Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

Adversarial conventional arms control in Europe: the quest for peace

Lippert, W.E.

Citation
Lippert, W. E. (2025, October 16). *Adversarial conventional arms control in Europe: the quest for peace*. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/1887/4270747

Version:	Publisher's Version
License:	Licence agreement concerning inclusion of doctoral thesis in the Institutional Repository of the University of Leiden
Downloaded from:	https://hdl.handle.net/1887/4270747

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

Adversarial Conventional Arms Control in Europe
The Quest for Peace

William Egon Lippert

© William Lippert (2025)

Adversarial Conventional Arms Control in Europe: The Quest for Peace

PhD Thesis at Leiden University, The Netherlands

All rights reserved. No parts of this publication may be reproduced in any form without the written consent of the copyright owner.
Cover: Riddermark
Layout: Riddermark
Printing: Riddermark

Adversarial Conventional Arms Control in Europe
The Quest for Peace

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van
de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden,
op gezag van rector magnificus prof.dr.ir. H. Bijl,
volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties
te verdedigen op donderdag 16 oktober 2025
klokke 11.30 uur

door

William Egon Lippert
geboren te Vietnam
in 1973

Promotor

Prof. dr. J.A. Koops, Universiteit Leiden

Co-Promotor

Dr. J. Becker, US Military Academy

Promotiecommissie

Prof. dr. ir. S.J.H. Rietjens, Universiteit Leiden (secretaris)

Prof. dr. E. Bakker, Universiteit Leiden

Dr. U. Kühn, University of Hamburg

Dr. C. Portela, Universitat de València

This research did not receive any funding.

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms *8*

Part I: The Quest for Peace *10*

Chapter 1: Introduction and Research Questions 11

Chapter 2: Definitions of Core Concepts, Theoretical Frameworks, and Methodology .. 31

Chapter 3: Literature Review 84

Part II: Research Articles *98*

Chapter 4: Status Quo Constancy and Conventional Arms Control 99

Chapter 5: Delegation to Treaty Bodies and International Organizations for Conventional Arms Control Agreements in Europe: A Sum Score Evaluation 129

Chapter 6: Conventional Arms Control Agreements in Europe: Conditions of Success and Failure 154

Chapter 7: CAC Causes of Russo-Ukraine War 185

Part III: The Impermanence of CAC Agreement Success and Failure *211*

Chapter 8: Conclusion 212

Appendix A: Chapter 4 – Status Quo Tables *233*

Appendix B: Chapter 5 – Delegation Tables *255*

Appendix B: Case Studies 272

Appendix C: Chapter 6 – QCA *277*

References *286*

Summary *335*

Samenvatting *339*

Acknowledgements *343*

Curriculum Vitae *345*

Tables

Table 1: CAC Agreements and their outcomes 19
Table 2: CAC and international security theories 44
Table 3: CAC and international organization theory 49
Table 4: Applicability of deterrence, the security dilemma, and offense-defense balance to each agreement 51
Table 5: Summary of chapter methodologies 63
Table 6: Number of cases in each chapter's dataset 81
Table 7: CAC agreement conditions and expected outcome for changing the status quo 115
Table 8: Condition combinations and outcome for each agreement 120
Table 9: Conventional Arms Control (CAC) agreement dataset, delegation scores, and success scores 136
Table 10: CAC agreement QCA dataset 169
Table 11: Agreement dataset and QCA calibrated values 173
Table 12: Truth table for "Success" 175
Table 13: Intermediate solution for "Success" 175
Table 14: Truth table for "Absence of Success 176
Table 15: Intermediate solution for "Absence of Success" 177
Table 16: Putin's war motivations 189

Table A 1: Assessment of historical periods, general geopolitical perceptions, and the number of agreements signed in each period* 233
Table A 2: CAC agreement dataset 234
Table A 3: Expected outcome determination 236
Table A 4: Geopolitical instability 238
Table A 5: Military balance instability 243
Table A 6: Resource constraints 247
Table A 7: Status quo assessment 251

Table B 1: CAC agreement variables and scoring 255
Table B 2: CAC agreement explanation of success or failure 256
Table B 3: Mandate modification 259
Table B 4: Governance independence 260
Table B 5: Staff independence 262
Table B 6: Assessment independence (of the governing body) 264
Table B 7: Enforcement authority 265
Table B 8: Agent resources 266
Table B 9: Monitoring 268
Table B 10: Inspection (by the agreement executor) 269
Table B 11: Third-party state involvement 270
Table B 12: Expected versus observed cases 271

Table C 1: Success scoring 279
Table C 2: Delegation calibration 281
Table C 3: National limitations calibration 282
Table C 4: Geographic demilitarization calibration 283
Table C 5: Great power rivalry calibration 284

Figures

Figure 1: Proportional outcomes of CAC agreements 20
Figure 2: Stages of conventional arms control agreements and their components 41
Figure 3: Conventional arms control agreement potential life-cycle 42
Figure 4: Stages of conventional arms control agreements and dissertation chapter relevance 43
Figure 5: Relationship between level of success and number of delegation points 145
Figure 6: Extent of delegation to Conventional Arms Control (CAC) agreement executors over time 146

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

Acronym	Meaning
A/CFE	Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
ACA	Agency for the Control of Armaments
ACC	Allied Control Council/Commission
ADE	Armored Division Equivalent
ATTU	Atlantic to the Urals
CAC	Conventional Arms Control
CBA	Cost-Benefit Analysis
CBO	(US) Congressional Budget Office
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Treaty)
CINC	Capabilities/Composite Indicator of National Capabilities
CRS	(US) Congressional Research Office
CSBM	Confidence and Security Building Measures
CoW	Correlates of War
csQCA	crisp set Qualitative Comparative Analysis
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
EDA	European Defense Agency
EORTC	European Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer
EU	European Union
EUMM	European Union Monitoring Mission
FAS	Fatigue Assessment Scale
FOI	Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut
fsQCA	fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IGO	Intergovernmental Organizatoin
IIGO	Informal Intergovernmental Organization
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMCC	Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
IO	International Organization
IR	International Relations
JCG	Joint Consultative Group
JIC	Joint Implementation Commission
KFOR	Kosovo Force
MAD	Mutually Assured Destruction
MBFR	Mutual and Balance Forced Reduction
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
ODB	Offense-Defense Balance

OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OST	Open Skies Treaty
PACA	Permanent Advisory Commission on Armaments
QCA	Qualitative Comparative Analysis
RUSI	Royal United Services Institute
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SMM	Special Monitoring Mission
TLE	Treaty Limited Equipment
TMC	Temporary Mixed Commission
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
US	United States
USSR	Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic
WEU	Western European Union
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization
WW1	World War 1
WW2	World War 2