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ABSTRACT: I propose, as an alternative to deductivism, 'conductivism': the view in argumentation studies that privileges the conductive model. To this end, I first recall very briefly some versions of the deductivist thesis, and after a short review of the evolution of the notion, I give my own definition of a conductive argument. Finally, I will make two philosophical points concerning the nature of argumentative practices and I provide a conductive argument in favor of conductivism.

KEYWORDS: argumentation, conductive arguments, deductivism, practical reason, pros and cons

1. INTRODUCTION

Deductivism is the position that privileges deduction over any other type of inference in the study of argumentation. As the reader is well aware, deductivism has been the dominant paradigm for most of the history of philosophy and argumentation studies, more or less since Aristotle's *First and Second Analytics* were constituted as a model of logical investigation (marginalizing or silencing his dialectical and rhetorical writings).

Under the model of deductive argument, there are hidden a series of notions historically associated with it: necessary, a priori, analytic, formal, syntactic-semantic, universal. They are not at all analytically equivalent notions. Precisely, an important point in Toulmin's critique of deductivism is precisely the unfoundedness and confusion of these associations. In any case, it should not be forgotten that in the most standard approaches, as well as in the philosophical tradition, or, if one prefers, in the "spirit" of deductivism, these features usually come together.

It is also possible to distinguish between types of deductivism according to the role played by the deductive model in the theory. In Vilanova (2020), I have distinguished:

> *Plain deductivism*: all arguments are deductive.
> *Interpretative deductivism*: we must interpret all arguments as deductive. *Evaluative deductivism:* arguments must be evaluated in the deductive model. *Reconstructive deductivism*: arguments must be reconstructed in the deductive model.
> *Ideal deductivism:* "ideal" arguments are deductive.
> *Mathematical deductivism:* abstract arguments are deductive.
> *Normative deductivism:* deductive arguments are models that we should try to imitate in our argumentative practice
> *Residual deductivism*: a tendency to consider the deductive model as better or preferable to other models[1].

[1] What I call "interpretativedeductivism" and "evaluativedeductivism" correspond respectively to thenotions of "interpretative deductivism" and "evaluative deductivism" introduced by Godden, 2005, inspired by the

To a large extent, the movement initiated separately by Perelman and Toulmin in 1958, which in a few decades will end up constituting the field that today we tend to call Argumentation Theory and in which converge Informal Logic, Pragmadialectics, Critical Thinking, New Rhetoric, etc., can be seen as a revolt against the prevailing deductivism, and has certainly opened the space for other ways of seeing, analyzing and evaluating arguments that have proved extraordinarily fruitful. However, this theoretical and methodological pluralism, to which I subscribe and which I value very highly, has not managed, in my opinion, to free itself sufficiently from the weight of tradition. The shadow of deductivism is still recognizable today as an idea to which scholars in the field seem to return as if bewitched. This is true, to begin with, for many who continue to work in the old paradigm, and who still consider classical formal logic as a model of good argumentation. But also many of the acolytes of the "new wave" defend new-fangled deductivisms (Groarke, 1992, Shecaira, 2018), and their predicament remains central and very recognizable in at least one of the main contemporary schools, that of Dutch Pragmadialectics[2].

It is in the spirit of conjuring up this "residual deductivism", as I shall call it, that I propose "conductivism". Quickly stated, this thesis enunciates that every good argument is, in essence, a conductive argument. My defense of constructivism will have a rather dialectical purpose, that of putting the deductivist on the spot. But I do not intend to remain on the purely pugilistic plane of the "disputatio", for my aim is not so much to pose problems, puzzles and counter-arguments to the deductivist thesis as to convince the reader of the theoretical and practical advantages of taking the conductive pattern as the model under which we understand and evaluate any other type of argumentation.

2. CONDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS

In order to make my proposal understandable, in this section I will make a quick review of the notion of conductive argument, and some clarifications on how I understand the notion. As the reader is probably aware, the term "conduction" was introduced by Carl Wellman (1971, p. 52) who defines it as a sort of reasoning which:

1) aconclusion about some individual case
2) is drawn non-conclusively
3) from one or more premisesabout the same case
4) withoutanyappeal to other cases."

In addition, Wellman also introduced three types of conductive arguments (making it clear that the last one was the paradigmatic one):

now classic two tasks for the logician proposed by Johnson, 2000. For the sake of completeness, I have chosen to cut the can and reconstructive theses from Godden's, to add the normative thesis to gather what Shecaira, 2018 calls "methodological deductivism", as well as the platonic thesis and the residual thesis which is very close to what Johnson 2011 calls "latent deductivism". Groarke, 1999, p. 1 identifies deductivism with what I call reconstructive deductivism.

[2] The relationship between Deductivism and Pragmadialectics is extensively and thoroughly explored in Groarke, 1999.

-withonly one premise in favor,
-withseveralpremisesin favor,
-withpremisesfor and against.

The notion was not entirely original. The type of reasoning that David Ross applies to moral dilemmas, in which the urgency to make a decision forces one to compare the factors that support conflicting obligations, is often cited as an illustrious precedent (Ross, 1930). In addition, there is a family of close and overlapping notions: "appeal to considerations", "cumulation of considerations", "balance of considerations", "pros and cons", "good reasons"...

In any case, the notion and the term have ended up imposing themselves through the multiple works that, since his review of Wellman's book (Govier, 1979), Trudy Govier has dedicated to expand and outline the notion. Several modifications and additions to Wellman's original notion have been introduced by Govier over the years. I will point out those that I consider most important:

1) she clarifies that the notion applies primarily to a type of arguments -and to the type of underlying inference, as in the case of the notion of deduction-, and not merely to mental processes or discursive maneuvers, as the term "reasoning" used by Wellman might lead one to think,

2) the elimination of the restriction that the conclusion must be about individual cases, allowing any type of statement to be concluded,

3) the generalization of the domain of the notion, which Wellman had limited to the realm of moral judgment, now including examples of aesthetic, classificatory, interpretive, evaluative, philosophical, political, deliberative, causal and scientific judgments (especially those in which we choose between alternative theories)[3] ,

4) the inclusion of a *ceteris paribus* or "other things being equal" clause (which does not need to be made explicit) to mark the fact that the reasons given in the premises are not sufficient in every situation to accept the conclusions, and that new considerations may block the inference,

5) she clarifies that the premises describing the reasons in favor must be understood as convergent (that is, that only by adding the supports of the premises in favor is the conclusion reached the requirement), and adds the requirement that there be more than one reason in favor, thus rejecting Wellman's single premise cases.

In general terms I agree with Govier's characterization, although I introduce my own (minor and somewhat ad hoc) considerations:

1) although I consider as the paradigmatic case the argument in which there are pros and cons, I also admit the case in which there are only pros as well as the case in which there is only one pro. For me what is characteristic of the conductive inference is the fact that all the available reasons for and against have been made explicit as far as possible; hence, the cases in which no reasons against have been found, or only one reason in favor

[3] It is interesting to note how Govier justifies this last example by appealing to a fact well know to philosophers of science: *To argue that a proposed explanatory hypothesis is better than its alternatives one needs to argue that it is more plausible, simpler, and has greater explanatory power. What makes conductive arguments necessary in this context is the fact that these are distinct aspects relevant to the merits of a scientific hypothesis, and they have to be considered together to determine its merits.* (Govier, 2010, p. 354). See Hitchcock, 2013 for an extensive list of Govier's examples.

has been found, can be seen as borderline or, if preferred, "degenerate" cases of conductive arguments,

2) I want to rescue a feature very salient in Ross' seminal approach and associated to the semantics of the term "conduction" (directed to conduct, or to behavior): a conductive argument involves a decision (not necessarily a practical decision, it can be a decision about the judgment we are going to issue on a matter of fact[4]). On the one hand, this implies that the fact that the relative weight of the pros are a reason to accept the conclusion does not derive only from ontic questions regarding the states of affairs in which premises and conclusions are fulfilled, but from the need to take a position on the matter (thus making sense of the non- monotonic trait). On the other hand, this opens the door to the fact that features specific to the purpose may introduce pragmatic factors regarding the consequences of the resolution, the interests of the participants, etc.[5]

3) I also want to qualify Govier's insistence that the proponent must make explicit that the reasons in favor expressed in the corresponding premises are not "sufficient" to reach the conclusion. While I understand the feature that Govier wants to highlight in imposing his condition (basically, the fact that the argument always leaves open the option of retracting the conclusion upon the appearance of new considerations), I consider (like Hitchcock, 2013, p. 199) that it imposes too strong a requirement here on the arguers, who would now be under the obligation to provide evidence that the conclusion does not necessarily follow (something that, in fairness, should fall to the one who disagrees with him). But in addition, the "sufficient" here could be confusing: it could lead one to think that conductive arguments do not serve to settle disagreements, or to decide objectively and decisively who is right, but only to provide hints or clues in this regard. Of course, I want to include within the conductive arguments also those that generate only a partial commitment to the conclusion, those in which the premises only serve to make the conclusion plausible, probable or even only "slightly more satisfactory than the alternative", but once the illusion of "absolute necessity" of the deductivist approach has been dispelled, I see no harm in also including other arguments that force total commitment to the conclusion, i.e., that prove that, at least in the situation in which the argument takes place, the conclusion is necessary (not "absolutely", but "relatively" to the subject or the situation).

Iwant now to add two more important and critical considerations with respect to the project of this work, and on which I will dwell a little more. The first one is related to "what" the term conductive is applied to. As we have seen, Wellman so called a type of reasoning, and Govier (whom I have followed on this point) primarily a type of argument. Well, I argue that it applies to "everything", to everything to which the term "deductive" has been applied and which we identify as belonging to the argumentative phenomenon: inference, relation of consequence, implication, reasoning, argumentation, argument, argumentation. I insist on this point, first, because one of the most undermined tactics of latent and manifest deductivism is to displace the conductive pattern to a domain other than

[4] We must not forget that research is first and foremost a practice and therefore includes decision making. In this respect, Bailin and Batterby, 2018's application of the conductive model to the reconstruction of epistemic processes with considerable success is very suggestive.

[5] To give a simple but very illustrative example, what may be sufficient reasons (as opposed to reasons against) to find the defendant guilty when the penalty is a small financial fine may not be so when the penalty is to be life imprisonment.

that of implication where deduction is found, in such a way that it neither disturbs nor overlaps with it. The same could be said of many treatments that treat conduction as a type of meta-argumentation.[6]

But I also insist on this point because it is very revealing of that "platonizing" tendency of residual deductivism, which begins by distinguishing two planes or dimensions, for example "logical" and "dialectical-rhetorical", or "syntactic-semantic" and "pragmatic", then begins to speak of two types of entities, such as "product" and "process", or "implications" and "arguments", afterwards proceeds to hypostatize or reify the former, and ends up postulating a realm of abstract entities in which the virtuous and blissful deductions dwell, and a sublunar world full of noise and maledictions in which we flesh- and-blood humans are forced to feed on the moldy bread of conductive (and inductive, abductive).

I will try to clarify this point. I am not saying that it is not sometimes useful, for example, to make a distinction between a "logical" point of view, more focused on the intrinsic properties of the argument, and a dialectical point of view, more focused on making one see how the argument fits within the overall situation in which the exchange of reasons takes place. As I also believe that the scholar of argumentation, like the linguist or the philosopher of language, has every legitimacy to propose general statements which, precisely because they are presented as generalizations or expressions of regularities of argumentative practice, can and should be called "syntactic" or "semantic". But just as the linguist would do very badly if he identified language with the system of ideal rules that he proposes, and which does not correspond to the actions of any concrete speaker, the scholar of argumentation would do very badly if he took his theoretical notions as something more than tools of analysis and evaluation of the real phenomenon. Hence it is no good putting "deduction" in one place and "conduction" in the other; whether or not one and the other are good theoretical notions will be whether they are useful in describing and explaining the only real phenomenon, that which, imitating what John Austin famously said about the speech act, we can describe as "the total act of argumentation within the total argumentative situation".

The second critical consideration has to do with the role of counter-reasons (counter-considerations, in Govier's jargon). I believe that the literature has not fully grasped the fundamental role played by counter-reasons, and in fact they tend to "annoy" in the theoretical analysis. Often for purely technical reasons, since the inclusion of premises contrary to the conclusion does not quite fit in with the inherited conception of argument as an explicit statement of the grounds for adopting or forcing commitment to a main statement (one of the motivations of the theories that treat conductive arguments as meta-arguments). In general, as is very clear in Govier's case, the presence of reasons against is understood as a natural result and therefore a symptom that the argumentation is being conducted rigorously and honestly (in the real world it is at the very least "suspicious" that not even the slightest objection arises), and the conductive "moment" tends to be seen as the one in which when weighing in the balance of reasons the pros and cons we discover that the former outweigh the latter. This is also part of my own way of looking at the matter, but I would like to add a further point whose presence, to date, I have not been able to detect in the debate.

[6] For example, adding as Hansen, 2013 as an implicit premise the "On Balance" (OB) clause that states that the pros outweigh the cons.

To explain this quickly, I will recall the criticism I raised against the Carnapian (or Bayesian) reconstruction of inductive arguments in Vilanova 2020. I claimed that it is absurd to require rational agents to gauge the probability of the conclusion given the premises because the agent cannot know a priori the initial probability distributions. This implies, among other things, that it is not possible to judge the weight (the support they provide for the conclusion) of the evidence from the evidence itself. In everyday situations we always judge from some background information about how things happen in our environment. But this is not enough. After all, that background information also counts as evidence (it would be part of the "implicit" premises in the reconstruction of the argument), so the same argument applies to it as to the premises of the argument (we cannot gauge their weight from them themselves, and therefore also not the weight they confer to the conclusion given the premises). What we need is something else, we need some element of contrast in reference to which we can calibrate (I do not say give a numerical measure, but at least weigh) the value of the evidence provided by the premises of the argument. And this is precisely what counter- considerations are for. It is only by placing the reasons on the other side of the scale that we can determine the weight of the reasons in favor (remember that a scale is worthless without counterweights).

It is true (I do not want to cheat here) that the same story can be applied here as to the deductive reconstruction of inductive arguments: we do not know the weight of the evidence against, so we do not obtain an "absolute" measure of the evidence in favor by comparison either (that is why on the other side of the real scales counterweights with marked values are placed). But precisely this (that there is no absolute but only relative measure) is one of the points I want to emphasize with the conductivist thesis, that the constitutive and original fact of what we call "arguing" is the contrast of reasons for and against, and not the execution of a set of formal rules (which, in any case, come later).

I will explain this better. We learn from a very early age to compare reasons for and against, we are taught from a very early age to look for reasons to defend our points of view that are stronger than the reasons that are adduced against us, and we exercise throughout our lives in the search for objections to the proposals of others that overcome the strength of their own supports, and during all the processes of learning and exercise of diverse argumentative practices we acquire and improve our skill to weigh pros and cons. Precisely because we do not possess a calculation procedure that gives us the absolute weight of each pro and each con, because what we need is not to understand or assimilate a doctrine but to acquire the skills that make us capable of satisfactorily performing all the tasks in which we defend and attack points of view, because in the end arguing is a knowing how and not a knowing what, it is *through our own experience* and not through a theory that we learn to weigh reasons[7].

[7] As stated by Wellman, even the balance may be a misleading metaphor, as it is not a “human skill” as weighing pros and cons is:

> *Nor should one think of the weighing as being done on a balance scale in which one pan is filled with the pros and the other with cons. This suggests too mechanical a process as well as the possibility of everyone reading off the result in the same way. Rather one should think of the weighing in terms of the model of determining the weight of objects by hefting them in one's hands* (Wellman, 1971, p. 58).

3. RESOLUTE CONDUCTIVISM VERSUS THE CONCEPTUAL ILLUSION OF THE PLATONIC

We are now ready to formulate the conductivist position. Summarizing, I will call a conductive argument such that:

c1) makesexplicit reasons for and against a given thesis (including borderline cases in which there are no reasons against and/or only one in favor),

c2) forces to weigh between several alternatives (in the most common case, between the alternatives of rejecting and accepting the thesis),

and c3) the conclusion is retractable (it is inferred "by default" or "not monotonically").

Later Iwillintroduce an importantnuance, but I want to start by launchingthemost radical thesis:

Resolute conductivism: every argument is, in essence, a conductive argument.

What evidence do we have in favor of this thesis? Well, to begin with, one relevant fact is that when we count the type of arguments we encounter in actual discursive practices a surprisingly high proportion have explicit markers or very definite features of the conductive pattern. In the study reported in Hitchcock, 2002, which sampled the holdings of a university library, the figure was 29%, while in an exploration reported in Hitchcock 2009 of a larger sample ranging from telephone calls to radio programs the figure rose to 49%[8].

A second argument in favor of the thesis is that, like the deductivist, we can reconstruct every argument as conductive. In several places Govier (e.g., Govier 2010, p. 263) has described the conductive sub-argument that lies behind every abductive argument, and in which the merits and demerits of the explanation that is concluded are weighed against its alternatives. It is obvious that abductive arguments, in addition, fulfill traits c2 and c3. The same is true of presumptive arguments, which in turn admit without too many problems the introduction of reasons to the contrary (either by making explicit some of the "caveats" that would block the conclusion or, better still, indications that some of them may be present in the current situation). And likewise inductive arguments, where it is obvious that each premise that describes a particular observation counts as a "support" to the general statement that is concluded and that is added to the rest of the observations. And it is not rare that there are counter-observations (including those that are later discarded as errors, perceptual illusions, memory failures, etc.), and that should be made explicit as counter- reasons (although, remember, the definition of a conductive argument does not require them to be present)[9].

We are left, then, with a narrow area: the arguments of mathematicians or those of formal logicians themselves, the arguments by which Euclid proves his propositions from his postulates, or the arguments by which Russell and Whitehead obtain their logical theorems from their axioms. I will try to dispel the conceptual illusion of mathematical deductivism (for it is, in short, only a conceptual mirage: a concept that seems to be there but is pure appearance) by recalling Wittgenstein's considerations in the *Philosophical Investigations*

[8] It must be said that Hitchcock works with a much narrower notion of conductive argument than ours (among other things, he only accepted, as in Wellman's original notion, particular conclusions), so it is to be expected that the figures will be higher.

[9] See Pinto, 2011 for a reconsideration of inductive arguments as conductive.

on rule-following[10]. There Wittgenstein reminds us that rules (including, of course, rules of inference) do not execute themselves, it takes an agent to instantiate them, and in order to follow the rule the agent has first to understand the rule. But, here is the problem, Wittgenstein realizes that there are always "different" ways of understanding how the rule applies to the current case, various interpretations of the rule or, if you prefer, different metaregulations (different procedures for applying the rule). And all of them, from the logical point of view (a priori, formal, analytical) are equally admissible, all are possible and none are necessary. As Kripke made clear, the platonic way out is of no use here, for in the "realm of abstract entities" reside also those other interpretations of the rules, those other meta- rules, those other geometries, arithmetical and logical.

Am I not justified when I say that 100 plus 2 is 102, given that there is an alternative arithmetic in which the rule of addition says to put 104 (or, if you prefer, because there is an interpretation of the rule of addition in which the result is 104)? Wittgenstein's response takes the form of a conductive argument: of course you are justified, you can conclude with the highest degree of necessity that it is 104 (though not, of course, in that nonexistent sense of "absolute necessity" or "no matter what"), because when you compare the reasons for and against one and the other interpretation (all those you find in the myriad of practices in which arithmetic plays a role, from bridge-building and trade exchanges to weather predictions or playing bingo) the weight of the former is overwhelming. So, hidden under every application of the rule (including the deductive norms) is a conductive argument.

A review of the history of Formal Logic or a cold look at current practice suffices to see that exactly the same story applies to it. On the one hand, inference has to be carried out from outside the logical system, so to determine whether a formula is a theorem we must make use of a meta-rule (the one provided by Metalogic where the proofs of first- order formulas are worked out), which in turn admits different interpretations of how it is to be executed (which brings us to the meta-meta-rule and the beginning of an infinite chain)[11]. Nor, as Gödel demonstrated in his famous incompleteness metatheorems, is it worthwhile to include the meta-rule in the logical system itself (making it a metalanguage of itself), since reflexivity not only causes the appearance of undecidable formulas, but also the impossibility of determining whether the system itself is consistent. And on the other hand, logicians have always discussed and continue to discuss a multitude of questions about the correct interpretation of the rules, about the correct ways of applying the rules or, what comes to the same thing, about which are the correct rules. For example, whether such and such quantifiers have existential import, whether the use of individual constants does, whether the inference is to be relevant or not, whether we admit infinite domains or not, whether we admit proofs by absurdity of negative statements, whether we admit second-order predicates or not, and in this case whether we adopt a standard semantics or

[10] I warn that it is not my intention to enter now into a debate on the meaning, scope and correctness of these (something very controversial and which would imply a radical change of subject), nor do I even ask the reader to consider them correct: if I choose to use an approach known and familiar to all, it is to explain my point more quickly.

[11] As Lewis Carroll already made clear with his reworked parable of Achilles and the Tortoise, it is of no use to introduce as a premise the description of the rule (since a statement cannot do what the rule does). The finding of automatic decision methods or test algorithms seems to ameliorate the problem, but does not solve it, firstly because as soon as we arrive at first order logic with polyadic predicates, undecidability results appear, and secondly (let us not forget this point) because the inputs and outputs of the decision procedure must be interpreted.

Markov semantics, whether we make the logical consequence relation relative to a universe of discourse or admit variations in the universe. And in the end, logicians do what all scientists do: they argue among themselves, giving reasons in favor (exhaustiveness, economy, explanatory power, intuitiveness, elegance), and against (paradoxes, antinomies, counterexamples, limitations), and always being very attentive to the applications of the theory. The logician, like the mathematician, does more than inferring theorems from axioms using the rules of deductive inference: the logician argues, which is the same as saying that the logician weighs reasons for and against.

In short: the "necessarily" that applies to the conclusion in a deductive argument is never "absolutely" but "relative to a theory", and the reasons for adopting the theory never support it deductively but conductively.

4. CONCLUSION: A CONDUCTIVE ARGUMENT FOR CONDUCTIVISM

I will confess that I have launched the thesis of resolute conductivism with a rather rhetorical and even, if you will, eristic intention. A sort of "tu quoque" (or rather, excuse the neologism, a “me quoque”) aimed at the deductivist: "if you can see all arguments as arguments of the type you privilege, I can see them as arguments of the type I privilege". But it is not my wish to impose the conductive as the only model with which to describe, analyze and evaluate arguments. As a methodological pluralist I think that the more the tools the better, and nothing is “intrinsically wrong” with the deductive tool.

My point, rather, is that if we take to the extreme the reconstruction of the "authentic argument" behind the one that appears to us as a phenomenon along the lines of the formalist (adding, then, all the considerations that are operating in the background), we will never arrive at an argument that proves with absolute necessity but always at one that judges that taking into account all available evidence and prior knowledge the sensible thing to do is to opt for the conclusion. That is why I will qualify my position in the following thesis: *Prudential constructivism:* we must take the conductive pattern as the best model for our argumentative practices. Therefore, I acknowledged that normative deductivism had its advantages, and that some of the reasons that have been adduced in its favor were, in my view, good reasons. I will enumerate the benefits that have been pointed out in this regard, and which I take to be reasons against prudential conductivism:

C1: it promotes the demand for formal rigor and certainty in our argumentative practices (the "classic" one),

C2: it is a resource to force to make explicit as premises implicit assumptions that may be relevant to the discussion, (Groarke, 1999, p. 9),

C3: it is a resource to force to make explicit the "guarantee" or the "argumentative scheme" used and consequently to clarify the argument (Shecaira, 2018, p. 478),

C4: it can serve to locate persuasive arguments that really have no probative force (Shecaira, 2018, p. 476),

Let us now consider the main advantages that have been postulated for the adoption of the conductive model, and which I adopt as pros:

P1: materializes an essential feature of rationality, such as openness to criticism and revision (Johnson 2011, p. 24),

P2: it impels to search and obliges to take into account all the considerations that are relevant to the conclusion, which at the same time fosters a self-critical spirit and endows the argumentative activity with greater rigor and richness (Govier 2010, p. 357),

P3: by valuing as legitimate and forcing to contemplate the other's reasons as reasons, it encourages tolerance of the opinion of others and constructive dialogue, constituting a remedy against the dogmatism to which the deductive model seems to push (Govier, 2010, p. 373).

P4: by constituting a standard of argumentative quality achievable in practice, it avoids the drift to skepticism to which the unattainable ideal of deductivism leads (Fogelin, 2005, p. 4),

P5: the inclusion of cons is an antidote to "tunnel vision" (the tendency to focus on one factor while forgetting the rest"), as well as "confirmation bias" (the tendency to exaggerate the value of evidence that confirms our thesis) (Govier, 1973, p. 363, p. 373).

P6: allows us to introduce gradualness in the inferential process, helping to recognize differences between the relative strength of different reasons (Govier, 1992),

P7: by unloading the weight of inference on the ability to compare reasons, it stimulates practice and argumentative training as an indispensable means to become a good arguer.

Well, I will leave it to the reader to produce the conductive argument with which I will end this paper. We have two alternatives, deductivism and conductivism, and reasons for and against adopting one or the other, which are more powerful?

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