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Long, F.; Hakan, C.

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## REGISTERED REPORT STAGE 2

# How ingroup norms of multiculturalism (and tolerance) affect intergroup solidarity: The role of ideology





 Feiteng Long<sup>1</sup>  | Hakan Çakmak<sup>2</sup> 

<sup>1</sup>Social, Economic and Organisational Psychology, Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands

<sup>2</sup>Department of Social Psychology, University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands

**Correspondence**

Feiteng Long, Leiden University.  
Email: [f.long@fsw.leidenuniv.nl](mailto:f.long@fsw.leidenuniv.nl)

Hakan Çakmak, University of Groningen.  
Email: [h.cakmak@rug.nl](mailto:h.cakmak@rug.nl)

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**Abstract**

Multiculturalism and tolerance, as two sets of normative beliefs about how to deal with intergroup diversity, have been recognized as effective at reducing outgroup negativity among majority group members. However, whether majority group members' normative beliefs regarding them might motivate their solidarity-based collective actions and how their political ideology might qualify this influence remained unclear. To answer these questions, we conducted two pre-registered experimental studies ( $N = 626$ ), both zooming in on the multiculturalism issues in the context of the relationships between native Dutch citizens and citizens with a Moroccan background within Dutch university campuses (Study 1) and broader Dutch society (Study 2). In both studies, we found an ingroup norm of tolerance (vs. control) undermined majority group members' engagement in collective actions in support of ethnic minorities. Additionally, ideological leftists were more sensitive to norms than rightists: Study 1 showed a facilitative effect of the multiculturalism norm (vs. control) on solidarity-based collective action intentions particularly among leftists, whilst Study 2 revealed a dampening effect of the tolerance norm (vs. control) on these intentions particularly among leftists.

**KEYWORDS**

ideology, multiculturalism, norm, solidarity, tolerance

Feiteng Long and Hakan Çakmak contributed equally to this work and share first author status.

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## BACKGROUND

In recent decades, Western democracies have faced increasing numbers of immigration flows, which, in turn, proliferated intergroup diversity within countries. To deal with this diversity, two different sets of normative claims along with policy implications were formulated, namely multiculturalism and tolerance (see Læggaard, 2021). The first proposes that cultural differences between groups should not only be acknowledged but also the diversity that arises from these differences be celebrated (Whitley Jr. & Webster, 2019). The second implicates the forbearance of these differences despite disapproving of them (Verkuyten et al., 2023). Building on this, social psychological research has recognized promoting multiculturalism and tolerance among majority group members as ways to reduce negative intergroup attitudes towards minorities (Verkuyten et al., 2023; Whitley Jr. & Webster, 2019). However, less is known about their roles as ingroup norms in motivating majority group members' active social change efforts. With this in mind, the present research focused mainly on whether an ingroup norm about multiculturalism or tolerance shapes solidarity-based collective action intentions among native Dutch people.

In some applied contexts aiming at prejudice and conflict reduction, researchers consider tolerance as part of multiculturalism practices, as their roles often overlap (Guimond et al., 2014; Meer & Modood, 2012; Urbiola et al., 2022). Indeed, tolerance has a positive connotation regarding the acceptance of others, similar to multiculturalism. However, tolerance also entails enduring significant group differences *with which one may feel discontent*, which distinguishes it from multiculturalism (Bagci et al., 2020; Verkuyten et al., 2020). As Oberdiek (2001, p. 38) aptly propounded, 'We tolerate what we disapprove, what we wish were otherwise, what we think distasteful, disgusting, or morally deplorable'. Considering these ambivalent aspects of it, tolerance stands out as somewhat distinct from colour blindness which implies sheer neutrality towards intergroup differences (Apfelbaum et al., 2010). Due to such duality, tolerance may increase the (outward) acceptance of minority groups but does not always guarantee a structural social change in favour of minorities (Dixon et al., 2012).

The present research aimed to examine how ingroup norms of multiculturalism (and tolerance) might influence solidarity-based collective action favouring minority groups, considering majority group members' ideological differences as a moderator. Ideology is a particularly relevant individual-difference variable since the different values endorsed by left and right political camps can shape individuals' engagement in solidarity-based collective action (see Jost et al., 2017). In order to answer this question, we zoomed in on the Netherlands – where critical debates on multiculturalism and tolerance are prevalent (Verkuyten et al., 2023). Across two experimental studies, we tested our fundamental hypotheses that an ingroup norm about multiculturalism increases solidarity-based collective action intentions among leftists while decreasing it among rightists. We also proposed symbolic threat as a potential mediator of this effect. Our research added to the literature by clarifying for whom and why ingroup norms of multiculturalism and tolerance enhance or undermine solidarity-based collective actions.

### A brief contextualization of the intergroup climate between native Dutch and immigrant populations

The Netherlands has a diverse population, with people from many different ethnic and cultural backgrounds living and working together. The country has a long history of immigration and is *stereotypically* known for its multicultural environment. Despite official state-level initiatives to promote multiculturalism, native Dutch people were reserved about how immigrants should be welcomed into the country at the societal level. Social psychological research, for instance, has shown that native Dutch people expected Turkish immigrants to fully assimilate into Dutch society, while immigrants only endorsed this in the public sphere and maintained their home culture in the private sphere (e.g. at home; Arends-Tóth & Vijver, 2003). This highlights the discrepancy between endorsing multiculturalism at the state and societal levels: The government advertising multiculturalism versus the majority advocating

assimilation. It, therefore, appears that native Dutch citizens are more willing to accept tolerance, as this suits their assimilationist expectancies better than multiculturalism.

In line with this discrepancy, there has recently been some evidence that the stereotype of the multicultural environment in the Netherlands is being challenged. Dutch society has become more polarized on the multiculturalism issue with the rise of the populist nativist discourse of far-right political parties (Kešić & Duyvendak, 2019). As a result, societal discontent with the increase in asylum seekers and with the integration of immigrants into Dutch society has scaled up (Albada et al., 2021; Gootjes et al., 2021). There have also been instances of discrimination and xenophobia, particularly against Muslim minorities like Moroccan immigrants (Ramos et al., 2021) and people of colour (Doornbos et al., 2022). All these are undermining the social cohesion and strives for equality between ethnic groups in the Netherlands.

This changing intergroup climate, on the other hand, provides us with a backdrop to examine multiculturalism and tolerance as majority ingroup norms in shaping the native Dutch solidarity with immigrant populations. That is, in a polarized setting on intergroup diversity, manipulating the native Dutch's perception about whether their ingroup fellows mostly endorse *the active celebration* (i.e. as the government has long advertised) or *the passive forbearance* (i.e. as closer to the majority's assimilationist expectations), of the cultural differences, may prompt their active solidarity, or lack thereof, with immigrants.

## The majority's solidarity with the minority

There is relatively less work on the majority's active solidarity with the minority because social psychological research focuses mostly on disadvantaged and minority groups' collective action for their own cause (Agostini & van Zomeren, 2021; van Zomeren et al., 2008). Considering minority groups having less access to institutional power and societal capital than the majority, they strategically aim to challenge these unequal arrangements through their members' concerted efforts (e.g. signing petitions, organizing campaigns and marches; Dixon et al., 2016). On the other side, the classic social identity approach offers the advantaged majority group members to be keen on maintaining their group's societal position. Therefore, their solidarity with the minority to challenge the ongoing status quo seems contradictory to their group-based interests (Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014; Jetten et al., 2017). As a result, one should expect majority group members to abstain from solidarity-based collective actions (Iyer & Leach, 2010). Contrarily, various real-life events instantiate advantaged majority group members marching together with the minorities to dismantle the unequal status quo (e.g. White Americans in the Civil Rights Movement and cisgender people in the Pride protests; Radke et al., 2020).

One of the fundamental motivations underlying advantaged group members' participation in solidarity-based collective action may be their need for moral affirmation and acceptance (Radke et al., 2020; Selvanathan et al., 2020). As people are motivated to restore a positive social identity, they tend to behave in a (at least outwardly) moral manner (Shnabel et al., 2008, 2013). As a result, once an advantaged group member is confronted with their group's unjust treatment of a disadvantaged group, they may feel ingroup morality is threatened and thus strive to mitigate this threat, for example, by acting in solidarity with the disadvantaged group, which helps foster a positive feeling of moral integrity (Selvanathan et al., 2020). This tendency may be particularly strong when there are specific norms within the advantaged group (Louis, 2009; Urbiola et al., 2022).

## How ingroup norms of tolerance and multiculturalism influence solidarity-based collective action

Norms convey standards of accepted or expected attitudes and behaviours shared by a group (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005) and have long been deemed as drivers of attitudes and behaviours by social psychologists (see Crandall et al., 2002). As people have a fundamental need to be liked or accepted by their group

members, they tend to accord their own attitudes and behaviours with what ingroup peers agree mostly upon. This process is called normative social influence (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Latané, 1981). Therefore, norms have also been regarded as a potential basis for interventions aimed at fostering collective action for social change (Prentice & Paluck, 2020).

Of their particular relevance to the current research, we presented here two social norms that may affect solidarity-based collective action intentions, namely tolerance and multiculturalism. A norm of tolerance can be deemed as a counter-discriminatory norm predicating upon ignoring group differences to promote intergroup harmony. However, it has also ironic influences on solidarity-based collective action (see Verkuyten et al., 2020). Rather than actively accepting and celebrating cultural differences, tolerance highlights the passive forbearance of an outgroup culture and *inaction* for it, thereby justifying the disapproval of group diversity (Verkuyten et al., 2023). Therefore, norms stressing tolerance could indeed cause majority group members' avoidance of intergroup conflicts (Verkuyten et al., 2020, 2023). This usually undermines collective action tendencies for the sake of maintaining the peaceful, albeit unequal, status quo (Dixon et al., 2016; Saguy et al., 2009; Wright & Baray, 2012). For example, previous research conducted among primary school students has revealed that introducing an injunctive norm of colour blindness (vs. multiculturalism) discourages the confrontation of racial discrimination and facilitates the maintenance of inequality (Apfelbaum et al., 2010). On the particular relevance of tolerance to colour blindness, one should acknowledge that tolerance encompasses a clearer statement about intergroup differences than colour blindness does: In the case of tolerance, it is the endurance towards *disliked/disapproved outgroup cultures*, whereas colour blindness implicates silence towards group-based differences for the sake of (at least outward) neutrality *without posing any open stance about liking them or not*. However, regardless of their position about liking other groups and/or their cultures, both are related to avoiding intergroup differences, potentially hindering action intentions. Hence, we predict that an ingroup norm about tolerance (vs. control) reduces solidarity-based collective action intentions (Hypothesis 1).

By contrast, an ingroup norm about multiculturalism stresses that group differences in societies should not only be acknowledged but also be actively celebrated (Whitley Jr. & Webster, 2019). It, therefore, implicates *the actions* to support the disadvantaged groups in maintaining their own cultures. In this sense, multicultural commitment should not only be promising for prejudice reduction but also be the likely motivator of progressive collective action intentions among both majority and minority group members (Guimond et al., 2014; Urbiola et al., 2022). However, empirical evidence suggests inconsistent patterns for the influence of multiculturalism on support for disadvantaged groups. Some show multicultural norms may foster positive attitudes towards minorities and promote majority members' engagement in equality-supporting actions (Guimond et al., 2013; Plaut et al., 2009; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Todd & Galinsky, 2012; Vorauer et al., 2009), while others indicate backfire effects such as ironically undermining the majority's support for diversity-oriented actions, increasing system justification beliefs through an illusory sense of fairness and constraining minority group members' identity expression (see Gutiérrez & Unzueta, 2010; Kaiser et al., 2013; Kauff et al., 2013; Morrison et al., 2010). These mixed results may stem from the individual differences in samples used in these studies. Particularly, ideological differences can be potent in explaining these mixed results.

## Political ideology as the moderator of the relationship between ingroup norm of multiculturalism and solidarity-based collective action

Ideology is defined as a set of 'socially shared but competing philosophies of life and how it should be lived (and how society should be governed)' (Jost et al., 2009, p. 309). Since ideological leftists are more concerned about social justice and embrace societal change (Becker, 2020), they should be more likely to accept a norm of multiculturalism that matches their values (see confirmation bias theory; Nickerson, 1998). Therefore, we predict an ingroup norm of multiculturalism (vs. control) to increase solidarity-based collective action intentions among the leftist majority (Hypothesis 2a).

By contrast, as ideological rightists are typically motivated to justify social inequality and defend the status quo (Jost et al., 2017), they might perceive multiculturalism as a threat to their dominant culture and thus be opposed to supporting minority cultures. Accordingly, we predict an ingroup norm of multiculturalism (vs. control) to decrease solidarity-based collective action intentions among the rightist majority (Hypothesis 2b). In detail, we discuss the likely role of symbolic threat in this process.

## The potential mediating role of symbolic threat

The integrated threat theory proposes that two types of intergroup threats, namely realistic threat (i.e. related to tangible resources and physical safety) and symbolic threat (i.e. related to culture, values and beliefs), are major predictors of negative intergroup attitudes and behaviours (Stephan & Stephan, 1996; Stephan et al., 1999, 2009; see also Riek et al., 2006; Rios et al., 2018). We consider symbolic threat to be particularly relevant to the current research since we focus on multiculturalism and tolerance in terms of cultural differences.

First, a tolerance norm (vs. control) can motivate majority group members to perceive the minority group as a symbolic threat, thus undermining their solidarity-based collective action intentions to support the minority (Hypothesis 3). As a norm of tolerance prompts majority group members to passively tolerate an outgroup culture, for example, emphasizing a superordinate identity or simply putting it behind them, this might usually help them justify the disapproval of cultural differences rather than motivating them to engage in solidarity-based collective action (Verkuyten et al., 2023). Therefore, when the situation requires them to actively cope with the cultural differences brought by a minority outgroup, they might perceive high demands (e.g. uncertainty and potential danger brought about by outgroups) and a lack of resources (e.g. knowledge about outgroups). Such perceptions might result in a feeling of being threatened (Scheepers, 2017; Scheepers et al., 2014; Urbiola et al., 2018), particularly symbolic threat in the context of the current research. This threat might in turn motivate defensive reactions: those majority group members might take actions to defend the status quo rather than engage in solidarity-based collective action to challenge it (Shepherd et al., 2018).

In contrast, the mediating role of symbolic threat in the relationship between the norm of multiculturalism and solidarity-based collective action intentions should be different for ideological leftists and rightists. On the one hand, we predict a multiculturalism norm (vs. control) to foster solidarity-based collective action intentions for leftist majority group members through decreased symbolic threat (Hypothesis 4a). Since a multiculturalism norm, which encourages majority group members to recognize and celebrate minority cultures, matches leftists' values that stress equality and challenging the status quo (Jost et al., 2008, 2017), leftist majority group members are likely to accept it. According to the contact hypothesis, celebrating and thus knowing more about the outgroup culture might reduce symbolic threat (Allport, 1954; see also Green et al., 2020; Long et al., 2023). In this vein, the reduced symbolic threat might further motivate leftist majority group members to support actions in favour of the minority outgroup. On the other hand, we expect a multiculturalism norm (vs. control) to generate a symbolic threat for rightist majority group members and thus reduce their solidarity-based collective action intentions (Hypothesis 4b). Previous research has shown that majority group members may perceive multiculturalism as threatening when it is experimentally introduced, in the sense that it makes group differences salient and implicates change to the majority group's culture which has prevailed in society (Alexander, 2013; Morrison et al., 2010; Rios, 2022). This threat might further facilitate the majority group members' reluctance to support the minority outgroup (Morrison et al., 2010; Urbiola et al., 2018). Particularly for ideological rightists, a multiculturalism norm may result in opposition to the outgroup culture as well as the possibility of social change because it counters rightist values (Citrin et al., 2001; Gale & Staerklé, 2019).




FIGURE 1 The conceptual model of the relationships among norms, symbolic threat and solidarity-based collective action intentions.

## Overview of the present research

The present research examined how ingroup norms (i.e. multiculturalism and tolerance vs. control) affected the majority's willingness to engage in solidarity-based collective action for the minority and how political ideology moderated this effect. First, we expected the ingroup norm of tolerance (vs. control) to reduce solidarity-based collective action intentions (Hypothesis 1). In contrast, we expected the ingroup norm of multiculturalism and ideology to interact in affecting solidarity-based collective action intentions. That is, a multiculturalism (vs. control) norm should increase solidarity-based collective action intentions among leftists (Hypothesis 2a) while decreasing it among rightists (Hypothesis 2b). In addition, we predicted symbolic threat to mediate these three-way interactive effects on solidarity-based collective action intentions (Hypotheses 3, 4a and 4b). The conceptual model in Figure 1 summarizes our hypotheses.

We tested these hypotheses in two experimental studies in the context of the interethnic relations in the Netherlands. Operationally, we specified the majority ingroup as native Dutch people (or Dutch people without a migration background, i.e. 'Nederlanders zonder een migratieachtergrond') and the minority outgroup as Dutch people with a Moroccan background (i.e. 'Nederlanders met een Marokkaanse achtergrond') in our studies.<sup>1</sup> Study 1 manipulated the ingroup norm (multiculturalism vs. tolerance vs. control) concerning the cultural differences between native Dutch students and Dutch students with a Moroccan background on Dutch university campuses. Next, we attempted to replicate our results in a broader societal setting. Study 2, thus, zoomed in on the relations between native Dutch citizens and Dutch citizens with a Moroccan background in the Netherlands. In both studies, we included context-relevant measures for solidarity-based collective action intentions (and behaviour in Study 2) as dependent variables. In study 2, we additionally measured symbolic threat and tested its potential mediating role.

We disclosed all study materials, datasets and analysis scripts in our research (<https://osf.io/65sb2>). No data were collected for a particular study once the analysis phase had commenced. The Stage 1 Registered Report manuscript was pre-registered at <https://osf.io/uy5n6>. All analyses were conducted in R Version 4.2.3 (R Core Team, 2023).

## STUDY 1

Study 1 was conducted in the context of the multiculturalism issue within Dutch university campuses. Specifically, we focused on the relations between native Dutch students and Dutch students with a

<sup>1</sup>In the Introduction, we use the term 'immigrants' to refer to people with a migration background in order to keep consistent with the usage of the terminology in the prior works we cited.

Moroccan background. The Netherlands is well-known for its inclusive and international university environment. However, this inclusion could mean either *actively supporting* (i.e. multiculturalism) or *passively tolerating* (but disapproving; i.e. tolerance) the cultural differences between native Dutch students and Dutch students with a Moroccan background. The current study focused on providing initial evidence for Hypotheses 1, 2a and 2b. To this end, we investigated Dutch students' solidarity-based collective action intentions for Dutch students with a Moroccan background when they were exposed to ingroup norms regarding multiculturalism and tolerance. Additionally, we measured political ideology as a moderator.

## Methods

### Participants

#### *Inclusion and exclusion*

The data collection phase took place between September 2023 and October 2023. In line with the pre-registration, 308 undergraduate self-identified native Dutch university students were recruited on campus to participate in the present study from authors' affiliated universities. Seventy-six of them who identified themselves as persons with immigration backgrounds were excluded beforehand.<sup>2</sup> We also excluded 2 participants who completed the survey in less than 2 minutes<sup>3</sup> and 12 who failed one or more attention checks. We obtained a final sample consisting of 218 participants ( $n_{\text{female}} = 177$ ,  $n_{\text{male}} = 38$ ,  $n_{\text{non-binary}} = 2$ ,  $n_{\text{queer}} = 1$ ;  $n_{16-19\text{ years}} = 94$ ,  $n_{20-22\text{ years}} = 105$ ,  $n_{22-25\text{ years}} = 17$  and  $n_{25+\text{ years}} = 2$ ).

#### *Sample size and power analysis*

To our best knowledge, no previous research investigated the interactive effects of the norms of multiculturalism and tolerance and political ideology on solidarity-based collective action intentions. We, therefore, based our power analysis on a medium-size effect ( $f = 0.25$ ) for a one-way ANOVA with three conditions (i.e. multiculturalism vs. tolerance vs. control). The a priori power analysis using G\*Power (Faul et al., 2009) suggested that we need a sample consisting of 207 participants in order to yield a power of 0.90. The final dataset consisted of 218 participants, which provided sufficient statistical power for the ANOVA. According to the sensitivity power analysis using G\*Power 3.1.9.7 (Faul et al., 2009), this sample size was also able to provide a 0.90 power to detect a minimum effect size of  $f^2 = 0.08$  for the regression analysis testing the interactive effects of ingroup norm (dummy coded) and political ideology.

### Procedure and materials

After giving informed consent, each participant read the manipulation information based on the random assignment to one of three conditions (i.e. multiculturalism vs. tolerance vs. control) in a between-participants design, followed by the manipulation checks and questions measuring solidarity-based collective action intentions and ideology (embedded in demographic questions). At the end of the questionnaire, participants were carefully debriefed.

<sup>2</sup>In our Stage 1 Registered Report manuscript, we initially defined the inclusion criteria for Study 1 as 'undergraduate self-identified native Dutch university students without any migration background'. However, we were unable to implement a pre-screener based on participants' migration background in the SONA system where we collected our data. Therefore, we had to allow the participation of all Dutch-speaking students in our study and exclude those with a migration background post hoc.

<sup>3</sup>To specify the minimum survey completion time, we relied on the research showing that 238 words for silent reading take 1 minute (Brybaert, 2019). The word count of our main survey was around 550. Therefore, we will calculate the minimum survey completion time roughly based on this and decide to exclude those who spend less than 2 minutes.

### *Manipulation*

Participants read the bogus results of a survey ostensibly conducted by Nuffic (The Dutch Organization for Internationalization in Education) in order to examine native Dutch university students' attitudes towards Dutch students with a Moroccan background. In the two treatment conditions, each participant read that most native Dutch students favoured either multiculturalism or tolerance (or have no clear preference) based on the random assignment. In the control condition, participants received a piece of information stating that students supported multiculturalism and tolerance more or less to the same degree. Specifically, multiculturalism was defined as 'I approve of the cultural differences between students with a Moroccan background and us, and I would like to celebrate these differences', while tolerance referred to 'I don't approve of the cultural differences between students with a Moroccan background and us, but I tolerate these differences'. Additionally, we included a 'don't know' option (i.e. 'I don't know a lot about this issue; thus, I prefer not to say anything') as a contrast in the fictitious survey. In each condition ( $n_{\text{multiculturalism}} = 71$ ,  $n_{\text{tolerance}} = 68$  and  $n_{\text{control}} = 79$ ), the overall ingroup stance about multiculturalism and tolerance was presented through pie chart figures depicting the students' opinions percentage wise. The percentage distributions differed in each condition. The full manipulation text can be found in Appendix S1.

### *Measures*

For the factor analysis results on solidarity-based collective action intentions, personal attitudes towards multiculturalism and tolerance, and political ideology, please refer to Appendix S2.

*Manipulation checks.* Right after presenting the manipulation information, participants filled out two manipulation checks measuring perceived ingroup norm of multiculturalism and perceived ingroup norm of tolerance: 'Regarding native Dutch students' attitudes towards students with a Moroccan background in Dutch universities, what percentage of native Dutch students favours multiculturalism over tolerance?' (0%–100%); and 'What percentage of native Dutch students favours tolerance over multiculturalism for students with a Moroccan background?' (0%–100%; reversely coded). We averaged the scores for both manipulation checks to obtain a composite, where higher scores represented higher perceived ingroup norm of multiculturalism while lower scores represented higher perceived ingroup norm of tolerance. They were followed by an attention check ('What is the name of the organisation that conducted the survey in the text you just read?' 1 = 'YouGov', 2 = 'Nuffic', 3 = 'Ipsos' and 4 = 'University of Amsterdam'), aiming to identify the participants who did not fully read the manipulation materials.

*Solidarity-based collective action intentions.* Participants were then asked if they, as Dutch students, were likely to engage in the following actions on behalf of Dutch students with a Moroccan background to increase the acceptance of Moroccan-Dutch culture within Dutch campuses (adapted from Tausch et al., 2015): 'organise discussion meetings to increase the understanding of Moroccan-Dutch students' culture', 'vote for student representatives representing the interests of Dutch students with a Moroccan background', 'demonstrate against the disadvantaged status of students with a Moroccan background', 'donate money to interest groups representing Dutch students with a Moroccan background' and 'send a letter to government or the media demanding policy change that would benefit Dutch students with a Moroccan background'. The scale with endpoints 1 (*very unlikely*) and 7 (*very likely*) displayed good reliability ( $\alpha = .87$ ).

An attention check was presented right after this scale: 'Which city is the capital of the Netherlands?' (1 = Beijing, 2 = Rotterdam, 3 = Amsterdam and 4 = Ankara).

*Personal attitudes towards multiculturalism and tolerance.* After completing the collective action measures, participants responded to six items assessing individuals' general attitudes towards multiculturalism and tolerance (adapted from Perry et al., 2015; Rosenthal & Levy, 2012): 'It is important to recognise the cultural differences between Dutch people with and without a migration background'; 'It is important to celebrate the distinguishing cultural characteristics of Dutch people with a migration background'; 'Combining

migrant cultures with the mainstream culture makes the Netherlands a better place over the years'; 'I endure cultural differences between Dutch people with and without a migration background even if I do not accept them'; 'It is important to bear Dutch people with a migration background who have the customs and habits we dislike'; and 'I tolerate Dutch people with a migration background even if I disagree with some distinguishing characteristics of their own cultures' (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*). The scales displayed a two-factorial solution (see Appendix S2) and good reliability ( $\alpha_{\text{multiculturalism}} = .78$ ;  $\alpha_{\text{tolerance}} = .78$ ). The first three items assessed personal attitudes towards multiculturalism while the others captured personal attitudes towards tolerance. In both studies, these two variables were included, for an exploratory purpose, as control variables in the additional analyses reported in Appendix S3.

*Ideology.* Finally, right after the demographic questions asking about gender, age and year of study, three questions measuring ideology regarding its general, economic and social dimensions will be presented: 'How would you describe your political orientation in general?' 'How leftist or rightist are your economic views?' 'How leftist or rightist are your views on social issues?' (1 = *very leftist*, 7 = *very rightist*). The scale displayed a good reliability ( $\alpha = .88$ ).

## Results

As outlined in our pre-registration, we utilized one-way ANOVAs to test the success of our manipulation and the main effects of the experimental manipulation on solidarity-based action intentions. Additionally, to test the interactive effects of the experimental manipulation and political ideology on solidarity-based collective action intentions, we employed a regression model in which the experimental manipulation was dummy coded. We further examined simple slopes in case of significant interaction terms.

### Manipulation check

We first performed a one-way ANOVA with ingroup norm (i.e. multiculturalism vs. tolerance vs. control) as the independent variable and the composite score of manipulation check items (i.e. perceived ingroup norm of multiculturalism over tolerance) as the dependent variable. This analysis suggested that there were significant differences in terms of perceived ingroup norms,  $F(2, 215) = 460.48, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .81$ . The pairwise comparisons revealed that the multiculturalism condition ( $M = 81.73, SE = 1.39$ ) significantly increased perceived ingroup norm of multiculturalism (over tolerance) compared to the control condition ( $M = 52.34, SE = 1.32$ ),  $t(215) = 15.35, p < .001, d = 2.50$ , and to the tolerance condition ( $M = 21.42, SE = 1.42$ ),  $t(215) = 30.35, p < .001, d = 5.13$ . Additionally, the tolerance condition significantly reduced perceived ingroup norm of multiculturalism (over tolerance) compared to the control condition,  $t(215) = 15.96, p < .001, d = 2.63$ . Thus, we concluded that our manipulation successfully influenced the perceived ingroup norms about multiculturalism and tolerance.

### Solidarity-based collective action intentions

Next, we tested our first hypothesis positing that an ingroup norm about tolerance (vs. control) would undermine solidarity-based collective action intentions. A similar one-way ANOVA with three experimental conditions on solidarity-based collective action intentions suggested a significant influence of the experimental manipulation,  $F(2, 215) = 10.45, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .09$ . The pairwise comparisons revealed that intentions in the multiculturalism condition ( $M = 3.58, SE = 0.15$ ) were higher than in the control condition ( $M = 3.09, SE = 0.14$ ),  $t(215) = 2.33, p = .021, d = 0.38$ , and tolerance condition ( $M = 2.59, SE = 0.16$ ),  $t(215) = 4.57, p < .001, d = 0.77$ . Additionally, the tolerance condition decreased

**TABLE 1** The interactive effects of ingroup norms and political ideology on solidarity-based collective action intentions (Study 1).

Predictors	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
X1	1.80	0.49	3.67	<.001
X2	−0.05	0.53	−0.10	.922
Political ideology	−0.36	0.11	−3.19	.002
X1 × Political Ideology	−0.40	0.15	−2.76	.006
X2 × Political Ideology	−0.09	0.15	−0.59	.557
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.38			

Note: X1 = ingroup norm of multiculturalism versus control, X2 = ingroup norm of tolerance versus control.

solidarity-based collective action intentions as compared to the control condition,  $t(215) = 2.39, p = .018, d = 0.39$ , yielding evidence in support of Hypothesis 1.<sup>4</sup>

We further tested our second group of hypotheses, namely that an ingroup norm of multiculturalism (vs. control) would increase solidarity-based collective action intentions among leftists (i.e. Hypothesis 2a) while decreasing it among rightists (i.e. Hypothesis 2b). We performed a regression analysis, which included two dummy contrasts, one (i.e. X1) contrasting the multiculturalism norm (=1) to other conditions (=0) and the other (i.e. X2) contrasting the tolerance norm (=1) to other conditions (=0). In doing so, the control condition was coded as the reference category. It also included political ideology and the interaction between each dummy contrast and political ideology. This analysis indicated that the interaction between X1 and political ideology was significant, whereas the interaction between X2 and political ideology was not (see Table 1). Simple slope analyses of the significant interaction (see Figure 2) revealed that an ingroup norm of multiculturalism increased solidarity-based collective action intentions mainly among leftists ( $B = 0.99, SE = 0.24, t(212) = 4.13, p < .001$ ), with no significant effect among rightists ( $B = -0.02, SE = 0.26, t(212) = -0.07, p = .945$ ). Taken together, these findings supported Hypothesis 2a but not 2b.


## Discussion

Overall, the results of the first study were supportive of Hypotheses 1 and 2a. On the one hand, an ingroup norm of tolerance (vs. control) had an undermining effect on the majority group members' solidarity-based collective action intentions. On the other hand, an ingroup norm of multiculturalism (vs. control) increased the willingness to outgroup solidarity, particularly among ideological leftists. Contrary to our predictions in Hypothesis 2b, there was no backlash effect of an ingroup norm of multiculturalism among ideologically rightists. Nonetheless, these results should be interpreted cautiously, as they came from a student sampling and focused on the normative effects in campus settings. Furthermore, the underlying mechanism that can explain these effects requires a nuanced investigation. Thus, we ran another study with a more representative sampling and included symbolic threat as a mediator variable to account for the experimental effects.

## STUDY 2

Study 2 aimed to replicate the findings of Study 1 on a broader societal context with a more representative native Dutch sampling (i.e. intergroup relations between native Dutch citizens and Dutch citizens

<sup>4</sup>However, there was no longer a significant difference in solidarity-based collective action intentions between the tolerance and control conditions after including personal attitudes towards multiculturalism and personal attitudes towards tolerance as control variables in the model.



**FIGURE 2** The interactive effects of ingroup norms and political ideology on solidarity-based collective action intentions (Study 1).

with a Moroccan background). Dutch citizens with a Moroccan background are one of the largest ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands and often face discrimination in Dutch society (De Vroome et al., 2014). There was still no clear consensus in Dutch society on whether native Dutch people should help Dutch citizens with a Moroccan background maintain their own culture or expect them to assimilate into the native Dutch culture, providing a ground for us to manipulate norms of multiculturalism (vs. tolerance). In addition to the hypotheses tested in Study 1, we also aimed to examine the mediating role of symbolic threat on the relationship between ingroup norm and solidarity-based collective action, thereby seeking evidence for Hypotheses 3, 4a and 4b.

## Methods

### Participants

#### *Inclusion and exclusion*

The data collection phase started on 4 November 2023 and ended on 15 November 2023. Four hundred and sixty-one Dutch nationals who were born in and resided in the Netherlands were recruited via Prolific to participate in the present study. As it is usually harder to ensure the quality of data collected online, we only recruited participants with a high approval rate (>95%) on Prolific, meaning that most of their previous survey responses were regarded as acceptable by researchers. We compensated £ 1.50 for each participation. Following the data collection, we implemented the same rules in Study 1 for the exclusion. Those with immigration background were excluded beforehand ( $N=43$ ). No one completed the survey in less than 2 minutes; however, we excluded participants who failed an attention check ( $N=12$ ). The remaining were 408 participants ( $n_{\text{female}}=199$ ,  $n_{\text{male}}=203$  and  $n_{\text{non-binary}}=6$ ), ageing from 18 to 74 ( $M_{\text{age}}=31.19$ ,  $SD_{\text{age}}=10.19$ ).

#### *Sample size and power analysis*

Initially, we planned to double the sample size used in Study 1 and thus aimed for 414 valid cases for two reasons. First, since we additionally measured symbolic threat in Study 2, the moderated

mediation analysis warrants a larger sample size. Second, interactions with categorical variables are usually underpowered in social psychology research (see Blake & Gangestad, 2020). We thus aimed to strengthen the empirical evidence using a larger sample. Our final sample size including 408 participants is very close to our initial plan. According to the sensitivity power analysis using G\*Power (Faul et al., 2009), this sample size was able to provide a 0.90 power to detect a minimum effect size of  $f = 0.18$  for the one-way ANOVA testing the main effect of the ingroup norm manipulation and a minimum effect size of  $f^2 = 0.04$  for the regression analysis testing the two-way interactive effect of ingroup and ideology.

## Procedure and materials

The procedure was almost identical to that of Study 1 with two additions. First, we measured symbolic threat after the items measuring solidarity-based collective action intentions.<sup>5</sup> Second, we also included a novel actual solidarity behaviour measurement following the solidarity-based collective action intentions. Unlike undergraduate students at Dutch universities, some Dutch participants in Prolific might not feel fully comfortable with a questionnaire in English. Therefore, we recruited a native Dutch-speaking research assistant to translate all presented materials to participants into Dutch language.

### *Manipulation*

Participants read the contrived results of the ‘European Social Survey (ESS) in Nederland 2020’. This national survey covered questions asking about native Dutch people’s attitudes towards Dutch citizens with a Moroccan background, suggesting most native Dutch people favoured either multiculturalism or tolerance (or no clear preference) based on the random assignment ( $n_{\text{multiculturalism}} = 129$ ,  $n_{\text{tolerance}} = 140$  and  $n_{\text{control}} = 139$ ). The manipulation of ingroup norm was similar to that of Study 1, except that we focused on the relations between native Dutch citizens (instead of students) and those with a Moroccan background in the current study. The full manipulation text can be found in Appendix S1.

### *Measures*

Right after presenting the manipulation information, participants filled out two *manipulation checks* measuring perceived ingroup norm of multiculturalism and perceived ingroup norm of tolerance: ‘Regarding native Dutch people’s attitudes towards Dutch citizens with a Moroccan background, what percentage of native Dutch people favours multiculturalism over tolerance?’ (0%–100%); and ‘What percentage of native Dutch people favours tolerance over multiculturalism for Dutch citizens with a Moroccan background?’ (0%–100%; reversely coded). Again, we obtained a composite score by averaging the scores for both manipulation checks, as we did in Study 1. They were followed by an attention check (‘What is the name of the national survey mentioned in the text you just read?’ with choices ‘Gallup Poll’, ‘World Values Survey’ and ‘European Social Survey’),<sup>6</sup> aiming to identify the participants who did not fully read the manipulation materials.

*Symbolic threat* was measured using four items adapted from Stephan et al. (1999) and Velasco González et al. (2008): ‘Dutch identity is being threatened because there are too many Dutch citizens with a Moroccan background’; ‘Dutch norms and values are being threatened because of the presence of Dutch citizens with a Moroccan background’; ‘Moral and religious beliefs of Dutch people are being

<sup>5</sup>In our original preregistration plan, we listed symbolic threat before solidarity-based action intentions when describing the measures. However, we considered before data collection that measuring this mediator before our actual outcome variable could have distorted our results, as even responding to the threat items itself could potentially result in backlash effects. Hence, we slightly diverted from what we pre-registered and measured this exploratory mediator after the outcome variables.

<sup>6</sup>Initially, there were four choices for this manipulation check question in our pre-registered plan. We decided to exclude the fourth choice (i.e., European Values Survey) and presented the attention check with three choices, as it could have distracted participants because of being too similar to the actual answer.

threatened because of the presence of Dutch citizens with a Moroccan background'; and 'Dutch citizens with a Moroccan background are a threat to the Dutch culture' ( $\alpha = .95$ ).

*Solidarity-based collective action intentions* were again measured using the scale adapted from Tausch et al. (2015) by asking participants if they would engage in the following actions on behalf of Dutch citizens with a Moroccan background to increase the acceptance of Moroccan-Dutch culture in the Netherlands: 'organise discussion meetings that address the situation of Dutch citizens with a Moroccan background', 'vote for political candidates representing the interests of Dutch citizens with a Moroccan background', 'demonstrate against the disadvantaged status of Dutch citizens with a Moroccan background', 'donate money to interest groups representing Dutch citizens with a Moroccan background' and 'send a letter to government or the media demanding social change that would benefit Dutch citizens with a Moroccan background' ( $\alpha = .86$ ).

An attention check item used in Study 1 was presented following the solidarity-based collective action intentions scale.

*Solidarity-based action behaviour* was captured by asking participants to sign a petition, as an actual behaviour measure used by van Zomeren et al. (2012):

"Moroccan-Dutch interests" is a non-profit organization in the Netherlands representing advocating for the rights of Dutch citizens with a Moroccan background. Last Monday, it initiated a petition aiming to address the situation that Moroccan-Dutch culture is being marginalized in Dutch society. Here is the message from their website:

"Do you know, one out of five Dutch citizens with a Moroccan background in the Netherlands reported experience of being discriminated due to their cultural differences from native Dutch people? Add your name to promote the authority to make policies enhance people's acceptance of multiculturalism and to help Moroccan-Dutch people maintain their own culture!"

Would you like to sign this petition? If yes, please enter your name/nickname/name initials and email address here. After doing this, you will receive a confirmation email soon.

Participants responded to this question at the end of the text with 'Yes' or 'No', and if they chose 'Yes', they were required to fill in the blank following the answer with their name/nickname/name initials and email addresses. Since it is a bogus petition, participants' personal information was not sent anywhere and they were well debriefed after completing the questionnaire.

*Personal attitudes towards multiculturalism/tolerance* were captured with the identical items used in Study 1. However, the factor analysis suggested a poor fit of two items for each (see Appendix S2). Therefore, we dropped these items and measured these constructs with two items for each ( $r_{\text{multiculturalism}} = .58$ ,  $r_{\text{tolerance}} = .49$ ). Finally, the *ideology* measure ( $\alpha = .90$ ) was identical to that used in Study 1.

## Results

We adopted the same data analysis techniques as in Study 1, except for several additions. First, we adopted logistic modelling to analyse the main effect of the ingroup norm manipulation and its interactive effect with ideology on solidarity-based collective action behaviour since it was dichotomous. Furthermore, we employed the same ANOVA and linear regression used in Study 1 to analyse the effect of ingroup norm and the interactive effect of ingroup norm and ideology on symbolic threat. As proposed, only if one of these effects were significant, we would deepen into the potential mediating role of symbolic threat using PROCESS (Hayes, 2013).

## Manipulation check

We first performed a one-way ANOVA with ingroup norm (i.e. multiculturalism vs. tolerance vs. control) as the independent variable and the composite score of manipulation check items (i.e. perceived ingroup norm of multiculturalism over tolerance) as the dependent variable. This analysis suggested that there were significant differences in terms of perceived ingroup norms,  $F(2, 405) = 699.22, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .78$ . The pairwise comparisons revealed that the multiculturalism condition ( $M = 82.55, SE = 1.17$ ) significantly increased perceived ingroup norm of multiculturalism (over tolerance) compared to the control condition ( $M = 49.96, SE = 1.12$ ),  $t(405) = 20.13, p < .001, d = 2.46$ , and to the tolerance condition ( $M = 22.13, SE = 1.12$ ),  $t(405) = 37.39, p < .001, d = 4.55$ . In contrast, the tolerance condition significantly reduced perceived ingroup norm of multiculturalism (over tolerance) compared to the control condition,  $t(405) = 17.55, p < .001, d = 2.10$ . Thus, we concluded that our manipulation was successful again.

## Solidarity-based collective action measures

Next, we tested our first hypothesis positing that an ingroup norm about tolerance (vs. control) would undermine solidarity-based collective action intentions and behaviour. A one-way ANOVA with three experimental conditions on solidarity-based collective action intentions suggested a significant effect of the experimental manipulation,  $F(2, 405) = 7.09, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .03$ . The pairwise comparisons revealed that intentions in the tolerance condition ( $M = 2.24, SE = 0.11$ ) were lower than in the control condition,  $t(405) = 2.34, p = .020, d = 0.28$ , and also than in the multiculturalism condition ( $M = 2.84, SE = 0.12$ ),  $t(405) = 3.72, p < .001, d = 0.45$ .<sup>7</sup> However, these intentions did not differ between the multiculturalism and control ( $M = 2.61, SE = 0.11$ ) conditions,  $t(405) = 1.42, p = .157, d = 0.17$ . Furthermore, we fitted a logistic model to predict solidarity-based collective action behaviour with three experimental conditions, suggesting a significant effect of the experimental manipulation,  $\chi^2(2, N = 408) = 9.33, p = .009$ . Pairwise comparisons revealed that participants in the tolerance condition ( $M = 0.19, SE = 0.03$ ) were less likely to actually engage themselves in solidarity-based collective action than those in the multiculturalism condition ( $M = 0.35, SE = 0.04$ ),  $OR = 0.43, SE = 0.29, \zeta = 2.99, p = .003$ . However, as compared to the control condition ( $M = 0.25, SE = 0.04$ ), neither the multiculturalism condition ( $OR = 1.59, SE = 0.43, \zeta = 1.73, p = .084$ ) nor the tolerance condition ( $OR = 0.68, SE = 0.20, \zeta = 1.33, p = .183$ ) showed a significant influence on solidarity-based collective action behaviour. Hence, we concluded that partial evidence supported the notion that an ingroup norm of tolerance (vs. control) can undermine solidarity-based collective action intentions and behaviour (i.e. Hypothesis 1).


We then tested our second group of hypotheses stating that an ingroup norm of multiculturalism (vs. control) would increase solidarity-based collective action intentions among leftists (i.e. Hypothesis 2a) while decreasing it among rightists (i.e. Hypothesis 2b). We first performed the same regression analysis on solidarity-based collective action intentions as in Study 1. This analysis indicated that the interaction between X2 and political ideology was significant, whereas the interaction between X1 and political ideology was not (see Table 2). Simple slope analyses of the significant interaction (see Figure 3) revealed that an ingroup norm of tolerance *decreased* solidarity-based collective action intentions only among leftists,  $B = -0.59, SE = 0.21, t(402) = -2.84, p = .005$ , with no significant effect among rightists,  $B = 0.01, SE = 0.21, t(402) = 0.05, p = .962$ . We further performed logistic regression to predict solidarity-based action behaviour with X1, X2, political ideology as well as the X1  $\times$  Political Ideology and X2  $\times$  Political Ideology interactions, showing both interactive effects were not significant (see Table 3). Taken together, these findings did not support Hypotheses 2a and 2b.

<sup>7</sup>Again, the significant difference in solidarity-based collective action intentions between the tolerance and control conditions disappeared after including personal attitudes towards multiculturalism and personal attitudes towards tolerance as control variables in the model.

**TABLE 2** The interactive effects of ingroup norms and political ideology on solidarity-based collective action intentions (Study 2).

Predictors	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
X1	0.58	0.38	1.51	.131
X2	-1.02	0.39	-2.61	.008
Political ideology	-0.43	0.08	-5.54	<.001
X1 × Political Ideology	-0.09	0.10	-0.85	.397
X2 × Political Ideology	0.21	0.10	2.01	.045
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.22			

Note: X1 = ingroup norm of multiculturalism versus control, X2 = ingroup norm of tolerance versus control.



**FIGURE 3** The interactive effects of ingroup norms and political ideology on solidarity-based collective action intentions (Study 2).

**TABLE 3** The interactive effects of ingroup norms and political ideology on solidarity-based collective action behaviour (Study 2).

Predictors	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>p</i>	OR
X1	1.30	0.89	1.46	.145	3.68
X2	-0.96	0.84	-1.15	.248	0.38
Political ideology	-0.88	0.20	-4.30	<.001	0.42
X1 × Political ideology	-0.25	0.30	-0.83	.405	0.78
X2 × Political ideology	0.24	0.28	0.85	.394	1.27
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.20				

Note: X1 = ingroup norm of multiculturalism versus control, X2 = ingroup norm of tolerance versus control.

## Symbolic threat

Furthermore, to test whether symbolic threat played a mediation role in the relationship between ingroup norms and solidarity-based collective action measures (i.e. Hypotheses 3, 4a and 4b), we

first performed the same ANOVA as we did before, suggesting a non-significant effect of the experimental manipulation on symbolic threat,  $F(2, 405) = 2.09, p = .125, \eta_p^2 = .01$ . Furthermore, we fitted a regression model to predict symbolic threat with X1, X2, political ideology as well as the  $X1 \times$  Political Ideology and  $X2 \times$  Political Ideology interactions. This analysis suggested that neither of the interactive effects were significant (see Table 4). These results indicated no ground for further mediation analyses. Consequently, we concluded that no evidence supported the mediating role of symbolic threat in the experimental effects on solidarity-based action intentions and behaviour (i.e. Hypotheses 3, 4a and 4b).

## Discussion

Overall, Study 2, again, provided evidence supporting Hypothesis 1, demonstrating that an ingroup norm about tolerance (vs. control) diminished solidarity-based collective action intentions. However, neither Hypothesis 2a nor Hypothesis 2b was supported: an ingroup norm about multiculturalism (vs. control) did not significantly influence solidarity-based collective action intentions and behaviour, either among ideological leftists or rightists. Moreover, symbolic threats had a limited role in mediating these effects. However, there was one effect that we did not pre-register: The dampening effect of the ingroup norm of tolerance (vs. control) on solidarity-based collective action intentions was qualified by political ideology since it was particularly observed among leftists. Taken together with the results of Study 1, these findings indicated that an ingroup norm about tolerance might weaken outgroup solidarity intentions in the broader society while the effects of the multiculturalism norm might be limited to campus settings in the Netherlands.

## UNPREREGISTERED EXPLORATORY ANALYSES

We conducted exploratory analyses to compare the multiculturalism norm and tolerance norm conditions for two reasons. First, in the analysis of the main effect of ingroup norm manipulation, the facilitative effect of a multiculturalism norm compared to a tolerance norm was replicated in both studies. Therefore, it would be interesting to further explore whether this main effect was qualified by ideology. Second, the control condition may not be as 'neutral' as we expected, since the manipulation information presented divided public opinion on multiculturalism and tolerance. Therefore, the control condition introduced a confounder, namely public opinion polarization, which may affect solidarity-based collective action in an unexpected way (Kleiner, 2018).

TABLE 4 The results on the main and interactive effects of ingroup norms and political ideology on symbolic threat (Study 2).

Predictors	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
X1	-0.83	0.42	-1.98	.049
X2	-0.08	0.42	-0.19	.848
Political ideology	0.62	0.08	7.42	<.001
X1 $\times$ Political Ideology	0.18	0.11	1.60	.111
X2 $\times$ Political Ideology	0.05	0.11	0.44	.657
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.38			

Note: X1 = ingroup norm of multiculturalism versus control, X2 = ingroup norm of tolerance versus control.

## Study 1

In the exploratory analyses, we coded ingroup norm of multiculturalism as the reference category, thus enabling both tolerance norm versus multiculturalism norm and control versus multiculturalism norm comparisons. In doing so, we generated an additional dummy variable X3 (1 = control, 0 = other conditions), along with X2 (1 = ingroup norm of tolerance, 0 = other conditions). Then, we regressed X2, X3, political ideology and the X2 × Ideology and X3 × Ideology interactions on solidarity-based action intentions. Thus, X2 compared the tolerance norm condition to the multiculturalism norm condition, whereas X3 compared the control condition to the multiculturalism norm condition. Since the latter comparison was already analysed in our pre-registered analyses, we focused on the tolerance norm vs. multiculturalism norm contrast (i.e. X2) here. As shown in Table 5, the X2 × Ideology interactive effect was significant. The simple slope analyses revealed that an ingroup norm of multiculturalism (vs. tolerance) increased solidarity-based collective action intentions among leftists ( $B = -1.22$ ,  $SE = 0.26$ ,  $t = -4.73$ ,  $p < .001$ ), but not among rightists ( $B = -0.44$ ,  $SE = 0.24$ ,  $t = -1.83$ ,  $p = .069$ ).

## Study 2

Adopting the above-mentioned approach, we built the same model to analyse solidarity-based action intention. As shown in Table 6, the X2 × Ideology interactive effect was significant. The simple slope analyses revealed that an ingroup norm of multiculturalism (vs. tolerance) increased solidarity-based collective action intentions among leftists ( $B = -0.99$ ,  $SE = 0.21$ ,  $t = -4.73$ ,  $p < .001$ ), but not among rightists ( $B = -0.13$ ,  $SE = 0.20$ ,  $t = -0.67$ ,  $p = .506$ ). Additionally, we built the same model to analyse symbolic threat, finding no significant X2 × Ideology interaction (see Table 7).

**TABLE 5** The interactive effects of ingroup norms and political ideology on solidarity-based collective action intentions (Study 1: exploratory).

Predictors	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
X2	-1.85	0.49	-3.76	<.001
X3	-1.80	0.49	-3.67	<.001
Political ideology	-0.77	0.09	-8.42	<.001
X2 × Political Ideology	0.31	0.14	2.30	.022
X3 × Political Ideology	0.40	0.15	2.76	.006
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.38			

Note: X2 = ingroup norm of tolerance versus ingroup norm of multiculturalism; X3 = control versus ingroup norm of multiculturalism.

**TABLE 6** The interactive effects of ingroup norms and political ideology on solidarity-based collective action intentions (Study 2: exploratory).

Predictors	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
X2	-1.59	0.38	-4.20	<.001
X3	-0.58	0.38	-1.51	.133
Political ideology	-0.51	0.07	-7.33	<.001
X2 × Political Ideology	0.30	0.10	3.00	.003
X3 × Political Ideology	0.09	0.10	0.85	.397
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.22			

Note: X2 = ingroup norm of tolerance versus ingroup norm of multiculturalism; X3 = control versus ingroup norm of multiculturalism.

TABLE 7 The interactive effects of ingroup norms and political ideology on symbolic threat (Study 2: exploratory).

Predictors	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
X2	0.75	0.41	1.80	.072
X3	0.83	0.42	1.98	.049
Political ideology	0.80	0.08	10.50	<.001
X2 × Political Ideology	−0.13	0.11	−1.22	.225
X3 × Political Ideology	−0.18	0.11	−1.60	.111
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.38			

Note: X2 = ingroup norm of tolerance versus ingroup norm of multiculturalism; X3 = control versus ingroup norm of multiculturalism.

TABLE 8 The interactive effects of ingroup norms and political ideology on solidarity-based collective action behaviour (Study 2: exploratory).

Predictors	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>p</i>	OR
X2	−2.27	0.88	−2.57	.010	0.10
X3	−1.30	0.89	−1.46	.145	0.27
Political ideology	−1.13	0.22	−5.07	<.001	0.32
X2 × Political Ideology	0.49	0.29	1.68	.093	1.63
X3 × Political Ideology	0.25	0.30	0.83	.405	1.29
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.20				

Note: X2 = ingroup norm of tolerance versus ingroup norm of multiculturalism; X3 = control versus ingroup norm of multiculturalism.

We further fitted a logistic model to predict solidarity-based action behaviour with X2, X3, political ideology and the X2 × Ideology and X3 × Ideology interactions. As shown in Table 8, the X2 × Ideology interactive effect was not significant.

## GENERAL DISCUSSION

In two studies conducted on campus and in a broader societal context in the Netherlands, we found evidence supporting Hypothesis 1 that an ingroup norm of tolerance (vs. control) can undermine the ethnic majority group's engagement in solidarity-based collective actions in support of ethnic minorities. However, this effect became non-significant after accounting for personal attitudes towards multiculturalism and tolerance as control variables (see Appendix S3). Additionally, Study 1 suggested that an ingroup norm of multiculturalism (vs. control) facilitated solidarity-based collective actions. This influence was present mainly among ideological leftists rather than rightists, thus supporting Hypothesis 2a but not Hypothesis 2b. However, these effects of ingroup norm of multiculturalism (vs. control) were not replicated in Study 2, where we found an ingroup norm of tolerance (vs. control) dampened solidarity-based collective actions among ideological leftists (but not rightists). Nonetheless, the facilitative effect of ingroup norm of multiculturalism (vs. tolerance) on solidarity-based collective actions, albeit not pre-registered, was consistently replicated across studies in exploratory analyses. This influence was particularly found among ideological leftists (instead of rightists).

## Implications

Our findings give some insight into the roles of social norms pertaining to multiculturalism and tolerance in mobilizing (or sedating) the ethnic majority group's collective actions in solidarity with ethnic

minorities on Dutch campuses and in the broader Dutch society. While previous research has regarded both multiculturalism and tolerance as anti-prejudice values (Verkuyten et al., 2020, 2023), we made a distinction between a norm of multiculturalism and a norm of tolerance both theoretically and operationally (also see Bağcı et al., 2020). In essence, multiculturalism encourages the positive celebration of differences between the ethnic majority and minority groups, while tolerance emphasizes the passive forbearance of an outgroup culture and inaction for the sake of peace. Our research cautions that while tolerance may improve intergroup relations, it concurrently heightens the inclination of majority group members to evade intergroup conflicts, possibly to sustain an illusionary harmony. This, in turn, seems to discourage collective actions aimed at addressing the existing unequal status quo.

The current findings also inform the approach to bridging the gap between the principle and implementation of ethnic equality. As identified by previous research on attitudes towards ethnic equality (Dixon et al., 2017), the ethnic majority group tends to endorse equality as an ideal but exhibits hesitancy in translating this commitment into actions. Our research suggests that conveying a principle of multiculturalism (i.e. a form of actively supporting ethnic equality) as a social norm may serve as a catalyst for its effective implementation, especially in campus settings. By encouraging the majority group's collective actions in support of ethnic minorities, multiculturalism norms can empower social change towards a more equal future in intergroup relations at least on Dutch university campuses.

In addition, the current research is relevant to the literature on the psychological basis of ideology (Jost et al., 2008, 2009, 2017). Our findings demonstrate that people do not automatically and necessarily accept multiculturalism norms and thus embrace social change for minority groups; instead, only people who hold particular ideological beliefs are influenced by multiculturalism norms. In theory, since the principle of multiculturalism matches leftists' values, they are more likely to attend and accept a norm of multiculturalism and follow it as their course of action to promote social change (Becker, 2020). In contrast, as ideological rightists tend to defend the status quo by justifying inequality (Jost et al., 2017), they are less likely to accept and adapt themselves to multiculturalism norms aimed at changing the present status relations between the majority group and ethnic minorities. While the findings of Study 1 supported this theorisation, Study 2 unexpectedly revealed that a norm of tolerance diminished only leftists' engagement in solidarity-based collective action. One plausible explanation was that ideological leftists particularly relied their judgements on the moral intuition of fairness and were thus generally more sensitive to changes in normative opinions on ways to deal with intergroup fairness (Graham et al., 2009). A second reason for the influence of the tolerance norm among leftists in Study 2 may be that rightists' lower baseline level of solidarity-based collective action intentions allowed less room for further reduction by a norm of tolerance (rightists' baseline score in the control condition:  $M = 1.99$ ,  $SE = 0.09$ ; leftists' baseline score in the control condition:  $M = 3.12$ ,  $SE = 0.09$ ).

## Limitations

A major limitation of the current studies is that our data failed to tell whether a norm of multiculturalism can increase intentions to engage in solidarity-based collective actions or a norm of tolerance can reduce them as compared to a condition where no clear normative information was provided, due to the inconsistent findings of Study 1 and Study 2. Although in both studies, a norm of tolerance, compared to the control condition, consistently showed a dampening effect on solidarity-based collective action intentions, results became more complicated after taking into account the control variables. In addition, the findings were mixed regarding the interactive effect of ingroup norms and ideology. In Study 1, a norm of *multiculturalism* (vs. control) increased solidarity-based collective action intentions among ideological leftists, whereas in Study 2, a norm of *tolerance* (vs. control) reduced these intentions among ideological leftists.

One explanation for this discrepancy might be that students (in Study 1) stayed on more multicultural campuses and received pro-diversity education compared to lay people (in Study 2) and were thus more sensitive to the norm of multiculturalism. That is, given the pro-diversity spaces on Dutch

university campuses that provide the flourishing of idealistic liberal environments about intergroup equality, it makes sense to observe that especially leftist students with majority group memberships are motivated by multiculturalist norms to show their solidarity with students from minority groups. On the other hand, it is less clear what multicultural norms may promote in the wider Dutch society, especially in the current climate of intense political debate surrounding Dutch immigration policy (Albada et al., 2021). Thus, this current political context in the Netherlands may have hindered the potential effects of multicultural norms on the solidarity of native Dutch citizens with immigrants, regardless of their political ideology.

Another reason may be that, in the current research, the importance of social identities and ingroup norms may vary from one study to another. In particular, the focus on native Dutch students in Study 1 and native Dutch citizens in Study 2 may have had different implications for outgroup solidarity. That is, beyond the differences between the liberal campus environment and the politically intense climate in Dutch society, student identity might be much more defined and imbued with leftist ideals (cf. Ince et al., 2018), whereas native Dutch identity might be very vaguely tied to such ideals (Lazëri & Coenders, 2023). Consequently, we might have found the outgroup solidarity-inducing effects of multiculturalism among students but not among citizens. Hence, research should delve deeper into such nuances regarding contexts and social identities.

Besides such nuances, the meaning of multiculturalism as a concept is more complex than how we have defined and operationalized it in this research. For example, instead of an active celebration of other cultures, multiculturalism can also be understood as a context of intergroup dialogue 'in which cultural differences can be questioned and discussed without aggression or oppression (Urbiola et al., 2022, p. 77)'. From this perspective, majority group members can refrain from expressing solidarity with minorities as long as intergroup relations do not involve oppression (or intergroup transgressions; Çakmak et al., 2024). In our studies, we simply manipulated ingroup norms of multiculturalism and tolerance and directly measured majority group members' intentions to show solidarity with minorities without presenting them with cues about oppression. Inconsistent findings across studies may also be due to this factor; therefore, future research should consider alternative understandings of multiculturalism.

Furthermore, the mechanism through which the norms of multiculturalism and tolerance influence solidarity-based collective action intentions remains unclear. Although we initially considered symbolic threat as a potential psychological mechanism, our results revealed a limited mediating role of it. Future research should delve deeper into exploring the psychological mechanisms involved. Additionally, the cross-sectional nature of our mediation analysis limits the strength of conclusions regarding a causal relationship between the mediator and the dependent variable. To bolster the evidence for this chain of processes, stronger support could be obtained through experimental manipulations of the mediator.

Another limitation that needs to be addressed is the nature of the experimental control condition. As exploratory analyses showed, after excluding the control condition, we consistently found that multiculturalist ingroup norms (compared to tolerance norms) promote minority solidarity among majority group members. This raises concerns about whether the control condition is truly a control condition. In our studies, not only did the control condition differ from the norm manipulation conditions in terms of whether tolerance and multiculturalism were equally endorsed, but it also varied the ambiguous 'I don't know' option (i.e. 25% in the control condition vs. 7.6% in the norm manipulation conditions). This unequal representation of the 'I don't know' option may have given participants a sense that society may feel torn between two sides and therefore reluctant to act to promote social change in favour of minorities (i.e. felt ambivalent about social change; see Ton et al., 2023). This casts doubt on what the control condition conveyed to participants. A better control condition might keep the 'I don't know' option at the same level as the other conditions while representing preferences for multiculturalism and tolerance at more or less equal percentages. Future research should take this drawback into account.

Finally, our regression analyses of interactive effects might be underpowered since we relied the power analysis solely on G\*Power. Recent developments in psychological statistics have questioned the effectiveness of G\*Power in addressing interactive effects. Sommet et al. (2023), for instance,

pinpointed power miscalculations of studies using G\*Power for interactive effects and introduced a shiny app that takes into account interactive effects for  $2 \times 2$  designs more accurately (see <https://intxpower.com/>). Specifically, they showed that G\*Power-based interaction calculations only account for the main differences between experimental factors, but do not account for the within-factor sub-differences. It thus appears that our power calculation reliably accounts for the main experimental effects, but not the shape of the interaction. This may be the reason why we could not replicate the interactive effects between ingroup norms and political ideology across studies. Future research should carefully consider the issue of power, both to rule out this potential explanation in our research and to adopt more rigorous methods of statistical treatment of interactive effects prior to data collection in the field more generally.

## CONCLUSION

The present work provides evidence for the positive role of multiculturalism norms (and a negative role of tolerance norms) in fostering the ethnic majority group's collective actions in solidarity with ethnic minorities, with the recognition that such a role is qualified by ideology. Beyond the theoretical insights discussed earlier and potential avenues for further research, these findings bear promise for tangible efforts in effecting social change. By better understanding how, why and for whom norms of multiculturalism and tolerance can mobilize or hinder solidarity-based collective actions, we are able to inform real-world interventions aimed at promoting social change for more equal intergroup relations, and for the betterment of society at large.

## AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

**Feiteng Long:** Conceptualization; data curation; formal analysis; funding acquisition; investigation; methodology; project administration; resources; software; supervision; validation; visualization; writing – original draft; writing – review and editing. **Hakan Çakmak:** Conceptualization; data curation; formal analysis; funding acquisition; investigation; methodology; project administration; resources; software; supervision; validation; visualization; writing – original draft; writing – review and editing.

## CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATEMENT

The authors have no conflicts of interest to declare.

## OPEN RESEARCH BADGES



This article has earned Open Data, Open Materials and Preregistered Research Design badges. Data, materials and the preregistered design and analysis plan are available at <https://osf.io/65sb2/> and <https://osf.io/uy5n6>.

## DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The data that support the findings of these studies are openly available in OSF at <https://osf.io/65sb2>.

## ORCID

Feiteng Long  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4057-8945>

Hakan Çakmak  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4617-4191>

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## SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Additional supporting information can be found online in the Supporting Information section at the end of this article.

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