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Citation

Ye, Z. (2025, May 20). *Emotion deception in negotiations and bargaining*. *Dissertatiereeks Kurt Lewin Instituut*. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/4246456>

Version: Publisher's Version

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Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/4246456>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

Summary: English & Dutch

Emotion deception in negotiations and bargaining

This dissertation examines the role of emotion misrepresentation in negotiations and bargaining, offering insights into how negotiators perceive and use emotion deception strategies to influence their counterparts. While traditional research has highlighted the interpersonal effects of emotional communication (e.g., Lelieveld et al., 2011, 2012, 2013; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b), this work focuses on the underexplored domain of emotion misrepresentation – the strategic display of emotions different from what one genuinely feels. Building on theories such as the Emotion as Social Information (EASI) model (Van Kleef, 2009, 2014; Van Kleef et al., 2010, 2012), the dissertation underscores the social functionality of emotions and their implications for negotiation dynamics. The research is presented in two parts (containing four empirical chapters), each addressing distinct aspects of emotion misrepresentation, followed by a general discussion on the findings and their broader implications.

Part I investigates how negotiators perceive and respond to counterparts who deceptively or genuinely communicate anger or happiness. Drawing on a series of experiments, **Chapter 2** reveals that the perceptions and responses to deceptive emotion communications vary significantly depending on the type of emotion and the nature of its misrepresentation. For example, communicating anger, whether genuine or deceptive, signals stricter limits, prompting higher concessions. Conversely, communicating happiness while actually feeling anger is often perceived as a sacrificial gesture, eliciting more favorable

responses in terms of post-negotiation outcomes. These findings refine the EASI model by highlighting that the impact of emotion communication depends not only on its perceived authenticity but also on the specific type of deception employed.

Chapter 3 extends this analysis by exploring the social evaluations of emotion misrepresentation across three fundamental dimensions: morality, sociability, and competence. Using different negotiation contexts and goals, the studies demonstrate that perceptions of deceptive anger and happiness vary on these evaluative dimensions. For instance, deceptive anger is often seen as immoral but competent, while deceptive happiness is perceived as more sociable. The findings emphasize that negotiators' evaluations are shaped not only by the type of emotion and misrepresentation but also by the specific negotiation context and goals. Specifically, negotiators prioritize traits related to morality or sociability when selecting opponents, whereas they value traits associated with competence when choosing representatives for future negotiations.

Part II shifts the focus to how negotiators themselves use emotion misrepresentation strategies, particularly with regard to the communication of supplication emotions (e.g., disappointment and sadness) and appeasement emotions (e.g., guilt and shame). **Chapter 4** investigates the disparity between experienced and communicated emotions and examines how these strategies differ across negotiation stages – before versus after a final offer is determined. Results indicate that negotiators often exaggerate supplication emotions, rather than appeasement emotions, during negotiations (before the final offer is determined) to secure better outcomes. These findings highlight the relation between strategic adaptation of emotional displays, negotiation stage, and its underlying motives.

Chapter 5 addresses cultural variations in emotion misrepresentation by comparing Chinese and U.S. negotiators. Given different cultural norms regarding emotional expression and deception, this chapter investigates how negotiators from these cultures misrepresent supplication and appeasement emotions. The results reveal both similarities and differences across cultures. American negotiators, like Dutch negotiators (in Chapter 4), tend to exaggerate supplication emotions during negotiations, while Chinese negotiators are more likely to exaggerate appeasement emotions. This cross-

cultural perspective enhances the understanding of emotion misrepresentation, highlighting the critical role of cultural context in shaping strategic emotional behaviors.

To summarize, this dissertation advances the literature on the social functional approaches of emotions (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Van Dijk et al., 2008) in negotiations by shedding light on the nuanced dynamics of emotion misrepresentation. The findings contribute to theoretical frameworks such as the EASI model (e.g., Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef et al., 2012), with the potential of offering practical implications for negotiation training and conflict resolution practices. By uncovering how deceptive emotional strategies are perceived and employed across different contexts and cultures, this work paves the way for future research to explore additional emotional and contextual variables. Ultimately, the dissertation underscores the complex interplay between emotion, perception, and strategy in shaping negotiation outcomes.