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Artistic practices of historical sound: memory, imagination, and mimesis in contemporary composition and historical performance

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4_Illusion, Capture, and Aphasia in the Negative Archive

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One discipline that has sincerely attempted to play this mediating role between subjective and objective inquiry since its inception is critical theory. In his recent history of the field, the critical theorist Bernard Harcourt [1963–] introduces it with a quote from Karl Marx [1818–1883]:

‘The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world, in various ways,’ Karl Marx wrote in his notebooks in 1845, ‘the point, however, is to *change* it.’ These now-famous words sealed the birth certificate of critical philosophy, although many had foreshadowed it earlier, including Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the Levellers, Saint Francis, or even, on some readings, the prophetic traditions long before. What they all shared—and would share with later critical theorists such as Max Horkheimer, Michel Foucault, Angela Davis, Judith Butler, and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak—was the ambition to infuse the world with the values of compassion, equality, solidarity, autonomy, and social justice. To turn the contemplative philosophical tradition into a practice of emancipation. To push thought in the direction of action and toward human liberation. To convert theory into practice.¹

Allow me to segment my interest here. There are a few key ingredients of such a proposition that will be useful to my purposes, but others that are simply circumstantial. What’s key is the particular combination of a foundation in philosophy, broadly construed, an attachment to practical concerns of individuals in their own present context, and a desire to marry these two. What’s a bit more circumstantial in this case is the desire to instrumentalize such a practice towards “compassion, equality, solidarity, autonomy, and social justice”—this is certainly a worthy cause, just not one I see as particularly relevant to the topic at hand. It’s also important to segment my interest in critical theory chronologically, as it also underwent the very same transition Hayden White described for the historical discipline, which Harcourt describes as an “epistemological detour” for critical theory. This allows him to place the work

¹ Bernard Harcourt, *Critique and Praxis: A Radical Theory of Illusions, Values, and Action* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020), 1. Harcourt quotes Karl Marx, “Eleventh Thesis,” *Theses on Feuerbach* [first published 1845], in *The German Ideology* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1938).

of Max Horkheimer [1895–1973] and Theodor Adorno [1903–1969] not as eponymous stand-ins for the discipline at large—as others have done—but simply as instigators of a more localized crisis moment. The following will sound familiar:

The tension at the heart of Horkheimer’s project for critical theory stemmed from the conflict between two intellectual tendencies [...] The first tendency was a certain type of reflexive and historical constructivism; the second, a deep commitment to Marx and an aspiration to scientific Marxism. The confrontation between the two pushed early critical theory toward a scientism that was entirely at odds with its own constructivism and antipositivism.²

This is another observation of tension between a self-oriented constructivism and an other-oriented positivism—in other words, the subject-object problem. It can be analogized to White’s observation that the traditional historian resisted engagement with, on one side, “the arcane strata of human consciousness and [...] contemporary modes of literary representation,”³ and, on the other side, “the monistic explanatory systems of a militant idealism in philosophy and an equally militant positivism in science.”⁴ But while White places the traditional historian in the middle of this tension between a perceived opposition of art and science, Harcourt paints his intellectual landscape as one of more direct opposition between the two, with traditional Marxists on the scientific side and participants in the post-1950s epistemological detour on the other.

Harcourt’s reading of critical theory is not as dire as White’s of history, as “new ways of thinking about truth and ideology emerged, liberated from the deceptive charms of analytic philosophy.”⁵ Writings such as those by Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, or Bruno Latour could be incredibly powerful as an *unmasking* of epistemological fallacies or of latent value assumptions embedded within powerful political and social institutions, especially those of an aspirationally scientific sociology or economics. The problem was that this conceptual labour “subtly diverted critical philosophy from its

² Ibid., 56.

³ Hayden White, *Tropics of Discourse* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 28.

⁴ Ibid., 27.

⁵ Harcourt, 8.

true ambition—to change the world. The task, once again, was to *know* it.”⁶ This detour in essence reverts critical theory back to the abstract philosophical origins out of which it grew in early Marxism. Yet at the same time, critical theorists’ anti-foundationalism makes that task of *knowing* with any degree of certainty so vexing that it becomes impossible to say much of anything meaningful at all.

At the core of the contestation, there was an epistemological disagreement about foundations that kept pushing the controversies and debates further down the epistemological detour: whether and how critical theory could ground itself in truth, such as through notions of progress, reason and rationality, learning processes, or communication and discourse; whether and how critical theory needed to be correct and objective; whether and how it needed to resemble a sociology and incorporate empirical research, or achieve something that could be thought of as objectively right [...] Of course, critical theory would always remain reflexive, and in that sense postpositivist; but the antifoundational contestation kept raising epistemological questions that challenged the foundations of critical theory.⁷

In short, critical theory became seized with uncertainty and disagreement over the most fundamental principles of its observational and explanatory mechanisms. The essence of the discipline was therefore no longer really the goal of “transforming human existence,” as it was first necessary “to clear the epistemological ground, to unveil the ideological interferences, and to let others see properly.”⁸ The discipline became more about a conceptualization of truth than a practice of social emancipation. It reverted to a kind of philosophy that was divorced from general practicality.

There are clear parallels to the historical performance of music. This same clearing of the epistemological ground was the topic of the authenticity debates of the 1980s. At that time, Daniel Leech-Wilkinson observed that,

⁶ Ibid., 9. Emphasis mine.

⁷ Ibid., 96–97.

⁸ Ibid., 7–8.

[h]istorical research may provide us with instruments, and sometimes even quite detailed information on how to use them; but the gap between such evidence and a sounding performance is still so great that it can be bridged only by a large amount of musicianship and invention.⁹

Alongside others at the time, Leech-Wilkinson pointed out that there simply isn't enough information about music that predates phonographic recording to actually verify whether an 'authentic' interpretation has been achieved. So 'authentic' performance—being the output of practices in Early Music—becomes a kind of *illusion* of historicism.

At each stage his own contribution is that of a contemporary (i.e. late 20th-century) musician, subject to the assumptions and tastes of his time. And the illusion that he has, on the contrary, been involved in an 18th-century experience is sustained only by the larger illusion that contemporary performance styles—in contrast to the interpretative excesses of earlier 20th-century artists—are largely uncoloured by personal involvement.¹⁰

This is an observation of the inevitable role of the self in shaping practices that aspire to scientific objectivity and neutrality. In all cases of musical performance, the individuality of the performer gets fused to the (metaphorical) objecthood of the music they play. And when one wishes to play older and older music where less and less information is available about it, the impact of this performative individuality becomes more and more pronounced. Musicians involved in historical performance practice have known this for a long time. It's evident in the quotes in the previous chapter from both Arnold Dolmetsch and Heinrich Schenker. The issue at hand is not *whether* the subject of the performer colours the object of the historical music, but *what should be done* about this.

Richard Taruskin extended this interpretation of aspirationally 'authentic' performance practices to aspirationally neutral editorial practices in musicology.

⁹ Daniel Leech-Wilkinson, "What we are doing with early music is genuinely authentic to such a small degree that the word loses most of its intended meaning," *Early Music*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Feb., 1984), 13–16.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 13.

All too often the sound of a modern 'authentic' performance of old music presents the aural equivalent of an Urtext score: the notes and rests are presented with complete accuracy and an equally complete neutrality [...] Nothing is allowed to intrude into the performance that cannot be 'authenticated'. And this means nothing can be allowed that will give the performance, in the sense in which we first defined the word, the authenticity of conviction."¹¹

And this is a trend Leech-Wilkinson saw as well:

Criticism presupposes a critic, and a critic is one who judges and chooses. But we often encounter a curious reluctance on the part of textual editors to exercise that function. Instead there has been a quixotic quest for mechanistically infallible techniques. The ostensible motive is to eliminate human error, but the underlying motive is the wish to eliminate the responsibility of applying judgement.¹²

In the terminology of my opening icons of Cartesian musical practice, the trends Taruskin and Leech-Wilkinson describe all land squarely on the objectivist side. The performer or editor goes to great lengths in their methodologies for research and practice to erase themselves as fully as possible such that their work may deal with its object as if 'on its own terms.' If successful, this will allow them to claim truth for their research outputs analogously as strong as Cartesian truths about geometry and other abstract mathematical and logical concepts.

But what happens if we admit this to be impossible, and if we truly look for an alternative? Perhaps not all participants in what became the historically-informed performance movement after the 1980s actually lost faith in the possibility of an at least semi-objective practice of recreating historical music, but Taruskin and Leech-Wilkinson certainly did. Yet I've always found a bit odd what this debate led Taruskin to suggest:

It seems to me that the special opportunity, and the special task, of a movement in musical interpretation that aspires to authenticity is to foster an approach to performance that is founded to an unprecedented degree on

¹¹ Richard Taruskin, "The authenticity movement can become a positivistic purgatory, literalistic and dehumanizing," *Early Music*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Feb., 1984), 6.

¹² *Ibid.*, 3.

personal conviction and on individual response to individual pieces. Such an approach will seek to bring to consciousness and thereby to transcend the constraints that are variously imposed by fashion, by conventional training, by historical evidence, and even, or especially, by our intuition. And this means, ultimately, cultivating an essentially sceptical frame of mind that will allow no 'truth' to pass unexamined.¹³

For some reason, Taruskin decides in this moment to skip over what I'm certain he knows to be the underlying attachments that *drive* the Early Music movement, and instead fixates on the mere word 'authenticity' itself. He points out the alternate definition of 'authenticity' as "knowing what you mean and whence comes that knowledge. And more than that, [...] knowing what you are, and acting in accordance with that knowledge."¹⁴ In this moment, he seems to merely deflect the actual difficulties of historical epistemology. We are again in a situation where we could achieve a kind of rhetorical musical practice that presents the performing subject in relation to the historical music they play, but along the way we've lost any indication that what that performer is doing is a historical act. We regain 'authenticity,' but at the expense of historicity. We've only moved ourselves into the other side of our founding paradox—that of a perfect originality. This binary of historical versus personal authenticity simply isn't good enough. We need a more sophisticated epistemology than we'll be able to find through a binary of true and false.

What Taruskin could have suggested, instead of taking his lexical turn toward alternate dictionary definitions of 'authentic,' was that the problem with the Early Music movement in the 1980s was an oversimplification of the relationship between evidence of historical performance practices and their use in the present. This would keep us more firmly within the initially identified problem concerning the *truthfulness to the past* of a musical performance. And this is precisely the problem Harcourt identifies in the "epistemological detour" of critical theory. Harcourt begins to unpack this by asking *why* this concept of truthfulness has value to critical theorists.

The claim to truth, validity, and certainty in political, legal, and moral philosophy is nothing more than the quest for a solid foundation on which to ground oneself or to convince others—to assure oneself that one is

¹³ Ibid., 8.

¹⁴ Ibid., 3.

living a good life, to persuade others that one is right, to convince others that one's way of living is good or better, to induce others to do as one says.¹⁵

This exposition of the *use value* of claims to truth is a crucial move in escaping the epistemological detour for Harcourt. He makes a distinction along the lines of Giambattista Vico's "physical phenomena" and "human nature." The claim to truth is, in Harcourt's formulation, something like a rhetorical analogy that lends strength to the political, legal, or moral assertions to follow, rendering them—the critical theorist may hope—more likely to be adopted by their readers.

But humans are not mere physical matter, so the same level of *immutability* that is essential to the rules governing physical matter is not actually appropriate here. Alongside Vico, Harcourt identifies and laments a persistent mistranslation into the humanistic realm of a type of epistemology that's only really suited to abstract mathematics and the physical sciences. The resemblance between them is striking. Per Harcourt:

It is precisely at those moments, when we claim truth, when we claim validity for others, that we have exceeded the bounds. We have borrowed from metaphysics a type of certainty that does not belong in politics or law or morality. And it is precisely here that we need to be more careful and honest about the noun *truth* and the adjective *true*. This is especially the case for critical philosophers who know that they should limit truth to ontology and epistemology at most, and yet they extend it or its cognate family of terms (reality, certainty, rightness, correctness) to the political and moral realms, and even the ethical realm. Critical philosophers claim to understand the family kinship and parallels, the differences between an assertion of truth in the context of a statement of fact and in the context of a moral judgment; but as evidenced above, so often they simply elide the differences and call for truth in politics. When they deploy that term, they gesture toward a more permanent or universal statement about the human condition. But that is actually unnecessary. At most, they may have temporary, punctual determinations about what all the best evidence suggests right now, which they should call their better interpretation. When we have to act, of course, we need to decide on the better interpretation. We may engage in the epistemological work of unmasking to try to rid ourselves of an illusion.

¹⁵ Harcourt, 185.

But at some point, when we must act, we do, and the model we use, most often, is a rough-and-ready juridical model: we review the evidence and decide based on a burden and a standard of proof.¹⁶

Per Vico:

Since, in our time, the only target of our intellectual endeavours is truth, we devote all our efforts to the investigation of physical phenomena, because their nature seems unambiguous; but we fail to inquire into human nature which, because of the freedom of man's will, is difficult to determine. A serious drawback arises from the uncontrasted preponderance of our interest in the natural sciences. Our young men, because of their training, which is focused on these studies, are unable to engage in the life of the community, to conduct themselves with sufficient wisdom and prudence; nor can they infuse into their speech a familiarity with human psychology or permeate their utterances with passion. When it comes to the matter of prudential behaviour in life, it is well for us to keep in mind that human events are dominated by Chance and Choice, which are extremely subject to change and which are strongly influenced by simulation and dissimulation (both pre-eminently deceptive things). As a consequence, those whose only concern is abstract truth experience great difficulty in achieving their means, and greater difficulty in attaining their ends. Frustrated in their own plans, deceived by the plans of others, they often throw up the game. Since, then, the course of action in life must consider the importance of the single events and their circumstances, it may happen that many of these circumstances are extraneous and trivial, some of them bad, some even contrary to one's goal. It is therefore impossible to assess human affairs by the inflexible standard of abstract right; we must rather gauge them by the pliant Lesbian rule, which does not conform bodies to itself, but adjusts itself to their contours.¹⁷

Embedded within both of these quotes is an assumption that political or otherwise human-institutional situations are so constantly shifting and open to innumerable divergent interpretations that to enter them with a rigid, scientific (or scientistic, perhaps) idea of truth is wholly unproductive. The relevant questions in such contexts are not what is correct, true, certain, universal, or real, but how an individual

¹⁶ Ibid., 186; emphasis his.

¹⁷ Vico, *Study Methods*, 33-34. I should point out that in the context of the present quote, clear theories of gender roles or characteristics are not presented; Vico's contrast between inflexibility as masculine and compliance as feminine seems merely incidental to the point at hand, and doesn't rely on this characterization of gender actually being true for its rhetorical efficacy.

might *decide* to live and why, or how we as groups of people might decide to structure our social institutions and why. If humans are believed to have free will, structures of knowledge designed only to correctly describe what they *see* are of limited value. The pertinent questions are those, to use Leech-Wilkinson's aforementioned descriptors of a proper critic, of *judgment* and of *choice*—they are about what people *do*.

An objectivist approach to issues of human culture fails because it neglects to understand its assertion of truth as a rhetorical move, as simply one more persuasive tool within a skilled orator's collection—and not a very sharp one, at that. In Harcourt's opinion, the implication of truth within matters of moral or critical philosophy

actually weakens arguments because it allows the other side to seize on any bit of uncertainty and use that differential to demonstrate that we are making truth up. It also distracts from the larger political question of the kind of world we want to live in and of what we believe in.¹⁸

By critiquing both the positivists and the sceptics along these lines, Harcourt strives to place a new conceptual framework somewhere beyond each of their pitfalls and their antagonisms toward each other. He names this new framework a “radical critical philosophy of illusions,” which I believe, along with two adjacent problematizations from Ann Laura Stoler and Stephen Wright, can provide case studies toward a more *rhetorical* musicianship.

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Harcourt pushes beyond his dialectic of positivism and scepticism by reclaiming a productive potential he sees in the exchange of diverse and ephemeral instances of critical judgment. A “radical critical philosophy of illusions [...] unveils not to discover truth, rather to offer a productive interpretation that can animate praxis, but that will quickly need to be critiqued.”¹⁹ This productive interpretation is what he calls an ‘illusion,’ in quite a strikingly indignant counter to Cartesian or otherwise scientific ideologies

¹⁸ Harcourt, 187.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 190.

that can only equate illusion with *defect*. This may offer a path beyond the problem of subjectivity in the historical performance of music. The unmasking, the problematization, and the deconstruction from critical theory's epistemological detour remain, though not to identify the *actual* or *deeper* truth, but rather the most just form of action for the present moment. The conceptual and practical result of this process is a new illusion, which will in turn need to endure that same process of critique and re-evaluation of practice shortly after it is created. And so on and so forth.

In a radical critical philosophy of illusions, each utterance, every instance of critique and iteration of a practice, is cast as a fiction: not a fiction that pushes its practitioner to scepticism or esotericism but that provides insight into real problems in the real world. However, it is also a fiction that yet still must almost immediately be subject to new critique, to a further revision of practice, to adaptation to a yet further changed understanding. Theory here does not uncover the essence beneath the façade. Each moment of theorization overcomes the inevitable shortcomings of one illusion by replacing it with yet another illusion with different shortcomings of its own. Productive potential lies in those points of misalignment, those moments where the present illusion in some way fails and in so failing instigates a reformulation of understanding that will be effective in a limited way for a limited time before itself failing and needing to be reformulated. All the while, praxis must be kept up. The right answer or the best approach will never be found. One must simply continue to work, theorize, adapt, work more, theorize more, and adapt again.

It's possible to see parallels with historiographical approaches such as Niall Ferguson's "virtual history," in which plausible imaginings of what *might have been*—but never actually was—are placed alongside traditional historical narratives as a way of complicating the historian's presentation of the systems of imagination, hope, fear, and desire that motivated human action in the past, just as they do now.²⁰ But Ferguson's approach leaves the idea of a known truth intact—to suggest that something *might have been but wasn't* implies that you already know what *was*. So it's perhaps more similar to recent work by John Conway, Darren Naish, and C. M. Koseman in the field of paleoart, the visual depiction of prehistoric life, which negotiates information scarcity by presenting many diverse guesses alongside each

²⁰ Niall Ferguson, *Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals* (New York: Basic Books, 1995).

other instead of a single ‘best’ guess.²¹ Instead of asking oneself what was *most* likely, Conway, Naish, and Koseman ask what possibilities may seem incredibly *unlikely* yet are still technically *plausible* given the available evidence. In other words, instead of asking what is the *most* plausible explanation, one asks what are *all the* plausible explanations?

Harcourt’s idea of illusion, as well as the other examples from Ferguson, and Conway, Naish, and Koseman, were the inspiration behind the final track, “Ten,” on the album *The Aviary*.²² Like “Nine,” it uses notation from Vivaldi’s *Quattro Stagioni*, only this time the second movement of “L’Autunno.” But the historiographical conceit is different than in “Nine,” using instead this idea of a production of critical illusion following Harcourt, and a stretching of plausibility following Conway, Naish, and Koseman.

²¹ John Conway, Darren Naish, and C. M. Koseman, *All Yesterdays: Unique and Speculative Views of Dinosaurs and Other Prehistoric Animals* (UK: Irregular Books, 2012).

²² Carlo Diaz, *The Aviary* (2022), <https://carlodiaz.com/music/the-aviary>.

II

Ubriachi dormienti. Fà ch'ogn' uno tralasci e balli e canti L'aria

Adagio

Sordini

(Sordini)

Sordini

Il cembalo arpeggio

ch' temperate dà piacere, E la Stagion ch' invita tanti e tanti d'un

dolcissimo Sonno al bel godere.

**) in print Adagio molto*

Figure 4.1: The first page of a score for the second movement of Antonio Vivaldi's

"L'Autunno," RV 293, edited by Newell Jenkins.

Instead of asking what the most historically plausible interpretation of this music might be, I was curious to understand just how far I could push away from other interpretations I've heard without explicitly contradicting the instructions in the score. This composition, like all movements of Vivaldi's *Le Quattro Stagioni*, is matched to a poem, and it's tempting to use the analogical vagaries at such an interface between music and poetry to inspire deviant interpretations. The poem for this movement reads as follows:

Fà ch' ogn' uno tralasci e balli e canti	They all forget their cares, and dance to greet
L'aria che temperata dà piacere,	The air that is with joy and pleasure filled,
E la stagion ch' invita tanti e tanti	The season that holds out to all and sundry
D' un dolcissimo sonno al bel godere.	The sweetest slumber with delight instilled. ²³

It could be easy to let one's imagination run with such a depiction of careless indulgence, perhaps by adding improvisational flourishes atop the tranquil chorale of the given notes. I'd be eager to hear such a performance, but in the case of my work with Stile Nu for "Ten," my desire to present a critical perspective on and within historically-informed performance ultimately made me decide against this. A commonality between my approach in "Nine" and "Ten" is an interest in the ambiguity of—or perhaps interpretive capaciousness of—notation that might otherwise be understood as explicit and inflexible. Were I to add improvisational or otherwise melodic figures to the notated score, my intervention could be mistaken for a mere fantasy *upon* Vivaldi's composition rather than a performance *of* it. In order for my critique of notational ambiguity and interpretive breadth to remain intact, I needed to resist the tempting ambiguity of this relationship between music and poetry, and restrain myself quite closely to the printed notation, however 'inauthentic' this may actually be to how notation was used at the time Vivaldi composed the piece.

So I decided instead to look upon this notation as if from a dogmatic, literalistic perspective, but at the same time with a desire that is often antithetical to such ideology—a desire to make the furthest possible music from my own imagining of historical plausibility. I sought to understand for myself just

²³ Antonio Vivaldi, trans. Armand D'Angour, *Le Quattro Stagioni* (sonnets) [first published 1725], accessed 24 July 2023, <https://www.armand-dangour.com/2017/07/vivaldis-four-sonnets/>.

how far this notation could be bent, toward however inauthentic a result, while never allowing one to suggest that I explicitly strayed from the indications on the page. Looking at the score, the most potent critical locus of such notational ambiguity seemed to sit in the basso continuo part. Basso continuo is, of course, always something of an improvisational instruction. It provides an explicit bass line and harmonic progression but leaves the exact voicing and ornamentation to the discretion of the performer. The basso continuo part of this piece is also a particularly interesting case as regards my critical desire to push the boundaries of notational ambiguity: its bass line is extremely sparse, yet the explicit instruction to arpeggiate indicates that the desire is not for stasis but for some kind of constant motion pushing the sound forward at all times. But in how many diverse characters, and how far from a ‘typical’ interpretation, can this stasis-cum-motion be animated?

Basso continuo is certainly not a naïve or unknown improvisational practice. It doesn’t allow any imaginable possibilities fitting within its indicated harmony at a given moment in musical time. It’s believed by most musicologists to be have indicated a significantly more predetermined set of metrical, textural, gestural, and formal possibilities, which would be learned over a musician’s many years of disciplined training. Partimento books—something like compositional and keyboard performance training textbooks for young musicians in 18th-century Italy—have been an invaluable resource for understanding these otherwise opaque cultures of continuo playing. Often giving basso continuo lines alongside several possible ‘realizations’ of them, these books allow a historian to find correlations between specific bass-line and figural patterns and similarly consistent patterns in their right-hand realization. As the music theorist Robert Gjerdingen shows in detail,

a boy [a music student] was not allowed to fumble around the keyboard trying anything that might pop into his mind. The masters required a boy to operationalize memories of the basic partimento patterns by playing them in various positions in various keys. [...] [T]his involved learning [...] cadences, the Rule of Octave, some simple suspensions, and a number of interval sequences for a bass. Practiced first were the cadences and the Rule of the Octave. With those items securely in memory a boy could venture to realize [...] partimento.²⁴

²⁴ Robert Gjerdingen, *Child Composers in the Old Conservatories: How Orphans Became Elite Musicians* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 115.

In essence, students would memorize a wide array of what Gjerdingen and others have called musical ‘schemata,’ which would over the course of their adult lives as professional musicians constitute the raw materials for ‘free’ composition and for the performance of basso continuo at the keyboard. So even though continuo lines may look, to the uninitiated, like invitations for an *extraordinary degree of musical freedom* as may be seen in the use of lead sheets by modern jazz musicians, the reality of their use throughout the 18th century seems to have been a bit more regimented. However, my impression is that there was still an *extraordinary degree of freedom* in the performance of basso continuo in early 18th-century Venice, just of a different kind. Even given a relatively strict set of rules for the selection and arrangement of notes when following a written basso continuo part, there remains an extraordinary amount of expressive flexibility possible in exact rhythm, meter, dynamic, texture, articulation, and phrasing.

In the case of the second movement of “L’Autunno,” this type of expressive flexibility lies particularly in the written call for arpeggiation; namely, how fast and how consistent should it be? There’s also some, though perhaps less, flexibility in the exact voicing and registration of the figured harmonies. It is at the sonic boundaries of these parameters of the music that decisions must be made principally by imagination. My critical objective in “Ten” was to provoke this strange boundary between empirical and imaginative choices. Both are certainly at play in all performances of historical music, but often one’s goal is to render the boundary invisible—to suppress it. I wanted to make it the explicit purpose of my performance. So for me these interpretive parameters of arpeggiation and voicing were those for which I chose to pursue what one might call ‘minimally plausible’ choices, going *against* any instinctive or imaginative idea I had of what choices ‘might have’ been made by Vivaldi or his contemporaries.

as slow as possible, fermata over every note

pp 6 6 4 4 2 7 5 6 4# 2

Dampen harpsichord heavily.
Arpeggiate very rapidly using the full range of the instrument.
Should be chaotic and frantic but consistent and extremely quiet.

Figure 4.2: The beginning of the keyboard part for “Ten,” by Carlo Diaz and Stile Nu; or, the beginning of the basso continuo part for the second movement of Antonio Vivaldi’s “L’Autunno,” RV293, with interpretive notes added. For a recording, see <https://carlodiaz.com/music/the-aviary>; this is the beginning of the track titled “Ten.”

These decisions were principally to arpeggiate “very rapidly” across the “full range of the instrument,” which emboldens the overall difference in note density between the harpsichord and the strings. In practice, this also ended up creating a significant disparity in dynamic level between the harpsichord and the strings, even with the sparsest of registrations on the instrument we had available, so we made the further decision to dampen the harpsichord by placing very light fabric over the strings.

As with “Nine,” the idea was, again, not to create an authentic or even historically plausible performance of Vivaldi’s piece, but to present a rhetorical turn of phrase within a broader conversation among and between musicians and listeners about the ways in which we’re controlled by our habits and assumptions, so that we might discover something new about the past and about ourselves by disrupting those habits and assumptions. By showing just how far the notation can stretch without making any alterations, I hope to suggest that even one pursuing a ‘plausible’ interpretation could easily stray much further from the interpretive norms of 21st-century historically-informed performance, and would stand to do well by the discipline at large in offering such a *broadening* force to their peers’ and audiences’ imagination of the musical past.

Considered as what Harcourt would call an “illusion,” then, “Ten” puts forth *an* understanding of Vivaldi’s music alongside an explicit demonstration of what we *don’t* know for sure about how Vivaldi might have played it. This illusion—historical in some ways, inventive in others, correct in some ways, ready for further critique in others—allows our escape from what can be understood as the

epistemological crisis of historically-informed performance without simply regressing into an assertion of plausibility that's impossible to assess or into an entirely personal self-reflection with no relation at all to the past in question.

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In *Along the Archival Grain*, Ann Laura Stoler [1949–] examines the epistemological limitations of applying a positivistic archival-historical practice to the study of institutions that were themselves prolific producers of documentary archives. Through several case studies of “failed projects, delusional imaginings, and equivocal explanations” of colonial administrators in the 19th-century Netherlands Indies, she recasts the identity of empire as fundamentally built not upon order and reason but upon anomaly, indeterminacy, and exception. Here, archives are not sources of true knowledge about the events and people they concern but sites for the politically instrumentalized performance of aspiration and fear, and for the wilful and unwilful muddying of truth as it is actually understood at the time.²⁵ “In these chapters Dutch colonial archives serve less as stories for a colonial history than as active, generative substances with histories, as documents with itineraries of their own.”²⁶ Crucial within this sentiment is the demarcation of temporality. In the moment of their writing, documents are not recordings of events gone by or facts presently observed but practical weapons in the socio-political arsenal of imperialism. Their orientation was toward their own future, and not even as a passive prediction thereof but as a will to purposefully shape it. As Stoler continues, her project is about

archiving-as-process rather than archives-as-things. Most importantly, it looks to archives as condensed sites of epistemological and political anxiety rather than as skewed and biased sources. These colonial archives were both transparencies on which power relations were inscribed and intricate technologies of rule in themselves.²⁷

This metaphor equating written documents to photographic transparencies performs significant conceptual work throughout the book, and is paired with another photographic metaphor—negatives.

²⁵ Ann Laura Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 21.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 1.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 20.

Both are metaphors for light and inscription—in perspective, projection, and inversion—and their role in the production of knowledge. What is developed is the mirror image of what is committed to film. Sometimes what one sees is the space in which ink was *not* deposited or off of which light did *not* reflect. And how one looks can have profound effects on what one sees.

These visionary narratives were colonial negatives in more than one sense: they were cropped and re-cropped. Some were never developed. Some faded as they were overexposed to what was transpiring [...] Others were blown up and distorted out of all proportion to the social realities in which people lived. Most are absent from the historiography because they appear to be colonial debris, unfulfilled visions discarded in process. But as a pulse on the tensions and uncertainties that pervaded these moments, such refracted images command attention.²⁸

Negatives and transparencies are also tools and technologies that stand in complement—but difference—to their finished-product counterparts of the photograph and print. Not all negatives are developed nor all drafts saved. What Stoler shows us in these documents is governance in the making. She makes a distinction between this project and a history of ideas:

How much historical weight should be assigned to such a set of improbable visions that were, for the most part, never implemented? How should we treat the history of what was deemed possible but remained unrealised? What can we learn [from] aborted projects, from proposals whose circulation was interrupted, from (blue)prints that were ultimately scrapped? *This is not a return to a history of ideas, mentalities, or representations.* Instead my attention to “non-events” takes as its subject the uneven presence of what was imagined as the possible, the tension between what was realizable and what was romance, between plausible plans and implausible worlds. At issue here is not the relationship between ‘text’ and ‘context,’ but the changing force fields in which these proposals were produced. I think here for a space for ‘developing historical negatives.’ The analytic shift from the high-gloss print of history writ-large to the space of its production, the darkroom negative: from direct to refracted light, from ‘figure’ and ‘field’—that which is more often in historic relief—to the inverse, grainy texture of ‘surfaces’ and their shifting ‘grounds.’²⁹

²⁸ Ibid., 138.

²⁹ Ibid., 108. Emphasis mine.

For Stoler, the archive is not an evidence room for historians but an active battlefield. Not only must we be conscious of the ways in which our own subjectivity influences our interpretation of historical documents, but also of the ways in which many of those whose hands are involved in the creation of our archives play a similar role. And much can be learned on this front by looking not only at formal records of true events and real policies but also at those other seemingly insignificant ephemera surrounding them on the uncertain ground from which they were lifted into a firmer reality. This approach further sophisticates one's ontology. No longer are empirical facts and verifiable realities the only stuff of meaning for historical research—so too are the many confused and conflicting expressions of will, fear, and desire uttered in uncertain and inconsistent terms that occur alongside them. Yet this is only possible to reasonably incorporate within academic scholarship—in other words, it is only *not* random conjecture—when one marries it to a less universalizing epistemology such as Harcourt's radical critical philosophy of illusions.

But what does this look like in music? Think of an early sketch of a known composition—perhaps Beethoven's sketches of his *Ninth Symphony*, for a copiously documented example. One can see in these sketches some kind of prescience of the completed work. There are familiar bits and pieces that can be traced forward to their fully-formed, published versions in the final score. As Nicholas Cook points out, even this is extremely uneven epistemological ground: "Like a mirror, the sketches for the Ninth Symphony reflect the assumptions of those who interpret them."³⁰ To extend Stoler's metaphor, these sketches would be the archival negatives that *were* developed into formal events, laws, policies, or trends. But now imagine that the symphony was never finished and performed, or somehow went missing before it could be canonized. Imagine the sketches of Beethoven's *Ninth Symphony* as one of those negatives that were discarded, abandoned, forgotten, or otherwise never really made into much of significance. What do they now become? They are now dissociated from their finished product, and so perhaps come to look like raw potential instead of early prototype. But they may also become dissociated from each other, no longer bound together by their shared fate as components of a soon-to-be-finished work,

³⁰ Nicholas Cook, *Beethoven: Symphony No. 9* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 2.

suddenly positionless and purposeless within a broader and undifferentiated mass of other sketches in Beethoven's hand.




Figure 4.3: A sketch by Ludwig van Beethoven; Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Artaria 201, 111.

Stoler's negatives in a musical archive would thus not be sketches of known compositions but perhaps simply sketches; unjustified, unqualified, unreferenced; notation that has no name, no beginning, no ending, no context. It doesn't come from a work and its composer will never put it into a work. It perhaps even lacks a tempo, a key, a clef, or even sometimes rhythm or pitch. To borrow Stoler's word, it is what one might at first see as a mere "debris" of the musical archive—marginalia, backsides, pages that only seem to be between other pages.

But how does one find such material when its very definition is its lack of those usual identifying features typically used to describe, classify, sort, and locate archival documents? Here, it's worth taking

Stoler's idea a bit further than just an analogy to photographic negatives, thinking about not only archival negatives as discrete objects, but also the negative space of the archival institution as a whole, or what I've taken to calling the *negative archive*. Though Stoler's metaphors of perspective and inversion in photographic negatives certainly remain valuable in my work, this concept is different, and is more akin to something like John Cage's reflections on silence.

[T]ry as we may to make a silence, we cannot. For certain engineering purposes, it is desirable to have as silent a situation as possible. Such a room is called an anechoic chamber, its six walls made of a special material, a room without echoes. I entered one at Harvard University several years ago and heard two sounds, one high and one low. When I described them to the engineer in charge, he informed me that the high one was my nervous system in operation, the low one my blood in circulation. Until I die there will be sounds. And they will continue following my death. One need not fear about the future of music. But this fearlessness only follows if, at the parting of the ways, where it is realized that sounds occur whether intended or not, one turns in the direction of those he does not intend.³¹

What we think of as silence, then, is not the total absence of sound but its *notable* or *relative* absence. In this comparative lack of sound, one still hears, and the key question becomes: *what?* Depending on where we are, we'll always tend to find the same specific types of sounds when we decide to listen to silence with a little intention, for a little while. In a loud, highly urbanized space this might be the sound of my building creaking in the wind, which becomes noticeable only when I listen carefully during a sudden absence of the usual traffic noise. And in the quietest possible space, as Cage points out, this might be the sounds of my own body. The negative archive is not dissimilar to this. Just as one can hear silence simply by listening to it, one can see the negative archive simply by looking for it.

Its first glimmer can be found through the many possible search terms that *negate* information yet are nevertheless included in catalogue entries: 'anonymous,' 'unknown,' 'missing,' 'incomplete,' 'unfinished,' 'damaged,' 'fragment,' 'sketch,' 'miscellaneous.' These words indicate assumptions made about documents; assumptions that are in some way disrupted by the actually perceived form of those documents. 'Anonymous' is typically used when a composer is not indicated or otherwise known, rather

³¹ John Cage, *Silence: Lectures and Writings* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), 8.

than when the scribe, compiler, or owner can't be determined. 'Unknown' appears before these latter, non-composer contributors to a document, though 'unknown' can also describe many other characteristics of a document such as its chronological or geographic origin. 'Missing,' 'incomplete,' and 'unfinished' all suggest there is a clear enough idea that some kind of grouping of notation *would* constitute a *piece of music* if something weren't lacking. 'Missing,' though, tends to imply that the piece was actually finished at some point in time but lost something in the interceding years. Perhaps something is labelled a duet but there's only one part, for example. 'Damaged' points to a similar kind of relatively clear physical lacking, but in this case obviously as the result of destruction or deterioration of the physical artifact of paper and ink. Perhaps a section of a page is ripped, or ink was smeared and blotched by water, or there's a stain that obscures the writing, or the paper is crumbling away due to age. 'Incomplete' and 'unfinished,' on the other hand, tend to refer to notation that is otherwise in good physical condition but that has no indicated ending—no double bar—but they can also refer to something less definitive such as notation that seems to be a bit sparse in the middle, as if some additional melody or countermelody ought to be there. Yet all of these are different than 'fragments' or 'sketches,' which could of course also be understood as 'incomplete' or 'unfinished' pieces, but that are perhaps deemed not to have reached enough maturity to even constitute apparently discrete notational *things*—they're still a kind of musical shrapnel not (yet?) giving impressions of a singular composed form. And 'miscellaneous' implies that either the creator of the document or the creator of the catalogue entry did not see logic to its particular grouping of notation.

These search terms yield fascinating results. Consider the following:




Figure 4.4: A page from Add. MS 14245, British Library, London

This page is from a document in the British Library that was likely penned sometime between 1726 and 1761.³² At the bottom of this page there is writing in what looks to be a much later hand than the music notation, in pencil: “This had better be cut out.” Clearly, whoever wrote this was not obliged, or perhaps I’m looking at this page in its newly “cut out” and relocated position, but the remark nevertheless makes visible the nature of archiving as not only the guardianship but also the *production* of reality. Not every document can be kept, so decisions must be made. Archivists today decide what to acquire and what not to acquire. Musicians of the 18th-century—both professional and amateur—compiled personal collections of notation for everyday use and long-term remembrance. We know this because a lot of

³² Add. MS 14245, British Library, London.

people—archivists, musicians, heirs to collections, and so forth—decided to keep these collections, and then more people a generation after that, and then another, and another.

What does it mean to keep something? Or to simply not throw it away? Inversely, what does it mean to throw it away? Or even to destroy it? Each of these actions or inactions is an assignment of value and a shaping of historical time and conceivable reality. *What* exactly is kept in one moment determines what the past can look like later on. And this doesn't always have to be an active decision that something is valuable and must be preserved, or that something is harmful and must be destroyed. It can also be an *indecision* about what to do with something, which typically defaults to keeping it—perhaps tucked away in a drawer or a box or a corner or an attic or a basement somewhere. Maybe somebody else will want it later?

What we see shapes what we anticipate, and on a variety of scales—from note to note, phrase to phrase, excerpt to excerpt, document to document, archive to archive, and discipline to discipline. In this way, our ancestors shape our worldview and, a step further, the outputs of our research. Should we carry on studying historical musical cultures without asking why we're interested in what we're interested in, without asking why we're trying to answer the questions we're trying to answer, without an understanding of why we feel the way we do about what we see? The structure of the archive is itself informed by the ideologies of previous generations of historians. Are we happy to tacitly accept this or should we begin to look for their cracks and spillover?

The initial search terms I used to find such an artifact, and the only such words I believe will ever be effective in such a search, at least in the near future, are still laden with value judgments that prioritize complete pieces by known composers over these documents' quality as "expectant and conjured,"³³ to return to Stoler's language. As words of *negation*, 'anonymous,' 'unknown,' 'missing,' 'incomplete,' 'unfinished,' 'miscellaneous,' 'fragment,' 'sketch,' 'damaged' do *reveal* the musical archive as an active battlefield, a continual gestation, an infinite recycling of the raw materials of musical sound akin to musical versions of Stoler's archival negatives. Yet they don't on their own render this *meaningful*. They keep our eyes fixed upon the seemingly inescapable, seemingly *natural* end goal of complete pieces by known composers. I need something else at this point. I need to escape the grip of the composer-work

³³ Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain*, 1.

model so I can see these artifacts not as inferior precursors to fixed musical objects but in their actual present state as alive with potential.

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There is a manuscript in the British Library that mostly contains music for two violins and basso, and seems to have been compiled in the late 18th century.³⁴ The fourth page has a piece marked “Sonata,” which is unique in that it has a substantial and apparently complete beginning section and a “da capo” indicated at the end but is missing most of its middle section. The basso part simply stops short. No double bar is written and no clef or key signature is written on the following blank staves. Additionally, the writing stops at the end of a staff line, which may suggest that it was not a compositional end but something like the end of a transcription session that was then *not* picked back up later—a scribal rupture rather than a musical one. Furthermore, the violin parts that continue through the rest of the “Andante Larghetto” and on to a third section in 3/4 before the “da capo” indication (up to this point the piece had been in 4/4)—all after the basso part fell off—contain considerable portions of simultaneous rest. This suggests that either the basso may have filled in those rests or that a fourth or further part is missing entirely.

Before encountering this manuscript, I had already found a substantial number of short melodic fragments in other manuscripts. But I was worried that simply piecing them together at will would lead me to create something that was perceived as new music—new altogether, having nothing to do with the past at all. As I gathered these materials and started to play around with them compositionally, I started to realize that they didn’t necessarily come across as historical if not placed in particular kinds of contexts or played in particular ways. I recognized that I would have to undertake some kind of balancing act in order to both convey a sense of historicity in the music I made with them while still acting critically in regard to the concepts I began my research intending to problematize. The extant larger-scale structure of this particular fragment was appealing in this respect. It gave me the ability to create something that sounded like it might be historical music, even if all else failed. It was a moderately complete form that

³⁴ Add. MS 34, 074–34, 076, British Library, London.

would allow me to simply ‘fill in’ the gaps. So that’s what I did, in a piece with Stile Nu that I’ve called, as pragmatically as I could muster, *One*.

Figure 4.5: Measures 30–38 of the score used for *One* (2019). The “*2” in measure 31 indicates the beginning of the first fragment incorporated from a different notational source.

For a recording, see [https://carlodiaz.com/permalinks/Carlo_Diaz_One_\(alternate\).mp3](https://carlodiaz.com/permalinks/Carlo_Diaz_One_(alternate).mp3);

the excerpt shown here begins at 01:07.

However, this first attempt was a failure to a significant degree. The style of *One* remained relatively consistent with complete pieces written around the time of its most significant contributor of source material because the relationships between discrete fragments did not work to dislocate the characteristics of that style in any significant way. If you look closely there are of course numerous harmonic ‘errors’ with respect to any such style. Consider for example the simultaneous C, E, and F in beat three of measure 35. The F in the violin 1 part could have become a dissonant passing tone if the following note was an E, or even if any of the following sixteenth notes were an E, but this is not what happened. The violin 1 part here, as in several other places, reveals itself *not* to be truly linked to its nominal accompaniment. However, this understanding presumes a fairly sophisticated understanding of historical music theory. To someone without that background, as I have confirmed through informal conversation with several listeners, the overall impression was of something that could plausibly have been written in the 18th century by a single composer. Any listener not tipped off in advance about the provenance of this music, then, would not have noticed anything out of the ordinary. So the first impression of this music does not satisfy my goal.

But *One* was successful in a different way, almost *because* of this superficial plausibility. It sparked conversation about the issues at play in this research. Because it sounded so innocuous, the effect of learning its provenance was even more startling. The moment any of us involved in the ensemble tried to answer one of the inevitable questions from the audience—“what was that piece?,” “who composed it?,” “when was it composed?”—any understanding those audience members thought they had of this music was instantly muddled. We were forced to equivocate; to reveal that the piece was composed by me but also that the fragments were composed by other people, that we didn’t know who those other people were, that we didn’t know when those other people composed them, that we didn’t really know how they ‘would have been’ played or how they ‘would have been’ incorporated within a larger composition, and therefore that the way we performed this music was very much of our own invention. But it also wasn’t of our own invention in the sense that we still built it from some sense of style and desire for coherence conjured by the notation’s seeming to be still somehow from the 18th century. Though this being was not differentiated according to how historians often geographically and temporally classify their objects of study. We combined several different moments, places, and people into this music, from

which follows that the style of our interpretation was more temporally broad than any performance of the 18th century ‘probably would have been.’ So...*what was it that we played then?*

Armed with all the tools of university-educated, conservatory-trained, professionally experienced historically-informed performers, we still lacked any tool that could enable to us to answer. We had no idea, and our audiences didn’t either. We failed to produce the new conceptual vocabulary we were searching for, but the very structure of our music denied us the option of falling back into old ways. We confounded our own understanding in order to evade a received knowledge system. The task now remained to rebuild from this spot.

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This kind of unknowing is a phenomenon Stoler refers to as “aphasia,” a central topic in her later book, *Duress*. Here, Stoler describes empire as a continuously shape-shifting assertion of the self-evidence of its common-sense epistemologies and structures of power, and she works to re-claim scholars’ critical vocabulary in the face of these oppressive forces, which persist even into our own time.³⁵ *Duress* focuses explicitly on the persistence of colonial formations in a present understood as deeply entangled with multiple layers of pastness. At particular issue here are racial categories devised by colonial administrators as mechanisms of segregation and control that have persisted within individuals’ self-identities long after those governments and policies have been overturned.³⁶ This problem is largely a linguistic one. Stoler defines aphasia as

a condition in which the occlusion of knowledge is at once a dismembering of words from the objects to which they refer, a difficulty retrieving both the semantic and lexical components of vocabularies, a loss of access that may verge on active dissociation, a difficulty comprehending what is seen and spoken.³⁷

³⁵ Ann Laura Stoler, *Duress: Imperial Durabilities in Our Times* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016), 169.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 72.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 12.

In a sense, aphasia is a type of confusion about what things are and how to name them. But in Stoler's use it's not merely an idiosyncratic psychological condition akin to amnesia or dementia but a core socio-political feature of the post-colony.

[V]ery little of these histories has been or is actually forgotten: it may be displaced, occluded from view, or rendered inappropriate to pursue. [...] It is not a matter of ignorance or absence. Aphasia is a dismembering, a difficulty in speaking, a difficulty in generating a vocabulary that associates appropriate words and concepts to appropriate things. Aphasia in its many forms describes a difficulty in retrieving both conceptual and lexical vocabularies and, most important, a difficulty in comprehending what is spoken.³⁸

This is an experience I've encountered repeatedly in my own work. Earlier, I defended "Three" as a legitimate example of both historical performance *and* contemporary composition. Yet the understandings of these two practices that allowed me to arrive at such defences were premised upon their incommensurability with each other. The two practices could *both* be identified as members of a mutually exclusive pair. Absurd. Each line of reasoning seems sound in isolation, but looking *across* the two reveals the paradox, and I find myself unable to retrieve the words or concepts necessary to comprehend the piece in any other way.

Perhaps this is too harsh; a moment in which I simply need to accept that no analysis can fully explain a phenomenon in its full vitality. After all, isn't that what Harcourt urged in his idea of the illusion? That no explanation is entirely adequate? That the work of the critical theorist is therefore to challenge and revise a received understanding, and to do so again and again? Not quite. Accepting that others will challenge and refine one's critique is different than putting forth what one already knows to be incoherent. Harcourt advocates humility in critical theory, not approximation. Stoler, too, urges us to

resist the reversion to received terms or the retreat to those in our ready repertoire—when one knows (in those dark conversations with oneself) that one has compromised, too quickly finessed what matters, and impatiently settled for a gloss.³⁹

³⁸ Ibid., 128.

³⁹ Ibid., 21.

In her usage, aphasia is the result of domination, and therefore the proper response is resistance. Inherited terminology that has lost its historical potency—or that retains lasting power of a kind that one now believes to be inappropriate—should be supplanted. Because words don’t only describe phenomena but they *create* their meaning. They have political force.

Concepts [...] do work and work on us to authorize some questions, to refigure what questions are worth asking, and, not least, to foreclose others. Concepts have a force of their own whose gravitas can be measured, in part, by the spaces they are called on to inhabit and by the constellation of concepts that congeal around them. With respect to imperial practice, they shape the parameters of what can be construed as the ‘facts of the matter.’⁴⁰

As with *One*, “Three” doesn’t neatly fit within existing models of musical performance. When dealing with a *complete* piece of music, one can at least plausibly suggest that they are only engaged in an act of interpretation. However authentic or inauthentic, it is still nevertheless an act of recitation. Similarly, when composing music in front of a blank piece of paper, one can suggest in a plausible way that they are engaged in an act of invention. However much the result may sound like other music by other people, it is still nevertheless a creative act. But these pieces are somehow both of those acts. There is historical notation to be interpreted and there’s blank paper to be invented upon.

One could perhaps suggest that they’re a hybrid of these two practices, but there’s more to be gained by resisting this ready solution.

The sort of conceptual labour I work through here attempts a venture unyielding to easy fit, one that is about neither the ‘usage’ of concepts nor acts of ‘borrowing.’ It is, rather, an exercise in attentiveness and vigilance in a provisional, active mode. The challenge is both to discern the work we do with concepts and the work that concepts may explicitly or inadvertently exert on us. Rather than acquiesce to the resolute security that concepts may be marshalled to confer, we might better look to the unmarked space between their porous and policed peripheries, to that which hovers as not quite ‘covered’ by a concept, as ‘excess’ or ‘amiss,’ that which

⁴⁰ Ibid., 173.

cannot be quite encompassed by its received attributes, when ‘portability’ is not self-evident, to that which spills across its edges.⁴¹

What conceptual work have historical performance and contemporary composition already *done upon* me in approaching the source manuscripts I look at, in attempting to answer questions about them, and in my use of them? How can I clear all of this noise to make space to think about this work and, if I succeed at this, what conceptual tools will I have left? To how far an extreme should I extend my own conceptual “attentiveness and vigilance” to the inherited concepts acting upon me and how might I open myself up and allow myself to identify, in an “active and provisional mode,” those candidates for a new ontology that better fits my task at hand?

And what might happen to these inherited concepts of historical performance and contemporary composition in the process?

A concept accumulates force from the other concepts that congeal, collide, and rearrange themselves around it. Replacing a concept not only displaces another. It breaks up contiguities and can render invisible the mutual dependencies [...] that join them to a problem, the articulations through which they do their work.⁴²

This operative question is not only about abstract ontology but also about the practical place of this type of work in musical culture and its meaning and effect in the context of artistic research. It’s also about the roles of and possibilities for innumerable further practices, experiments, and studies of this kind. How do the many institutional and social structures of the *communities* of historical performers and contemporary composers encourage certain types of practice and discourage others, whether by steadfast rule or quiet disinterest? Even something as seemingly innocuous as an administrator of a concert venue asking for a composer and title to print in a program can have extraordinary significance. Who composed this piece and what is it called? I don’t know! But do I need to find an answer or is it the wrong question?

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⁴¹ Ibid., 9.

⁴² Ibid., 19.

In *Toward a Lexicon of Usership*, Stephen Wright [1963–] critiques, invents, retools, and retires terminology in the lexicon of art theory in light of what he calls a “usological turn” that has occurred over the past several decades as a rejection of Modernist notions of authorship, spectatorship, and expert culture.⁴³ In simple terms, it’s an act of trying to figure out what the wrong questions are. His effort is partially in line with Postmodernism in that it problematizes Modernist notions of art practice, but it displays a similar disenchantment with Postmodern critique to that of Harcourt in that it is more concerned with recalibrating toward a better future than analysing (or deconstructing) a past in-and-of itself. So really it’s more about finding the new right questions.

Wright offers a lexicon rather than a theory, a toolkit rather than a description. As much as it’s infused with theory, his work is not merely an image of the art world at present or past but a provision of effective methods for active practitioners and theorists in contemporary art to use right now. He strives not for reflection alone but for action *through* reflection; to reshape the field via his critique of it. His lexicon is inseparable from a *historical* understanding of the art world’s pre-existing conceptual foundations. It is only by looking to the origins and development of the terminology he questions that he is able to identify and—via new vocabulary—transcend the ways in which they shape the artistically *thinkable* when left unproblematized, even by an otherwise highly critical and reflexive artist.

The crucial point in relation to the authenticity debates in Early Music, however, is Wright’s very choice of the *lexicon* as a form of publication. At its heart, the authenticity problem was one of language—it was as much about the identification, justification, and description of a musical practice as it was about that practice in itself. By framing his intervention as a lexicon, Wright centres this linguistic aspect. Instead of lingering on the inadequacy of received art-theoretical concepts—whether by theoretical analysis or practice-based disruption—he works to proliferate alternative conceptualities, and does so in the understanding that they may both prove to be more effective descriptors of current art practices and that they may open up further ground for new art practices suddenly rendered thinkable. By framing his work as lexical, Wright demonstrates that he understands words as not only *descriptive* but *generative* of practices.

⁴³ Stephen Wright, *Toward a Lexicon of Usership* (Eindhoven: Van Abbemuseum, 2013).

The term Wright uses to describe this phenomenon throughout his lexicon is “capture.”⁴⁴ Capture can take many forms—lexical, ontological, institutional, ideological, logistical, operational, performative⁴⁵—and is precisely the phenomenon I described above with regard to “Nine” and “Ten” being classified as New Music. Using Wright’s terminology, this is an instance of *lexical* capture, which occurs when critical, nuanced, or otherwise complex phenomena are shoed-into existing terminology. Sometimes this happens naïvely, as a mere misunderstanding or oversimplification. Other times it’s a malignant force, either a conscious or subconscious attempt to disarm what might otherwise be potent challenges to pre-existing ontological structures. This is the type of danger that forces Wright to move beyond an ontological view of his field, in which something must be either ‘art’ or ‘not art.’ Within this framework, boundary challenges at either side don’t actually problematize the binary but simply expand each group. What may otherwise become new conceptualizations end up being wedged into these pre-formed categories. What are intended as challenges to these classifications only end up reinforcing them. The new or radical is ‘captured’ by the old or traditional.

This is what happens with projects like “Nine” and “Ten.” In institutional structures that starkly divide music into ‘new’ and ‘old’ (or perhaps ‘historical’), practices that challenge the distinction between these two simply end up being forced onto one side or the other. Historical practitioners have often suggested to me that these projects are just new pieces—part of my creative practice as a composer. Composers and improvisers have suggested exactly the opposite, that I’m not really composing anything, just playing the same old music again and again—taking a novel and intriguing approach, but still just playing the same old music. This is a problem that *One* solved, to a certain extent. On a surface level the project was still captured, though primarily from the side of historical performance. But upon digging deeper, this fit became much less clear. As is likely apparent, Wright’s concept of ‘capture’ sits in important relation to Stoler’s concept of ‘aphasia.’ Avoiding capture is a necessary but insufficient step toward an adequate conceptual framework for this music. It buys me some breathing room away from received notions of artistic invention and historical representation within which to hypothesize new

⁴⁴ Ibid., 23; also see page 1.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 23; also see page 1.

possibilities, but in this breathing room I discover a sudden feeling of aphasia, an inability to now properly name or identify the parameters of this practice. I still need a way to rebuild.

Beyond his overriding attention to the idea of lexical capture, a few specific entries in Wright's lexicon bear mentioning on this front, as his base goal is to overcome a similar dualism in the field of contemporary art. Through both revised definitions within and new additions to contemporary art vocabulary, Wright works to collapse the space between an independent, institutionalized art world (a sort of cloistering of affected *subjectivity*; analogous here to contemporary composition) and any kind of "proposition having consequences beyond the aesthetic realm"⁴⁶ (including more purportedly *objective* fields of practices; analogous here to historical performance).

Wright's entries for "1:1 scale" and "Autonomy" illustrate this move. He classifies the former as an "emergent concept (underpinning usership)," and the latter as a "conceptual institution to be retired." He introduces autonomy as a term that, "has come to denote almost the opposite of what it set out to name," shifting from a desire for greater say among artists over what work they do and how they do it to a more general cordoning off and guarding of art from anything and everything that isn't art—particularly economics and politics. But "the price to pay for autonomy," Wright argues, is that "[a]rt judged by art's standards can be easily written off as, well...*just art*. Of contemplative value to people who like that sort of thing, but without teeth."⁴⁷ Art becomes relativized. One can't argue that artists should be able to do whatever they want because art is divorced from the outside world only to turn around and expect art to have some impact on the outside world. This is why it is a *danger* for pieces such as "Nine" and "Ten" to be relegated to classification as New Music. They lose their purchase as a critique of *historical* epistemology and methodology.

The corrective for this error, this "conceptual institution to be retired," is in part located in what Wright calls 1:1 scale, drawing on Lewis Carroll's anecdote about 1:1 cartography. A mapmaker who wants to achieve perfect accuracy in their work ends up creating a 1:1 scale model of the place they are mapping. The city becomes indistinguishable from its map. The 1:1 map

⁴⁶ Ibid., 12.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 12.

undercuts some of the fundamental assumptions about scaled-back representation: its role as surrogate, its status as an abstraction, and its use as a convention that references the real to which it is subordinate. [...] It evacuates the mapping event altogether. The territory is neither mapped nor transformed in any way.⁴⁸

It's important to note here that Wright is not instrumentalizing this concept as it might be instrumentalized by historians; not according to the idea that one might write a history by merely replicating all its objects, characters, and phenomenon as precisely as possible, but as a way of disrupting the separation of art from the 'real' world. If art moves toward 1:1 mimesis *of* the real world instead of abstraction departing *from* it, it may just be able to exert real forces upon that real world. For Wright, 1:1 scale offers an escape route from the hegemony of artistic autonomy. When artistic practices no longer "look like anything other than what they also are" they obtain what he calls a "double ontology."⁴⁹ They are neither art in a non-art context nor non-art in an art context; the distinction simply becomes moot. They can have all the effect upon the world that any other kind of action or object outside art spaces can have, and yet they are still able to retain all the critical and aesthetic specificity that has come to define artistic sensibility. They unite art and non-art. They transcend autonomy.

But beyond this rescaling of art, Wright is still not satisfied with 1:1 practices being framed as *merely* double-ontological. He pushes to transcend the ontological framing altogether, because perhaps "this is not an ontological issue at all, but rather a question of the extent to which [practices] are informed by [...] artistic self-understanding, not framed as art." Having demonstrated how a practice can be seen as both among two options present in modernity, Wright moves toward a new paradigm in which this 'both' is no longer a dualism but its own singularity.

These three terms—capture, scale, and autonomy—may prove useful in my own efforts to retool the conceptuality of musical practice that is also historical practice. One interesting observation from the authenticity debates of the 1980s was that shifting one's understanding of the word from a historical to a personal authenticity didn't actually solve the problem either. As Taruskin pointed out,

⁴⁸ Ibid., 4.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 4.

[O]ur intuitions are not the fine, free, feral things we may think they are. They are thoroughly domesticated beasts, trained to run along narrow paths by long years of unconscious conditioning, endowed with vast reserves of cliché, naïve posture, and nonsense. If you are a trained musician, what you will find if you scratch your intuition will be the unexamined mainstream, your most ingrained responses, treacherously masquerading as imagination.⁵⁰

Though the problem of an authentic historical performance movement may be a naïve belief in the possibility of objectivity, the corrective may not merely be a folding back inward to the subject. As I pointed out earlier in the work of both John Locke and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, our basest instincts and most deeply held assumptions are not ‘innate’ within us as individuals but have come from the outside world. This makes the pursuit of self-knowledge not merely a looking inward at the self in isolation but an attempt to dissect the relationship between the self and the outside world across a broad temporal and spatial narrative of one’s life. Such a simplistic ontological binary between self and other, composer and performer, artist and historian, just isn’t meaningful except on an extremely superficial level.

What’s needed in music is quite similar to what Wright proposes for contemporary art: a double ontology that simultaneously encapsulates this music’s abstraction from and situation within the present, its production by both the other of the past and the self of the practitioner.

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⁵⁰ Taruskin, 10.

The catalogue entry for document #77796 at Travis & Emery Music Bookshop in London reads:

Sonata a 3. G major. Parts.

[England]: 1737.

Folio (33 x 20cm). 2, 1, 1ff. Manuscript in brown ink on 13-stave hand-ruled paper, front of basso used as title page and giving incipit. The incipit has not been found in the RISM Online search. With *fragments* of another trio in similar format and the basso part of a Concerto a 5 (violins, flute, viola, basso) in G major; all dated “1737 Scrip.” £400.⁵¹

The following are photographs of excerpts from this document, which I took myself in 2019.

⁵¹ #77796, Travis & Emery Music Bookshop, London. Photographed 15 December 2019. This document no longer appears in the Travis & Emery catalogue as of December 2023.




Figure 4.6

Here is the “Flaute Travers” part from the first mentioned “Sonata a 3” in two pages.




Figure 4.7




Figure 4.8

And here are some example pages of the “fragments”—the search term that enabled me to find this document—of “another trio.”




Figure 4.9




Figure 4.10

And here are the first two pages of the “basso part of a Concerto a 5.”




Figure 4.11




Figure 4.12

To work through the concepts from Harcourt, Stoler, and Wright introduced above, I'd like to briefly analyse this document at a set of increasing scales—note, phrase, form, document, archive, and discipline.

The Note Scale



Figure 4.10.1

In the second example page of the fragmentary three-part sonata, in the third measure of the second line (Figure 4.10.1), I see an A3 followed by an A4 and then a C#4, all as consecutive sixteenth notes. Here, I resist the urge to say that there's another sixteenth-note A4. If I look very, very closely, I actually *cannot* see this. But the instinct that tells me it's there is incredibly strong. Why?

In the preceding measure I see a pattern of four sixteenth notes repeated three times—D4, D5, F#4, D5. Now returning to the third measure of that line, I can see that every visible note conforms to this same pattern transposed down a fourth, diatonically. There is an additional A3 and C#4 in the second beat, as well as what looks like a third instance of A3-C#4 approximately where the third beat would plausibly appear. I should note, however, that even this carries assumptions. I can't actually see the first ledger line below the staff of what I identified as the A3 in beat three, nor can I see anything of what I've identified as the C#4 in that beat except for what looks to be the bottom edge of a sharp sign.

Here, I'm looking for local similarities on a *note-by-note* scale between the passage that is interrupted by the rip in the page and its immediate still-extant surroundings.

The Phrase Scale




Figure 4.10.2

Further down on this page, there's a passage that looks similar (Figure 4.10.2). In this seventh line of the page, the second through fifth measures show the same pattern moving back and forth between G Major and D Major in a one-measure harmonic rhythm. This further reassures my assumption that the composer of this piece likely wrote the D Major to A Major pattern I described above. The final two measures of this line also provide a possible cadential schema for that earlier phrase, again assuming their composer treated them as analogous phrases all the way through their respective cadences.

Here, I'm looking for a type of logic that exists on the scale of the musical *phrase*. I'm treating the full phrase as an integral musical object that can be transported elsewhere within its broader context, and I'm assuming that each appearance of such a phrase will retain the same internal patterning of pitches and rhythms.

The Form Scale



Figure 4.10.3

There is notation between the two passages I isolated above, and my assumptions about their relationship to each other also implies a certain type of relationship with these intermediaries. The intermediary lines—the third through sixth lines shown in Figure 4.10.3—contain significantly different notation than that of either the second or seventh lines. What I’m assuming with the idea that the second and seventh lines are analogous is that what happens in the third line is more of a section break than a smooth transition. I’m reassured of this at the beginning of the seventh line, which suggests that the overall role of the third through sixth lines on this broader scale of the compositional *form* of this movement is a kind of departure from, a ‘B’ section of, or an interruption to, a cadential move that is missing at the end of the second line, which is then finally satisfied immediately preceding the double bar that ends the movement.

The Document Scale



Figure 4.9




Figure 4.10

The second of these options—the ‘B’ section—seems most likely because the first line of this page seems to be the first measure of this whole piece. Even though the tempo indication usually stated at the beginning of each movement is missing—whether by compositional omission or by the rip at the top of the page, I don’t know—none of the surrounding pages in this document end in measures that seem plausible predecessors to the first measure of this page. It’s actually fairly difficult to determine the original page order of this document, but the above is the order in which I found it and I see no other logic suggesting the other possibilities to be either more or less plausible than this one. Also notable in this broader view at the *document* scale is that my working hypotheses above find support in similar overall formal schemata appearing in other movements. Furthermore in the interest of ‘filling in’ sections that appear to be missing from this page, the other parts to this piece—the traverso and the basso—can provide further context clues. Except in passages where all three parts are compromised, each part can give clues as to the harmonic, melodic, and/or rhythmic content of simultaneous sections of each other part.

The Archive Scale

So far I've assumed that this document has an internal logical consistency on four separate levels—note, phrase, form, and document—that will continue beyond where physical ink and paper exist. In a Cartesian mode, I do *not* have certainty that what used to fill these voids didn't completely depart into full-on chromatic serialism. In a Cartesian mode, I don't even fully know that there was ever ink and paper where these voids now are. I'm assuming that they're voids and that the physical form of this ink and paper isn't actually the original intended form. Of course, all this seems unreasonable to suggest given everything else I see, but through a strict Cartesian framework, it can't be ruled out.

But a more traditional epistemology might encourage one to move outward from the present document toward others extant in archival form that seem to share many of its both formal and incidental qualities. These formally similar documents might have notation for the same instrumentation, in the same key, at the same tempo, with the same nomenclature, or of the same length as the notation here. These incidentally similar documents might have been purchased or inherited from the same collection, traceable to the same geographical and/or temporal origin point, or tied to the same or related individuals near the time of their commitment to paper. Analysing these larger groups of documents across each other at the scale of the full *archive* can provide a knowledge—and instinct, even—of common trends that can allow me to statistically extrapolate which scenarios are more likely than others where individual documents on their own leave unanswered questions.

The Discipline Scale

But this is complicated by the fact that this type of broad corpus study is of course the underlayment for music education at large, as a storehouse of examples for how to write good music and/or imitate various styles. This means that the logic of past work in archival collecting and cataloguing, historical research and interpretation, and contemporary application of all these resources in living cultures of musical practice, feed back into the primary shape of those archives, which then return again to (re-)constitute them in the future, and so forth. In turn, this means that my own understanding of what music is, how it works, and what I understand to be historically plausible, is itself informed by decisions others have made in similar analytical work throughout the course of the very long documentary past of music. It's a continual feedback loop that produces the shape of this culture at once *of the past* and *in the present*.

The only thing that I will insist upon here is that it is a matter of *judgment* whether one meets this phenomenon as a source of fascination or of inconvenience. It's not a matter that can be solved through the application of scientific principles because it's a matter that sits at the very same level as that which confers value upon scientific principles in the first place. The theory can't serve as its own proof. I, for one, am certainly more interested in meeting this problem as a source of fascination.

In relation to Stoler's archival methodology, the issue is not even whether we can or cannot be reasonably sure of the complete form of this document prior to its incurring damage. The issue is that this presumptive work to fill in the gaps is aimed at delivering an image of the past that is free from the instability, sediment, flux, and punishment of historical time. It erases the intervening temporality between the abstracted *then* of the document's creation and the abstracted *now* of the historian's efforts, presenting the former to the latter apparently unadulterated. In the particular case of this example—a damaged manuscript—the story I see on this front is about decay over time. There are perhaps other questions to be explored about why this particular manuscript was not better cared for and, from the inverse perspective, why it survives at all. But what is apparent is that this composition *was* finished at some point in time and is also, in my opinion, quite good. This is not a case, then, of what Stoler called “failed projects” or “delusional imaginings”—though other manuscripts I've introduced in this text certainly are. It has more to do with an understanding of the passing of time as the accrual of sediment, of

archiving as in part the enablement of forgetting, and of historical research as *generative* of both the known and knowable past.

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I'd like to now move back through these scales of analysis of this manuscript, bringing this more pointed understanding of archival and historiographical processes in tow. Beginning on this disciplinary scale, what's vital in reference to the image of a disciplinary feedback loop above is that there are also *cracks between* and *contestation within* these disciplines.




Figure 4.11

Returning to the catalogue entry, it's difficult to see why anyone not specifically looking for 18th-century fragments would look at this manuscript at all. In one way of looking at it, there's not really anything here. No composer is given and the titles of the included pieces are the extremely generic terms "Sonata" and "Concerto." A date is given—1737—but the geography of the document is not particularly clear, with "England" appearing in brackets because it's inferred from context rather than explicitly indicated. From any of the terms typically used to organise sub-disciplines of classical music—period, geography, composer, style, form, theme—there is nothing that makes this manuscript stand out. Furthermore,

given this, the added *inconvenience* of having to reconstruct a plausible completed piece from these fragments would surely not be considered worthwhile.

But if one doesn't assume a completed piece to be a prerequisite of activity in historical performance, and if one organizes archival material according to metadata other than period, geography, composer, style, form, and theme, then there is suddenly much more historiographical potential in this manuscript than others. This manuscript becomes worth a look only after a shift in the disciplinary underpinning of one's visit to the archive. It only becomes an object of research *after* the disciplinarity of the historian is reoriented against the grain of their institutional support system. For me, this shift occurred, as I've illustrated in this chapter, through exposure to the adjacent disciplinarity of critical theory, where I found Ann Stoler's idea of archival negatives. Because I don't fully sequester myself within music as a self-sustaining discipline, I came across this idea external to the musical discipline and have been able to translate it into musical research.

But for this translation to be worthwhile, I need to have some idea that the written documents Stoler described from 19th-century Dutch colonial administrators might have extant analogues in 18th-century music. We only search through archival catalogues because we think something *might* be there—something that we haven't actually seen. Our knowledge of what a particular archive *does* contain and how those contents are structured creates within us an anticipatory sense of what else it might *also* contain. Having not seen every single document within the archive, our memory of what we have seen there, how we found it, and how any particular archive presents itself as an institution, creates in us an idea of what *might* be there. When we search, we are projecting possible realities beyond what we have seen, much in the same way we look at a line of music notation that is interrupted by a rip in the page. Much as one might reasonably anticipate unknown pieces or unknown copies of pieces by known composers to be sitting in an archive waiting to be found, I reasonably anticipated upon starting my own search that such archival negatives as Stoler described might sit within those same archives.

But I also needed to know how I might conjure them from archival catalogues not specifically designed to yield such cross-sections of their content. This is where those terms of negation come in—'anonymous,' 'not found,' and 'fragments.' 'Not found' is a particularly interesting one here in that it doesn't actually describe a quality of the document itself but a disruption to the archivist's ability to

understand and describe that document according to their usual methods. In this case, the specific language is, “The incipit has not been found in the RISM Online search,” indicating that the first few notes of the manuscript are not the same as those in any other manuscript or piece entered into the *Répertoire International des Sources Musicales*, one of the largest aggregated catalogues of archival music manuscripts in existence. On its own, this is not necessarily enough for me, as this often happens for pieces that can be tied to specific composers or are otherwise complete. But in combination with the other search terms of ‘anonymous’ and ‘fragments,’ what is indicated *to me* is that the given manuscript is perhaps an entirely singular object and that it is for some reason unpliant with regard to traditional archival methods. In one fell swoop, this trifecta of search terms places all the archival negatives in a neat list.



Figure 4.10.3

On the document, form, phrase, and note scales, something else peculiar begins to happen. When one's priority moves from plausibility to possibility, the task at hand quickly becomes overwhelming. Even from a perspective of actively seeking the most plausible complete form of this piece beyond the tear in the page, it wouldn't be inconceivable that there might have been some sudden melismatic, soloistic, or punctuating interruption of what otherwise appear to be rules consistently applied through the course of this document. It becomes impossible to make a single decision, and all these stacks of possibilities suddenly outweigh even the full scale of the document at hand. These alternate pasts, these imaginaries into the space beyond the rip in the page, become much bigger than the page itself. This task is a very different one now. Furthermore, the position of this task in relation to this notation alone is no longer clear. Part of the idea was to *not* render away the decay and sedimentation that make its temporality so rich. I don't see how merely filling in these gaps—regardless of what I fill them with—will achieve this at all.

It becomes apparent to me at this point that applying Stoler's reasoning actually *within* the medium of music itself will not be at all straightforward. Her work—like Wright's and Harcourt's—is based in written language, a medium that comes with unique capacities to describe the same object in multiple ways and to make clear the distinction between a retracing and a revision, between a known and a postulated, and, crucially, between a quotation and a reaction thereupon. In no way can I satisfyingly make clear within music itself the dividing line between what I see on this page and my additions to it. Work in critical theory *always* retains these divisions. As a property of academic research, it is a medium in which there is *always* a distinction between the evidence being analysed and the analysis in-and-of itself.

I could imagine various strategies for segmenting these aspects in music, and I've indeed tried several. Each could be given to a different instrument or performer; each could be separated by a brief pause; the fundamental stylistic characteristics of the additions could depart drastically from the archival source. But still none of these would be clear without verbal explanation accompanying the music. And even so, I would have to give those extant archival notes from the source an actual sounding form in music. If I'm to separate these historical sounds from my interpretations around them, how could I possibly present the former at all? A musician cannot merely *give* a quotation of a historical source. They must *make* it in

music. They must become their object in order to describe it. As indeed Taruskin, Leech-Wilkinson, and many others made so abundantly clear a few decades ago, no true separation of this type is possible.

This exploration of the kinds of conceptual or expressive inertia or potentialities in this document, at many perspectival scales, certainly makes significant headway toward a re-evaluated practice capable of overcoming initial assumptions about objective historical work as separate from creative, inventive, speculative, or otherwise artistic work. But the thinking-, looking-, and writing-based methods of critical theory will not suffice on their own as complete correctives to a field so immediately bodily, instinctive, and visceral as music. Physically speaking, acoustic sound is so fundamentally different than physical matter that the methods developed to treat artifacts of the latter will not be fully transferable to those of the former. Harcourt's, Stoler's, and Wright's workings through broad problems of historical theory and artistic ontology provide excellent tools with which to escape and rebuild away from received methods and ontologies in historical performance and contemporary composition, but I'll need something further to meaningfully achieve this in musical contexts.

Another way of putting this is that perhaps Hayden White's outward assimilation of history was never actually realized in critical theory. Perhaps the mutual suspicion and ignorance he identified between artists and scientists was never really overcome. Critical theory has embraced subjectivity and affectivity, but more as a sedimentation than a fusion or transcendence. It retains an underlying belief that meticulous segregation between fact and judgment is an absolute necessity. As outlined above, critical theory is a challenge to much the same core historiographical problem faced by historical performance practice since the 1980s, but it leaves the fundamentally Cartesian dualities of true/false, subject/object, and description/interpretation intact—because it *can*. Music unfortunately has no such luxury. This is where Giambattista Vico's later concept of poetic wisdom, as presented in the 1744 edition of his *New Science*, will therefore be vital.

Harcourt, Stoler, and Wright exhibit the same urge as mine to complicate the relationship between subject and object, both by laying bare the personally-driven politics, judgments, and aspirations of their work, and by approaching the past as more of a quality or gradation that can be perceived within present experiences of the present world, than a rupture between a foreign historical time and the present moment of the historian. But Vico represents a further—and essential—opportunity to move beyond

what is simply a renewed attention to subjectivity and ethics toward a communicative performing of metaphor and a subjective embodying of or transformation into otherness.