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The oligarchy in China: a case study of China's electricity industry, 1978-2013

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In memory of the great reformers of Deng Xiaoping, Li Guangyao, and Jiang Jinguo in East Asia, and all those who love freedom which is naturally inherited in our mind, of which nobody can deprive us, and for which we fight blood against the fear of serfdom, in recognition of all the people in the world.

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The Oligarchy in China:

A Case Study of China's Electricity Industry, 1978-2013

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To my wife, Min Cheng, and my son, Leo Song

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Abbreviations (selected)

BEPA Beijing Electric Power Administration

CCDICC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the CCP

CCP Chinese Communist Party

CPIG China Power Investment Group

CPPCC Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference

CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union

DNS Dayawan Nuclear Station

IPP Independent Power Plant

MEP Ministry of Electric Power

MWE Ministry of Water and Electricity

MWR Ministry of Water Resources

NDRC National Development and Reform Commission

NPC National People's Congress

ODCCP Organizational Department of the CCP

PLA People's Liberation Army

PRC People's Republic of China

RFA Radio Free Asia

RFI Radio France Internationale

SASAC State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission

SEPG Shandong Electric Power Group

SERC State Electricity Regulation Commission

SOE State-Owned Enterprise

SPC State Power Company

TGCC Three Gorges Construction Committee

TGTP Three Gorges Transmission Project

UHV Ultra-High Voltage

UHVTP Ultra-High Voltage Transmission Project

Look at it horizontally, they're mountain ranges,
Vertically, they appear to be precipitous peaks.
Viewing the mountain from afar, the vista changes—
From up front and various angles, different physiques.
No one could see the true face of Lu Mountain with one's heart,
For standing here, of the mountain one has become a part.¹

¹ Shi Su (1084).