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Separation and immersion: the changing role of the armed forces in Northwestern liberal democracies

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Citation

Vark, A. van. (2025, October 17). *Separation and immersion: the changing role of the armed forces in Northwestern liberal democracies*. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/4270680>

Version: Publisher's Version

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Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/4270680>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).



7

FINLAND

7.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the results of the case study on Finland. The first part of this chapter describes the Finnish armed forces, its tasks and legal framework, the relations between military and society, the current state of civil-military relations and civil-military cooperation in Finland (section 7.2). In section 7.3, specific security challenges and threats in the Finnish context are described in addition to the general analysis provided in chapter 4. Section 7.4 focuses on recent changes in the domestic role of the Finnish armed forces and explanations for these changes. Subsequently, section 7.5 addresses what policy options can be defined for a future domestic role of the armed forces. The last part of this chapter will focus on the balance between separation and immersion and developments in that area and will include an analysis of the results of this chapter using civil-military relations theory.

7.2 THE FINNISH DEFENCE FORCES

This section describes the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF), its tasks, the legal framework for the domestic use of the armed forces, as well as civil-military relations and cooperation. In addition, it describes the position of the Finnish armed forces in society. This will lay the foundation for future developments regarding the domestic role of the armed forces and civil-military relations.

The Finnish President is Supreme Commander of the FDF and can decide on key principles of national military defense, important changes in military readiness and principles of implementation of military defense. The Minister of Defense decides on the establishment of new garrisons or brigade-level units. The FDF are led by the Commander of the Finnish Defence Forces (Chief of Defence). The FDF consist of the Defence Command, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the National Defence University (The Finnish Defence Forces, 2022b).

During peacetime, the FDF consists of approximately 12.000 persons, including approximately 4.000 civilians. Annually, the FDF train around 22.000 conscripts (The Finnish Defence Forces, 2022b). Wartime strength of the FDF is 280.000, which can be augmented by adding more reservists, of which there are 900.000 in total.

Tasks

The tasks of the FDF are defined in the Law on the Defence Forces, dating from 2007 (Laki Puolustusvoimista, 2007), and last updated in 2022 (Laki Puolustusvoimista an-

netun lain 2 ja 10 §:n muuttamisesta, 2022). The FDF have 4 main tasks, based on article 2 of this law:

1. The military defense of Finland, which includes
 - a. Surveillance of land, water and airspace and safeguarding territorial integrity,
 - b. Safeguarding the living conditions of the population, fundamental rights and freedoms and the freedom of action of the state leadership, as well as defending the lawful social order,
 - c. The provision of military training and the management of voluntary defense training and the strengthening of the will to defend,
2. Support of other authorities, including
 - d. Assistance in maintaining public order and security, in preventing and interrupting terrorist offences and other offences causing serious danger to human life or health, and in protecting society in general,
 - e. Participation in rescue operations by providing equipment, human resources and expert services necessary for rescue operations,
3. Participation in assistance and aid based on Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union and participation in territorial surveillance cooperation or in other international assistance and activities,
4. Participation in international military crisis management and in military missions in other international crisis management.

Legal framework

Support of the FDF to other authorities is based on the Law on the Defence Forces, article 2, as defined under 'Tasks' above. Article 10 of this law defines support to the Police and the Border Guard (Laki Puolustusvoimista, 2007).

As for the Police, article 10 states that the FDF shall provide official assistance to the Police in accordance with the provisions of the Act on Official Assistance to the Police (Laki Puolustusvoimien virka-avusta Poliisille, 2022). It also states that a soldier is entitled, while under the direction and guidance of a police officer, to carry out measures related to the official assistance mission and to use force in accordance with the provisions of the above-mentioned act. In cases of emergency defense, the soldier acts under his official responsibility.

The Act on Official Assistance to the Police further specifies that the police can only receive assistance from the FDF if that is necessary for its performance due to insufficient police resources and if the assistance can be provided without jeopardizing the first task of the FDF (military defense of Finland). Assistance is defined in paragraph 2 of

the Act and could include a wide range of tasks such as search, arrest, directing traffic, security and surveillance, identification and clearance of explosive devices, protection of an event or public gathering, prevention and stopping of a crime which poses a serious threat to life or health and temporarily making available equipment, facilities, or expert assistance. Assistance by the FDF is based on four principles, namely respect for human rights, proportionality, least harm and purpose limitation.

The assistance may include the use of force and firearms suitable for the performance of police duties (article 5). Assistance must be requested by the Police Board or, in urgent cases, a police unit under the Police Board (article 7), and the decision to grant assistance is taken by the General Staff or the headquarters of the Army, Navy or Air Force.

Article 8 regulates the use of 'more powerful armament', in addition to a soldier's personal armament. This form of assistance may be requested when necessary to prevent or interrupt a terrorist (or comparable) offence which seriously endangers the life or health of many people.

Article 9 regulates the protection of visiting international VIPs, for which the FDF can deliver official assistance.

Referring to both article 8 and article 9, article 10 arranges for a special decision-making procedure where in principle the Government Council decides at the request of the Ministry of the Interior. In urgent cases, the Ministry of Defense decides. In case 'more powerful armament' needs to be used, the Ministry of Defense decides at the request of the Ministry of the Interior. In urgent cases, the General Staff may decide at the request of the Police Board. This procedure could be used for example in case of a hijacked airplane which needs to be shot down.

Personnel working based on the Act on Voluntary National Defence (*Laki Vapaaehtoista Maanpuolustuksesta*, 2007) can participate in official assistance duties, but are not allowed to use firearms (article 11).

Based on article 12, the official assistance mission takes place under police command. The police decide on the use of force (article 14). The armed forces personnel involved may only use force if necessary to prevent a serious and immediate threat to human life or health that cannot be averted by less serious means. The FDF are responsible for the costs of assistance, unless it takes up considerable resources, in which case the FDF can be reimbursed.

The Act on Official Assistance to the Police came into effect in 2022 and is an update of a 40-year-old law on the same topic. As explained on the website of the Ministry of the Interior, the update was deemed necessary because of the changing threat environment, for example to make it possible for the FDF to assist the police in exceptional circumstances where police personnel or equipment are not enough to deal with a situation (either quantitatively or qualitatively) (Ministry of the Interior, 2022). Examples are the prevention or interruption of terrorist crimes, but also other crimes that seriously endanger life or health if their effects are comparable with terrorist crimes. The decision to grant assistance can be made at an earlier stage than in the old law, facilitating prevention and preparation. In the old law, the situation had to be immediately threatening. In the words of the ministry, official assistance is an economically justified means of strengthening the operational capacity of the police.

As for the Border Guard, article 10 of the Law on the Defence Forces states that the FDF shall provide official assistance to the Border Guard in accordance with the Border Guard Act (Rajavartiolaitos, 2005). Based on the Border Guard Act, article 79, the Border Guard can receive assistance from the FDF for missions related to border security, if the assistance can be provided without jeopardizing the performance of other tasks of the FDF. Personnel providing assistance are permitted to use force under the supervision of a Border Guard. Same as with assistance to the police, the FDF bear the costs of assistance, unless the assistance takes so long that it leads to significant costs for the FDF, in which case it can be reimbursed.

Lastly, article 11 of the Law on the Defence Forces stipulates that the defense forces can provide assistance to protect society, in particular in case of oil spills (Laki Puolustusvoimista, 2007).

Military and society

As in Sweden, the total defense model has dominated the Finnish security landscape during the Cold War. This section therefore starts with a description of the relevant developments in that respect. After the Cold War, the total defense model transformed into what is called the comprehensive security model, which is also described in the following section. An important element of both models is the Finnish system of conscription. The final part of this section focuses on that topic.

Total defense

The roots of the total defense model lie in the civil war after the Finnish declaration of independence in 1917, with the Finnish Red Guards revolting against the White Civil Guards (state troops). After the civil war, the Finnish security structure was based on

the White Civil Guards. An important factor in stimulating collaborative thinking in the country was the Winter War in 1939-1940, that was caused by the invasion of the Soviet Union. Former 'reds' and 'whites' united against the invasion and despite severe losses, Finland was able to remain independent. It had been forced to mobilize the whole nation to achieve this. This served as the foundation for the concept of total defense (Valtonen & Branders, 2021).

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union forced Finland to keep some distance from other western countries, leading to what the Finns call '*impivaara*', and what Valtonen and Branders describe as the '*Finnish mindset of go-it-alone isolationism*' and to the principle of pragmatism informing security policy (Valtonen & Branders, 2021). The balancing act of Finland between Soviet pressure and cooperation with the western world has been called 'Finlandization' (Aaltola et al., 2014).

In this period the Finnish Defence Council that developed the components of total defense was established, including the creation of national defense courses for key leaders in the 1960s. The total defense concept was implemented top-down, and a major element of the model concerned the ability to endure large-scale societal distress, which also required a willingness of the citizens to defend the country and its core values. Hyvönen and Juntunen describe this as the spiritual component of the model and point at the 'enlightened patriotism' it entails (Hyvönen & Juntunen, 2021).

After the Cold War, the threat environment started to change and widen. As Hyvönen and Juntunen describe new emerging threats like organized crime, terrorism and migration challenged the military-centric conceptions of security (Hyvönen & Juntunen, 2021). During this period, the model of total defense was broadened and evolved into the Finnish comprehensive security model, a cross-sector cooperative framework that will be discussed below. One of the reasons for this development was that the total defense model was considered a militarization of the nation (Valtonen & Branders, 2021). However, the total defense model was not abolished but remains part of the comprehensive security model.

Comprehensive security

The Finnish comprehensive security model, as described by Valtonen and Branders, (a) focuses on coordination across and between governance levels, (b) takes a phenomenon-led approach, (c) is built on the rule of law, and (d) emphasizes preparedness (Valtonen & Branders, 2021). In this sense, it can be considered as both a conceptual approach and a governance model (Fitz-Gerald & Macnamara, 2012; Valtonen & Branders, 2021).

As for coordination, the model aims for better coordination between national security authorities, local authorities, (non-governmental) organizations, the private sector and citizens. An important role is fulfilled by the Security Committee, that assists the government in matters related to comprehensive security. The committee was installed in 2013, facilitates information exchange between relevant actors and develops various strategies, such as the Security Strategy for Society and the Finnish Cyber Security Strategy. The committee is jointly chaired by the Ministry of Defense and the Prime Minister's Office. Its members come from various government ministries and executive organizations such as the Police, Defence Command, Border Guard, Customs, and the Intelligence Service (The Security Committee, 2022). To improve the involvement of citizens, the concept of 'security cafés' was implemented. In these cafés, authorities and citizens discuss safety and security issues (Valtonen & Branders, 2021).

The approach is phenomenon-based, which means that practical needs are at the core of the model, rather than administrative decisions. A good example of this phenomenon-based approach is the cooperation model between the Border Guard, Customs, and the Police. This model developed in rural Lapland because of scarce resources and will be further explained in section 7.5.

The principle of rule of law means that each authority has its own competence, based on legal provisions. In specific cases, when regular legislation is considered insufficient, the Emergency Powers Act may be activated, as was for example the case during the COVID pandemic (Valtonen & Branders, 2021).

Lastly, the principle of preparedness means that foresight processes play an important role in the comprehensive security model.

The most recent description of the model can be found in the Security Strategy for Society that was published in 2017¹⁸. It is based on cooperation between various security actors from both the public and private sectors, including citizens. The strategy describes the seven vital functions of society that should be safeguarded, namely leadership, international and EU activities, defense capability, internal security, economic infrastructure and security of supply, functional capacity of the population and services, and psychological resilience. The vital functions are presented in the shape of a diamond (The Security Committee, 2017).

18 A revised version of this strategy is expected early 2025.

The FDF organize *National Defence Courses*, that encourage comprehensive thinking. The course takes 3,5 weeks and is attended by key leaders of Finland, such as Members of Parliament, CEOs of critical infrastructure companies, NGO and media leaders, artists, and academics (Valtonen & Branders, 2021). The courses have a certain aura of mystery surrounding them for the public and are known to foster both networking and cohesion in the Finnish elite (Hart, 2023).

Although largely considered a success, some problems with the model remain, as Valtonen and Branders describe. These have to do with lack of resources and with competition and bureau-politics between the security organizations involved. As we will see in section 7.4, this is recognized by respondents as well.

An interesting element in the Finnish comprehensive security model, as analyzed by Hyvönen and Juntunen, is the concept of resilience. They describe resilience as the ability to (a) withstand the effects of major disruptions, (b) maintain the ability to act amid a crisis and (c) bounce back from the crisis and being able to learn from it to increase the ability to adapt to future circumstances (Hyvönen & Juntunen, 2021). Resilience focuses on the enhancement of society's functionality to face unpredictable threats, and it emphasizes the role of the private sector, civil society, and even individual citizens (Hyvönen & Juntunen, 2021). According to Hyvönen and Juntunen, in the specific Finnish context the main interpretation of the concept of resilience emphasizes the top-down process of defining strategic priorities and maintaining national cohesion as well as resistance through preparedness and fast recovery instead of the adaptive and self-governing capacities of the population (Hyvönen & Juntunen, 2021). Based on a discourse analysis of textbooks for the National Defence Courses, Hart concludes that the word 'resilience' (both at the collective and at the individual levels) has replaced the term 'pluralist patriotism' that was used before to emphasize that patriotism is relevant for both the political left and the political right (Hart, 2023).

The role of the Ministry of Defence remains relatively strong and according to Virta and Branders, there is no devolution of power and agency to the civil society and local communities (Virta & Branders, 2016). However, it is recognized that resilience capacities of society are needed to execute the strategic priorities, and this requires legitimacy, trust in the authorities and a sense of national togetherness (Aaltola et al., 2018; Hyvönen & Juntunen, 2021). Hyvönen and Juntunen also recognize a shift towards responsabilization of civil society and individual citizens as key agents in resilience building. Still, they consider the Finnish concept of resilience is mainly aimed at 'bouncing back' rather than 'bouncing forward' or adaptive learning / resilience as renewal. This may be related to

the total defense heritage that is still very much present in the comprehensive security model.

Conscription

Based on the Finnish Constitution, every Finnish citizen must participate in national defense. For men, this means conscription (or civil service for those with ethical or religious objections). As mentioned on the website of the FDF, the objective of military training is '*to sustain the readiness of the Finnish Defence Forces and to train individuals liable for military service in tasks of national defence*.' (The Finnish Defence Forces, 2022a) Military service is obligatory for men; women can serve on a voluntary basis since 1995.

Military training consists of various training phases and, depending on the training, it takes 165, 255 or 347 days. Conscripts are selected for training programs based on the needs of the FDF, willingness and personal competences (The Finnish Defence Forces, 2022a).

As Kosonen and Mälkki describe, conscription has for over a century been a deep-rooted part of the Finnish state, nation, society, and culture (Kosonen & Mälkki, 2022). It is seen on the one hand as the only cost-effective model to establish national defense in a non-aligned country like Finland, situated so close to and with such a long border with Russia. On the other hand, it is seen as a key cultural phenomenon, or even a myth that unites citizens and fosters the will to defend the country (*maanpuolustustahto* in Finnish), which is very high in Finland compared with other countries. The FDF have a legal obligation to foster the willingness to defend the country among the Finnish population and participation in national defense is considered a civic duty, based on the Finnish Constitution (Hadar & Häkkinen, 2021; The Finnish Constitution, 1999). Conscription also makes the military a visible part of society (Valtonen & Branders, 2021).

Conscription in Finland has remained unchanged for a long time. However, as Hadar and Häkkinen describe, since 2018 the possibility of national service has been debated, which would allow both men and women to choose between military or non-military service as an alternative to conscription (Hadar & Häkkinen, 2021). The most recent developments will be described in section 7.5.

Civil-military relations

Looking at the ideal types for civil-military relations defined in chapter 2, Finland, at first sight, seems to match the preferred model for a democratic regime, in which the civilian and the military domain are separated and there is civilian supremacy over the military. Virta and Taponen, in describing the Nordic police philosophy, emphasize the

importance of civilian features, meaning that policing tasks are not performed by the military (Virta & Taponen, 2017).

However, other than Sweden, Finland has never abandoned the total defense model, which has resulted in a relatively strong position of the FDF in Finnish society. Although officially the total defense concept has transformed into the concept of comprehensive security, in practice the influence of the military remains relatively strong. This can be seen in the Security Committee, for example, which is headed by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense while the State Secretary of the Prime Minister's Office acts as deputy. It can also be seen in the National Defence Courses, that are organized by the FDF, and even in the name of these courses, that have not been changed to 'comprehensive security courses'.

As general conscription for men has never been abandoned, there is little distance between the armed forces and society. As Hadar and Häkkinen describe it,

Conscription, therefore, is not only a source of military manpower but also a facilitator of a militarized mind-set, whereby giving one's all in time of national crisis is essential to the state's survival (Hadar & Häkkinen, 2021, p. 207).

On the legal level, there are many possibilities for the armed forces to support civilian authorities. However, in practice, as will be discussed further on in this chapter, there is quite a strict separation between the armed forces and other actors in the security domain.

Military personnel are encouraged to refrain from party political discussions and from connecting the FDF to these discussions (Finnish Defence Forces, 2017).

Civil-military cooperation

The FDF have 12 regional offices that are responsible for conscription matters (call-ups, ordering reservists to refresher exercises), the planning of military national defense, cooperation with other authorities and national defense work (Finnish Defence Forces, 2022). The most recent Government's Defence Report proposes a transformation of most of the regional forces into local forces. These will create a national network that will cooperate with and support other authorities and society, for example in the protection of vital infrastructure or restoring services after disruptions. The local forces will have to use the reservists more effectively, and this will include more training and refresher exercises, also using the capabilities of voluntary national defense (Finnish Government, 2021b). Voluntary defense training in Finland is provided by the National Defence

Training Association of Finland (MPK). The organization provides military training to FDF reservists, familiarization training for youths aged 16 and older, and information on voluntary national defense. It also provides safety, security, and preparedness skills training (such as first aid, self-defense) and instructor and leadership training (Maanpuolustuskoulutus, n.d.).

7.3 SECURITY CHALLENGES AND THREATS

In chapter 4, three security and stability related threats were defined that undermine liberal democracy, namely (1) the blurring of internal and external security and the rise of new security threats, (2) declining social cohesion and the rise of social unrest and parallel societies and (3) undermining of liberal democracy by the state. This section will discuss how these challenges play out in Finland.

The Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy emphasizes global challenges such as climate change, pandemics, the rise of nationalism and populism, migration and hybrid threats and the impact these challenges may have on Finnish society and social cohesion. At the same time, it recognizes that the rules-based international system is under growing pressure because of the increasing competition between great powers, and specifically naming the role of China and Russia (Finnish Government, 2020).

Under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior, every three years, the Finnish government produces a National Risk Assessment. The latest version was published in 2023 (Ministry of the Interior, 2023). It assesses threats and risks on the global, societal, and individual level, and relates them to the functions that are vital to society as they have been defined in the Security Strategy for Society 2017. The report points at a transformation of the foreign and security policy environment of Finland, due to increased competition between the superpowers, the weakening of the rules-based international order and increased instability in the region caused by the Russian war in Ukraine. It also points at global challenges such as climate change, the availability of food and water, migration, and pandemics. Within Finnish society, the report points at polarization, growing regional differences, and increasing inequality. It notes that hostile information influence activities may be used to create and accelerate polarization in society. In the area of crime, the report points at an increase of violence, firearms, and drugs, online and cross-border crime. The report also mentions that digitalization poses specific risks, such as cybercrime and disruptions of electronic platforms. Research by Virta and Taponen is in line with the results of this risk assessment (Virta & Taponen, 2017).

In 2021, the Finnish Government published a Report on Internal Security, identifying developments in internal security until 2030 (Finnish Government, 2022). The report emphasizes that Finland is a very safe country and ranks high in international comparisons. Still, the report notes that rising social inequality may lead to security problems, and polarization may lead to increased social tensions and unrest, although in general social cohesion in Finland remains high. Trust in security authorities is generally high as well, although the opposition and violence towards the authorities have increased steadily in the past 10 years. As for safety issues, the report notes that accidents and injuries are more common in Finland than in neighboring countries. The analysis notes that for the past 30 years, crime rates have decreased. The report also notes that there are about 70 organized-crime groups in Finland, most of them biker gangs. These groups have tried to become part of legal social structures and the use of organized crime in hybrid influence operations must be monitored. The report expects organized crime to increase and become more international and serious, following the trend in other EU member states. Serious and extensive incidents may become more common, for example, maritime or regional major accidents, violent movements, extensive immigration, activities targeting critical infrastructure, and terrorist attacks.

In its 2021 yearbook, the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (Supo) emphasizes the risk of refugee espionage operations, risks to information security and the threat of terrorism (right wing or radical Islamist) (Supo, 2021).

As mentioned in chapter 4, research by IDEA shows there is a decline in all indicators for liberal democracy in Finland in the last 10 years. As the data show, the sharp decline in civil liberties and impartial administration stands out from the other indicators also showing a decline. This may indicate the undermining of liberal democracy by the government. The decline in the indicator for impartial administration could also point at horizontal undermining if part of the population feels treated unfairly. On the other hand, the World Bank data discussed in chapter 4 show that 'group grievances' are not a major issue in the Nordic countries.

Hyvönen and Juntunen point at exceptional measures that have been taken by the government in recent years to combat new security threats, for example the introduction of new intelligence laws and surveillance measures in 2019 (Hyvönen & Juntunen, 2021). However, as Virta and Taponen describe, it may be difficult to reconcile these measures with principles of community policing, such as trust in communities and protection of human rights (Virta & Taponen, 2017). They see a strengthening of the role of the state in Nordic countries, due to the political situation and new security threats.

Recent research by IDEA focuses on the impact of COVID-19 measures on democracy and human rights. Both in 2020 and 2021, the Finnish government declared a state of emergency in Finland, which lasted for a couple of months and made the use of special powers under the Emergency Powers Act possible. These measures included restrictions on cross-border movement and assembly. One measure that stood out was the quarantining of the Uusimaa region (including Helsinki) from the rest of the country for three weeks in March 2020, with exceptions for essential commuting and other work-related travel. All in all, IDEA classifies Finland as a high performing country with no violations of the Democratic Standards Index during the pandemic and a low risk on the Pandemic Backsliding Index (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2022).

The reports mentioned above show indications for the three security challenges identified in chapter 4. How do the respondents for this case-study evaluate the challenges? When asked about security threats, respondents first and foremost speak about Russia, and to a lesser extent China, pointing out that *'...the risk of conventional war, armed conflict with Russia, is always on the table when we are evaluating our crisis environment.'* (Respondent 78, academic) Although Russia most readily comes to mind, one respondent points out that *'...one could say that Russia is a bad weather or a storm, but China is a climate change. And China is also interested in Finland because it's the only area where it can reach the Arctic area.'* (Respondent 73, civilian, national government)

At the same time, some respondents recognize that the threat environment is changing, with non-military threats on the rise. As one respondent points out, *'Cyber is one big issue which I think we are always a few steps behind what we should have done already and that is maybe my main concern, that it might...have cascading effects leading to systematic failures, which can cause harm to normal people and to politicians ability to do their job. We have built a modern society which is very vulnerable in some sense, because people do not tend to think of security first; it comes few steps later.'* (Respondent 77, military)

Terrorism is considered as less of a problem in Finland, and the same goes for organized crime: *'Organized crime is not so interested in Finland, because nothing is happening here. There are not so many opportunities. And mostly the critical infrastructure is located in Helsinki area and the south part. And in the north, there is nothing. So, you cannot run an illegal business either, because there are no consumers. The only trend we have at the moment is that organized crime is interested in buying land in Finland.'* (Respondent 81, academic)

Relatively few respondents are concerned with polarization and social unrest, although they do recognize this may change towards the future. One respondent explains, *'On my radar, that is not a particularly pressing issue. There are signs that social unrest may rise to*

the domestic security agenda as well; for instance, our major cities in Finland are developing in the direction of Sweden, where some areas have become no-go zones for instance.' (Respondent 83, academic)

As this short overview shows, respondents are mainly concerned with external threats and the increased blurring of external and internal threats, but less with internal issues like declining social cohesion, although they do recognize this may change towards the future.

7.4 RECENT CHANGES IN THE DOMESTIC ROLE: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Respondents note that changes to Finnish policy, on any subject, typically happen very slowly; this also holds true for the domestic role of the armed forces. A respondent with an academic background explains, *'Our legislation is not flexible enough to face these hybrid threats or new situations. I think there might be some attempts to tackle that fact, but otherwise I don't see that at this moment there would be any changes or surprises. There usually isn't. We always strive for consensus and that means changes are slow. It can be frustrating sometimes.'* (Respondent 91, academic)

In Finnish history, social transformations are usually related to a big crisis because *'Then people understand that this is not the way to live. We have to change society.'* (Respondent 81, academic) One recent example is of course the Finnish decision to apply for NATO membership after the Russian attack on Ukraine. Public opinion changed almost overnight to an overwhelming majority in favor of NATO membership.

One recent change that stands out is the transformation of the total defense model into the comprehensive security model, as was described in section 7.2. This transformation reflects the broadening of the threat environment and could imply a larger domestic role of the FDF, since with the total defense model all focus was on society supporting national defense. However, in practice not much has changed in the domestic role of the FDF.

In 1961 Finland started with National Defense Courses for elite representatives of various sectors in society. With the transformation of total defense to the comprehensive security model, the substance of these courses has changed, but it is still the FDF who is organizing the courses.

The main purpose of the courses is to inform the participants about national security and to at the same time build a network between participants. Respondents are overwhelmingly positive about the courses. As one respondent explains: *'It suits Finland because of what I said about cohesion in a small country. Everybody knows everybody. We trust each other and it reproduces that. It would also be beneficial in security situations, that people know each other. As a military sociologist I know that the official organization is never enough. You need to have the unofficial side as well, the networks.'* (Respondent 91, academic)

In recent years, these courses have broadened: *'It's been opened up, it's more broad than it used to be, and it's very good that journalists, government officials, heads of enterprises and so on, it's very good that the military brings them together. There should be more internal issues, like organized crime for example, and the change has been in that direction.'* (Respondent 84, academic)

As a side effect, most respondents point out the positive effect of the courses on the position of the military: *'... they are extremely well arranged. You'll be flying helicopters, visiting battle ships. So, it's also a promotional activity from the military point of view.'* (Respondent 73, civilian, national government) Very few respondents make critical remarks about the courses: *'I was in the course in 2005 or so. I think it's a big opportunity for the military. I think it's very clever ..., because they create that kind of atmosphere that we are really important and remarkable people in society, and we have a big responsibility because we are so important. People are like that. If they hear they are so important, they want to support it. And I didn't like this atmosphere. It's a kind of manipulation. But there's also a lot of useful information.'* (Respondent 72, civilian, national government)

As we have seen in Sweden as well, the fact that the FDF are preferably not used for police tasks has led to a certain militarization of the police: *'Of course we are aware of this militarization of police. Police has bought armored vehicles. ... But what has happened in Sweden, some who are fond of militarizing, also in police, they claim that it's obvious what is happening in Sweden will in the near future happen in Finland. Of course we have to be ready and be prepared, have the equipment.'* (Respondent 86, academic) However, most respondents say this process has been relatively limited in Finland. This may be related to the relatively small problems in Finland in for example organized crime, as was described in section 7.2, but also with the police not being as good in strategic communication as the FDF. As one respondent points out: *'I think this is partly because of the police itself. The police are not very good at explaining what they are doing and why the money is needed. The armed forces are very good at this kind of PR work, how to touch*

people's feelings. The police think that everybody knows what they are doing so they don't have to explain.' (Respondent 72, civilian, national government)

Looking for explanations for the fact that relatively little changed in the domestic role of the armed forces in Finland, three factors stand out:

Factor 1: Historical reasons and the security environment

Because the Finnish have always felt an external threat, even after the end of the Cold War, unlike Sweden and the Netherlands (and many other countries), the debate about what to do with the armed forces simply has not come up much: *'There hasn't been much need to debate what to do with the armed forces, because it is pretty evident that they are needed for the defense of the country, the traditional role.'* (Respondent 83, academic) This image of the FDF is ingrained in Finnish society and is easy to explain to the Finnish population, unlike the comprehensive security model: *'We see the defense forces like, every man goes to the border and fights, that's the defense forces. ... It's so difficult for people to understand what we have done in terms of comprehensive security for example. It's so fuzzy, different kinds of organizations, coordination, cooperation in networks.'* (Respondent 91, academic)

Some find that a domestic role would distract them from their main task of defending the country and make them less capable of fulfilling these tasks as well: *'If you would give them more tasks, they probably would say no, we don't want to. We have enough work in making these youngsters become soldiers and handling emergencies, and that's the only way in which we can keep the level of deterrence that is needed. ... So that is part of deterrence, that you have well educated...you don't lower them to be like stopping cars [like a police officer], you know.'* (Respondent 88, academic)

In a sense, in the words of the same respondent, the main task of the FDF is simply to be there: *'They are withstanding or preventing the threat by existing. By keeping the equipment and training at that level that it would be very costly for Russia to do what they are doing in Ukraine now. ... That's the main task, to just be there. ... I think almost everyone in Finland understands it. ... So that's why also the military want to do their own job, and not be distracted by anything else, like organized crime.'* (Respondent 88, academic)

Some point at the Finnish history to explain the reluctance to use the armed forces in a domestic context: *'And also we have our long history of our war for freedom where the Finns were fighting against each other. The state was divided between Reds and Whites and the Whites won the war. The defense forces have been created based on the white army and we still carry symbols on our flags and uniforms which are coming from the white army. That's*

one sensitivity. ... Many families still remember these events and look negatively towards the armed forces, because our ancestors shot their grandfather for example.' (Respondent 78, academic) Another respondent clarifies that because of the civil war '*...we don't want to see our own people fighting against our own people.'* (Respondent 92, academic)

Interestingly, one respondent points out that the existence of conscription may prevent change in the military because '*If you think about society, almost all men have been to military service. They have a view of the military. That view can prevent a new role for the military in society.'* (Respondent 82, academic)

Factor 2: Comprehensive security, a model of silo's

In the Finnish system, organizations stick to their own task as much as possible: '*I'm not sure about the background, but we don't have this kind of culture or traditions. We have very good cooperation between authorities, and we can help each other, but we want to keep the authorities separated in public. I think it's strongly a part of our culture and our tradition.'* (Respondent 74, military) Culture is mentioned by another respondent from the military as well: '*It's quite difficult to say, but in our culture all the authorities do their own business. And then we have some kind of model, we are dining together, but after dinner everybody leaves to do their own work. It's not tradition.'* (Respondent 75, military)

This model sounds similar to the Swedish model of independent government agencies, and it may actually be related to it, as Finland used to be part of Sweden in the past. As one respondent points out, '*First of all, if you think about governmental structures and processes in Finland, they date back to I think 19th century, [when Finland was] part of Sweden, part of Russia and so on, and very little has changed since then. The status of a ministry in Finland is very independent, very strong. They are very jealous regarding resources, positions, and so on.'* (Respondent 84, academic)

As was shown in section 7.2, the Finnish comprehensive security model seems in fact to be a model of silos: '*I say what is the main issue here in Finland is that we have horizontal phenomena, but our processes, organizations and actors are very vertical. We have silos.'* (Respondent 84, academic) Another respondent confirms this view: '*Now we look at this system of comprehensive security and in the idealistic world this model creates great cooperation between all authorities. And it is doing that, but there are quite strong political tensions inside that system, because if you are starting to expand your limits, then you are always overlapping some other organization's authority. ... So that has led to the situation that the comprehensive security model is a silo model.'* (Respondent 78, academic)

The Security Committee, which assists the government in matters of comprehensive security, is currently positioned at the Ministry of Defense. According to the same respondent, this is a mistake: *'First of all, it's in the wrong place. It shouldn't have been in the Ministry of Defense at all. I was part of the process and I was strongly recommending that it should be in the PM's office, but in 2011/2012 there was a discussion and the PM's office didn't realize, well, more or less anything, but at least not security issues as they should. So, it ended being part of the Ministry of Defense and it took several years that the committee has become acceptable to all partners. But currently it has no resources, it has no legislation backing them. ...that committee should step up from this coordinating role to do some implementing. But ok, nobody in those organizations which are represented there wish any organ above them.'* (Respondent 84, academic) Another respondent agrees, pointing out the usefulness of the model, but criticizing the execution: *'I think the concept, the idea of this diamond model is excellent. It is almost 10 years old at the moment and there's a need to update it. The problem with the model is that mostly the execution, after the decision-making of the crisis, the part that executes the security for society, they are in the stovepipes.'* (Respondent 81, academic)

These responses are confirmed in the literature. Based on her discourse analysis of the textbooks for the *National Defence Courses* between 2000 and 2018, Hart concludes that even though the comprehensive security model aspires towards a holistic approach, comparable with the comprehensive approach in international relations, in practice, it has 'morphed into a technocratic and bureaucratic management tool' (Hart, 2023, p. 184). A report by the Safety Investigation Authority on the management by the government of the first part of the COVID-19 pandemic confirms this sentiment. Among other recommendations, the report recommends an update of the model for future crises, ensuring that open, proactive, and adequate cooperation, preparation, and leadership are started on time. In addition, the flow of information between the levels of administration needs to improve (Safety Investigation Authority, 2021). A respondent elaborates, *'At the start of the COVID pandemic an organization was created for situational awareness for the prime minister and other ministers from different sectors of society. We have an organization where we can organize that function, but instead of that, when the crisis started, the prime minister created her own headquarters, with her own staff. So, this model we have been building since 35 years was pushed aside. It was not used at all.'* (Respondent 78, academic)

Competition between organizations is primarily playing a role at the state level and less at the regional level: *'I would say that at the regional level there are no such problems. ... The idea of all the police chiefs, fire guard, doctors, etc. They have been friends with each other in such a small city. They know each other, they practice together constantly. But then when we come to state level, the problems start.'* (Respondent 78, academic) Another

respondent confirms that *'At the local level, the cooperation is very good, but the higher you go, at the strategic level, the more problematic it becomes.'* (Respondent 84, academic)

When asked why there is close cooperation between civilian security organizations (Police, Customs and Border Guard) and not so close between these organizations and the armed forces, respondents are quite clear: *'I think the main reason for the problem is we have [the] Ministry of Defence leading national defense. [The] Ministry of Interior is leading police forces, border guard and customs. They are under one ministry and it's natural for them to take breakfast together and operate together. But if you must go to a different ministry and create cooperation, it's quite a long way.'* (Respondent 75, military)

One respondent points out that the silos may remain so strong in Finland, exactly because there are strong networks: *'Maybe that's why we have such strong silos, because the networks fill in. If we didn't have the networks, we couldn't have the silos.'* (Respondent 91, academic)

Factor 3: Mixed attitudes

As was evident in Sweden and the Netherlands as well, attitudes in Finland are mixed about a different role for the FDF in a domestic context. This is related to the previous two factors mentioned.

On the civilian side, some fear the armed forces could be too dominating in cooperation: *'I think it's very difficult for the military to be in a supporting role. It's somehow against their professional identity. ... There would be difficulties if the civilians do not take a strong position. Because the military would like to decide independently how the cooperation is going on, because that's the way they work. But it can lead to the civilians being more on the side, and that's the challenge.'* (Respondent 72, civilian, national government)

On the military side, according to most respondents, the armed forces prefer to remain in a supporting role: *'They are in a supporting role, and they like to keep it that way. So, more or less the situation is that and our military is not very eager to have a larger role and I think this current understanding, this sentiment in society would not support that.'* (Respondent 84, academic)

While most respondents are quite reluctant when it comes to a different role for the armed forces, some think it will have to change due to changing security challenges: *'We cannot decide now to concentrate on our classical tasks. The society needs more and more response and dialogue from the FDF. How the FDF sees society, how to defend society, what are the options. Maybe the nation state and civilians and the other sectors are no longer*

happy to see that we only concentrate on our own task.' (Respondent 81, academic) However, some fear that the military will not want to change: *'The challenge is that I'm not sure that the military system and the people behind it have real interest to take into account all those threats in society, which we really have and people are afraid of. That's one thing that's preventing the change from a traditional military organization to an organization which is taking part in comprehensive security. I hope I am wrong about it.'* (Respondent 82, academic)

7.5 POLICY OPTIONS FOR A CHANGING DOMESTIC ROLE

As discussed, Finland has been quite reluctant to increase the domestic role of the armed forces. This is related to historical reasons and the threat environment, the comprehensive security model and its silos, and mixed attitudes on both the civilian and military side. What future policy options do Finnish experts see for the domestic role of the armed forces?

In general, when asked about a changing domestic role for the armed forces towards the future, most respondents agree that changes will be incremental and limited, unless a big crisis takes place that makes change necessary: *'But looking at the learning cycle of crisis management, things need to go terribly wrong for the government to come to the conclusion that we need a radical change. Otherwise, it's more incremental changes here and there, but the basic structure remains the same.'* (Respondent 80, academic)

One respondent points out that Finland may be at a crossroads: *'In my opinion we are at a crossroads, whether we are heading for option A or option B. Maybe there is an option C available. In my opinion, the defense forces are very much, culturally speaking, Anglo-American. All our ideas come from either the US or the UK. And the situation in those countries is like Huntingtonian, or post-Huntingtonian. ... Why not read Janowitz in addition to Huntington and figure out how to organize those things that we discussed about. But there are few options and I'm not sure in which direction we are heading. In the 2030s we will see what has happened.'* (Respondent 86, academic)

This section describes the various policy options in detail. In the appendix to this chapter, the policy options are summarized in table 7.1.

Civic education and conscription

Because general conscription is mandatory for men in Finland, it is usually the first topic mentioned by respondents when asked about civic education and they add that the FDF is *'a real citizen's army in that sense.'* (Respondent 87, academic)

Some respondents propose a civil service or new models of conscription to increase the involvement of young people in society. *'...what we should have is a civil service. Ok, you may be part of the military, and the military decides we need you, and not you, but everybody should help, in a school or a hospital or whatever. Nowadays, there are so many young people that are not part of society at all. ... everybody participates three months, four months whatever to find out, ok, there is a society! And that's something we should be doing.'* (Respondent 84, academic) Another respondent agrees and links this with the comprehensive security model: *'But if I think about the future, we have a really big strength in society. We could change military service in a way that it could take all those comprehensive security issues to the citizen level. Citizens would participate to solve the problems in society. ... I think that part of the people should just participate in a short security course, which could also be virtual. Others could integrate more deeply. It's very challenging to develop such a model.'* (Respondent 82, academic)

Conscription could also be helpful in the integration of migrants, as is pointed out by several respondents: *'We have a lot of very good, even excellent experiences with those things, how former migrants have been to conscript service and how well they have learned and how good their experience is with these training events. This has enabled them to be more and more citizens of Finland.'* (Respondent 86, academic) A recent article confirms a positive effect of conscription in Finland on labor market integration of migrants (Bontenbal et al., 2024).

An important topic related to conscription is the fact that it is only for men. This is debated in Finnish politics and society and is also pointed out by several respondents: *'... you also referred to future challenges and one of them is the gender equality issue. That should be discussed. More and more people are challenging why it's only compulsory for men. It's the only exception where Finland is not gender equal. It's actually in the constitution: every citizen is obligated to defend their country. For men it means conscription but for women it doesn't say what it means.'* (Respondent 73, civilian, national government)

However, most respondents do not expect any big changes in this respect: *'I very much doubt it will be compulsory for both men and women, because the military doesn't need more people, and that's why they take men. ... What I'm expecting is that within 10 years there will not be any big changes. What they have been talking about is a common call-*

up for both men and women, for 1 or 2 days, where they can learn about comprehensive security system and think about if they want to be drafted into the military.' (Respondent 87, academic)

In 2020, a Parliamentary Committee on National Defence Obligation and Conscription was established to define the goals for strengthening and developing conscription. According to the appointment decision, this development must be based on the needs of military national defense, must generate additional operational value, must strengthen equality and the will to defend the country. The Government's Defence Report published in 2021 states that increasing the number of women completing military service is a goal to ensure size and quality of the reserves, and at the same time deepen societal impact of national defense, improve the will to defend the country and increase equality (Finnish Government, 2021b).

The Parliamentary Committee reported in the Fall of 2021 and recommended to extend the call-up system to the entire age class (not just the men), meaning information days at schools about conscription and voluntary service (Finnish Government, 2021a). The report also states that operational needs do not justify conscription for the entire age group.

Some respondents suggest involving schools more in civic education by the military: *'... something we're looking into, is giving more defense related education at school. Not a subject of its own, but people in 9th grade or something would get an hour or two in a semester. Now, I think they have 45 minutes in senior high school.'* (Respondent 73, civilian, national government)

Others consider that this would be sensitive, but small steps have been taken: *'In the '60s and '70s it was more tricky, the red flag of militarization would go up very easily. I don't know how conscious that is, but I feel the defense forces have made small steps. In some places, they go to schools and talk about defense issues. It's a very small part of the curriculum, that is optional. It depends on the school. There have been some small occasions where the flag has been going up, because it was considered too much.'* (Respondent 91, academic)

Police tasks

Finnish respondents are very reluctant to consider a role for the FDF in police tasks, mainly because of the risk of using violence against civilians and the impact this may have on the position of the military. One respondent illustrates: *'I remember when I was in the MoD there were big riots in Helsinki city center. People having riots against fur production, that was turning out aggressive. Police was asking if we could bring our water guns,*

that we normally for example use in the harbor, when a military ship would start to burn, and it carries ammunition. They were asking if we can get these armored personnel carriers with water guns to shoot at the demonstrating people. Later we saw the media coverage with the armored personnel carrier in armed forces colors which was starting to shoot ordinary people. And it's coming with full pressure, so they are flying away. And we said this is not good publicity, so next time you need this go to the fire guard, we are not coming anymore.' (Respondent 78, academic)

One recent event in which the military was used for public order management was during the pandemic, when the region around Helsinki was closed off from the rest of the country. In total, 800 conscripts and 50 FDF staff supported the closure (Safety Investigation Authority, 2021). In that case, the support by the military was considered acceptable because it was such an extraordinary situation: *'Then the military helped the police in controlling the traffic. I think, in general, there were some issues if that's the military's task to do that, but also this was an extraordinary situation and I think there was a consensus, although you can debate how effective that measure was.'* (Respondent 80, academic)

Respondents do not generally see a role for the military in the fight against organized crime, emphasizing that the organized crime problem is not so big in Finland, and that the police are well able to deal with it. As one respondent states, *'I think Finland is a very safe country, in terms of violence produced by organized crime, much safer than Sweden. So there has been no special need.'* (Respondent 87, academic) Another respondent adds, *'Of course, there is organized crime in Finland as well, but most of the organized crime in the Finnish context are those Bandidos, motorcycle gangs. They deal with drug trafficking and they can be armed. Police have their own special forces to deal with that. ... So, it's very difficult to imagine such an organized crime situation where you would need defense forces.'* (Respondent 88, academic)

On special occasions, the military can support the police in security and surveillance: *'Police can ask assistance from the military, and we have preparation units that can, for example, lend armored vehicles and professional soldiers. We don't use the conscripts. ... for example, big summits and these kinds of events in Finland ..., of course the military was asked to support in security at the outskirts, but only [a] couple of them had guns and they were professional soldiers.'* (Respondent 77, military)

Also, for the fight against terrorism, in principle, respondents see no role for the military (other than taking down a hijacked plane if necessary): *'I think that is something that is more difficult to imagine, because what we consider terrorist threats are small groups,*

lone individuals, so you wouldn't imagine you would need the military.' (Respondent 80, academic)

Intelligence

In the area of intelligence, respondents recognize the need for increased cooperation between military and civilian authorities. One respondent points out that new legislation has already been created to increase cooperation: *'We developed military intelligence laws last year, and I think it's one step for recognizing new threats, organized crime, immigration, domestic operations, overseas operations, cyber space, to have enough flexible laws to recognize new threats and cope with threats that are concrete already now.'* (Respondent 75, military)

Of course, there are still some obstacles to the sharing of intelligence between civilian and military authorities: *'The legislation not just encourages but commits the civilian and military intelligence to work together more, but then, like in any democratic society, we also have legal obstacles and legal sensitivities. ... So, the big picture is that the cooperation between the two is increasing, but there are legal obstacles.'* (Respondent 83, academic)

Crisis management

Crisis management is an area where support by the armed forces to the civilian authorities is not considered sensitive at all. A couple of respondents talk about the accident that happened in the city of Nokia: *'It happened some time ago, maybe 10 years. There were bacteria in the water network in the city and it was a couple of weeks that people couldn't use their water. They had to sanitize the whole system. There was a lack of water. The local authorities asked support from the defense forces. We were driving our tank trucks through the streets, where people could get water and the conscripts were going door to door to deliver water bottles and these kinds of things.'* (Respondent 78, academic)

Other examples named by respondents are pandemics, natural disasters due to climate change, such as floodings, or large-scale evacuations in case of radiological fall-out.

Cyber threats

Research shows that strategic leadership of cyber security in Finland is fragmented, and overall leadership is lacking, with activities largely siloed in various departments. In addition, there is no effective cooperation structure at the strategic level (Lehto & Limnell, 2021). The 2019 Cyber Security Strategy proposes the installment of a Cyber Security Director at the Ministry of Transport and Communications to coordinate national cyber security policies (The Security Committee, 2019). However, the above-mentioned research

shows that the Prime Minister's Office would have been a more logical place and that the chosen model could lead to continuation of siloed activities (Lehto & Limnell, 2021).

The cyber domain is an area in which many respondents see some developments towards a larger role for the military, mainly due to the problem with attributing cyber-attacks: *'I think there is a really good possibility to make progress. And I think cyber is the first concrete threat where authorities are trying to learn to cooperate together.'* (Respondent 75, military) They recognize that cyber capabilities are too separated in the current situation: *'We have divided cyber capabilities with authorities, so when it's crime it goes to the police, and when it's critical infrastructure it's Ministry of Communications. Military cyber defense is for military systems. And this is too separated because we have limited resources. I would like to see the cyber version of Border Guard, Customs and Police.'* (Respondent 77, military)

However, the latest Government Defence Report emphasizes that the Defence Forces are responsible for military cyber defense, and their goal is to safeguard the systems of the Defence Forces as well as others that directly impact defense capability (Finnish Government, 2021b). The FDF do support other authorities by providing executive assistance, but the report does not mention any ambitions to increase cooperation.

As discussed in the Sweden case study as well, Finland experiments with using conscripts for cyber tasks and some respondents consider this to have great potential, emphasizing that *'the young men who are conscripts could contribute to cyber defense more than they would in the old-fashioned defense in the forest.'* (Respondent 80, academic)

Hybrid forces

The Finnish Border Guard can be considered a hybrid force. Its officers are trained at the National Defence University and the organization uses military ranks and procedures, such as for command and control. However, it is positioned under the Ministry of the Interior. In case of war, the Finnish Border Guard or parts of it can come under the command of the FDF, if the president so decides. Conscripts can elect to do their service at the Border Guard. In a sense, this makes the Border Guard a multipurpose authority, and several respondents describe it that way: *'Border Guard is our multipurpose authority so to say. During war time, they are part of the defense forces but in normal times they are part of the Ministry of the Interior.'* (Respondent 77, military)

As one respondent points out, the Finnish Border Guard, though being a civilian organization, has a military identity: *'I think that the Border Guard, its identity is quite military. They feel that they are part of the military system.'* (Respondent 72, civilian, national government)

The main task for the Border Guard is border security, including guarding of the external border and checks at border crossings. There is close cooperation between the Border Guard, Police and Customs organization. This cooperation has originated in remote regions of Lapland, where arrangements were made for one organization to represent the other two. As a respondent explains, *'In the north of Finland, they used to be strict on tasking, but when they realized OK, there's only you and me, they said, well if you are doing a border check, can you also check if he has something for Customs? And that is very functional in those areas where there are not many people. ... So, it started due to lack of resources, but they found that it was so good that they made legislation for it.'* (Respondent 77, military)

The Act on Cooperation between the Police, Customs and the Border Guard regulates cooperation between the three organizations (Laki Poliisin, Tullin Ja Rajavartiolaitoksen Yhteistoiminnasta, 2009). Based on this legislation, a so-called PCB authority may, on request, carry out measures related to the combating of crime on behalf of another PCB authority, using the powers that are available to it in its own crime-combating tasks. In case of urgent measures that cannot be postponed, these measures may be used without a request as well.

According to the respondents familiar with this model of cooperation, it works very well and is mainly motivated by lack of resources: *'My understanding when I compare this model to other member states is that it is very advanced and working very well. It can always be better, but I believe it's a very reasonable system. Also, in a small country with limited resources, we need to cooperate.'* (Respondent 76, military)

As for future policy options, respondents are very reluctant to involve the defense forces in border security, unless in a case of hybrid warfare, where Russia would transport large amounts of migrants to the border with Finland, as happened in 2015 (Reuters Staff, 2016). One respondent explains: *'So, I can imagine if that kind of thing would happen, that thousands and thousands of migrants would come over the border from Russia, then you would need defense forces...they need camps, etc., you don't have enough police to deal with it. I think that you could connect the concept of hybrid warfare to this, ..., where you necessarily need the defense forces also. At least as plan B.'* (Respondent 88, academic)

Another idea related to hybrid forces is to create a reserve for the Finnish police with armed forces personnel: *'We are trying to create a reserve for the police in Finland. The armed forces have more reserves than they need, so it's not a big problem for them to give us some of their reserves as well. ... We want to create a reserve who can take care of these*

support tasks, so that the police officers can focus on police cases. You can think about traffic control, not the kind of tasks where you need strong powers.' (Respondent 74, police)

Another respondent describes how the armed forces are currently considering the position of reservists: *'What the armed forces have been thinking about, at least at some tables, is whether we could use the reservists for those purposes. We have the military training, and they are willing and then they go into the reserves, and then if they are not called back, they kind of forget about it. So maybe for the 30, 40 years they are in reserves we should do more on that, and the only way is to use them for something. So, it is about the life course of a citizen-soldier. There is a military obligation in the law. It's not only your military training, but you have an obligation until you are 60. So, the armed forces are thinking more about the reserve career.'* (Respondent 91, academic)

Conclusion

As we have seen in this section, respondents have identified a few options for a changing (or larger) domestic role of the armed forces, primarily in the cyber domain, in intelligence and in civic education. Using reserve personnel would be preferred over using active military soldiers. One of the arguments has to do with the resource potential. Some respondents name the blurring of internal and external threats as a reason to consider changes in the domestic role of the armed forces, but at the same time the wish to separate law enforcement from warfare runs deep in Finland.

As was evident in the Netherlands case study as well, respondents are quite reluctant about seeing the FDF in a visible role on the streets, fearing that it will undermine trust in the armed forces, especially if force would be used: *'Trust in the military is indeed very high in Finland, because we are doing the core business of defending Finland. But there is a risk that we are extending our response area and start to come in riots in the street and that kind of business. So, it can turn around.'* (Respondent 78, academic) Another respondent adds, *'When I go around Europe and you see the military on the streets, it's quite a tricky thing. We definitely couldn't have that. ... it's also the history I think, since the civil war. How the armed forces came out of the White Guards. There were some incidents where the military has used violence against their own citizens. I think those kind of legacies are still there.'* (Respondent 91, academic)

They also state clearly that support to the police can only be delivered if the armed forces do not need those capabilities at the same time. Priority always goes to the needs of the FDF: *'It's reactive in a sense that when there is [a] police force needing an armored vehicle or non-kinetic assistance, it can be given if the defense forces don't need it at the same time.'* (Respondent 73, civilian, national government)

Respondents are very reluctant to use the armed forces for police tasks. *'Now in the pandemic there's a role. In climate change there could be a role. Flooding could be an issue. And then cyber, perhaps those are the main new threats. But not like organized crime or anything. That's something that people would say it's much more difficult to imagine what the role of the military could be.'* (Respondent 80, academic)

Support by the armed forces should always be under civilian control (as is defined in the law as well): *'The competent authorities are always in charge and the defense forces are supporting [them] if need be. ... So they can be there, but never in the first lines and always under the command of the competent authority.'* (Respondent 76, military)

7.6 IMPACT ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

As discussed in this chapter, in terms of civil-military relations Finland formally prefers the separation paradigm, in which the military and civilian domain are separated and there is civilian supremacy over the military. At the same time, signs of immersion are visible. These signs and the trends will be described in this section, focusing on four domains: society, public administration and strategy, law, and performance.

Immersion in society

Mainly due to general conscription for men, the FDF are largely immersed in society. As one respondent explains: *'In many societies, military forces are one island somewhere. Nobody wants to go there; interaction between armed forces and society is really weak. In Finland, I think that armed forces are really close to our society.'* (Respondent 75, military)

Because they are all over the country, local social control is quite high: *'Partly because of conscription, but also partly that local organizations come together in this comprehensive security system.'* (Respondent 87, academic)

Still, the FDF has taken some steps to decrease its footprint in society: *'For instance, the number of garrisons in the country is going down. ... The armed forces are more thinking nowadays about effectiveness and concentrating the amount of conscripts in bigger garrisons, bigger units. ... I think the relation was more intimate in the past where the armed forces were more spread out in the country.'* (Respondent 83, academic)

Related to conscription, some respondents emphasize that the percentage of men who participate has declined for many years, leading to a decreasing militarization of society in Finland. Also, some fear that if conscription would be expanded to women, and there-

fore become more selective, the bond between military and society may loosen, which they consider to be a bad thing: *'Many people are afraid if it is compulsory for men and women, and we have to become selective, that the bond between society and the military may loosen.'* (Respondent 87, academic)

In addition to being visible in society due to conscription, the FDF also take steps to promote itself in society. As one respondent explains, *'It's more like selling your brand nowadays. FDF are very active in social media. Many young people are interested in extreme sports and extreme things, so we are spreading out the combat videos where the guys are falling out of a helicopter. ... And for the older people we are keeping our traditions, we are showing ourselves on the streets. We organize exercises in the middle of Helsinki.'* (Respondent 78, academic)

The media in general are very positive about the armed forces as well: *'In the media there is very seldom something negative written about the FDF. They can in a sense do what they want because the support is so big.'* (Respondent 81, academic)

As discussed in section 7.2, one of the tasks of the FDF is to strengthen the will to defend the country. In a yearly survey on Finns' opinions on foreign and security policy, national defense and security, the Finnish Advisory Board for Defence Information measures this will to defend the country. The opinion poll usually takes place in autumn, but because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, an extra survey was carried out in spring 2022 (The Advisory Board for Defence Information, 2022a).

When asked whether in case of an attack on Finland, Finns should take up arms to defend themselves in all situations, even if the outcome seemed unclear, 83% answers 'yes' (68% in 2021). This is the highest percentage in the history of the surveys, that have been taking place since 1976. The personal will to defend ("If Finland were attacked, would you be prepared to participate in the various tasks of national defense according to your abilities and skills?") remains high at 82%. New survey data from the end of 2022 confirm these results (The Advisory Board for Defence Information, 2022b). Trust in the FDF to defend Finland against various military threats is very high as well (87%).

Inglehart, Puranen and Welzel relate the high willingness to defend in Finland (and other Nordic countries) to the perceived threat by their close neighbor Russia (Inglehart et al., 2015). However, it is important to note that before the Russian invasion, there was a slight downward trend for the first question. Additionally, Finnish scholars have recently questioned the measurement of citizens' willingness to defend with just the two questions mentioned above, arguing for a more in-depth analytical approach (Hart et al., 2023).

In this and earlier surveys (2016-2021), questions were also asked about the Finnish system of general conscription for men (The Advisory Board for Defence Information, 2021, 2022b). Most of the population is still in favor of this system, although it has decreased from almost 70% in 2016 to 53% in 2022. A growing share of the population (from 11% in 2016 to 22% in 2021 to 31% in 2022) supports general conscription for both men and women. A more or less stable number of 15% supports voluntary military service for both men and women (although in 2022 the percentage was only 10%) and around 7% (but declining to 3% in 2022) supports a professional army. Almost three quarters of the respondents support extending the call-up system to women in one of three ways, namely compulsory conscript service for women, compulsory call-ups for women but conscript service on a voluntary basis or sending all 18-year-old women information on the possibility of conducting military service. Support for general civic service has gone up as well, to 59% in 2022 (50% in 2021).

Respondents see the will to defend as an essential element of the Finnish defense system, related to general conscription: *'General conscription is not all about learning skills and becoming a soldier. It's also a place where you go with people in the same age group, from different social surroundings, from different parts of Finland. They share from six months to one year time, [the] same misery in wintertime, which is miserable. When it comes to sociological defense studies, ..., what's the main factor affecting a strong defense will? It's not about social background, information, being conservative or liberal...the strongest defense will was in those groups that had spent the most time together in the same unit. You're not only depending on a metaphysical thing of the Finnish nation, you're defending they guy next to you, your family.'* (Respondent 73, civilian, national government) And in the words of another respondent, *'You may have great equipment, but if you don't have the will, then you can leave the theatre.'* (Respondent 77, military)

Another respondent explains how this will to defend puts Finland in a unique position within Europe: *'Of course, the strategic challenges are specific for Finland, no other country has the same geopolitical strategic position, but the unity, the will to defend, they are rather unique in Europe, I would say, and are related to the compulsory conscription.'* (Respondent 87, academic)

It is not just conscription that explains the closeness between the armed forces and Finnish society. Respondents also point at stories about the armed forces in the past, that have an important role in Finnish society: *'Yes, if you think about the Finnish culture more broadly, how veterans are respected and how Finland for example celebrates Independence Day. It's very solemn, not such a festival as in many countries. Stories related to WWII, it's very Finnish. It still continues after generations.'* (Respondent 87, academic)

On the other hand, some think these stories are losing their influence as Winter War is a long time ago and society is diversifying: *'It has been really strong; grandfathers were in Winter War. It has been really important. But now we are 70-80 years from the war, and we are forgetting about it. Our youngsters don't know anyone who's been in the war.'* (Respondent 75, military) And in the words of another respondent, *'Russia is a kind of story and stories are more significant than the rational part. They are making that collectivity in society. And I'm not sure that we have those stories anymore.'* (Respondent 82, academic)

Immersion in public administration and government strategy

The FDF have, according to most respondents, a strong position within the security domain: *'I think that there is a kind of dilemma or internal dispute, competition, that should we focus on Russia or should we have a more broad approach and role regarding hybrid threats, intelligence, these kinds of issues. But currently Finnish military are quite a strong player in the security field. If they want something they quite often will get it, unlike Finnish police. ...the thing is because they are very well organized, very well resourced and there is always some Colonel to participate in whatever working group. And others do not have those resources. They will end up writing reports and obviously they get to have their say in those documents.'* (Respondent 84, academic)

Another respondent confirms, explaining how the FDF have a better position than the police: *'The police are not very good at explaining what they are doing and why the money is needed. The armed forces are very good at this kind of PR work, how to touch people's feelings. The police think that everybody knows what they are doing so they don't have to explain. ... It's such a closed profession. The fathers and mothers were also in the police usually. They don't know that they should communicate more.'* (Respondent 72, civilian, national government)

Most likely, the National Defence Courses play a role in this strong position of the FDF in public administration and government strategy as well. As was mentioned before, the courses are organized by the FDF and are attended by the Finnish elite, including the political elite, with parliamentarians from all political parties forming about 8% of the participants (Hart, 2023).

Immersion in performance

As discussed, immersion in performance is quite low in Finland. However, some respondents recognize the need to change in relation to new threats: *'If we are looking at new security threats, there has to be overlapping between the capabilities. When I was telling you that everyone is supervising their own areas, this is fighting against this idea.'* (Respondent 78, academic)

Immersion in the law

Interestingly, some respondents point out legal limitations for a larger domestic role: *'The law is quite strict and that's why I think there is not so much collaboration between the military and other organizations in domestic things or problems.'* (Respondent 90, academic)

However, the analysis in section 7.2 has shown that there are many possibilities for the FDF to support civil authorities.

In summary, the data indicate that while most respondents claim a relatively strict separation between Finland's military and civil domains, in reality, both domains are heavily immersed in three of the four dimensions (performance being the lone exception), with the FDF having a strong position in both society as well as public administration and strategy. According to one respondent, the topic deserves more research: *'I always found it interesting that nobody has really looked or discussed the theory of civil-military relations. Of course, the military sociology has been very small in Finland. Some researchers are interested in social cohesion, military identity. But we don't think about issues like if the Finnish officer corps is so far away from society that they have different values, and how to control that. I have sometimes been wondering if we should do something about it.'* (Respondent 91, academic)

7.7 ANALYSIS

All three security and stability related threats identified in chapter 4 can be found in the country-specific literature. Recent reports emphasize the changing geopolitical environment, new security threats, such as climate change, organized crime, pandemics and hybrid threats, foreign influence activities and increasing polarization in Finnish society. In addition, some authors point at the strengthening of the role of the state and exceptional measures taken such as new intelligence laws and surveillance measures, which may put pressure on liberal democracy. When asked about security threats for Finland, Finnish respondents first and foremost point at the Russian threat, more specifically the risk of conventional war on the one hand and cyber threats on the other. They are less worried about the threat posed by terrorism, organized crime or declining social cohesion, although they do recognize these threats may rise in the future.

Looking at recent changes in the domestic role of the armed forces, continuity is in fact the word that resonates from the interviews. Respondents characterize their country as one where change is always slow, unless triggered by a major shock. The prime recent example of such a shock is of course the Finnish NATO membership, after public opinion shifted almost overnight. A relevant recent development is the transformation of the

total defense model into the comprehensive security model. This could imply demilitarization and a less influential role for the FDF, which would match the changing threat environment after the Cold War. However, both academic authors and respondents in the interviews argue that in practice the implications have been few. As for hybridization, the Finnish Border Guard can be considered a hybrid organization. In the civilian domain, the close cooperation between the Border Guard, the Police and Customs stands out, but the FDF are not involved in this cooperation. Militarization of the police has been limited in Finland.

The relatively small domestic role of the FDF can mainly be explained by historical reasons and the security environment: the main task of the FDF is to defend Finland against an armed attack and not be 'distracted' by other tasks. As the external threat of Russia has remained relevant, even in the two decades after the end of the Cold War, drivers for a growing domestic role have been largely absent in Finland. The history of civil war explains the reluctance to use the military in police tasks. Furthermore, the comprehensive security model is a model of silos in which each organization preferably sticks to its own tasks. Finally, similar to the Netherlands and Sweden, respondents have mixed attitudes about a domestic role for the military.

In line with the relatively slow changes in the past, respondents expect change for the future to be incremental as well, unless a big crisis takes place that necessitates change. In the area of conscription, gender neutrality is an important topic and respondents expect small steps to make conscription more gender neutral (e.g. call-up days for women). Respondents expect little or no change in police tasks, following from the wish to separate warfare from law enforcement. Support to civilian authorities can only be delivered if the armed forces have spare capabilities, as the defense of Finland against armed attack always takes priority. Consequently, with the increasing Russian threat not much development can be expected. Most development is expected in the cyber domain and in the intelligence area, where respondents recognize the need for better cooperation between civilian and military authorities.

Looking at the separation versus immersion dichotomy, Finland considers itself to be Huntingtonian. However, when looking at other dimensions than the task dimension (law, society and public administration), the amount of immersion is actually very high. There are relatively few legal limitations to a domestic role for the FDF, although the law does state that the defense of Finland always takes priority. Once support is given, there are relatively few restrictions regarding the use of force. As for immersion in society, due to conscription the military is very visible. It also works actively to promote itself in society. Interestingly – also from a perspective of civilian control – the FDF have the

legal obligation to foster the will of the population to defend the country. Finally, as discussed, the FDF have a strong position in the security domain as well. The Security Committee, chaired jointly by the Ministry of Defense and the Prime Minister's Office, plays an important role in that. Furthermore, the National Defense Courses, organized by the FDF, provide the armed forces with access to and influence over the country's elite.

The data clearly show that alignment between the government, the population and the military regarding the 'proper' role of the FDF is in fact very strong in Finland. There are strong ties between the FDF and the political level on the one hand, and between the FDF and the population on the other. Finnish culture and history play an important role here. The prime task of the armed forces is to defend Finland against an armed attack, and as the Russian threat is considered the prime threat by all players, a debate on new domestic roles for the military has simply hardly come up at all. The cyber domain is perhaps the only exception, related to grey zone threats where again Russia (but also China) is seen as the prime risk. The mere existence of conscription (for men) most likely fosters this alignment, as more or less all men have been through the same experience, which has shaped their opinions on what the role of the armed forces should be. In this sense, the Finnish case can be considered the opposite of the Dutch case, in which there was alignment on a changing role for the armed forces.

Finland may be considered a case in which the traditional separation versus immersion dichotomy is less appropriate (as has been argued by Schiff for countries like Israel and India as well (Schiff, 1995), as it is a stable democracy (even taking the above-mentioned challenges into account) and has a high amount of immersion at the same time. As the external threat has not really diminished after the Cold War, the work of Desch on the impact of a changing threat environment is not so relevant in the Finnish context (Desch, 1998) and the balance between the republican exchange and the control exchange (Levy, 2012) has not changed significantly. Consequently, this study has not provided evidence for a rebalancing effort by the state, as was the case in the Netherlands. For example, there have been no militarization efforts, large budget cuts or burden redistribution as have taken place in many other western countries in that era.

What does this mean for civilian control of the armed forces? On paper, at least, civilian control is firmly established and there are clear rules on the powers of the armed forces when supporting other authorities. On the other hand, this study has shown that the FDF have a lot of influence in public administration and security strategy, both in a formal way (e.g. the Security Committee) and in an informal way (e.g. the National Defense Courses). The Finnish situation arguably does not match the subjective control that for Janowitz matched the immersion paradigm. Rather, it matches Travis' "pragmatic civilian

control' as the preferred model (Travis, 2017, 2020). In fact, pragmatism characterizes the Finnish culture. And although formally civilian control is firmly in place, the Finnish situation shows elements of Bland's theory of shared responsibility as well (Bland, 1999), with the military participating in political decision-making. Taking the work of Levy, a high external threat in combination with militarization leads to a high level of autonomy for the military (Kuehn & Levy, 2021a). I would argue that the Finnish case confirms this theory, as demilitarization efforts have largely been unsuccessful and the position of the FDF remains strong.

APPENDIX: TABLE 7.1: POLICY OPTIONS FOR A CHANGING DOMESTIC ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Domain	What	Why	Why not	Preconditions
Civic education	- General conscription for men - Women on voluntary basis - Discussion about gender equality. - Common call-up day for men and women - Information days at schools - Social conscription - Variation in time: from short security course to regular military service - National Defense Courses	- External threat - Foster social cohesion and strengthen equality - Integration of migrants - Positive effect National Defense Courses on the position of the military	- Operational needs do not justify conscription for the entire age group (men and women) - Defense related education in schools is considered as militarization of society by some	- Social cohesion argument only works with large numbers and when gender neutral - Must generate additional operational value, strengthen equality and the will to defend the country
Police tasks	- Reluctance to use the armed forces for police tasks - Use of military materiel in exceptional occasions - Legal possibilities are there: search, arrest, traffic, security and surveillance, explosives. Use of force is allowed	- Armed forces can provide specific capabilities in exceptional situations - Resource potential	- Risk of using violence against the population - Impact on the reputation of the armed forces when using violence - Police can deal with police matters, supported by Customs and Border Guard - Preference to separate law enforcement from warfare	- Only in extraordinary situations (e.g. the pandemic) - No use of conscripts in contact with the population - Only when police resources are insufficient and always under police command - First task of the FDF (military defense of Finland) must not be jeopardized - Principles: respect for human rights, proportionality, least harm, purpose limitation
Cyber domain	- Cooperation and coordination - Cyber conscripts - Cyber version of Border Guard, Customs and Police?	- Difficult to attribute cyber-attacks - Cyber capabilities are too separated	Legal obstacles, for example in sharing information	Legal aspects must be dealt with

Domain	What	Why	Why not	Preconditions
Crisis management	Support civilian authorities in case of crises and disasters	Uncontroversial, appreciated role		Never in the lead
Intelligence	Cooperation between military and civilian actors	Grey-zone threats	Legal obstacles	Legal aspects must be dealt with
Hybrid forces	- Border Guard is a hybrid force and multipurpose authority - Close cooperation between Police, Customs and Border Guard - Police reserve with armed forces personnel?	- Support each other in remote locations - Motivated by lack of resources - Hybrid warfare situations	Preference for a separation of agencies	May use each other's powers on request (or in emergencies without request)