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Adversarial conventional arms control in Europe: the quest for peace

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Chapter 3: Literature Review

This thesis has already introduced some of the literature covering CAC, particularly theoretical bases, the definition of adversarial CAC in Europe, other scholars' methodological approaches to CAC agreements, the importance and relevance of CAC to international security and peace, and CAC relevance to the Russo-Ukraine War and post-war geopolitics.

This chapter delves into greater detail of the available literature, acknowledging that while this thesis attempts to offer some new and unique insights about CAC in Europe, it does so based on the research and scholarship of many others. This chapter breaks the literature into four main categories. Additionally, chapters 4-7 contain a discussion of the literature relevant to each of the chapter's main themes.

General CAC Issues

Much CAC literature has already been covered in this thesis' previous sections, so the following section provides complementary information. The literature's central themes and conclusions discussed in this section do not focus on a single agreement or rivalry – although both are used as examples – but can be applied more broadly to any adversarial CAC agreement or potential agreement. The insights that this section's literature also applies broadly over time; that is, they are not limited to a particular historical period.

Croft offers a definition of arms control and lays out various theories related to arms control,²⁴⁹ while Jervis similarly offers theoretical observations and then presents a stag game and prisoner's dilemma as paradigms to understand arms control theory.²⁵⁰ These emphasize challenges with the security dilemma as well as the benefits of cooperation. Maurer proposes that arms control has three main purposes: disarmament, stability, and advantage while finding that states may pursue multiple purposes simultaneously.²⁵¹ States' primary goals will shape the kind of agreement that they seek as well as the agreement's quantitative details. Fearon focuses on the notion that a potential motivation and benefit of arms control is reducing the financial and resource cost of interstate competition inherent in an anarchic system.²⁵² His study develops

²⁴⁹ Croft, "In Defence of Arms Control."

²⁵⁰ Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma."

²⁵¹ Maurer, "The Purposes of Arms Control."

²⁵² James D. Fearon, "Cooperation, Conflict, and the Costs of Anarchy," *International Organization* 72, no. 3 (2018): 523–59, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818318000115>.

a quantitative model based on the prisoner's dilemma to assess the costs of competition and the security dilemma and applies this to analyzing military force size over time. These articles emphasize an issue that this thesis does not itself address, which is the question of whether or not CAC agreements result in clear and actual financial and resource savings. Whether or not further research would support this hypothesis is beyond this thesis' scope, but these two articles are examples of quantitative attempts to offer a conclusion.

This thesis has attempted to disentangle the literature on nuclear weapons-related arms control and conventional arms control, despite theoretical and practical crossovers. Theoretically, many of the same premises apply, including perceptions of the status quo, deterrence, the security dilemma, and ODB. The differences, however, are too numerous to cover in this chapter. It is worth noting, however, Leah and Lowther's observation that if rivals reduce to low numbers or eliminate nuclear weapons, the importance of CAC is much greater because the stability between nuclear weapons powers that nuclear weapons impose may no longer be present.²⁵³

One of this dissertation's central themes is the question of the military balance and military competitions, which CAC agreements attempt to stabilize either in terms of quantitative, qualitative, or geographic controls on military capabilities. Schofield lays out the case that CAC is connected with the broader issue of the balance of power – which incorporates more variables than conventional forces. He observes that one reason for CAC failure is that it does not accurately account for the overall balance of power, whether at the time of signature or over time. Müller and Albert view arms control negotiations as a forum to communicate perceptions of one another's national and military power, and they define this as associational balancing versus adversarial balancing such as arms races and arms build-ups.²⁵⁴

Woolf, Downs, et al. emphasize the importance of verification and compliance enforcement in how states conceive and consider engaging in a CAC agreement, with the latter stating that if states suspect others will cheat or defect, states are unlikely to enter into an agreement in the first place.²⁵⁵ Coe and Vaynman similarly note that "The main impediment to arms control is the need for monitoring that renders a state's arming transparent enough to

²⁵³ Christine Leah and Adam B. Lowther, "Conventional Arms and Nuclear Peace," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 11, no. 1 (Spring 2017): 14–24.

²⁵⁴ Müller and Albert, "Whose Balance?"

²⁵⁵ George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N Barsoom, "Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?," *International Organization* 50, no. 3 (Summer 1996): 379–406; Amy F. Woolf, *Monitoring and Verification in Arms Control* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service (CRS), 2010).

assure its compliance but not so much as to threaten its security.”²⁵⁶ This underscores the manner in which the three CAC stages can be intertwined.

Schelling developed a framework to evaluate arms control proposals, identifying different combinations of the military balance and then focusing on negotiations and bargaining. He created the concept of *No*, *Iff* (if and only if), *Yes*, and *Yes!* which refer to bargaining positions and weapon possession preferences.²⁵⁷ Though he refers to “weapons”, the notion can apply equally to weapon systems or overall military capabilities. This thesis does not substantively address CAC agreement bargaining, but Schelling’s notion that states assess a variety of approaches to how limits are distributed between rivals is one demonstration of how there is substantial, potential CAC agreement variety.

Pre-Cold War

CAC literature covering the interwar period following the First World War until the onset of the Cold War, approximately 1918-1946, focuses in large part on a global desire to reduce the likelihood of war through what was then referred to as disarmament (but which is now referred to as arms control) and by complex great power rivalries between more than two states or groups of states. In the aftermath of the First World War, disarmament began with the peace treaties which sought to significantly restrict the defeated states’ military capabilities. Barros and Fox, for example, discuss British and French enforced disarmament policies towards Europe, including the creation and operations of the International Military Commission of Control (IMCC) and other, independent commissions focused on naval and air issues.²⁵⁸ Juhasz discusses the Hungarian experience of the Allied commissions, particularly how the commissions functioned and how Hungary resisted their work.²⁵⁹

Burns and Urquidi wrote a seminal reference work on interwar arms control agreements. This included the post-World War One peace treaties and the IMCC in Germany,

²⁵⁶ Andrew J. Coe and Jane Vaynman, “Why Arms Control Is So Rare,” *American Political Science Review* 114, no. 2 (2020): 342, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305541900073X>.

²⁵⁷ Thomas C. Schelling, “A Framework for the Evaluation of Arms-Control Proposals,” *Daedalus* 104, no. 3 (Summer 1975): 187–200.

²⁵⁸ Andrew Barros, “Disarmament as a Weapon: Anglo-French Relations and the Problems of Enforcing German Disarmament, 1919–28,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 29, no. 2 (2006): 301–21, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390600585159>; John P. Fox, “Britain and the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control, 1925–26,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 4, no. 2 (April 1969): 143–64, <https://doi.org/10.1177/002200946900400208>.

²⁵⁹ Balázs Juhasz, “The Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control and the Military Control of Hungary Between 1921 and 1927,” *Hadtudományi Szemle* 5, no. 1 (January 2012): 47–72.

demilitarization agreements for the Åland and Spitzbergen islands, the interwar naval agreements, and the agreements concerning the Turkish straits.²⁶⁰ This four-volume work covers the agreement conditions, geopolitical background, and the agreements' implementation. This work is especially useful because the literature on some of these agreements is marginal, and as a work that covers a variety of agreements, it provides a concluding analysis of these agreements collectively unlike other works that this dissertation consulted.

The horrors of the Great War convinced many – the general public and governments alike – that Europe should not experience another general, continental war. Genuine efforts were made to reduce global military capabilities through a combination of limiting the size of militaries, capabilities, and numbers of certain military systems such as capital ships, aircraft, and battle tanks, and banning some capabilities such as long-range bombers.²⁶¹ The heart of this effort took place in Geneva, Switzerland, through the League of Nations' disarmament conference. Webster's works focus on the interwar period and he covers the League's efforts in detail, including efforts to establish fixed ratios of forces between states as well as different approaches to arms control.²⁶² The League's disarmament work was led by two offices: the Permanent Advisory Commission on Armaments (PACA) composed of national representatives and the Temporary Mixed Commission (TMC) made up of independent, "eminent figures formed by the League to consider the problem of disarmament in its widest aspects and to suggest potential initiatives, plans and solutions."²⁶³

Contemporary discussions of the League's disarmament efforts offer interesting insights into the issues that states grappled with in largely good faith, especially in the 1920's.

²⁶⁰ Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 1, An Analysis of Selected Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements Between the World Wars, 1919-1939*; Richard Dean Burns and Donald Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 2, Demilitarization of Frontiers, Islands and Straits*, vol. 2 (Los Angeles: California State College at Los Angeles Foundation, 1968); Richard Dean Burns and Donald Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 3, Limitation of Seapower*, vol. 3 (Los Angeles: California State College at Los Angeles Foundation, 1968); Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 4: Conclusions*.

²⁶¹ Arthur Henderson, "Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments: Preliminary Report of the Work of the Conference" (Geneva: League of Nations, November 1935).

²⁶² Webster, "Piecing Together the Interwar Disarmament Puzzle"; Andrew Webster, "Making Disarmament Work: The Implementation of the International Disarmament Provisions In the League of Nations Covenant, 1919-1925," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 16, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 551-69, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592290500208089>; Andrew Webster, "From Versailles to Geneva: The Many Forms of Interwar Disarmament," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 29, no. 2 (2006): 225-46, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390600585050>; Andrew Webster, "'Absolutely Irresponsible Amateurs': The Temporary Mixed Commission on Armaments, 1921-1924," *Australian Journal of Politics & History* 54, no. 3 (2008): 373-88, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8497.2008.00512.x>; Andrew Webster, "The League of Nations, Disarmament and Internationalism," in *Internationalisms*, ed. Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 139-69, <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781107477568.008>.

²⁶³ Webster, "'Absolutely Irresponsible Amateurs,'" 374.

For example, Steiner discusses at length the difficult balance states debated between security and CAC.²⁶⁴ Henderson, the Disarmament Conference president, offers an extensive record of the Disarmament Conference which took place from 1932-1934.²⁶⁵ His report highlights many issues that states discussed and includes specific proposals and comments on proposals by participating states.

The body of scholarly literature on the post-World War Two peace treaties, their CAC agreements, and the bodies created to implement them is generally thin as the Cold War's onset superseded victors' desires to impose and retain arms control measures on the defeated Axis states that, except for Finland and Austria, became either Warsaw Pact or NATO members. Tanner provides a detailed survey of post-World War Two arms control in Europe, covering both limitations and the activities of the Allied Control Commissions.²⁶⁶

The history of interwar and post-World War Two peace agreement CAC offers insights into two, important areas. First, how quantitative military capability limitations were considered, selected, and implemented; and second, despite their poor recognition in the scholarly literature, the creation and design of post-World War One CAC agreement executors.

Cold War Era

Cold War-era CAC literature – whether it is works produced during the period or afterwards about the period – is focused on the NATO-Warsaw Pact rivalry, generally ignoring almost all other CAC agreements in force at that time. Most scholars were concerned with the question of how to reduce the likelihood of a conventional war in central Europe by reducing the military forces facing one another. Two negotiations dominated perspectives and considerations: the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations, which despite fifteen years of talks failed to produce an agreement; and the CFE Treaty which was signed in 1990.

Scholars grappled with deterrence, the security dilemma, and the ODB. Recognizing that neither side would commit to an agreement that increased their vulnerability, scholars attempted to find the quantitative zone in which a successful defense could be conducted but

²⁶⁴ H. Arthur Steiner, "The Geneva Disarmament Conference of 1932," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 168, no. 1 (July 1933): 212–19, <https://doi.org/10.1177/000271623316800128>.

²⁶⁵ Henderson, "Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments: Preliminary Report of the Work of the Conference."

²⁶⁶ Tanner, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, and Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva, Switzerland), *From Versailles to Baghdad*.

neither alliance would pose an offensive threat. With this came the question of which weapons systems would provide for defense but not offer an offensive advantage. Among the complicating issues was the sheer scale of the forces facing one another, with tens of thousands of battle tanks and hundreds of thousands of troops stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean. Soviet doctrine which called for an offense-based defense complicated goals of reducing forces to the lowest levels possible while maintaining defensive capabilities.

Bluth,²⁶⁷ Bowman,²⁶⁸ Brayton,²⁶⁹ and Goldblat²⁷⁰ discuss the MBFR negotiations in varying detail, highlighting issues such as geographic coverage, state parties, perceptions of relative military strength, and the question of whether Warsaw Pact reductions should be the same proportion as NATO's (which would mean that Warsaw Pact forces would remain numerically superior), or if the Warsaw Pact should reduce more forces to obtain equal limits with NATO.

Rohn attempted to identify the force levels in which both sides perceived that neither had an offensive advantage – by assessing military capability at various force levels and advance rates based on notional armored division equivalents (ADEs).²⁷¹ An important aspect of her study is the acknowledgment and calculations based on the belief that each side is likely to assess their adversary as more capable than they may assess themselves; that is, NATO assessed Warsaw as more offensively capable than it might assess itself, and vice versa. Kelley produced a similar study, focusing on tactical air forces and the then-proposed CFE Treaty TLE figures.²⁷²

Snyder discussed the ODB and how to incorporate this in a potential NATO-Warsaw Pact CAC agreement, taking into consideration ADEs, force-to-space ratios, and NATO's superior combat airpower.²⁷³ Biddle focused on force-to-space ratios, concluding that there is no absolute and specific minimum number of forces necessary to defend against an attack, in large part due to the many other factors beyond force size that contribute to battlefield

²⁶⁷ Bluth, "Arms Control as a Part of Strategy."

²⁶⁸ William R. Bowman, *Limiting Conventional Forces in Europe: An Alternative to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Negotiations* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985).

²⁶⁹ Abbott Brayton, "MBFR and Conventional Forces Reductions in Europe," *The World Today* 40, no. 12 (December 1984): 497–507.

²⁷⁰ Goldblat, *Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements*.

²⁷¹ Laurinda L. Rohn, *Conventional Forces in Europe: A New Approach to the Balance, Stability, and Arms Control* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp, 1990).

²⁷² Charles T. Jr. Kelley, *Methodology for Examining Effects of Arm Control Reduction on Tactical Air Forces: An Example from Conventional Forces In Europe (CFE) Treaty Analysis* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1993).

²⁷³ Jack Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options," *International Security* 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988): 48–77, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2538994>.

outcomes.²⁷⁴ Houser addressed specific proposed treaty text and quantitative limits, identifying practical problems, definitional challenges, and implementation challenges.²⁷⁵ He also discusses, unlike some other studies, the zonal approaches.

Hamm attempts to go beyond conceptions of NATO-Warsaw Pact static or weighted force comparisons based on equipment and manpower and focuses on doctrine.²⁷⁶ This concept is later elaborated by Biddle's works which focused on the notion of force employment as being a greater determinant in combat outcome than numerical or technological differences.²⁷⁷ In a similar vein, Davis focuses on readiness as a focal point of CAC rather than force size and composition as a measure of potential or likely capability to conduct or defend against a surprise attack.²⁷⁸

The Cold War ended with a whimper rather than a bang, to the benefit of peace and security and Europe. Many of the issues raised by those who studied Cold War CAC were answered, if not resolved, by the CFE Treaty whose authors, ultimately, had to commit to writing specific figures and details, whether or not they fit perfectly with analysts' assessments. The CFE Treaty entered into force after the Cold War, but as one article noted in 1992 – when the Treaty took effect:

the objectives of conventional arms control are not obsolete. Steps to limit, reduce, and restructure conventional forces and armaments, whether by formal agreement, informal understanding, or reciprocal action, can aid broader efforts for peace in a turbulent world. The reductions mandated in the CFE Treaty would still contribute substantially to stability in Europe; post-CFE reductions in the conventional forces of the industrial nations would build confidence, facilitate peacekeeping and peacemaking, and reduce military spending.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁴ Stephen D. Biddle et al., *Defense at Low Force Levels: The Effect of Force to Space Ratios on Conventional Combat Dynamics* (Alexandria, Virginia: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1991).

²⁷⁵ G.M. Houser, *Conventional Armed Forces in Europe: Technology Scenario Development* (Argonne, Illinois: Argonne National Lab, 1990), <https://doi.org/10.2172/6795659>.

²⁷⁶ Manfred R. Hamm and Hartmut Pohlman, "Military Doctrine—the Missing Link of Conventional Arms Control," *Defense Analysis* 6, no. 2 (1990): 147–65, <https://doi.org/10.1080/07430179008405443>.

²⁷⁷ Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*, 5. pr., 1, paperb. print (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006).

²⁷⁸ Paul K. Davis, *Toward a Conceptual Framework for Operational Arms Control in Europe's Central Region* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp, 1988).

²⁷⁹ Jonathan Dean and Randall Watson Forsberg, "CFE and Beyond: The Future of Conventional Arms Control," *International Security* 17, no. 1 (Summer 1992): 77, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539159>.

Cold War-era CAC discussions offer insights and analyses that are relevant to today's CAC challenges in Europe, and CAC theory in general. Though there are substantial differences between the Cold War and what might now be a new Cold War, many of the fundamental challenges of deterrence, the security dilemma, and ODB still apply, with the goal of preventing a surprise attack by NATO or Russia being as relevant today as it was several decades ago.

Post-Cold War Era

There are a substantial number of CAC reports and works on the post-Cold War era, which spans from approximately 1991 to the present. For much of this time, however, CAC in Europe was not a priority for policy or scholarship. From 2014, the issue began to resurface, with scholars and practitioners grappling with how to reduce NATO-Russia tensions and prevent a major conflict. Yet as Zellner noted in 2019, there was “little scholarly discussion on new initiatives or innovative approaches to CAC in Europe.”²⁸⁰

Mazar et. al assess arms control between NATO and Russia from a broad, historical, and quantitative perspective, first conducting case studies of great power rivalries and then identifying overarching themes and variables.²⁸¹ They assessed that the factors that were common across rivalries that resulted in conflict are present between NATO and Russia (even before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine), but that arms control could nonetheless contribute to stabilizing the rivalry. Charap et al. take a narrower approach, focusing on specific areas of friction and offering specific policy proposals.²⁸² Compared to other policy-oriented reports, this one is more comprehensive in its accounting of deterrence, the security dilemma, and the ODB in formulating policies. Moreover, this report makes various comparisons to Cold War CAC challenges.

CAC study since the early 2000's has primarily been to offer specific CAC proposals or to offer broader CAC strategies and considerations and advise that CAC should be a higher priority. Lunn and Williams, for example, argued that NATO should reprioritize arms control

²⁸⁰ Wolfgang Zellner, “Time for a New Approach to Conventional Arms Control?,” *Modern Diplomacy*, October 5, 2019, <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2019/10/05/time-for-a-new-approach-to-conventional-arms-control/>.

²⁸¹ Michael J. Mazarr et al., *Stabilizing Great-Power Rivalries* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2021), <https://doi.org/10.7249/RR-A456-1>.

²⁸² Charap et al., *A New Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe*.

as part of its defense strategy.²⁸³ Kühn emphasized the risk of escalation and conflict between NATO in the Baltic region and that CAC is one measure to address this.²⁸⁴ Van Ham, in contrast, offers broader approaches to CAC, raising institutional and organizational questions such as NATO's, the EU's, and OSCE's role in improving CAC.²⁸⁵ Engvall et al. assess CAC from the perspectives of certain countries and what their considerations might be.²⁸⁶ Some experts considered the issue of what might be considered offensive TLE in any future agreements such as UAVs.²⁸⁷

Several other studies also offer specific proposals, such as *A Little of the Old, a Little of the New: A Fresh Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe*.²⁸⁸ Prior to 2022, specific CAC proposed measures often focused on the Baltics. Examples include *Dilemmas of Arms Control: Meeting the Interests of NATO's North-Eastern Flank*,²⁸⁹ *Outlines for Future Conventional Arms Control in Europe: A Sub-Regional Regime in the Baltics*,²⁹⁰ and *Sub-Regional Arms Control for the Baltics: What Is Desirable? What Is Feasible?*²⁹¹

There is a stark difference in scholarship between Cold War and post-Cold War literature. First, Cold War literature did not have the template and institutions that the CFE and A/CFE agreements offered post-Cold War scholars. These provide post-Cold War CAC scholars a substantial basis of thought, reflected in many of the proposals and discussions directly or indirectly flowing from Cold War CAC accomplishments.

Second, some Cold War scholars applied quantitative conflict modeling to determine CAC options – something that is lacking in post-Cold War studies. Another notable absence is the lack of specific, quantitative proposals (perhaps due in part to the lack of quantitative studies). Studies and discussions look at geographic areas of interest for CAC and TLE categories but do not propose specific TLE ceilings beyond prohibitions. Lastly, as with the

²⁸³ Simon Lunn and Nicholas Williams, *NATO's DNA: The Alliance's Contribution to Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation* (London, UK: European Leadership Network (ELN), 2020).

²⁸⁴ Ulrich Kühn, *Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO Playbook* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018).

²⁸⁵ van Ham, *Modernizing Conventional Arms Control in the Euro-Atlantic Region*.

²⁸⁶ Johan Engvall, *OSCE and Military Confidence-Building in Conflicts* (FOI, 2019).

²⁸⁷ Gregory G Govan, "Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Some Thoughts about an Uncertain Future," Deep Cuts Issue Brief #5, July 2015, 4; Kulesa, "The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe"; Kühn, "Conventional Arms Control 2.0."

²⁸⁸ Zellner, Oliker, and Pifer, "A Little of the Old, a Little of the New: A Fresh Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe."

²⁸⁹ Artur Kacprzyk and Łukasz Kulesa, *Dilemmas of Arms Control: Meeting the Interests of NATO's North-Eastern Flank* (Tallinn, Estonia: International Centre for Defence and Security, 2020).

²⁹⁰ Evgeny Buzhinskiy and Oleg Shakirov, *Outlines for Future Conventional Arms Control in Europe: A Sub-Regional Regime in the Baltics* (London, UK: European Leadership Network (ELN), 2019).

²⁹¹ Wolfgang Richter, *Sub-Regional Arms Control for the Baltics: What Is Desirable? What Is Feasible?*, Deep Cuts Working Paper 8 (Hamburg, Germany: Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg (IFSH), 2016).

Cold War CAC scholarship, experts often omit mention of agreements that are not between the superpowers or their alliances.

In 2009, a few years after Russia's suspension of their CFE Treaty participation, Zellner accurately predicted that the treaty's collapse would be a major contributor to arms control deterioration in Europe and the breakdown of the NATO/US-Russia cooperative relationship.²⁹² Although it was not possible to predict if, when, or where the deterioration would lead to armed conflict, Zellner's warnings were, in retrospect, prescient.

Outside of Europe

This dissertation is focused on CAC in Europe for several reasons, including the dense overlapping European institutions involved in CAC, the extensive history of CAC over the past 100 years, and the notion that CAC historical lessons and insights might apply to addressing the NATO-Russia rivalry and the Russo-Ukraine War. Although this dissertation is Europe-focused, a brief discussion on the extra-European CAC may offer some global perspectives on the issues.

Fortna²⁹³ offers a dataset of ceasefires and peace agreements from 1948-1994 covering the entire world, and these could, based on experience in Europe, form the basis of CAC agreements elsewhere in the world. However, despite the potential based on quantity, relatively few of these agreements resulted in CAC agreements or included CAC elements outside of Europe.

Adversarial CAC in South and Central America is likely largely absent due to many factors. Although South and Central American states participated in the 1930's Geneva Disarmament Conference,²⁹⁴ South and Central America has had no involvement in any of the European CAC agreements (in comparison to North America) except to the extent to which they had declared war against the Central Powers or Axis states (World War One and Two, respectively) and were direct or indirect parties to the ceasefires, armistices, and peace agreements. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty prohibits any military capabilities on the continent – a

²⁹² Wolfgang Zellner, "Can This Treaty Be Saved? Breaking the Stalemate on Conventional Forces in Europe," Arms Control Association, September 2009, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009-09/can-treaty-be-saved-breaking-stalemate-conventional-forces-europe>.

²⁹³ Fortna, *Peace Time*, app. A.

²⁹⁴ Henderson, "Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments: Preliminary Report of the Work of the Conference."

relevant agreement due to the continent's proximity to Argentina and Chile.²⁹⁵ Otherwise, there are few or no CAC agreements that have been made since 1918 relevant to South and Central America. This may be due to a combination of factors, but one of the most important of which may be the relatively low number and low scale of interstate conflict between South and Central American states. This lack of conflict may mitigate the security dilemma, as states may be hesitant to perceive other state's actions (within South and Central America) as malign if there is no or minimal history of armed conflict. Moreover, there may be a sense of mutual deterrence between most states that have any security rivalry, because a combination of the size of the states and the insufficient size of adversaries' militaries (as a measure of the size and capability they may need to defeat an adversary) may also discourage formal CAC. Several South and Central American states have been compelled to deal with, and continue to in some cases, internal strife including organized crime, terrorism, separatism, and insurgency. Thus, states often have a force posture clearly oriented towards these threats that are not viewed as threatening to their neighbors.²⁹⁶

In sum, South and Central America may not have a history of CAC because various factors such as economics already impose sufficient limitations so that armies are at or near their lowest capabilities, there is a minimal perception of military threats in large part due to a minimal history of interstate conflict, and many states are focused on internal security threats.

The overall lack of CAC in the Middle East is driven by a complex, overlapping set of rivalries and conflict rather than by any lack of perceived need. The main CAC form in the region has been geographic demilitarization in the form of buffer zones – mainly in or near the Sinai to separate Israeli and Egyptian forces.²⁹⁷ Iraq was subjected to a range of military capabilities restrictions following its 1991 capitulation to the US-led coalition and the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 687.²⁹⁸ Although most attention was placed on its WMD capabilities,²⁹⁹ limitations included ballistic missiles, conventional or otherwise. The Middle East has experienced frequent interstate conflicts since at least the end of World War Two, with

²⁹⁵ Florian Vidal, "The Antarctic Peninsula: Argentina and Chile in the Era of Global Change," *The Polar Journal* 13, no. 1 (January 2, 2023): 13–30, <https://doi.org/10.1080/2154896X.2023.2205236>.

²⁹⁶ The Security Challenge for Democracies in Latin America; Andrew Hurrell; Challenges and Security Threats in Latin America.

²⁹⁷ Mona Ghali, "Non-UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Middle East," 12, Occasional Paper Series (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, May 1993); "Multinational Force & Observers," Multinational Force and Observers, accessed September 23, 2024, <https://mfo.org/>.

²⁹⁸ Ruth Wedgwood, "The Enforcement of Security Council Resolution 687: The Threat of Force Against Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction," *American Journal of International Law* 92, no. 4 (October 1998): 724–28, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2998137>.

²⁹⁹ Towle, *Enforced Disarmament*.

interstate attacks short of all-out conflict almost commonplace (especially if non-state actors who have many of the characteristics of state actors are involved, such as the Houthis in Yemen or Hezbollah in Lebanon). There are likely many reasons for the lack of CAC including mistrust, multiple, overlapping rivalries which complicate setting national limitations (balancing), and the roles of proxy and great power states.

Asia was included – through Japan’s participation in the Washington Naval Treaty’s Five-Power agreement – in one of the first, major, post-World War One balancing agreements.³⁰⁰ The Korean peninsula saw the establishment of the first, major post-World War Two demilitarized zone staffed by the United Nations which was created when a ceasefire ended (provisionally, as a formal peace agreement is yet to be made) the Korean War.³⁰¹ A 2018 agreement established several restrictions on certain types of military activities, mostly within proscribed areas (geographic demilitarization).³⁰²

Nonetheless, despite Southeast and East Asia having been the setting of several interstate conflicts since 1919, including the World Wars, CAC has been minimal. In contrast to the European Axis states, Japan was not subject to any formal arms control largely due to the onset of the Cold War and Japan being dominated by the US to the exclusion of the USSR.³⁰³ The main restriction was that Japan was only authorized “self-defense” forces according to its US-co-written constitution³⁰⁴ – a generally vague limitation.

There is, however, a broadly recognized need for CAC in Asia, driven in part by both rivalries and arms racing.³⁰⁵ Setting aside issues of feasibility, areas in which CAC could be

³⁰⁰ Meredith William Berg, “Admiral William H. Standley and The Second London Naval Treaty,” *The Historian* 33, no. 22 (February 1971): 215–36; Burns and Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: Volume 3, Limitation of Seapower*.

³⁰¹ Michael Anderson, “Shadows of War: Violence along the Korean Demilitarized Zone,” *Military Review*, December 2019, 91–99.

³⁰² Yong-Sup Han, “Conventional Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula,” Research Paper (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2020).

³⁰³ Tanner, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, and Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva, Switzerland), *From Versailles to Baghdad*; Towle, *Enforced Disarmament*.

³⁰⁴ James E. Auer, “Article Nine of Japan’s Constitution: From Renunciation of Armed Force ‘Forever’ to the Third Largest Defense Budget in the World,” *Law and Contemporary Problems* 53, no. 2 (1990): 171, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1191849>.

³⁰⁵ Robert Ayson, “Arms Control in Asia: Yesterday’s Concept for Today’s Region?,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 67, no. 1 (2013): 1–17, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2013.748272>; Lee Jaehyon, “Understanding the Recent Southeast Asian Arms Build-up: A Commitment to a Minimum Military Response Capability,” Issue Brief (Seoul: The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, December 20, 2023); Masako Ikegami, “Missile Arms-Racing and Insecurity in the Asia-Pacific,” Missile Dialogue Initiative (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, August 2021); Felix Heiduk, “An Arms Race in Southeast Asia? Changing Arms Dynamics, Regional Security and the Role of European Arms Exports,” SWP Research Paper (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, August 2017).

developed include medium-range ballistic missiles (INF-like),³⁰⁶ major warships, amphibious landing ships, submarines, and the designation of demilitarized areas – especially islands in the South China Sea that are currently a major flashpoint between China and Southeast Asian states.³⁰⁷ State parties might be limited to sub-regions, such as the Korean peninsula, Southeast Asia, or between Japan and its neighbors. Alternatively, they might be much broader, to include great powers such as the US, UK, France, and Russia (all of whom have interests, if not territory, in the greater Asia-Pacific region).³⁰⁸ The US-China rivalry might be mitigated by CAC.³⁰⁹

The last agreement that bears mentioning is a border area treaty for China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan which, among other requirements, sets limits on the size and scope of military exercises and a general prohibition on permanent stationing of military forces along their common borders.³¹⁰

The world is full of rivalries and, to a lesser extent, conflict. This brief literature review explains that there is so little literature on CAC outside of Europe because, for numerous reasons, there is little CAC and little *political* demand for CAC. This is not to say that there is not a general, theoretical need for CAC; all that is necessary is the presence, history, or prospect of a rivalry.³¹¹ Thus, this discounts a CAC agreement between, for example, Bolivia and Bhutan – outside of very large alliances, there is no likelihood that either will ever be security or military competitors – but otherwise, there are a very large number of potential agreements through various combinations of rivalries, now, in the past, and future. In general, differences

³⁰⁶ One of the INF and CFE Treaty's sticking points during negotiations was the concern that either party could shift prohibited capabilities in Europe to Asia – especially relevant for INF-range missiles. Thus, the agreement prohibited the missiles globally, while a likely combination of practicality, improving relations, and other factors reduced fears of CFE-reduced forces shifting to Asia (Larsen).

³⁰⁷ Brian Benjamin Crisher, "Ships over Troubled Waters: Examining Naval Development in Asia," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 56, no. 8 (December 2021): 1918–34, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909621995859>; Brijesh Khemlani, "Southeast Asia's Arms Race," RUSI, January 13, 2011, <https://rusi.orghttps://rusi.org>.

³⁰⁸ Khemlani, "Southeast Asia's Arms Race."

³⁰⁹ Michael J. Mazarr et al., *Stabilizing Great-Power Rivalries* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2021), <https://doi.org/10.7249/RR-A456-1>.

³¹⁰ "Agreement between the Russian Federation, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan and the People's Republic of China on Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Border Area" (Shanghai, April 26, 1996).

³¹¹ Even the US and Canada, close allies and partners for over 100 years, retain a CAC agreement in the form of the 1817 Rush-Bagot Treaty which sets limits on naval forces in the Great Lakes and Lake Champagne, and is a product of the rivalry between the two that had existed from the American Revolution through the War of 1812. Barry O'Neill, "Rush-Bagot and the Upkeep of Arms Treaties," *Arms Control Today* 21, no. 7 (September 1991): 20–23.

between Eurasian states' foreign policy priorities and security interests versus those in the Global South may minimize CAC experiences in Europe are relevant in the Global South.³¹²

³¹² Nicolas Blarel and Niels Van Willigen, "Symposium: Coalitions and Foreign-Policy-Making: Insights from the Global South," *European Political Science* 16, no. 4 (December 2017): 502–14, <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-016-0066-7>.