

Transdisciplinary perspectives on validity: bridging the gap between design and implementation for technologyenhanced learning systems

Haastrecht, M.A.N. van

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A SHARED CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE SOLUTION FOR SMES

Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) frequently experience cyberattacks, but often do not have the means to counter these attacks. Therefore, cybersecurity researchers and practitioners need to aid SMEs in their defence against cyber threats. Research has shown that SMEs require solutions that are automated and adapted to their context. In recent years, we have seen a surge in initiatives to share cyber threat intelligence (CTI) to improve collective cybersecurity resilience. Shared CTI has the potential to answer the SME call for automated and adaptable solutions. Sadly, as we demonstrate in this chapter, current shared intelligence approaches scarcely address SME needs. We must investigate how shared CTI can be used to improve SME cybersecurity resilience. In this chapter, we tackle this challenge by using a systematic review to discover current state-of-the-art approaches to utilising shared CTI. We find that threat intelligence sharing platforms such as MISP have the potential to address SME needs, provided that the shared intelligence is turned into actionable insights. Based on this observation, we developed a prototype application that processes MISP data automatically, prioritises cybersecurity threats for SMEs, and provides SMEs with actionable recommendations tailored to their context. Our application will increase SME cybersecurity awareness and resilience, which will enable them to thwart cyberattacks in future.

The contents of this chapter are based on: van Haastrecht, Golpur, et al. (2021). A Shared Cyber Threat Intelligence Solution for SMEs. Electronics.

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The cybersecurity threat landscape is diverse and dynamic, as witnessed by several recent supply chain attacks with worldwide impact (Browning, 2021; Lazarovitz, 2021). Attack sophistication is increasing (Skopik et al., 2016) and it is now widely accepted that even nation-states are actively involved in the most advanced and persistent threats (Lemay et al., 2018). Unsurprisingly, the trend of increased complexity in attacks is expected to continue in the future (Lella et al., 2021).

These observations stand in stark contrast to the situation of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), who lack the knowledge and resources to appropriately address any cybersecurity threats (Heidt et al., 2019); never mind advanced threats. SMEs require the help of their external environment to deal with cybersecurity attacks since they do not have internally available expertise (van Haastrecht, Yigit Ozkan, et al., 2021).

In this sense, the maxim "a problem shared is a problem halved" is fitting in the SME context. It is this maxim that is the driving force behind information sharing in the cybersecurity community (Skopik et al., 2016). Sharing cybersecurity intelligence has long been recognised as a key ingredient in raising our collective cybersecurity resilience. Yet, until recently, efforts in this area were fragmented and unsuccessful (Kampanakis, 2014), with many feeling the advantages to sharing data were outweighed by the disadvantages (Albakri et al., 2018; Ring, 2014).

This changed with the introduction of standardised cybersecurity intelligence taxonomies (Barnum, 2012; Burger et al., 2014; Connolly et al., 2012) and intelligence sharing platforms (Sauerwein et al., 2017; Wagner et al., 2016). Especially the sharing of threat (Johnson et al., 2016; Mavroeidis and Bromander, 2017; Qamar et al., 2017) and incident (Baesso Moreira et al., 2018) information gained acceptance and popularity.

Privacy concerns still remain regarding the sharing of cybersecurity intelligence (Shojaifar and Fricker, 2020; Zibak and Simpson, 2019). However, the focus has now shifted to finding solutions rather than simply detailing problems (Azad et al., 2021; de Fuentes et al., 2017; Ezhei and Tork Ladani, 2017). Exploiting the properties of blockchain for privacy preservation is an example of a novel and promising approach (Brotsis et al., 2019; Purohit et al., 2020).

Recently, the use of advanced data analytics (Husák, Komárková, et al., 2019; N. Sun et al., 2019) and machine learning (Sarker, Furhad, et al., 2021; Sarker, Kayes, et al., 2020) techniques to extract further insights from shared intelligence has spurred on optimism regarding the future of cybersecurity information sharing. Nevertheless, the literature remains eerily silent regarding the use of shared incident data to support SMEs; a group in dire need of help from their external environment.

SMEs have their own concerns regarding information sharing (Shojaifar and Fricker, 2020), and certainly require different treatments and solutions than other enterprise types (Yigit Ozkan, Spruit, et al., 2019). This is perhaps most true for the least digitally mature SME categories: *start-ups* and *digitally dependent SMEs*. Along with the more mature *digitally based SMEs* and *digital enablers*, the European DIGITAL SME Alliance (European DIGITAL SME Alliance, 2020) distinguishes these SME categories to emphasise that SMEs are not one homogeneous group, but rather a diverse set of businesses, with diverse needs.

SMEs require distinctly different solutions than other enterprises due to their lack of internally available cybersecurity knowledge and resources. Additionally, any solution looking to aid SMEs should recognise the heterogeneity within this group of enterprises. Based on what we know of current trends in cybersecurity intelligence sharing literature, it is therefore unlikely that any of the prevailing approaches to utilising shared incident data are suitable for SMEs. Nevertheless, it can be expected that current approaches contain building blocks for useful SME approaches, especially due to the automatic nature of today's machine learning techniques.

Finding out how we can use shared cybersecurity information to aid SMEs is our main focus in this chapter. Hence, we ask:

• **RQ**: How can shared incident information be utilised to help improve SME cybersecurity?

We will answer our research question by first systematically reviewing current approaches to utilising shared incident data in Section 5.2. Here we will also provide a detailed analysis of the difficulties of using the VERIS Community Database (VCDB) (*The VERIS Community Database* 2021) in the SME context. These efforts will provide insight into what adaptations to current approaches are necessary to yield a useful solution for SMEs.

We then describe our proposed solution using the Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP) (Wagner et al., 2016) in Section 5.3, covering the input (5.3.1), process (5.3.2), and output (5.3.3). In Section 5.3.4, we provide a practical example of how our application helps SMEs, demonstrating the potential impact of our solution. Finally, we discuss our findings in Section 5.4 and conclude in Section 5.5.

5.2 LITERATURE REVIEW

Before proposing our methodology, we should investigate current approaches to utilising shared cybersecurity threat intelligence. We conducted this investigation via a systematic literature review using the SYMBALS (van Haastrecht, Sarhan, Yigit Ozkan, et al., 2021) methodology. We searched the Scopus database for the keywords presented in Table 5.1, where we restricted our search to conference and journal articles and English-language documents.

KEYWORD	SYNONYMS
cybersecurity	cyber security, information security
threat	event, attack, incident
sharing	share

Table 5.1: Keywords and accompanying synonyms used in our search of the Scopus database.

Additionally, we focused on research published since 2016. In 2016, the Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP) was introduced (Wagner et al., 2016). MISP is one of the most widely used threat sharing platforms, along with the Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information (TAXII) (Connolly et al., 2012). Both MISP and TAXII facilitate information exchange using the Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX) language (Barnum, 2012), the de-facto standard format for exchanging threat intelligence.

The choice to focus our review on the period since 2016 is no coincidence. Since the introduction of MISP, the subject matter of shared threat intelligence research has shifted. Whereas earlier research explored information sharing options (Kampanakis, 2014; Steinberger et al., 2015) and outlined the barriers to sharing (Ring, 2014), research since 2016 has largely centred around how we can use shared intelligence.

Our database search yielded 546 results, of which 47 inclusions remained after applying the filtering steps of SYMBALS. The most common reason for exclusion was that a paper did not cover our topic of interest: the utilisation of shared threat intelligence. This is not surprising, as the keywords we employed do not provide a guarantee of papers in our focus area.

We then proceeded to extract relevant data from our inclusions. One dimension we considered was the suitable organisation type for an approach. The European DIGITAL SME Alliance outlines four SME categories: start-ups, digitally dependent SMEs, digitally based SMEs, and digital enablers (European DIGITAL SME Alliance, 2020). The cybersecurity maturity of these SME categories progresses from the least mature start-ups to the most mature digital enablers (van Haastrecht, Yigit Ozkan, et al., 2021).

Where start-ups are only beginning to realise the importance of cybersecurity, we can expect digital enablers to have embedded, automated cybersecurity processes (van Haastrecht, Yigit Ozkan, et al., 2021). Nevertheless, even digital enablers are unlikely to have the capacity to run a Security Operations Centre (SOC) which can monitor and analyse continuously gathered internal security intelligence. This is why we included a 'large enterprises' category to collect any methods unsuited to any SME category. The first column of Table 5.2 depicts our considered enterprise categories.

Ramsdale et al. (2020) offer a concise classification of cyber threat intelligence (CTI) sources. They divide sources into internally sourced intelligence, externally sourced intelligence, and open-source intelligence. Internally

Table 5.2: The type of cyber threat intelligence used in each of our 47 inclusions, along with the minimum SME category maturity required to implement the proposed methodology.						
CATEGORY	EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE	OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENC	E INTERNAL INTELLIGENCE			

CATEGORY	EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE	OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE	INTERNAL INTELLIGENCE
Start-ups	Vakilinia et al. (2018)	Badsha et al. (2019)	
Digitally dependent		S. He, G. M. Lee, et al. (2016)	
Digitally based	Tanrıverdi and Tekerek (2019) Riesco, Larriva- Novo, et al. (2020)	Qamar et al. (2017) Faiella et al. (2021) J. Zhao et al. (2020) Ural et al. (2021)	Brotsis et al. (2019) Best et al. (2017)
Digital enablers	Y. Zhao et al. (2017) Gonzalez-Granadillo et al. (2019) Ansari et al. (2020)	Husari et al. (2018) W. Yang and Lam (2020) Koloveas et al. (2021) Khramtsova et al. (2020) Mutemwa et al. (2017)	Purohit et al. (2020) H. Zhao and Silverajan (2020) Lin et al. (2019) Serketzis et al. (2019) Mohasseb et al. (2020) Y. Sun et al. (2020) Husák, Bartoš, et al. (2021) Jeng et al. (2019) Husák, Bajtoš, et al. (2020) Husang et al. (2020) Riesco and Villagrá (2019)
Large enterprises	E. Kim et al. (2018) S. He, Fu, et al. (2020) Schlette et al. (2021) Schaberreiter et al. (2019) Settanni et al. (2017) Manfredi et al. (2021)	Mtsweni et al. (2016) J. Yang et al. (2020)	Takahashi and Miyamoto (2016) Kure and Islam (2019) Graf and King (2018) S. Brown et al. (2019) Leszczyna and Wróbel (2019) Badri et al. (2016) Mc- Keever et al. (2020) Abe et al. (2018) Leszczyna, Wallis, et al. (2019)

sourced intelligence relates to data on events occurring within an organisation's IT infrastructure. External intelligence comes from structured threat intelligence feeds, such as those sourced from the TAXII and MISP platforms. Finally, open-source intelligence is defined as intelligence from publicly available sources such as news feeds and social media. We choose to not employ the commonly used abbreviation of open-source intelligence OSINT, as OSINT is more broadly associated with the methodology of collecting threat intelligence from publicly available sources.

Table 5.2 categorises our inclusions based on the suitability of their approach to different enterprise types and the type of intelligence source they build on. We should note that the enterprise categories of Table 5.2 are ordered by cybersecurity maturity. This means that if start-ups can use a particular approach, digitally dependent SMEs will automatically also be able to use that approach. Similarly, if an approach is classed as being suitable for digitally based SMEs, it is not suitable for the less digitally mature start-ups and digitally dependent SMEs.

The first thing to notice about Table 5.2 is that very few of our inclusions specify shared CTI solutions suitable for start-ups and digitally dependent SMEs. We cannot expect these SMEs to collect and analyse internal intelligence, which explains why none of the internal intelligence approaches is suited to start-ups and digitally dependent SMEs. Internal intelligence approaches often require an internal security expert or even a SOC, which make them difficult to implement even for digitally based SMEs and digital enablers.

Open-source intelligence methodologies often suffer from their open-ended nature, making them less actionable for SMEs. The collected data is often

unstructured text and will generally only serve to inform the user, rather than assist them in concrete tasks. The two open-source approaches that are suited to less digitally mature SMEs have a very specific goal. In the first, the authors create a spam filter based on open-source spam data, which can then be used by organisations to prevent spam from reaching employee inboxes (Badsha et al., 2019). The second approach also uses publicly available spam data, but this time it is connected to organisation IPs and used as a tool to confront companies with their security level (S. He, G. M. Lee, et al., 2016).

Although the mentioned open-source intelligence sharing methods have their merits for start-ups and digitally dependent SMEs, they only scratch the surface of what can be done to help SMEs. Structured external intelligence could be an outcome here, but, as Table 5.2 shows, most research is geared towards large enterprises. All of the external intelligence approaches for large enterprises use STIX as their data sharing format, and most use TAXII as the sharing platform. The benefit of STIX is that it is flexible and therefore facilitates many different indicators of compromise (IoCs). However, most research proposes methodologies whereby the STIX data is shared without much processing. This means the shared data retains much of STIX's complexity, and it is left to analysts at an organisation to interpret this data. SMEs simply do not have the resources for such activities.

The external intelligence approaches suited to SMEs still regularly employ STIX. However, they no longer use TAXII as a sharing platform, preferring less common platforms or a custom sharing platform. Approaches that apply a more extensive filtering process to provide organisations with concise insights are most suited to the least digitally mature SMEs. By comparing shared data to blacklists (Tanrıverdi and Tekerek, 2019) or using the shared intelligence to advise on suitable production rules (Riesco, Larriva-Novo, et al., 2020), digitally based SMEs are aided in their detection process. However, detection is still a step too far for start-ups and digitally dependent SMEs, who are often still in the process of understanding their assets and attack surface (van Haastrecht, Yigit Ozkan, et al., 2021).

The external intelligence approach suited to start-ups uses a feed of passwords identified in breaches to inform users of susceptible passwords (Vakilinia et al., 2018). As with the open-source intelligence approaches, it is the focused nature and clear aim of this approach that makes it accessible to all types of SMEs. The question remains whether we can go beyond these specific implementations while maintaining usability for the least digitally mature SMEs. Such solutions currently do not exist and would be immensely beneficial to SMEs.

We certainly believe it is possible to create such solutions. It is clear from our systematic review results that the solution lies in the use of structured external threat intelligence, preferably conforming to the STIX standard, which is sufficiently processed and filtered to yield actionable insights for SMEs. Section 5.3 explains our solution.

Before diving into our solution, it is worth investigating whether a similar approach using open-source intelligence would also be feasible. We noted earlier that one of the main issues with open-source intelligence for SMEs is its unstructured nature. However, structured open-source intelligence sources do exist. The VERIS Community Database (VCDB) (*The VERIS Community Database* 2021) is commonly used in cybersecurity research (Baesso Moreira et al., 2018; Y. Liu et al., 2015) and also serves as the basis for Verizon's yearly Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) (Bassett et al., 2021). Altogether, VCDB seems like the ideal CTI source.

As we look closer, however, problems start to emerge. VCDB is largely composed of data breach incidents collected by analysts from news reports. Although a data breach can be considered an outcome of a cybersecurity threat, it is more commonly classified as a type of threat. The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) is a prominent example of an institution classifying data breaches as a threat type.

ENISA publishes a yearly list of top threats (ENISA, 2020) and 'data breach' appears every year. Figure 5.1 shows a comparison of VCDB and ENISA threat rankings from 2012 to 2017. Of the 12 threats depicted, 11 appear in the ENISA top threats each year. The exception is the 'external environment threat' which was introduced by van Haastrecht, Sarhan, Shojaifar, et al. (2021). External environment threats comprise the threats resulting from third parties and suppliers interacting with an organisation. This threat category is especially relevant for SMEs, as we have seen in the proliferation of recent supply chain attacks (Browning, 2021; Lella et al., 2021). Although ENISA has not included it in their top threats, the threats making up the external environment threats do appear in their overall threat taxonomy.

To produce Figure 5.1, we analysed confirmed SME incidents included in VCDB from 2012-2017, with 2017 being the most recent year for which confirmed incidents were available. VCDB can be seen as structured open-source intelligence, but it is based on unstructured open-source intelligence. The intermediate step of structuring the original data is a time-consuming task. Thus, a common drawback of structured open-source intelligence is that it is outdated by the time it becomes available. This is problematic when the cyber threat landscape is constantly changing.

VCDB defines small businesses as having fewer than 1,000 employees, which is an exceedingly broad definition, given that it is more common to use 250 employees as the cut-off point for SMEs (European Commission, 2016). This curious SME definition is one of the reasons why using VCDB can be problematic in the SME context.

Nevertheless, we persisted in our analysis and chose to use those incidents classified as involving companies with 100 or fewer employees. Yet, as can be observed from Figure 5.1, the rankings resulting from our VCDB analysis differ from the ENISA rankings. Unsurprisingly, VCDB's focus on data breach incidents leads to a much higher ranking for the data breach threat. However,




Figure 5.1: VCDB and ENISA threat rankings compared over time. For several threats we observe large ranking differences.

many of the other threats also have ranking progressions dissimilar to ENISA's rankings.

This points to two issues with using VCDB data. Firstly, given the focus on data breach incidents, the data collected for VCDB is skewed heavily towards this threat type. This influences not only the data breach category but also all other categories, as threats that are highly correlated with data breaches will receive a higher ranking.

Secondly, since the main collection method for VCDB incidents is the scanning of news reports, the threat ranking is biased towards newsworthy threat types. Data breach incidents often appear in the news, since in many countries there is an obligation to openly report such incidents. Phishing incidents, for example, are much less likely to be reported in news articles, as companies have no incentive to communicate their occurrence.

Further issues with VCDB relate to the fact that around 82% of the SME incidents originate from the US, that the English-speaking analysts collect almost exclusively English news articles, and that the manual process of its construction results in erroneously included incidents and duplicates. Altogether, this yields a VCDB threat ranking that is unlikely to reflect the ranking obtained when having perfect knowledge of incident frequencies.

Does that mean that the VCDB is useless to SMEs? No, certainly not. By being aware of the selection bias involved in constructing the VCDB, we can still use this data as input for the prioritisation of SME cybersecurity threats. We must take care to always complement VCDB information with

other data sources, such as the ENISA rankings and expert assessments. With our approach, we hope to harness the beneficial aspects of VCDB, while taking care to avoid some of the traps associated with using its biased and outdated data.

5.3 SHARED CTI SOLUTION FOR SMES

The European Horizon 2020 project GEIGER (GEIGER Consortium, 2020) aims to develop an adaptable, dynamic, and usable application to assess and improve the cybersecurity risk level of SMEs. GEIGER achieves these goals in part by using shared threat intelligence.

Before turning to the solution we developed within the GEIGER project, let us recap what we have learned in the past two sections, to inform our solution design. We know that SMEs lack the cybersecurity knowledge and resources to perform complex tasks. Hence, they require understandable and actionable recommendations on how to improve their cybersecurity posture.

We learned that SMEs should not be seen as one homogeneous group, but rather as a heterogeneous set of enterprises with different characteristics and needs. Any cybersecurity solution for SMEs should therefore be able to adapt based on SME characteristics, to provide tailored advice.

Lastly, any cybersecurity solution needs to be updated based on changes in the cyber threat landscape. For larger enterprises, we may expect a security expert or SOC to be involved in this updating process. However, such resources are rarely available at SMEs. Therefore, our solution should incorporate an automated updating procedure facilitating adaptation to a changing threat landscape. We summarise our three requirements for an SME cybersecurity solution below:

- The solution must provide understandable and actionable recommendations.
- 2. The solution should be able to adapt to different SME characteristics.
- The solution should update automatically in response to a changing cyber threat landscape.

In the next sections, we describe how shared CTI could be the ideal prescription to meet the above requirements. The utilisation of shared CTI involves an input, a process, and an output. We cover each of these elements in the context of the GEIGER solution, starting with the input: MISP data.

5.3.1 Input: explaining MISP

The Malware Incident Sharing Platform (MISP) was introduced in 2016 (Wagner et al., 2016) and has risen in popularity ever since. MISP is a flexible

incident sharing platform that is compatible with STIX. The platform is supported by the Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg (CIRCL), which explains why it is popular among many colleague Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) across Europe.

MISP is a free and open-source platform for threat information sharing. MISP provides software for the sharing, storage, and correlation of IoCs related to cybersecurity incidents.

The MISP data model is composed of *events*, which usually represent threats or incidents. Events, in turn, are composed of a list of *attributes*. Examples of attributes are IP addresses and domain names. Other data types exist in MISP, such as *objects*, which allow advanced combinations of attributes, and *galaxies*, which enable deeper analysis and categorisation of events.

MISP's data model is based on a JSON schema for event exchange, allowing for the classification of objects using different taxonomies. MISP comes with predefined taxonomies and users can define taxonomies according to their needs. This allows CERTs to classify events according to their requirements, while still following accepted standards in the cybersecurity field. In Figure 5.2, we can see some examples of available taxonomies being used to classify incidents.




Figure 5.2: Examples of TLP:WHITE events that can be shared from CERT-RO's MISP instance to the GEIGER cloud.

CERT-RO, the Romanian CERT that is a partner in the GEIGER project, uses MISP for the collection of cybersecurity alerts from different stakeholders. To comply with its legal obligations, CERT-RO has developed a taxonomy for reporting specific events to Romanian cyberspace. All events from their sources and sensors use the CERT-RO taxonomy.

The CERT-RO MISP implementation is based on the MISP module implemented in the National Cyber Security Platform (NCSP). This platform was developed to increase CERT-RO's technical capabilities related to cybersecurity incident management and information sharing. The platform is used for the collection, processing, and dissemination of data related to cybersecurity incidents, vulnerabilities, threats, events, and artefacts, including incident notifications received by CERT-RO. Information such as malicious URLs, IPs, and file signatures are usually distributed through this module.

CERT-RO's MISP data tagged with 'TLP:WHITE' is made available to GEIGER in a feed that can be imported in the GEIGER backend component in the cloud. TLP stands for Traffic Light Protocol; a protocol created to promote the sharing of information. TLP is a set of designations used to ensure that sensitive information is shared with the appropriate audience. It employs four colours to indicate expected sharing boundaries to be applied by the recipient(s). The four colours are red (named recipients only), amber (limited distribution), green (community-wide distribution), and white (unlimited distribution). GEIGER only receives TLP:WHITE data for now. Figure 5.2 shows some examples of events shared from CERT-RO to GEIGER.

GEIGER can then use the CERT-RO CTI feed to update its solution. The technical solution used to process incoming MISP data is summarised in Figure 5.3. Information is exchanged between the GEIGER cloud storage and MISP using an information-sharing channel API. MISP JSON is shared via the information sharing channel API and temporarily stored in a raw data storage. The MISP data is then filtered to extract the information used within the GEIGER solution. The filtered information is stored in a database for processed data. Finally, the GEIGER cloud storage obtains the processed MISP events via a call to the API.

One can see that GEIGER additionally returns enriched events to MISP. Although this is a unique and useful feature in the GEIGER solution, we will not discuss it further as it falls outside of the scope of this chapter.




Figure 5.3: Incoming MISP data processed by the GEIGER information sharing channel and stored in the GEIGER cloud storage.

5.3.2 Process: extracting insights from MISP data

In our literature review, we found that researchers are starting to apply supervised machine learning (Mohasseb et al., 2020), natural language processing (NLP) (Koloveas et al., 2021; J. Zhao et al., 2020), and deep learning (Ansari et al., 2020) techniques to process shared CTI. However, we also found that applying an expert evaluation to the raw data, or using production rules, was far more popular. Of our 47 inclusions, 30 proposed the use of either an expert evaluation or production rules.

This points to the fact that shared CTI often lacks the necessary contextual information for automated reasoning, meaning some form of external knowledge has to be used during processing. This can be in a fully manual process whereby CTI is displayed and it is left to a security expert to decide what to do with the presented data. The other option is to use some form of production rules formulated by security experts a priori, whereby shared CTI can be processed automatically in production.

Of the 11 solutions in our literature review that were relevant to start-ups, digitally dependent SMEs, and digitally based SMEs, 7 used production rules in their process of turning shared CTI into usable output. This insight led us to conclude that using production rules within the GEIGER solution provides the ideal circumstances to combine expert insights with an automated, usable process for SMEs.

The GEIGER process for utilising shared CTI from MISP is depicted in Figure 5.4. We will focus on the threat prioritisation part of Figure 5.4 here, and discuss recommendation selection and the user interface in Section 5.3.3.

The threat prioritisation process proceeds as follows. First, security experts form a threat classification that is suitable for the SME target group, based on cybersecurity threat reports. In the case of GEIGER, the target audience is primarily the smallest and least digitally mature SMEs. Given their large dependence on external suppliers for IT solutions, we introduced an external environment threat representing threats from third parties and the supply chain in our classification. All other threat categories, which can be seen in Figure 5.1, appear regularly in ENISA's top threat lists. For more details on our classification, see van Haastrecht, Sarhan, Shojaifar, et al. (2021).

Next, the selected threats must be prioritised. We could choose to base prioritisation solely on the shared CTI from MISP. Yet, although MISP's threat intelligence provides a plentiful and continuous stream of data, it does not contain the information that allows us to create distinct prioritisations for different SME categories. As we outlined in our solution requirements at the start of Section 5.3, SME cybersecurity solutions must recognise the heterogeneous nature of the SME landscape. The GEIGER solution achieves this by creating different threat prioritisations for digitally dependent SMEs, digitally based SMEs, and digital enablers. Start-ups are not treated separately,

since prioritisation of threats is largely dependent on an enterprise's nature in the digital environment, rather than how long it has been in existence.

Our initial threat prioritisation was constructed based on expert insights and information from SME cybersecurity reports. Additionally, we used the insights from our VCDB analysis. We mentioned the potential issues with using VCDB data in an SME cybersecurity solution in Section 5.2. However, the analysed data can provide insights into how threat frequencies progressed over time and which threats are especially relevant to particular SME categories. An example of such an observation is that denial of service is less relevant to digitally dependent SMEs than to digitally based SMEs.




Figure 5.4: Process for turning shared CTI into actionable recommendations for SME users.

We can then use the MISP threat intelligence to continuously update our tailored threat prioritisation. However, CERT-RO's MISP taxonomies do not directly map to our ENISA-derived threat classification. Hence, we first need to use a threat mapping to map the incoming threats to the GEIGER threat classification. This mapping step is also depicted in Figure 5.3, as 'Filter and Analysis.' We can then apply our production rules to update our threat prioritisation based on the new information we receive.

To update our weights, we use an exponential smoothing approach inspired by the more advanced intermittent demand forecasting approaches known from operations research (Nikolopoulos, 2021). In exponential smoothing, new data does not fully determine how we update our forecasts. Instead, we define a smoothing factor $\alpha \in [0,1]$, which determines how much weight the new data receives compared to the data we already have. A lower value of α results in less weight for new data, and therefore a smoother progression over time.

The final inputs we must determine are the time intervals that we consider for updating. These intervals determine how often our algorithm should be executed, and thus how often we update threat weights in the GEIGER solution. We elected to update our weights every month, to ensure that we can respond quickly to a changing threat landscape. One might then ask: Why not update every week or every day?

We have two main reasons for not updating more frequently. Firstly, by updating very frequently we increase the influence incident outliers have on our weights. If on a particular day a large number of malware incidents are shared via MISP, this would lead to an increase in our malware weights, even though this may be unwarranted when looking at a longer period. The second reason is more practical. Users of the GEIGER application will receive recommendations based on our threat prioritisations. If we change our weights daily, users will have to deal with different prioritisations daily. From a user experience perspective, this would not be ideal.

Hence, we selected to update monthly, making the previous month the period where we consider reported incidents to be new. We label this period as t_{new} and the corresponding array of incident frequencies per threat \mathbf{n}_{new} . Similarly, we introduce t_{old} and \mathbf{n}_{old} . For these variables, we choose to look back one year, meaning incidents reported between one month ago and one year ago fall in the 'old' category.

Through the application of our exponential smoothing algorithm, we update our threat weights monthly. By updating our threat prioritisation, we ensure that the information we provide to SMEs accurately represents the current threat landscape. This allows GEIGER users to receive information on what actions they should take to counter the most pressing threats.

The process of threat prioritisation is continual, as the cyber threat landscape is ever-changing. Besides the periodic updates provided by the MISP data, we also periodically assess whether our threat classification and initial threat prioritisation should be updated.

As witnessed by the consistency in the ENISA top threats, completely new types of cybersecurity threats do not appear often. Nevertheless, given the dynamic nature of the cyber threat landscape and the constant struggle between cyber attackers and defenders, any cybersecurity solution must have controls in place to deal with major, unexpected shifts. If we observe major changes to the cyber threat landscape in our GEIGER periodic evaluations, we will repeat the complete threat prioritisation process to ensure our prioritisations are as accurate as possible.

5.3.3 Output: providing actionable recommendations

We observed in Section 5.2 that shared CTI solutions applying an extensive filtering process to arrive at actionable insights, are most suited to the least digitally mature SMEs. Simply providing SMEs with tailored threat prioritisations is not enough if we want to motivate them to take action. Given their lack of internally available cybersecurity expertise and resources, they need to be given clear and actionable instructions, rather than generic advice. The recommendation selection and user interface components of Figure 5.4, serve the purpose of providing SMEs with the guidance they require.

Our process starts with collecting the latest cybersecurity recommendations - sometimes termed countermeasures - from reports such as those of ENISA and the websites of national CERTs and National Cyber Security Centres (NCSCs). Many of these sources offer advice aimed specifically at SMEs.

We must then determine which recommendations apply to which threats. Luckily, many sources provide such mappings, making it relatively simple to couple recommendations to threats in the collection phase. Knowing SME characteristics such as its category, we can then order recommendations based on relevance to the SME.

Finally, we can present the ordered recommendations to the user, who can then choose to enact the recommendations they deem most relevant. Figure 5.5 shows how the GEIGER user interface presents recommendations to users.

The user receives prioritised, personalised, and actionable recommendations, without needing to first provide extensive internal data. As with any risk assessment solution, providing more data will help the SME to gain a more accurate picture of the cybersecurity risk they face. However, the user can get started without such data. This makes our approach accessible to start-ups and digitally dependent SMEs, who are in dire need of cybersecurity assistance.

5.3.4 Practical example

To provide insight into how the process of Figure 5.4 works in practice, we will cover a practical example in this section. The steps of our example are presented in Figure 5.6.

Recently, a malware variety termed 'Flubot' infected Android devices across Europe and Australia (Trend Micro, 2021). An increased frequency of malware incidents should be reflected in how we prioritise threats for SMEs, given that other threats are not similarly on the rise.

Figure 5.6 explains how our solution would respond to a Flubot malware wave. As the wave hits, Flubot incidents will start to appear in CERT-RO's MISP feed. The feed depicted in Figure 5.2 would change to include incident descriptions similar to the one shown in Figure 5.6.




Figure 5.5: Phishing and malware recommendations shown to the user in the GEIGER user interface.



Figure 5.6: Our solution responds to the Flubot malware wave based on incoming MISP data.

The MISP data is then processed further within the GEIGER solution. Figure 5.3 showed the technical components and interactions involved in filtering MISP data and storing it in the GEIGER cloud storage. The next time the exponential smoothing algorithm is executed, the relatively high incidence of malware will cause the malware threat type to receive a higher priority. The user will be notified of a change in the prioritisation and can act accordingly. Although recommendations themselves will not be updated, the change in threat prioritisation will motivate the user to enact malware recommendations sooner rather than later.

This example highlights that just because many SMEs do not have the resources to actively monitor the cyber threat landscape, does not mean they are incapable of responding to changes. We need to construct solutions that automate the tasks SMEs are unable to perform while enabling SMEs in the tasks only they can execute. In the end, it is up to the SME to take action and implement recommendations. We, as cybersecurity experts, should do our utmost to ensure SMEs are in a position to act with confidence and determination.

5.4 DISCUSSION

At the outset of this chapter, we asked: How can shared incident information be utilised to help improve SME cybersecurity? Our literature review showed that approaches exist that could be used to help digitally based SMEs and digital enablers, but that start-ups and digitally dependent SMEs are largely left to their own devices.

We discussed how solutions building on structured external CTI show promise in helping the least digitally mature SMEs. Structured open-source intelligence also has potential, but, as our analysis of VCDB demonstrated, is likely to have biases in the data collection phase that are problematic for use in SME solutions.

Our solution using structured CTI sourced from the MISP threat sharing platform addresses the needs of the least digitally mature SMEs. In Section 5.3, we introduced three requirements for an SME cybersecurity solution, which we used to guide the design of our solution.

Our solution embeds understandable recommendations collected from CERTs and NCSCs throughout Europe in an intuitive user interface. This ensures that SMEs consider our recommendations actionable (Requirement 1). We use input from cybersecurity experts, reports, and VCDB to create a threat prioritisation tailored to an SME's category. Thus, our solution can adapt to different SME characteristics to offer tailored advice (Requirement 2). Lastly, we use incoming MISP data to continuously update our threat prioritisation, ensuring a timely response to changes in the cyber threat landscape (Requirement 3).

Our methodology and solution have their limitations. We focused our literature review on the period since the introduction of MISP in 2016. Although the last years have seen remarkable progress in the shared CTI field, it is certainly possible that we overlooked ideas for suitable solutions by restricting our timeline.

Although our application is currently complete in a prototype components implementation, its impact and relevance remain to be proven in an operational environment. We based our solution on a broad range of existing insights regarding SME cybersecurity, but it is nevertheless possible that we have overseen certain implications of using our application in the real world. An in-depth investigation of the optimal algorithm choice for updating threat weights is another future necessity.

Additionally, our solution is dependent on the continued popularity of MISP as an incident sharing platform. MISP facilitates data exchange using the STIX format, which is the de-facto standard for information exchange in the cybersecurity field. MISP, however, is not the only standard when it comes to threat sharing platforms. However, we believe in its future given the large support it receives from CERTs throughout Europe.

A final point to mention is that the validity of our solution relies on the inclusion of new cybersecurity threats in CERT-RO's MISP feed. Currently, the threats we include in our solution are all covered by one or more MISP incident types. However, if a new threat appears that is relevant to SMEs, this threat may not be represented in CERT-RO's MISP feed. This could happen if the nature of the threat makes it relevant to SMEs, yet not to CERT-RO. We believe our tight cooperation with CERT-RO and other CERTs throughout Europe offers sufficient potential for mitigation of this risk, but it is present.

5.5 CONCLUSION

Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) generally do not have the knowledge and resources to deal with cybersecurity threats. Therefore, they need to be assisted in raising their cybersecurity awareness and resilience.

A solution is to share the cyber threat intelligence (CTI) of other institutions and organisations with SMEs. After all, a problem shared is a problem halved. Yet, shared CTI is rarely used in solutions to address SME needs. Especially the least digitally mature SMEs are often overlooked.

Through reviewing the shared CTI literature, we found potential in structured, externally gathered CTI feeds to aid the most vulnerable SMEs. Our solution incorporates such an external CTI feed to continuously update threat prioritisations for SMEs. By mapping publicly available countermeasure suggestions to our prioritised threats, we can provide SMEs with actionable recommendations that are ordered by relevance.

We tailored our threat prioritisations to SME characteristics, to recognise the heterogeneous SME landscape. Different SME categories deserve different treatment, for example due to varying amounts of internal cybersecurity data being available. Our solution does not place a heavy burden on SMEs to provide internal data, making it ideally suited to less digitally mature SMEs.

Our solution is only the tip of the iceberg for what is possible with shared CTI for SMEs. In future, we will continue to develop our solution and seek to employ it in operational environments. More importantly, we hope that other researchers realise the potential of using shared CTI to help vulnerable organisations. A problem shared is a problem halved. We are well aware of the problem; it is time to start sharing.