be unstable, but the current ratio is stable thus offering some immediate stability and reducing pressures to reduce the ratio difference. However, although resource constraints might encourage reductions, states will retain the status quo as the mlitary balance is stable and geopolitical uncertainty encourages retaining contingency capabilities.
H	1	1	0	0	Even though the overall geopolitical situation is stable or improving, the existing military balance is unstable as it offers a first attack advantage and can lead to arms racing. The strongest state (bloc) is able to afford arms racing and can maintain the existing ratio in part because greater expenditures may ensure or increase deterrence. Thus, the strong state/bloc will not be willing to change the military balance status quo because it can afford not to and it may seek to increase deterrence to deter a surprise attack.

Source: Authors' research and analysis

Table A 4: Geopolitical instability

Agreement	Does the more powerful state anticipate a negatively unstable geopolitical order? 1=yes	Explanation
WW1	1	There was broad optimism that the war's destructiveness, new governments, and the League of Nations had established a peaceful Europe.[731]
Spitsbergen	1	There was broad optimism that the war's destructiveness, new governments, and the League of Nations had established a peaceful Europe.[732]
Tartu	0	Continued instability in Eastern Europe and Soviet Russia would suggest uncertainty or a pessimistic view of global governance.[733]
Åland	1	With several newly created Baltic states, and the Western Allies and League of Nations actively mediated disputes in the Baltic Sea, views were optimistic despite the Russian civil war (and Western intervention) and concerns about the Bolshevik government. Sweden was arguably the most powerful country the Baltic Sea (based on naval forces present, although other navies could overpower Sweden if moved into the Baltic Sea). Sweden, which had stayed neutral during World War One, had a positive view of global governance following World War One.[734]
Helsinki1922	0	Continued instability in Eastern Europe and Soviet Russia would suggest uncertainty or a pessimistic view of global governance.[735]
WashNav	1	There was broad optimism that the war's destructiveness, new governments, and the League of Nations had established a peaceful Europe. This optimism remained 3 years (and more) after the end of

[731] Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 1, An Analysis of Selected Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements Between the World Wars, 1919-1939*; David Lincove, "Data for Peace: The League of Nations and Disarmament 1920-40," *Peace & Change* 43, no. 4 (October 2018): 498–529, https://doi.org/10.1111/pech.12316; Webster, "From Versailles to Geneva"; Webster, "The League of Nations, Disarmament and Internationalism."

[732] Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 2, Demilitarization of Frontiers, Islands and Straits*; Timo Koivurova and Filip Holiencin, "Demilitarisation and Neutralisation of Svalbard: How Has the Svalbard Regime Been Able to Meet the Changing Security Realities during Almost 100 Years of Existence?," *Polar Record* 53, no. 2 (March 2017): 131–42, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0032247416000838.

[733] Albin T Anderson, "Origins of the Winter War: A Study of Russo-Finnish Diplomacy," *WORLD POLITICS* 6 (January 1954): 169–89; Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 2, Demilitarization of Frontiers, Islands and Straits*; Jarosław Suchoples, "In the Shadow of the Eastern Neighbour. Finland in the Security Policy of Russia and the Soviet Union from Peter the Great to Contemporary Times," *Studia Europejskie - Studies in European Affairs* 26, no. 4 (January 30, 2023): 9–38, https://doi.org/10.33067/SE.4.2022.1; "Tarton rauha oli tiukan neuvottelun takana - eikä kestänyt kauan," text (Yle, October 14, 2020), https://yle.fi/aihe/artikkeli/2020/10/14/tarton-rauha-oli-tiukan-neuvottelun-takana-eika-kestanyt-kauan.

[734] Sia Spiliopoulou Åkermark, "The Puzzle of Collective Self-Defence: Dangerous Fragmentation or a Window of Opportunity? An Analysis with Finland and the Åland Islands as a Case Study," *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 22, no. 2 (2017): 249–74, https://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/krx005; Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 2, Demilitarization of Frontiers, Islands and Straits*; Anders Gardberg, *Åland Islands: A Strategic Survey*, Finnish Defence Studies 8 (Helsinki: National Defence College, 1995); Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, *Government Report on Changes in the Security Environment* (Helsinki: Finnish Government, 2022); Suchoples, "In the Shadow of the Eastern Neighbour. Finland in the Security Policy of Russia and the Soviet Union from Peter the Great to Contemporary Times."

[735] Suchoples, "In the Shadow of the Eastern Neighbour. Finland in the Security Policy of Russia and the Soviet Union from Peter the Great to Contemporary Times"; Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 2, Demilitarization of Frontiers, Islands and Straits*.

		WW1, although there was recognition that states might seek to obtain naval superiority through arms racing.[736]
Lausanne	1	With Turkey a new state and republic, seeking good relations with its neighbors, and Mediterranean and Black Sea states seeking general cooperative security at least on maritime issues led by the UK, there was a general atmosphere of cooperation and optimism.[737]
Aegean	1	The agreements were made within a few years of the end of the World Wars, where there was broad global optimism.[738]
Thrace	1	The agreements were made within a few years of the end of the World Wars, where there was broad global optimism.[739]
Tangiers	1	The main signatories, which were western European countries, were optimistic about the post-WW1 global order especially concerning this region. Spain itself had not participated in WW1.[740]
London1930	1	Disarmament goals and security cooperation were still the norm globally, with the League of Nations disarmament conference about to occur.[741]
Anglo-German	0	Rising nationalism, Germanic and Italian expansionism and militarism, and a more aggressive Soviet Union among other factors suggested a destabilizing and unpredictable future, especially for the UK. The UK also had concerns about geopolitical developments in the Pacific region.[742]
Montreux	0	Rising nationalism, Germanic and Italian expansionism and militarism, and a more aggressive Soviet Union among other factors suggested a destabilizing and unpredictable future. The League of Nations had been shown to be ineffective in dealing with a determined aggressor (Italy in Africa, and Japan in Manchuria, for example).[743]

[736] Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 3, Limitation of Seapower*; Croft, "In Defence of Arms Control"; Downs, Rocke, and Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation."
[737] Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 2, Demilitarization of Frontiers, Islands and Straits*; A. L. Macfie, "The Straits Question: The Conference of Lausanne (November 1922-July 1923)," *Middle Eastern Studies* 15, no. 2 (May 1979): 211–38, https://doi.org/10.1080/00263207908700406; Hazal Papuççular, "Contested Sovereignties: Turkish Diplomacy, the Straits Commission, and the League of Nations (1924–1936)," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 25, no. 2 (November 9, 2022): 207–21, https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2022.2143773; Teoman Ertuğrul Tulun, "Consequences Of Material Breach Of The Lausanne Peace Treaty" (Çankaya, Turkey: Center for Eurasian Studies (AVIM), October 7, 2020).
[738] Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 2, Demilitarization of Frontiers, Islands and Straits*; Jon M. Van Dyke, "An Analysis of the Aegean Disputes under International Law," *Ocean Development & International Law* 36, no. 1 (February 16, 2005): 63–117, https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320590909088; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Background Note on Aegean Dispute," Relations Between Turkey and Greece, accessed April 19, 2024, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/background-note-on-aegean-dispute.en.mfa.
[739] Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 2, Demilitarization of Frontiers, Islands and Straits*.
[740] David Dunthorn, "The Paris Conference on Tangier, August 1945: The British Response to Soviet Interest in the 'Tangier Question,'" *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 16, no. 1 (March 9, 2005): 117–37, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592290590916167; Brian Edwards, "3. Tangier(s): The Multiple Cold War Contexts of the International Zone," in *Morocco Bound: Disorienting America's Maghreb, from Casablanca to the Marrakech Express*, ed. Donald E. Pease (New York, USA: Duke University Press, 2005), 121–57, https://doi.org/10.1515/9780822387121-006.
[741] Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 3, Limitation of Seapower*; "The London Naval Conference, 1930," US Department of State, Office of the Historian, accessed April 19, 2024, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/london-naval-conf.
[742] Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 3, Limitation of Seapower*; Thomas Hoerber, "Psychology and Reasoning in the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, 1935-1939," *The Historical Journal* 52, no. 1 (March 2009): 153–74; Watt, "The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935."
[743] Acer, *Russia's Attack on Ukraine: The Montreux Convention and Turkiye*; Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 2, Demilitarization of Frontiers, Islands and Straits*; Seydi, *The Turkish Straits and the Great Powers : From the Montreux Convention to the Early Cold War, 1936-1947*; Seydi and Morewood, "Turkey's Application of the Montreux Convention in the Second World War."

London1936	0	Rising nationalism, Germanic and Italian expansionism and militarism, and a more aggressive Soviet Union among other factors suggested a destabilizing and unpredictable future. The League of Nations had been shown to be ineffective in dealing with a determined aggressor (Italy in Africa, and Japan in Manchuria, for example). The US in particular feared a conflict with Japan, which would have been foreseen to be very navy-focused; as a result, they were reluctant to agree to reductions to address European instability.[744]
Moscow1940	0	World War Two was in progress. The Soviet Union felt threatened by Germany, and had a rival relationship with the UK and France (who had condemned the Soviet invasion and had sought to aid Finland).[745]
WW2	1	The victorious Allies were confident in post-war peace and stability, both due to the high costs of war, the removal and defeat of the fascist powers, and the establishment of the United Nations.[746]
Dodecanese1947	1	The agreement was a product of Allied victory, and they were generally optimistic about the global order, especially in Western Europe which was most concerned with this issue.[747]
WEU	1	Although the Cold War was at a high level of intensity, western Europe was developing a trusting, positive cooperative security relationship across institutions.[748]
Cyprus	1	The Mediterranean area was mostly stable, with many European Mediterranean states in a cooperative relationship (and NATO allies).[749]
INF	1	This was the shortly after the Reagan-Gorbachev détente period, and the Cold War in Europe had been relatively stable for several decades and neither side faced any other significant threat.[750]
Germany1990	1	The Cold War was moving towards its end, and the US-Soviet relationship was very positive due to Gorbachev's reform policies.[751]

[744] Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 3, Limitation of Seapower*; David Chessum, "The 1936 London Naval Treaty," *Warship International* 57, no. 3 (September 2020): 197–98.
[745] Anderson, "Origins of the Winter War: A Study of Russo-Finnish Diplomacy"; Lauri Hannikainen, "Finland's Continuation War (1941–1944): War of Aggression or Defence? War of Alliance or Separate War?: Analyzed from the International – Especially Legal – Perspective," *Baltic Yearbook of International Law Online* 17, no. 1 (December 20, 2020): 77–121, https://doi.org/10.1163/22115897_01701_006; Suchoples, "In the Shadow of the Eastern Neighbour. Finland in the Security Policy of Russia and the Soviet Union from Peter the Great to Contemporary Times."
[746] Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation"; Ikenberry, *After Victory*; Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe"; Tanner, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, and Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva, Switzerland), *From Versailles to Baghdad*.
[747] Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Turkish Claims Regarding the Demilitarization of Islands in the Aegean Sea," ssues of Greek - Turkish Relations, January 31, 2024, https://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-turkish-relations/relevant-documents/turkish-claims-regarding-the-demilitarization-of-islands-in-the-aegean-sea.html; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Background Note on Aegean Dispute."
[748] Hughes Hallett, "Western European Union (Armaments Control Agency), (Hansard, 17 December 1959)," Hansard UK Parlaiment archives, December 17, 1959, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1959/dec/17/western-european-union-armaments-control; Johnston, *How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance since 1950*; "The Establishment of Western European Union (WEU)," CVCE.EU by UNI.LU, January 2014, https://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/803b2430-7d1c-4e7b-9101-47415702fc8e/6d9db05c-1e8c-487a-a6bc-ff25cf1681e0.
[749] *The Blue Helmets : A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping* (New York: UN, Department of Public Information, 1996); Alexandra Novosseloff, "Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and The Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary- General on Cyprus (OSASG)" (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2021).
[750] Colbourn, *Euromissiles*; Davis, "Lessons of the INF Treaty"; Philipp Gassert, Tim Geiger, and Hermann Wentker, eds., *The INF Treaty of 1987: A Reappraisal*, 1st ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2020), https://doi.org/10.13109/9783666352171.
[751] M. E. Sarotte, *Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate*, The Henry L. Stimson Lectures Series (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2022).

CFE	1	Détente, reforms in the Soviet Union, significant reductions in military capability, and quickly improving diplomatic relations between the East and West created an optimistic atmosphere of cooperation and peace.[752]
Transdnistria	1	Despite the disorderly dissolution of the Soviet Union, there was general optimism due to the end of great power rivalries, broad security cooperation across Europe, and Moscow's hope that it could facilitate a more peaceful transition for the newly independent states.[753]
Balkans	1	After the breakup of the former Yugoslavia and the ensuing war (with NATO and UN involvement), a combination of war fatigue and diplomacy created more optimism for cooperation, also facilitated by the OSCE.[754]
Belfast	1	Throughout Europe there was overall optimism in the area of security cooperation and long-term peace (despite the Balkan wars). Moreover, neither of the state parties viewed the agreement as likely to be significantly undermined by other geopolitical developments due to the nature of the conflict.[755]
Kosovo	1	Despite controversies and disagreements over the conflict, the strongest parties (US, NATO, and the other UN Security Council Permanent 5) seemed to still have been committed to security cooperation in Europe and global governance.[756]
A/CFE	1	A spirit of security cooperation was still dominating Europe, despite disagreements over Kosovo. The CFE Flank Agreement may have helped facilitate cooperation for the A/CFE.[757]

[752] Robert Jurski, *The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and Its Contribution to Euro-Atlantic Security after 1990* (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2005); Wilcox, "Russia and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)—A Paradigm Change?"; Wilcox, *The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and Russian Foreign and Security Policy (Dissertation)*.

[753] Victoria Rosa, "The Transnistrian Conflict: 30 Years Searching for a Settlement," SCEEUS Reports On Human Rights And Security In Eastern Europe (Stockholm: Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS), October 2021); Stanislav Secrieru, "In the Shadow of War: Moldova's Quest for Stability and Security," Brief (Luxembourg: European Union Institute for Security Studies, May 2023); Marius Vahl and Michael Emerson, "Moldova and the Transnistrian Conflict," *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe* 1 (2004).

[754] Darko Bekic, "An Important Step Toward Peace and Long-Term Stabilisation in the Region of Southeastern Europe," *Croatian International Relations Review*, June 1996, 9–12; Mersiha Čaušević Podžić, "A New Era for South-East Europe - Rebuilding Peace, Security and Stability in Aftermath of War," OSCE, November 25, 2014, https://www.osce.org/cio/126754.

[755] Dowling, "Pulling the Brakes on Political Violence"; Alan Macleod, *International Politics and the Northern Ireland Conflict: The USA, Diplomacy and the Troubles* (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2016), 10.5040/9781350986848; "US Involvement in the Northern Irish Peace Process and the Good Friday Agreement."

[756] Susan Hannah Allen and Tiffiny Vincent, "Bombing to Bargain? The Air War for Kosovo: Bombing to Bargain?," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 7, no. 1 (2011): 1–26, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2010.00120.x; Stephen T. Hosmer, *Why Milosevic Decided to Settle the Conflict Over Kosovo When He Did* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), https://doi.org/10.7249/RB71; "Key Role of UN Stressed as Security Council Debates Resolution on Kosovo Peace Plan - Serbia," ReliefWeb, June 10, 1999, https://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/key-role-un-stressed-security-council-debates-resolution-kosovo-peace-plan; Kühn, *The Rise and Fall of Cooperative Arms Control in Europe*, 2020.

[757] Klaus Bolving, "The Adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe - CFE - Considerations Concerning Baltic CFE-Membership," *Baltic Defense Review* 2000, no. 4 (2000), https://www.baltdefcol.org/files/docs/bdreview/03bdr200.pdf; Kühn, *The Rise and Fall of Cooperative Arms Control in Europe*, 2020; John E. Peters, *The Changing Quality of Stability in Europe: The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty toward 2001* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000); Wilcox, *The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and Russian Foreign and Security Policy (Dissertation)*.

Georgia	0	A period of Russia-NATO competition was setting in due to a number of disagreements, especially NATO expansion but also the 2003 Iraq invasion.[758]
Minsk	0	Due to a number of disagreements and geopolitical developments, trust and cooperation was very low between NATO/EU and Russia.[759]

Source: Authors' research and analysis

[758] Stephen J. Cimbala, "Russian Threat Perceptions and Security Policies: Soviet Shadows and Contemporary Challenges," *The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies*, no. Issue 14/15 (2013), https://doi.org/10.4000/pipss.4000; Dmitri Medvedev, "Speech at Meeting with German Political, Parliamentary and Civic Leaders" (President of Russia Official Web Page, June 5, 2008), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/d_ru_20080617_04_/D_RU_20080617_04_en.pdf; Olga Oliker et al., *Russian Foreign Policy in Historical and Current Context: A Reassessment* (RAND Corporation, 2015), www.rand.org.

[759] Samuel Charap and Jeremy Shapiro, "A New European Security Order: The Ukraine Crisis and the Missing Post-Cold War Bargain" (Foundation pour la Recherche Stratėgique, December 8, 2014); Kvartalnov, "Indivisible Security and Collective Security Concepts"; Bettina Renz, "Why Russia Is Reviving Its Conventional Military Power," *The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters* 46, no. 2 (Summer 2016): 15.

Table A 5: Military balance instability

The military balance was considered stable for agreements in which the military balance was not a consideration. For cease-fire agreements, the study determined to what extent the status quo was changed largely based on changes to the line of contact at the time of the ceasefire; that is, if any side gave up territory or obtained territory as part of the cease-fire agreement.

Agreement	Does the more powerful state/bloc view the current ratio viewed as dangerously unstable? 1=yes	Explanation
WW1	0	The victorious Allies viewed that their overwhelming superiority and battlefield victories, and in many cases major changes in governments (including fragmentation of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires), established military balance stability as the defeated states accepted the new balance established by defeat and surrender, at least in the near term.[760]
Spitsbergen	0	The island was strategically located but rival forces were not positioned to seize or hold it.[761]
Tartu	0	Both sides acknowledged that Soviet Russia was militarily superior, and Finland did not expect to or seek to alter this balance.[762]
Åland	0	There is no information suggesting that Sweden viewed the naval balance of power in the Baltic as unstable.[763]
Helsinki1922	0	Both sides acknowledged that Soviet Russia was militarily superior, and Finland did not expect to or seek to alter this balance.[764]
WashNav	1	The fear was broadly that, because of naval ships' mobility and difficulty in tracking them when on the high sees, a state with a large navy could amass a single fleet that could overpower any distributed defensive naval force. (First strike advantage)[765]
Lausanne	0	There was not necessarily a single more powerful navy in terms of the area of dispute, in part because Turkey's geographic control by default of the Straits (due to it possessing all land on the north and south banks of

[760] Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 1, An Analysis of Selected Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements Between the World Wars, 1919-1939*; Lincove, "Data for Peace"; Webster, "From Versailles to Geneva"; Webster, "The League of Nations, Disarmament and Internationalism."
[761] Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 2, Demilitarization of Frontiers, Islands and Straits*; Koivurova and Holiencin, "Demilitarisation and Neutralisation of Svalbard."
[762] Anderson, "Origins of the Winter War: A Study of Russo-Finnish Diplomacy"; Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 2, Demilitarization of Frontiers, Islands and Straits*; Suchoples, "In the Shadow of the Eastern Neighbour. Finland in the Security Policy of Russia and the Soviet Union from Peter the Great to Contemporary Times"; "Tarton rauha oli tiukan neuvottelun takana - eikä kestänyt kauan."
[763] Åkermark, "The Puzzle of Collective Self-Defence"; Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 2, Demilitarization of Frontiers, Islands and Straits*; Gardberg, *Åland Islands*; Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, *Government Report on Changes in the Security Environment*; Suchoples, "In the Shadow of the Eastern Neighbour. Finland in the Security Policy of Russia and the Soviet Union from Peter the Great to Contemporary Times."
[764] Suchoples, "In the Shadow of the Eastern Neighbour. Finland in the Security Policy of Russia and the Soviet Union from Peter the Great to Contemporary Times"; Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 2, Demilitarization of Frontiers, Islands and Straits*.
[765] Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 3, Limitation of Seapower*; Croft, "In Defence of Arms Control"; Downs, Rocke, and Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation."

		the Straits) negated considerations of naval ratios. Thus, the balance was stable in that Turkey held an understood and accepted advantage.[766]
Aegean	0	Although a surprise attack was possible, it is not clear that the more powerful state(s) viewed their superiority as destabilizing.[767]
Thrace	0	There are no indications that fears of military balance instability were a consideration in the agreement. Rather, the agreement was a product of overlapping claims and agreements as well as conflict Greek-Turkish War).[768]
Tangiers	0	There is no information suggesting that there was military tension related to Tangiers, Morocco.[769]
London1930	0	The Washington Naval Treaty limits were still in effect, and state parties still viewed the established ratios as stable.[770]
Anglo-German	1	The UK had a by far superior by far naval force, but the balance of forces on the continent were evening as Germany shed Versailles limitations. The UK's navy may have been viewed by the UK as unnecessarily and destabilizingly superior, especially as they feared Germany would attempt to engage in naval arms racing to narrow the capabilities gap. Urquidi states that the UK was interested in naval arms control to extend "naval limitations throughout Continental waters". The UK was also facing domestic pressures on disarmament (might be an indirect relationship with perceptions of instability - if the public viewed current ratios as unfair or unnecessary). The UK certainly viewed that the current ratio was "unfair", so they were willing to permit Germany to "rearm" especially due to failed agreements with Germany/France. Thus, the instability was not as much about first-strike but about arms racing and overall geopolitical imbalance of forces.[771]
Montreux	0	The Montreux convention was an evolution of the Lausanne agreements, and did not substantially change any aspects related to the military balance.[772]
London1936	0	The Washington Naval Treaty and First London Naval Treaty restrictions still applied, and there was no clear sign that the strongest power(s) viewed their superiority as destabilizing, in part due to global commitments (compared to other rival's commitments to a single hemisphere).[773]

[766] Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 2, Demilitarization of Frontiers, Islands and Straits*; Macfie, "The Straits Question"; Papuççular, "Contested Sovereignties"; Tulun, "Consequences Of Material Breach Of The Lausanne Peace Treaty."
[767] Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 2, Demilitarization of Frontiers, Islands and Straits*; Dyke, "An Analysis of the Aegean Disputes under International Law"; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Background Note on Aegean Dispute."
[768] Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 2, Demilitarization of Frontiers, Islands and Straits*.
[769] Dunthorn, "THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON TANGIER, AUGUST 1945"; Edwards, "3. Tangier(s): The Multiple Cold War Contexts of the International Zone."
[770] Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 3, Limitation of Seapower*; "The London Naval Conference, 1930."
[771] Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 3, Limitation of Seapower*; Hoerber, "Psychology and Reasoning in the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, 1935-1939"; Watt, "The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935."
[772] Acer, *Russia's Attack on Ukraine: The Montreux Convention and Turkiye*; Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 2, Demilitarization of Frontiers, Islands and Straits*; Seydi, *The Turkish Straits and the Great Powers : From the Montreux Convention to the Early Cold War, 1936-1947*; Seydi and Morewood, "Turkey's Application of the Montreux Convention in the Second World War."
[773] Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 3, Limitation of Seapower*; Chessum, "The 1936 London Naval Treaty."

Moscow1940	0	Due to the war's course, both sides accepted that the Soviet Union was superior (ie. Mocow did not view their superiority or Finland's inferiority as threatening).[774]
WW2	0	The Allied states had uncontested and accepted military superiority over the defeated Axis states.[775]
Dodecanese1947	0	Neither Greece nor Italy feared a military imbalance between one another.[776]
WEU	0	There was no perception of military instability within the WEU, as they were NATO allies.[777]
Cyprus	0	At the time that the ceasefire was established, each side was fixed in their military positions. Longer-term conflict did not offer certain gains due to the diplomatic situation.[778]
INF	1	The first-strike instability went both ways, but Moscow was especially concerned about its vulnerability to INF missiles because of the short flight time to hit Moscow. Washington was not similarly threatened. The instability was in the need for the Soviets to strike NATO INF forces with their INF weapons, before NATO could launch.[779]
Germany1990	0	Germany accepted the superiority of its former adversaries, especially the US and Soviet Union, and did not seek to unilaterally increase its military capability. Instabilities were between the blocs, and were being addressed through the CFE Treaty which was being finalized.[780]
CFE	1	Both sides, including the Warsaw Pact (the stronger one) viewed the build-up of conventional armed forces, especially offensive ones, as destabilizing. The Warsaw Pact/USSR was facing economic pressures on maintaining a large military.[781]
Transdnistria	0	The front lines had stabilized, offering each side some defensive security/stability.[782]
Balkans	0	There is no information suggesting that any particular side felt threatened by others, due to a combination of war losses (decreasing offensive capabilities), and stabilization of the borders.[783]

[774] Anderson, "Origins of the Winter War: A Study of Russo-Finnish Diplomacy"; Hannikainen, "Finland's Continuation War (1941–1944)"; Suchoples, "In the Shadow of the Eastern Neighbour. Finland in the Security Policy of Russia and the Soviet Union from Peter the Great to Contemporary Times."
[775] Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation"; Ikenberry, *After Victory*; Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe"; Tanner, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, and Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva, Switzerland), *From Versailles to Baghdad*.
[776] Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Turkish Claims Regarding the Demilitarization of Islands in the Aegean Sea"; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Background Note on Aegean Dispute."
[777] Hallett, "Western European Union (Armaments Control Agency), (Hansard, 17 December 1959)"; Johnston, *How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance since 1950*; "The Establishment of Western European Union (WEU)."
[778] *The Blue Helmets : A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping*; Novosseloff, "Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and The Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary- General on Cyprus (OSASG)."
[779] Colbourn, *Euromissiles*; Davis, "Lessons of the INF Treaty"; Gassert, Geiger, and Wentker, *The INF Treaty of 1987*.
[780] Sarotte, *Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate*.
[781] Jurski, *The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and Its Contribution to Euro-Atlantic Security after 1990*; Wilcox, "Russia and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)—A Paradigm Change?"; Wilcox, *The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and Russian Foreign and Security Policy (Dissertation)*.
[782] Rosa, "The Transnistrian Conflict: 30 Years Searching for a Settlement"; Secrieru, "In the Shadow of War: Moldova's Quest for Stability and Security"; Vahl and Emerson, "Moldova and the Transnistrian Conflict."
[783] Bekic, "An Important Step Toward Peace and Long-Term Stabilisation in the Region of Southeastern Europe"; Podžić, "A New Era for South-East Europe - Rebuilding Peace, Security and Stability in Aftermath of War."

Belfast	1	The presence of the UK military was viewed as provocative and a cause of Republican violence, and it was accepted that it was an obstacle to peace.[784]
Kosovo	0	NATO did not view its victory and strong military position as destabilizing, as it did not believe that Serbia would attempt to compete/attack.[785]
A/CFE	0	NATO members (the stronger side) did not view that their superiority threatened Russia, nor that Russia would seek a first strike due to its inferior military balance. Nor did they fear arms racing, as CFE Treaty limits were largely being respected (adjustments had been made to the Flank).[786]
Georgia	0	Within a week of the conflict, it was clear that Russia's military was superior and Georgia had no means to contest it.[787]
Minsk	0	A stalemate largely existed in Ukraine, and there was no indication that Ukraine or the separatists could launch a debilitating attack. Russia was largely recognized as having the superior army.[788]

Source: Authors' research and analysis

[784] Dowling, "Pulling the Brakes on Political Violence"; Macleod, *International Politics and the Northern Ireland Conflict: The USA, Diplomacy and the Troubles*; "US Involvement in the Northern Irish Peace Process and the Good Friday Agreement."
[785] Allen and Vincent, "Bombing to Bargain?"; Hosmer, *Why Milosevic Decided to Settle the Conflict Over Kosovo When He Did*; "Key Role of UN Stressed as Security Council Debates Resolution on Kosovo Peace Plan - Serbia"; Kühn, *The Rise and Fall of Cooperative Arms Control in Europe*, 2020.
[786] Bolving, "The Adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe - CFE - Considerations Concerning Baltic CFE-Membership"; Kühn, *The Rise and Fall of Cooperative Arms Control in Europe*, 2020; Peters, *The Changing Quality of Stability in Europe*; Wilcox, *The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and Russian Foreign and Security Policy (Dissertation)*.
[787] Cimbala, "Russian Threat Perceptions and Security Policies"; Medvedev, "Speech at Meeting with German Political, Parliamentary and Civic Leaders"; Oliker et al., *Russian Foreign Policy in Historical and Current Context: A Reassessment*.
[788] Charap and Shapiro, "A New European Security Order: The Ukraine Crisis and the Missing Post-Cold War Bargain"; Kvartalnov, "Indivisible Security and Collective Security Concepts"; Renz, "Why Russia Is Reviving Its Conventional Military Power."

Table A 6: Resource constraints

Agreement	Can the more powerful state afford to compete to maintain the ratio? 1=No (they cannot afford because there is a resource shortage)	Explanation
WW1	1	World War One was very expensive for all parties, and the Allied states felt pressure to significantly reduce defense costs and do so rapidly.[789]
Spitsbergen	1	The UK (the strongest navy in the Atlantic Ocean area at the time) faced significant resource constraints due to the high war costs.[790]
Tartu	1	Soviet Russia had significant resource constraints due to its civil war and conflicts along its borders.[791]
Åland	0	Sweden, the most powerful Baltic Sea naval power, was not facing significant resource constraints as it had not participated in World War One. Although Sweden faced some economic challenges in the first 5 years after WW1, there is no information to suggest that they had to make drastic cuts to defense. Defense spending only slightly decreased in the coming decade, with an increase in 1920-1921. The main debate was about force composition.[792]
Helsinki1922	1	Soviet Russia had significant resource constraints due to its civil war and conflicts along its borders.[793]
WashNav	1	The UK generally was facing substantial financial constraints after WW1.[794]
Lausanne	0	The complicated interaction between naval and land forces that would have required any domination or control of the Straits minimize the extent to which resource constraints was an issue. In short, at low cost Turkey could control the Straits due to the geographic realities.[795]

[789] Nicholas Crafts, "Walking Wounded: The British Economy in the Aftermath of World War I," CEPR, August 27, 2014, https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/walking-wounded-british-economy-aftermath-world-war-i; Martin Ellison, Thomas J. Sargent, and Andrew Scott, "Chapter 2: Funding the Great War and the Beginning of the End for British Hegemony," in *Debt and Entanglements Between the Wars*, ed. Era Dabala-Norris (International Monetary Fund, 2019); "Military Expenditure as a Share of GDP," Our World in Data, accessed July 5, 2024, https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/military-expenditure-as-a-share-of-gdp-long.
[790] Crafts, "Walking Wounded"; Ellison, Sargent, and Scott, "Chapter 2: Funding the Great War and the Beginning of the End for British Hegemony"; "Military Expenditure as a Share of GDP."
[791] Mark Harrison, *Guns and Rubles*, Yale-Hoover Series on Stalin, Stalinism, and the Cold War (New Haven [Conn.]: Yale University Press, 2008).
[792] Anders Berge, *Sakkunskap Och Politisk Rationalitet: Den Svenska Flottan Och Pansarfartygsfrågan 1918-1939* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1987); Björn Hagelin and Peter Wallensteen, "Understanding Swedish Military Expenditures," *Cooperation and Conflict* 27, no. 4 (1992): 415–41; Henric Häggqvist, "Wartime and Post-War Economies (Sweden)," International Encyclopedia of the First World War (WW1), September 18, 2019, https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/wartime_and_post-war_economies_sweden.
[793] Harrison, *Guns and Rubles*.
[794] Crafts, "Walking Wounded"; Ellison, Sargent, and Scott, "Chapter 2: Funding the Great War and the Beginning of the End for British Hegemony"; "Military Expenditure as a Share of GDP."
[795] Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 2, Demilitarization of Frontiers, Islands and Straits*; Macfie, "The Straits Question"; Papuççular, "Contested Sovereignties"; Tulun, "Consequences Of Material Breach Of The Lausanne Peace Treaty."

Aegean	1	The challenge of defending many islands from attack and invasion would have likely stressed the stronger state(s) finances in the 1920's. Both navies were relatively small, and Turkey (the larger and stronger state) did not show any growth in its navy from 1919-1927.[796]
Thrace	0	Turkey was probably the strongest of the states directly concerned, and had sufficient resources and to deal with the border issues, as the defense would likely rely primarily on personnel numbers (compared to ships, in the case of the Aegean islands). 1923 Turkey:Greece:Bulgaria personnel ratios were 129:79:20; and CINC 66:44:16.[797]
Tangiers	0	Although France and the UK had significant resource constraints, Tangiers was not a source of major military rivalry and there is no information that costs were a factor in its internationalization (which had been under negotiation even before WW1).[798]
London1930	0	All state parties (US, UK, Japan) were in the midst of modernizing their navies; thus, no resource constraints applied.[799]
Anglo-German	0	No clear information that cost was a major issue for the UK's accepting the reduced ratio.[800]
Montreux	0	There were no indications that resource constraints played a role in establishing the Montreux Convention.[801]
London1936	0	States were undergoing modernization and generally increasing defense spending at this time.[802]
Moscow1940	0	The Soviet Union did not face resource constraints at this time.[803]
WW2	0	Despite the high costs of the war, the victorious Allies (especially USA) did not face significant economic distress at the war's end. The Soviet Union had suffered enormously, but war-time industrialization had helped its recovery.[804]
Dodecanese1947	0	Resource constraints did not factor into the agreement.[805]
WEU	0	There were no significant resource constraints amongst the signatories.[806]

[796] Serhat Güvenç, "Building a Republican Navy in Turkey: 1924-1939," *International Journal of Naval History* 1, no. 1 (April 2002); Serhat Güvenç and Dilek Barlas, "Atatürk's Navy: Determinants of Turkish Naval Policy, 1923-38," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 26, no. 1 (March 2003): 1–35; *Armaments Year-Book: General and Statistical Information*, vol. First Year (Geneva: League of Nations, 1924); *Armaments Year-Book: General and Statistical Information*, vol. Third Year: 1926-1927 (Geneva: League of Nations, 1927).
[797] Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 2, Demilitarization of Frontiers, Islands and Straits*; Greig and Enterline, "Correlates of War Database, National Material Capabilities (v6.0)."
[798] Dunthorn, "THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON TANGIER, AUGUST 1945"; Edwards, "3. Tangier(s): The Multiple Cold War Contexts of the International Zone."
[799] Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 3, Limitation of Seapower*; "The London Naval Conference, 1930."
[800] Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 3, Limitation of Seapower*; Hoerber, "Psychology and Reasoning in the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, 1935-1939"; Watt, "The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935."
[801] Acer, *Russia's Attack on Ukraine: The Montreux Convention and Turkiye*; Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 2, Demilitarization of Frontiers, Islands and Straits*; Seydi, *The Turkish Straits and the Great Powers : From the Montreux Convention to the Early Cold War, 1936-1947*; Seydi and Morewood, "Turkey's Application of the Montreux Convention in the Second World War."
[802] Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 3, Limitation of Seapower*; Chessum, "The 1936 London Naval Treaty."
[803] "Military Expenditure as a Share of GDP."
[804] M. Harrison, "The Soviet Union after 1945: Economic Recovery and Political Repression," *Past & Present* 210, no. Supplement 6 (January 1, 2011): 103–20, https://doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gtq042.
[805] Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Turkish Claims Regarding the Demilitarization of Islands in the Aegean Sea"; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Background Note on Aegean Dispute."
[806] Hallett, "Western European Union (Armaments Control Agency), (Hansard, 17 December 1959)"; Johnston, *How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance since 1950*; "The Establishment of Western European Union (WEU)."

Cyprus	0	There are no indications that either side (and their partners) faced significant resource constraints that prevented them from continuing to fight if pressed.[807]
INF	1	Gorbachev felt that the costs of arms racing in general was too high, and he sought to shift defense expenses to general economic growth and cost of living improvements.[808]
Germany1990	0	Although the Soviet Union was seeking to reduce defense expenditures, this was much less the case of the other Allies (US, UK, and France).[809]
CFE	1	The Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact were seeking to reduce defense expenditures significantly to improve their economies.[810]
Transdnistria	0	The new Russian republic was facing resource constraints generally, but there are no indications that this conflict in particular were outside of its means to deal with given its local and small nature.[811]
Balkans	0	There is no information suggesting that resource constraints compelled the state parties to sign the agreement.[812]
Belfast	1	The UK was facing significant pressures to generally reduce its defense budget, and operations in Northern Ireland were a source of personnel costs in particular.[813]
Kosovo	0	NATO did not face any major resource constraints.[814]
A/CFE	0	The more powerful states (NATO) were not facing major resource constraints, with defense budgets stable following the early 1990's drawdowns.[815]
Georgia	0	Russia did not face any resource contraints to continue a conflict with Georgia.[816]
Minsk	0	There are no indications that resource constraints were a driving factor in the ceasefire.[817]

[807] *The Blue Helmets : A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping*; Novosseloff, "Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and The Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary- General on Cyprus (OSASG)."
[808] Colbourn, *Euromissiles*; Davis, "Lessons of the INF Treaty"; Gassert, Geiger, and Wentker, *The INF Treaty of 1987*.
[809] "Military Expenditure (% of GDP) - Russian Federation | Data," The World Bank, accessed January 22, 2023, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=RU; James M. Cypher, "Military Spending after the Cold War," *Journal of Economic Issues* 25, no. 2 (June 1991): 607–15, https://doi.org/10.1080/00213624.1991.11505193.
[810] Jurski, *The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and Its Contribution to Euro-Atlantic Security after 1990*; Wilcox, "Russia and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)—A Paradigm Change?"; Wilcox, *The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and Russian Foreign and Security Policy (Dissertation)*.
[811] Rosa, "The Transnistrian Conflict: 30 Years Searching for a Settlement"; Secrieru, "In the Shadow of War: Moldova's Quest for Stability and Security"; Vahl and Emerson, "Moldova and the Transnistrian Conflict."
[812] Bekic, "An Important Step Toward Peace and Long-Term Stabilisation in the Region of Southeastern Europe"; Podžić, "A New Era for South-East Europe - Rebuilding Peace, Security and Stability in Aftermath of War."
[813] Tom Dodd and Mark Oakes, "Strategic Defence Review White Paper," Research Paper (London: House of Commons Library, October 15, 1998); Select Committee on Defence, "House of Commons, Defence, Eighth Report," www.parliament.uk, September 3, 1998, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmdfence/138/13826.htm; J. Vitor Tossini, "A Brief Look at the British Defence Budget in the 1990s," *Ukdj* (blog), July 15, 2015, https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/a-brief-look-at-the-british-defence-budget-in-the-1990s/.
[814] David L. Phillips, *Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention*, Belfer Center Studies in International Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012).
[815] William S. Cohen, "Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review" (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, May 1997); "Future Years Defense Program: DOD's 1998 Plan Has Substantial Risk in Execution" (Washington, DC: US General Accounting Office, October 1997).
[816] Galeotti and Shumate, *Russia's Five-Day War: The Invasion of Georgia, August 2008*.
[817] Lidia Powirska, "Through the Ashes of the Minsk Agreements," May 18, 2022, https://epicenter.wcfia.harvard.edu/blog/through-ashes-minsk-agreements.

Source: Authors' research and analysis

Table A 7: Status quo assessment

The study considered the status quo unchanged when the quantitative ratio change was under five percent overall, or when there was otherwise no noticeable change in the overall military balance. The study considered it altered when the overall ratio changed by more than five percent, or when it was clear that the agreement significantly reduced the relative military superiority of the most powerful state party in other aspects.

Agreement	**Status quo change or not (ratio reduction for the stronger party); 1 = ratio change**	**Explanation**
WW1	0	The Allies imposed strict and debilitating limits on the defeated Central Powers, without accepting any limits on their own military capabilities.[818]
Spitsbergen	0	The agreement kept the island free of military activity and presence, as it had been prior to and during World War One.[819]
Tartu	0	The military superiority of Soviet Russia was retained; only Finland was subject to restrictions.[820]
Åland	0	The agreement did not substantially change any state parties' military capabilities, deployments, etc. The island remained demilitarized as it had in the past (since 1856).[821]
Helsinki1922	1	Soviet Russia had military superiority, and therefore could have likely imposed a buffer zone on Finland without accepting one of its own (as was the case with the Tartu agreement where Finland accepted limitations in the Arctic).[822]
WashNav	1	The pre-agreement ratio was 4 : 2.3 : 1.3 : 1.0 : 1.3 (all ships in 1920, UK, the United States, Japan, Italy, and France, respectively); or 5.3 : 1.8 :0.9 : 0.7 : 1.2 (Ships completed in 1911 or later; UK, the United States, Japan, Italy, and France, respectively). The new agreement ratio was approximately 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 for the UK, the United States, Japan, Italy, and France, respectively. Agreement ratio: approximately 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 for the UK, the United States, Japan, Italy, and France, respectively.[823]

[818] World War 1 peace treaties' text, with Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, and Hungary.
[819] Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 2, Demilitarization of Frontiers, Islands and Straits*; Koivurova and Holiencin, "Demilitarisation and Neutralisation of Svalbard."
[820] Anderson, "Origins of the Winter War: A Study of Russo-Finnish Diplomacy"; Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 2, Demilitarization of Frontiers, Islands and Straits*; Greig and Enterline, "Correlates of War Database, National Material Capabilities (v6.0)"; Suchoples, "In the Shadow of the Eastern Neighbour. Finland in the Security Policy of Russia and the Soviet Union from Peter the Great to Contemporary Times"; "Tarton rauha oli tiukan neuvottelun takana - eikä kestänyt kauan." The Correlates of War (COW) Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) scores Russia:Finland 1920 at 0.10320065:0.001545291, or 103:1.
[821] *Armaments Year-Book: General and Statistical Information*, 1924; Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 2, Demilitarization of Frontiers, Islands and Straits*; Gardberg, *Åland Islands*; Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, *Government Report on Changes in the Security Environment*; Suchoples, "In the Shadow of the Eastern Neighbour. Finland in the Security Policy of Russia and the Soviet Union from Peter the Great to Contemporary Times"; Åkermark, "The Puzzle of Collective Self-Defence."
[822] Greig and Enterline, "Correlates of War Database, National Material Capabilities (v6.0)." The Correlates of War (COW) Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) scores Russia:Finland 1922 at 0.1443790: 0.0015718592, or 144:2.
[823] Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 3, Limitation of Seapower*.

Lausanne	0	The agreement did not control states' military capabilities per se, as limitations applied to access through the Straits rather than what was in the Black Sea (unless it came through the Straits). Overall, there was no alteration in the existing naval balance in the Black Sea region that was determined by the Lausanne agreement.[824]
Aegean	0	Generalizing all of the islands' histories relevant to the sets of agreements is difficult, but in general the agreements balanced competing interests and claims to maintain a status quo and deepen stability. None of the agreements impacted the national military capabilities.[825]
Thrace	0	The agreement did not impact national capabilities, but was a way to stabilize rivalries and prevent conflict by keeping forces separate.[826]
Tangiers	0	Tangiers' demilitarized status was retained.[827]
London1930	0	The agreement left intact the exisiting Washington Naval agreement, and supplemented areas which had not been covered. The new ratio was based on current holdings, although some believed the US might have sacrificed some superiority.[828]
Anglo-German	1	The balance prior to the agreement was 14:100 (Germany:UK). The new balance set by the agreement was 35:100 (Germany:UK).[829]
Montreux	0	The Montreux Convention upheld the status quo established by the Lausanne Convention.[830]
London1936	0	The agreement left intact the exisiting Washington Naval agreement, and supplemented areas which had not been covered. The new ratio was based on current holdings, although some believed the US might have sacrificed some superiority.[831]
Moscow1940	0	The agreement affirmed the Soviet Union's military superiority (with limits only placed on Finland).[832]
WW2	0	The Allied military superiority was as only the defeated Axis states were subject to limitations.[833]

[824] Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 2, Demilitarization of Frontiers, Islands and Straits*; Macfie, "The Straits Question"; Papuççular, "Contested Sovereignties"; Tulun, "Consequences Of Material Breach Of The Lausanne Peace Treaty."
[825] Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 2, Demilitarization of Frontiers, Islands and Straits*; Dyke, "An Analysis of the Aegean Disputes under International Law"; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Background Note on Aegean Dispute."
[826] Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 2, Demilitarization of Frontiers, Islands and Straits*.
[827] Dunthorn, "THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON TANGIER, AUGUST 1945"; Edwards, "3. Tangier(s): The Multiple Cold War Contexts of the International Zone."
[828] Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 3, Limitation of Seapower*; D. W. Knox, "The London Treaty and American Naval Policy," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 57, no. 8 (August 1931), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1931/august/london-treaty-and-american-naval-policy.
[829] *Armaments Year-Book: General and Statistical Information*, vol. Eleventh Year (Geneva: League of Nations, 1935); Watt, "The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935."
[830] Acer, *Russia's Attack on Ukraine: The Montreux Convention and Turkiye*; Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 2, Demilitarization of Frontiers, Islands and Straits*; Seydi, *The Turkish Straits and the Great Powers : From the Montreux Convention to the Early Cold War, 1936-1947*; Seydi and Morewood, "Turkey's Application of the Montreux Convention in the Second World War."
[831] Acer, *Russia's Attack on Ukraine: The Montreux Convention and Turkiye*; Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 2, Demilitarization of Frontiers, Islands and Straits*; Seydi, *The Turkish Straits and the Great Powers : From the Montreux Convention to the Early Cold War, 1936-1947*; Seydi and Morewood, "Turkey's Application of the Montreux Convention in the Second World War."
[832] Anderson, "Origins of the Winter War: A Study of Russo-Finnish Diplomacy"; Hannikainen, "Finland's Continuation War (1941–1944)"; Suchoples, "In the Shadow of the Eastern Neighbour. Finland in the Security Policy of Russia and the Soviet Union from Peter the Great to Contemporary Times"; W.R. Trotter, *The Winter War: The Russo-Finnish War of 1939-40* (Aurum, 2002).
[833] Various armistices and peace agreements between the Allies and Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Finland, Germany, and Romania.

Dodecanese1947	0	The agreement did not alter the status quo, as it left untouched Italian and Greek national military capabilities; and granting islands to Greece under the condition of demilitarization did not offer Greece a substantial military advantage; nor did it remove significant military capability from Italy.[834]
WEU	0	The agreement had a flexible limit, based on NATO policy.[835]
Cyprus	0	The agreement more or less froze the front line in place.[836]
INF	1	By the deadline, the two countries had together destroyed a total of 2,692 short- and intermediate-range missiles: 1,846 Soviet missiles and 846 American missiles, with the end result that neither side had any INF weapons (conventional or nuclear).[837]
Germany1990	0	Germany's relative inferiority to the WW2 allied powers combined was retained with a range of limits. Additionally, addressing reunification and the Cold War, the western allies were prohibited from establishing a military presence in the former East Germany (where they had also not been present). The Soviet Union agreed to withdraw from East Germany (GDR), which was a slight modification of the status quo - however the agreement otherwise did not limit Soviet military capabilities in Europe, including in other Warsaw Pact states. Thus, presumably or theoretically, the Soviet Union could have retained its military superiority over Germany if it sought to do so by stationing forces around the reunified Germany. The agreement was linked to the CFE Treaty which was being finalized.[838]
CFE	1	The pre-agreement November 1990 TLE count (all five TLE categories combined) was Warsaw Pact: 112,068: NATO 76,009. The agreement ratio for all 5 TLE categories was 1:1.[839]
Transdnistria	0	The agreement kept the front lines in place, and no impact on overall military capabilities.[840]
Balkans	0	The agreement reflected that the former Yugoslavia (FRY) had more TLE, and that Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (B/H) were comparable. The main variation was artillery, where the rank was the same but distribution different. The pre-agreement ratio for all TLE was 61:15:23. The agreement set a ratio of 55:22:22 for FRY, Croatia, and B/H respectively.[841]

[834] Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Turkish Claims Regarding the Demilitarization of Islands in the Aegean Sea"; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Background Note on Aegean Dispute."
[835] Hallett, "Western European Union (Armaments Control Agency), (Hansard, 17 December 1959)"; Johnston, *How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance since 1950*; "The Establishment of Western European Union (WEU)."
[836] *The Blue Helmets : A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping*; Novosseloff, "Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and The Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary- General on Cyprus (OSASG)."
[837] Daryl Kimball, "The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty at a Glance," Arms Control Association, August 2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty.
[838] Hannes Adomeit, "Gorbachev's Consent to Unified Germany's Membership in NATO" (Berlin: Stiftung und Wissenschaft und Politik / German Institute for International and Security Affairs, December 11, 2006); "Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany" (Moscow, September 12, 1990).Hannes Adomeit, "Gorbachev's Consent to Unified Germany's Membership in NATO" (Berlin: Stiftung und Wissenschaft und Politik / German Institute for International and Security Affairs, December 11, 2006); "Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany" (Moscow, September 12, 1990).
[839] (Dean and Forsberg 1992)
[840] Rosa, "The Transnistrian Conflict: 30 Years Searching for a Settlement"; Secrieru, "In the Shadow of War: Moldova's Quest for Stability and Security"; Vahl and Emerson, "Moldova and the Transnistrian Conflict."
[841] "Parties Complete Weapons Reductions Under Balkan Arms Control Accord," Arms Control Association, accessed February 15, 2024, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997-10/press-releases/parties-complete-weapons-reductions-under-balkan-arms-control-accord.

Belfast	1	Due to complicated nature of the rivalry, there was no (perceived) need for Irish forces to reduce. Rather, militant groups were to demobilize, and the UK agreed to reduce its armed forces in Northern Ireland.[842]
Kosovo	0	NATO's military superiority was upheld, with Serbia forced to accept geographic demilitarization and retain limits agreed to in 1996. Serbian forces were prohibited from operating within Kosovo, while NATO forces had no such limitations.[843]
A/CFE	0	The changes for territorial ceilings between current (1 Jan 2000) holdings and territorial ceilings was under 5% for every country and category.[844]
Georgia	1	The agreement did not impose limitations on either side's national military capabilities. However, Russia agreed to withdraw from some areas it had seized including Gori and Poti (major cities). Russia also agreed to draw down its forces in South Ossetia and Abkhazia to pre-conflict levels.[845]
Minsk	0	The battlelines were largely kept in place, and the agreement did not impact overall military capabilities of either side (or Russia).[846]

Source: Authors' research and analysis

[842] Independent Monitoring Commission, *Twenty-Sixth and Final Report of the Independent Monitoring Commission: 2004-2011 - Changes, Impact and Lessons* (London: Stationery Office, 2011).
[843] Mark W. Corson and Clemson G. Turregano, "Spaces of Unintended Consequences: The Ground Safety Zone in Kosovo," *GeoJournal* 57, no. 4 (2002): 273–82, https://doi.org/10.1023/B:GEJO.0000007205.16802.d7; Hosmer, *Why Milosevic Decided to Settle the Conflict Over Kosovo When He Did*; "Interviews: Strobe Talbott," PBS Frontline, accessed July 7, 2024, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/talbott.html; "Kumanovo Agreement 24 Years Later: Kosovo Problem Far from Resolved, KFOR Strengthens Its Forces - Kosovo Online," Kosovo Online, June 9, 2023, https://www.kosovo-online.com/en/news/analysis/kumanovo-agreement-24-years-later-kosovo-problem-far-resolved-kfor-strengthens-its.
[844] Bolving, "The Adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe - CFE - Considerations Concerning Baltic CFE-Membership."
[845] Galeotti and Shumate, *Russia's Five-Day War: The Invasion of Georgia, August 2008*; Phillips, *Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention*; Ühtegi, "The 2008 Russia-Georgia War Five Years Later."
[846] OSCE, *A Peaceful Presence - The First Five Years of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine*; Powirska, "Through the Ashes of the Minsk Agreements."

Appendix B: Chapter 5 – Delegation Tables

Table B 1: CAC agreement variables and scoring

Variable	Description	Scoring	Points
Mandate modification	Ability of the agreement executor to modify its mandate	Yes; No or NA	1; 0
Governance independence	Extent to which the treaty executor can make decisions without state party approval	Yes; Somewhat; No or NA	1; 0.5; 0
Staff independence	Extent to which staff are independent of states parties	Yes; Somewhat; No or NA	1; 0.5; 0
Assessment independence	Extent to which the agreement executor can make independence assessments on compliance	Yes; Somewhat; No or NA	1; 0.5; 0
Enforcement authority	Extent to which the agreement executor can enforce the agreement	Yes; Somewhat; No or NA	1; 0.5; 0
Agent resources	Amount of personnel, equipment, and financial resources available to the agreement executor	High; Medium; Low; NA	1; 0.5; 0.25; 0
Monitoring	Extent to which the agreement executor is permitted to monitor compliance	Yes; No or NA	1; 0
Inspection	Extent to which the agreement executor is permitted to conduct on-site inspection activities	Yes; No or NA	1; 0
Third-party involvement	Involvement of a third-party IGO or state as witness, guarantor, or implementer	Yes; No or NA	1; 0
Success	Level of treaty success based on lack of conflict between primary states parties over the issue that the agreement is intended to address	Successful; Somewhat successful; or Not successful	1; 0.5; 0

Source: Author's methodological analysis and research

Note: CAC, conventional arms control; IGO, intergovernmental organization; NA, not applicable

Table B 2: CAC agreement explanation of success or failure

Agreement	**Explanation**	**Score**
Post−World War I peace treaties	During the lifetimes of the multilateral treaty bodies charged with implementing the World War I peace treaties, particularly the various international military commissions, the bodies successfully identified violations, oversaw reductions, and conflict did not break out during their operations. However, the CAC elements of the peace treaties largely collapsed in the 1930s and war across Europe broke out by the end of that decade.	Somewhat successful
Svalbard (Spitsbergen) Treaty	There has not been any conflict between states parties over the Spitsbergen archipelago, and no substantial violations.	Successful
Finnish-Russian Dorpat/Tartu Agreement	While relations between Finland and Russia were mediocre between the wars, the agreement was respected and endured with cooperation between parties for over 20 years.	Somewhat successful
Åland Island Convention	There has not been any conflict between states parties over the Åland Islands, and no substantial violations.	Successful
Washington Naval Treaty	The treaty was generally successful, with parties respecting the agreement until the treaty's expiration. However, failure to extend or revise the treaty and the subsequent war between the global naval powers, especially Japan versus the United States and the United Kingdom, suggest that the Washington Naval Treaty's success was unenduring.	Somewhat successful
Lausanne Agreements of 1923	These agreements concerning Turkish and Greek demilitarization and control and access to the Bosporous Straits were respected, and no conflict occurred.	Unsuccessful
London Naval Treaties	The treaties failed to reduce tensions between states parties, and war broke out between them within a decade.	Unsuccessful
Anglo-German Naval Treaty	While the agreement was respected during its brief lifetime in part due to the inability of Germany to produce beyond the treaty's limits, the overall rivalry continued and war broke out between the countries within a few years.	Unsuccessful

Montreux Convention of the Straits	This agreement is still in force, even with conflict having occurred several times in the Black Sea region since its passage. Turkey has meticulously observed and implemented the treaty, and no state has attempted to militarily contest Turkey's control over the straits.	Successful
Moscow Treaty (Finland and Russia) of 1940	The treaty that ended the Winter War was quickly violated when Finland joined Germany in attacking the USSR.	Unsuccessful
Post−World War II agreements	The post−World War II agreements were successful in that the states that composed the Axis never attacked the Allied states again, and there was no attempt to violate the mostly vague CAC controls imposed on the Axis states without the Allies' permission. However, the onset of the Cold War largely negated all of the postwar CAC agreements, with only the agreement applying to Finland being generally respected, and war never breaking out between it and the USSR after the treaty's entry into force.	Somewhat successful
Western European Union (WEU) agreements	The WEU agreements that set controls on its Member States, particularly Germany, succeeded. Germany never exceeded the NATO-authorized military quantities, and (Western) Germany did not go to war with any of the Western World War II Allies.	Successful
Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty	The INF Treaty, which is no longer in force, is a partial success from a CAC perspective. First, it was fully respected by the United States and Soviet Union and then Russia until the 2010s (at least 20 years) − with violations being related to conventional missiles rather than the nuclear missiles that were the treaty's focus. The INF Treaty was a key arms control component in ending the Cold War, and the United States and USSR/Russia have not gone to war. Still, the Russo-Ukraine War, as well as US withdrawal from the treaty due to alleged Russian violations, make the treaty only partially successful.	Somewhat successful
Conventional Arme Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty	The CFE Treaty offered high levels of transparency between states parties, and is credited with assisting in a peaceful end of the Cold War. There was never a surprise attack by either NATO, the Warsaw Pact, or Russia (against NATO). Russia's invasion, which occurred approximately 15 years after Russia had suspended its participation in most of the CFE Treaty, shows that the treaty did not resolve the post−Cold War military balance or imbalance, and did not prevent Russia from attacking a NATO partner and proxy. Thus, it was somewhat successful in many aspects, but the Russo-Ukraine War counters many of its successes.	Somewhat successful
Subregional Arms Control (Balkans)	States parties of the Balkans CFE Treaty, as it is sometimes referred to, have not gone to war with one another since the agreement's signature and entry into force. The 1999 Kosovo conflict did not involve combat between the states parties.	Successful
Belfast Agreement	The Belfast Agreement has seen the United Kingdom withdraw a large part of its military forces, and paramilitary violence is much lower in Northern Ireland compared to the period of the Troubles.	Successful

Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia	Since the agreement's signature, there has not been armed conflict between NATO and Kosovo on one side, and Serbia. Recent instability within Kosovo between ethnic Serbs and the central government is a cause of concern for the agreement's sustainability, but there are no indications yet that Serbia seeks to violate or withdraw from the 1999 agreement.	Successful
Six-Point Peace Plan for Georgia	While the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia remain in dispute, fighting between Georgia and Russia has not occurred since the peace plan's implementation.	Successful
Minsk agreements	The Minsk agreements were never substantively respected, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine is another manifestation of the agreements' abject failure.	Unsuccessful

Source: Authors' research and analysis

Note: CAC, conventional arms control; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; WEU, Western European Union; INF Treaty, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; CFE Treaty, Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.

Table B 3: Mandate modification

Agreement	Explanation	Score
Post−World War I peace treaties	The various interwar commissions could not change their mandates. This could only be done by the Allied powers, primarily through the Conference of Ambassadors and, to a lesser extent, the Allied Military Committee in Versailles.	0
Svalbard (Spitsbergen) Treaty	Not applicable due to lack of an agreement implementing body.	0
Finnish-Russian Dorpat/Tartu Agreement	The small joint commission had no independence.	0
Åland Island Convention	Not applicable due to the narrow nature of the agreement, and no disputes arising.	0
Washington Naval Treaty	Not applicable due to lack of agreement implementing body.	0
Lausanne Agreements of 1923	Not applicable due to the narrow nature of the agreement, and no disputes arising.	0
London Naval Treaties	Not applicable due to lack of an agreement implementing body.	0
Anglo-German Naval Treaty	Not applicable due to lack of an agreement implementing body.	0
Montreux Convention of the Straits	Not applicable due to lack of an agreement implementing body.	0
Moscow Treaty (Finland and Russia) of 1940	Not applicable due to lack of an agreement implementing body.	0
Post−World War II agreements	The Allied Control Councils and Commissions had substantial authority in the execution of occupation duties.	1
WEU agreements	The Agency for the Control of Armaments' (ACA) role was clearly defined by agreement, with any changes having to go through WEU members and WEU decisionmaking bodies.	0
INF Treaty	The Special Verification Commission had a narrow, specified mandate.	0
CFE Treaty	The Joint Consultative Group had a narrow, specified mandate.	0
Subregional Arms Control (Balkans)	OSCE and the SRCC had narrow, specific mandates in how the agreement was to be executed.	0
Belfast Agreement	The IMC and IICD had narrow mandates that could not be changed without revising NI and state party agreements.	0
Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia	The mandate was determined by NATO's senior decisionmaking bodies and Member States.	0
Six-Point Peace Plan for Georgia	The EUMM's mandate was determined by EU senior decisionmaking bodies and EU members.	0
Minsk agreements	The OSCE's SMM was able to modify and expand its mandate to adjust for conditions and unforeseen challenges.	0.5

Source: Authors' research and analysis

Note: WEU, Western European Union; INF Treaty, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; CFE Treaty, Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty; ACA, Agency for the Control of Armaments; OSCE, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; SRCC, Subregional Consultative Commission; IMC, Independent Monitoring Commission; IICD, Independent International Commission on Decommissioning; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; EUMM, European Union's Monitoring Mission in Georgia; EU, European Union; SMM, Special Monitoring Mission.

Table B 4: Governance independence

Agreement	Explanation	Score
Post−World War I peace treaties	While the Allied commissions were subject to higher authorities, such as the Conference of Ambassadors and the Allied Military Committee in Versailles, each commission was given latitude in the execution of its mission, in part due to the fact that they were not located in the same country as their superiors, and also due to the nature of the work that required daily tasking and decisions.	0.5
Svalbard (Spitsbergen) Treaty	No need for any governance for this agreement execution.	0
Finnish-Russian Dorpat/Tartu Agreement	The commission had no independence.	0
Åland Island Convention	No need for any governance for this agreement execution.	0
Washington Naval Treaty	Not applicable.	0
Lausanne Agreements of 1923	No need for any governance for this agreement execution.	0
London Naval Treaties	Not applicable.	0
Anglo-German Naval Treaty	Not applicable.	0
Montreux Convention of the Straits	Not applicable.	0
Moscow Treaty (Finland and Russia) of 1940	Not applicable.	0
Post−World War II agreements	The Allied Control Commission and Councils had some independence, but the each Allied representative was formally under the command of a national military officer or reported directly to their home government.	0.5
WEU agreements	The Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA) was not subject to any individual government's decision or oversight, and could thus make decisions on tasks, priorities, and so forth.	0.5
INF Treaty	The Special Verification Commission had no governance duties.	0
CFE Treaty	The JCC had no governance duties.	0
Subregional Arms Control (Balkans)	The OSCE had significant leeway in how it could support implementation of the agreement, but the Subregional Consultative Commission (modeled after the CFE JCC) did not have substantial independent duties.	0.5
Belfast Agreement	The two commissions, IMC and IICD, both had broad authority to conduct their duties as they saw fit. They had no responsibility to obey any state party demands, and states parties had no substantive role in the commissions' decisionmaking.	1
Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia	The agreement was implemented by both Serbia and KFOR. Serbian officials only reported to their national government, while KFOR management permitted substantial leeway within the NATO command structure, but decisions and other activities were always subject to both national controls and restrictions, and KFOR was also subject to NATO's decisionmaking bodies.	0.5
Six-Point Peace Plan for Georgia	The EUMM was subject neither to Georgia nor Russia's control, as neither were EU members. This gave the EUMM – within its narrow mandate – substantial freedom to govern its own activities.	1
Minsk agreements	The OSCE's SMM was partially independent due to the scale and scope of its work, which meant that much of its major daily activities and taskings were conducted independent of national interference. However, the SMM was subject to OSCE governance, which was based on state party input, as well as national officials who were part of the SMM (seconded) may have been subject to some controls from their home government.	0.5

Source: Authors' research and analysis

Note: WEU, Western European Union; INF Treaty, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; CFE Treaty, Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty; ACA, Agency for the Control of Armaments; JCC, Joint Consultative Commission; OSCE, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; IMC, Independent Monitoring Commission; IICD, Independent International Commission on Decommissioning; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; EUMM, European Union's Monitoring Mission in Georgia; EU, European Union; SMM, Special Monitoring Mission.

Table B 5: Staff independence

Agreement	Explanation	Score
Post−World War I peace treaties	Staff were primarily national military members, thus subject to their home government at various levels, formally and informally, but they were also formally assigned to the Allied commission hierarchies, under a single commander.	0.5
Svalbard (Spitsbergen) Treaty	Not applicable.	0
Finnish-Russian Dorpat/Tartu Agreement	The commission members were national government representatives.	0
Åland Island Convention	Not applicable.	0
Washington Naval Treaty	Not applicable.	0
Lausanne Agreements of 1923	The limited work of the commission was done by national representatives.	0
London Naval Treaties	Not applicable.	0
Anglo-German Naval Treaty	Not applicable.	0
Montreux Convention of the Straits	Not applicable.	0
Moscow Treaty (Finland and Russia) of 1940	Not applicable.	0
Post−World War II agreements	The Allied Control Council and Commission members were all uniformed military officials representing their national government. Nonetheless, they were able to make substantive decisions and manage the commissions' affairs with some independence, especially when their hierarchy was primarily to the ACCs' heads.	0.5
WEU agreements	The ACA staff were subject to WEU management, which was itself subject to Member State decisionmaking processes.	0.5
INF Treaty	The Special Verification Commission members were all national government representatives.	0
CFE Treaty	The Joint Consultative Council members were all national government representatives.	0
Subregional Arms Control (Balkans)	While the SRCC members were national representatives, many of the OSCE members, including the special representative, were international civil servants under direct pay of the OSCE.	0.5
Belfast Agreement	The two commissions' staffs were wholly independent.	1
Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia	KFOR leadership had some leeway in conducting their activities and policies, in part because KFOR was not under the control of any individual state. Rather, it was subject to national leadership collectively, and NATO command and governance.	0.5
Six-Point Peace Plan for Georgia	The EUMM was not subject to daily, national control but staff were still subject to broader EU management, and any seconded officials to the EUMM were also subject to national prerogatives.	0.5
Minsk agreements	The OSCE SMM staff were a combination of contract and seconded officials. The seconded officials were subject to national prerogatives and influence. OSCE staff were subject to OSCE secretariat management.	0.5

Source: Authors' research and analysis

Note: WEU, Western European Union; INF Treaty, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; CFE Treaty, Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty; ACCs, Allied Control Councils and Commissions; ACA, Agency for the Control of Armaments; SRCC, Subregional Consultative Commission; OSCE, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization;

EUMM, European Union's Monitoring Mission in Georgia; EU, European Union; SMM, Special Monitoring Mission.

Table B 6: Assessment independence (of the governing body)

Agreement	Explanation	Score
Post−World War I peace treaties	The Allied commissions issued regular assessments of compliance and other observations of relevance and importance.	1
Svalbard (Spitsbergen) Treaty	Not applicable.	0
Finnish-Russian Dorpat/Tartu Agreement	No reports were issued.	0
Åland Island Convention	No reports were issued.	0
Washington Naval Treaty	No reports were issued.	0
Lausanne Agreements of 1923	The Straits Commission could assess compliance and issue reports.	1
London Naval Treaties	Assessments of compliance were done by states parties.	0
Anglo-German Naval Treaty	Assessments of compliance were done by states parties.	0
Montreux Convention of the Straits	Assessments of compliance were (or could be) done by states parties.	0
Moscow Treaty (Finland and Russia) of 1940	Assessments of compliance were done by states parties.	0
Post−World War II agreements	While the Allied Control Commissions and Councils could assess compliance, this could be complicated by differing national perspectives among the Allied commanders and political leaders. In principle, any lead member of an ACC could object to any assessment.	0.5
WEU agreements	The ACA could assess compliance.	1
INF Treaty	Assessments of compliance were done by states parties.	0
CFE Treaty	Assessments of compliance were done by states parties.	0
Subregional Arms Control (Balkans)	The OSCE could make observations about compliance, without a determination of compliance. States parties made the formal determination about state party compliance.	0.5
Belfast Agreement	The commissions had full authority to assess compliance.	1
Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia	KFOR had full authority to assess Serbian compliance.	1
Six-Point Peace Plan for Georgia	The EUMM issued reports about compliance.	1
Minsk agreements	The OSCE SMM issued reports about compliance.	1

Source: Authors' research and analysis

Note: WEU, Western European Union ; INF Treaty, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; CFE Treaty, Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty; ACC, Allied Control Council and Commission; ACA, Agency for the Control of Armaments; EUMM, European Union's Monitoring Mission in Georgia; OSCE, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; SMM, Special Monitoring Mission.

Table B 7: Enforcement authority

Agreement	Explanation	Score
Post−World War I peace treaties	The Allied commissions could demand compliance, and use various tools to compel compliance such as seizure of equipment, insistence on certain laws.	1
Svalbard (Spitsbergen) Treaty	Not applicable.	0
Finnish-Russian Dorpat/Tartu Agreement	The commission had no enforcement role.	0
Åland Island Convention	The League of Nations never had to enforce the agreement.	0
Washington Naval Treaty	Not applicable.	0
Lausanne Agreements of 1923	The Straits Commission had no enforcement powers.	0
London Naval Treaties	Not applicable.	0
Anglo-German Naval Treaty	Not applicable.	0
Montreux Convention of the Straits	Not applicable.	0
Moscow Treaty (Finland and Russia) of 1940	Not applicable.	0
Post−World War II agreements	The Allied Control Commissions and Councils had complete authority and could call on the occupying militaries to enforce their decisions.	1
WEU agreements	The ACA had no enforcement authority, which was the responsibility of states parties.	0
INF Treaty	The Special Verification Commission (SVC) had no enforcement authority, which was the responsibility of states parties.	0
CFE Treaty	The JCG had no enforcement authority, which was the responsibility of states parties.	0
Subregional Arms Control (Balkans)	Neither the OSCE nor the SRCC had enforcement authority, which was the responsibility of states parties.	0
Belfast Agreement	The commissions had no enforcement responsibility.	0
Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia	KFOR had full authority to enforce the agreement.	1
Six-Point Peace Plan for Georgia	The EUMM had no enforcement authority.	0
Minsk agreements	The OSCE SMM had no enforcement authority.	0

Source: Authors' research and analysis

Note: WEU, Western European Union; INF Treaty, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; CFE Treaty, Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty; ACA, Agency for the Control of Armaments; SVC, Special Verification Commission; JCG, Joint Consultative Group; OSCE, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; SRCC, Subregional Consultative Commission; EUMM, European Union's Monitoring Mission in Georgia; SMM, Special Monitoring Mission.

Table B 8: Agent resources

While the eight other variables are scored as 0.0, 0.5, or 1.0, agent resources has a fourth scoring scale of 0.25 because several agreements such as the CFE Treaty create a permanent, standing body composed of national officials acting in a national capacity. These treaty executors have limited powers and resources of their own, but they are more substantive than ad-hoc bilateral approaches. The Belfast Agreement is assessed as having 0.25 because the two commissions' staffs of under a dozen each were much smaller than most other distinct, agreement executors.

Agreement	Explanation	Score
Post−World War I peace treaties	The Allied commissions had extensive staff and operating budget in each country with commissions. The number of staff varied based on the size and scope of the mission, but were at least several hundred in some countries.	1
Svalbard (Spitsbergen) Treaty	Not applicable.	0
Finnish-Russian Dorpat/Tartu Agreement	The joint commission was small.	0.25
Åland Island Convention	Not applicable.	0
Washington Naval Treaty	Not applicable.	0
Lausanne Agreements of 1923	The Straits Commission was small.	0.25
London Naval Treaties	Not applicable.	0
Anglo-German Naval Treaty	Not applicable.	0
Montreux Convention of the Straits	Not applicable.	0
Moscow Treaty (Finland and Russia) of 1940	Not applicable.	0
Post−World War II agreements	The Allied Control Commissions and Councils had a headquarters staff, and had the occupying military forces at their disposal.	1
WEU agreements	ACA staff of approximately 50.	0.5
INF Treaty	The SVC was composed of national representatives who attended meetings.	0.25
CFE Treaty	The JCG was composed of national representatives who attended meetings.	0.25
Subregional Arms Control (Balkans)	The number of OSCE staff assigned to support the agreement was between 20 and 50, based on available information, full-time equivalent staff. Many staff, including national officials participating in OSCE inspection missions, were temporary or part time for that task. The SRCC was composed of national officials who attended meetings.	0.5
Belfast Agreement	The commissions were composed of approximately 10−15 full-time staff.	0.25
Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia	KFOR was a large, substantial military force, composed of task-specific personnel and units, and national units assigned under KFOR command, plus additional NATO and national military support outside of Kosovo.	1
Six-Point Peace Plan for Georgia	The EUMM had a substantial field presence of hundreds of personnel, plus any EU support outside of Georgia.	1
Minsk agreements	The OSCE SMM had over 1,000 staff in Ukraine, plus OSCE support outside of Ukraine.	1

Source: Authors' research and analysis

Note: WEU, Western European Union; INF Treaty, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; CFE Treaty, Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty; ACA, Agency for the Control of Armaments; SVC, Special Verification Commission; JCG, Joint Consultative Group; OSCE, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; SRCC, Subregional Consultative Commission; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; EUMM, European Union's Monitoring Mission in Georgia; EU, European Union; SMM, Special Monitoring Mission.

Table B 9: Monitoring

Agreement	Explanation	Score
Post−World War I peace treaties	The Allied commissions monitored for compliance through various means.	1
Svalbard (Spitsbergen) Treaty	Not applicable.	0
Finnish-Russian Dorpat/Tartu Agreement	The Joint Commission did not monitor for compliance, this was the responsibility of states parties.	0
Åland Island Convention	Not applicable.	0
Washington Naval Treaty	Not applicable.	0
Lausanne Agreements of 1923	The Straits Commission monitored for compliance.	1
London Naval Treaties	Not applicable.	0
Anglo-German Naval Treaty	Not applicable.	0
Montreux Convention of the Straits	Not applicable.	0
Moscow Treaty (Finland and Russia) of 1940	Not applicable.	0
Post−World War II agreements	The Allied Control Councils and Commissions monitored for compliance.	1
WEU agreements	One of the ACA's primary functions was to monitor for compliance, primarily from state reporting.	1
INF Treaty	The SVC had no monitoring responsibility, which was conducted by states parties.	0
CFE Treaty	The JCG has no monitoring responsibility, which is conducted by states parties.	0
Subregional Arms Control (Balkans)	The OSCE could monitor for compliance, but not the SRCC.	1
Belfast Agreement	The commissions monitored for compliance.	1
Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia	KFOR monitored for compliance.	1
Six-Point Peace Plan for Georgia	The EUMM monitored for compliance.	1
Minsk agreements	The OSCE SMM monitored for compliance.	1

Source: Authors' research and analysis

Note: WEU, Western European Union ; INF Treaty, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; CFE Treaty, Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty; SVC, Special Verification Commission; JCG, Joint Consultative Group; OSCE, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; SRCC, Subregional Consultative Commission; EUMM, European Union's Monitoring Mission in Georgia; SMM, Special Monitoring Mission.

Table B 10: Inspection (by the agreement executor)

Agreement	Explanation	Score
Post−World War I peace treaties	The Allied military commissions conducted on-site inspections.	1
Svalbard (Spitsbergen) Treaty	There were no inspections.	0
Finnish-Russian Dorpat/Tartu Agreement	There were no inspections by the commission.	0
Åland Island Convention	There were no inspections.	0
Washington Naval Treaty	Not applicable.	0
Lausanne Agreements of 1923	The Straits Commission did not conduct inspections.	0
London Naval Treaties	Not applicable.	0
Anglo-German Naval Treaty	Not applicable.	0
Montreux Convention of the Straits	Not applicable.	0
Moscow Treaty (Finland and Russia) of 1940	Not applicable.	0
Post−World War II agreements	The Allied Control Councils and Commissions could inspect freely any part of the occupied states.	1
WEU agreements	ACA staff conducted inspections.	1
INF Treaty	Inspections were conducted by states parties.	0
CFE Treaty	Inspections were conducted by states parties.	0
Subregional Arms Control (Balkans)	The OSCE participated in inspections, with states parties.	1
Belfast Agreement	The commissions conducted inspections.	1
Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia	KFOR had the authority to conduct inspections if it felt it needed to.	1
Six-Point Peace Plan for Georgia	The EUMM could conduct inspections – but mostly in the areas controlled by the Georgian government.	1
Minsk agreements	The OSCE SMM had extensive inspection authority and conducted such activities throughout Ukraine.	1

Source: Authors' research and analysis

Note: WEU, Western European Union; INF Treaty, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; CFE Treaty, Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty; ACA, Agency for the Control of Armaments; OSCE, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; EUMM, European Union's Monitoring Mission in Georgia; SMM, Special Monitoring Mission.

Table B 11: Third-party state involvement

Agreement	Explanation	Score
Post−World War I peace treaties	All states parties were belligerents.	0
Svalbard (Spitsbergen) Treaty	A large number of signatories had no direct interest in Spitsbergen's control.	1
Finnish-Russian Dorpat/Tartu Agreement	All states parties were belligerents.	0
Åland Island Convention	States parties the United Kingdom, France, and Italy did not have a direct interest in the Åland Islands.	1
Washington Naval Treaty	All states parties were subject to limitations.	0
Lausanne Agreements of 1923	Japan, and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom and France, did not have a clear interest in restricting access to the Black Sea – especially as the access would apply more to them than Black Sea states.	1
London Naval Treaties	All states parties were subject to limitations.	0
Anglo-German Naval Treaty	Both states parties were subject to limitations.	0
Montreux Convention of the Straits	Japan, Australia, and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom and France, did not have a clear interest in restricting access to the Black Sea – especially as the access would apply more to them than Black Sea states.	1
Moscow Treaty (Finland and Russia) of 1940	All states parties were belligerents.	0
Post−World War II agreements	All states parties were belligerents.	0
WEU agreements	All states parties were belligerents.	0
INF Treaty	Both states parties were subject to limitations.	0
CFE Treaty	All states parties were subject to limitations.	0
Subregional Arms Control (Balkans)	Third-party states supported the agreement through the OSCE, and provided national staff to participate in activities such as inspections.	1
Belfast Agreement	The United States was a major promoter of the peace process and agreement facilitator.	1
Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia	Non-NATO states participated in KFOR.	1
Six-Point Peace Plan for Georgia	EU states supported the EUMM (Georgia and Russia were the belligerents).	1
Minsk agreements	The OSCE members, including those that are not members of the EU or NATO, supported the creation of the OSCE SMM and provided national staff.	1

Source: Authors' research and analysis

Note: WEU, Western European Union; INF Treaty, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; CFE Treaty, Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty; OSCE, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; EUMM, European Union's Monitoring Mission in Georgia; EU, European Union; SMM, Special Monitoring Mission.

Table B 12: Expected versus observed cases

Table B12 shows the number of expected and observed cases for the various combinations of delegation and treaty success. The combinations are for high, medium, and low delegation and high, medium, and low (no) success. The expected number is based on the theory that there is a positive correlation between the level of delegation and level of success.

Category	**Observed no.**	**Expected no.**
High-Suc	6	8
High-PartSuc	2	0
High-NoSuc	1	0
Med-Suc	1	0
Med-PartSuc	0	1
Med-NoSuc	0	0
Low-Suc	2	0
Low-PartSuc	4	0
Low-NoSuc	3	10
	19	19

Source: Author's calculations

Appendix B: Case Studies

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty

The CFE Treaty was signed in 1990 and entered into force in 1992, with the intent to reduce the likelihood of either the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launching a successful surprise attack through reductions of and limits to five "offensive" military systems: tanks, armored vehicles, tactical combat aircraft, artillery, and attack helicopters. The treaty set equal equipment ceilings for both "groups of state parties," which meant that the WTO had to reduce more weapon systems. A vigorous system of on-site inspections, reporting and information exchange, equipment destruction, open storage, overflights, and other measures were taken to support monitoring and verification. The CFE Treaty created the Joint Consultative Group (JCG), which was composed of national officials who meet regularly to discuss treaty-related issues.[847] The JCG is an agreement executor that has no staff, secretariat, or agency. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) serves as an administrative facilitator, including for information exchange.

Mandate Modification (No): The JCG can discuss technical issues, but substantive issues remain the prerogative of individual national governments.

Governance Independence (No): The JCG does not make any substantive decisions as an independent entity. Rather, decisions are reached by consensus from states parties.

Staff Independence (No): JCG participants attend the meetings in their capacity as national representatives.

Assessment Independence (No): The JCG does not publish any assessment documents or make any statements concerning compliance or violations. These come exclusively from states parties.[848]

Enforcement Authority (No): The JCG does not possess any enforcement authority.

Agent Resources (Low): The JCG has few resources other than those required to hold meetings and perform basic coordination and information exchange functions.

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[847] "Joint Consultative Group," OSCE, accessed June 6, 2023, https://www.osce.org/jcg.. The JCG was established in Article XVI of the CFE Treaty.

[848] For example, "Condition (5)(C) Report: Compliance With The Treaty On Conventional Armed Forces In Europe" (US Department of State, January 2020), https://www.state.gov/compliance-with-the-treaty-on-conventional-armed-forces-in-europe-condition-5-c-report-2020/..

Monitoring (No): The JCG itself does not conduct any monitoring activities. This is the responsibility of states parties, though compliance issues could be raised in the JCG.

Inspection (No): The JCG is merely a meeting forum for states parties; thus, it does not conduct any inspection activities.

Third-Party State Involvement (No): At the time of signature, all states parties were either a NATO or WTO member. There were no neutral or third-party signatories nor participants in CFE inspection activities.

Agreement Type (Balanced): The CFE was a balancing agreement, setting equal Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) for each group of states parties.

Intergovernmental Organization (IGO) (No): The JCG has no agency or autonomy.

Arms Limitation or Geographic Demilitarization (Arms Limitation): The agreement is an arms limitation treaty with limits varying by zones and states, but does not establish any demilitarized areas.

Major Military Adversarial Agreement? (Yes): The agreement was intended to address destabilizing military postures between the WTO and NATO by decreasing the threat of either side being capable of launching a successful surprise attack. This treaty was an attempt to resolve the security dilemma between the two blocs, which were referred to in the treaty as "group of state parties."

Success (Somewhat Successful): In some ways, the CFE Treaty was almost irrelevant when it entered into force, with the WTO dissolving and then many former WTO members joining NATO. However, the treaty is credited with facilitating a soft landing of the Soviet Union's dissolution due to the treaty's robust transparency measures, as well as the significant reduction in military forces.[849] Moreover, to the extent to which Russia is the inheritor of the Soviet Union's security interests, neither NATO nor Russia have launched a surprise attack against the other. Russia's attack against Ukraine in February 2022 would be the main reason why the CFE Treaty could be assessed as not being fully successful because Russia's attack was due, in part, to concerns about the military balance that the CFE Treaty had attempted to address.[850]

[849] See, for example, Richard A. Falkenrath, "The CFE Flank Dispute: Waiting in the Wings," *International Security* 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995): 118–44, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539122; John E. Peters, *CFE and Military Stability in Europe* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997)..

[850] Nelson and Twardowski, "How the Demise of an Arms Control Treaty Foreshadowed Russia's Aggression against Ukraine.".

The Minsk Agreements

The Minsk agreements of 2014−2015 were intended to reduce violence and conflict within eastern Ukraine between Ukrainian state forces and separatist groups. The agreements included demilitarized zones, withdrawal of foreign of armed forces, weapon restrictions near the line of contact, and prohibitions on placing landmines. The agreement was signed by Ukraine, Russia, separatist leaders, and the OSCE and had been facilitated by the "Normandy Format," which was a high-level diplomatic forum to resolve the conflict in eastern Ukraine composed of France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine.[851]

The agreement's implementation was managed by the OSCE's Special Monitoring Mission (SMM), whose mandate included observing and reporting on the conflict and treaty implementation and engaging in dialogue with the belligerents to promote local cease-fires [852]. The SMM had extensive field presence throughout Ukraine including in the contested eastern areas, with over 1,300 contract and seconded staff who were nationals of the 57 OSCE states parties [853]. The SMM was able to purchase at least several dozen unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) of short, medium, and long-range to support their operations.[854]

The SMM's activities were wide-ranging and their mandate was broad and flexible. The staff faced considerable risks, with one perishing and several kidnapped in separate incidents. The SMM had a substantial role in responding to and supporting investigations into the shoot-down of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 (MH17).[855]

Mandate Modification (Somewhat): The SMM was granted a flexible and vague mandate, as demonstrated by its need to deal with kidnapped personnel and response to the downing of MH17. SMM drones, for example, were not a customary capability and nothing within the original mandate authorized advanced equipment purchases, but their acquisition and deployment was another demonstration of how the SMM was able to broadly interpret its mandate to accomplish its missions. At the same time, the SMM operated largely within its mandate, partly because of its broad scope, and did not (in the area of conventional arms control [CAC]), for example, engage in enforcement or significantly broaden the geographic scope. Moreover, major decisions were subject to OSCE approval, which in turn may (depending on

[851] Cameron, "After U.S. & NATO Reject Russia's Proposals, Outlook for Ukraine Is Grim. But Normandy Format Talks Still Offer a Pathway to Peaceful Resolution of the Crisis.".
[852] Permanent Council, "Decision No. 1117: Deployment Of An OSCE Special Monitoring Mission To Ukraine" (OSCE, March 21, 2014)..
[853] "OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) Daily Report 244/2021 Issued on 18 October 2021," OSCE, October 19, 2021, https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/501352.b.
[854] Tanner, "The OSCE and Peacekeeping.".
[855] OSCE, *A Peaceful Presence - The First Five Years of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine*.a.

their importance or impact) have been subject to the OSCE's Permanent Council which is composed of states party representatives.

Governance Independence (Somewhat): The SMM's operational fieldwork with over 1,000 personnel spread throughout Ukraine in sometimes challenging circumstances made close control and management by states parties impractical. The head of the SMM was not a state representative, but worked for the OSCE and reported to the OSCE's senior management. Nonetheless, as an OSCE organ the SMM was ultimately subject to state party authority, which was demonstrated when in March 2022 Russia refused to extend the SMM's mandate, which resulted in the mission's cessation.

Staff Independence (Somewhat): During its operations, the SMM had 814 international and 477 national staff – thus, seconded staff made up one-third of the mission staff. Information is not available concerning the extent to which the seconded staff were beholden to national interests or orders but, as previously discussed, seconded staff are typically formally or informally under orders or guidance from their home governments.

Assessment Independence (Yes): The SMM was able to issue regular reports with assessments and observations, with over 2,500 reports issued.

Enforcement Authority (No): The SMM was unarmed and had no enforcement authority.

Agent Resources (High): The SMM had substantial manpower, equipment, and administrative resources with an average budget of over 70 million euros per year.

Monitoring (Yes): The SMM's primary mission was to monitor the situation in Ukraine and report on compliance and violations of the Minsk agreements.

Inspection (Yes): The SMM had over 1,000 staff in Ukraine, including in the contested areas, to conduct inspection activities. However, these were not as invasive or intrusive as inspection activities connected to other CAC agreements. SMM staff could not compel cooperation as evidenced by continuous denial of entry into certain areas under their jurisdiction.

Third-Party State Involvement (Yes): The OSCE and SMM were fully supported by the OSCE states parties, and the Minsk agreements were facilitated by the Normandy Format.

Agreement Type (Cease-fire): The Minsk agreements were primarily intended to create conditions for a cease-fire to be followed by a more permanent solution.

IGO (Yes): The OSCE was closely involved in the Minsk agreements, and the SMM was, as part of the OSCE, an IGO.

Arms Limitation or Geographic Demilitarization (Geographic Demilitarization): The agreement's CAC elements were focused on reducing certain types of weapon systems along the line of contact and respect for a cease-fire.

Major Military Adversarial Agreement (Yes): While the origins of the conflict in eastern Ukraine are complex, they were closely tied to Moscow's perceptions of Kiev's gravitation toward NATO and the European Union.[856] Although narrow in that they did not address the broader military balance between NATO and Russia, the Minsk agreements were an attempt for all parties, through the Normandy Format, OSCE, and TCG to address the adversarial situation.

Success (No): Almost no CAC aspect of the agreement was successful, with compliance minimal at best with at least 1.4 million violations, including from prohibited artillery systems, from 2015 to 2019.[857] The Russian invasion in February 2022 ended the agreements definitively.

[856] Oliker et al., *Russian Foreign Policy in Historical and Current Context: A Reassessment*..
[857] OSCE, *A Peaceful Presence - The First Five Years of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine*.a.

Appendix C: Chapter 6 – QCA

Outcome:Success Data Analysis

Complex and Parsimonious Solution for Success

Complex Solution					
			Coverage		
Outcome	Solution	Consistency	Raw	Unique	Cases
Suc	Del*~Demil*~GrtPwr	1	0.3	0.1	WEU, Balkans, Belfast
	~Del*~NatLim*GrtPwr	1	0.4	0.3	Spitsbergen, Åland, Lausanne, Montreux
	Del*~NatLim*~Demil	1	0.3	0	WEU, Belfast, Georgia
	~NatLim*~Demil*GrtPwr	1	0.2	0	Montreux, Georgia
solution coverage: 0.8					
solution consistency: 1					
Parsimonious Solution					
			Coverage		
Outcome	Solution	Consistency	Raw	Unique	Cases
Suc	~NatLim*GrtPwr	0.857143	0.6	0.4	Spitsbergen, Åland, Lausanne, Montreux, Kosovo, Georgia, Minsk
	Del	0.75	0.6	0.1	WW1, WW2, WEU, Balkans, Belfast, Kosovo, Georgia, Minsk
	~Demil*~GrtPwr	1	0.3	0	WEU, Balkans, Belfast
solution coverage: 1					
solution consistency: 0.833333					

Necessary Conditions for Success

Condition	Consistency	Coverage
Del	0.6	0.75
~Del	0.4	0.363636
NatLim	0.2	0.222222
~NatLim	0.8	0.8
Demil	0.5	0.5
~Demil	0.5	0.555556
GrtPwr	0.7	0.5
~GrtPwr	0.3	0.6

Outcome:~Success Data Analysis

Complex and Parsimonious Solution for ~Success

Complex Solution					
			Coverage		
Outcome	Solution	Consistency	Raw	Unique	Cases
~Suc	~Del*Demil*~GrtPwr	1	0.222222	0.222222	Tartu, Moscow1940
	~Del*NatLim*GrtPwr	1	0.555556	0.555556	WashNav, LondonNav, Anglo-German, INF, CFE
solution coverage: 0.777778					
solution consistency: 1					
Parsimonious Solution					
			Coverage		
Outcome	Solution	Consistency	Raw	Unique	Cases
~Suc	~Del*~GrtPwr	1	0.222222	0	Tartu, Moscow1940
	~Del*NatLim	1	0.666667	0	WashNav, LondonNav, Anglo-German, Moscow1940, INF, CFE
	Demil*~GrtPwr	1	0.222222	0	Tartu, Moscow1940
	NatLim*GrtPwr	0.857143	0.666667	0.111111	WW1, WashNav, LondonNav, Anglo-German, WW2, INF, CFE
solution coverage: 0.888889					
solution consistency: 0.888889					

Necessary Conditions for ~Success

Condition	Consistency	Coverage
Del	0.222222	0.25
~Del	0.777778	0.636364
NatLim	0.777778	0.777778
~NatLim	0.222222	0.2
Demil	0.555556	0.5
~Demil	0.444444	0.444444
GrtPwr	0.777778	0.5
~GrtPwr	0.222222	0.4

Table C 1: Success scoring

The following describes the scoring and calibration for each condition for each case, and outcome.

Agreement	**Explanation**	**Score**
Post World War One Peace Treaties	The defeated and victorious states went to war again about 20 years later.	0
The Svalbard (Spitsbergen) Treaty	There has not been any conflict between state parties over the Spitsbergen archipelago, and no substantial violations.	1
Finnish-Russian Dorpat/Tartu Agreement	Finland and Russia ended up going to war, for a number of reasons, in part due to perceived threats from areas under the agreement.	0
Åland Island convention	There has not been any conflict between state parties over the Åland Islands, and no substantial violations.	1
Washington Naval Treaty	Italy went to war against France and the UK, and though it is outside of the article's scope, Japan went to war with the US and UK over naval control of the Pacific.	0
Lausanne Agreements of 1923	These agreements concerning Turkish and Greek demilitarization and control and access to the Bosporous Straits were respected, and no conflict occurred concerning Turkey's control of the Straits.	1
London Naval Treaties	The treaties failed to reduce tensions between state parties, and war broke out between them within a decade.	0
Anglo-German Naval Treaty	While the agreement was respected during its brief lifetime in part due to the inability of Germany to produce beyond the treaty's limits, the overall rivalry continued and war broke out between the countries within a few years.	0
Montreux Convention of the Straits	This agreement is still in force, even with conflict having occurred several times in the Black Sea region since its passage. Turkey has meticulously observed and implemented the treaty, and no state has attempted to militarily contest Turkey's control over the Straits.	1
The Moscow Treaty (Finland and Russia) of 1940	The treaty which ended the Winter War was quickly violated when Finland joined Germany in attacking the USSR.	0
Post-World War Two agreements	The post-WW2 agreements were successful in that the states that composed the Axis never attacked the Allied states again, and there was no attempt to violate the mostly vague CAC controls imposed on the Axis states without the Allies' permission. However, the onset of the Cold War largely negated all of the post-war CAC agreements, with only the agreement applying to Finland being generally respected, and war never breaking out between it and the USSR after the treaty's entry into force.	1
WEU agreements	The WEU agreements that set controls on its member states, particularly Germany, succeeded. Germany never exceeded the NATO-authorized military quantities, and (Western) Germany did not go to war with any of the western WW2 Allies.	1
INF Treaty	While the agreement was respected for over 20 years, and the US and USSR/Russia have not gone to war, Russia violated the agreement due to perceived military imbalances caused by the agreement, and the violations resulted in the US withdrawal. Russia's invasion of Ukraine is also an indicator of the agreement's failure.	0

Agreement	Explanation	Score
CFE Treaty	The CFE Treaty is difficult to assess at several levels. Its original purpose of preventing the Warsaw Pact or NATO from launching a surprise attack became irrelevant between the dates of signature and entry into force with the Warsaw Pact's dissolution. The treaty somewhat adapted to provide general regional stability and transparency. While state parties engaged in conflict with one another, the overall, evolved objective of preventing a large-scale surprise attack and conventional war between NATO and Russia (as the Warsaw Pact's successor) was largely accomplished, not just until 2007 when Russia withdrew, but to this day. The treaty is still in effect without Russia, and includes Russian ally Belarus who presumably can provide some assurances to Russia. While the larger goal of preventing a NATO or Russia surprise attack against the other is still met, Russia's invasion of Ukraine suggests that the two blocs are in a state of near conflict contrary to the CFE Treaty's spirit and goals.	0
Subregional Arms Control (Balkans)	State parties of the Balkans CFE Treaty, as it is sometimes referred to, have not gone to war with one another since the agreement's signature and entry into force. The 1999 Kosovo conflict did not involve combat between the state parties.	1
Belfast Agreement	The Belfast Agreement has seen the UK withdraw a large part of their military forces, and paramilitary violence is much lower in Northern Ireland compared to the period of the Troubles.	1
Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force ("KFOR") and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia	Since the agreement's signature, there has not been armed conflict between NATO and Kosovo on one side, and Serbia.	1
Six-Point Peace Plan for Georgia	While the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia remain in dispute, fighting between Georgia and Russia has not occurred since the peace plan's implementation. Russia violated several aspects of the treaty concerning the presence and size of its armed forces in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but this has not resulted in conflict and is of questionable millitary significance in the long-term given the imbalance of military capabilities overall.	1
Minsk Agreements	The Minsk Agreements were never substantively respected, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine is another manifestation of the agreement's abject failure.	0

Source: Authors' research and analysis

Table C 2: Delegation calibration

Agreement	Raw Score	csQCA calibrated score	Brief explanation
WW1	6	1	WW1 established international commissions of control, composed of the victorious powers, to oversee implementation of the military aspects of the peace treaties.
Spitsbergen	1	0	Spitsbergen did not have any agreement executor.
Tartu	0	0	There was a small commission created to oversee the agreement, but it was composed of state representatives and had no substantative authority
Åland	1	0	The agreement identified the League of Nations to review and adjudicate any challenges or disagreements, but none ever arose.
WashNav	0	0	There was no treaty executor created
Lausanne	3	0	The Straits Commission created to oversee the Lausanne Agreements were composed of state parties and had limited authority and responsibilities.
LondonNav	0	0	There was no treaty executor created
Anglo-German	0	0	There was no treaty executor created
Montreux	1	0	The League of Nations, and now potentially the UN Security Council, might adjudicate disputes but implementation of the treaty is Turkey's responsibility.
Moscow1940	0	0	There was no treaty executor created
WW2	7.5	1	The Allied Control Councils and Commissions (ACCs) had sweeping authority over the defeated and occupied states.
WEU	5.00	1	The WEU Armaments Control Agency (ACA) was created by WEU members to oversee and inspect military limits of its members, particularly Germany.
INF	0	0	The treaty executor was small and entirely composed of state party representatives, with limited authority.
CFE	0	0	The treaty executor was small and entirely composed of state party representatives, with limited authority.
Balkans	5	1	The OSCE was extensively involved in implementation and the agreement created the Subregional Consultative Commission (SRCC), which was composed of state party representatives.
Belfast	6	1	The agreement created the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) and the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC). Both were fully independent, without any state party representation.
Kosovo	7	1	The agreement gives NATO/KFOR authorization to use military force to deal with non-compliance and violations. Implementation was a combination of KFOR, NATO, and the Joint Implementation Commission (JIC) with Serbia.
Georgia	6.5	1	The EU created and deployed the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) to oversee the peace plan. The EUMM was independent of any single EU member, and it was a delegation on the part of Georgia. The EUMM is not operating in the separatist areas.
Minsk	6.5	1	The OSCE created the Special Monitoring Mission (mandated by OSCE members) to oversee the Minsk Agreements. This included field offices throughout Ukraine, with over 1000 SMM officials.

Source: Authors' research and analysis

Table C 3: National limitations calibration

Short Name	csQCA calibrated score	Brief explanation
WW1	1	Extensive limits on national inventories of the defeated states.
Spitsbergen	0	No national limitations
Tartu	0	No national limitations
Åland	0	No national limitations
WashNav	1	Limits on naval forces by class, expressed as the number of ships in each class
Lausanne	0	No national limitations
LondonNav	1	Limits on naval forces by class, expressed as the number of ships in each class
Anglo-German	1	Limits on naval forces by class, expressed as the number of ships in each class
Montreux	0	No national limitations
Moscow1940	1	No national limitations
WW2	1	Several states had limits placed on the number of troops, types of weapons, and quantity of certain weapon systems
WEU	0	There was not a specific limit placed on any state, but states were not to exceed the planned NATO force sizes. This flexible and somewhat ambiguous limitation results in a coding of absence of national limits.
INF	1	The state parties were prohibited from possessing anywhere conventional missiles of a certain range.
CFE	1	State parties agreed to a large number of conventional arms restrictions based primarily on national counts.
Balkans	1	State parties agreed to conventional arms limitations.
Belfast	0	While the UK agreed to reduce its millitary forces in Northern Ireland, no agreement specified exactly what the reduction and end state should be.
Kosovo	0	No national limitations
Georgia	0	No national limitations
Minsk	0	No national limitations

Source: Authors' research and analysis

Table C 4: Geographic demilitarization calibration

Short Name	csQCA calibrated score	Brief explanation
WW1	1	Extensive limitations on fortifications and other military capabilities in certain locations
Spitsbergen	1	Spitsbergen was not to be militarized
Tartu	1	Extensive limitations on fortifications and other military capabilities in certain locations
Åland	1	Åland Islands were not to be militarized
WashNav	1	Various restrictions on fortifications and bases in certain locations
Lausanne	1	Various restrictions on fortifications and other military capabilities in certain locations
LondonNav	0	No geographic limitations
Anglo-German	0	No geographic limitations
Montreux	0	No geographic limitations on land (fortifications, etc.). There are limitations on which states can use the straits with what kind of ships, and other limits on ships. However, this does not fall into the usual category of demilitarization, of limiting forces in a geographic area to stabilize forces and security. The restrictions are on the passage through the Straits, rather than in the Black Sea itself. Thus, a state could theoretically build or assemble a ship of any size and quantity in the Black Sea.
Moscow1940	1	Extensive limitations on fortifications and other military capabilities in certain locations
WW2	1	Limitations on fortifications and other military capabilities in certain locations for Italy and Bulgaria
WEU	0	No geographic limitations
INF	0	No geographic limitations
CFE	0	No geographic limitations
Balkans	0	No geographic limitations
Belfast	0	No geographic limitations
Kosovo	1	Areas along the border were prohibited to Serbian/Yugoslav military forces
Georgia	0	There were no specific, quantitative prohibitions or limitations along the border or contested areas. The agreement called for withdrawal to pre-conflict positions, but this was vague.
Minsk	1	Extensive limitations on various weapon systems along the line of contact

Source: Authors' research and analysis

Table C 5: Great power rivalry calibration

Determining in the first place whether or not a great power rivalry exists requires a historical assessment of the relations and perceptions at the time of the agreement's signing (see appendix for the determination of great power status). Mazarr et al. note that identifying a rivalry can be difficult in part because even rival relationships can be a mix of positive and negative relations, but are often defined by "a serious clash of goals and objectives… with an ingrained sense of dislike or hatred and with some degree of zero-sum clashes of intention," and a "history of conflict."[858] Moreover, especially during the interwar period, some rivalries evolved slowly from cooperative and friendly relationships, and from which point or year the relationship was more one than the other is not always clear. This complicates coding in csQCA, which requires that the great power rivalry condition be set at yes or no (1, 0). For the interwar cases, a determination was made by assessing the geopolitics at the time of signature between great power signatories of the given treaty, complemented by awareness of future relations.

In many cases, the determination is straightforward: practically by definition, any agreement between the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War or NATO and the Warsaw Pact were great power rival agreements. However, in some instances the impact of the rivalry on an agreement, or the extent to which a great power rivalry is partly or mostly the cause of an agreement, is uncertain. For example, while the Spitsbergen agreement was not initially signed by great power rivals in Europe as in 1920 relations between the World War One allies of the US, France, Italy, and the UK were warm, many other states including great powers acceded to the agreement prior to World War Two, including Germany and the Soviet Union. The island was strategically significant enough that the Germans and Allies clashed over it during World War Two.

Some scholars and analysts view the fighting in Georgia in 1998 ended by the Six Point Peace Agreement as being rooted in Georgia's goals to join the EU and NATO.[859]

[858] Mazarr et al., *Stabilizing Great-Power Rivalries*, 2021.
[859] Phillips, "Implementation Review: Six-Point Ceasefire Agreement Between Russia and Georgia."

Short Name	csQCA calibrated score	Brief explanation
WW1	1	Peace agreement following a great power war
Spitsbergen	1	Original signatories were not rivals (possibly Italy) - but in any case, with the additional signatures major great power rivals joined
Tartu	0	The agreement was between Russia (great power) and Finland (not a great power)
Åland	1	1921 Germany; clearly the French viewed Germany as a rival (Wright; various interwar articles).
WashNav	1	The agreement involved European rivals, particularly Italy, UK, US, and France
Lausanne	1	The main great power rivalry was UK vs. Russia. In 1923, Manne suggests deep disagreement with the UK - anti-Soviet attitudes in the UK.
LondonNav	1	The agreement was between growing great power rivals, particularly with Italy vs. UK and France.
Anglo-German	1	Clear UK vs. Germany rivalry
Montreux	1	In 1936 Russia was clearly a great power rival with the UK and France among other states. (Manne, Watson articles); in general, it is clear that Russia was a competitor, attempting to balance competing interests which were ultimately manifested in the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.
Moscow1940	0	The agreement was between Russia (great power) and Finland (not a great power)
WW2	1	Peace agreement following a great power war
WEU	0	Germany at this time was an ally of the other WEU members
INF	1	US and Soviet Cold War rivalry
CFE	1	NATO and Warsaw Pact Cold War rivalry
Balkans	0	No great powers are state parties
Belfast	0	The agreement is primarily between the UK and Republic of Ireland, with the latter not a great power rival.
Kosovo	1	The conflict is viewed as the start of the post-Cold War US-Russia rivalry. The agreement itself was facilitated by a UNSC resolution (which includes the US and great powers in Europe).
Georgia	1	The conflict was motivated in part by Georgia's gravitation towards NATO and the EU, contrary to Russia's preferences.
Minsk	1	The conflict was motivated in part by Ukraine's gravitation towards NATO and the EU, contrary to Russia's preferences.

Source: Authors' research and analysis

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