



Terrorist Black Holes

A study into terrorist sanctuaries
and governmental weakness



Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies





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Summary

Research Problem

In light of the growing interest in terrorist sanctuaries, failed/ weak states and terrorism, the Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies has commissioned a report to answer the following two questions:

1. What areas constitute terrorist sanctuaries?
2. What factors have amounted to these areas becoming terrorist sanctuaries?

In formulating the answer, the concept of *black holes* is introduced. This report conceptualises *black holes* as areas where effective state control is jeopardised and which are inhabited by criminal, terrorist or militant non-state actors. In this research, the focus lies on terrorist non-state actors (*terrorist black holes*). The theory of *black holes* is proposed as a refinement to the state failure theory, which has up until now been considered the authoritative approach for studying terrorism and state weakness.

Methodology

A list of 41 terrorist black holes has been compiled, from which six cases have been selected for exploratory qualitative analysis.

Results and Conclusions

The relevance of the study ‘Terrorist Black Holes’ is two-fold:

1. It complements current thinking about state fragility and terrorism.
2. It is a step towards refining terrorism risk assessments and analyses.

In so doing, it can contribute to the development of intelligence products by CCSS/ TNO in relation to transnational terrorism. In itself it will serve as the basis for further academic research.

The study ‘Terrorist Black Holes’ has been a first step in a research aimed at uncovering terrorist sanctuaries. By no means has it been intended to offer the reader generic conclusions with a polished methodology. Instead, this first step should be seen as setting the scene for future research efforts. The results provided in the report offer TNO/CCSS with a conceptual framework and research fundamentals from which to embark on further, more in-depth and detailed analyses.

A brief summation of some of the most relevant conclusions of the research follows.

1. This research takes the perspective of the terrorist actor as its point of departure and looks at the terrorist actor’s necessities for its operations. Its perspective is non-state to the point that the research identifies areas, rather than states, as places to which terrorist groups are attracted.
2. Terrorist groups/individuals/networks are found in areas that are firstly, characterized by low levels of government control and secondly, that have specific characteristics making the area attractive for the performance of terrorist support activities or the terrorist act itself. These latter characteristics are encapsulated under the term ‘terrorist comparative advantage’. The areas that combine these two components and to which terrorist groups are attracted are termed ‘terrorist black holes’.

- 3 Both governmental weakness and terrorist comparative advantages allow a terrorist group freedom of movement and action, which forms the key of the attraction of a particular area.
- 4 The first part of the research has resulted in a list of 41 terrorist black holes in the world found between 2000 and 2005. From the case studies, five categories of factors have emerged that contribute to the lack of government control in an area:
 - Societal Tensions
 - Legacy from Civil Conflict
 - Geography
 - Corruption and Policy Failure
 - External Interference

And six factors have been identified that constitute a comparative advantage for that area to be inhabited by terrorist non-state actors:

- Religion and Ethnicity
 - Legacy from Civil Conflict
 - Geography
 - Economic Opportunities
 - Economic Underdevelopment
 - Regional Stimuli
- 5 The characteristics that render an area a potential black hole have been in place for a substantial period of time, mostly more than five years. This facilitates the early identification of areas at risk of becoming black holes.
 - 6 Black holes in themselves are not homogenous. A ranking of terrorist black holes has been proposed on the basis of the terrorist activities taking place in the area in question. Four categories, ranging from 1 to 4, have been formulated. The first two categories are so-called 'battlefield' black holes where (or in the neighbourhood of which) the terrorist actor also engages in the act of terrorism itself. The latter two are 'support' black holes, where the terrorist group finds conditions that are conducive to its support activities such as logistics, refuges and human resource management. This approach can be a tool in assessing the risk resulting from a black hole area. Using the four black hole categories proposed in this report can also be helpful in making a systematic prioritisation of black holes on the basis of the nature of the terrorist presence.
 - 7 There is a clear link between the location where particular ethnic/religious communities live and the presence of a terrorist group with a similar background. Where particular types of communities live is important. Not only does this include those places where there are social tensions potentially leading to violence (i.e. civil conflict in which terrorist groups participate). Instead, the mere presence of a particular community can be reason for a terrorist group to find sanctuary there. This observation can be traced back to guerrilla doctrine, whereby the support of the rural population is a necessity to the guerrilla warrior as it is from this population that he draws logistic support, refuge and accommodation. In other words,

it is the population that grants the guerrilla/terrorist freedom of movement and action.

- 8 How geography can aid an insurgency and become an obstacle to authorities is a premise that has also been fundamental to guerrilla doctrine however, it is again underlined in this research. Geographic characteristics on the one hand may hamper the ability of the government to control its territory and will on the other hand facilitate the freedom of movement of terrorist groups. From this research it has become apparent that geography should not be viewed only as physical topography, urban environments are likewise included. Terrorist actors can exploit the anonymity provided by the sprawling 'urban jungle' in similar ways as Iraqi insurgents can seek refuge in the marshes along the Euphrates river.
- 9 This observation is relevant to the study of black holes in the Western world. An area's combination of particular religious/ethnic communities and an urban non-permissive environment has the potential of being rendered a terrorist black hole. There are numerous similarities between the circumstances in the Lebanese refugee camps that render it attractive to terrorist groups and the degenerating, dog-eat-dog atmosphere of the suburbs in some of Europe's major cities. There where the authority of (local) government is compromised, and where communities exist which have a background similar to that of a terrorist group, or where there is ethnic strife, black holes can be created.

On the whole, the research results in this report confirm the usefulness of the concept of black holes and validate the black hole analysis framework as a useful analytical tool.

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I Introduction

*'Bad governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability – and civil conflict corrode States from within. In some cases, this has brought about the collapse of State institutions. Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan under the Taliban are the best known recent examples. Collapse of the State can be associated with obvious threats, such as organized crime or terrorism. State failure is an alarming phenomenon that undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability.'*¹

In the wake of the post Cold War euphoria of the 1990s, Europe has come to realise that its prosperity and security remain threatened. Both traditional 'hard' and unconventional 'soft' threats strain Western societies. Aging populations, large non-western immigrant groups having difficulties finding their place in modern Western society, lagging economic performance, environmental degradation, and a flagging EU integration project have accompanied the rise of traditional, yet unconventional security threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. With regard to these latter threats, the attacks on New York, Madrid and London have brought to Europeans the realisation that their position of privilege cannot be maintained in passive isolation. Taking the cue from the Bush administration's problematic war in Iraq, the European governments as well as institutions in Brussels have begun devising strategies to complement the US' military approach to targetting terrorists, by focusing on the 'root causes' of, and societal and economic factors that contribute to, terrorism.

Similarly, the fall of the Berlin Wall at the beginning of the past decade and the wave of democratisation that followed throughout the 1990's created several fragile and instable regimes, youthful democracies and underdeveloped civil societies. Tajikistan, Georgia and Azerbaijan are only some examples of newly independent states that have suffered from fragile political institutions. Social tensions of the past were released as the lid of the Cold War was removed. Other forms of state fragility have included ethnic tensions across the Balkans, civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa and manifestations of violence driven by separatism in South and South-East Asia. At the same time, globalisation has come upon us through the increased interconnectivity of economies and people around the globe. These developments have made the world both smaller and at the same time more delicate. Western, developed states fair well on a wave of global stability, but are vulnerable to turbulence. State failure is such a form of turbulence. However the threat of this turbulence remains obscure. As the EU Security Strategy above contends, there is indeed a relationship between state fragility and the movements of terrorist actors. Fully understanding the dynamic that arises from failed states calls for studying the composite threat offered by the interaction between terrorist organisations and state failure. In attempting to uncover the reasons why certain terrorist groups are located in certain areas around the world, this research offers the thesis that terrorist groups look for characteristics of particular territories instead of the entirety of states. These territories are referred to as *black holes*. One of their key characteristics is that effective government control over the area has been rendered difficult, allowing the terrorist actor to exploit that vacuum of authority. Black holes are those areas in the world where

¹ EU Security Strategy, "A Secure Europe in a Better World", p.3.


effective government authority is weak and non-state actors with malevolent intent can thrive.

The black hole approach to terrorism can be instrumental because it provides an answer to security issues facing Western governments. Namely 'how can we determine where terrorists find sanctuary, why do they choose those locations and, most importantly, what threat they pose to us?'. In so doing, it can aid governments to identify and assess the threat posed by terrorist actors outside their own sovereign jurisdiction. To date, most terrorist acts as well as most operations in support of terrorism take place outside of the European Union or the United States. This report will identify the black holes outside the Western world that have harboured terrorist activity in the period between 2000 and 2005. Since black holes are a dynamic concept, this list will require constant updating in order to be an accurate tool for analyzing contemporary non-state threats. The research will also perform an initial exploratory analysis into the nature of some of these black holes and the origins of the terrorist presence there. The report is meant as a first step in the process of understanding black holes and invites further investigation.

II Structure, Questions and Definitions

Report Structure

This report presents the results of a first systematic research into the topic of black holes, a concept that explores the nexus between terrorism and state fragility. The structure of the report is represented by the following image:



As we can see in this picture, the content of the report is divided into four segments: an introductory part, two sets of research methods and results, and a conclusion.

The introductory chapters of this report (chapters I and II) present the structure of the research and the report, the concept of black holes and discuss how it combines the threats of terrorism and state failure. Because of the novelty of this research topic, the first chapters will also extensively discuss the definitions relating to terrorism and state failure adhered to in this report.

The research performed to produce this report has been two-tracked: first, a list of currently existing black holes has been compiled, after which case studies explored the nature and causes of some of these black holes in more detail. Therefore, the middle section of the report has been divided into two research parts, one for each of these research-tracks:

- 1 the research methods and results of compiling the list of black holes (chapter III) and
- 2 the research methods and results of the case studies, from which the research derives the most important factors that render an area a black hole (chapter IV).

The final chapter discusses conclusions drawn from the research results, as well as the practical implications of these results. An important element in this concluding chapter will be to highlight the difference between the black holes approach and former approaches to terrorism and state failure and emphasise the applicability of black hole theory.

Research Problems

Terrorism and our responses to it are contemporary security topics whose exposure in the media, public and academic debate are hard to equal. Researchers and politicians alike are attempting to place terrorism in the 'bigger picture', to conceptualise terrorism and the threat it poses to open, democratic societies. Their aim being to design counterterrorism strategies that 'root out' terrorists and destroy their assets and support. With this aim in mind, scholars in many academic fields have applied their knowledge to the concept of terrorism in order to come to a better understanding of the occurrence of terrorism and the motivations of terrorists. Thus, some apply economic models in order to explain terrorist behaviour, whereas others emphasise the religious and cultural motives underlying terrorist activity. Others focus on the (individual or collective) processes of radicalisation, or view the occurrence of terrorism in a longer term historic perspective.

This paper takes a slightly different approach, which is best described by the terms 'structuralist' and 'rational-choice'. It aims to discern elements of the structure in which terrorism and terrorist groups function but at the same time maintains that terrorist actors make a cost-benefit analysis regarding where they settle. An example of the 'structuralist' school of thought in terrorism studies is the research performed in search of its 'root causes'. The 'root cause' hypothesis states that there are factors embedded in the social fabric which can predispose an individual to opting for terrorist acts; social and economic structures that are significantly contributory to an individual's choice for resorting to terrorist means in a given society. The argument made in this paper shares with the 'root cause' theory its base that terrorism is somehow stimulated or motivated by certain circumstances and that individuals are not born 'evil' or as terrorists. However there are two important distinctions. Firstly, the authors of this research take as central premises that although there are factors that contribute to an individual becoming a terrorist, it is ultimately the choice of an individual and these contributing factors cannot be used to attenuate the circumstances under which a terrorist act takes place. As such the analysis presented here should not be seen as a fundamental explanation for terrorism, but rather as a means of understanding the operations of terrorist organisations and as a starting point in order to discern which areas contain an increased risk of harbouring terrorist organisations. Secondly, in contrast to the study of 'root causes', this research takes a more specific stance: it argues that certain areas are more likely to harbour terrorist organisations than others. In these areas activities are undertaken in support of terrorist operations. Certain comparative advantages exist in the areas which make it attractive to a terrorist group.

It is in this focus on areas that this paper departs from the 'root cause' and other structural theories. It assumes that terrorists, like other violent political groups, 'need a home'² and that terrorist sanctuaries share certain characteristics that attract or spawn terrorist organisations. This research aims at discovering some of the factors that enhance this process. This is not to say that all terrorist groups are free to choose their territory, and base their operations wherever they please in the world. Obviously, many terrorist groups have local roots and objectives and are therefore limited to a certain state. But even within that state, they have a degree of freedom where to base their

2 Takeyh, R., & Gvosdev, N., 'Do Terrorist Networks need a Home?', in *The Washington Quarterly*, 25:3 (Summer 2002), pp. 97-108.

activities and operations. Taking this as an assumption, this research attempts to explain why some areas are more attractive to terrorist organisations than others.³

The main research puzzle addressed in this report is therefore the ontological question: why do non-state terrorist organisations find sanctuary in particular regions/ areas?

The concept of ‘sanctuary’ is central to this research. According to Webster’s dictionary sanctuary is strictly defined as ‘a place of refuge/ asylum.’ From that perspective this research would examine those areas in the world where terrorist organisations can hide. This is only *pars pro toto* to the research. Here the term ‘sanctuary’ covers a broader concept. Sanctuary to terrorist organisations implies not only a refuge from persecution but also a place where they can deploy activities in support of their initial objectives. It is assumed that terrorist organisations are international pariahs and that there are only a limited number of areas in the world where they are able to deploy those activities in order to survive and further their interests. Places where they can recruit, train and find refuge. Afghanistan under the Taliban regime is one of these places; an area where they can go about their activities unchecked. That is a sanctuary.

Chapter II and III will be devoted to an elaboration of the concept of *black holes* and their role in harbouring terrorists, and offer a list of areas where terrorist groups have found sanctuary. In chapter IV, this paper uses case studies from the data set created in the first part to determine the factors that render an area a terrorist *black hole*.

Research
Questions

This paper is therefore structured around the following two questions:

- 1 In which areas around the world do terrorist groups find sanctuary?
- 2 Why do these terrorist organisations base their activities in those areas?

In answering these research questions, this paper takes the perspective of Western states (most notably those members of the NATO alliance) and examines those terrorist groups and *black holes* that these Western states consider a serious threat to their security. Understandably this can be considered an academically subjective premise from which to venture on the research. The reason for this is due to the highly political nature of the subject; the dictum ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ makes any choice of terrorist group to analyse potentially questionable. Nevertheless, because the objective of this research is not to judge non-state terrorist actors but rather to understand what type of area of operations they require, this choice for a Western perspective should not hamper the validity of the research.

The following paragraphs will provide the reader with a discussion of the theoretical principles and definitions on which the analysis in this paper is based. A lucid outline of definitions, assumptions and research choices is essential in providing a solid base for further analysis.

³ For a more detailed description of the methods and theoretical framework concerning this approach, see below in the sections on Research Methods.

Definitions

*'A wrong definition - like the Ptolemaic definition of the earth as a flat disk - makes certain solutions impossible because they are not thinkable in that particular framework'*⁴

Terrorism

Terrorism is notoriously difficult to define, not only because it is inherently hard to conceptualise, but also because of the politicised nature of the concept. Two key dimensions of any definition of terrorism are presented below.

Following the analysis of R. Spiers, terrorism is a means, a tactic with which violent actors attempt to attain political objectives.⁵ Tactics can be applied by any actor, irrespective of his nature, character or background. Individuals and groups (and even states) alike can strive to obtain political objectives through terrorist tactics. This notion of terrorism as a tactic in political conflict is one of the crucial elements of the definition of terrorism that is given below and adhered to in this paper.

The label of terrorism should not and cannot be applied to all forms of political violence. Terrorism *per se* contains an element of fear,⁶ of fright (from the verb *terrere* in Latin), that is instilled into the minds of the public and politicians, with the aim of forcing them to give in to the terrorist's demands. This terror is evoked by the application of violence to civilians, to people who are untrained and unprepared to face physical violence. In modern states, the monopoly on the use of force and violence has been delegated to the state, which has created special institutions (the military and police) to deal with internal or external violence. Terrorism disregards the separation between the civilian and military sphere and specifically attacks civilian ('soft', non-military) targets. The second crucial dimension in a definition of terrorism therefore concerns terrorism's targeting of civilians.⁷

Because the focus of this research lies on the threat of terrorism to the EU and the US, their definitions will be discussed and compared in this paper: the definition of the Council of the European Union and the United States Department of State. There is an interesting comparison to be made between the two, especially in relation to the lists of terrorist organisations that these two institutions have drafted (for a brief comparison see the subchapter *Assumptions* in Chapter III).

The Council of the EU provides the following definition of terrorism:

*'Terrorist offences can be defined as offences intentionally committed by an individual or a group against one or more countries, their institutions or people, with the aim of intimidating them and seriously altering or destroying the political, economic, or social structures of a country'*⁸

⁴ Crelinsten and Schmid (eds) *Western Responses to Terrorism*, page 315.

⁵ Spiers, R. *The Anatomy of Terrorism*. In: Foreign Service Journal, September 2004. Found on: <http://www.afsa.org/fsj/sept04/Spiers.pdf>.

⁶ Ruby, C. *The Definition of Terrorism*. In: *Analysis of Social Issues and Public Policy*, Volume 2 Issue 1, December 2002.

⁷ Ruby, C. *The Definition of Terrorism*. In: *Analysis of Social Issues and Public Policy*, Volume 2 Issue 1, December 2002.

⁸ Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism. Found on: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/doc/com_01_521.pdf.

Several aspects of this definition demand elaboration. Firstly, the Council of the European Union provides not a definition of terrorism, but of a terrorist offence. The term ‘terrorist offence’ emphasises terrorism as a violent action that is used to attain political change by attacking ‘political, economic and social structures’. Thus the first necessary dimension of terrorism as discussed above (terrorism as a tactic) is integrated into this definition. The second dimension (violent actions against citizens) is also met. In relation to this, the targets that are circumscribed in this definition include all possible institutions of a country including military.

Interestingly, the EU defines terrorist offenders as ‘an individual or a group’ and excludes states from the spectrum of terrorist actors. Apparently, the Council deems the occurrence of terrorist states unlikely, or at least does not consider those a threat to European Union Member States necessitating inclusion in this definition.

US Definition
of Terrorism

The US State Department offers a flexible definition:

‘[Terrorism is] premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.’⁹

This definition leaves much more room for variation in interpretation than the one drafted by the European Union. Most likely this is due to the difference in legal traditions; common vs. civic law. The definition does however, include the two essential abovementioned dimensions: first, the idea of terrorism as an action with the aim to instill fear and using violence to achieve its political goals and second, the dimension of terrorism as violence directed at civilians.

In line with these definitions, the focus of this paper lies on non-state terrorist actors, or terrorist groups, or terrorist networks. A **terrorist group** is any group that resorts to terrorism in order to attain political objectives. A group of loose but interconnected individuals can be considered a network. Groups, networks, organisations and other outfits can be regarded as ‘terrorist’ when they apply terrorism. The terms *group*, *organisation* and *network* will be used intermittently, as for the purposes of this research the distinctions between them is not of essence.

Important however is the distinction between locally and globally operating terrorist organisations and those with local and global objectives. This obviously has effects on the spread of their operations worldwide. Globally oriented and globally operating terrorist groups are practically all related to the Jihadist movement of which Bin Laden has been a leader/motivator and Al Qaeda the main exponent. These groups and networks are anti-systemic in the sense that they struggle against the global system in which Western (Christian) cultures seem to dominate the world’s other cultures, most notably Islam.¹⁰ Locally interested and locally operating terrorist organisations are for instance the Aum Shinrikyo movement in Japan. Between these two extremes the whole host of other organisations can be found. A significant number (possibly the majority) of organisations are hybrid to the extent that they have local interests but operate on a global scale. Terrorist organisations with local interests, such as FARC, Hezbollah and the Harakat ul-Mujahideen, have different ideological backgrounds, ranging from Maoism to extreme Muslim ethno-nationalism. These organisations, engage in terrorist

⁹ US Department of State.

¹⁰ See for instance, De Wijk, R., et al., *Background Contributing Factors to Terrorism: Radicalisation and Recruitment*, forthcoming.

Terrorist
Activities

acts only in specific areas, but use other areas in the world for their support activities. Obtaining financial capital is for instance an activity which often takes place on a global scale. Thus, groups with a local cause can be international or even global in their activities. Vice versa, global Jihadist outfits can have some traits which are very local, because for instance recruitment mostly takes place on the basis of familial, clan, tribal or ethnic ties. Nonetheless, all terrorist organisations perform terrorist acts to attain certain political objectives and engage in a set of activities to be able to perform these acts.

The first and foremost of those activities common to terrorist and other militant organisations is the act itself, the staging of operations. In pursuit of their objectives, terrorist organisations apply violent means against non-combatant victims and other ‘soft’ targets, trying to ‘scare’ their opponents into submission. Subsequently, to perform these operations, terrorists need both the capital (financial and otherwise) and the human resources; the staff and capable operatives (which need to be managed and trained). Also, most terrorist groups need to establish a base from which to operate and coordinate operations, as well as hide-outs before and after operations. Often, but not always, these two final activities go hand in hand and are co-located.

Hence, five terrorist support activities and one operational activity have been identified for the purposes of this research;¹¹

Support Activities

- The collection of capital; mostly financial but can include any economic means to sustain activities. It also includes weapons and ammunition.
- Human resource management (HRM); this involves the fluid managing of individuals throughout the network or the different ranks and activities of the group. Because self-recruitment and auto-radicalisation of terrorists often take place, the responsibility of the terrorist group then lies in coaching these individuals. It involves the selection of those individuals which are considered willing and able, but also implies familiarising suitable individuals with the workings of the group or network. It involves spotting and offering overall guidance to recently radicalised individuals who are willing to partake in terrorist activities. In general, it concerns all activities related to the management of the personnel of the terrorist group or network. Areas for HRM can be those where active recruitment is undertaken or where self-recruitment takes place (passive recruitment).
- The training of recruits, either in training camps or in live combat situations.¹²
- Hide-outs, places to find refuge.
- The establishment of bases, usually for training or command purposes.

Operational Activity

- Staging operations, in or near the area concerned.

State Failure

Because the concept of black holes is a refinement to the theory on state failure, these paragraphs will serve as a brief introduction into this theoretical framework. The theory of **failed states** as referred to in this paper is based upon the work by Robert Rotberg

¹¹ These five activities are intentionally broad. Future research could identify other and/or stricter categories.

¹² Such as for example on the Moluccas, where operatives from JI are sent to train in real-life combat.

and others of the Failed States Project at Harvard University. According to Rotberg, 'nation-states fail when they are consumed by internal violence and cease delivering positive political goods to their inhabitants.'¹³ The literature on failed states identifies four categories of state 'strength'; strong, weak, failed and collapsed. The differentiation among them, according to Rotberg, depends on the state's performance in delivering political goods to its citizens. In political science, these political goods are often categorised in three types, all relating to the 'social contract' between 'the governing' and 'the governed':

- 1 Provide security and order in society (the security sphere);
- 2 Represent the electorate (the democratic sphere); and
- 3 Provide and protect wealth and welfare (the economic sphere).¹⁴

Providing these political goods is the core function of any state and when it fails to provide these seamlessly, state governance is weakened, the 'social contract' is put under pressure, governmental legitimacy is called into question and social tensions increase contributing to fractures in the state fabric. Widespread corruption can lead to a weakening of the state, because shadow economies are developed and government officials work for their private benefit instead of the public good. If the population has the perception of not being represented or if the government only represents part of the population or a specific group, the state becomes the focal point of tensions. If the state is unable to provide security, or maintain a monopoly over the use of force, alternative modes of security are sought. Vigilantism and gang-formation may result, which can clash with the state. With this perspective in mind the theory on state failure makes the following distinction:

- Strong states: there is governmental control over its territory, full range and high quality of political goods are being provided and a state monopoly on the use of force is in force. Examples are France, the UK, the US and many other Western (European) countries.
- Weak states: harbour various sources of social tension, although short of conflict. Both internal and external security are threatened, the government has a limited monopoly on the use of force. The Philippines, Indonesia and Sri Lanka are examples of weak states.
- Failed states: there is a presence of armed disharmony between communities; governments are often predatory and play a part in civil strife. Overall, internal and external security is compromised. There is no governmental monopoly on the use of force, as is the case in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone.
- Collapsed states: no functioning state institutions, a 'vacuum of authority'. This rare type of state failure is the ultimate failed state, such as Somalia.¹⁵

The demarcation between these four phases is not strict and states move from one category to another. With regards to this fluid movement one phase is often referred to in the literature, namely that of the 'failing' state, i.e. a state being in between the weak and the failed category. Hereby is meant a state that evolves from a situation where there is a dormant albeit present tension among communities to one with an overt, including violent, expression thereof.

¹³ Rotberg 2004: p.1.

¹⁴ Schneckener, U. p 12.

¹⁵ Rotberg, R., *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, 2003.

The Need for New Understanding

Failed, failing and collapsed states are polar opposites of the prosperous stable Western state. The concept of state failure is suitable for analyzing the threat to global structural (in)stability; as its focus of analysis lies with the nation-state and the policy response that flows forth from them is one of dealing with institution-building and the political infrastructure of the state. But in terms of the relation between state failure and terrorism, the theory falls short and additional refinement is required.

Past research into the dynamic of failed states has pursued a top-down focus; perceiving states as the central component of the international, essentially Westphalian system, whereby the failure of state institutions is the primary element of analysis. Indeed, nation-states form the core foundation of the international system, yet the presence of non-state actors, operating without government sanction, complicates this picture. After all, these groups are not connected (explicitly) to a particular government, which makes tracking and targetting the non-state actor difficult. No government can be held ultimately accountable for the activities of present-day terrorist non-state actors. These groups operate on the seams of the Westphalian system. International terrorists do not abide by the rules of the Westphalian system. They are stateless actors disconnected from any particular territory and hence able to move around at will and settle where it convenes, as long as the conditions are right.

There is a clear link between terrorism and areas with either a degree of lawlessness or symptoms of governmental weakness. The US 9/11 Commission Report has written that ‘to find sanctuary, terrorist organisations have fled to some of the least governed, most lawless places in the world.’ It is in these areas that illegal activities such as drug smuggling and arms-trafficking can be deployed that are critical to the survival of a terrorist organisation. The Report continues that ‘[t]he intelligence community [CIA, *ed.*] has prepared a world map that highlights possible terrorist havens, using no secret intelligence –just indicating areas that combine rugged terrain, weak governance, room to hide or receive supplies, and low population density with a town or city near enough to allow necessary interaction with the outside world. Large areas scattered around the world meet these criteria.[...] In the twentieth century, strategists focused on the world’s great industrial heartlands. In the twenty-first [century], the focus is in the opposite direction, toward remote regions and failing states.’¹⁶ This research follows in the lines of this recommendation. State failure creates environments where terrorist organisations can base or expand their operations with respect to terrorist actions without being scrutinised by a central government.¹⁷ But does this imply that in every weak or failed state we find terrorist groups? Logic presumes that terrorist organisations seek those areas where the environment is most favorable to their operations, where the comparative advantage is in their favor. Whether it concerns guiding those that have self-recruited, logistical activities or endeavors to expand the financial base of the organisation, terrorist groups are attracted to those areas where their transaction costs are lowest and their freedom of action is at an optimum; terrorist organisations seek areas with the comparative advantage. Obviously this is not in a strong state where government exercises effective control.¹⁸ One could compare terrorist groups to other modern multinational enterprises. Both organisations namely have specific objectives

¹⁶ The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Norton & Co., p.366-367.

¹⁷ Takeyh and Gvosdev, 2002.

¹⁸ Unless when state-sponsored terrorism is concerned.

and undertake activities necessary to meet these objectives, have a global outlook and will locate themselves or part of their operations in those areas which best suit their preferences. Just as the multinational has its headquarters in country A due to i.e. the lenient tax regime, bases part of its offices in country B because it can get subsidies, constructs its material in country C because of the low labour costs and sells mainly in country D because of the market potential, a terrorist organisation is no different to the extent that it makes an implicit cost-benefit analysis of its areas of operation, seeking specific advantageous characteristics, perhaps even using specific areas for specific purposes and avoiding high transaction costs imposed by effective governance that make operating difficult or impossible. Freedom of action for a terrorist organisation is not created through the effective enforcement of contract law, a beneficial social welfare system or a AAA-credit rating, instead in order to deploy operations fully terrorists seek the area on the one hand where they are able to go untracked and unmeddled by governments such as very isolated terrain or by blending into an area which is occupied by similar-minded people that strive for a level of autonomy by whom they can be supported and camouflaged. Or on the other hand, the non-state actors go to those areas where they find support from local corrupt authorities, which can shield them from central scrutiny. The internationally operating terrorists' area of choice, the place with greatest comparative advantage, in which they can find sanctuary or deploy activities in support of their terrorist operations are lawless areas, whether they are in collapsed, failed, failing states or not.¹⁹

The dilemma that arises out of the literature on state failure with respect to studying its relation to terrorism is that due to its focus on states it fails to take the terrorist's, essentially non-state, perspective into account. As mentioned the literature makes a distinction between weak, failed and failing states. This hierarchy of failure implicitly creates a hierarchy of danger. Somalia is considered a collapsed state, Afghanistan a failed state, Indonesia a failing state and Kenya a weak state.²⁰ This distinction would lead one to believe that Somalia is more dangerous to the international system than Afghanistan, and Afghanistan more so than Indonesia, and so on. However, this is not necessarily the case. Al Qaeda and allied organisations have been operating in all four states, with Afghanistan being the primary headquarters during the Taliban regime. Loretta Napoleoni points out that it is weak states (and not collapsed states) that are a primary sanctuary for terrorists. 'Weak states offer other advantages to those engaged in terror. They provide territory for training camps and armed bases. [...] Weak states with low or non-existent law enforcement are ideal grounds for smuggling. Weak states may also offer opportunities in legitimate business [...].'²¹ She juxtaposes this to collapsed states. 'Paradoxically, a collapsed state is a less protective cocoon [...] than a failed state. This is because a collapsed state does not maintain any elements of legitimacy: it lacks government and foreign policy; internationally, it is perceived as a country with a weak, or no, identity.[...] Failed states, instead, retain the outward elements of sovereignty; even if they cannot control their borders, as in Sudan or Afghanistan, they maintain the footprint of territoriality. A violation of their territory by an outside power is perceived as an act of war; this is why armed groups can easily hide inside the borders of a failed state, as bin Laden did in Afghanistan.'²² Napoleoni draws the

¹⁹ The relationship between terrorist groups and state weakness is a two-way street. Not only do terrorist groups seek particular areas but they also sustain the lawless character of the territory in which they are settled. Hence the relationship is circular.

²⁰ Rotberg 2002.

²¹ Napoleoni 2004, p.191.

²² Napoleoni 2004, p.190.

conclusion that '[t]he ideal breeding ground for terror is, therefore, a weak state that is slipping into a failing or failed state. It is within the progressive erosion of central power, and the escalating power struggle among fading state institutions, that terror groups are able to form surprising strategic alliances.'²³ So the ideal breeding ground would be the weak state.²⁴ However this only partially explains the places where we find terrorist sanctuaries. It does not answer why we find terrorist organisations in some weak states and not in others. And why some areas are used by terrorist groups for other purposes and not as a terrorist breeding ground (self-recruitment and training) but rather for e.g. engaging in economic activities to acquire funding.

Besides, the concept of failure is fluid and leads to difficulties of definition. When is a state weak or failing? When it cannot control 15, 20 or 25% of its national territory? Or can a state also be weak or failing if several of its political institutions do not function but overall monopoly of the use of force is still in the hands of the government? Is a collapsed state at peace more dangerous than a weak state in ethnic political turmoil? These are questions that the theory on state failure finds difficult to answer but which are relevant for this study. This information is a necessity for the policy-maker to formulate a response. The state-centered perspective limits the ability to grasp the movements and rationale of the non-state terrorist actor. Terrorist groups are not located in states *per se*, rather they are located in specific areas in particular states. They seek out the soft spots, the weak seams of the Westphalian nation-state and the international order that it has created. Sometimes the territory's boundaries coincide with the entire territory of a state, as with Somalia, but mostly this is not the case. Traditional weak spots, like border areas are more likely. Terrorist organisations operate on the fringes of this Westphalian system, in the grey areas of territoriality. Border areas such as the Afghan-Pakistani border or the tri-border region in central South America, isolated terrain such as the Pankisi gorge in Georgia or the Sahel, conflict areas where ethnic separatists are waging a struggle against the central government such as Aceh in Indonesia or the Sulu archipelago in the Philippines, regions that are in a chaotic (post-)conflict stage such as Sierra Leone or Kashmir or areas that have suffered from such a dramatic economic decline that a shadow economy has taken over able to be exploited by terrorist groups such as in Albania. Terrorists seek lawless areas in states with failing institutions; they are not content by being in any weak or failed states, but rather in specific failed areas in those states. The shroud of legitimacy that a weak state offers to a terrorist organisation is helpful but it does not complete the story. When the October 2001 campaign to change the regime in Kabul started, Al Qaeda and the Taliban scaled down and dispersed regionally. Where to? To new and other sanctuaries. The state of Afghanistan in itself no longer remained a sanctuary but parts of its territory did. Al Qaeda operatives and Taliban retreated to the areas of lawlessness around the Afghan-Pakistani border and the South Eastern flank of the country, the traditional base of the Taliban between Kandahar in Afghanistan and Peshawar in Pakistan. Here, in these tribal areas, they can move freely due to the isolated terrain and are able to blend in with the local population, finding often religiously- or ethnic-based support for their cause.

²³ Napoleoni 2004, p.191.

²⁴ A further difficulty with the theory on state failure is that there exists the potential of a semantic traffic jam when it comes to making a clear distinction with regards to the extent of failure a state is in. What is the correct denomination of Afghanistan: failed, weak, failing or perhaps even collapsed? Rotberg defines it as failed, but from Napoleoni's quotes above it does not seem at all clear. It remains difficult if not impossible to draw a clear line; this especially concerns the distinction weak vs. failing and failing vs. failed.

A significant part of the puzzle remains to be solved. We need to look closer at the state, within the state and beyond the state in order to understand why a terrorist organisation is located in a particular area. The example of Afghanistan can be instructive. Even in the Afghanistan of today, under the pro-Western presidency of Hamid Karzai, Al Qaeda and Taliban pockets remain; especially in the South-East and the border areas with Pakistan. Why these pockets? And why specifically there? Some failed states are threatening and others are not. Why? In some weak, failing, failed states there are terrorists, in others there are not. Why?

The Black Hole

This paper argues that the threat arising from state fragility, as implied by the EU Security Strategy, is not directly caused by the weakening or disappearance of state structures, but rather is due to the opportunities this state fragility offers non-state actors. Fragile states are not the loci of the security threat, but rather they can be used as a means to terrorist groups and networks; which *are* a Western security threat. The fragile state is ‘merely’ the context that enables these elements to hide and thrive. Rather than focusing on states, this analysis takes the threat, i.e. the terrorist group or network as the outset and attempts to understand why a particular terrorist group is attracted to a particular area. As such a non-state perspective is held. While areas identified may consist of an entire state this is by no means necessary as the assumption is that a terrorist group will seek a particular territory on the basis of its characteristics, and these characteristics need not be present in the entire state, or may span far across it. While different areas may be used by terrorist groups for different purposes, these areas have in common that they boast terrorist comparative advantages. These areas are dubbed *black holes*.

Similar to the astronomical objects, black holes consist of territories of limited size yet with significant impact on the system as a whole. They are centers of gravity in which destructive forces are at play, where transparency is limited and where finding out what goes on inside them is difficult. Black holes come very close to the Hobbesian world where life is ‘nasty, brutish and short.’ Black holes provide the terrorist group with freedom of operations, and therefore become staging grounds for various types of activities in support of the non-state actor/ terrorist group. These activities include among others the establishment of vast infrastructure for training and HRM, but can also be activities geared at acquiring funds or the black hole may constitute a venue for refuge or gathering.²⁵

This conceptualisation of black holes is inspired by the work of several notable experts on terrorism and political institutions. Loretta Napoleoni, in *Terror Inc.*, identifies so-called failed areas ‘- regions within weak states where the central authority has ceased to exercise any power – geographical enclaves [...]’.²⁶ Anarchy is the norm in these areas, crime and violence are uncontrollable, Napoleoni continues that ‘it is in *failed areas*, therefore, that armed groups most easily establish and cement their power and legitimacy, stepping into the void created by the collapse of the central authority.’²⁷ In turn, Napoleoni’s work refers to a paper by Guillermo O’Donnell published in April

²⁵ A qualification is in place since the training of terrorists is more and more taking place on the internet. This research focuses on the physical and not the virtual realm, even though due to the absence of complete state or institutional control over the internet, it might qualify as a virtual black hole.

²⁶ Napoleoni, 2004, p.187.

²⁷ Napoleoni, 2004, p.188.

1993 titled *On the State, Democratisation and Some Conceptual Problems*. In it, O'Donnell describes so-called 'brown areas'.

'Consider, O'Donnell states, 'those regions where the local power (both those formally public as well as *de facto*) establish power circuits that operate according to rules that are inconsistent with, if not antagonistic to, the law that supposedly regulates the national territory. These are systems of private power (or, better, of privatized power, since some of the main actors hold state positions) [...] Let us imagine, a map of each country in which the areas covered by blue would designate those where there is a high degree of presence of the state (in terms of reasonably effective bureaucracies and of the effectiveness of properly sanctioned legality), both functionally and territorially; the green color would indicate a high degree of territorial penetration but a significantly lower presence in functional/class terms; and the brown color a very low or nil level in both dimensions.'²⁸

O'Donnell's work focuses on the functioning of political entities, nevertheless his thoughts are highly relevant to this topic.

As for the term *black hole* to describe these areas of lawlessness in which terrorist groups find sanctuary, it is not new. Among the most prominent scholars who have coined the term is Mary Kaldor. Referring to terrorist networks she stated that:

'[i]t is these long-running conflicts in Afghanistan, the Middle East or parts of Africa that produce 'black holes' of lawlessness, extremist ideologies and endemic insecurity. And it is in the 'black holes' that the culture of violence is nurtured. [...] Perhaps the most important element of any strategy is to deal not with terrorism per se but the 'black holes' that generate the culture of violent struggle.'²⁹

Kaldor's remarks refers to black holes being the greenhouses where terrorist ideologies grow and are nurtured. This present study however refers to black holes in wider terms to include all activities that a terrorist group will undertake in support of its terrorist ideology; recruitment being just one aspect of these. Nevertheless, her analysis coincides with the underpinnings of this research. Her work can be posited next to that of Tamara Makarenko of St. Andrews University who writes that the black-hole syndrome, reflects situations 'in which weak or failed states foster the convergence between transnational organized crime and terrorism, and ultimately create a safe haven for the continued operations of convergent groups.' Non-state actors fill the void produced by failing political institutions and take *de facto* control.

²⁸ O'Donnell, 1993.

²⁹ Kaldor, *Terrorism as Regressive Globalisation*, at http://www.intlstudies.ucsd.edu/iicas_research_papers/Political%20Networks/Kaldor.pdf

‘There is growing evidence that these non-state actors are producing alternative economic and political structures in the absence of a strong state. In fact, criminal and terrorist groups in weak states have already constituted de facto governments who imitate the characteristics of formal state activities, despite perpetuating their involvement in activities considered illegal by formal state structures.’³⁰

Makarenko’s black-hole syndrome denotes a vacuum being created by the inability of the government to wield control and thereby drawing in terrorist organisations. Once settled, they become an alternative source of legitimacy and political power. The parallel with this study lies in the understanding that terrorist groups are drawn to areas where there exists a vacuum of authority.

This research however especially follows in line with the analysis offered by Magnus Ranstorp. Ranstorp draws a line between areas of lawlessness and the presence of terrorist organisations. In particular he notes that ‘black holes’ can be used as a recruiting ground but also as a haven of refuge and as a ‘conduit’ for terror financing. Ranstorp makes the reference to black holes in a statement to the US National Commission on the Attacks on the United States. He explicitly makes the connection between two US-led campaigns; the War on Drugs and the War on Terrorism. Ranstorp analyses that:

‘[a]ccepting that trans-national organized crime and terrorism are two inextricably linked phenomena, every effort must be made to undermine the illicit drug trade. This drug (crime)/terror nexus has multiple consequences, the most dangerous of which is its ability to sustain areas of lawlessness... or “black holes” [emphasis added]. These areas, in which no state legitimacy or rule of law exists, are one of the foremost dangers to US security as related to international terrorism. [...] Areas such as the Golden Triangle in Southeast Asia contain multiple threats. Not only are they a safe-haven for international terrorists, they serve as a conduit for terrorist financing, a nexus in which organized crimes creates links between ideologically varied terrorist organisations, a conduit for weapons and WMD trafficking, and the socio-economic disadvantage often provides fertile recruitment ground.

Black holes must be combated by active human intelligence and military presence in conjunction with local government, a comprehensive counter-narcotics strategy, local government institution building so that respective government can exert control over their rural areas, and finally a sustained humanitarian program to curb the fundamental catalysts for recruitment in these areas. It must be remembered that recruitment in black holes is often not the result of ideological adherence as opposed to economic sustenance. Equally, the ability for black holes to serve as ‘communal gathering places’ for varied terrorist organisations cannot be stressed enough. The cross-fertilisation of resources and operational capacity is worrying in and of itself.’³¹

It is clear that the concept of black holes lies at the heart of this research paper. It is useful as a redefinition of the criminal and terrorist threat in the context of state failure. The following definition will be adhered to in this paper:

Definition
Black Hole

*A **black hole** is a geographic entity where, due to the absent or ineffective exercise of state governance, criminal or terrorist elements can deploy activities in support of, or otherwise directly relating to criminal or terrorist acts including the act itself.*

³⁰ Makarenko, 2004, p.139

³¹ Ranstorp 2003 at http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/9-11_commission/030331-ranstorp.htm

The interpretation of the word ‘geographic entity’ in this respect is important; it denotes substantial geographic territory limited by discernible boundaries (be they social, economic, topographic or political) and inhabited or otherwise used by one or more criminal or terrorist organisations (as a sanctuary). Thus a black hole can indicate areas of different size: as small as the Pankisi Valley in Georgia or the Garm Valley in Tajikistan, and as large as the deserted and mountainous border regions of the Sahel countries or the entirety of Somalia. The boundaries separating black holes from other territory can be diverse, as the case studies will show. They can for instance be strictly topographic, due to the diversity in the natural environment, or demographic in terms of specific population concentrations. Furthermore, in the definition note is made of the ‘absent or ineffective exercise of state governance’, this is a reference to state failure. It denotes that black holes are intimately tied to a level of state fragility, i.e. (part of) the state’s territory is lacking in governmental control to such an extent - be it at the local, sub-national or national level – that a vacuum of authority is created in the area.

This definition of black holes includes those areas where criminal or insurgent groups are active. The focus of this paper, however, is only on the black hole cases where terrorism, widely perceived as the primary challenge to liberal, democratic, Western states, is endemic. Therefore, this paper will only deal with *terrorist black holes*; black holes where terrorist groups or organisations are structurally active.³² In order to analyse these cases an analytical framework has been devised so as to answer the question: what are characteristics of terrorist black holes?

A Black Hole Framework

Terrorist black holes are the world’s hot-spots of terrorist activity. In dealing effectively with transnational terrorism at least one part of the strategy should therefore focus on finding these black holes. A crucial challenge to scholars of terrorism is to understand which regions in the world are at risk of becoming black holes and which are not. Understanding the terrorists’ motives to settle in certain regions of the world and to base some of their operations is key to answering this question.

Then what do terrorist groups look for? One crucial element has already been alluded to in the black hole definition given above: the absolute or relative absence of rule of law, order and governance in a region. To a terrorist organisation, for its survival largely dependent on illegal activities, a first condition is its ability to deploy its activities without outside meddling. Fragile states, whatever their degree of ‘failedness’, offer this because of the incapacity of the governments to control (parts of) it. Fragile and conflict-ridden states are intimately linked to black holes, because they enable terrorist groups to undertake their activities without outside interference. These areas thus offer the terrorist group a bottomline condition for it to be there. Weak state control over a particular area is thus a necessary characteristic. Nevertheless, not all areas that are lawless are infested with terrorist groups. So what determines whether a terrorist group settles in a particular area? This is related to the specific character of the area that constitutes a black hole: its geographical, social and ethnic composition, its natural resources or its criminal shadow economy; its comparative advantages. Thus, there are two elements which draw a terrorist organisation to a particular territory:

³² In the rest of this research, the generic term *black hole* will be used intermittently with the specific term *terrorist black hole*.

Elements of Analysis

- The lack of government control in the area and
- The specific characteristics of the area, which make the area attractive to terrorist groups; the terrorist comparative advantage.

Some confusion can arise over the nature and interaction of these two elements. Whilst we know where most failed and weak states are,³³ little is clear on the specific areas attracting terrorist organisations and networks. To understand this the black hole framework looks at the activities terrorist organisations undertake and their relation to the territory in which they are undertaken. This interaction between an area's characteristics and the activities of the terrorist organisation in the area form the core of the analytical model: it hypothesizes that while the lack of state control indicates whether terrorist presence is possible in the state, the specific characteristics of an area whether the terrorist presence is likely. These two factors are indicators for an area being a terrorist black hole.


Having established the research problems, defined the terms in this research and provided the reader with a sketch of the analytical framework of black holes, the following part of the paper will describe the steps taken to compile a list, a data set, of existing terrorist black holes in the contemporary global system.

³³ Rotberg 2004, p.46-49.

III Listing Black Holes

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of terrorist black holes that existed in the period between 2000-2005. In order to compile such a list, the geographic locations where terrorist activities take place are considered potential black holes. If one of those locations meets four criteria (as specified on the following page) it is labelled 'terrorist black hole'. The final list of terrorist black holes comprises 41 cases. At the end of the chapter, a categorisation of black holes is proposed on the basis of the activities terrorists undertake there.

Research Methods



This first section of the research part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the research methods used.

Research Question

The research question of this chapter has been phrased as follows:

In which areas around the world, outside Western states, do terrorist groups find sanctuary?

Four criteria are used to identify black holes; first and foremost is the criterion that any of the 6 previously identified terrorist activities take place in the area. This paper takes existing terrorist organisations as its point of departure and subsequently terrorist black holes are characterised by the activities that they host. This first criterion is ontological in its essence, it is meant as a method to identify what black holes exist, and is a way to compile a sound and meaningful data set.

Criteria

Black Hole Criteria

Having identified a terrorist organisation and hence one or more terrorist activities in a specific area, the area needs to fulfil four additional criteria before being labelled a black hole:

- 1 State fragility: the government is unable to exert adequate influence over the territory concerned.
- 2 The area must comprise a geographic entity. Although a minimum size is not set, the smallest identified in this research is a refugee camp, small city or village. Examples of black holes of this size are the refugee camps in Lebanon and the village and surroundings of Bocinja Donja in Bosnia-Herzegovina. By no means however must a black hole be urbanized, it can be a tract of jungle, mountainous valley or desert swath, as long as it is a geographic entity.
- 3 It must have been a black hole in the period 2000-2005. This criterion acknowledges the dynamic nature of black holes.³⁴ The number and distribution of black holes in the world changes continuously; this report is a frozen image of the world in the first years of the 21st century. This implies that once a list of black holes is compiled and used, it should be updated regularly.
- 4 A territory's black hole status should be confirmed by at least two (open) sources. This methodological criterion implies required confirmation of the terrorist activity in the area by *at least* two sources. This criterion is very important because the quality of sources used in open source research is not always obvious. When possible, this paper has tried only to include cases that were confirmed by more than two sources.

Assumptions

Black Hole Assumptions

Two assumptions that lie at the basis of this paper should be made explicit:

- The list of Designated Terrorist Organisations of the US Department of State is used as the basic list of existing terrorist organisations.

Several widely acknowledged lists exist. Those produced by the European Union and the US State department are among the best documented. A comparison of the EU and US lists leads the authors to argue that the latter list is most applicable to this research. In the eyes of the authors, the EU list has omitted several important organisations that have engaged in terrorist activities. These are included in the US State Department's list. The EU list excludes some of the largest and most important terrorist organisations on the globe. Organisations such as Al-Qaeda (present in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Liberia etc.), Jemaah Islamiyah (South-East Asia), the Abu Sayyaf Group (Southern Philippines), Hezbollah (Lebanon) and the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka) have not made their way onto the EU terrorism list. According to the EU definition of terrorism as it is presented above, these groups doubtlessly belong there. The US list does include these organisations.³⁵

³⁴ As a black hole depends on the presence of a terrorist group, they are dynamic, they come and go. An identified black hole in this research implies that there was a moment during 2000 and 2005 that a terrorist group was present in that area to perform those terrorist activities as defined in chapter II.

³⁵ The authors are aware that, given the political nature related to the development of lists of terrorist organisations, these lists may not contain all entities that have employed terrorism in the period 2000-2005. Nevertheless, these are the organisations which Western policy-makers focus on and thereby the list serves as an appropriate starting point to study the characteristics of areas that organisations using terrorism rely on for their activities.

- Only black holes *outside* territory belonging to NATO Member States are considered.

In parallel to the choice of basic list of terrorist groups, the second fundamental in this research is concerned with its scope. This research into terrorist black holes is limited to states and areas *outside* of the NATO Member States. Although this research does not deny that there are terrorist cells and hide-outs in Europe or North America, this is not the subject of this research. Instead it focuses on the relationship between state failure and terrorism; according to Rotberg's analysis Western European and North American states are not subjected to failure.³⁶ More importantly, a further reason lies in the policy implications arising out of this research. In order to deal with terrorist cells inside NATO territory, a whole new dynamic comes into play; the internal judicial and legislative policy realm. In order to avoid clouding over the research's implications, this study looks at the external aspects of the threat of terrorism.

In short, the list of terrorist black holes identified is not an exhaustive list of those areas in states suffering failure that are sanctuaries for terrorist organisations around the globe. The authors stress that it constitutes a summation of those areas that have been identified on the basis of open-source information, and relate to terrorist organisations listed by the US State Department. Further research will have to provide a more complete picture.

Sources Used

A second-order purpose of this research has been to investigate which sources are useful in performing research like this. If successful, there is much work to be done in the field of open-source research regarding this topic. The following paragraphs give some idea of the sources used in this research and the usefulness and quality. This research is based entirely on open source information.

The sources used for chapter III and chapter IV have often been the same; therefore this short summation of sources used applies to the entirety of the research. The sources used are:

- books (including large, multi-chapter reports);
- articles;
- numerical data.

Books

Several books and reports have been crucial in the analyses performed in this report. If possible, books and reports were used as a prime source with preference over articles. These books and reports have roughly been used to:

- provide detailed background information on specific terrorist organisations³⁷, multiple terrorist organisations³⁸, fragile states³⁹ and their relation to terrorism⁴⁰ and international organised crime⁴¹, conflict situations and their history⁴² and

³⁶ See Rotberg 2004, p.46-49.

³⁷ e.g. Farah, D. *Blood from Stones*; Lifton, R. 2000; McCormick, G (RAND). *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*.

- provide encyclopaedic information⁴³.

The reliability of books used in this research is generally high. Authors are often academics or otherwise experts in their field, the organisations financing them are generally international organisations, think-tanks and universities, national governments or high-standard NGO's. Among the most useful institutions were the International Crisis Group (not only for the quality but also the focus of their reports), RAND and the US State Department. At the same time, the authors have tried to take account of the notable political or ideological bias noticeable in some think-tanks.

Articles

Articles have been the main source of information for this research, providing background information on the terrorist groups, fragile states, international crime and conflicts. Different types of articles have been used:

- News articles, mostly elucidating on new developments⁴⁴, providing up-to-date and local information⁴⁵ and comprehensive or brief reference articles.⁴⁶ For up-to-date information these have been unbeatably useful. Although the more renowned news agencies produce reliable info, the internet offers access to a variety of less than well-known agencies such as Xinhua Net⁴⁷ and Kazinform⁴⁸. The criterion that information concerning black holes should be based on more than one source is clearly necessary in this case.
- Academic articles, providing roughly similar information as the books and reports discussed above, although briefer and often more specific in scope.⁴⁹ Academic

³⁸ e.g. US Department of State Patterns of Global Terrorism; Curtis, G. *Nations Hospitable to Crime and Terrorism*; Curtis, G. *Terrorist and Organised Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area of South America*.

³⁹ e.g. Rotberg, R., *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*; Goldstone, J., *State Failure Task Force Report*; UNDP Human Development Reports; Menkhaus, K., *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*; Schneckener, U., *States at Risk: Fragile Staaten als Sicherheits- und Entwicklungsproblem*.

⁴⁰ e.g. US Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2004.

⁴¹ e.g. US Drug Enforcement Administration, Country Reports (Afghanistan, Colombia, Burma); UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme Survey Reports; Cragin, K (RAND). *Arms Trafficking and Colombia*; Rabasa, A (RAND). *Colombian Labyrinth*.

⁴² e.g. Crisis Group Reports, on conflict issues on a global, regional and local level; Project Ploughshares, *Armed Conflict Report 2003*; Schiavo-Campo, S (World Bank), *The Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines*.

⁴³ Winkler Prins Online Encyclopedia .

⁴⁴ e.g. Al-Jazeera, *More killed in Philippine fighting*; Blanford, N., *Palestinian warriors who refuse to let Lebanon go*.

⁴⁵ e.g. El-Ghoul, A., *The Bekaa gears up for cannabis crops*; Foreign and Commonwealth Travel Advice at <http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029390590>.

⁴⁶ e.g. Guardian Unlimited Website, World Terror Attacks Since September 11.

⁴⁷ <http://www.xinhuanet.com>.

⁴⁸ <http://www.inform.kz>.

⁴⁹ e.g. Haahr-Escolano, K. *Iran's Changing Relationship with Hezbollah*; Levitt, M. *Hezbollah's West Bank Terror Network*; Byman, D. *Should Hezbollah be Next?*; Dietrich, C. *Hard Currency: The Criminalised Diamond Economy of the DRC and Its Neighbours*; Gberie, L. *Diamonds Without Maps*; Radu, M. *Terror in the Sahara*; Chege, M. *Sierra Leone: The State That Came Back From the Dead*.

articles have also been used as theoretical background into the topics of state failure,⁵⁰ terrorism⁵¹ and the causes of war.⁵² Think-tank articles (e.g. Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, the Jamestown Foundation, Heritage Foundation, Brookings Institute) are also considered academic articles.

- Terrorism internet portals offer a variety of information, from numerical data (see below) to analytical articles. The three portals that have been most useful in this analysis are the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) Terrorism Knowledge Database⁵³, the South Asian Terrorism Portal⁵⁴ and Global Security Online⁵⁵.

Numerical Data

Numerical data sources are used in the case studies. To this end, data has been retrieved from internet sources such as the World Bank Development Indicators⁵⁶, the UNDP Human Development Indices (HD) and the other data in the HD Report data sets,⁵⁷ the Freedom House ratings⁵⁸, the Minorities at Risk programme⁵⁹, the FIRST data set of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute⁶⁰ and the Small Arms Survey.⁶¹

Maps

A special information source, though small, is the University of Texas Perry Castaneda Library Map Collection⁶². Most of the maps used in this research and paper stem from this source. Another important source, apart from specific articles, is the National Geographic Xpeditions Atlas⁶³, also a provider of useful world, regional and national maps.

⁵⁰ e.g. Zartman, I. *Posing the Problem of State Collapse*; Rotberg, R. *The New Nature of Nation State Failure*.

⁵¹ e.g. Takeyh, R., & Gvosdev, N., *Do Terrorists Need a Home?*; Simon, S. *Denying Al-Qaeda its Popular Support*; Makarenko, T. *The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay Between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism*.

⁵² e.g. Collier, P. *Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars*.

⁵³ www.tkb.org.

⁵⁴ www.satp.org.

⁵⁵ www.globalsecurity.org.

⁵⁶ <http://www.worldbank.org/data/>.

⁵⁷ <http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/>.

⁵⁸ <https://www.freedomhouse.org>

⁵⁹ <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/>.


⁶⁰ <http://first.sipri.org/index.php>.

⁶¹ <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/>.

⁶² <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/>

⁶³ <http://www.nationalgeographic.com/xpeditions/atlas/>

Results



This research has produced a list of 41 terrorist black holes. The following map shows the approximate locations of the terrorist black holes as has been identified in this research. It is followed by a list of these areas divided by region:

The World Map of Terrorist Black Holes




Figure 1: Terrorist Black Holes in the World

South America

- Colombia, FARC-controlled territory;⁶⁴
- Peru: Huellaga Valley;⁶⁵
- Tri-Border Area of Paraguay, Argentine and Brazil;⁶⁶
- Chile: Iquique region;⁶⁷

Middle East, including Maghreb (Greater Middle East)

- Isolated mountainous and desert regions of the Sahel countries⁶⁸
- western sahara: border area Mauretania and Sahara occidental;⁶⁹
- Lebanon: Refugee camps in the west (most notably Ein Al-Hilwe)⁷⁰
- Lebanon: Southern border areas with Israel (around Shebaa farms) & Beqa'a Valley;⁷¹
- Iraq: Sunni triangle and the area south of Baghdad;⁷²
- Iraq-Iran border area;⁷³
- Kurdish populated territories known as 'Kurdistan';⁷⁴
- Palestinian territories: Gaza and West Bank;⁷⁵
- Yemen: Marib and Hadhramaut;⁷⁶

Sub Saharan Africa

- Somalia & Kenyan Somali areas;⁷⁷
- Liberia & Sierra Leone: Kono district;⁷⁸
- DRC, Central African Republic and the Congo: Diamond mining areas;⁷⁹

⁶⁴ McDermott, 2003; 2002; Cragin, 2003; Llinas, 2004; Rabasa, 2001; McLean, 2002; McDermott, 2004 (b); US List DTO.

⁶⁵ James, 2001; Chirinos, 2004; McCormick, 1990; McDermott, 2004(a); US List DTO.

⁶⁶ Abbott, 2004; Hudson, 2003; Madani, 2002; US List DTO.

⁶⁷ Anti-Semitism World Wide 2003-2004; Abbott, 2004.

⁶⁸ ICG 2005 (a); FCO 19-1-2005; ICG 2005 (b); Radu, 2004; Reuters, AP 12-5-2005; ICG 2005 (c).

⁶⁹ Smith, 2004(a); Smith 2004(b) Gomes, 2005; ECISC 2005; Scott Tyson, A., 2005; Arnuero, 2004.

⁷⁰ Global Security.org (a); Haahr-Escolano, 2004; Gambill, 2001; 2002; 2003; Najjar, 2003; Gebara, 2004; Paz, 1998; US List DTO.

⁷¹ Blanford, 2005; US Dept. of State, 22-4-2005; Intelcom Inc., 2002; Council on Foreign Relations, Lebanon; LebanonWire, 8-3-2005; Whitaker, 2001; US State Department, 2004; Najjar 2003; Byman, 2003; ICG, 2002 (a); US List DTO.

⁷² Cordesman, 2004; Vick, 2004; US List DTO.

⁷³ Hunt, 13-9-2003; Cordesman, 2004 ; US List DTO.

⁷⁴ Rubin, 2001; Council on Foreign Relations: PKK; Schanzer, 2004; Abedin, 2004; Human Rights Watch, 2004; US List DTO.

⁷⁵ Levitt, 2003; Fighel, 2002; Council on Foreign Relations: Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade; Amayreh, 5-9-2004; US List DTO.

⁷⁶ Glosemeyer, 2004; UIP, 2005; Katz, 2002; Council on Foreign Relations: Yemen; ICG 2003 (a); Ulph, 2004.

⁷⁷ Menkhaus, 2004; Phillips, 2002; Schofield, 2004; US List DTO.

⁷⁸ Curtis, 2003; ICG, 2004 (a) ; Gberie, 2002; 2004; Rotberg, 2002; Farah, 2004(a); 2004 (b) ; Humphrey, 2004.

⁷⁹ Dietrich, 2002; HRW, 2005.

Eastern Europe

- Bosnia-Herzegovina: Bocinja Donja;⁸⁰
- Northern Albania;⁸¹

Caucasus and Central Eurasia

- Russia: Chechnya;⁸²
- Georgia: Pankisi and Kodori gorges;⁸³
- Georgia: Abkhazia;⁸⁴
- Uzbekistan: Ferghana Valley;⁸⁵
- Tajikistan: Tavildara Valley, Garm Valley;⁸⁶
- Afghanistan: Northern Provinces of Kunduz, Balkh and Samangan;⁸⁷
- Afghanistan: Eastern/southern provinces bordering Pakistan;⁸⁸
- Afghanistan/Pakistan: Border areas (including Pakistan's Waziristan and Baluchistan);⁸⁹

South Asia

- North-eastern Sri Lanka;⁹⁰
- India/Pakistan: Jammu and Kashmir and surrounding cities;⁹¹
- Pakistan: Karachi;⁹²
- Pakistan: Punjab;⁹³
- Bangladesh: Chittagong Mountains and border area Bangladesh-Burma;⁹⁴
- Western Bangladesh, border area with India;⁹⁵

⁸⁰ The Centre for Peace in the Balkans, 2001; Trifkovic, 2001; Christoff Kurop, 2001; Lavigne, 2001; Smith, 2000.

⁸¹ Galeotti, 2001; Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda* (2003), p.13,77,244; US List DTO.

⁸² Cohen, 2003; Council on Foreign Relations: Chechnya; US List DTO.

⁸³ Skakov, 2002; Khaburdzania, 2003; Dalziel, 5-8-2002; Van der Schriek, 2-5-2003; Baev, 2002; Silverman, 23-5-2002.

⁸⁴ Khaburdzania, 2003; Council on Foreign Relations: Georgia; Small Arms Survey, 2003.

⁸⁵ Gleason, 2002; ICG 2002 (b); McConnell, 2004; Makarenko, 2002 Cornell, 2002; Schwartz, 2005; US List DTO.

⁸⁶ Gleason, 2002; Rashid, 2002; ICG 2002 (b); Cornell, 2002 ; US List DTO.

⁸⁷ UNODC, 2004; Rashid, 2002; JIR, 2004; Makarenko, 2002; Cornell, 2002 ; US List DTO.

⁸⁸ UNODC, 2004; JIR, 2004; Makarenko, 2002; US List DTO.

⁸⁹ McConnell, 2004; Rotar, 2004; Van der Schriek, 2004; ICG 2002 (b). ICG 2003 (b); Walsh, 21-2-2005; Khan, 2005; Khan, 2002; Khan, 2004; US List DTO.

⁹⁰ Global Security: LTTE; Jane's Sentinel, 4-9-2000; Wagner, 2004; US List DTO.

⁹¹ SATP, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/usa/pokmap.htm>; <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/usa/pakmap.htm>; http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/index.html; Global Security: Lashkar-e-Toiba; John, 2005 (a); ICG 2003 (c); US List DTO.

⁹² ICG 2002 (c); Shahzad, 2005; John, 2005 (c).

⁹³ Rana, 22-2-2005; Marquand, 18-10-2001; Express India 24-2-2005; Lal, 1999; Shahzad, 2005.

⁹⁴ John, 2005 (b); Sakhuja, 2003; Hashmi, 2004; Lintner, 2004.

⁹⁵ John, 2005 (b); Sakhuja, 2003; Ahmad, 2004; Bedi, 2004.

South-East Asia

- Indonesia: Aceh⁹⁶
- Indonesia: Northeastern Kalimantan and Malaysian border region⁹⁷
- Indonesia: Sulawesi⁹⁸
- Indonesia: Moluccas⁹⁹
- Philippines: Rural areas Luzon and Visayas¹⁰⁰
- Philippines: Mindanao and Sulu archipelago¹⁰¹
- Thailand: Southern border areas with Malaysia, including Patani¹⁰²

East Asia

- Japan: Fujinomiya and Kamikuishiki¹⁰³
- China: Xinjiang province¹⁰⁴

Presented in a pie-chart, the distribution of these terrorist black holes over the world produces the following image:




Figure 2: Black holes per region

Clearly, the Greater Middle East is the top ‘host’ to terrorist organisations. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Syrian influence over Lebanon, the Iraq war and resulting

⁹⁶ Abuza, 2005; MIPT TKB at <http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=3600>.

⁹⁷ ICG 2003 (b); Davis, 2004 (b); US List DTO.

⁹⁸ ICG 2003 (b); Davis, 2004 (b); ICG 2004 (b); US List DTO.

⁹⁹ Wanandi, 2004; Sallabank, 2004; US List DTO.

¹⁰⁰ Philippine Revolution Web Central; US List DTO.

¹⁰¹ Al-Jazeera, 9-2-2005; ICG 2003 (b); ICG 2004 (c); US List DTO.

¹⁰² ICG 2005 (d); Holt, 2004; Davis, 2004 (a).

¹⁰³ Lifton, 1999; US List DTO.

¹⁰⁴ Council on Foreign Relations: ETIM; Schwartz, 2005; Gunaratna, 2003; US List DTO.

insurgency campaigns and the decade-old Kurd struggle have offered fertile ground for terror groups. Second, and also a region rich in civil strife and violent political opposition is Central Asia and the Caucasus, comprising the former Soviet states, Afghanistan and the provinces of Russia striving for autonomy and independence. South East Asia, accounting for roughly one-fifth of the world's terrorist black holes, is home to many local insurgency campaigns and weak and failing states. It concerns mostly parts of Indonesia and the Philippines. Similarly, South Asia has its hotbeds of violence in Kashmir and North-eastern India, where Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs battle for their identity and independence. Thus, the top-four black hole regions, together accounting for almost three-quarters of existing terrorist black holes, are clearly conflict-ridden regions, where terrorism is intimately intertwined with local insurgency campaigns.¹⁰⁵ Regarding Africa, the states in equatorial Africa, running the full width of the continent from Sierra Leone to Congo and the Horn of Africa have a black hole presence. South America, which has long known Marxist/nationalist insurgency campaigns and has been plagued by endemic drug cultivation and trade contains together with Eastern Europe and East Asia, approximately another fifth of the identified black holes.

Rating Black Holes

A first step of further analysing terrorist black holes would be to classify the different types of black holes and to propose a categorisation. A meaningful categorisation of black holes would be made on the basis of activities performed in the black hole. Terrorist threats result from specific terrorist activity. In chapter II, terrorist activities have been defined as comprising six activities: Collection of Capital, Human Resource Management (which includes both active and passive recruitment), Training, Establishing Bases, Staging Operations and Hide-outs. Rating all 41 terrorist black holes on the basis of the activities that take place within them produces table 1 on the next page. In this table, dots represent an activity that is undertaken in the area, whereas empty cells stand indicate the absence of a specific activity. The column on the far right shows the four-type categorisation that has been made on the basis of the data:

Black Hole Categories

- 1 All activities;
- 2 Limited support activities & staging operations;
- 3 Limited support activities and
- 4 One support activity.

¹⁰⁵ cf. Case studies in Part II for more illustrations of this thesis.

Table 1: Terrorist Activities in Terrorist Black Holes

Black Holes	Category	Staging Operations	Hide-outs	Establish Bases	Training	Human Resource Management	Collection of Capital
Colombia: FARC territory	1	•	•	•	•	•	•
Peru: Huellaga Valley		•	•	•	•	•	•
Lebanon: Beqa'a valley		•	•	•	•	•	•
Lebanon: Refugee Camps		•	•	•	•	•	•
Central Iraq		•	•	•	•	•	•
Iran-Iraq Border		•	•	•	•	•	•
Kurdistan		•	•	•	•	•	•
Sri Lanka: North-east		•	•	•	•	•	•
Jammu & Kashmir		•	•	•	•	•	•
Pakistan/Afghan Border		•	•	•	•	•	•
Chechnya		•	•	•	•	•	•
Abkhazia		•	•	•	•	•	•
Tajikistan: Garm & Tavildara		•	•	•	•	•	•
Northern Afghanistan		•	•	•	•	•	•
East/South Afghanistan		•	•	•	•	•	•
Indonesia; Aceh		•	•	•	•	•	•
Indonesia: Kalimantan		•	•	•	•	•	•
Philippines: Luzon & Visayas		•	•	•	•	•	•
Philippines: Mindanao & Sulu		•	•	•	•	•	•
Southern Thailand		•	•	•	•	•	•
Indonesia: Sulawesi		•	•	•	•	•	•
Eastern Bangladesh		•	•	•	•	•	•
Western Bangladesh		•	•	•	•	•	•
Japan: Fujinomiya and Kamikuishiki		•	•	•	•	•	•
Xingjiang, China		•	•	•	•	•	•
Northern Albania		•	•	•	•	•	•
Tri-Border Area		•	•	•	•	•	•
Somalia		•	•	•	•	•	•
Bosnia		•	•	•	•	•	•
Gaza & West Bank	2	•	•	•	•	•	•
Yemen: Marib/ Hadhramaut		•	•	•	•	•	•
Karachi		•	•	•	•	•	•
Ferghana Valley	3	•	•	•	•	•	•
Indonesia: Moluccas		•	•	•	•	•	•
Chile: Iquique		•	•	•	•	•	•
Sahel	4	•	•	•	•	•	•
Sierra Leone & Liberia		•	•	•	•	•	•
Georgia: gorges		•	•	•	•	•	•
western sahara	4	•	•	•	•	•	•
DR Congo & CAR		•	•	•	•	•	•
Punjab	4	•	•	•	•	•	•

Category 1: All Activities

The upper 25 cases in the table above belong to this first category. The category contains diverse cases, both in global location and the terrorist organisation identified in the area. Nevertheless, they all share the characteristic that the terrorist organisations perform all six forms of terrorist activity.¹⁰⁶ In practically all cases (excluding the Lebanese refugee camps and the Japanese black hole) the terrorist organisation is part of an insurgency campaign, aimed at overthrowing the local government. It is well-organised with highly developed and institutionalised activities and operations and are more often than not part of (or inspired by) an extensive insurgency campaign. Except the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo, all terrorist actors in these black holes have an irredentist agenda either with respect to the black hole or its immediate adjacent territory. The terrorist group wishes to either overthrow the government of the state in which it is located or secede part of the territory from the state.

Most of the terrorist organisations in this category are composed of mainly Muslim fighters, only four black holes show different ideologies; revolutionary Marxists (Colombia, Peru, Luzon) and extremist Buddhists (Japan). The most important cause most of these terrorist organisations fight for is however best described as ethnic or religious nationalism. They fight for autonomy, independence, a redistribution of economic wealth and have clearly identifiable political goals in support of their ethnicity or religion.

The threat resulting from terrorist black holes of this first category is very real and acute. Counterterrorism strategies should function on different levels, relying on both repression (military or police force) and persuasion (reducing the local levels of support, socially isolating the group in question).

Category 2: Limited Support Activities and Staging Operations

The black hole cases (9) of the second category undertake limited support activities, mostly the acquisition of capital and HRM, combined with staging operations and hide-outs. Other combinations of support activities are possible too, as in the case of Bosnia, Somalia and the Moluccas; the characteristic feature of black holes in this category is the fact that they combine some support activities with terrorist operations, but with the significant difference to Category 1, namely that there is no training provided or bases/headquarters established in these areas. Because there is no indication that training camps or bases have been established here, one would expect not to find substantial physical infrastructure belonging to the group. Black holes in this category are diverse

¹⁰⁶ The exceptional case in this category is Jammu & Kashmir, because there is no direct proof that insurgents in Kashmir use the area to acquire capital. However, it resembles the other cases in this category very closely both in the high-level of organisation that the organisations present portray, the irredentist nature of their goals and the serious and constant threat resulting from their presence. Most of the outfits in the area are supplied from outside Kashmir, either from India or Pakistan, yet they base all their other operations and activities within the Jammu & Kashmir provinces. Thus, even though there is no direct proof that insurgents in Kashmir use the area to acquire capital, it is highly plausible that they do and the terrorist groups in the area so closely resembles the outlook and other characteristics of the other cases in category 1 that it belongs there.

in physical appearance, ranging from very small (TBA, Bosnia, Karachi) to large parts of entire countries (Somalia and Albania).

Category 3: Limited Support Activities

The four black hole cases in the third category are characterised by a lack of operational activity undertaken in the black hole; the terrorist presence in these areas is ‘merely’ confined to limited support activities, for example acquiring financial capital through diamond trading (Sierra Leone & Liberia), the passive or active recruitment of marginalised social groups such as immigrants and nomads (Sierra Leone & Liberia, Sahel) or hide-outs from international scrutiny (e.g. Sahel, Georgian gorges). In these black holes only limited indigenous terrorist actors are found. Instead, the terrorist presence here is a product of the globalised reach of terrorist groups. Although of great importance to terrorist organisations, these black holes pose a limited threat to the environment of the black hole. The threat is posed by the potential of regional destabilisation rather than terrorism. The terrorist groups present are not geared towards operational activities but mainly at finding hide-outs or the acquirement of capital.

Category 4: Singular Support Activities

Similar to those in the third category, the three black holes of this type only serve support purposes, yet at a more limited scale than category 3. These areas are used only for one single activity; either for the collection of financial capital (Western Sahara, the Congos and the Central African Republic) or the HRM of terrorist operatives (Punjab). In all three cases only a very limited terrorist presence has been recorded, often comprising a handful of operatives, simply because the nature of the activities do not require substantial amounts of people. Because only one support activity takes place in these areas, they cannot be considered as bulwarks of terrorism. These black holes do not form an acute threat.¹⁰⁷ Nevertheless, when trying to stem the financial flows of terrorist capital these areas are important and their position in the overall network of black holes used by particular terrorist groups cannot be underestimated.

The Differentiation of Categories

These four categories offer a differentiation of black holes on the basis of the terrorist activities that take place and hence could aid in offering a prioritisation on the counterterrorist agenda. Going down the scale of categories, several observations are striking. As made clear, Category 1 black holes contain all terrorist activities and hence reflect the highest priority. One step down, we find category 2 black holes. These differ from the first in that the areas do not contain training and establishment of bases. In fact, these activities neither appear in Category 3 or Category 4 black holes. Apparently the presence of training camps and the establishment of bases are not found in themselves in black holes but are always accompanied with other activities. These activities can thus be considered defining activities for category 1 black holes. An interesting question is what determines if a terrorist group is able to establish bases and

¹⁰⁷ It is important to emphasise that black holes can have immensely destabilising and otherwise negative effects on their environment. These effects should, when prioritising uprooting these black holes, of course be taken into consideration. The analysis of the destabilising effects of black holes is beyond the ‘terrorist scope’ of this paper and should best be performed separately.

facilities for training, when does a category 2 black hole move to category 1? Perhaps a terror group is *unwilling* to set up a base in the area, because it has sufficient bases elsewhere or it is *unable* to do so because the authorities are impeding the group to do so. Nevertheless, this is speculation and should be subject of future research.

The second watershed in the differentiation lies with the staging of operations. The staging of terrorist acts is the defining activity between Category 1 and 2, and 3 and 4. In the former categories the terrorist group is actively pursuing its irridentist agenda or otherwise carrying out attacks against targets in the area. Category 2 black holes are, like category 1, battlefields whereas categories 3 and 4 are ‘support’ black holes. This also increases the urgency to address the terrorist presence, precisely because the groups are staging operations. This is different for categories three and four where the terrorist group acts more parasitic, making use of the weak environment around it and making use of the opportunities this brings rather than actively following an agenda of violence. Most likely in category three and four black holes, terrorist groups will vacate the area - rather than actively contest the state’s control - if conditions and the state’s ability to control the territory improve.

State Failure vs.
Black Holes

Comparison Black Holes and State Failure

As an illustration of the data set, the following chart shows the regional distribution of the terrorist black holes per category alongside the regional distribution of state failure on the basis of Robert Rotberg’s analysis in *When States Fail*.¹⁰⁸




Figure 3: Black Holes vs. Failed States

The darker (blue) stacks illustrate the number and type of terrorist black holes per region. It becomes clear the four largest black hole regions (the Greater Middle East, Central Asia & Caucasus, South East Asia and South Asia) account for the greatest number of Category 1 black holes. The stacks also clearly demonstrate the difference in number of black holes.

¹⁰⁸ Rotberg, 2004.

The orange- and red-hued stacks illustrate the number of states suffering from state failure in a particular region, with their hue being an indication of that failure. It becomes obvious that sub-sahara Africa has the largest number of states suffering from failure and similarly that East Asia, Eastern Europe, and South Asia have the least.

A comparison between the two types of stacks aptly illustrates differences in black holes and state failure per region. The discrepancy in sub-sahara Africa is striking. While by far the most weak and failed states are in that region, 'only' three terrorist black holes are present, the second smallest number. The inverse is the case for South Asia; with a weak (Sri Lanka) and a failing state (Nepal), this region boasts six terrorist black holes, four of which are Category 1 (mostly tracts of Pakistan). One of the reasons for the increased number of black holes is because there can be more than one black hole per state. This obviously increases the figure. Nevertheless, by looking at areas of terrorist sanctuary separate from the state in which they are located enables a different threat understanding, which focuses on territory. This is to the virtue of the concept of black holes.

The example of 'South Asia' in the graph also illustrates the extent to which black holes can be located in states that have not been identified in the theory as suffering from state failure. Similarly, the graph shows (in particular with respect to South East Asia) that the presence of weak states in no manner implies that the threat of terrorism is low. After all, in South East Asia, boasting mainly weak states, especially Category 1 black holes are found. In general, the graph clearly shows that the number of states suffering from state failure is not always an indication of the extent of terrorist presence in that region.


In general, due to the discrepancies made apparent between the regions affected by state failure and terrorist black holes it can be said that the black hole approach provides a more telling picture of the potential for a terrorist presence in a given region. The graph supports the underlying thought of this research; i.e. the necessity of looking at black holes in order to understand the relationship between terrorism and state failure.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁹ The 'failed state' perspective however is very useful in providing a more general picture of states that need attention for the sake of regional and global stability.

IV Case Studies

This chapter presents several case studies of terrorist black holes. These explorative case studies identify characteristics of terrorist black holes that determine why that particular area sees a terrorist presence. The case studies will seek an explanation for both governmental weakness in the area and what the comparative advantages are of that area. The factors and features that emerge from the analysis are categorised in five categories.

Research Methods



The following paragraphs will outline the research question, discuss the case selection and the method in which the cases are analysed.

Research Questions

This segment will answer the second research question:

Why do the terrorist organisations base their activities in the areas identified above?

Black Hole
Hypothesis

This question leads to two hypotheses: 1) whilst the lack of state control indicates the *opportunity* for terrorist organisations to undertake activities in a given area, 2) the *specifics* of the area determine the terrorist comparative advantage.

The premise underlying these distinctive hypotheses is that although lack of government control is by definition a necessary condition for the existence of a terrorist black hole, it is by no means a sufficient explanation. There are many fragile states in the world and only a few of these states harbour terrorist groups. Some areas have characteristics that are specifically useful to terrorist organisations, which determine the

likelihood of a terrorist presence in the area. The Afghan poppy cultivation for example offers terrorist groups a unique and lucrative way of making money; a great necessity - and thus advantage - to terrorist organisations. Thus, while a lack of state control (in the area, not necessarily the entire state) is a necessary condition for the emergence of a black hole, the features of the area determine the likelihood of and nature of a terrorist presence there.

The black hole approach to state failure is relatively new. The novelty and exploratory nature of the research therefore demands a qualitative analysis of representative black hole cases and the relation between the lack of state control and the specific features of the area. In this paper six cases will be examined that can be considered 'typical' for different subtypes of existing black holes.

Case Selection

In both quantitative and qualitative research, case selection is an essential determinant of the quality of the research results. Quantitative work often depends on large, random samples to provide a significant measure of representation. In qualitative research, with its extensive reliance on in-depth, explorative case studies, large samples are inherently impossible. Instead, cases are selected on the basis of theoretical arguments that can provide evidence of the value of the selected cases with respect to the research hypotheses.

In this research, the four-fold black hole categorisation is the basic variable on the basis of which cases are selected. Out of 41 possible black hole cases, six are selected to be used in the case studies, from three different categories of black holes. Four (the Beqa'a, Refugee Camps, Luzon, Mindanao/ Sulu) are chosen from category 1 and one each from the categories 2 (Tri-Border Area) and 3 (Liberia/ Sierra Leone). Category 4 (Congo and the Central African Republic) is represented in the discussion on Sierra Leone and Liberia, because these two black holes are in many respects very similar.

Also the geographic location of the black holes are taken into account. Four of the Category 1 black holes chosen are 'twin' black holes to the extent that they lie in the same state (namely the Beqa'a Valley and the Refugee Camps in Lebanon as well as Luzon and Mindanao/ Sulu in the Philippines). These 'twin' cases are interesting as they portray differences in terrorist comparative advantage even though they are located in the same state.

Methodology of Case Analysis

A recurring problem in using multiple case studies in qualitative analysis is the comparability of the research results. In order to obtain comparable results, all case studies should follow the same sequence of analysis. This section will outline the analysis structure used in the six case studies.

Two Elements of Analysis

Each case will be discussed on the basis of the two elements attracting terrorist presence and activity:

- the lack of state control and its relation to state failure and violent conflict;
- the specific characteristics, or ‘comparative advantages’ of the area.

As background to the analysis of state performance four quantitative indicators will be provided (taken from the UNDP’s Human Development Index, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index and the Freedom House Ratings), yet most important is the qualitative description of the most crucial factors rendering the area a black hole. These characteristics of the area will be regarded as ‘comparative advantages’.

Factor Typology

To analyse the comparative advantages, a typology of factors is required which allows us to map the comparative advantages found. A typology of factors, derived in varied form from U. Schneckener, has been applied to the case studies. On the one hand the table differentiates between factors on different levels of governance where the activity impacts, i.e. on the international, cross-national, national or sub-national level.¹¹⁰ This enable us to see at what level governmental weakness is at play for a specific area. On the other hand the typology distinguishes factors on the basis of time: structural factors have been in place for a lengthy period of time (20+ years), medium-term factors have affected the situation for a shorter period (5-20 years) and the direct factors have had an almost immediate effect (-5 years) .¹¹¹ This gives us information regarding how long a factor has already been affecting the area. Thus, there are twelve types of factors that can influence either the stability of the state or the nature of the terrorist activities in the area:


International Structural	Cross-national Structural	National Structural	Sub-National Structural
International Medium-term	Cross-national Medium-term	National Medium-term	Sub-National Medium-term
International Direct	Cross-national Direct	National Direct	Sub-National Direct

Table 2: Factor typology


¹¹⁰ Cross-national factors refer to those events that affect a continuous area transcending a state border. For example, the factor can be the specific characteristic of a border region. International factors are events that have a geographically discontinuous spread and need not originate from an adjacent country. For example, the influx of foreign fighters in a civil conflict.

¹¹¹ Schneckener, U. States at Risk: Fragile Staaten als Sicherheits- und Entwicklungsproblem. SWP-Studie, Berlin: November 2004.

Now we will turn to the four case studies of six black holes in the Philippines, Lebanon, Liberia and the South American tri-border area.



Research Results



CASE STUDY 1: The Southern Islands of the Philippines and Rural Luzon

Overview

- *Black Hole:* Category 1
- *Activities:* Bases, Collection of Capital, HRM, Training, Operations, Hide-Outs
- *Period of Black Hole Status:* 1994 – now, although weakened
- *Population:* 5.2 million (Mindanao), 1.7 million (northeast Luzon)
- *Geography:* island archipelago and mountainous (South), jungle mountains (North)
- *Main groups:* indigenous tribal ethnicity

The Philippines		Rank	Index	Past index
Human Development Index (2003) <i>(1 is high, 0.1 is low)</i>		84	0.758	0.736 (1995)
Corruption Perception Index (2004) <i>(1 is high corruption, 10 low corruption)</i>		102	2.6	2.8 (2000)
Freedom House Rating <i>(1 is high, 7 is low)</i>		Political Rights	Civil Rights	Status
	2005	2	3	Free
	2000	2	3	Free
Gini-Coefficient 2005 <i>(0 presents perfect equality, 100 perfect inequality)</i>			46.1	

The black holes in the Philippines are spread out across a substantial part of the country (see map 2)¹¹²: the southern island of Mindanao and the adjacent Sulu archipelago; the western islands of Visayas; and the rural areas of southern and north-western Luzon.¹¹³ Several different terrorist outfits are active in the country. The southern islands are controlled by an Islamic revolutionary movement (Moro Islamic Liberation Front, MILF) and some of its violent splinter groups (e.g. Abu Sayyaf Group).¹¹⁴, ¹¹⁵ The Visayan Islands are divided between the MILF and the Communist Party of the Philippines with the National People's Army as its military wing (CPP-NPA).¹¹⁶ Luzon is the main operating ground for the CPP-NPA, especially the underdeveloped, rural areas.¹¹⁷ All six activities as they are outlined above are undertaken by the terrorist organisations in these black hole areas.

¹¹² University of Texas Library; Perry Castaneda Collection

¹¹³ Curtis, 2003: 113-115

¹¹⁴ Importantly, MILF has not been designated a terrorist organisation by the US State Department. Therefore, the area is a black hole not because of MILF presence, but because of its cooperation with Jemaah Islamiyah, Al-Qaeda and the Abu Sayyaf Group.

¹¹⁵ ICG, 2004 (2): 1

¹¹⁶ ICG, 2004 (2): 10; PRWC, Command List

¹¹⁷ IFAD, 2002: 2-4.




Figure 4: The Philippines

Lack of Government Control

The Philippines is a weak state.¹¹⁸ It is unable to control substantial parts of its territory, most notably around the Moro islands in the Sulu Sea. The factors affecting state fragility are:

- ethnic tensions in southern Philippines spawning ethnic conflict;
- the complex island structure of the country;
- local underdevelopment in the rural areas of the Philippines spawning ethnic conflict;
- increasing corruption;
- the proximity and cooperation of MILF with Indonesian Jemaah Islamiyah;
- the spill-over effects from the mujahideen war in Afghanistan and Kashmir;
- (former) Chinese support for the CPP-NPA.

The quantitative indicators provide us with an image of the Philippines as a medium-level and increasingly developed country, a stable perception of freedom over the past years yet with a high and slightly increasing level of corruption. This image seems to represent a weak state, not yet in real danger of failure or even collapse, but fragile enough to warrant attention. The national picture however, is slightly overoptimistic.

¹¹⁸ Rotberg, 2004: 49.

Although seemingly a medium-risk country, the uncontrolled territories constitute a very serious threat to the stability of the region. Part of this threat can be explained by looking at the causes for Filipino lack of control over its territory.

Sub-national, Structural

First and most fundamental of all, Filipino society is divided by religion and ethnicity. This divide can be traced back to colonial times, in which the northern part of the country was under Spanish control, while the south was influenced by the Muslim religion and culture. For the better part of the 20th century, the southern islands have claimed independence from the Christian Filipino state, aiming at a Muslim nation in and around Mindanao.¹¹⁹ The MILF and its splinter groups represent the Muslim (Moro) minority in the southern parts of the Philippines. They are generally considered a rebel group, revolutionary and nationalistic, but with terrorist tactics. Because of their Islamic outlook and proximity to Indonesia however, the MILF and Abu Sayyaf Group have come in contact with broader-based Islamic terrorist organisations, such as Jemaah Islamiyah.¹²⁰ After most of the training camps in Afghanistan had been uprooted in 2001, Jemaah Islamiyah put to use the fact that the southern Philippines were not under control of the state and created, in coordination with MILF, training camps in the mountains of Mindanao.¹²¹ Thus the conflict between the MILF and the Filipino state grew more complex, comprising not only the straightforward war between separatists and the government, but also a third, transnational terrorist actor. One of the most difficult dilemmas the Filipino government is facing is how to reach a sustainable solution to this problem: on the one hand rooting out the terrorist organisation, while on the other hand resolving the conflict with its Moro minority in a mutually acceptable fashion.¹²²

Secondly, underdevelopment of the rural regions of the Philippines is a major cause for support for the CPP-NPA.¹²³ As one of the few true Socialist revolutionary parties, they still aim for a 'dictatorship of the proletariat' and are as such fighting for the cause of the rural peasants. Without more development attention given to the peripheral areas of the Philippines, the CPP-NPA will continue to rally support there.

The civil wars between the Filipino government and CPP-NPA and the MILF have been destructive to the efficacy and legitimacy of the Filipino state. Partly caused by the structural factors of ethnic diversity and underdevelopment and fuelled by outside supporters (see below), these civil wars have been the main reason for the lack of state control over its black hole territory.

National, Structural

Added to the structural factor of ethnicity in the Philippines, is the complex geography which forms an impediment to effective state control. The great number of islands, often hardly accessible because of mountain ranges and jungle woods across a vast archipelago require an enormous policing and military capability that the Philippines do not possess. Thus the rugged, uninviting character of the Filipino islands is a major obstacle for effective forcible state control in the Philippines.

¹¹⁹ Winkler Prins: Filippijnen.

¹²⁰ ICG, 2004: 1.

¹²¹ Ibid.: 13-17.

¹²² Ibid.: 3.

¹²³ IFAD, 2002: 2-4; PT.

National, Medium-Term

Increasing corruption has generally been acknowledged to have a detrimental effect on the workings of a state and the development of a country.¹²⁴ It limits economic growth and hinders effective and legitimate governing. It also augments the unfair distribution of wealth and resources, leading to inequality, dissatisfied populations and, ultimately, fuels rebel movements. These effects can clearly be discerned in the Filipino case, where corruption has been a long-lasting problem with harmful effects on the workings of the state.

International, Direct

One of the international factors influencing the weakness of the Filipino state has already been alluded to above: the interactions between Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and MILF and their cooperation in the Mindanao training camps. While one has a strong regional outlook originating from Indonesia and Malaysia (JI), the other is focused on particular territory in the Philippines (MILF). The overlap in objectives has led to a fruitful collaboration and a destabilisation of the Philippines.

International, Direct

Another international factor of importance is the spill-over effect of mujahideen from South- and Central Asia. After the military campaign against Afghanistan had uprooted most of these fighters. Many found a new occupation in the Kashmiri conflict and the Chechen cause, but some also furthered their struggle – which is founded on their perceived duty to fight anywhere in the world where Muslims are perceived to be oppressed – and sought refuge in the conflicts of South-East Asia.¹²⁵ These well-trained fighters – often already linked to the Al Qaeda network - integrated into JI and Abu Sayyaf (ASG), bringing with them military know-how and precious experience and increasing the threat from these terrorist organisations.

International, Medium-Term

Also, a factor on the international level is the relationship of the CPP-NPA with China. During the 1960s and '70s, China was supportive of the Communist cause in the Philippines and helped the CPP-NPA with military and financial capital and training. Although this support has apparently ceased, it supported the CPP-NPA in creating its base of operations and is as such one of the main causes for their presence. Currently, the CPP-NPA seems to sustain its livelihood primarily by means of extorting foreign businesses in the Filipino territory under their control.¹²⁶

The Philippines and Terrorist Activity

This section will describe the terrorist comparative advantages of the different areas in the Philippines.

- the ethnic divide has lead to domestic terrorism;
- the perceived struggle of Muslims has drawn in regional terrorist groups;
- the Filipino geographical structure;
- underdevelopment of rural regions;
- the civil war in the southern Philippines;
- Ideology of Jemaah Islamiyah.

¹²⁴ Gray and Kaufman, 1998: 7-10.

¹²⁵ ICG, 2003: 7-10.

¹²⁶ MIPT Terrorist Knowledge Base: CPP-NPA.

Sub-National, Structural and International, Structural

The ethnic divide is a source of funding, HRM and creates an environment in which ASG and JI can set up bases, hide-outs and training camps. This is due to the fact that the Moro people identify with the political goals of the terrorist groups, because of their shared cause, religion and ethnicity. While the ASG is a home-grown terrorist group, for the JI the Southern Philippines are one of many battlefields where Muslims are deemed repressed. Terrorist groups thus find reason to wage campaigns here as well as supportive population in which they can find sanctuary.

Sub-National, Structural

The geography of the Philippines is attractive to terrorists for similar reasons. The ruggedness of the terrain provides ideal training circumstances, while the complex island structure makes government penetration difficult. These islands and mountains also facilitate the construction of training camps and other bases, as well as hide-outs, because of their isolation.

Underdevelopment in the rural regions of the Philippines is to the benefit of the CPP-NPA, because it creates a base of support among the population in these regions. Thus, its effect is rather similar to that of the ethnic divide, in that it facilitates the active and passive recruitment of new operatives, as well as the construction and protection of training camps and other bases. The help of the population might also gain the CPP-NPA access to foreign businesses, which they target for extortion.¹²⁷

Sub-National, Medium-Term

The conflict in the southern parts of the country has also left significant scars to the benefit of terrorist groups. The weapons caches built up during the war form a steady supply of arms that can be used for operations.¹²⁸ But the fighting itself has also created beneficial circumstances for terrorist organisations, in that it has led to a bulk of military veterans and veteran mujahideen from south- and central-Asia. Similarly, the cooperation between MILF, ASG and JI has provided all three organisations with benefits,¹²⁹ be they training, experience, recruits or hide-outs.

International, Medium-term

Related to the above and fueling the conflict is the presence/ existence of Jemaah Islamiyah and affiliated terrorist groups in the region. JI has a professed interest in the outcome of the civil war however only as a subelement to its wider South Asian and South-East Asian strategy over which it wishes to install an Islamic caliphate. Because the Filipino battlefield fits within the operational plans of the JI it has contributed to the creation of a black hole in the Philippines. Without the JI, the MILF and ASG would have more difficulty in sustaining their activities.

The Threat from the Filipino Black Hole

The black holes in the Philippines are all in Category 1; they comprise the entire spectrum of terrorist activity. The local support bases, the remnants of the civil wars, the geographical structure of and the international environment around the Philippines render these areas attractive to the terrorist organisations in the region. The threat

¹²⁷ US State Department 2004: 119.

¹²⁸ Garrido, 2003.

¹²⁹ ICG, 2004 (2): 7-25.

resulting from these factors is equally significant: with most of Afghanistan under close government or international scrutiny, regional terrorist actors have been looking for new black holes to base their operations. JI (and possibly Al-Qaeda) have had positive experiences in the Philippines and can be expected to continue or even expand their operations in the country.¹³⁰ The Filipino black hole can be compared to the black holes in Indonesia and even Afghanistan. It is a central node in the network of transnational terrorist operations. The terrorist presence in the Philippines is a serious security threat, not only to its host country, but to the stability of the entire south-east Asian region. It is expected however that the presence of roughly 1300 US special forces and marines since 2002 in the Southern Philippines has made it more difficult for the MILF and JI to operate in the area.

¹³⁰ ICG, 2003: 2-13.

CASE STUDY 2: *Beka'a Valley, Southern Lebanon and Palestinian Refugee Camps*

Overview

- *Black Hole:* *Category 1*
 - *Activities:* *Bases, Collection of Capital, HRM, Training, Hide-outs, Operations*
 - *Period of Black Hole Status:* *Early 1990s – no, although improving*
- | | <u>Refugee Camps</u> | <u>Beqaa Valley</u> |
|-----------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| • <i>Population:</i> | <i>200.000 in 12 camps</i> | <i>750.000</i> |
| • <i>Geography:</i> | <i>urban</i> | <i>plain surrounded by mountains</i> |
| • <i>Main Groups:</i> | <i>palestinians</i> | <i>shi'a muslims</i> |

Lebanon		Rank	Index	Past index
Human Development Index (2003) (1 is high, 0.1 is low)		81	0.759	0.742 (2000)
Corruption Perception Index (2004) (1 is high corruption, 10 low corruption)		97	2.7	-
Freedom House Rating (1 is high, 7 is low)		Political Rights	Civil Rights	Status
	2005	6	5	Not Free
	2000	6	5	Not Free
Gini-Coefficient	2005	-		

The black holes in Lebanon comprise two different types of territory (see figure 5):¹³¹ first the Lebanese-Syrian border areas in the south and east of Lebanon, around the Sheba farms and further north into the Beka'a Valley; and second, the Palestinian refugee camps that are mostly located in the western parts of Lebanon, near the cities of Saida and Beirut.

¹³¹ University of Texas Library, Perry Castaneda Collection.



Figure 5: Lebanon

Hezbollah is the main terrorist actor in the ‘border’ black holes¹³², whereas the refugee camps mainly harbour Palestinian terror groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (General Command), Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, al-Fatah and the al Qaeda-affiliate Asbat al-Ansar.¹³³ Within these Lebanese black holes all terrorist activities are undertaken. The refugee camps are mainly used for hide-outs, human resource management and the collection of capital, whereas the other Lebanese black hole is used for practically all purposes.

Lack of Government Control

Lebanon is a weak state. In the aftermath of decades of violent civil war and outside intervention, the Lebanese government has to date not succeeded in bringing its territory under control. The quantitative indicators portray dangerous state weaknesses; high levels of corruption, limited development and an unfree status. Several qualitative factors can be identified that caused or aggravated this situation:

- the Iranian influence on Lebanese Shias;
- the remnants from the Lebanese civil war;
- Lebanon’s underdeveloped and isolated Beqa’a valley;
- Institutional failure to deal with refugee camp lawlessness;

¹³² US State Department 2004: 122.

¹³³ Ibid.: 116-117, 120, 131, 130.

- Syria's control over parts of Lebanon;
- the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;
- the conflicts over the area around the Sheba farms.

The quantitative indicators show a clear image of a country that is structurally weak. Although the national Lebanese HDI numbers seem to be reasonable and rising, the regional HDI provide us with an interesting nuance: that there is a large development gap between the urban regions and the southern and eastern rural areas, the latter of which comprises the black hole discussed here.¹³⁴ The Corruption Perception Index and Freedom House Ratings also portray a weak state: high and increasing corruption levels over the past two years¹³⁵ and very limited (though slightly increasing) political and civil freedoms.¹³⁶ These liberties are especially low, again, in the black hole areas under discussion here, most notably in the Beqa'a valley.

International, Structural

The international-structural cause for state weakness is the influence of Iran on Lebanese politics. Iran has an interest in the country due to - amongst others - the demographic composition of the state. A sizable Shi'ia minority can be found in the south of the country and the Beqa'a valley. Its support for the Hezbollah movement is one of the materialisations of Iranian influence in the area. Through this organisation Iran has been intervening in the process regarding Israeli interests in the southern Lebanese provinces around the Sheba farms and the so-called Blue Line (the demarcation between Lebanon and Israel)¹³⁷ and recent Hezbollah attacks indicate a continued presence and willingness to affect regional politics and Lebanese security.¹³⁸

Sub-National, Structural

The Lebanese civil war was an incredibly complex conflict, the causes and effects of which are mostly beyond the scope of this paper. Certain features of contemporary Lebanon are however rooted in the civil war. One of the most important features is the disputed nature of Lebanon's southern borders towards Israel and the Golan Heights. The Sheba areas remain contested as are the demarcations of the southern provinces. The Lebanese government has to date not been capable of making significant changes in this situation. The civil war has also meant the availability of small arms. A factor influencing state fragility is the number of arms caches within the country.¹³⁹ The leftover arms used in the civil war are in part still being used by the Lebanese population, mostly for personal protection but also as a socio-cultural symbol.

A low level of economic development in the southern provinces and the Beqa'a valley are a factor of fragility. Economic recession has proved destructive for the livelihoods of Beqa'a agriculture. The poor economic situation fosters dissatisfaction, rebellion and illegal practices (such as the planting of illicit crops) and offers groups like Hezbollah fertile recruiting soil.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁴ UNDP, 2002: 17.

¹³⁵ Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2003-2004; there were no measurements done before 2003.

¹³⁶ Freedom House Ratings 2004-2005.

¹³⁷ Haahr-Escolano, 2004.

¹³⁸ Arabic News 25/4/2005.

¹³⁹ Regional Workshop on 'Traditional Cultural Practices and Small Arms in the Middle East', 2002: 1.

¹⁴⁰ Whitaker, 2001.

Cross-national, Medium-Term

Since its 1976 military intervention in Lebanon, Syria has always had a formidable military presence in Lebanon, most notably in the eastern provinces. Under the pretence of protecting Lebanon against Israeli aggression, Syria has come to consider its positions in Lebanon as vital to its own security.¹⁴¹ Even after the Israelis abandoned their military bases in southern Lebanon in May 2000, Syria maintained its military presence and Syria's security services have penetrated Lebanese society.¹⁴² Terrorist organisations, extremist Islamic and aimed at the destruction of the 'Zionist entity', have not only been condoned but also supported. From the 1990s onwards, Syria began to sponsor Hezbollah and support it with military training and bases. Syria's influence in Lebanon has thereby had substantial impact on the ability for terrorist organisations to deploy their activities in Lebanon.^{143, 144} As a result of the investigation into the assassination of Rafik Hariri, international pressure on Syria to end its intervention in Lebanese politics has increased.

Cross-national, Structural

Directly related to this is the profound impact that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has had on Lebanon. Used by the PLO as an area from which to launch attacks against Israeli forces, Israel occupied Southern Lebanon in 1982 and maintained a presence until 2000. As a consequence of the conflict, Palestinian refugees flowed towards Lebanon and refugee camps have become black holes in their own right. The Lebanese government has shown a remarkable reluctance to interfere with the terrorist activities within these camps, most notably the 'island of insecurity' which is Ein al-Hilweh.¹⁴⁵ Because Lebanon does not seem to lack the capacity to intervene, and a substantial security apparatus exists, scholars argue that it is on Syria's order that Beirut refrains from intervention in these camps.¹⁴⁶ Syria supports the terrorist organisations because of their common cause against the state of Israel. Nevertheless, the Lebanese institutions show a severe weakness in dealing with this lawlessness. Perhaps the current demise of Syrian influence in Lebanon will give a renewed impulse to the dismantling of these terrorist havens. In either case, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has spawned and fueled these black holes. As already identified above, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has caused the influx of great flows of Palestinian refugees, for whom the refugee camps that we now classify as black holes have been created. Thus, the direct cause for these black holes to exist is the presence of Palestinian refugees opposing Israel, waiting to return to their homes.

A similar argument can be made for the conflict over the Sheba farms and surrounding areas: without the start of this conflict, Hezbollah would have no reason to be there and there would most likely not be a black hole in those parts of Lebanon. Thus, the direct cause for the existence of the black hole in the southern parts of Lebanon is the conflict with Israel over those southern territories.

¹⁴¹ GlobalSecurity.org, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/lebanon/overview.htm>

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Interestingly, the Syrians are currently retreating from their positions. The position of terrorist outfits in Beqa'a valley and southern Lebanon has now, for the first time in nearly 25 years, come to be questioned seriously.

¹⁴⁵ Gambill, 2003 accessed at http://www.meib.org/articles/0306_11.htm

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.



The Ein al Hilweh Refugee Camp

'The Ain al-Hilweh camp has four entries and all of these are blocked by checkpoints manned by the Lebanese army. There are no fixed phone lines and residents steal electricity from the nearby neighborhoods of Sidon. The camp also lacks basic sanitation and clean water. The United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA) are responsible for providing basic housing, medication and education whereas security is in the hands of the different Palestinian militias. Most important of all the Lebanese authorities have no presence inside the camp. The Lebanese media calls Ain al-Hilweh the "island of un-law" because of the lack of security and concentration of outlaws and the fact that the Lebanese state does exercise sovereignty over the camp.'

(Excerpt from Ain al Hilweh: Al Qaeda's foothold in Lebanon,

http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=400&issue_id=3131&article_id=2368804)

Lebanon and Terrorist Activity

This section will describe the relation between characteristics of the Lebanese black holes and the nature of the terrorist activities undertaken in the black hole:

- disputed state borders;
- arms caches, remnants from civil war;
- ethnic religious composition;
- economic malaise;
- Palestinian refugees;
- Non-permissive urban jungle in Refugee camps;
- the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Cross-national, Structural

Two black hole areas in Lebanon are mostly along the border, in the east with Syria and the contested region with Israel around the Sheba farms. In the Lebanese-Syrian border area, Hezbollah has received assistance in the form of material support.¹⁴⁷ In the southern disputed border areas terrorist outfits both found a cause (against Israel), recruits to support the cause and territory which is either disputed or weakly controlled to enable the establishing of refuges.

National, Structural

The arms left from the civil war, as has been discussed above, found new use in the hands of terrorists and armed groups. Often collected in the refugee camps, away from outside interference, these arms are used by terrorist organisations. This ready availability of firearms has a greatly facilitated the terrorist activities in Lebanon and the region at large.

Sub-National, Structural

The Shi'a background of many of the Lebanese in the underdeveloped southern and eastern black hole areas and their sympathy for either Iran or the political objectives of Hezbollah creates an environment for Hezbollah (and other Islamic groups) where active and passive recruitment is straight-forward and the possibilities for acquiring funds (either from Iran, Syria or from the supportive population) are plenty.¹⁴⁸ Also, supportive populations can be passively instrumental by not betraying the terrorist group's locations. Finally, Iranian support for Hezbollah has not only been financial, but extended to training as well, either on Lebanese or Iranian territory.¹⁴⁹ Thus, the supportive population and their ethnic-religious links to Iran have been important determinants of the activities of Hezbollah.

The economic underdevelopment of the rural regions has created, just like the Shi'a background of many Lebanese, a support base for religious extremism offering to resolve these problems. This support base has been instrumental in the self-recruitment of new terrorists.

The geographic surroundings of the refugee camps also works to the advantage of terrorist groups. The urban jungle environment is beneficial as a hide-out and a place for refuge.

Sub-national, Direct

The refugee camps have been primarily used as pools of active and passive recruitment, hide-outs and arms collection.¹⁵⁰ Palestinian refugees, either born in the Palestinian territories or in the refugee camps, live in an in-between state, torn between their desire to return home and their need for security and peace. Brought up in a culture of violence and poverty, many of the younger refugees are willing to fight for the Palestinian cause. Thus, Palestinian refugee camps offer plenty of opportunity for terrorist HRM. Also, their function as potential hide-outs is important. Small chaotic cities and shantytowns without government interference are perfect hide-outs or bases for operations. They are

¹⁴⁷ Brew, N., Dept. of the Parliamentary Library: Research Note *Hezbollah in Profile*, 2002-2003 accessed at <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rn/2002-03/03rn42.pdf>.

¹⁴⁸ ICG, 2002: 16-19, 32; ICG, 2005: 17-22.

¹⁴⁹ Haahr-Escolano, 2004.

¹⁵⁰ Gambill, 2003.

also ideal black markets, where required material (including firearms) can be sold and acquired.

Cross-national, Medium-Term

Lastly, a word on the effect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the black holes in Lebanon. Though one cannot assume that the black holes would disappear at the resolution of this protracted conflict, it would render the operations of terrorist groups in Lebanon more difficult in two distinct ways: first, the ideological motivator for struggle would disappear and in line with this, the ready availability of refugee-recruits. Different groups in Lebanon have different causes and objectives, but most of them despise Israel's conflict with the Palestinians. Especially the Palestinian refugees are strongly supportive of the Palestinian cause and oppose Israel. Would however peace be established between the two opposing parties, this would steal much of the terrorists' thunder. In addition, and perhaps equally important, the conflict has spurred the self-recruitment of militant youth. This flow would be reduced. This would mean a setback for all terrorist outfits in Lebanon and hinder their activities.

The Threat of the Lebanese Black Holes

The black holes in Lebanon are characterised by their ambiguous nature: either semi-autonomous, self-made Palestinian enclaves in the shape of refugee camps, and disputed or otherwise fragile border areas. The civil wars both in Lebanon and between the Israelis and Palestinians have each contributed to the existence of the Lebanese black holes, as have the outside intervention policies of Syria and Iran. The 'push-over' character of the Lebanese state has been a major cause for the black holes within its territory.

The threat arising from these Lebanese black holes is high, especially towards Israel and Israeli interests. The nature of the Lebanese black holes, both the fragile border areas as well as the man-made character of the refugee camps are two representative examples of characteristics found in many black holes. On the one hand are the fragile, disputed or on the whole ambiguous border areas, abused by terrorist organisations to find refuge and target interests nearby, which are also found in the Ferghana valley in Central Asia, the southern provinces of Thailand or the North Western Frontier Provinces of Pakistan. On the other hand, the urban sprawl of the refugee camps can be compared to areas with high population concentrations such as the Pakistani city of Karachi, north-eastern Sri Lanka, the Palestinian Territories and tracts of Iraq where terrorist groups can be the fish in a sea of people.

CASE STUDY 3: *Liberia and Sierra Leone's Eastern Diamond Mining Areas*

Overview

- *Black Hole:* Category 3
- *Activities:* Collection of Capital, HRM
- *Period of Black Hole Status:* 1989 – present, although situation improved after 2004
- *Population* 9.5 million (Sierra Leone, Liberia combined):
- *Geography:* coastal mangroves leading northwest to low jungle mountains
- *Main Groups:* indigenous African tribes, americo-liberians

Liberia		Rank	Index	Past index
Human Development Index (2003) (1 is high, 0.1 is low)		-	-	-
Corruption Perception Index (2004) (1 is high corruption, 10 low corruption)		-	-	-
Freedom House Rating (1 is high, 7 is low)		Political Rights	Civil Rights	Status
	2005	5	4	Partly Free
	2000	4	5	Partly Free
Gini-Coefficient 2005 (0 presents perfect equality, 100 perfect inequality)			-	

Sierra Leone		Rank	Index	Past index
Human Development Index (2003) (1 is high, 0.1 is low)		176	0.298	-
Corruption Perception Index (2004) (1 is high corruption, 10 low corruption)		114	2.3	-
Freedom House Rating (1 is high, 7 is low)		Political Rights	Civil Rights	Status
	2005	4	3	Partly Free
	2000	3	5	Partly Free
Gini-Coefficient 2005 (0 presents perfect equality, 100 perfect inequality)			62.9	

The black hole in Liberia and Sierra Leone extends over the former country's entire territory and includes the diamond mining areas in the eastern parts of Sierra Leone (see figure 7).^{151, 152} Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda form the terrorist presence in this part of the world, of which the former is the more established and institutionalized.¹⁵³ Their presence is strongest in the western provinces of Liberia (most notably the Lofa and

¹⁵¹ Gberie, 2004: 4.

¹⁵² Curtis, 2003: 31-32.

¹⁵³ Farah, 2004 (1).

Mano river valleys) and Sierra Leone's diamond mines.¹⁵⁴ Terrorist activity mainly consists of collecting financial capital through participation in the (illegal) diamond trade, money laundering and HRM.¹⁵⁵




Figure 6: The Liberian-Leonese Black Hole and West African diamond mines

Lack of Government Control

Liberia is a failed state at the heart of the tumultuous West-African region, rich both in natural resources and protracted civil wars. Quantitative indicators of Liberian state performance trends over the past decades uncover the country's structural underperformance. There are several factors which have most strongly contributed to the failing of the state apparatus:¹⁵⁶

- the country's natural resource endowments;
- corruption and prolific illegal trade;
- harsh jungle environment;
- ethnic heterogeneity making national unity difficult;
- bad governance and a weak democratic tradition preventing the country
- from developing a productive economy, increasing the prevalence of corruption and fuelling the ethnic oppositions into two decades of destructive civil war in the entire West-African region.

Human Development Indices (HDI) have to date not been available for Liberia; therefore this paper will refer to the HDI statistics for Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire, so as to give an indication of the situation in the region. Sierra Leone, first rated in 2002, has been placed at the bottom and on the second-last place of the HDI list. Neighbouring Cote d'Ivoire ranks 163rd out of 177 and is observed to have been

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ ICG, 2004 (1): 6; Gberie, 2002: 5.

deteriorating over the past 15 years.¹⁵⁷ If data on Liberia were available, it would no doubt be somewhere in the same range. In the Freedom House Rating, which rates both civil liberties and political rights, Liberia has ameliorated its position from a score of 5 to 4 (on a 1 to 7 scale, with 1 being a high level of freedom and 7 low) and now holds the description 'partly free'. This is due to the end of the civil war, the UNMIL intervention and the expulsion of its former president, Charles Taylor. The situation however remains precarious. However, political freedoms have decreased from 4 to 5 in the same period. Lastly, the Corruption Perception Indices (also not available for Liberia) of Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire indicate serious fragilities for effective governance; Sierra Leone, ranked only twice, holds the 114th place out of 145. Cote d'Ivoire does even worse with a 133rd place.¹⁵⁸ The quantitative indicators thus show steady underperformance at the state level, leading to low levels of human development, partial or even absent freedoms and high levels of corruption.

Cross-national, Structural

Geographically, the country is characterized by dense rainforests that run inland from the coastal plain and mountainous jungle areas near the border with Sierra Leone. These mountainous areas are difficult to penetrate and govern but rich in natural resources, most notably diamonds.¹⁵⁹ Although Sierra Leone's diamond reserves are far more substantial than Liberia's, the latter country has been instrumental in the (illegal) diamond trade from all over the region.¹⁶⁰

Since the start of the civil war in 1989, Liberia has known a strong shadow economy, based also on illegal trade in diamonds, illegal logging and smuggling.¹⁶¹ In Sierra Leone, the shadow economy has been on par with Liberia's. The combination of a chaotic atmosphere due to civil conflict and large uncontrolled mineral resources has been to the benefit of corrupt officials and organized criminal groups. These parties therefore have had a strong interest in an unstable Liberia, a volatile territory in which they can operate without outside interference.

An indication of the scale of smuggling is given by the UN Panel of Experts Report on Liberia, which investigated the relationship between the Liberian government and the RUF rebels and in turn found serious indications of corruption.

'The Panel examined Liberia's diamond industry because it is another crucial source of natural resource revenue for the Government. Liberia's own official diamond exports were said to be only 8,500 carats in 1999, valued at US\$ 900,000. Liberia's Minister of Lands, Mines and Energy estimates that this represents only 10 to 15 per cent of what is actually leaving the country.'¹⁶²

National, Structural

Although never formally colonized, the Liberian indigenous people were dominated by a foreign minority group (Americo-Liberians, ca. 3% of the population). Founded in 1847 by the United States as a re-created homeland for its liberated African slaves, Liberia was considered to be a rightful home to all former American slaves. The

¹⁵⁷ UNDP, Human Development Report 2005: Trends in Human Development Index.

¹⁵⁸ Transparency International: Corruption Perceptions Indices 2001 – 2004.

¹⁵⁹ Winkler Prins: Liberia.

¹⁶⁰ Gberie, 2002: 5.

¹⁶¹ Gberie, 2004: 5-6.

¹⁶² UN Panel of Experts Report on Liberia, 26 October 2001.

tensions between Americo-Liberians and the indigenous African groups, complemented by the differences between the many indigenous ethnic groups, were first politicised by president Samuel Doe in 1986. He preferred his own Krahn tribe and alienated others, thereby leading the way to the violent ethnic conflicts that erupted with the power struggle between him and his key adversary, Charles Taylor.

National, Medium-Term

‘State failure is man-made, not merely accidental nor – fundamentally – caused geographically, environmentally, or externally. Leadership decisions and leadership failures have destroyed states’.¹⁶³ In most fragile states human agency, often in the shape of bad governance and the presence of ‘spoilers’, is decisive in determining its future. Liberia had the structural factors facilitating state weakness and failure. Nevertheless, it required the kleptocratic and aggressive rule of President Charles Taylor to push Liberia over the brink of failure. As a genuine warlord and international pariah, he embezzled state money from the diamond trade, fueled the civil war in order to gain power, and sponsored and directed the RUF (Revolutionary United Front) in their violent quest for diamonds in neighbouring Sierra Leone.¹⁶⁴ Taylor has been a mitigating and necessary factor in the destabilisation of Liberia. His aggressive attitude caused opposition parties - the LURD (Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy) and MODEL (Movement for Democracy in Liberia) - to rise against him and force him out of office. A bloody civil war ensued. Taylor’s destructive governance has been a key to the failure of the Liberian state.

Liberia, Sierra Leone and Terrorist Activity

Two of the above factors have not only caused the Liberian government to fail, but have also shaped the terrorist activities undertaken by Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda in the country. As a third, and hitherto disregarded structural factor, the Lebanese émigré community in Liberia has been a source of income and passive recruitment and has provided Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda access to Liberian resources. The following factors are identified that shaped the terrorist presence in both Liberia and Sierra Leone:

- the diamond production and illegal trade,
- the corrupted nature of the Taylor regime,
- the Lebanese émigré community.

Cross-national, Structural

Like poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, Liberia and Sierra Leone’s natural resources have attracted the attention from criminal organisations and terrorist groups in search of capital. Diamonds are small and have a stable, high value and are as such among the perfect smuggling commodities. Al-Qaeda and especially Hezbollah are believed to have taken part in the shadow economy of the Liberian diamond trade.¹⁶⁵

National, Medium-Term

Abusing the state’s disorder and its high levels of corruption, both terrorist organisations have been able to force and bribe their way into the diamond trade, often with help from government forces. Through President Taylor Hezbollah was able to

¹⁶³ Rotberg, 2002: 93.

¹⁶⁴ Farah, 2004 (1).

¹⁶⁵ Farah, 2004 (2): 32-34; Simpson, G., Wall Street Journal, June 28 2004.

gain a foothold in the diamond fields of RUF-controlled Sierra Leone.¹⁶⁶ Terrorist and other (state and non-state) actors still involved in the diamond trade now constitute one of the greatest forces inhibiting a peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict and the country's reconstruction. The status quo is simply too profitable.

Life in a Black Hole

Liberian citizens live in a constant state of fear, not only because of the LURD insurgency but also because of fear of forced recruitment, maltreatment, looting, extortion or other abuses by the undisciplined armed units deployed by the Government, including the former RUF units. The regular armed forces, the various militia and the groups of fighters have not received salaries for months, a situation that encourages them to fight each other or to loot, steal or even kill innocent civilians. Although cases of torture and maltreatment of civilians by the various factions of LURD have also been documented, the population fears the Government controlled forces even more.

(excerpt from UN Panel of Experts Report on Liberia, 24 October 2002)

Sub-national, Structural

Corrupt government and resources are only part of the explanation why terrorist groups have gained access to diamond money. The last factor to be discussed is the presence of a strong and commercially-savvy Lebanese émigré community in Liberia. This group of mostly Shi'ia Lebanese, who immigrated to Liberia in the second half of the 20th century, has always shown to have strong sympathy for Hezbollah, which they felt was fighting for their interests in their home country.¹⁶⁷ As Michael Humphrey convincingly argues in an article on Lebanese Diaspora identities,¹⁶⁸ these Lebanese communities have always had a marginal position in their host societies, mostly trusting on their mercantile livelihoods¹⁶⁹ and kinship structures to keep them safe and wealthy. All the terrorist group requires in such a situation where ethnic-religious loyalties run deep, is a well-connected Lebanese businessman who sympathizes with the political objectives of the group (or who is handsomely paid) and access is provided. Hezbollah has thus found an opening into the diamond trade through these communities, either working through middlemen or managing the relationship directly.¹⁷⁰

The Threat of the Liberian-Leonese Black Hole

The Liberian- Leoneese black hole is characteristic of a particular type. It is the stereotype where physical and human geography have combined. Favourable conditions of state degeneration (a conflict-ridden, corrupt failed state) have combined with financial opportunities (the diamond trade) and local 'ethnic' support (from the Lebanese émigrés). Together, these factors render Liberia and the adjacent Leoneese

¹⁶⁶ Farah, 2004 (1).

¹⁶⁷ Gberie, 2002: 14.

¹⁶⁸ Humphrey, 2004.

¹⁶⁹ The Liberian Lebanese communities traditionally earn their living with trade; part of their fortune originates in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean diamond trade.

¹⁷⁰ Humphrey, 2004.

diamond mining area a region where terrorist organisations deploy capital-seeking activities, although with a limited presence. Most likely their presence is confined to only a handful of business-minded and well-connected people. Another black hole with characteristics similar to it are areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic, where the extraction of natural resources is central to the operations of terrorist groups in the black hole and are a direct cause for the contested nature of the territory. The DRC, like Liberia/Sierra Leone has suffered greatly from internal conflict driven by resource extraction and corruption. In that sense, the model in Congo is the same as in Liberia/Sierra Leone.

As we shall see in the following case study, the Tri-Border Area has similarities with Liberia/Sierra Leone as there are emigré/ refugee communities that offer opportunities to those terrorist groups that can tap these human resources in relative isolation. The same holds true for the case study on the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. The presence of specific communities offer specific terrorist groups comparative advantages.

The lethal risk from the terrorist groups in the Liberian-Leonese black hole is limited compared to the risks posed by militias, paramilitaries and government forces active in the area. Nevertheless, financial operations are the lifeline for the existence of any organisation, targeting it hampers the operations of any terrorist group.

CASE STUDY 4: The Tri-Border Area between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay

Overview

- *Black Hole:* Category 2
- *Activities:* Collection of Capital, HRM, Staging Operations and Hide-outs
- *Period of Black Hole Status:* 1970s - now
- *Population:* 630.000
- *Geography:* jungle & urban
- *Main Groupss:* Hispanic, Indian, Arab, African

Paraguay	Rank	Index	Past index
Human Development Index (2003) (1 is high, 0.1 is low)	88	0.755	0.753 (2000)
Corruption Perception Index (2004) (1 is high corruption, 10 low corruption)	140	1.9	-
Freedom House Rating (1 is high, 7 is low)		Political Rights	Civil Rights
	2005	3	3
	2000	4	3
Gini-Coefficient 2005 (0 presents perfect equality, 100 perfect inequality)		57.8	

Brazil	Rank	Index	Past index
Human Development Index (2003) (1 is high, 0.1 is low)	63	0.792	0.783 (2000)
Corruption Perception Index (2004) (1 is high corruption, 10 low corruption)	59	3.9	3.9
Freedom House Rating (1 is high, 7 is low)		Political Rights	Civil Rights
	2005	2	3
	2000	3	4
Gini-Coefficient 2005 (0 presents perfect equality, 100 perfect inequality)		59.3	

Argentina	Rank	Index	Past index
Human Development Index (2003) (1 is high, 0.1 is low)	34	0.863	0.856 (2000)
Corruption Perception Index (2004) (1 is high corruption, 10 low corruption)	108	2.5	3.5
Freedom House Rating (1 is high, 7 is low)		Political Rights	Civil Rights
	2005	2	2
	2000	2	3
Gini-Coefficient 2005 (0 presents perfect equality, 100 perfect inequality)		52.2	

The black hole in the tri-border area comprises the three border towns of Puerto Iguazu (Argentina), Ciudad del Este (Paraguay) and Foz do Iguacu (Brazil) in the jungle heart of South America. The towns are separated from each other by the Iguacu River that produces the nearby Iguacu Falls. Bridges (bearing names like the Friendship International Bridge) connect the three towns, facilitating work on the one hand and housing on the other side of the river. The total population of the three towns is estimated at around 600,000, of which some 70,000 belong to overseas ethnic minority groups (Chinese, Lebanese and Korean).

The main terrorist groups active in the area are primarily Hezbollah, but Hamas and Al-Jihad members have also been reported.¹⁷¹ Al-Qaeda is believed to have a presence but to-date remains uncorroborated by intelligence reports.¹⁷² The terrorist activities have mainly been aimed at financial gain (through participation in the immense illegal trade flows in the tri-border area), passive recruitment from the pool of Lebanese émigrés, providing a hide-out for so-called ‘sleepers cells’ and being a base from which to stage operations; i.e. the 1992 and 1994 Buenos Aires bombings are believed to be organised from here.¹⁷³




Figure 7: The Tri-Border Area between Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina

Lack of Government Control

The Tri-Border Area (TBA) is a ‘lawless area of illicit activities that generates billions of dollars annually’,¹⁷⁴ over which the governments of the three adjacent states have little control. Three factors warrant elaboration:

- the inaccessible jungle surrounding the TBA;
- the ‘free-trading zone’;
- the endemic corruption of all three governments;

¹⁷¹ Hudson, 2003: 12; US Department of State, 2004.

¹⁷² Washington Post, 18-3-2003; Veja Online, 16-3-2003.

¹⁷³ Hudson, 2003: 14-34; Abbott, 2004.

¹⁷⁴ Abbott, 2004.

The quantitative indicators of state performance used in this analysis¹⁷⁵ show two relatively strong states, both highly developed and free, and one weak state that is only partly free and underdeveloped. These numbers would lead one to assume that Paraguay is the region's weakest link and the least effective state in the area. However Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina all experience high levels of corruption. In fact, the latter has actually become more corrupt over the past years. Corruption seems to be an endemic (and growing) problem in all three states, to such a degree that it destabilises their societies and hinders their development. In the discussion below on the national, medium-term factors, the role of corruption in creating state fragility and rendering the tri-border states incapable of acting against the lawlessness in their border area are highlighted. Finally, the Gini-coefficients for all three countries show significant inequalities, contributing to dissatisfaction among the population and the fragility of the state.

Cross-national, Structural

In the early 1970s, the government of Paraguay decided to establish a free-trading zone in Ciudad del Este, seeking to stimulate the Paraguayan economy by allowing Argentines and Brazilians to purchase cheap electronics in the Ciudad.¹⁷⁶ and exploit the tourism generated by the Iguacu Falls. The free trade was beneficial to the economy of the area: Ciudad del Este boomed. The estimated annual turnover in 2001 of the combined legitimate and illegitimate economies in Ciudad del Este made the city's economy larger than that of the rest of Paraguay.¹⁷⁷

The free trade, however, not only attracted legitimate businesses, but also elements of the Latin American underworld. They recognised an opportunity to exploit the lack of government overview in Ciudad del Este and the region saw a growth in drugs and arms dealing and money laundering. As an example of the size of the criminal activities in the area, money laundering alone has been estimated to average about 12 billion US dollar each year, a staggering amount considering the size of the city (with only about 300,000 inhabitants).¹⁷⁸ The lax border controls on all three borders further established its position as a smugglers' paradise: the favored smuggling route is the aforementioned Friendship Bridge, which carries about 30,000 to 40,000 people daily between Brazil and Paraguay.¹⁷⁹ With only limited personnel and capabilities, only a fraction of the vehicles and travellers are submitted to thorough checks. Simultaneously alternative routes are abundant through the jungle surrounding the tri-border area, which obscures the rest of the border from the control of the respective governments. The topographic surroundings are an important structural factor in impeding the government to uphold the law.

Paraguay thus played a facilitating role in the initiation of the tri-border area as a black hole, by creating a smugglers' paradise in a remote, inaccessible border area. From the initial review of the quantitative indicators, it does not seem likely that Paraguay will in the short term be able to counter these activities. Argentine and Brazilian border controls have been partially successful in limiting the illegitimate trade to and from

¹⁷⁵ Human Development Index, FH ratings and the Corruption Perception Index.

¹⁷⁶ Hudson, 2003:6.

¹⁷⁷ Hudson, 2003: 10, 11.

¹⁷⁸ Hudson, 2003: 8.

¹⁷⁹ Hudson, 2003: 11.

their border towns, but still encounter large problems when dealing with the weakness and corruption of their Paraguayan counterparts.¹⁸⁰ It is therefore very unlikely that the tri-border area will rid itself of its lawless character, especially in the Paraguayan city of Ciudad del Este.

National, Medium-Term

Corruption is one of the key words in the analysis of South American state failure, most strongly so in Paraguay and the tri-border area. In general, corruption has been shown to have severely detrimental effects on the development of state efficacy and legitimacy.¹⁸¹ A poignant example of the 'cooperation' between corrupt officials and terrorist actors is found in the *New York Times*' interview with a witness in the case of the July 1994 bombing in Buenos Aires. According to this witness, the Iranian government (as a main supporter of Hezbollah) paid President Menem of Argentina 10,000,000 US dollar to cover up an investigation into the attack.¹⁸² Although Menem still strongly denies the claims, many analysts hold them to be true and are an example of the huge problem of fostering security under corrupt conditions. In the tri-border area specifically, criminal purposes often coincide with the interests of corrupt officials even to the extent where it aids outside terrorist groups.

The Tri-Border Area and Terrorist Activity

This section will detail how various characteristics of the tri-border area have been conducive to the operations of terrorist groups and hence explain the presence of these groups in the area. The following characteristics have been observed:

- the isolated environment surrounding the tri-border cities;
- the nature of the area as a 'smuggler's paradise';
- the local Arab ethnic minorities in the tri-border towns;
- the prevalence of corruption in the three tri-border jurisdictions.

Cross-national, Structural

The cross-national structural features of the tri-border area that constitute the comparative advantage for terrorist outfits are the jungle surrounding the tri-border towns and the ease with which goods and capital are transacted across the region.

The function of the jungle surrounding the tri-border area is clear: it obscures terrorist movement and activities from the law enforcement agencies active in the area. In preparing the bomb attacks on Buenos Aires in the 1990s, the tri-border area was instrumental in the sense that the preparations could go undetected and the operation could be conducted from the terrorist strongholds in the area. Thus, the tri-border area provided the terrorist outfits with a place to prepare the operation, a suitable place from which to acquire the necessary logistics as well as appropriate hide-outs.

The high level of illegitimate commerce in the TBA is clearly functional as it facilitates the procurement of necessary means, including arms and explosives. Illegal transactions can be performed oblivious to the law enforcement agencies. Narcotics trafficking, money laundering, blackmail and other traditionally criminal activities are common

¹⁸⁰ Hudson, 2003: 12.

¹⁸¹ Gray and Kaufmann, 1998: 7-10.

¹⁸² Rohter, L., "Iran blew up Jewish Center in Argentina, defector says", *New York Times*, July 22, 2002; Young, G., "El testigo C ahora dice que Irán nunca le pagó al menemismo", *Clarín*, 12 January 2003.

sources of funds for groups like Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda and can be performed in the areas.¹⁸³

Another factor is the presence of relatively large Lebanese minorities in the tri-border towns. Estimates of the number of Arabs in the TBA range from 20,000 to 30,000, mostly living in Brazilian Foz do Iguacu but also in Ciudad del Este. Their large number has made it possible to create a tightly-knit social 'column' within TBA society, in which the Arabs have their own clubs, their own schools and visit their own mosques. Having migrated there during the Lebanese civil war, among these Lebanese émigrés (most of whom are Shi'a) there are those who feel strongly for the political agenda of Hezbollah. During the 1990's and in preparation to the 1994 Buenos Aires bombing, the Iranian diplomatic corps played a pivotal role in enabling Hezbollah to operate in the TBA. Through its network of diplomats Iran was able to offer logistics and planning to operatives in the TBA under the guise of valid diplomatic dealings and at the same time give a level of trust to the mostly pro-Iranian Lebanese community. It is unclear whether this is still the case.

Estimates have ranged between 400 and 500 Hezbollah operatives to be present in the region. The social group of Muslim Lebanese diaspora functions as both an active as well as a passive supporter of the Party of God. Active involvement of some of the communities' members in support activities can be accompanied by a those who act as a cloak for operatives and logisticians alike through their passive support. In terms of active support, the TBA is also believed to be a key source for Hezbollah's funding through the presence of Lebanese entrepreneurs.¹⁸⁴ Similar advantages, although arguably to a lesser extent, are available to other Islamic terrorist groups.

National, Medium-Term

One factor on the national level that makes the TBA attractive to terrorist organisations is the level of government corruption in the three tri-border countries. Government corruption has already been discussed in relation to the vulnerability of the state and its function to terrorist organisations has briefly been alluded to: it provides them with protection from officials, access to the TBA (through illegitimate documents) and facilitates procurement. In that sense, corruption promotes state fragility *because* it is beneficial to illegal organisations such as criminals and terrorists and therefore it is not surprising that both criminal elements and terrorist groups are found in the TBA.

The Threat of the Tri-Border Black Hole

The terrorist black hole in the tri-border area of Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina is of the second category: it combines limited support activities with violent operations. Although no terrorist events have occurred inside the black hole, the terrorist attacks on the Israeli embassy and the cultural exchange center in the 1990's could not have been performed without the presence in the TBA. The criminal nature of the terrorist activities within the TBA demands that part of the counterterrorism strategy include strong local law enforcement measures and border controls. Additionally, development initiatives could target the South American governments in an attempt to limit the rotting of the state's institutions caused by endemic state corruption. Although most of the terrorist activity in the area is supportive; aimed at financial support, HRM or


¹⁸³ Hudson, 2003: 29-30.

¹⁸⁴ Madani, B., *Hezbollah's Global Finance Network: the Triple Frontier*, http://www.meib.org/articles/0201_12.htm

protection, the operational threat is what should make the TBA a serious priority. Any serious activities in South America are likely to be at least partially organised from the TBA. The area is a stereotype of a true sanctuary for muslim terrorists. It is unique because it accomodates Muslim terrorist groups on the Western hemisphere. The presence of the Lebanese diaspora seems to be crucial in this. At the same time, the TBA is an example of a black hole where terrorist groups have made use of the traditional comparative advantages of the region; namely the smuggler's paradise, and have exploited it to their own benefit. The combination of these two factors has rendered the TBA a true black hole.

Similarlities to the TBA can be found in black holes such as the Ferghana Valley in Uzbekistan, the Chittigong hills in Bangladesh, the border of Iraq and Iran, the Pakistani-Afghan border, and the Pankisi and Kodori Gorges in Georgia. In these black holes, border areas of doubtable efficacy in governance combine with ethnic-religious communities in which terrorist groups can find sanctuary.

Explaining the Black Hole



Why are black holes formed in particular areas? With the help of the case studies above we can attempt to answer that question. The case studies have made clear that terrorist black holes emerge through a combination of factors, with no particular reason seeming to be paramount above others, in other words they are the product of a confluence of factors.

In order to fully understand the occurrence of black holes the factors identified in the case studies need to be analysed and it must be discerned whether a general pattern of factors can be found. This section will do so by examining and categorising the factors, both for the lack of effective government control and the area's features that facilitate terrorist activity. It will show firstly what factors contribute to state fragility and the rise of terrorist groups according to the typology used and secondly, an analysis of the generic factors will be provided in order to determine what shapes the presence of black holes.

Firstly, in the following two figures, a 3x4 matrix graphically presents the quantity of factors contributing to weak government control and terrorist activity in the area per level of government and per measure of time.¹⁸⁵ Although the factors in the matrices are not weighted and each factor is considered equal (a premise that is disputable, because some factors may be more important than others), it nevertheless offers a glimpse into the general spread of factors that have been identified from the case studies. In figure 8 the matrix of factors amounting to the lack of government control is presented. It shows that mainly structural factors are responsible for the lack of government control. This is not surprising since state control over a particular area is unlikely to crumble from one day to the next, but takes place over a protracted period of time. The primary level of impact where the factors occur are at the cross-national and national levels (8 instances both). This implies that either the factor that is causing the state's weakness is confined

¹⁸⁵ Appendix B shows the matrices with the individual factors specified.

to the entirety of the state, or it transcends the borders into a neighbouring state, i.e. there is a situation of spill-over. Regarding the cross-national factors, the events in one state may affect the territory of another. This coincides with traditional state failure theory; namely the regional destabilizing nature of state weakness. However, 5 factors are found at the sub-national level, indicative of specific characteristics in that region affecting that region. This supports the black hole approach of looking at territories instead of at states.

The clout of factors can be traced to those of a cross-national/ structural, national/ medium-term and subnational/ structural nature.

	Factors amounting to Lack of Government Control		
international	2	1	1
cross-national		1	7
national		5	3
sub-national			5
	direct	medium-term	structural

Figure 8: Matrix of Factors amounting to lack of government control

Figure 9 similarly presents the factors identified in the case studies contributing to terrorist activity in the areas. There is a clear bias towards medium-term and specifically structural factors. This would lead to believe that terrorist groups settle in specific areas because of certain conditions that have been around for quite some time, in other words there is a structural attraction of these areas to terrorist groups. Also, sub-national (11 factors) and cross-national (6 factors) factors are most prevalent and four out of the six cross-national factors are related to the conditions in border areas. This affirms the relevance of the black hole approach; a terrorist presence is influenced by the factors in specific areas. Similar to the results in figure 8 the dominant factors are *sub-national, structural* and *cross-national, structural*.

Factors amounting to Terrorist Activity			
International		1	1
Cross-national		1	5
national		2	2
sub-national	1	2	8
	direct	medium-term	structural

Figure 9: Factors amounting to Terrorist Comparative Advantage

While by far the majority of factors contributing to the presence of a terrorist group are cross-national and subnational in nature, state fragility is also very much affected by national factors. To weaken government control, national factors do play a role but for the presence of a terrorist group, area-specific features are more important – hence again supporting the *black hole* thesis. Black holes are created because certain conditions in 1) an area greatly affected by events in neighbouring states, 2) a border region or 3) an area specifically different from the rest of the state, have been able to weaken the states' control over a protracted period of time, making these areas *structurally* lawless. Similarly, the study shows that black holes exist because the conditions that make an area attractive for terrorist groups have been in place for a substantial period of time. This is good news for the intelligence community as it implies that black holes do not pop up from one day to the next but that the reasons why terrorist groups are in a particular area have been in place for quite some time.

Five Factors contributing to State Fragility

Among each of the six black holes, factors have been identified that contribute to the creation of a vacuum of authority in the area. The nature of these factors has been very diverse, ranging from physical geographical factors such as an area's vegetation to the remnants of a civil war. Such diversity calls for categorisation and on the basis of the table in Appendix B, the following five indicators have been formulated:

- *Social Tensions.*
- *Legacy from Civil Conflict.*
- *Geography.*
- *Corruption and policy failure.*
- *External Interference.*

Social Tensions

- Ethnic tensions in Philippines.
- Ethnic tensions in Liberia/ Sierra Leone.
- Underdevelopment of rural regions in Northern Philippines.
- Underdeveloped Beqaa Valley.

Societies that are fragmented along ethnic, religious or class lines have been the subject of many studies, in particular in relation to civil conflict. The lack of political representation of minorities, the gap between the rich and poor, the dominance of one ethnicity/ religion or class over the other or a predatory regime favoring a particular social group can have disastrous consequences for the functioning of the state, especially if these inequalities – whether perceived or real – are

canalised by particular groups or people. The risk of state fragility is augmented when these tensions become the premise for political strife. State fragility becomes a fact when these tensions erupt into civil conflict and the legitimacy of the governing elite is jeopardized.

When cleavages are geographically concentrated and there are clear social or ethnic demarcations among the various groups in society and a group feels disadvantaged, underrepresented or relatively deprived, the situation can lead to the creation of revolutionary, secessionist or irredentist movements. Such conditions have proven to be fertile soil for terrorist groups, who may evolve from or can 'plug in' to an ethnic/religious/class conflict. Terrorist groups make use of the momentum created by social tensions and exploit the opportunities that accompanies conflict, in order to further their agenda. In some cases, terrorist groups are the violent extreme of a secessionist movement, so-called splinter groups, as is the case with the Abu Sayyaf Group and the MILF in the Philippines. Another possibility is that a revolutionary organisation, such as the NPA in the rural Philippines as a whole can be classified a terrorist organisation. In yet other situations, a transnational terrorist group takes advantage of the black hole created by a separation movement to base their activities and fight their own war, as for example JI in the Moro provinces of the Philippines and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.

The societal cleavages found in the case studies are either ethnic, as in Liberia and the southern Philippines, or socio-economic, as in the Beqaa Valley and the rural Northern parts of the Philippines.

Legacy from Civil Conflict

- Remnants Lebanese civil war, Beqaa Valley.
- Remnants of Civil War, Refugee Camps.
- Effect of Israeli-Palestinian conflict on Refugee Camps.
- Disputed territory over Shebaa farms.

Currently, civil wars are not only the greatest threat to the stability of individual states but possibly also to international peace and security. Thereby it is not surprising that they influence state fragility and the creation of black holes. Civil wars create chaos and disorder in the conflict zone and render effective governance difficult if not impossible.

Simultaneously, civil conflict implies the failure of government, stressing its lack of legitimacy and

underlining the state's fragility. Both in the Philippines and Liberia/ Sierra Leone civil conflict has destabilized the countries. Nevertheless, in this generic category it is not the conflict *per se*, but its legacy which promotes state fragility.

For at the same time, civil wars not only produce immediate suffering for the people within the conflict zone, but they also create a number of problems that extend over a

larger area and may persist well after the conflict has come to an end.¹⁸⁶ These may include the presence of refugees that strain resources; the economic downturn resulting from lost revenue due to a cessation of trade with the conflict area and the increase in illegal trade; the presence of small-arms; the frustrated mass of war veterans, etc. This spill-over can explain state fragility even if no conflict is present. Examples of the spill-over from civil wars in the case studies are the arms caches that were left in Lebanon after the Lebanese civil war; the Palestinian refugees from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the presence of disputed territory claimed by both Lebanon and Israel even after violent hostilities have ceased. These products of conflict can cause state fragility directly through the strain on resources, or indirectly by fueling tensions to be canalised by violent opposition groups or by making arms readily available.

Geography

- Nonpermissive geography in Mindanao/ Sulu
- Nonpermissive geography in Luzon
- Non-permissive geography in the TBA
- Non-permissive geography in Liberia/ Sierra Leone
- Natural resource endowments in Sierra Leone/ Liberia

The physical and economic geography of an area can be a crucial factor in explaining the measure of state control. The diamond reserves of Western Africa have drawn criminals, terrorists and corruption towards the region, thus rendering effective control problematic. The conflict in that part of Africa is a resource conflict. Abundance of highly valuable natural resources, mostly coinciding with bad or non-existent governance structures, attract actors that have a vested interest in destabilising the area to gain control over the exploitation of these resources.

Often, when state institutions are weak, the presence of substantial valuable resource endowments can create predatory regimes, who use the resources which are de facto under their control as a means for self-enrichment, thereby inviting potentially violent opposition and hence enhancing state fragility.

Similarly, the jungle surrounding the tri-border area in Southern America provides illegitimate actors with ideal hiding places, as does the isolated and vast archipelago in the Sulu Sea. But at the same time this renders government control very tedious, because of the enormous reach required by the authorities. Jungles, mountains, islands, deserts or otherwise impenetrable terrain is detrimental to state control simply because it renders any activity in the area difficult and thereby costly to monitor. For developing states, these resources are often missing.

While impenetrable terrain can thus weaken the control of the state who lacks the resources for substantial monitoring capabilities, natural riches weaken state control in those states or regions that are incapable of controlling the exploitation of these riches. These two aspects of an area's natural environment, valuable resources and impenetrable terrain, hinder effective government.

¹⁸⁶ Spill-over from civil wars can occur both in space (from a conflict zone to its neighbouring areas) or in time (the remnant effects of past civil wars).

Corruption and Policy failure

Corruption and policy failure are often endemic aspects of fragile states. The two concepts go hand-in-hand with bad governance and are destructive for effective

- Ungoverned Free-trade zone in TBA.
- Corruption in the southern Philippines.
- Corruption in northern Philippines.
- Corruption in the TBA.
- Predatory regime in Liberia
- Illegal trade in Liberia/ Sierra Leone.
- Failure to deal with Refugee camp lawlessness, Lebanon.

government control. Corruption tears at the seams of state legitimacy and efficacy. Bad policy, such as the free-trade policy in the corrupt tri-border area, is often accompanied by bad policymakers, corrupt officials or even violent megalomaniacs. Here, the perpetual interaction between structure and agency is at its peak. Weak structures enable the rise of spoilers who in turn further weaken structures.

Corruption breaks the rules of the system in exchange for money and it constitutes a misuse of public offices. In developing countries, civil servants receive such a low pay that corruption is necessary in order to make ends meet. Corruption can also be a logical consequence when the office of civil servant is the only means to a suitable living. Corrupt officials

can turn a blind eye towards money laundering and drug trade as in the tri-border area.. Documents can be forged, commodities can be smuggled, right of passage can be acquired in an area where bribes are accepted or when officials are 'in the cut'. In the TBA bad policy enabled the creation of a poorly governed free trade zone, enabling illegal trade whereby corruption could flourish. In Liberia a predatory regime, having the intention to rob the region of its riches, became the materialisation of corruption.

External Interference

- Iranian influence on Lebanon.
- Interaction regional and transnational terrorist groups.
- Chinese support for NPA.
- Syrian control over (parts of) Lebanon.
- Spill-over of mujahideen from South Asia.

External political actors can influence the measure of control a government can exert over its territory. This influence can be positive or negative, either strengthening state control or weakening it. In the negative sense, outside actors can withdraw an area from the grasp of its government. The Syrian influence over the Beqa'a Valley and southern Lebanon enabled Hezbollah and other terrorist organisations to base activities in those areas,

protected by Syrian armed forces. The influence can also consist of significantly supporting one particular group who is contesting the legitimacy of the government. This support can be in the form of logistics, materiel or capital. Chinese support for the CPP-NPA, and Iran's support to Lebanese Hezbollah are examples. In the case of the southern Philippines, the cooperation between Jemaah Islamiyah and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, of which Abu Sayyaf Group is a violent splinter, has been part of the reason why Moro rebels have been successful in withstanding government military action. JI, a terrorist group mainly based in Indonesia and Malaysia supported the MILF rebellion. External intervenors can thus be strong contributors to state fragility.

Six Generic Factors contributing to Terrorist Comparative Advantage

Under what conditions are terrorist groups drawn to a particular area? In Appendix C a chart is presented that groups all the identified factors together per case study analysed. Of these factors the following generic indicators have been made that help explain the presence of the terrorist group in the area.

- *Religion and Ethnicity*
- *Legacy from Civil Conflict*
- *Geography*
- *Economic opportunities*
- *Economic underdevelopment*
- *Regional Stimuli*

Religion and Ethnicity

- Ethnic Tensions in Southern Philippines.
- Perceived Oppression of Muslims in Southern Philippines.
- Ethnic Religious Composition in Beqa'a Valley.
- Palestinian population in Refugee Camps in Lebanon.
- Lebanese Minorities in Liberia.
- Lebanese emigrés in TBA.

Terrorist groups consist of people. People with specific backgrounds, cultural heritage, education, and training and like everybody else they have specific motivations, emotions, fears and desires. The focus on people is perhaps the most important lesson to draw from the study of black holes, as there is an intricate relationship between the population in an area and answering the question why a terrorist group is located there. The six black holes in the case studies analysed have in common that they concerned muslim-fundamentalist terrorist groups (mainly Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, JI and MILF). The picture that arises from these studies is that these groups are able to exploit the opportunities offered by the presence of an ethnic-religious, or ethnic-tribal social group in the area with

which it has similarities. Similarities that lower the threshold to the transaction costs for interaction. Perhaps this is due to a common culture, a common language or a common religion. Muslim fundamentalist groups have by definition a muslim fundamentalist ideology and seek support among fellow Muslims. In the Palestinian Refugee camps terrorist groups have found sufficient angry auto-radicalising and self-recruiting youth, enough support from which to draw financial or material aid and even in which to 'evaporate' if need be. Ofcourse, it also works the other way around. Due to the presence of particular communities, a terrorist group may want to be active there. In Lebanon, Iran would not have supported the creation of Hezbollah if it was not for its sizable Shi'a community. Likewise, the JI would not have been present in the Philippines if it were not for the perceived oppression of Muslims in Mindanao. Finally, terrorist groups exploit the access that diasporas with similar ethnic-religious backgrounds offer. In the case studies, we find examples of this in both Liberia/ Sierra Leone and the TBA; sizeable Lebanese minorities which offer the terrorist groups access to illegal markets, new funding opportunities and sometimes even recruitment or bases of operation. This is not to say that the presence of a Lebanese minority automatically implies a terrorist presence. Nevertheless it does illustrate the necessity to look at diaspora communities and how they can facilitate terrorist groups of a particular background.

Examples from other black holes are the Uighur muslim community in Xinjiang province in China, and the presence of Chechen refugees in the Pankisi and Kodori gorges in Georgia. These are just two examples and there are many more, in fact most black holes are created because a factor of *Religion and Ethnicity* is present.

Legacy from Civil Conflict

- Arms Caches in Beqa'a Valley.
- Arms caches in refugee camps in Lebanon.
- Remnants of Civil war: arms and veterans in southern Philippines.
- Remnants of Civil war: arms and veterans in northern Philippines.

Terrorist groups use the legacy from civil conflict. The influence of civil wars on the nature of terrorist activities is multi-faceted: they can provide terrorists with new recruits, extensive means with which to stage their operations and a culture of violence.

Civil wars generate potential terrorist recruits in two ways: first, they create angry youth willing to fight¹⁸⁷, secondly, civil wars create pools of veterans that are combat savvy and – due to the protracted nature of the civil conflict – may have no prospect of a new occupation or no wish to do otherwise when the war

ends. When there is an armed peace in their homeland these veterans may become part of an organisation like the MILF. On the other hand, they may also join the ranks of mujahideen and travel the world to fight a *jihad* where Muslims are perceived to be oppressed.

Another remnant of civil wars are arms caches. An example are the weapons used in the civil war in Lebanon. These have remained in the country creating easy access to small arms. This facilitates the logistic operations of terrorist groups.

Geography

- Nonpermissive geography in the southern Philippines.
- Nonpermissive geography in northern Philippines.
- Nonpermissive geography in frontier region in the TBA.
- Non-permissive urban jungle in Refugee camps.
- Disputed state borders in Southern Lebanon.

Geography can work to the advantage of terrorist groups, just like it does in guerilla warfare. Jungles, deserts and mountains, in particular when it stretches across more than one country, are beneficial to the illicit operations of terrorist groups. The naturally nonpermissive surroundings enable a group to seek refuge, enjoy certain freedom of movement, and facilitate the illicit trade in goods. Examples from the case studies are training camps in the southern Philippines, hide-outs and illegal trade in the TBA.

Other examples are the Sahel countries, the Pankisi gorge in Georgia, the democratic republic of Congo, the Southern provinces of Thailand along the Malaysian border, or the Northwest frontier province in Pakistan.

Disputed borders can fuel frustrations and help develop greater sympathy for a particular terrorist group willing to address these frustrations. Such is the case in Kashmir. On the other hand disputed or uncontrolled borders create ambiguous border areas which create free movement for terrorist groups. Such is the case in the Sahel

¹⁸⁷ Civil conflict is not included as a category drawing in terrorist activity. While terrorist groups are active in some civil conflicts, not in every civil conflict do we find terrorist groups. The complex dynamic of civil conflict and black holes requires us to look at a deeper level at the intricacies of the conflict and explain why in some conflicts we do find terrorist groups. This is more or less covered by the factors *Religion and Ethnicity* and *Economic Underdevelopment*.

countries or the Marib in Yemen. Travelling across jurisdictions unnoticed is easy rendering persecution difficult. These border areas are hence attractive places where terrorist groups can seek sanctuary.

Economic Opportunities

Terrorist groups are present in specific territories for the economic opportunities that that area offers. Like any other organisation, terrorist groups need an economic operating base. However, due to their illegal nature, terrorist groups seek financial means through illicit operations. Credit card fraud and petty crime are examples of this. When the means of acquiring finances consist of (trade in) commodities which are concentrated in a specific area the possibility arises that a black hole is created. Such is the case in Liberia/ Sierra Leone and the TBA. Due to the high value and small size of diamonds they are attractive smuggling items. On the other hand, contraband and other illegal trade in the TBA are means of acquiring finance out of sight from authorities. Not surprisingly, the two areas in the case studies in which illegal commerce takes place are also characterized by high levels of corruption. Corruption enables illegal transactions to take place and hence constitute an opportunity for developing economic enterprises.

- Diamond resources and illegal trade in Liberia/ Sierra Leone.
- Illegal trade in TBA.
- Corruption in Liberia/ Sierra Leone.
- Corruption in TBA.

Other examples of such areas of economic opportunity are the Democratic Republic of Congo/ Central African Republic, and the shadow economy and organized crime in Albania.

Economic Underdevelopment

- Rural underdevelopment in the Philippines.
- Economic malaise in the Beqaa valley in Lebanon.

Economic underdevelopment can lead to frustrations. These tensions can trigger civil conflict in the event that the (perceived) inequality has been caused by (the government representing) a particular social group. Under such circumstances social tensions can be exploited by terrorist groups to seek support for their cause. Economic underdevelopment can create a population with a sense of disenfranchisement who seek other ways to bettering their lives. Implicit or explicit support for a terrorist group becomes an option. Like the CPP in the Philippines which mobilized the population along class lines and Hezbollah in Lebanon which drew support for its policies among the marginalized population of the Beqaa Valley. Oftentimes, the sensation of economic underdevelopment is coupled to the ethnically-motivated lack of political representation. Other examples are the support for the FARC in Colombia, and the population of Aceh in Indonesia.

Regional stimuli

- Proximity of Jemaah Islamiyah to the Philippines.
- Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.

The final generic category identified in the case studies which is considered mitigating to the presence of terrorist groups in a specific area is the indicator of regional stimuli. Although an abstract concept at first

sight, it denotes those characteristics which are not endemic to the area itself but are rather external impulses that contribute to the presence of a terrorist group in the region. Subsequent indicators further specify the presence of a terrorist group in a particular area. Regional stimuli thus function as an impetus for a terrorist group to form/ settle in a particular area. The proximity of Jemaah Islamiyah to the Philippines, and its ideological objective which includes the Philippines in its scheme to create a regional Caliphate, have driven it to cooperate with the MILF and ASG, exchange know-how and train together. In turn this outside support has strengthened the MILF.

Similarly, the continuing Israeli-Palestinian conflict – or perhaps even the existence of Israel - fuels the frustrations of many Arabs and creates willing recruits. This is especially the case in the Palestinian refugee camps. Hence, this is an external stimulance to the presence of terrorist groups in the refugee camps. Regional stimuli can thus offer support to a terrorist group or increase tensions thereby offering terrorist groups new recruits, support or an increased number of targets. Other examples of such regional stimuli are the presence of foreign, Western - often American – armed forces in Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Afghanistan.

Explicitly, regional stimuli are not key factors in explaining a terrorist presence in a specific area, however they are key in explaining the presence of terrorism in a specific region. As such the stimuli aid in obtaining a clear picture of terrorist activity but are secondary to factors such as *Religion and Ethnicity* and *Geography*, which directly involve the characteristics of the area.

Answering the Research Question

In the following section a final analysis will be provided based upon the indicators and factors identified above in order to answer the research question: *why do terrorist organisations operate in particular areas?* From the outset it must be made clear that the number of case studies should be expanded in order to offer conclusive results and the results presented here are based upon the case studies offered above.

Five generic indicators for state fragility and six generic factors contributing to a terrorist presence in the area have been identified. The task is now to synthesize the results and answer the key question what determines the creation of black holes. In the following two pie-charts, the share of generic factors identified in the case studies are presented on the basis of Appendix B and C.

Factors contributing to Lack of Government Control




Figure 10: Factors contributing to Lack of Government Control

Figure 10 shows a relatively even spread, indicating that there is not one generic factor which is much more prevalent in determining state fragility than others. This supports the assumption that states crumble due to a multitude of factors and hence black hole formation cannot be reduced to a single-concept explanation. Nevertheless *corruption and policy failure* shows a slight majority, followed by *geography* and *external influence*. Social tensions such as ethnic fragmentation consist of roughly 16% of the factors found and a similar amount for the legacy from civil conflict. Because of the even spread of the indicators they can all be considered enablers of state fragility.

In figure 11, a similar pie-chart is presented. It shows those factors that portray a terrorist comparative advantage. Here, there is a clear majority for *religion and ethnicity*, representing more than a quarter of the indicators identified. This is an interesting result because it underlines the role played by particular centres of population: Hezbollah could only have infiltrated the diamond market in Liberia through the Lebanese diaspora, the JI was attracted to Sulu/ Mindanao because it could obtain recruits from among like-minded people, Islamic Jihad is present in the Palestinian refugee camps because it can immerse itself among the population echoing Mao's dictum that a guerilla must move amongst the people like a fish in the sea. If the terrorist group can find support in a particular area amongst the population – either

implicit or explicit – than that area becomes a lot more attractive. *Religion and Ethnicity* enable the terrorist group to seek hide-outs, establish bases, train, perform HRM activities, obtain funding and, through the conflict that erupts in certain cases among ethnic groups, also an arena where to stage operations.

Factors contributing to Terrorist Presence





Figure 11: Factors contributing to Terrorist Comparative Advantage

Another factor with a high incidence rate is *geography*. Geographic surroundings determine the measure to which a terrorist group has ‘physical freedom of movement’. This is rather similar to the cloak-function provided by a supportive population in *Religion and Ethnicity* which could be formulated as ‘human freedom of movement’. The geography in the case studies consisted mostly of jungle surroundings, however it can also be mountainous terrain (such as in the Pankisi gorge) or desert terrain (Sahel), or even dense urban terrain (Karachi). Beneficial geography enables the establishment of bases, training, hide-outs and the collection of capital. Both *Economic Opportunity* and *Legacy from Civil Conflict* show a 17% share of indicators. Both these indicators offer terrorist groups the opportunity to obtain critical enablers for their operations; namely arms, recruits (in the form of veterans) and finances.


Economic underdevelopment represents 9% of the indicators. Like *Religion and Ethnicity* it is a mobilizer for support, however it does so mainly along class lines. Due to the current surge in muslim fundamentalist extremism – essentially ethnic and/or religious in nature – class-based motivators, arising from the poverty or oppression of peasants is a less brighter star in the firmament. Nevertheless, besides the CPP in the Philippines, the FARC in Colombia attracts support for its activities on the basis of this factor. Once support of an economically disenfranchised population has been received, it enables the passive and active recruitment of operatives, the collection of capital, establishment of hide-outs and bases, training, as well as an area where to stage operations.

Regional Stimuli also represent 9% of the indicators. Defining the regional environment in which a terrorist group could be active, regional stimuli consist of factors that make a region at large attractive for a terrorist group to deploy activities but says nothing about the specific area in which these activities take place. Hence they are like a broad-lensed telescope, narrowing the horizon but without zooming in on the details. As such regional stimuli in themselves can never explain the presence of a terrorist group in a particular black hole. Also, regional stimuli may only enable the broad location where to stage operations.



What the pie-charts do not show is how the indicators are spread per black hole. This is illustrated in the following chart (figure 12). It offers new insights into the importance of particular factors in shaping black holes. From figure 13 it becomes clear that *Corruption and Policy Failure* is a factor present in 5 out of 6 cases (83% of the cases). It is thus the factor most commonly present in contributing to a lack of governmental control. This is not surprising as it can be distilled from the theory on state failure discussed in the first part of this research; state failure is caused by the inability of the state to uphold control and provide essential public goods to the population in its territory. Factors of *geography* and *social tension* are found in two-thirds of the cases studied. These can thus be considered important factors mitigating state fragility. *External interference* plays a role in half of the cases, and *legacy from civil conflict* in one-third.

Factors Contributing to Terrorist Presence



The lack of government control is never caused by a single factor, it is always a combination of several that create a dynamic whereby state fragility occurs. Nevertheless, some factors may seem more important than others. In the chart we have seen that *corruption and policy failure* play a role in 83% of the cases, whereas *legacy from civil conflict* only in 33%. This might lead to the observation that an area where there is prolific corruption and governmental policy failure is prevalent, has a higher risk of being subject to a lack of government control than an area where we ‘only’ find significant arms caches. Unfortunately however, none of these factors can be considered completely independent from one another and we have no insights into the causal relationships of the factors. After all, the location of arms caches may well be influenced by the geography of the surroundings, and external interference be the result of particular social cleavages. While causal relationships between factors cannot be discerned from this study, it is the interaction among these factors that lead a state to fall into a cycle of weakness or failure. Nevertheless, what this graph shows is that three of the five factors have occurred in more than half of the cases, thereby demanding our attention. When comparing figure 12 with the corresponding pie-chart (figure 10), we see that *Corruption and Policy Failure* top both lists, but that *Social Tensions* - present in two-thirds of the black holes and thereby one of the most commonly present factors in areas without government control- only represents 16% of the total of factors.

With regard to factors of terrorist comparative advantage, figure 13 shows the spread of factors per black hole. The factor present in more than 80 percent of the cases is *religion and ethnicity*. The presence of a group of people with a particular ethnic-religious (or tribal) background thus poses the most prevalent contributing factor to the presence of terrorist groups in an area. This is similar to the level at which *geography* is present as a factor facilitating terrorists. In an equal amount of cases do we find geographic factors that render the area attractive to terrorist groups. The legacy from civil conflict in the form of arms caches and war veterans is present in two-thirds of the cases.

Lack of State Control				Terrorist Presence			
	Category 1	Category 2	Category 3		Category 1	Category 2	Category 3
Legacy from Civil Conflict				Religion and Ethnicity			
Social Tensions				Economic Opportunity			
Geography				geography			
Corruption and Policy Failure				legacy from civil conflict			
External Interference				Economic underdevelopment			
				Regional Stimuli			

Figure 14: Combined chart of factors contributing to black hole formation

If we now place the results of both the factors contributing to a lack of government control and the factors of terrorist comparative advantage alongside the different categories of black holes as portrayed in table 1, we obtain the following picture (figure 14). A darker color represents a higher likelihood of that factor being present in that particular category of *terrorist black hole*. A lighter color represents a lower likelihood of finding that factor. Eventhough the n-size of the study has been too small to draw any statistically relevant conclusions, and in the case of category 2 and 3 black holes the results are based on $n = 1$, the following observations are made. Factors of geography and corruption/policy failure are found in all categories of black holes. In Category 2 black holes this also includes social tensions. It coincides with the fact that in these black holes operations are also staged by the terrorist group, and certain measures of social frustration both lead to a waining of government control as well as to a motivating factor for the terrorist group to be present in the area, especially when it concerns the perceived oppression of a particular ethnic-religious group. This latter motivator is represented in *religion and ethnicity* which is a terrorist comparative advantage found in all black holes. For Category 3 *Religion and Ethnicity* implies the presence of a diaspora through which it can gain access to capital, hence also the necessity of an explicit *economic opportunity*.

Category 3 black holes are areas which offer access to a lucrative business through the presence of a diaspora community, in which the terrorist group commits no violent actions, but in which there is a strong measure of state weakness due to the geographic setting and the corruption/ inefficacy of the government. They hence provide terrorist groups with opportunities for the collection of capital, hide-outs and recruitment.

For Category 2 black holes, *religion and ethnicity* implies a like-minded community of any sort (diaspora or native population) in which the terrorist group can seek sanctuary as well as obtain access to capital. Because activities directly in support of operations, or operations itself, are carried out from Category 2 black holes, the surrounding geography needs to be in the terrorist groups' favor so as to move around freely.

Category 2 black holes are areas in which social tensions and bad governance, both exacerbated by a non-permissive geography, have weakened the state's control. However, the social tensions which have diminished state control, have also led to a perceived oppression of an ethnic-religious group and have drawn in terrorist organisations with similar ethnic-religious underpinnings. The geography of the area has made it possible for terrorist groups to roam around and seek refuge with relative ease. Through the weak government presence or prevalent corruption terrorist groups can engage in economic practices, whether it be the collection of capital through setting up fronts, the collection of funds from the population or the illegal trade in commodities (diamonds, drugs, arms, etc.). These operations are greatly facilitated by the presence of the like-minded community. These areas hence are used by terrorist groups to collect capital, recruit, hide and also stage operations.


Category 1 black holes are those areas in the world where terrorist groups are either based in order to aid a social/ethnic group which is being oppressed by a government or, where a social/ethnic group offers sanctuary to a terrorist group so that it can stage operations against an adversary in a neighbouring region. The isolated and/or nonpermissive terrain of the area has made it difficult for the government to wield control yet it has aided the terrorist group in moving around and setting up training camps, or establishing bases. These areas are characterized by a guerilla-like setting. The local population shelters the terrorist group and from it it draws recruits and funds. Category 1 black holes are the sea in which terrorist groups prefer to swim. They are true sanctuaries and from here operations are planned. Oftentimes the area has been plagued by conflict in the past. This has aided the terrorist group in the ready availability of small-arms or explosives and able war veterans, and has further diminished the government's monopoly on the use of force. Corruption has further exacerbated the situation and has made the flow of arms and goods nearly impossible to trace by the central authorities. Also, outside actors with an interest in the region have affected its stability. These actors usually oppose the central government and support the terrorist group or directly participate in the struggle of the social/ethnic community. These areas hence offer terrorist groups the opportunity to collect capital, recruit, train, establish bases, hide and stage operations. The complete black hole.

In Category 1 black holes, economic considerations hardly play a role. Instead they are true sanctuaries close to the battleground, or at least where the battleground is considered to be by the terrorist group. They are anarchic areas in which the terrorist organisation finds sanctuary and where at the same time it is actively trying to further the objectives of a particular ethnic, religious or social group.

So where do we find black holes? As we have seen, conflict zones can be black hole areas, whether because the terrorist actor is one of the main warring factions (as e.g. in Colombia or Palestine) or because a terrorist actor takes advantage of the disorder created by the civil war (as e.g. in Liberia). However, not all civil wars create black holes. Instead we must look deeper at the specifics of the civil war which make it attractive to terrorist groups. Similarly, external interference is a mitigating factor for the creation of black holes, either because the external actor controls the black hole territory instead of the state it belongs to, as in the case of Syria and Lebanon, or because the external actor destabilises the state or the black hole area in such a way that the state is unable to sustain its grip over the black hole. However this does not mean that every intervention by an outside party creates a black hole. Instead we must look at the dynamic under which the external interference occurs. Also isolated terrain and non-permissive territories contribute to the creation of terrorist black holes; however Switzerland as of yet has not demonstrated a terrorist presence. Black holes are never caused by one reason, it is always a combination of reasons that will render a particular area a terrorist black hole. If we are to understand black holes how then do we go about it, where do we start? One starting point would be to look at some of the factors that have popped up throughout this study. It is interesting to note that in the chart above there are three indicators that are prevalent among all three categories. *Geography* and

Corruption and Policy Failure contribute in all cases to the lack of government control and *Religion and Ethnicity* contributes to the presence of terrorist groups. Potentially there is a high risk of black hole formation in an area which is a) characterized by isolated, non-permissive geography, b) is under the rule of a government who is notably corrupt or ineffective and c) where a community lives with an ethnic-religious background that coincides with that of a terrorist group. Ofcourse this is not to say that this will indeed be a black hole, but the area nevertheless should warrant our attention.

V Conclusion



This research has produced two sets of results that together answer the two research questions.

- 1 A list of 41 terrorist black holes divided over 4 categories to be found on four continents of the world.¹⁸⁸
- 2 A set of generic factors that are indicators for the occurrence of terrorist black holes. These factors shape the two main elements constituting terrorist black holes: first of all, lack of state control in the area and secondly the terrorist comparative advantage.



There are several conclusions to be drawn from the results in this report. Firstly, the list of terrorist black holes has provided us with evidence for the usefulness of the concept of black holes. Black holes are territories around the world where a lack of state control coincides with specific characteristics that have made them attractive sanctuaries for terrorist organisations. Having mapped the presence of terrorist groups across the globe and compared it to the map of fragile states, significant differences have become apparent. It signified that taking terrorist organisations as the point of perspective and looking at territories instead of states aids in providing a more detailed picture of the global spread of terrorist organisations. This new conceptual framework is required to examine terrorist sanctuaries.

Second, after having created a data set of black holes a toolbox has been developed in order to analyse them; a two-way split has been proposed as the core of the analysis. On the one hand uncovering the *opportunity* for terrorist organisations to undertake activities in a given area due to a lack of state control (a vacuum of authority) and on the other hand unravelling the *specifics* of the area that determine the terrorist comparative advantage. The lack of state control on the one hand and the presence of some comparative advantages on the other can thus be regarded as *the two necessary conditions* for an area to become a black hole.

¹⁸⁸ See Chapter III.

The primary necessity for a terrorist organisation is that it is located in an area where there is no or ineffective governmental control. The specific characteristics of that lawless area will then determine whether indeed it will become a terrorist sanctuary and of which category. The categories of black holes (1, 2, 3 and 4) are based upon the number and type of activities that take place in them. In Category 1 black holes, all six terrorist activities take place. Category 2 black holes are less central to the terrorist group's existence because no training or bases are found here but terrorist operations do take place. Category 1 and 2 form the 'battlefields' for terrorist groups whereas the other two categories only serve supportive functions. Category 3 and 4 black holes are primarily used as hide-outs and areas where to seek capital, with the primary difference being that in Category 3 black holes also human capital is sought for and managed, i.e. human resource management.

In order to explain the occurrence of black holes the research has analysed the two dynamics of state fragility and comparative advantage to terrorist presence and has identified the following generic factors:



Interestingly, the factors that influence the lack of state control on the one hand and constitute the comparative advantages of the area on the other hand, show some overlap. What this means is that there are some factors which on the one hand weaken state control, and on the other offer advantages to terrorist groups. Such is the case for instance with the factor *geography* and *legacy from civil conflict*. To a certain extent this also holds for *social tensions* and *religion and ethnicity/ economic underdevelopment*. While the latter two factors create distinct social groups within society, which due to their identity become 'human ponds' in which terrorist groups can swim, the former factor weakens state control because there are separate factions within society, and when animosities increase these different communities enhance the risk of

state erosion. Hence the factors identified can influence the fragility of the state on the one hand, and simultaneously constitute a comparative advantage to the terrorist organisation. This is not surprising since terrorist groups are averse to effectively governed states, so any factor which weakens effective governance of an area will logically be to the advantage of the terrorist group.

The indicators for lack of government control as well as those forming the terrorist comparative advantage interact and together create sanctuaries for terrorist groups. Although the research has been unable to formulate a statistically relevant hierarchy – the number of case studies should be expanded - it has been made clear that in all categories of terrorist black holes factors of *religion and ethnicity*, *geography* and *corruption and policy failure* often play a role. This leads to five observations, relevant also to future research. First of all, it shows the necessity to focus on the link between people and geography. Where particular types of communities live is important. Understanding how geography can aid a terrorist group and become an obstacle to authorities is a premise that is fundamental to guerilla strategy however it is again underlined in this research. Geography should not be considered as a purely natural phenomenon, urban environments are geography as well. This yields the necessity to look closer at the role played by urban environments. With regard to people, there is an absolute necessity to look at diaspora communities and the role they may play in facilitating particular terrorist groups. Diasporas have been considered important in global finance networks of terrorist groups, but this research also notes that diaspora or emigré communities in themselves can become sanctuaries to terrorist groups. Thirdly, the relevance of corruption and policy failure remind us that it is necessary to have transparency in the policies of governments. Political systems are at their most vulnerable when they are in transit to stable democracies and are most prone to policy failures and the disease of corruption. The process of transition is not a period of two or three years but may take decades. These young and fragile democracies require the strong and dedicated support of Western states as they try to maneuver between the schylla and charybdis of the political sea. Transparency of policies and a crack-down on corruption are essential for all governments. As this research has shown, not only does lack thereof weaken the state but in doing so it may also open the door to the presence of a terrorist organisation. Fourthly, the analysis of black holes has shown that the conditions of territories that render it attractive to a terrorist group do not arise suddenly, but instead they are dynamics which are either endemic to the territory itself or are characteristics have been allowed to develop for numerous years. In other words, the factors creating black holes have been around for quite some time. This implies that potential black holes around the world (where terrorist groups have not been present) can be mapped and with the right tools the territories in which terrorist groups or networks may wish to find sanctuary can be monitored from an early moment on and appropriate action can be taken. Finally, this research has shown the relevance of open-source information. The entirety of this research has been performed with sources available on the internet or in libraries. With respect to the three dominant factors (geography, religion/ethnicity and corruption/policy failure), extensive open-source information on these factors is available yielding the optimistic prospect that creating a risk analysis for black holes surely is possible.

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
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VII Signature

The Hague, November 2005

Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies

A handwritten signature in blue ink, consisting of a large, sweeping loop followed by a smaller, more intricate flourish.

R.F.W.M. Willems, M.Sc.
Head of department

A handwritten signature in blue ink, featuring a series of sharp, angular strokes and a long, horizontal tail.

A.R. Korteweg, M.A.
Author

A US Designated List of Foreign Terrorist Organisations

- 1 Abu Nidal Organisation (ANO)
- 2 Abu Sayyaf Group
- 3 Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
- 4 Ansar al-Islam
- 5 Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
- 6 Asbat al-Ansar
- 7 Aum Shinrikyo
- 8 Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
- 9 Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA)
- 10 Continuity Irish Republican Army
- 11 Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group)
- 12 HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)
- 13 Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)
- 14 Hizballah (Party of God)
- 15 Islamic Jihad Group
- 16 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
- 17 Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) (Army of Mohammed)
- 18 Jemaah Islamiya organisation (JI)
- 19 al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad)
- 20 Kahane Chai (Kach)
- 21 Kongra-Gel (KGK, formerly Kurdistan Workers' Party, PKK, KADEK)
- 22 Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LT) (Army of the Righteous)
- 23 Lashkar i Jhangvi
- 24 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
- 25 Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)
- 26 Mujahedin-e Khalq Organisation (MEK)
- 27 National Liberation Army (ELN)
- 28 Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
- 29 Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
- 30 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
- 31 PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)
- 32 al-Qa'ida
- 33 Real IRA

Appendix A

- 34 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
- 35 Revolutionary Nuclei (formerly ELA)
- 36 Revolutionary Organisation 17 November
- 37 Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)
- 38 Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)
- 39 Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL)
- 40 Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (QJBR) (al-Qaida in Iraq) (formerly Jama'at al-Tawhid wa'al-Jihad, JTJ, al-Zarqawi Network)
- 41 United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC)

B Contributing Factors to Lack of Government Control

Lack of Government Control	International	Cross-national	National	Sub-National	
Structural			Non-permissive geography	Ethnic tensions in South	Philippines South
			Non-permissive geography	Underdevelopment of rural regions	Philippines North
		Effect of Israeli-Palestinian conflict		Remnants of Civil war	Refugee Camps, Lebanon
	Iranian influence on Lebanese Shias	Disputed territory of Shebaa Farms		Remnants of Civil war Underdeveloped and isolated Beqaa Valley	Beqaa Valley, Lebanon
		Non-permissive geography Corruption and illegal trade Natural resource endowments	Ethnic tensions		Liberia/ Sierra Leone
		Nonpermissive geography Ungoverned free-trade zone			TBA
Medium-Term			Corruption		Philippines South
	Chinese support for CPP-NPA		Corruption		Philippines North
			Failure to assert control		Refugee Camps, Lebanon
		Syria's control over parts of Lebanon			Beqaa Valley, Lebanon
			Predatory Regime		Liberia/ Sierra Leone

Appendix B

			Corruption		TBA
Direct	Spill-over of mujahideen from South Asia Interaction regional and transnational terrorist groups				Philippines South

C Contributing Factors to Terrorist Comparative Advantage

Terrorist Activity	International	Cross-national	National	Sub-National	
Structural	Perceived Oppression of Muslims			Ethnic tensions Nonpermissive geography	Philippines South
				Rural underdevelopment Nonpermissive geography	Philippines North
			Arms caches	Non-permissive urban jungle	Refugee Camps, Lebanon
		Disputed state borders	Arms caches	Ethnic-religious composition Economic malaise	Baqaa Valley, Lebanon
		Diamond resources and illegal trade		Lebanese emigrés	Liberia/ Sierra Leone
		Nonpermissive geography Illegal trade Lebanese minorities			TBA
Medium-Term	Proximity of Jemaah Islamiyah			Remnants of Civil war: arms and veterans	Philippines South
				Remnants of Civil war: arms and veterans	Philippines North
		Israeli-Palestinian conflict			Refugee Camps, Lebanon
			Corruption		Liberia/ Sierra Leone
			Corruption		TBA
Direct				Palestinian population in refugee camps	Refugee Camps Lebanon