The social ties that bind: the role of social relations and trust in EU intelligence cooperation

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Chapter 2

Chapter 2: The Research Gap

Explaining the Depth and Breadth of International Intelligence Cooperation[1]

2.1. Introduction

> *'...ultimately intelligence agencies deal in secrets and instinctively hate pooling and sharing. Most of all they hate multilateral sharing, which is exactly what globalization seems to require.'*[2]

Despite the rapidly increasing interest of both scholars and practitioners in international intelligence cooperation, there has not been a sufficient explanation for the current depth and breadth of the phenomenon. Most puzzling of all is why international intelligence cooperation does occur, and is even rising, in multilateral settings such as the EU.[3] Even advocates of increased multilateral intelligence cooperation approach it as being 'counter-natural'. In their view, the core characteristic of intelligence is international competition, not cooperation.[4] Currently, there seem to be clear limits to our understanding of international intelligence cooperation. In chapter 1 it was already mentioned that building knowledge in the disjointed field of IS is challenging as 'advancing our understanding requires a systematic literature to make its findings cumulative'.[5] Troubling is the conclusion by Marrin in 2016 that IS is 'anything but cumulative', not having 'a structured process for compiling and evaluating the literature'.[6] Equally disturbing is Svendsen's observation that intelligence cooperation is 'even less systematically [...] studied than intelligence as a whole'.[7] Aiming to contribute to a better understanding of international intelligence cooperation, this chapter will identify the research gap for this study. It sets out to critically examine the current state of the debate, to identify where 'progression of knowledge has stalled' and to suggest avenues for further research.[8] To do so, it answers three questions. First, what has been written so far on international intelligence cooperation both in quantity as well as in content? Second, what

1 An earlier version of this chapter has been published as peer-reviewed article: Pepijn Tuinier, 'Explaining the Depth and Breadth of International Intelligence Cooperation: Towards a Comprehensive Understanding', Intelligence and National Security 36, no. 1 (January 2021).

2 Aldrich, "'A Profoundly Disruptive Force,'" 153.

3 For an overview of the debate on EU Intelligence cooperation, for example see: Gruszczak, Intelligence Security in the European Union, 9–12.

4 Lander, 'International Intelligence Cooperation', 483–84; Wippl, 'Intelligence Exchange Through InterIntel'; Hulnick, 'Intelligence Cooperation in the Post-cold War Era', 458.

5 Kent, 'The Need for an Intelligence Literature'.

6 Marrin, 'Improving Intelligence Studies as an Academic Discipline', 269.

7 Svendsen, The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation, 72.

8 Marrin, "Improving Intelligence Studies as an Academic Discipline," 278; Machi and McEvoy, *The Literature Review: Six Steps to Success*, 185–89.

gaps still exist that are worth exploring further? Third, and maybe most important for this thesis, how can these gaps be best addressed?

This chapter will answer these questions in succession based on a systematic literature review. Section 2.2 shows that cooperation is no longer a neglected topic. Not only is the number of publications rising, the scholarly and content diversity is cautiously widening as well. In section 2.3 this chapter asserts that a research gap still exists. Contrary to the constructivist turn to practice seen in International Relations, most research into international intelligence cooperation still holds a neorealist presumption albeit used mostly implicitly. This research gap clarifies why the debate has difficulties in explaining the increasing depth and breadth of international intelligence cooperation, especially in established multilateral settings. In section 2.4 this chapter suggests three avenues along which the debate can be systematically advanced. It forms the basis for the way this study fills the research gap. It advocates exploring the activities following the initial decision to cooperate, further examining the interorganizational and interpersonal levels and using a sociological perspective. Accordingly, the final section discusses these results and reaches the conclusion that a more comprehensive understanding of international intelligence cooperation is within reach. The debate has grown to a point that it invites new approaches and these approaches are readily available in neighboring disciplines of IS. This literature review covers the period from 1990 to 2019 and has been published as a peer-review article in the journal of Intelligence and National Security shortly after. Publications on international intelligence cooperation dating after 2019 are not included in the systematic review, but will be mentioned and used in the rest of the thesis. They do not alter the conclusions in this chapter.

2.2. Reviewing the Debate on International Intelligence Cooperation

2.2.1. Framing the Topic of International Intelligence Cooperation

This chapter provides a systematic literature review of the academic debate on international intelligence cooperation. Although it strives to be comprehensive, choices on definition, focus and methods inevitably demarcate the topic. As seen in the previous chapter, within IS there is no consensus about the definition of 'intelligence'.[9] The same applies to cooperation. It is not within the scope of this study to cover this debate in depth, let alone try to resolve it. Nevertheless, to conduct a proper literature review, one has to define the topic at hand. Based on the definition and demarcation of the research topic presented in chapter 1, here international intelligence cooperation is defined as 'intelligence organizations from different

9 Warner, 'Wanted: A Definition of "Intelligence"'; Wheaton and Beerbower, 'Towards a New Definition of Intelligence', 319–20.

countries working together for mutual benefit in the deliberate collection and enhancing of data and information, aimed at establishing a competitive knowledge advantage in matters of national security'. This inclusive definition suits a literature review meant to identify conceptual research gaps and explore worthwhile avenues for this research. It is not limited to the EU or its particular fields of interest and covers various types of partnerships, in formal and informal arrangements, and in bilateral as well as in multilateral settings.[10] The review is nevertheless limited by its frame in two ways; its focus and the methods employed.

The focus in this chapter is on the activity of international cooperation leading to intelligence for national security. First, it is international which means that cooperation within national intelligence communities is no part of the review, no matter how extensive or well-documented like is the case with the US intelligence community. Second, it is about cooperation which means that not all activities executed in international intelligence organizations or systems are included in the review, as they are not considered to be primarily about cooperation. For example, the way information is processed in structures such as the EU External Action Service (EEAS) is in many cases mainly about their internal procedures and only marginally about cooperation between intelligence organizations from different countries. It will be included in later chapters though, when addressing its influence on trust in EU intelligence cooperation. Third, this review is limited to cooperation aimed at acquiring intelligence for national security (state interest). It thus considers strategic (or foreign) intelligence, military intelligence and counterterrorism for being seen as supporting the purpose of national security. It excludes cooperation for individual or corporate security, like in criminal intelligence and business intelligence. Security intelligence on a supranational level such as the EU or NATO is considered to serve issues delegated from or similar to state interest and is included.

The research methods used in this literature review further delineate what is considered a publication on international intelligence cooperation. Cooperation activities, for potentially being part of every step of the intelligence process, can be found in a wide variety of publications on intelligence. For this research, only publications were included that have international intelligence cooperation in the title and/or as one of the key topics. It covers the related topics of alignment, coordination, collaboration and integration and their subsequent activities. Furthermore, although intelligence is at present a topic frequently seen in the popular press and in policy documents, this research focusses on the academic debate. The systematic literature review was conducted by identifying on-topic articles in the journal of 'Intelligence and National Security' (INS) and the 'International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence'(IJIC), as these are the foremost (openly available)

10 See for example: Rudner, 'Hunters and Gatherers'; Labasque, 'The Merits of Informality in Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation'; Van Buuren, 'Analysing International Intelligence Cooperation: Institutions or Intelligence Assemblages?'

subject matter, reviewed journals.[11] Next, using the method of 'snowballing', publications from other sources were detected that also cover the topic of international intelligence cooperation. This chapter reviews the academic literature on international intelligence cooperation for the period 1991 up to and including 2019, both in sheer quantity as well as in a more qualitative manner. By systematically categorizing the publications identified, it became possible to critically examine their focus, perspectives and concepts albeit many of the publications do not name them specifically. It provides a clear insight in the development of the debate as well as its current state. The next section will first address the size and scope of the debate, essentially establishing whether or not we can still speak of a neglected topic.

2.2.2. A Neglected Topic?

International intelligence cooperation has long been considered the forgotten dimension within an already peripheral academic discipline of IS.[12] Nowadays, one can hardly uphold that claim. Despite the challenges facing academics in terms of data collection, especially the last two decades were fruitful in terms of journal articles, monographs and other publications. In the period 1991 up to and including 2019, 82 articles were published in INS and IJIC that have international intelligence cooperation in their title and/or as one of their key topics. When compared with the total number of original articles in these journals during that period (1842), international intelligence cooperation could indeed qualify as 'neglected', accounting for no more than 4.4% of the total. Yet, at the same time an almost uninterrupted growth in scholarly attention for international intelligence cooperation is present in the three decades examined. The average number of publications in INS and IJIC combined steadily rose from one per year in the period 1990-1999, to almost four per year in the period 2000-2019. Moreover, this picture of growing interest is bolstered when taking other sources into consideration.

In the last three decades an increasing number of publications on international intelligence cooperation has been published outside the two main intelligence journals mentioned. Using the method of snowballing down the sources of on-topic-articles in INS and IJIC, this research found 20 monographs exclusively covering the topic of international intelligence cooperation, as well as 63 book chapters in edited volumes. Furthermore, an additional 84 articles on international intelligence cooperation were published in other academic journals. Some of these journals specifically cover 'intelligence', like the 'Journal of Intelligence History' and the more recent 'International Journal of Intelligence and Public Affairs'. Yet,

11 In this the research concurs with Damien Van Puyvelde & Sean Curtis (2016) 'Standing on the shoulders of giants': diversity and scholarship in Intelligence Studies, Intelligence and National Security, 31:7, 1040-1041.

12 Fägersten, *Sharing Secrets*, 38–39; Westerfield, 'America and the World of Intelligence Liaison', 523; Lefebvre, 'The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation', 536; Munton, 'Intelligence Cooperation Meets International Studies Theory', 121.

interestingly, most of the journal articles on international intelligence cooperation outside INS and IJIC in the period 1990 up to and including 2019 were published in a variety of more off-topic journals like the 'Journal of Common Market Studies' and the 'Journal of Strategic Studies'. Especially from 2001 onwards, an increasing number of articles appear outside what can be considered the main intelligence debate.

On average, a continuous growth of academic publications on intelligence cooperation in the last three decades exists. All in all a total of 274 unique publications on international intelligence cooperation were included in this review, although these publications vary with regard to the depth and width of the analysis, as well as in sheer volume. Figure 2 presents the growing number of publications on international intelligence cooperation, per year and on average. While it is clear that substantial growth has been occurring especially from 2004 onwards, the number of publications still varies significantly per year.



Figure 2; Number of academic publications on international cooperation

Three event-related topics leave their mark on the growing debate. First, in the period from 2004 onwards several contributions were made on intelligence cooperation in response to jihadist terrorism. For example, publications on the effectiveness of transatlantic intelligence cooperation follow the events of 9/11 and the adjoining 'War on terror', and

later the Madrid and London bombings.[13] Second, in the period from 2006 onwards the maturing of the European Union's (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy led to an academic response on the feasibility of intelligence cooperation within this supranational organization.[14] Third, from 2009 onwards a growing body of literature addresses issues of ethics, accountability and oversight in international intelligence cooperation. Publications, for example, follow on exposures in the United States of extraordinary rendition methods by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the existence of the PRISM program of the National Security Agency (NSA). Yet, not only exposures or incidents drive this topical interest. Also, the perceived difficulties for current national oversight mechanisms to monitor increasingly complex cooperation arrangements, and the introduction of new legislation concerning intelligence cooperation in several countries drives the academic debate.[15]

However important events are, it would be overly simplistic to depict them as the sole reason for the growth of the debate on international intelligence cooperation. A variety of topics exists in the 'underbrush' of the debate, indicating that the debate is developing a dynamic of its own. Noteworthy examples include Munton's attempt to explain Canadian intelligence collaboration against Castro's Cuba using both realist and liberal-constructivist theory in 2009[16], Thomson's elaborate Ph.D. thesis using microeconomic analysis to explain the success or failure in intelligence cooperation in 2015[17] and Maras' article on the role of organizational culture in overcoming the intelligence-sharing paradox in 2017.[18] These examples, only some out of many, also show that there is more to the growth of the debate on intelligence cooperation than sheer numbers. Its academic diversity, the multiformity regarding features of the academic debate, is increasing as well.

13 See for example: Bensahel, 'A Coalition of Coalitions'; Rudner, 'Hunters and Gatherers'; Reveron, 'Old Allies, New Friends'; Wetzling, 'European Counterterrorism Intelligence Liaisons'; Aldrich, 'US-European Intelligence Co-Operation on Counter-Terrorism'; Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror; Bures, 'Intelligence Sharing and the Fight against Terrorism in the EU'; Walsh, 'Intelligence-Sharing and United States Counter-Terrorism Policy'.

14 See for example: Müller-Wille, 'For Our Eyes Only Shaping an Intelligence Community within the EU'; Walsh, 'Intelligence-Sharing in the European Union'; Dorn, 'European Strategic Intelligence'; Müller-Wille, 'The Effect of International Terrorism on EU Intelligence Co-Operation'; Fägersten, 'Bureaucratic Resistance to International Intelligence Cooperation – The Case of Europol'; Davis Cross, 'EU Intelligence Sharing and Joint Situation Centre: A Glass Half-Full'; Nomikos, 'European Union Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN): Next Stop to an Agency?'

15 See for example: Born et al., *Making International Intelligence Cooperation Accountable*; Manjikian, "But My Hands Are Clean"; McGruddy, "Multilateral Intelligence Collaboration and International Oversight"; Puyvelde, "Intelligence Accountability and the Role of Public Interest Groups in the United States"; Hillebrand, "The Role of News Media in Intelligence Oversight"; Borelli, "Rendition, Torture and Intelligence Cooperation"; Sepper, "Democracy, Human Rights, and Intelligence Sharing."

16 Munton, 'Intelligence Cooperation Meets International Studies Theory'.

17 Thomson, 'Prolegomenon to a Political Economy of Intelligence and Security: Can Microeconomic Analysis Explain Success or Failure in Intelligence Cooperation?'

18 Maras, 'Overcoming the Intelligence-Sharing Paradox'.

2.2.3. Author Diversity

The debate on international intelligence cooperation is not only increasing in terms of number of publications or the variety of topics covered. Alongside this trend, the type of debate is changing as well. It is cautiously broadening, both in author and in content diversity. Diversity strengthens explanatory power in the debate. A more diverse group of scholars and a wider range in content enlarges the chance of competing approaches, thus furthering the debate in terms of generating new insights.[19] A trend of growing author diversity exists in the gender and nationality of the authors, two characteristics that enable a comparison with the broader scholarly diversity in IS. It is clear that the debate on international intelligence cooperation is still mainly a male affair. Only 21% of the publications on international intelligence cooperation in the period 1991 up to and including 2019 has a female first author. Nevertheless, when one divides this period in blocks of ten years each, an interesting trend appears. After having no female authors at all in the first decade, their share grows to 13% in the second and 27% in the last period. In addition, almost forty percent of all second authors is female. This is clearly a more favorable picture than for IS in general, as examined by Van Puyvelde and Curtis. They find that in the period 1986-2015, 9,1% of all publications in INS and IJIC have a female author.[20]

Notwithstanding the positive trend in gender diversity, when considering explanatory power for international intelligence cooperation, 'national background' is even more telling as an attribute of growing author diversity. There are systematic differences in the way people from different national cultures observe the world, let alone interpret it.[21] Their differing frames of reference can counter blind spots, each attending to useful information and complementing each other.[22] The field of IS is very clearly dominated by authors based in Anglo-Saxon countries, with the United Kingdom, United States and Canada accounting for 85.4% of all publications in IJIC and INS.[23] Again, the debate on international intelligence cooperation stands out favorably, with only 51.9% of the publications in these journals made by an author based in one of these three countries. Moreover, a national frame of reference stems from more than the country a researcher is based in. At the least, it involves the country of origin as well.

In the last three decades there has been increased scholarly diversity in the intelligence cooperation debate in terms of nationality. Authors originating from the UK and US still dominate the debate. On average 44% of all publications stems from these authors.

19 Puyvelde and Curtis, '"Standing on the Shoulders of Giants"', 1041.

20 Ibid., 1044.

21 Masuda et al., 'Culture and Aesthetic Preference'.

22 Syed, Rebel Ideas. The Power of Diverse Thinking., 15, 20; van Knippenberg and Mell, 'Past, Present, and Potential Future of Team Diversity Research', 139; McChrystal, Team of Teams, 118–24.

23 Puyvelde and Curtis, '"Standing on the Shoulders of Giants"', 1045.

Interestingly, as with gender, a shift appears to be occurring. Whereas, in the early days of the debate (1991-2000) authors from the UK and US accounted for almost all (83%) of the publications, the following decade their share shrunk to 48%. In the 2010-2019 the UK-US share fell further to 39%. This is still a significant percentage for only two countries on a topic as 'international' as international intelligence cooperation, but the variety of nationalities is clearly rising. Although the academic debate over international intelligence cooperation is still predominantly an endeavor by western scholars, figure 3 presents the steady trend of internationalization. Not only did the number of contributing authors from differing countries per year rise, the cumulative total of unique nationalities involved in the debate has increased significantly as well in the last decades. In the three decades leading up to 2019, authors from 31 different countries have contributed to the academic debate with publications on the topic of international intelligence cooperation. As the next subsection will show, this increasing scholarly diversity in gender and nationality is dovetailed by a growing diversity in content.



Figure 3; Country of origin of first authors addressing international intelligence cooperation

2.2.4. Content Diversity

The last aspect of the debate on international intelligence cooperation reviewed is its content. Again, there is a trend of cautiously growing diversity. Apart from the widening of

topics, as found at the beginning of this section, two additional shifts in content are present. First, a shift is occurring from a largely historical to a more current body of literature. In 2003 Lefebvre still claimed that 'the literature on international intelligence cooperation is still [...] largely historical'.[24] Indeed, in the period from 1990 to 2003, 21 publications, accounting for 62% of all publications in that period, dealt with the Cold War or before. Moreover, 16 out of these 21 publications covered topics from the early Cold War (1970 or before). Notable examples are the examination of the Axis SIGINT collaboration in the Second World War by Alvarez[25] and the Syrian-Egyptian intelligence cooperation in the period 1954-1967 by Rathmell.[26] From 2003 onwards, around the same year the number of publications began a significant ascent, the number of publications dealing with current (post-Cold War) issues rises to 92% in the period 2010 up to and including 2019. Although, as the years pass, there naturally is more and more 'history' positioned after the Cold War, the observed shift away from Cold War topics is so abrupt that it appears to account for more than just a gradual move away from a past era over time.

Second, the shift to a more current body of literature coincides with a change in the knowledge level pursued. In the period from 1990 to 2000 many of the publications on intelligence cooperation were descriptive or explanatory accounts, often based on sources declassified over time. Yet, more and more publications appear that not merely aim to describe or explain events, but try to extract general lessons about international intelligence cooperation and forecast its development accordingly. Others are more normative, its authors commenting on what they think international intelligence cooperation should look like. Especially the latter typify a move away from historical lessons to directly addressing current-day challenges, even offering advice. This trend can be illustrated by publications on the long-lasting UK-US agreement. Whereas publications by Smith[27] and Budiansky[28] uncover its beginnings based on at that time recently declassified sources, later writings by for example Herman[29] and Dittmer[30] try to extract general explanations. Others, like Manjikian[31], now make recommendations on accountability and oversight based on ethical considerations and notions of complicity.[32]

24 Lefebvre, 'The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation', 536.

25 Alvarez, 'Axis Sigint Collaboration'.

26 Rathmell, 'Brotherly Enemies'.

27 Smith, The Ultra-Magic Deals and the Most Secret Special Relationship, 1940-1946.

28 Budiansky, 'The Difficult Beginnings of US-British Codebreaking Cooperation'.

29 Herman, 'Understanding the UK-US Intelligence Partnership'.

30 Dittmer, 'Everyday Diplomacy'.

31 Manjikian, 'But My Hands Are Clean'.

32 See for example: Boer, 'Counter-Terrorism, Security and Intelligence in the EU'; Boer, Hillebrand, and Nölke, 'Legitimacy under Pressure'; McGruddy, 'Multilateral Intelligence Collaboration and International Oversight'; Wetzling, 'The Democratic Control of Intergovernmental Intelligence Cooperation'; Hillebrand, The CIA's Extraordinary Rendition and Secret Detention Programme.

A potential third shift in content diversity, a broadening of research strategies, appears harder to achieve. In 2013 Walsh suggests that intelligence cooperation could be analyzed more fruitfully by using 'the description of patterns of behavior, the development of hypothesized causes of this behavior and a clearly articulated and methodical research design that allows for the rigorous collection of evidence'.[33] Yet, obtaining this 'evidence' remains a challenge. Tuzuner, one of the few authors applying a quantitative approach to intelligence cooperation, admits that one should be cautious with regard to the validity of data for studying intelligence behavior, 'many of it being extremely secretive and therefore possibly remaining undetected'.[34] As a consequence many scholars use deductive reasoning to test hypotheses -mainly stemming from international relations theories - with a limited set of observations. The lack of empirical evidence makes it very hard to turn findings around to induce a revision of the dominant neorealist approach and its concepts.

2.3. The Existing Research Gap

2.3.1. Cooperation in International Relations

IR theory provides a valuable benchmark for the debate on international intelligence cooperation. Cooperation, and its rivals competition and conflict, are at the heart of this field.[35] Since the end of the 1970's, two main theories and their offspring dominate the debate, neorealism and neoliberalism. Both start from the concepts of rationality and self-interest in state-behavior. Even more so, based on their commonalities the two theories are even seen moving towards each other in what Wæver calls a 'neo-neo synthesis'.[36] The hard debates of the early years seem to be waning. Nevertheless, especially (offensive) structural realism and neoliberal institutionalism still disagree heavily on many topics as they are based on a very pessimistic and ideational view of the international system respectively. Whereas the first asserts that this system is inherently anarchistic and based on power politics, the latter focusses on interdependence and institutions. It leads to an entirely different view on international cooperation and international organizations. Neorealists focus on conflict and minimize the prospect for international cooperation. International organizations are merely forms by which states exercise hierarchical power and try to maximize their relative gain. States join alliances either to balance a threat coming at them, or to bandwagon with

33 Walsh, 'Intelligence Sharing', 295.

34 Aydinli and Tuzuner, 'Quantifying Intelligence Cooperation', 677.

35 See for example: Hurd, "The Case against International Cooperation," 263–72; Long, "Cooperation and Conflict in International Relations," 7–8; Müller, "Security Cooperation"; Sato, "International Cooperation," 42–44, 48–49.

36 Wæver, "Still a Discipline After All These Debates?," 310–15; Wohlforth, "Realism," 145–46; Onuf, "Worlds of Our Making (2002)," 31; Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation," 42–43; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," 391–92.

the powerful and avert risk.[37] Liberal institutionalists acknowledge cooperation as a means to promote self-interest, but they see it as part of a quest for absolute gain. In their view, states craft institutions to solve the cooperation dilemma sketched in the previous chapter and further elaborated on in the next. Institutional solutions limit the problems in collective action by limiting the range of acceptable behavior and offering information. Moreover, in this system, international organizations are thought to hold a power (actorness) of their own.[38]

Since the end of the Cold War, a third theory gained prominence in the debate. Constructivism has become an increasingly important and accepted approach to international relations.[39] It is distinct from both the materialism found in realist approaches (focusing on relative gain) and the instrumentalism in neoliberalist approaches (focusing on absolute gain). By contrast, constructivism emphasizes the social and relational construction of state preferences and behavior.[40] Moreover, constructivist theory steps beyond the notion of rationality. It focusses on the intersubjective role of norms and ideas in deriving meaning from events and objects. In cooperation, constructivism helps explain why actors converge around specific norms and frames of understanding. They offer some sort of social arrangement with (informal) rules for behavior, limit the anarchy in the international system and shape the meaning of state interests.[41] As Wendt puts it: 'an anarchy of friends differs from one of enemies'.[42] Similarly, the English school in International Relations adheres to notions of norm-based convergence. It is a line of theory that claims that world society restrains the practice of states; their behavior is structured by international norms, regulated by international institutions and guided by moral purposes. Like constructivism it includes the power of shared values and collective identities in creating cooperative solidarity. In doing so, both constructivism and the English School do not deny the importance of states and the influence of power relations, but they add organizations and individuals as agents in a broader collective.[43] They not only open the way for transnational role-based bureaucracies

37 Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 30–36; Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation," 44–50, 62–63; Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," 12–14; Grieco, *Cooperation among Nations*, 3–11; Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," 487–90; Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

38 Keohane and Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory"; Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy," 247–48; Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy; Majeski and Fricks, "Conflict and Cooperation in International Relations," 622–25.

39 Adler, "Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, and Debates," 118; Hurd, "Constructivism," 301; Sterling-Folker, "Competing Paradigms or Birds of a Feather? Constructivism and Neoliberal Institutionalism Compared," 113–16.

40 Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," 73; Onuf, "Constructivism: A User's Manual (1998)," 3–4.

41 Legro, Rethinking the World; Adler, "Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, and Debates," 123, 126–28; Hurd, "Constructivism," 299–300; Onuf, "Constructivism: A User's Manual (1998)," 8–20; Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," 393, 396–99.

42 Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," 78.

43 Dunne, "The English School," 267–74; Buzan, From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation, 228–32; Onuf, "Constructivism: A User's Manual (1998)," 17.

to play their role in cooperation, but also introduce a broad conception of institutions as regimes governing appropriate behavior and a basis for identity formation.

European integration has been a hallmark event for theories of IR. The project has by repetition offered a litmus test. Elements of these theories have been used to explain cooperation in the EU or the lack thereof. The cradle of the modern state system and the scene of numerous wars and great-power rivalry, Europe also became the place where states began to combine aspects of governance. In times of positive expectations, it was mainly neoliberal theories that took the stand, while in times of crises and setback neorealist explanations resurfaced.[44] Recently, this has been especially the case with the development of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the EU's strive for 'strategic autonomy', two topics covered in more detail in chapter 5. These events have spurred academic responses from all sides of the theoretical spectrum in IR.[45] In addition to the theories mentioned above, two[46] schools of thought have emerged; intergovernmentalism (and its foil federalism) and neofunctionalism. They are closely related to the study of cooperation in international relations, but have their origins in explaining the European experience.[47] Like neorealist and neoliberal theories, intergovernmentalism explains integration as the outcome of cooperation and competition among national governments.[48] On a more realist footing, intergovernmental cooperation in regional organizations is a response to shifts in the balance of power in the international system. On a more liberal footing, intergovernmental cooperation in regional organizations is the result of growing interdependence. Although the outcome is still the result of state bargaining, many cooperation decisions are made by 'a small groups of relatively well socialized officials in key committees'.[49] Nevertheless, in both types of intergovernmentalism national sovereignty will always prevail over regional cooperation and integration and is thus limited. This is different in neofunctionalism, where institutional dynamics are seen to drive change and transformation.

44 See for example: Fiott, "In Every Crisis an Opportunity?"; Genschel, Leek, and Weyns, "War and Integration. The Russian Attack on Ukraine and the Institutional Development of the EU"; Orenstein, "The European Union's Transformation after Russia's Attack on Ukraine"; Nicoli, "Neofunctionalism Revisited"; Schmidt, "Theorizing Institutional Change and Governance in European Responses to the Covid-19 Pandemic"; Wallaschek, "Contested Solidarity in the Euro Crisis and Europe's Migration Crisis"; Hooghe and Marks, "Grand Theories of European Integration in the Twenty-First Century"; Schimmelfennig, "European Integration in the Euro Crisis."

45 Mengelberg, *Permanent Change?*, 39–40; Reus-Smit and Snidal, "Between Utopia and Reality," 24.

46 Generally, postfunctionalism is identified as a third 'school'. It emphasizes the disruptive potential of a clash between ongoing integration and exclusive identities in civil society leading to polarization and conflict. Although very insightful in scrutinizing for example the origins, course and effect of the BREXIT referendum, it has little to say directly on cooperation within the EU institutions. Therefore, in this study it will not be explicated separately. See for example: Hooghe and Marks, "Grand Theories of European Integration in the Twenty-First Century," 1116–17, 1122–24.

47 Börzel and Risse, "Litmus Tests for European Intergation Theories," 238; Wiener, "Taking Stock of Integration Theory," 262, 268–70.

48 Hooghe and Marks, "Grand Theories of European Integration in the Twenty-First Century," 1115–16.

49 Howorth, "Decision-Making in Security and Defense Policy," 448–49.

2.3.2. Neofunctionalism and New Institutionalism

Neofunctionalism takes the institutional approach to integration and cooperation a step further. It specifically focusses on dynamics of institutional change and transformation. As its name already suggests, neofunctionalism starts from a functional approach. Functionalism is based on the general assumption that the only reason for states to cooperate - or integrate - is when it suits a function that they cannot efficiently or effectively perform alone. It sees a formal transfer of state functions to specialized agencies in international organizations as the only feasible way to bypass problems of sovereignty. In contrast, neofunctionalism focusses on the autonomous role of non-state actors, especially on regional organizations like the EU and their secretariats. Once established, these regional institutions and their employees develop an actorness that moves collective identity-formation to the supranational level and drives cooperation and integration further. This development tends to be incremental. In time, the functional transfer of tasks in one domain will lead to integration in other areas as it opens windows for new cooperation or evokes unanticipated problems. Neo-functionalists term this process 'spill-over'.[50] Although starting from the functionalist idea of added value, they are less concerned with the formal outcome of this process.[51] Whether or not the EU - or any other regional cooperation for that matter - ultimately evolves into federal unity is of less importance than the explanatory value of the institutional dynamics underlying this process. It offers an insight into the pathways for changing beliefs and perceptions about the benefits of cooperation once established. However, being a theory of change and transformation, neofunctionalism has endured considerable criticism for not being able to explain recent setbacks or even reverse dynamics in EU integration.

Revised versions of neofunctionalism are still at the heart of explaining dynamics of cooperation and integration in international organizations. They offer valuable building blocks for explanations of international cooperation.[52] First, revised neofunctionalism has a focus on social construction that is unseen in either intergovernmentalism or federalism. In this respect, it can be considered 'a forerunner as well as a part' of constructivism.[53] Agents are seen as 'softly rational' actors who pursue goals, but are confronted with new situations and unintended consequences along the way. As a result, they develop new ideas and norms that gradually adjust their shared networks, institutions and identities. From this point of view, the true purpose of EU institutions can be identity building rather than delivering effective policy per se. In this process of change, national representatives 'increasingly understand their roles in terms of collective responsibility'.[54] Second, revised

50 Niemann, Lefkofridi, and Schmitter, "Neofunctionalism," 46–50; Haas, The Uniting of Europe, 283–318; Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization; Mengelberg, Permanent Change?, 81–31.

51 Niemann, Lefkofridi, and Schmitter, "Neofunctionalism," 45.

52 Niemann, Lefkofridi, and Schmitter, 50–53.

53 Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, xiii; Haas, "Does Constructivism Subsume Neo-Functionalism?," 22–29.

54 Bickerton, "Functionality in EU Foreign Policy," 214–16.

neofunctionalism takes a broader view on this change process than neofunctionalism did, stepping beyond the automaticity of integration. Institutional dynamics of cooperation can take several forms, like the proliferation of specialized institutions in an intergovernmental framework ('spill around'), the accumulation of authority by regional institutions without expanding the scope of the mandate ('build-up'), or the modification of institutions to maintain the cooperation effort ('muddle-about').[55]

By now, most approaches in IR and European integration theory acknowledge that international institutions and organizations matter in the cooperative behavior of states.[56] Yet, they differ on how they matter exactly. In explaining dynamics of integration and cooperation, at least three strands of 'new institutionalism' can be discerned.[57] The first is rational institutionalism. It explores how rational actors design functional institutions to maximize their utility. This strand of institutionalism relates closely to early versions of functionalism. The second is historical institutionalism. In addition to the utility base in rational institutionalism, this strand emphasizes the conservative effect of path-dependency in the development of institutions. It sees the structural organization as the principal factor in structuring behavior. Third, there is sociological institutionalism. It marries insights of constructivism and revised neofunctionalism. Contrary to the other strands, sociological institutionalism steps beyond narrow utilitarian concerns and the appearance of organizational designs. In this view, 'material conditions always matter, but they never matter all by themselves'.[58] Institutions are not so much adopted because they are the most efficient instrument for the task at hand, but are the result of culturally specific practices and social relations of transnational elites.[59] Consisting of members of national and international bureaucracies or secretaries as well as outside experts in a certain policy domain, these communities are seen to develop a collective identity and have a profound influence on the way state interests are defined.[60] Under certain conditions and circumstances, they are even seen to shape policies 'in ways unintended or undesired by member-states'.[61] Davis Cross uses this concept of 'a vibrant transnational society of individuals' to explain international

55 Schmitter and Lefkofridi, "Neo-Functionalism as a Theory of Disintegration," 3–6; Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, xxv–xxix, xxxix–xliv, *I-*Ii.

56 Martin and Simmons, "International Organizations and Institutions," 326; Stein, "Neoliberal Institutionalism," 210, 203.

57 March, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life"; Pollack, "Rational Choice and Historical Institutionalism," 109; Hall and Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," 936.

58 Onuf, "Worlds of Our Making (2002)," 35; Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," 73.

59 McCourt, "Practice Theory and Relationalism as the New Constructivism," 475–76; Onuf, "Worlds of Our Making (2002)," 31–32; Hall and Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," 947–50; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," 424; Wiener, "Constructivism and Sociological Institutionalism," 35–47, 54.

60 Barnett and Finnemore, *Rules for the World*; Onuf, "Worlds of Our Making (2002)," 25; Barnett and Finnemore, "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations."

61 Barnett and Finnemore, *Rules for the World*, 10; Barnett and Finnemore, "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations."

cooperation in the context of European integration, arguing that the social relations and identity formation have the potential to change the meaning of sovereignty.[62]

The interplay between practices and identity formation takes center stage in sociological institutionalism. In sociological terms, structure and agency interact; 'it is not only who we are that drives what we do, it also what we do that determines who we are.'[63] In this respect, two types of communities need to be mentioned that relate to transnational elites in international cooperation. Both are normative and professional communities that focus on inarticulate knowledge and shared practice as a binding factor. First, there are communities of practice; groups of people in a shared domain that engage in a process of collective learning. They help each other, share information and develop a collective identity. Most importantly, they are practitioners in the same trade sharing a common repertoire and expertise, even when these are not recognized by the outside world.[64] Second, there are epistemic communities. Like communities of practice, they are bound by a common expertise and a shared frame of understanding. In addition, epistemic communities have an authoritative claim to knowledge in a specific domain and a common policy goal.[65] In these communities members develop a collective identity based on their common practice. Interestingly, people can be part of multiple communities without finding the need to choose a primary identity.[66] Role-based identities can overlap and exist next to one another or next to national identities. In terms of international cooperation, this means that overlapping identities can be a vehicle to traverse zero-sum reasoning and negotiate differing interests. This idea of collective identity formation and the solidarity it might bring will be covered more elaborately in chapters 3 and 8.

2.3.3. A Neorealist Presumption in Intelligence Studies

IR theory as well as the mosaic of approaches to European integration offer a diversity of insights into international cooperation. Especially the middle ground theories of constructivism, sociological institutionalism and revised versions of neofunctionalism offer nuanced insights in cooperation practices at multiple levels and include the intangible

62 Davis Cross, *International Cooperation Against All Odds.*, 1–7, 125–26.

63 Pouliot, *International Security in Practice*, 5; Onuf, "Worlds of Our Making (2002)," 21–23; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," 399.

64 Wenger and Wenger-Trayner, "Introduction to Communities of Practice, a Brief Overview of the Concept and Its Uses."; Li et al., "Evolution of Wenger's Concept of Community of Practice"; Wenger, Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning, and Identity.

65 Davis Cross, "The Limits of Epistemic Communities," 90–93; Cross, "Rethinking Epistemic Communities Twenty Years Later"; Howorth, "Discourse, Ideas, and Epistemic Communities in European Security and Defence Policy"; Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation"; Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," 3, 7, 14–20.

66 Risse, "Social Constructivism and European Integration," 131–32, 137.

role of ideas and identities. Unfortunately, this constructive turn to practice so far has largely gone unnoticed or at least unused in the study of international intelligence cooperation. The study of intelligence has begun to engage mainstream social science, in particular IR[67] and international intelligence cooperation is no exception. Nevertheless, a large share of the publications on cooperation scrutinized in this research has a neorealist foundation, albeit not always referring to this approach explicitly. They are neorealist in approach, in the sense that they combine the concepts of state competition, direct self-interest and the rational weighing of cost-benefit. As mentioned in subsection 2.3.1, neorealists assert that the international political system is one of anarchy, lacking central authority, where states behave according to a rational logic of egoistic self-interest. Because states can never be certain of other states' intentions, there is a lack of trust between them. Instead, they rely only on the (relative) strength of their own capabilities. Intelligence in this setting is supposed to deliver competitive advantage for states who seek relative gains among each other.[68]

The pre-eminence of neorealism is not surprising, as it is the approach to international relations most centrally concerned with security and threat, what is called 'high politics'. As such, neorealism already provides a theoretical explanation for certain key questions in IS, for example why intelligence is necessary.[69] One of the most well-known advocates of neorealism in addressing intelligence cooperation is Sims. She asserts that the international system is 'essentially one of self-help and anarchy' in which information is a component of power.[70] By conceptualizing information and information sharing this way, this scholar deserves credit for introducing one of the first frameworks for analyzing and comparing cost and benefits of intelligence cooperation, introducing the concepts of 'simple' (intelligence only) and 'complex' (asymmetric) liaison. Framing intelligence within neorealism has brought IS much needed structure for debate, supporting further understanding of the topic.

A typical neorealist would argue that states are reluctant to share intelligence and that cooperation will only occur when the self-indulgent gains clearly outweigh the perceived cost, for example in terms of manpower and risk.[71] This occurs in the rare occasions that the perceived self-interest of both parties to a great extent overlap, like in the case of a common threat.[72] The shared perception of military threat coming from the Soviet Union during the Cold War is an example of common threat as a powerful incentive for cooperation. More

67 Gill and Phythian, 'Developing Intelligence Theory', 469.

68 Gill, Marrin, and Phythian, Intelligence Theory, 2, 5.

69 Phythian, 'Intelligence Theory and Theories of International Relations: Shared World or Separate Worlds?', 57.

70 Sims, 'Foreign Intelligence Liaison', 196.

71 See for example: Wirtz, 'Constraints on Intelligence Collaboration'; Westerfield, 'America and the World of Intelligence Liaison'; Bensahel, 'A Coalition of Coalitions'.

72 See for example: Clough, 'Quid Pro Quo'; Lefebvre, 'The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation'; Svendsen, 'Connecting Intelligence and Theory'.

often, two states can help each other achieve differing, but not conflicting, goals. In these cases, a rational weighing of cost and benefit is required to decide whether a cooperation is fruitful.[73] Cooperation only occurs when there is some sort of acceptable reciprocity in the exchange.[74] This is typically achieved in a tit-for-tat manner, better known as the old intelligence adage of 'Quid pro Quo' (QPQ). In the absence of trust, cooperation is achieved under conditions of hierarchy and bargaining, afterwards sustained by monitoring and punishing defection.[75] This rational calculative mechanism for cooperative behavior and the control it needs, will be further elaborated on in chapter 3 when discussing the cooperation dilemma in intelligence.

Following a neorealist presumption, scholars and practitioners alike often portray international cooperation between intelligence services as a 'contradictio in terminis'. These services have a national tasking, an accompanying national mandate and are firmly embedded in national structures.[76] Intelligence services are thus said to have no friends, just adversaries or at best rivals. They 'instinctively hate pooling and sharing'.[77] Cooperation resembles a zero-sum game in which the gains of one state occur at the expense of the other. Intelligence cooperation thus 'drives up distrust and defensive positioning, even among relatively close allies'.[78] Nevertheless, even neorealist scholars like Hulnick were among the first to acknowledge that cooperation is becoming less about relative gain and more about collective security. Notwithstanding the element of competition, the changing threat environment is driving cooperation to higher levels.[79] Moreover, relations can be important in intelligence, even in cases where the arrangement clearly started out from a rational weighing of cost-benefit and self-interest. This is apparent in the intense cooperation of the MAXIMATOR alliance recently reported on by Jacobs. In the course of this long-term SIGINT cooperation the number of 'cognoscenti' grew and the restriction to only discuss cryptanalytical issues in bilateral meetings eased.[80] A neorealist approach alone is insufficient to explain this evolution and the dynamics of international intelligence cooperation in a long-standing multilateral setting.

73 See for example: Wetzling, 'European Counterterrorism Intelligence Liaisons'; Bock, 'Bilateral Intelligence Cooperation'; Thomson, 'Prolegomenon to a Political Economy of Intelligence and Security: Can Microeconomic Analysis Explain Success or Failure in Intelligence Cooperation?'

74 See for example: Richelson, 'The Calculus of Intelligence Cooperation'; Doron, 'The Vagaries of Intelligence Sharing'; O'Halpin, 'Small States and Big Secrets'; Walsh, The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing; Munton and Fredj, 'Sharing Secrets'; Schaefer, 'Intelligence Cooperation and New Trends in Space Technology'.

75 See for example: Walsh, 'Defection and Hierarchy in International Intelligence Sharing'; Walsh, The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing; Odinga, '"We Recommend Compliance"'.

76 Rathmell, 'Towards Postmodern Intelligence', 102.

77 Aldrich, '"A Profoundly Disruptive Force"', 153.

78 Crawford, 'Intelligence Cooperation', 2.

79 Hulnick, "Intelligence Cooperation in the Post-cold War Era," 462–63.

80 Jacobs, 'Maximator: European Signals Intelligence Cooperation, from a Dutch Perspective', 1–4, 8.

2.3.4. Difficulties in Explaining Increasing Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation

The traditionally dominant neorealist approach is overtaken by the reality of rapidly expanding international intelligence cooperation.[81] International intelligence cooperation is not the hesitant affair neorealists make it out to be, only beneficial under strict considerations of self-interest and reciprocity. The form of intelligence cooperation most likely to be achieved is bilateral cooperation. The smaller the number of participants in a cooperation, the smaller the risk of willingly or unwillingly giving away secrets beyond the scope of the deal, and the easier the cost and benefit equation can be managed. Yet, contrary to neorealist expectation, it does not stop there. Systematic intelligence cooperation in multilateral and plurilateral arrangements is 'overlaying the received picture of it as [only] a secretive, exclusively 'national' entity'.[82] International cooperation now frequently occurs in arrangements like the EU and NATO, or in ad hoc coalitions and informal clubs.[83] Moreover, the age-old adage of QPQ no longer seems to regulate intelligence cooperation the way it did in the past.[84]

There appear to be clear limits to the extent to which neorealism can form the basis for a comprehensive understanding of current-day intelligence. Basing an explanation of intelligence cooperation 'solely on realist ground [...] risks ending up with an overly simplistic explanation at best'.[85] This approach is perfectly capable of explaining what is not happening in international intelligence cooperation and why this is the case. However, it is inadequate to understand what does happen in international intelligence cooperation. The new security environment brings along 'new issues about what to share, as well as with whom, especially in international security organizations'.[86] It has become questionable whether international intelligence cooperation is (still) constituted of states operating in a zero-sum situation of total anarchy, in a rational way and only driven by power politics and narrow self-interest. For this reason, already in 2002, Aldrich was one of the first to suggest that 'clandestine agencies and their intelligence alliances [perhaps] should be viewed less as exponents of realism and more as the smooth and experience exemplars of neoliberalism'.[87]

81 Crawford, 'Intelligence Cooperation', 3.

82 Bigo, 'Shared Secrecy in a Digital Age and a Transnational World', 380; Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*.

83 Shiraz and Aldrich, 'Globalisation and Borders', 267; Aldrich, '"A Profoundly Disruptive Force"', 142; Svendsen, 'Connecting Intelligence and Theory', 701–2; Wetzling, 'European Counterterrorism Intelligence Liaisons'.

84 Fägersten, *European Intelligence Cooperation*; Fägersten, *Sharing Secrets*; Scott and Hughes, 'Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century', 9; Van Buuren, 'Analysing International Intelligence Cooperation: Institutions or Intelligence Assemblages?', 81.

85 Fägersten, *Sharing Secrets*, 17; Omand, *Securing the State*, 136–37.

86 Boatner, 'Sharing and Using Intelligence in International Organizations: Some Guidelines'.

87 Aldrich, 'Dangerous Liaisons', 54.

As shown in the previous sections, despite the significant growth in intelligence theories[88] and the similar broadening of the debate on international intelligence cooperation, a research gap still exists. The question remains what, despite all skepticism, explains the current depth and breadth of international intelligence cooperation, especially in multilateral settings. The leading concepts of neorealism, being state centrality, cost-benefit considerations and rational choices continue to hold prominence in the debate. Applying these concepts, it is puzzling why international intelligence cooperation does occur, and is even rising, in multilateral settings such as the EU.[89] Finding concepts better suited to address intelligence cooperation in these arrangements, which neorealism has the most difficulties in explaining, will lead to a better understanding. They qualify as long-standing interaction mechanisms instead of short-lived exchanges, organizational constructs instead of mere stately affairs and, as a result, perhaps based on social relations as much as on rational calculations. Addressing the research gap, striving for a more comprehensive understanding of international intelligence cooperation, would imply taking these characteristics as avenues for advancement.

2.4. Addressing the Gap

2.4.1. Approaching Cooperation as a Process: Adding Interaction and Outcome

A first avenue to advance the debate is to approach international intelligence cooperation as a process, rather than a product. In chapter 1 cooperation was defined as 'the practice of people or entities working together with commonly agreed-upon goals and possibly methods'. As mentioned there, this definition incorporates two features of cooperation commonly seen in the social sciences. First, cooperation is a shared activity, in essence something that for its meaning is dependent on concrete actions by two or more participants. Their interactions, or cooperative behavior, shape the arrangement.[90] Second, cooperation serves a common goal. This means that it is goal-orientated and that all participants in the arrangement add value and benefit from it, albeit maybe not in the same manner or degree. In any case, there is a reciprocity involved in the activity.[91] In sum, cooperation qualifies as a process, that is a series of actions directed to an end.

Addressing cooperation as a process will help a more comprehensive understanding of intelligence cooperation in two ways. First, it will move the debate beyond predominantly

88 Marrin, 'Evaluating Intelligence Theories', 479.

89 For an overview of the debate on EU Intelligence cooperation, for example see: Gruszczak, Intelligence Security in the European Union, 9–12.

90 Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 11–12, 54, 85.

91 Bowles and Gintis, A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution; Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 17, 42, 173; Tomasello et al., Why We Cooperate, 41, 57–58.

scrutinizing the reasons for forming a cooperation arrangement. At present, because of the neorealist emphasis on relative gain, rational choice and direct returns, many publications scrutinize the initial cost-benefit decision whether or not to cooperate.[92] Moreover, even publications on a more neoliberal footing often focus on initial drivers for cooperation like countering increased transnational threats.[93] Yet, the activities in international intelligence cooperation comprise of more than just the formation of an arrangement. Second, approaching international intelligence cooperation as a process accommodates that it is often not a simple and isolated act, but a recurrent event. It has a history and a future that influence the behavior of the participants. Understanding international intelligence cooperation as an activity is hard using a photo, one should watch the movie instead. Cooperation should thus be seen as a process, being the initial decision to cooperate as much as the activities shaping it afterwards and the outcome they bring. That outcome in turn influences future decisions to cooperate (or not). Figure 4 visualizes international intelligence cooperation as a simple process flow including the different phases of activity and the feedback loop.



Figure 4; International intelligence cooperation as a process flow over time

Differentiating between the formation and interaction phases, allows international intelligence cooperation to be studied as more than just an all-or-nothing game. The depth and breadth of intelligence cooperation are determined in the activities following the decision to participate, as most of the cooperative behavior, conflictual or otherwise, lies after the initial formation.[94] This is most applicable to established multilateral arrangements, like the 'Five Eyes community' and the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC). Although

92 Tuzuner, 'The State-Level Determinants of the United States' International Intelligence Cooperation'; Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 209, 218.

93 See for example: Aldrich, 'Global Intelligence Co-Operation versus Accountability'; Svendsen, 'The Globalization of Intelligence since 9/11'; Fägersten, Sharing Secrets; Daghie, 'Intelligence Cooperation - Sharing Secrets in a Multipolar World'.

94 Koops, 'Theorising Inter-Organisational Relations', 192.

formed decades ago and generally perceived as successful arrangements, their workings and effect still very much depend on the quality of interaction in a given period.[95] Nevertheless, the interaction phase is important for more ad-hoc, bilateral relations as well. As shown by Odinga in his article on Ethiopian-US intelligence cooperation, compliance bargaining in the interaction phase can lead to a varying depth and breadth of cooperation over time. Regardless of the hierarchy imposed in the formation, states continue to bargain over compliance to the terms and obligations of an already established agreement.[96]

Taking the outcome of the cooperation process into account, allows international intelligence cooperation to be studied as more than just a one-time game. In many cases cooperation is not an entirely new decision made on a blank sheet, as the participants are no strangers towards each other. For example, it stands to reason that directors and analysts of Western defence intelligence services encounter frequently in overlapping settings like NATO's Military Intelligence Committee, it's working groups, intelligence courses provided by the NATO school in Oberammergau or in support of joint missions lead by this alliance. Familiarity with a partner is important, as is the reputation a partner holds within the community. Cooperation experience will influence future formation and interaction with a partner or adjustment of cooperative behavior in the current arrangement.[97] This is not only about operational results, but about the implicit and explicit valuation of the process as well in terms of quality (norms) and gratification (values). Adding the factor of cooperation experience is especially relevant for longstanding cooperation arrangements where relations and structures had time to evolve. Shpiro finds that the development of mutual institutional confidence and personal relationships through regular meetings make a significant contribution to the effectiveness of future cooperation.[98]

2.4.2. Adopting a Multilevel Approach: Adding the Interorganizational and Interpersonal Levels

A second avenue to advance the debate is to scrutinize international intelligence cooperation on multiple levels, rather than on the state-level alone. Differentiating between levels of analysis allowed IR as an academic discipline to 'gradually move away from a dominant focus on the international system and the role of the state in that system, to deal more with the transnational role and perspective of groups and individuals'.[99] In similar fashion, several authors have proposed to capture the complexities of intelligence cooperation in different levels of analysis, ranging all the way down to the 'individual' (as 'professional') and

95 O'Neil, 'Australia and the "Five Eyes" Intelligence Network'; Gordon, 'Intelligence Sharing in NATO'.

96 Odinga, '"We Recommend Compliance"'.

97 Munton and Fredj, 'Sharing Secrets'; Fägersten, For EU Eyes Only?

98 Shpiro, 'The Communication of Mutual Security: Frameworks for European-Mediterranean Intelligence Sharing', 35.

99 Gebhard, 'One World, Many Actors', 39–44.

'personal' levels'.[100] In this respect, Bures and Aldrich note the importance of 'low politics' in intelligence organizations. The first states that political elites have trouble imposing their decisions on cooperation on national services 'over which [they] usually exercise less than perfect control'.[101] The latter contends that the realm of 'grand strategy remains unfamiliar territory for the [...] workaday intelligence professional, whose particular interests [...] tend to insulate him from wider political arguments'.[102] Marrin even states that 'IR theories at the individual level [...] have the most to contribute to intelligence studies'.[103] Figure 5 depicts a possible cascade of levels for the analysis of international intelligence cooperation. Although the exact (sub)categorizations differ in both IR and Interorganizational Relations (IOR), based on these disciplines this study discerns three aggregate levels of analysis being international, interorganizational and interpersonal.[104] The international level refers to the wider global dynamics of the international system and the behavior of states in it. The interorganizational level, or group level in IR, refers to the institutional structures stemming from the cooperation itself, such as steering committees and secretariats. Within these structures, bureaucracies and (in)formal groups interact. The interpersonal level refers in basis to the actions of individuals responding to their personal and professional attitudes or feelings towards a partner or situation.



Figure 5; International intelligence cooperation on multiple levels of analysis

100 Svendsen, 'Connecting Intelligence and Theory', 714.

101 Bures, "Informal Counterterrorism Arrangements in Europe," 506.

102 Aldrich, "US-European Intelligence Co-Operation on Counter-Terrorism," 124.

103 Marrin, 'Enhancing Political Science Contributions to American Intelligence Studies', 104.

104 Temby, 'What Are Levels of Analysis and What Do They Contribute to International Relations Theory?'; Gebhard, 'One World, Many Actors'; Koops, 'Inter-Organizationalism in International Relations: A Multilevel Framework of Analysis'.

Addressing cooperation at the organizational and personal levels will help a more comprehensive understanding of intelligence cooperation. Outside the field of IS, scholars have tried to understand why humans cooperate for decades, ultimately extending behavioral patterns bottom-up from individuals to social institutions and organizations.[105] Adversely, within IS cooperation so far has been examined mainly as a state affair. Several scholars mention factors important to intelligence cooperation that appear to be on the organizational and personal levels, but most of them only do so in the context of relations between states and without exploring the interorganizational and interpersonal factors in depth. For example, in his much-cited article 'Quid Pro Quo' from 2004 Clough already goes well beyond state considerations and addresses factors such as bureaucracy, perceptions of information ownership and personal relationships, but does not empirically study them.[106]

Organizational approaches to international intelligence cooperation are evolving, but so far mainly focus on structures and formal institutions, often scrutinizing intelligence cooperation in the EU and incidentally NATO.[107] Two scholars examining European institutions stand out as illustrative. Müller-Wille is one of the scholars to note that in the face of current crises and given the establishment of a European Common Defence and Security Policy (CSDP), the organizational design of EU intelligence is inadequate.[108] Yet, instead of advocating the creation of new structures to improve this, as many scholars do[109], Müller-Wille follows the traditional functionalist approach mentioned above. He argues that increasing the utility of existing structures offers the most convincing way ahead for clearing obstacles in cross-agency intelligence cooperation.[110] Fägersten subsumes to this functionalist approach and tries to explain how European intelligence cooperation can occur within the organizational design given.[111] Combining rational and historical institutionalist approaches, he examines how formal rules and constraints shape and affect cooperative behavior. Fägersten finds that if changes in organizations or their routines and rules are necessary for cooperation to take place, then institutional resilience can constitute a barrier. Mandates, formal rules and procedures, as well as bureaucratic politics, will hamper, abolish or adjust the cooperative arrangement at hand.[112]

105 Tomasello et al., Why We Cooperate.

106 Clough, 'Quid Pro Quo'.

107 See for example: Ballast, "Merging Pillars, Changing Cultures"; Gruszczak, "Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union: Big Challenges for Hard Times"; Bures, "Intelligence Sharing and the Fight against Terrorism in the EU"; Pleschinger, "Allied Against Terror: Transatlantic Intelligence Cooperation"; Walsh, "Intelligence-Sharing in the European Union."

108 Müller-Wille, 'EU Intelligence Co-Operation. A Critical Analysis'.

109 See for example: Nomikos, 'European Union Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN): Next Stop to an Agency?'; Bilgi, 'Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union'; Bures, 'Intelligence Sharing and the Fight against Terrorism in the EU'; Davis Cross, 'EU Intelligence Sharing and Joint Situation Centre: A Glass Half-Full'.

110 Müller-Wille, 'The Effect of International Terrorism on EU Intelligence Co-Operation'; Müller-Wille, 'For Our Eyes Only Shaping an Intelligence Community within the EU'.

111 Fägersten, *Sharing Secrets*, 60–61, 80–82.

112 Ibid., 98–99.

Whereas Müller-Wille and Fägersten focus very much on formal positions within organizations, like the European Police organization (EUROPOL) and the EU Situation Centre (SITCEN, since 2012 INTCEN), other authors take a network approach. They point at the importance of the rising number of transgovernmental networks in the European intelligence domain constituting a multi-layered patchwork of formal and informal arrangements.[113] These scholars differ on its exact meaning though. For example, Herman argues that the patchwork is unusual in its secrecy, but otherwise not unlike the intergovernmental arrangements that have developed in other specialized areas.[114] Svendsen discerns more than that, referring to the existence of 'epistemic communities' in intelligence cooperation.[115] Although being skeptical about the latter, Davis Cross sums up their mutual understanding when stating that 'the most important developments in European intelligence cooperation actually have more to do with institutional and personal dynamics in distributed networks than with state preference or formal positions'.[116] She clearly - although perhaps not explicitly - advocates a sociological institutionalist approach to international intelligence cooperation in a way she has also done in IR (see subsection 2.3.2). In the next chapter a further differentiation to collectives in cooperation will be made when discussing trust issues; it will cover networks, institutions and identities as part of what might be called a 'trusted community'.

2.4.3. Taking a Sociological Perspective: Cooperative Behavior

A third avenue to advance the debate on international intelligence cooperation is to take a sociological perspective, rather than a structural one. Sociology is the systematic study of society, social structures, institutions and relationships. Nolan shows that IS is currently missing a sociological perspective, hampering its understanding of 'how intelligence organizations are constructed and reproduced through social interaction every day'.[117] Several authors agree that intelligence cooperation to a large degree consists of organizational and personal relationships.[118] Cooperation in their view is not only about an organizational structure or the formal rules and cost-benefit considerations governing these. It is about the interconnections or relations between the actors as well. These relations intermediate cooperative behavior. For example, Soeters and Goldberg note that the assumption of a

113 Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, 203–4; Van Buuren, 'Analysing International Intelligence Cooperation: Institutions or Intelligence Assemblages?'; Clough, 'Quid Pro Quo'.

114 Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*.

115 Svendsen, 'Contemporary Intelligence Innovation in Practice'.

116 Davis Cross, 'The Limits of Epistemic Communities', 98; Davis Cross, 'A European Transgovernmental Intelligence Network and the Role of IntCen', 288; Alexander, Knowing Your Friends; Aldrich, 'US–European Intelligence Co-Operation on Counter-Terrorism'; Brown and Farrington, 'Democracy and the Depth of Intelligence Sharing'.

117 Nolan, 'A Sociological Approach to Intelligence Studies', 79, 90.

118 Aldrich, 'US–European Intelligence Co-Operation on Counter-Terrorism'; Pleschinger, 'Allied Against Terror: Transatlantic Intelligence Cooperation'.

single valence in relationships (either cooperative or conflictual) is one of the remaining blind spots in research on information sharing in multinational security arrangements.[119]

Addressing cooperation from a sociological perspective will help a more comprehensive understanding of intelligence cooperation for two reasons. First, it helps the debate evolve beyond the concepts of 'calculating' and 'negotiating', adding concepts regarding 'believing', 'perceiving' and 'valuing'. Lander underlines the importance of these relational concepts when stating that the 'value of multilateral [European] institutional arrangements lies, not critically in the information exchanged at meetings, but in the mutual confidence and understanding and the personal friendships that they bring'.[120] Second, addressing international intelligence cooperation from a sociological perspective will support studying its change. Svendsen describes this as international intelligence cooperation 'developing incrementally, substantially following what can be characterized as the familiar evolutionary path of being driven largely by cautious necessity from its bilateral onset to its later more multi-orientated basis'.[121] For example, it is questionable whether operational cooperation between European domestic security services in the CTG would have been conceivable without the relational bonds stemming from the earlier 'Club de Berne'.[122]

From a sociological perspective, cooperation is a social construct that can change over time. This seems especially relevant to the less studied interorganizational and interpersonal levels where interaction is influenced directly by the beliefs, perceptions and attitudes of the participants. Moreover, it furthers our understanding of intelligence cooperation in long-standing institutions. In these established settings a stronger relationship can develop over time, including higher levels of trust and acceptable levels of vulnerability, eventually even leading to communities of shared norms and values. Scholars point at the 'homogenization' effect these networks have, 'radiating established norms and conventions'.[123] An illustration of the importance of this sense of community and the role of relations within them, can be found in the recently established 'Intelligence College Europe' (ICE). ICE serves as a platform, not for the exchange of intelligence, but to promote through dialogue the 'emergence of a common strategic [intelligence] culture and to strengthen the ties between the intelligence

119 Soeters and Goldenberg, 'Information Sharing in Multinational Security and Military Operations. Why and Why Not?'

120 Lander, 'International Intelligence Cooperation'.

121 Svendsen, 'Developing International Intelligence Liaison Against Islamic State'.

122 'PET Annual Report 2018', 40.

123 Aldrich, 'Dangerous Liaisons', 54; Svendsen, 'The Globalization of Intelligence since 9/11'; Svendsen, *Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence*.

communities'.[124] Cooperation in the present-day international intelligence community apparently amounts for more than a simple and rational 'stamp exchange'.[125]

Viewing the institutions for international intelligence cooperation as social constructs, opens the door to interesting social concepts from neighboring disciplines. Applying them to the specific context of intelligence cooperation will put more focus on 'soft institutions', such as ideas, social and cultural norms, rules and routinized practices.[126] Examples can already be found of scholars examining the very real consequences of these soft institutions. Using the 'sociology of practices and habitus' Ben Jaffel convincingly argues that 'Anglo-European ties become alive in way of incorporated dispositions generated in spheres of socialization to liaison craft' supporting the counter-terrorism effort. She concludes that because of this, bilateral Anglo-European cooperation will subsist in a post-Brexit world.[127] Based on a similar sociological notion, Brown and Farrington marry insights from interdisciplinary scholarship on gossip and embedded exchange.[128] Other authors have begun to scrutinize secrecy as a component of social relations and identity. Understood as such, what becomes important to understand about the secret is less the hiding per se, and more the way in which it structures intergroup behavior, regulates communication and distributes power.[129] The fresh insights these examples offer, encourage further use of approaches and concepts from neighboring fields in the in the social sciences.

2.5. Conclusion

Systematically reviewing the academic debate reveals a clear research gap. One that makes it difficult to explain the current depth and breadth of international intelligence cooperation, especially in multilateral settings. Sir Andrew Parker, quoted at the beginning of chapter 1, was correct when stating that there is too little public explanation of intelligence cooperation within Europe, in particular in relation to interaction at the interorganizational and interpersonal levels. Moreover, the debate on international intelligence cooperation is haphazardly theorized. As demonstrated, there is a growing gap between the reality of

124 Goldman, 'A Unique Initiative in Content and Format'; Van Puyvelde, 'European Intelligence Agendas and the Way Forward'; Lledo-Ferrer and Dietrich, 'Building a European Intelligence Community' Intelligence College Europe, Letter of intent signed March 1st 2020, https://www.intelligence-college-europe.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/LoI-English.pdf, last accessed May 22nd 2020.

125 Fägersten, For EU Eyes Only?, 3; Lander, 'International Intelligence Cooperation', 487.

126 Gill and Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World, 23; Wiener, 'Constructivism and Sociological Institutionalism', 35–36.

127 Ben Jaffel, 'Britain's European Connection in Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Cooperation', 5-6,12-13; Ben Jaffel, Anglo-European Intelligence Cooperation: Britain in Europe, Europe in Britain.

128 Brown, Lupton, and Farrington, "Embedded Deception," 15–16; Brown and Farrington, "Democracy and the Depth of Intelligence Sharing."

129 Goede and Wesseling, 'Secrecy and Security in Transatlantic Terrorism Finance Tracking'; Bigo, 'Shared Secrecy in a Digital Age and a Transnational World', 379–80; Soeters and Goldenberg, 'Information Sharing in Multinational Security and Military Operations. Why and Why Not?'

international intelligence cooperation and the theoretical tools to comprehend it. This chapter argues that the difficulties in explaining international intelligence cooperation stem from a shortage in approaches and concepts. The neorealist approach, still dominant in studies on international intelligence cooperation, lacks appropriate tools for addressing multilateral cooperation that results from transnational security concerns. Concerns that dominate in a globalized international system and that often transcend the realm of international competition between states. In this setting international intelligence cooperation cannot merely be seen as a one-time all-or-nothing game, but appears to be a gradual and more complex relation that can take many types and forms and that evolves over time. This is apparent for different forms of multilateral cooperation, but applies to many bilateral arrangements as well.

The state of the debate on international intelligence cooperation shows great promise though. The debate is growing in quantity as well as in quality. First, this chapter rules out that the lack of explanation is caused by a lack of interest and scholarly attention. This is not the case. This literature review shows that on average there is a continuous growth of academic publications on international intelligence cooperation in the last three decades. It is by no means still a neglected topic. Second, this chapter dismisses the idea that a small scholarly community is only looking at a narrow set of topics. The review of publications shows that there is a cautious, yet unmistaken, growth of diversity in the debate on international intelligence cooperation, both in scholars and in content. This diversity even stands out favorably when compared to IS in general. Noteworthy is the number of articles currently addressing international intelligence cooperation outside the main intelligence journals. Moreover, the increasing content diversity and the increasing scholarly diversity coincide, suggesting that the latter is related to the first. This presumed relation is worth examining further.

This chapter concludes that the debate on international intelligence cooperation provides fertile grounds for further development. A more comprehensive understanding of international intelligence cooperation is within reach. The debate has grown to a point that it invites new approaches and these are readily available in neighboring disciplines like IR, organizational sciences and sociology. Concepts from outside IS are already producing fresh and intriguing insights. Many more are available. This study will contribute to this more comprehensive understanding of international intelligence cooperation by taking the three avenues for advancing the debate proposed in this chapter. First, it will step beyond a state-centric approach and include the organizational and personal levels. Second, this research will take a process approach and focus on the interaction phase of cooperation. Third, it will use a sociological perspective that will complement the debate by offering a way for scrutinizing the mechanism of social relations and trust in cooperative behavior. The mechanism of social relations and trust will prove an insightful window. In addition,

the EU intelligence system will provide a case of multilateral cooperation well fit to explore these avenues in the setting of intelligence. Chapter 4 will elaborate on this case study and the methods for engaging it. Yet before doing so, chapter 3 will first construct a conceptual framework of social relations and trust in intelligence cooperation that provides an analytical lens for this study.