Deception, risk, and evasion: the politics of sovereign debt in emerging markets
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Propositions

Relating to the subject of the dissertation:

1. Governments in the Global South use financial transparency strategically to gain advantages in global markets.

2. International financial institutions prioritize their own financial stability, sometimes at the expense of borrowing governments.

3. The success of fiscal consolidation depends on citizens' reciprocal relationship with the government.

4. The strategic choices of borrowing governments in concealing sovereign debt reshape global financial governance by undermining the transparency mandates of international institutions.

Relating to the field of international political economy:

5. The rise of China as an alternative lender has weakened the traditional dominance of Western financial institutions in sovereign debt governance.

6. International financial institutions, while claiming to promote stability, inadvertently incentivize risky borrowing practices among developing states.

7. The agency of debtor governments in shaping global financial markets is underestimated, as they employ financial statecraft to manipulate creditor conditions.

8. The willingness of citizens to evade taxes under austerity reflects a broader crisis of legitimacy in global financial institutions.

Relating to societal subjects:

9. Academic solutions to society's most urgent crises will be incomplete until theory and methods are explicitly adapted to research within the Global South.