



Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

Adversarial conventional arms control in Europe: the quest for peace

Lippert, W.E.

Citation

Lippert, W. E. (2025, October 16). *Adversarial conventional arms control in Europe: the quest for peace*. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/4270747>

Version: Publisher's Version

License: [Licence agreement concerning inclusion of doctoral thesis in the Institutional Repository of the University of Leiden](#)

Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/4270747>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

**Adversarial Conventional Arms Control in Europe
The Quest for Peace**

William Egon Lippert

© William Lippert (2025)

Adversarial Conventional Arms Control in Europe: The Quest for Peace

PhD Thesis at Leiden University, The Netherlands

All rights reserved. No parts of this publication may be reproduced in any form without the written consent of the copyright owner.

Cover: Riddermark

Layout: Riddermark

Printing: Riddermark

Adversarial Conventional Arms Control in Europe
The Quest for Peace

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van
de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden,
op gezag van rector magnificus prof.dr.ir. H. Bijl,
volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties
te verdedigen op donderdag 16 oktober 2025
klokke 11.30 uur

door

William Egon Lippert
geboren te Vietnam
in 1973

Promotor

Prof. dr. J.A. Koops, Universiteit Leiden

Co-Promotor

Dr. J. Becker, US Military Academy

Promotiecommissie

Prof. dr. ir. S.J.H. Rietjens, Universiteit Leiden (secretaris)

Prof. dr. E. Bakker, Universiteit Leiden

Dr. U. Kühn, University of Hamburg

Dr. C. Portela, Universitat de València

This research did not receive any funding.

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms	8
Part I: The Quest for Peace	10
Chapter 1: Introduction and Research Questions	11
Chapter 2: Definitions of Core Concepts, Theoretical Frameworks, and Methodology ..	31
Chapter 3: Literature Review	84
Part II: Research Articles	98
Chapter 4: Status Quo Constancy and Conventional Arms Control	99
Chapter 5: Delegation to Treaty Bodies and International Organizations for Conventional Arms Control Agreements in Europe: A Sum Score Evaluation	129
Chapter 6: Conventional Arms Control Agreements in Europe: Conditions of Success and Failure	154
Chapter 7: CAC Causes of Russo-Ukraine War	185
Part III: The Impermanence of CAC Agreement Success and Failure	211
Chapter 8: Conclusion	212
Appendix A: Chapter 4 – Status Quo Tables	233
Appendix B: Chapter 5 – Delegation Tables	255
Appendix B: Case Studies	272
Appendix C: Chapter 6 – QCA	277
References	286
Summary	335
Samenvatting	339
Acknowledgements	343
Curriculum Vitae	345

Tables

Table 1: CAC Agreements and their outcomes.....	19
Table 2: CAC and international security theories	44
Table 3: CAC and international organization theory	49
Table 4: Applicability of deterrence, the security dilemma, and offense-defense balance to each agreement.....	51
Table 5: Summary of chapter methodologies	63
Table 6: Number of cases in each chapter's dataset	81
Table 7: CAC agreement conditions and expected outcome for changing the status quo.....	115
Table 8: Condition combinations and outcome for each agreement.....	120
Table 9: Conventional Arms Control (CAC) agreement dataset, delegation scores, and success scores.....	136
Table 10: CAC agreement QCA dataset	169
Table 11: Agreement dataset and QCA calibrated values	173
Table 12: Truth table for “Success”	175
Table 13: Intermediate solution for “Success”	175
Table 14: Truth table for “Absence of Success”	176
Table 15: Intermediate solution for “Absence of Success”	177
Table 16: Putin’s war motivations.....	189
 Table A 1: Assessment of historical periods, general geopolitical perceptions, and the number of agreements signed in each period*.....	233
Table A 2: CAC agreement dataset	234
Table A 3: Expected outcome determination	236
Table A 4: Geopolitical instability	238
Table A 5: Military balance instability.....	243
Table A 6: Resource constraints	247
Table A 7: Status quo assessment.....	251
 Table B 1: CAC agreement variables and scoring.....	255
Table B 2: CAC agreement explanation of success or failure	256
Table B 3: Mandate modification	259
Table B 4: Governance independence.....	260
Table B 5: Staff independence	262
Table B 6: Assessment independence (of the governing body)	264
Table B 7: Enforcement authority.....	265
Table B 8: Agent resources	266
Table B 9: Monitoring.....	268
Table B 10: Inspection (by the agreement executor)	269
Table B 11: Third-party state involvement	270
Table B 12: Expected versus observed cases	271

Table C 1: Success scoring	279
Table C 2: Delegation calibration	281
Table C 3: National limitations calibration	282
Table C 4: Geographic demilitarization calibration	283
Table C 5: Great power rivalry calibration	284

Figures

Figure 1: Proportional outcomes of CAC agreements	20
Figure 2: Stages of conventional arms control agreements and their components	41
Figure 3: Conventional arms control agreement potential life-cycle	42
Figure 4: Stages of conventional arms control agreements and dissertation chapter relevance	43
Figure 5: Relationship between level of success and number of delegation points	145
Figure 6: Extent of delegation to Conventional Arms Control (CAC) agreement executors over time	146

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

<u>Acronym</u>	<u>Meaning</u>
A/CFE	Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
ACA	Agency for the Control of Armaments
ACC	Allied Control Council/Commission
ADE	Armored Division Equivalent
ATTU	Atlantic to the Urals
CAC	Conventional Arms Control
CBA	Cost-Benefit Analysis
CBO	(US) Congressional Budget Office
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Treaty)
CINC	Capabilities/Composite Indicator of National Capabilities
CRS	(US) Congressional Research Office
CSBM	Confidence and Security Building Measures
CoW	Correlates of War
csQCA	crisp set Qualitative Comparative Analysis
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
EDA	European Defense Agency
EORTC	European Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer
EU	European Union
EUMM	European Union Monitoring Mission
FAS	Fatigue Assessment Scale
FOI	Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut
fsQCA	fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IGO	Intergovernmental Organizatoin
IIGO	Informal Intergovernmental Organization
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMCC	Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
IO	International Organization
IR	International Relations
JCG	Joint Consultative Group
JIC	Joint Implementation Commission
KFOR	Kosovo Force
MAD	Mutually Assured Destruction
MBFR	Mutual and Balance Forced Reduction
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
ODB	Offense-Defense Balance

OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OST	Open Skies Treaty
PACA	Permanent Advisory Commission on Armaments
QCA	Qualitative Comparative Analysis
RUSI	Royal United Services Institute
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SMM	Special Monitoring Mission
TLE	Treaty Limited Equipment
TMC	Temporary Mixed Commission
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
US	United States
USSR	Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic
WEU	Western European Union
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization
WW1	World War 1
WW2	World War 2