Artistic practices of historical sound: memory, imagination, and mimesis in contemporary composition and historical performance

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2_Underlying Attachments, Conscious Desires

Research Question and Literature Review

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The question[i] guiding my entire project is this: "How can"[ii] the "underlying attachments" and "conscious desires"[iii] of "musicians"[iv] in the "impulse"[v] of "collective memory,"[vi] "taste for the past,"[vii] "will"[viii] to "make it new,"[ix] and "eagerness for novelty,"[x] be "extended still forwards beyond"[xi] the "dualism"[xii] of "mind"[xiii] and "body,"[xiv] "subject" and "object,"[xv] "thinking"[xvi] and "doing,"[xvii] "fact"[xviii] and "opinion,"[xix]" "[xx]"theory and practice,"[xxi] that at once constitute and render into paradox[xxii] the "disciplines"[xxiii] of "Early Music"[xxiv] and "New Music?"[xxv]

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[i] As its visual appearance likely makes immediately clear, the form of this chapter is somewhat unorthodox. Because the question of whether or how to distinguish between authorship and recitation is a guiding question of this project, I thought it might be interesting to make an extreme attempt to credit every conceivable influence of a given piece of text. I acknowledge the risk that this may come across as somewhat absurd, but it seemed productive to push through this absurdity as a way of coming to understand just how deeply external influence runs within the theoretical frameworks, auditory aesthetics, and linguistic formations that might otherwise be understood as novel. I do hope it's at least somewhat intriguing to read. I suggest doing so both by glancing back and forth from the research question to the endnotes *and* by reading the question as a whole and then reading all the endnotes sequentially as a self-contained essay. Sometimes these two approaches reveal different parts of the story.

[ii] To quote Henk Borgdorff, *The Conflict of the Faculties: Perspectives on Artistic Research and Academia* (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2012), 7:

> The principal theme addressed by this book is: What are the characteristics of artistic research? This general question breaks down into a series of more specific questions, explored in different chapters.
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> a. How can we differentiate artistic research practices from artistic practices?
> b. What are the ontological, epistemological, and methodological attributes of artistic research?
> c. How can the relationship between artistic research and academia be characterized?
> d. What position does the artistic research programme occupy in science and technology policy and classification?
> e. Under what terms does artistic research qualify as academic research?
> f. What are the similarities and differences between artistic research and other academic research fields and how does artistic research relate to other life domains?
> g. What criteria may we employ in assessing artistic research?
> h. How is such an assessment framework rendered into concrete practice in a peer-reviewed journal?
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> The focus in the later chapters turns increasingly to the epistemology of artistic research and the criteria for research assessment. Throughout the work, I urge the acceptance of artistic research as a fully fledged research form, including institutional recognition.

The two words I extract from this quote, “how can,” are certainly among the least insightful of Henk Borgdorff’s *Conflict of the Faculties*. But I quote them here as a way of signaling the presence of his conceptualization of artistic research as an academic discipline within this project, and especially of its more formal aspects such as the writing of a research question. My own project is very much an outgrowth of a research mindset in which my own long-standing artistic practice as a composer and concert producer interlaces with my more abstract interests in critical theory and the history of philosophy, generating novel questions and perspectives unlikely to have been produced outside the context of this particular interdisciplinarity and/or intermethodology.

As Borgdorff defends throughout his book, artistic practices of varying types have the capacity to produce an embodied knowledge that surpasses abstract conceptual understanding in some ways, and that is deficient to it in others, but that can nevertheless be productively reflected back into theoretical writing. This improves such abstract understanding, sitting within the form of traditional academic scholarship,

which can then be further developed within its own written form before feeding back to re-inform the artistic practice in turn, forming a reciprocal bond between the two.

This idea has been explored further in the past ten years through numerous monographs and edited volumes. Michael Schwab's *Experimental Systems: Future Knowledge in Artistic Research* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2013) and *Transpositions: Aesthetico-Epistemic Operators in Artistic Research* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2018) have picked up many of the same questions about the epistemological status of artistic research, while Paulo de Assis's two-volume edited collection, *The Dark Precursor: Deleuze and Artistic Research* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2017), and later monograph, *Logic of Experimentation: Rethinking Music Performance Through Artistic Research* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2018), have expanded discourse on the diverse *experimental* methodologies of artistic research as well as the possibility for that experimentation to directly engage and develop more squarely philosophical thought. Borgdorff's own *The Exposition of Artistic Research* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013), edited along with Michael Schwab, also provides further investigation of the particular aspect of artistic research that deals with its public dissemination, with emphasis on the close integration of diverse media in the context of a single research presentation, using the development of the Research Catalogue and the Journal for Artistic Research (JAR) as a case study.

My own project flows from this disciplinary tradition. I theorize and interrogate a problem area in writing and reflection, which produces novel questions and ideas that I then investigate in action in the context of my musical practice. My practice then develops from these starting points within its own internal logic and pragmatic boundaries and thereby transforms the questions and ideas in addition to perhaps offering further, unexpected insights that I wouldn't have arrived at through writing and reflection alone. I then return to writing and reflection to dissect this experiential knowledge, and so the cycle repeats.

[iii] To quote Lisa Wedeen, *Authoritarian Apprehensions: Ideology, Judgment, and Mourning in Syria* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2019), 7:

> [O]ne hallmark of ideological uptake is the disavowal expressed in the famous line 'I know very well, yet nevertheless…' In Syria, as we shall be seeing in greater detail throughout the book, this logic of disavowal has worked in myriad ways: I know very well that the regime is systemically corrupt, yet nevertheless I act as if it will reform itself; I know very well that there is no return to the way things were, yet nevertheless let's act as if things can return to the way they were; I know very well

> that the opposition is hopeless, yet nevertheless let's act as if the opposition will make things right; I know very well that the commodity form takes a social relation among human beings and makes it into a relation among things, yet nevertheless I shall act as if the commodity form were a simple relation among things. The *as if* here [speaks] to fundamental fantasy investments like the desire for an unattainable coherence or for an economic prosperity that comes at no one's expense. The political implications of this difference are profound: even though we know better or are educable, our fundamental investments (in, say, comfort or order or the hope that change can happen effortlessly) prove resistant to ideology critique. Thus, we can 'know very well' that a proposition is false or unjust or contingent *yet nevertheless* continue to act as if we believe in it because, at some level, we are still supported by fundamental fantasy investments in the very practices we nevertheless consciously want to repudiate. Our underlying attachments, to express this in a slightly different theoretical register, can be in tension with our conscious desires and the propositional statements that communicate those desires to others. And this tension is what I am indexing as ambivalence, a situation in which the toggle between the attachment to order and the desire for change, for example, results (as it did among key populations in Syria) in the paralysis of political commitment, in the polarization of opinions and the gravitation toward existing comfort zones in some cases, and in a suspension of judgment in others.

My own project has nothing to do with Syrian politics, but Wedeen's observation here, from which I extract the pair of phrases "underlying attachments" and "conscious desires," describes a social phenomenon closely related to the iconographic metaphors of historical performance and contemporary composition I presented earlier. In the case of these musical disciplines, the phrase would go something like this: "I know very well that I'll never authentically reproduce historical music, yet nevertheless it's worth a try." And on the other hand: "I know very well that I cannot produce entirely original music, yet nevertheless—again—it's worth a try." These articulations are somewhat facile and generic, but we can go deeper: "I know very well that fidelity to the past as it actually happened is not a viable criterion through which to evaluate my performances or the performances of others, yet nevertheless I will make decisions about and judgments of these performances as if it is the only relevant criterion." Or: "I know very well that my own personal tastes, preferences, habits, and other idiosyncrasies have a profound and inevitable effect upon the sound of my performances, yet nevertheless I will present these performances as if they are exclusively to do with the isolated historical past of the notation I'm reading." And on the other side: "I know very well

that my own unique subjectivity, creativity, and artistry are the cumulative product of influence by many other artists, scholars, and otherwise peers, yet nevertheless I will take full ownership of every artistic expression I make as solely mine." Or: "I know very well that the lines between an arrangement and a composition, a remix and a new song, a sample and a reference, are vanishingly thin at the very best, yet nevertheless I will perpetuate institutional formations in my field that use them as absolutely clear and discrete categories."

These characterizations may seem like harsh criticisms, but my goal is not to chastise others for applying imperfect logic in the face of incredibly complex expressive ontologies. Rather, I am interested in beginning to distinguish between what Wedeen is calling our "attachments" and "desires," or in other words, between what drives us to pursue a certain goal and how we might practically translate that underlying drive into intentional action. In the absence of any better ontologies than "what music sounded like in the past" and "music that sounds unlike past music," we stay our course within existing practical strategies that we know to be fundamentally deficient. But if we begin to separate out *why* we want these things from *what* we do about it, we may be able to rebuild new types of practice that finally extricate us from these conceptual deficiencies without causing us to vacate our deeply held values and passions in the process. So *why* is it that we want to hear music of the distant past and *why* is it that we want to create music that's profoundly different? In other words, what is it that we want not *within* but *out of* Early Music and New Music?

I should give further explanation here of what might otherwise be interpreted as somewhat of a tangent. I first came upon critical theory through Hayden White's and Ann Laura Stoler's work on historical epistemology. First, the former's *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* [originally published 1973] (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), and *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990). And second, the latter's *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010) and *Duress: Imperial Durabilities in Our Times* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016). My initial curiosity about these texts came as an outgrowth of my interest in the phrase "historically-informed performance," as adopted by the Early Music movement in the 1980s. In them, I discovered a much broader world of both epistemological and methodological possibility in regard to historical, artistic, and otherwise scholarly practices writ large. In exploring their influences further, I came across the field of critical theory more broadly, and the Chicago Center for Contemporary Theory (3CT) at The University of

Chicago in particular. I was fortunate enough to be able to join 3CT's administrative staff in late 2019, staying there until 2021.

Lisa Wedeen is their Faculty Director, and it is through this role at 3CT that I became acquainted with her and with many of her peers working in what they call *contemporary* theory, a refinement of the idea of *critical* theory. Through publications such as Linda Zerilli's *A Democratic Theory of Judgment* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2016), Jennifer Pitts's *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), William H. Sewell Jr.'s *Capitalism and the Emergence of Civic Equality in Eighteenth-Century France* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2021), William Mazzarella's *The Mana of Mass Society* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2017), Neil Brenner's *New Urban Spaces: Urban Theory and the Scale Question* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), Dipesh Chakrabarty's *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007) and *The Climate of History in a Planetary Age* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2021), Thomas Dodman's *What Nostalgia Was: War, Empire, and the Time of a Deadly Emotion* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2018), Adom Getachew's *Worldmaking After Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), and William M. Reddy's *The Making of Romantic Love: Longing and Sexuality in Europe, South Asia, and Japan, 900–1200CE* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), I developed a more refined sense of the role of ideology and its many forms of masking, transfiguration, and institutionalization across the political and the social. This sensibility is sometimes explicit and sometimes implicit within my writing, but it very much *provides* the deeper conceptualization of the fields of Early Music and New Music, as well as my relationship to them, that I use throughout the project.

[iv] To quote John Cage, "Goal: New Music, New Dance" [first published 1939] in "Four Statements on the Dance" [originally four separate essays, published sequentially between 1939 and 1957] in *Silence: Lectures and Writings* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), 87:

> At the present stage of revolution, a healthy lawlessness is warranted. Experiment must necessarily be carried on by hitting anything—tin pans, rice bowls, iron pipes—anything we can lay our hands on. Not only hitting, but rubbing, smashing, making sound in every possible way. In short, we must explore the materials of music. What we can't do ourselves will be done by machines and electrical instruments which we will invent. The conscientious objectors to modern music will, of course, attempt

> everything in the way of counterrevolution. Musicians will not admit that we are making music; they will say that we are interested in superficial effect, or, at most, are imitating Oriental or primitive music. New and original sounds will be labeled as 'noise.' But our common answer to every criticism must be to continue working and listening, making music with its materials, sound and rhythm, disregarding the cumbersome, top-heavy structure of musical prohibitions.

Because my project deals with such fundamental questions about musical practice, I think it's worth addressing, at least in brief, what I understand music and musicians to be. I am indeed a product of training in music composition in the context of U.S. higher education, a disciplinarity that owes quite a lot to John Cage. In my reading of the quote above as well as my understanding of Cage more broadly, I see not only an aestheticization of noise but an incorporation of *all auditory phenomena*, whether physiological or psychoacoustic, in the basic concept of music. Alternatively, one can interpret this quote as redefining music not in terms of its physical requirements of sound but in terms of a listener's mindset in attending to that sound. In other words, a sound can qualify as musical simply by being *listened to* as music There's also another underlying principle at play in this quote with the suggestion that musical practice should challenge and interrogate received practices and understandings.

In the case of this project, I question whether music is exclusively constituted by the physical sound produced by musical instruments, in total abstraction from all other sensory, psychological, and social phenomena adjacent to and interlocked with that physical sound. Think, for example, of Brian Eno's suggestion in "The Studio as Compositional Tool," *Down Beat* 50, no. 7 (July 1983): 56-7, and 50, no. 8 (August 1983): 50-2. Here, the electrical devices and unique social space of a recording studio are as much musical instruments as pianos or guitars. What is typically treated as mere superficial aesthetic processing of audio—equalization, compression, and so forth—Eno treats as *fundamental* within the compositional act. In my own practice, I extend this to the ephemera of concert production as well, including venue selection, scenographic design, promotional materials, program materials, concert curation, and more. The idea of music as abstracted from its surrounding culture is of course an inheritance from the 19th century—see, for example, William Weber, *The Great Transformation of Musical Taste: Concert Programming from Haydn to Brahms* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), David E. Coke and Alan Borg, *Vauxhall Gardens: A History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), and Christopher Marsh, *Music and Society in Early Modern England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013)—that significantly obscures understanding

of earlier musical cultures and furthermore in large part produces the core paradox of historical authenticity in music in the first place.

While Cage's writings can perhaps be read as a kind of call to iconoclasm, they can also underpin vital types of questioning in the context of historical research in music that is *not* so at odds with the preservation of those histories. And beyond providing the bare impetus to confront this received understanding of music, Cage's work also provides an example of what such re-joining of auditory sound to broader accompanying sensory and social phenomena might look like. To me, all this is encapsulated in his understanding of music and musicians, and this is the sense in which I used the word "musicians" in my research question. This sense of the word should be understood to be ever-present in my descriptions of music throughout this text.

I should also be as clear as possible in stating that I understand Cage's idea of music and musicianship not as an *alternative* but as an *expanded* understanding in comparison to earlier ones. So though musicians of the 18th or 19th centuries may perhaps not have seen Cage as a musician, as he suggests, the same isn't true in the other direction, and the suggestion does not disqualify any of my statements in this text as relevant to music of these earlier historical moments.

[v] To quote John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* [first published 1693] (New York: Prometheus Books, 1995), 165:

> For, all power relating to action, and there being but two sorts of action whereof we have any idea, viz., thinking and motion, let us consider whence we have the clearest ideas of the powers which produce these actions. […] A body at rest affords us no idea of any active power to move; and when it is set in motion itself, that motion is rather a passion than an action in it. For when the ball obeys the stroke of a billiard-stick, it is not any action of the ball, but bare passion: also when by impulse it sets another ball in motion that lay in its way, it only communicates the motion it had received from another, and loses in itself so much as the other received; which gives us but a very obscure idea of an active power moving in body, whilst we observe it only to transfer but not produce any motion.

In Wedeen's idea of "underlying attachments," I can't help but see what Locke describes here as an "impulse," and so I present the latter in my research question as a kind of synonym for the former. The key aspects of this idea of an impulse are that it is involuntary, external, and irresistible. It should be noted that Locke's use of the word "passion" denotes what we, 300 years later, would probably call "passivity." He

describes an individual's thoughts and actions as taking place only as the result of outside influences. This sentiment builds from Locke's foundational idea in his *Essay* that there are "no innate ideas in the mind"—our entire understanding of ourselves, our environment, and even the most abstract ideas come from the perceptions and memories we accumulate from the outside world. Thus, all our thoughts and actions can be understood as a kind of unstoppable external impulse—a fast-moving billiard ball hitting a stationary billiard ball. In this light, Wedeen's "attachments" and Locke's "impulses" appear to be precise synonyms, but there's an important distinction that can be made in *how* they package their respective concepts. In Locke's case, what's notable is that he adopts a mechanistic language analogous to Newtonian physics in contrast to Wedeen's more empathic language. To my understanding, the deeper motivating forces of Early Music and New Music reflect aspects of both of these presentations; on the one hand, as an irresistible impulse to think or act in a certain way, and on the other hand, as a set of moral or aesthetic values that need not be resisted, yet the exact translation of which into action can and ought to be consciously decided.

[vi] This is a reference to Paul Ricoeur, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer, *Memory, History, Forgetting* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004). In the chapter "Personal Memory, Collective Memory," Ricoeur turns on its head his initial question of what collective memory is and where it came from, asking instead when, why, and by whom individual memory was ever postulated as something different. His observations on Locke and Descartes are particularly relevant to my project. To quote, from page 93:

> The situation of John Locke within the philosophical current of inwardness is utterly singular. […] It is with Descartes that we believe him—wrongly, we shall see—most closely associated, precisely on the question of the *cogito* [the thinking individual]. However, the critique of innate ideas already served to distance Locke definitively from him, at least on the level of the ideas of perception. It remains that John Locke is the inventor of the following three notions and the sequence that they form together: identity, consciousness, self. […] The *cogito* is not a person defined by his or her memory and the capacity to give an accounting to himself or herself. It bursts forth in the lightning flash of an instant. Always thinking does not imply remembering having thought. Continual creation alone confers duration upon it. The *cogito* does not possess duration in its own right.

One of the impulses that I see in Early Music as a discipline is toward collective memory, which I might simply define as a desire to remember together, or to develop and

preserve a societal memory that stretches farther back than any one person can individually remember. This reminds us both of the fundamental sociality of Early Music as a culture—making music *together* and *sharing* it with others—and of the dependence of its extremely long desired timescale on an *abstraction* of the knowledge that informs it. Because it deals with music older than anyone now living, it is not a practice of individual but collective memory. As Ricoeur points out, Locke argues *against* the coherence of the Cartesian *cogito* by arguing that all human thoughts, ideas, and actions are the result of external influences received through the senses. In this case, the self is not an absolute self-produced, self-contained, and self-perpetuating unity, as it is for Descartes, but something more like a unique constellation of outside influences. As we shall see later on, the difference between these two concepts can play an important part in re-evaluating the role of the self in historical research and historical representation. If the self is already a sedimentation of outside influences, then the incorporation of the self in studies of the past is not necessarily a contamination of those pasts as objects of study because that particular selfhood is not necessarily external to them. It could itself have been constituted *by* them. This will warrant more working out later on.

[vii] Beyond the idea of history as a kind of collaborative remembrance, there is also a quality of history that is more purely aesthetic. The past has a *feel* to it. Sometimes we want to study the past, not because we want to remember together or remember for others or remember as members of our culture, but because, in relief to all else we see, and hear, and smell, and taste, and touch in the modern world, those artifacts of the past somehow stand out as different, and perhaps better. Francois Hartog calls this a "taste for the past," and contrasts it to the futurism of Filippo Tommaso Marinetti's musings about the absolute newness of experience made possible by rapid developments in industrial technology at the beginning of the 20th century. To quote Francois Hartog, trans. Saskia Brown, *Regimes of Historicity: Presentism and Experiences of Time* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 149:

> [W]hat regime of historicity is implied by the phenomenon that some have described as the 'meteoric rise of the heritage industry' in the 1990s? Did this taste for the past, for everything old, emerge suddenly as a kind of nostalgia for an older regime of historicity that had in fact long been inoperative? And how could it be reconciled with the modern regime, which for two whole centuries had pinned all 'hopeful expectation' on the future, as expressed in Marinetti's proclamations and prophecies?

This line of questioning helps us further distinguish between various among our underlying attachments to pastness. Is an interest in historical string instruments an interest in using older methods and materials of construction in the present, or is it an interest in the changes to wood and other organic materials that occur over long spans of time? Wood, for example, develops a unique hardness and sheen to it after half a century or so of ageing, which both looks different than recently finished woodwork and, in the case of musical instruments, sounds different. So while it's surely the case that instruments made with different materials and different methods in the distant past sounded different than instruments made with modern materials and modern methods, the task of the historian interested in an abstracted past isn't as simple as playing an instrument made at the relevant time. Historians not only see the past of their object but all the intervening time as well. Which of these qualities are we interested in—if not all—and how can we carry forward those more specific drives in a kind of musical practice that isn't beholden to the same unrealistic standards of achievement that police Early Music today? Here we begin to slowly transition in this project's broader research question from interest in the old to interest in the new, though not necessarily in a chronological sense. Part of what has made Early Music such a peculiarly well-suited partner to New Music, as can be seen in the many collaborations between musicians in each of these worlds, is a disjunction between new and old as a distinction of *either* chronology or proximity. Movement from old to new can be movement from past into present and future, but it can also be movement from familiar to unfamiliar. Pastness can, in this way, feel more new than old simply by nature of its being unfamiliar. This is in contrast to the more traditional type of newness defined by its quality as *production* or *invention*—as not having been found but made or, perhaps, *willed into being*. Shortly after his use of the word "impulse," mentioned above, Locke introduces "will."

[viii] To quote Locke, *Essay*, 165-6:

> [W]e find in ourselves a power to bring or forbear, continue or end, several actions of our minds and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind ordering, or, as it were, commanding the doing or not doing such or such a particular action. This power which the mind has thus to order the consideration of any idea, or the forbearing to consider it, or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and *vice versa*, in any particular instance, is that which we call 'the will.'

The will is driven by a kind of impulse. It is not yet entirely clear at this point in the *Essay* why we want what we want, do what we do, or think what we think, but the will nevertheless represents only those impulses on which we voluntarily elect to act. As our minds contain no innate ideas, all ideas, it logically follows, come from outside ourselves through the senses. Each course of action we consider taking enters our mind in the same way that the motion of one billiard ball is transferred into it from the impact of another. But the will is an active, self-created force in that we can *choose* whether to allow this inertia to be transferred into our actions. This characterization is the fulcrum point of the subject-object problem, separating a reproduction of an abstracted past from a manufacture of the previously non-existent. We find the two inextricable here, yet not quite identical. What this orientation toward "will" can give us is a much more sophisticated understanding of "new" than simply "didn't exist before." Rosalind Krauss introduces her own work to problematize the idea of the artistic new as the artistic *original*.

[ix] To quote Rosalind Krauss, quoting Ezra Pound, *The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), 6:

> The avant-garde artist has worn many guises over the first hundred years of his existence: revolutionary, dandy, anarchist, aesthete, technologist, mystic. He has also preached a variety of creeds. One thing only seems to hold fairly constant in the vanguardist discourse and that is the theme of originality. By originality, here, I mean more than just the kind of revolt against tradition that echoes in Ezra Pound's 'Make it new!' or sounds in the futurists' promise to destroy the museums that cover Italy as though 'with countless cemeteries.' More than a rejection or dissolution of the past, avant-garde originality is conceived as a literal origin, a beginning from ground zero, a birth. Marinetti, thrown from his automobile one evening in 1909 into a factory ditch filled with water, emerges as if from amniotic fluid to be born—without ancestors—a futurist. This parable of absolute self-creation that begins the first *Futurist Manifesto* functions as a model for what is meant by originality among the early twentieth-century avant-garde. For originality becomes an organicist metaphor referring not so much to formal invention as to sources of life. The self as origin is safe from contamination by tradition because it possesses a kind of originary naivete.

This is the sense in which I use the words "new" and "original" throughout this text. Whether or not Krauss's appraisal holds true for the work of all 20th-century composers,

it is my understanding that it is the sense in which these words are often used when identifying a broad cross-section of musical culture in phrases like “New Music” in the name or introduction of a concert series or record label. Such monikers are not only about music that is nominally new—anything composed recently—but that is new in a way that does many or all those things that Krauss describes—rejects or dissolves the past, is uncontaminated by tradition, begins from nothing, emerges from a pure individuality. But we do need to address an impulse toward newness as “novelty” as well. Robert Gjerdingen identifies it as an older idea of the proper goal of composition.

[x] To quote Johann Joseph Fux, as quoted in Robert Gjerdingen, *Music in the Galant Style* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007), 6:

> The popular view of the composer—a Romantic view inherited from the nineteenth century—does not fit eighteenth-century reality. The composer of galant music, rather than being a struggling artist alone against the world, was more like a prosperous civil servant. […] He worried less about the meaning of art and more about whether his second violin player would be sober enough to play for Sunday Mass. The galant composer necessarily worked in the here and now. He had to write something this week for an upcoming court ceremony, not tortured masterworks for posterity. Even a conservative musician like Johann Joseph Fux (1660-1741), imperial court chapel master in Vienna, had to admit that a court’s 'eagerness for novelty' resulted in music changing 'every five years or so.' Comparing music to clothing, he explained that 'if a middle-aged man appeared today dressed in the clothes worn fifty or sixty years ago, he would certainly run the risk of ridicule.' And so he advises a young composer that 'music too must be accommodated to the times.' A court composer, rather than expressing his deep personal feelings for all to share, strove to touch his patron’s sentiments.

Whether this idea of the artist as a lone genius more properly belongs in the 19th century, as suggested here by Gjerdingen, or in the 20th, as suggested by Krauss’s example of futurism, it certainly does not seem to belong in much of the 18th century, if at all. The type of new 18th-century music Gjerdingen describes departs from the past only insofar as it contains a simple difference to or variation upon the past. It is evaluated by its ability to strike a uniquely delicate balance between being expected and unexpected—falling within aesthetic trends understood and appreciated by its listeners, yet also able to surprise and delight those listeners by finding fresh ways

to articulate or expand upon those trends. This is a kind of newness that emanates not from an isolated self but from a member of a community.

From this point in the endnotes we transition from what I understand to be the underlying attachments and conscious desires fueling Early Music and New Music as cultures into some of their founding conceptual dualisms. Over the course of this text, my goal will be to determine whether and/or how members of these two groups—attachments/desires on the one hand, founding conceptual dualisms on the other—might be untangled from each other. In this sense, my own project might be understood as motivated by a "will" to "make it new." It is, after all, a project of making music other than how I've heard it made before. But I use a different phrase here than "will to make it new," because I don't see it as a project of creation but of reorganization or reconceptualization. These underlying attachments and conscious desires already exist, and I don't suggest they need to be changed. Only that their translation into musical practice needs to be reconceptualized according to foundational theories other than the dualisms I mention in the next endnote. Therefore, I choose the phrase from Locke: "extended still forwards beyond."

[xi] To quote Locke, *Essay*, 149, in full:

> *Our different conception of the infinity of number, duration, and expansion*—It will, perhaps, give us a little farther light into the idea we have of infinity, and discover to us that it is nothing but the infinity of number applied to determinate parts, of which we have in our minds the distinct ideas, if we consider that number is not generally thought by us infinite, whereas duration and extension are apt to be so; which arises from hence, that in number we are at one end as it were: for there being in number nothing less than an unit, we there stop, and are at an end; but in addition or increase of number, we can set no bounds: and so it is like a line, whereof one end terminating with us, the other is extended still forwards beyond all that we can conceive; but in space and duration it is otherwise. For in duration we consider it as if this line of number were extended both ways to an unconceivable, undeterminate, and infinite length; which is evident to anyone that will but reflect on what consideration he hath of eternity; which, I suppose, he will find to be nothing else but the turning this infinity of number both ways, *a parte ante* and *a parte post*, as they speak. For when we would consider eternity *a parte ante*, what do we but, beginning from ourselves and the present time we are in, repeat in our minds the ideas of years, or ages, or any other assignable portion of duration past, with a

> prospect of proceeding in such addition with all the infinity of number? And when we would consider eternity *a parte post*, we just after the same rate begin from ourselves, and reckon by multiplied periods yet to come, still extending that line of number as before: and these two being put together are that infinite duration we call 'eternity;' which, as we turn our view either way, forwards or backwards, appears infinite, because we still turn that way the infinite end of number, i.e., the power still of adding more.

As will become clear over the following chapters, this idea of extending trajectories beyond their sensible, real forms can be a crucial bridging point between interpretation and invention. This can exist on the small scale within a single document or on a much larger scale over the entire breadth of a discipline. If I've seen three or four of something across only a few pages, a few books, or a few libraries or archives, I might reasonably expect to see much more of it in further pages, books, or archives. But this can be a temporal concept as well as a spatial one, as our idea of the future is often informed by our understanding of recent trends from the past into the present, whether on a timespan of centuries or milliseconds. My own project is itself one of this same type of projection or, to use Locke's word, "extension." I have seen the aforementioned attachments and desires elsewhere than in Early Music and New Music, so I might reasonably expect to be able to find them beyond those disciplinary bounds as well. Where are they? For a start, I believe they will *not* be in those dualisms I name here of mind and body, subject and object, thinking and doing, fact and opinion, and theory and practice. Each of these dualisms in my research questions are ones I see as further specifications or subcategories of the dualism I introduced in the preceding chapter between idealized forms of contemporary composition and historical performance or, more broadly, between creation and representation as fundamentally different acts. This concept of dualism in itself is fiercely complex, as I hope the following excerpt from Jonathan Israel's long-form history of the Enlightenment will begin to make clear.

[xii] To quote Jonathan Israel, *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man 1670-1752* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006), 729:

> The main tradition of ancient thought, since philosophy's beginnings, holds [Jean-Baptiste de] Mirabaud, was materialist and monist, based on the idea of the corporeality of the active principle. This original current, he argues, nurtured no notion of Creation *ex nihilo* or immortality of the soul but was later diverted to a different course by a mystifying metaphysics of spirituality introduced less by Plato

> (who, he alleges, adduced his notions of soul and world-soul merely as a thought experiment but did not really believe in them) than by the Neoplatonists. Greek philosophy, he contends, following Bayle and Le Clerc, was then further debased by the Church Fathers who severed Platonism from its roots in the idea of an eternal spirit or world-soul pervading, rather than distinct from, the universe and adapted his ideas to Christianity. Claiming immortality of the soul wholly alien to the archaic and classical Greek and Roman culture, Mirabaud notes the absence of such a concept in classical religion, differentiating sharply between Plato and Neoplatonism, and claiming all Greek and Latin words designating soul or spirit to have originally denoted just 'breath' or 'breathing,' there being originally no terms for immaterial spirits. Descartes's and Malebranche's mechanistic dualism Mirabaud deems an absurd diversion from the true path, a duality deriving ultimately from Platonist and Christian tradition. Descartes's and Malebranche's systems he considers self-contradictory monstrosities justly derided by Pyrrhonian sceptics and disciples of Montaigne.

As so many others have done before me—from Israel, here, to Bernard Harcourt, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Giambattista Vico—my own project positions Descartes as a metonym for its central conceptual problem. The word "dualism" is not one that Descartes uses himself, but it is regularly used by historians and philosophers to describe his main philosophical efforts: namely, to unequivocally separate out and distinguish matters of the mind from matters of the body, and matters of absolute certainty from all *other* matters. This idea, both in Descartes's writing and in its long afterlife in the Enlightenment and beyond, as partly evidenced in this quote from Israel, is far more complex than I can expand upon here, but the curious similarity to a Christian dualism of body and soul is worth noting. The dualisms named in the latter half of my research question are what I see as extensions of Descartes's conceptual apparatus into music.

[xiii] To quote René Descartes, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, "Rules for the Direction of the Mind" [first published 1701], in *Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 31: Descartes and Spinoza*, ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952), 1:

> *The end of study should be to direct the mind towards the enunciation of sound and correct judgments on all matters that come before it.* Whenever men notice some similarity between two things, they are wont to ascribe to each, even in those respects in which the two differ, what they have found to be true of the other. Thus

> they erroneously compare the sciences, which entirely consist in the cognitive exercise of the mind, with the arts, which depend upon an exercise and disposition of the body. They see that not all the arts can be acquired by the same man, but that he who restricts himself to one, most readily becomes the best executant, since it is not so easy for the same hand to adapt itself both to agricultural operations and to harp-playing, or to the performance of several such tasks as to one alone. Hence they have held the same to be true of the sciences also, and distinguishing them from one another according to their subject matter, they have imagined that they ought to be studied separately, each in isolation from all the rest. But this is certainly wrong. For since the sciences taken all together are identical with human wisdom, which always remains one and the same, however applied to different subjects, and suffers no more differentiation proceeding from them than the light of the sun experiences from the variety of the things which it illumines, there is no need for minds to be confined at all within limits; for neither does the knowing of one truth have an effect like that of the acquisition of one art and prevent us from finding out another, it rather aids us to do so.

It should be noted that I only extract the word “mind” from this quote, not “body.” For Descartes, the mind seems to be bound by nothing except its own ambition against innumerable problems. It can take on whatever form and envision whatever idea necessary to the task at hand. The body, on the other hand, is presented as if it is part of a machine. 350 years later, Foucault had what I find to be a much more useful insight into the nature of the body.

[xiv] To quote Michel Foucault, trans. Alan Sheridan, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* [first published 1975] (New York: Random House, 1977):

> The historical moment of the disciplines was the moment when an art of the human body was born, which was directed not only at the growth of its skills, nor at the intensification of its subjection, but at the formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes it more obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely. What was then being formed was a policy of coercions that act upon the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behaviour. The human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it.

What’s important here is to see that there is a point in history at which the body *becomes* the mechanistic utility that Descartes sees it as. And as the mind is, in this

view, more agile and prolific as a navigator of reality, it *masters* the body. This is not symbiosis but domination. For Foucault, this capture and rationalization of the body by the Cartesian mind is the conceptual underpinning of a wide range of disciplinary institutions, from the prison and the military to the school and the church. But this view of the body is historically contingent. Other more synergistic understandings of the body's relationship to the mind both preceded and followed it, and it is through these that likely more value will be found for my own purposes.

[xv] To quote Louis Dupré, *The Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Culture* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 46:

> From the beginning a basic ambiguity had adhered to the science of the self. The object of the investigation was at the same time the investigating subject. The self was both knowing *subject* and the substance to be known. The terms 'subject' and 'substance' were both translations of the same Greek term, *hypokeimenon*, the permanent base that supports the transient qualities of a being. Descartes uses the term 'subject' rarely and never in the pregnant sense here described. The term 'substance,' originally no more than the permanent core that supports (*sub-stat*) all qualities of a being, had gradually come to refer to that being itself. Early Scholasticism had referred to God, the soul, and the world, as substances. Descartes continued to apply that term to the conscious self (*res cogitans*), but because for him consciousness functions as the source of meaning of all substances, that denomination created a major problem. How can what constitutes meaning be, at the same time, a substance endowed with a meaning content of its own? How can there be an *objective* science of what is supposed to be the source of all objective meaning? The problem continues to haunt contemporary thought. Michel Foucault referred to it as the paradox of a 'being such that knowledge will be attained in him of what renders all knowledge possible.' Paul Ricoeur has rephrased the two functions of the self while attempting to avoid the dualism involved in the terminology of subject and substance. He distinguishes the two modes of self-description by the Latin terms *ipse* (the meaning-giving function of the self) and *idem* (the quality whereby a self remains the same substance). The self is both. Yet referring to it through either of those designations singularly is inadequate.

Through Descartes's invention of the *cogito*, the human being is ruptured into the thinking subject and the investigable object. The mind as a source of auto-generated, self-contained certainty is divorced from its fleshy home and thus becomes able to study

that home—the body—as *objectively* as it studies any other outside thing. Reality thus becomes segregated into two parts: on the one hand there is the mind and what it knows, and on the other hand there is that which the mind knows things *about*. But the mind itself is insulated from this logic, from this ability to become an object of study in itself, as Dupré details above. Thus, the Cartesian subject remains something akin to its Christian predecessor in the *soul*—a mysterious, supernatural thing—and transfers that obscurity to everything it produces through itself. Its objects, on the other hand—everything outside that subject or soul—can come to be known through a more scientific (though in the case of Descartes himself, I'd have to say *proto*-scientific) style of inquiry.

One can already start to see ingredients of the Romantic artistic genius in this casting of the Cartesian subject. Reflexively to the logic above, it—and artistic practice itself—becomes almost fully synonymous with that which is unknowable through scientific inquiry. The artist reaches into their inner self and draws out that which is entirely divorced from the outside world, that which is self-sustaining and divine. It aligns in this way also with religion: a relationship whose vestiges can be seen in terms such as the "canon," where the most respected musical works are as culturally cemented into orchestral institutions as the word of God is into the Bible. This grows in the 20th century into the musical version of Rosalind Krauss's artistic avant-garde. Only this time, instead of being invested in the mystery of the self as a producer of true knowledge—the mind in itself—attention is given to the type of *certainty* that self is capable of producing—what the mind knows. Composers from Arnold Schoenberg to Milton Babbitt become increasingly invested in mathematics—the grid, as Krauss specified it for visual media—for the same complete and total self-containment that led Descartes to it. In either version, though, Romantic or Modern, artistic practice is in this formulation a production of and by the self, or subject.

In complement to this stand those musical practices that eschew the self of the practitioner in favor of making a music that belongs entirely to an other, or object. This distinction is what defines the classical roles of composer and performer, with the latter given the very difficult charge of acting as neutral medium for the former. The self of the performer is irrelevant in the context of their performative efforts, as they focus all energy on understanding and replicating the composer's intent. Historical performance takes a more modern historiographical approach to this than mainstream classical music, favoring archaeological and documentary evidence over received tradition or oral culture, but the two practices share the same basic goal. This is why I tend in the context of this dissertation to use "subject" and "object" as metonymic representatives of "New Music" and "Early Music," respectively, though surely the

opposite mapping could be plausible in the context of other artistic research problem areas.

[xvi] To quote Rene Descartes, trans. John Cottingham, *Meditations on First Philosophy* [first published 1641] (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 37:

> But what shall I now say that I am, when I am supposing that there is some supremely powerful and, if it is permissible to say so, malicious deceiver, who is deliberately trying to trick me in every way he can? Can I now assert that I possess even the most insignificant of all the attributes which I have just said belong to the nature of a body? I scrutinize them, think about them, go over them again, but nothing suggests itself; it is tiresome and pointless to go through the list once more. But what about the attributes I assigned to the soul? Nutrition and movement? Since now I do not have a body, these are mere fabrications. Sense-perception? This surely does not occur without a body, and besides, when asleep I have appeared to perceive through the senses many things which I afterwards realized I did not perceive through the senses at all. Thinking? At last I have discovered it—thought; this alone is inseparable from me. I am, I exist—that is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking? For it could be that were I totally to cease from thinking, I should totally cease to exist. At present I am not admitting anything except what is necessarily true. I am, then, in the strict sense only a thing that thinks; that is, I am a mind, or intelligence, or intellect, or reason—words whose meaning I have been ignorant of until now. But for all that I am a thing which is real and which truly exists. But what kind of a thing? As I have just said—a thinking thing.

It seems worth noting at this point that the discipline of artistic research, as practiced at the Orpheus Institute and many other European institutions of higher education, is premised upon a similar re-unification of mind and body, subject and object, thinking and doing. I'd like to read this pivotal moment from Descartes's most famous meditation through another set of observations from William Brooks.

[xvii] To quote William Brooks (ed.), *Experience Music Experiment: Pragmatism and Artistic Research* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2021), 10-11:

> At the next [Orpheus Institute fellows'] assembly (8 February 2010), I delivered a short paper in which I distinguished between what I came to call 'test' and 'observation.' This led to additional articles and presentations I gave at Orpheus

> and elsewhere, all titled with the form 'In re: Experimental ____,' and all of which applied pragmatist thought to Cage or to the broader domain usually called 'experimental music.' In June 2012, Orpheus fellow Michael Schwab organised a study day with the philosopher and scientist Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, following this with a watershed edited collection of essays; musical applications of 'experiment' were thereby joined with present-day thinking in the sciences. In 2013, Paulo de Assis received a major grant for a five-year Orpheus research project called MusicExperiment21, and the term (and its marriage with 'music') became ubiquitous. A measure of its centrality thereafter can be seen in the titles of publications issued by Orpheus between 2013 and 2018: one-third of these have contained some variety of the word 'experimental.' Partially in response to all this, I was rereading [John] Dewey's *Art as Experience* and many related texts, and a question began to plague me: what was the relationship between the term 'experience,' as used by Dewey and other pragmatists, and 'experiment,' as used by composers like John Cage and Lejaren Hiller and by philosophers of science like Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger? The words have the same Latin root—*experiri*, 'to try, to test,' from *ex*, 'out of' and *per*, 'risk'—but very different implications. […] I have come to think that the distinction between these two words—two sides of a single coin—is much like the distinction I had drawn between 'test' and 'observation.' And it further seems to me that in conducting what we at Orpheus call 'artistic research' both sides of the coin have to be present simultaneously—that 'artistic research' entails tossing *experiri* into the air, spinning it rapidly, so that the whole coin is at once two-sided and a single thing. Like all coins, when it falls to the ground, 'artistic research' shows primarily one face: it appears either as a research report, with the academic trappings of objectivity and reliability; or it is offered as a performance, with all the attendant uncertainties concerning intention, truth, and even 'what happened.' But while it is in progress, both sides are equally in play, and the researcher cycles unpredictably between performance and reflection—between doing and undergoing, in Dewey's influential formulation in *Art as Experience*.

"Thinking" and "doing" are often presented as a complementary pair, and one that can be understood as the core set of activities constituting artistic research. But it's worth noting that this complementary pair can be cast in a number of different ways, each with a unique shade of meaning. Again, I need to be cognisant of how using Descartes as a stand-in for this dualism of "thinking" and "doing" and various other shades of dualism I problematize in this text may oversimplify matters if I'm not cautious. "Thinking," in Descartes's sense, is a valuable concept because it is a single word for that which

belongs to the self or the mind alone—or more properly, the *cogito*. This "thinking" is an extremely narrow one. It is not a thinking *about* anything in particular that gives the self its undeniable existence but the mere fact of thought in itself. In this sense, "doing" is not really its perfect complement, as "doing" implies activities only of the body, while there are other activities of the mind that are not "thinking." Dreaming is Descartes's own example, but there's also imagining, wishing, worrying, and so forth. So Descartes's "thinking" must be broadened before it matches to the "thinking" and "doing" of artistic research. William Brooks offers several other frameworks here: test and observation, experiment and experience, and (John Dewey's) doing and undergoing. Furthermore, Brooks points out a similar type of mode-switching in artistic research as I point out later in this project in the writing style of critical theory. Much as each field may strive toward a dissolution of the hierarchy or even distinction of theory and practice—to give another shade of dualism underpinning my project—they are bound by certain institutional or cultural norms regulating activity in the pre-existing fields they bring together. In this sense, each really is, at least for now, an *inter-* rather than *trans*-disciplinarity. So each of these shades of dualism is worth keeping in mind and revisiting over the coming chapters, but it's also worth considering whether and how any of them might be overcome altogether and what more unified conceptual form(s) might emerge in their place. This problem also appears in the distinction between fact and opinion, or truth and interpretation, that plays a strong role in shaping historical research and writing, as is detailed at length by historical theorist Paul Ricoeur and critical theorist Linda Zerilli, both of whom are quoted in the following two endnotes.

[xviii] To quote Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, 179:

> What at this stage of the historiographical operation [the documentary stage] can be held to have been proved? The answer is clear: a fact, facts, capable of being asserted in singular, discrete propositions, most often having to do with the mentioning of dates, places, proper names, verbs that name an action or state. Here we need to be alert for one confusion, that between confirmed facts and past events. A vigilant epistemology will guard here against the illusion of believing that what we call a fact coincides with what really happened, or with the living memory of eyewitnesses, as if the facts lay sleeping in the documents until the historians extracted them. This illusion […] for a long time underlay the conviction that the historical fact does not differ fundamentally from the empirical fact in the experimental natural sciences. Just as, in dealing below with explanation and representation, we shall need to resist the temptation to dissolve the historical

> fact into narration and this latter into a literary composition indiscernible from fiction, so too we need to resist this initial confusion between a historical fact and a really remembered event. The fact is not the event, itself given to the conscious life of a witness, but the contents of a statement meant to represent it.

[xix] To quote Linda Zerilli, *A Democratic Theory of Judgment* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2016), 121:

> Let us begin by turning not to 'Truth and Politics' but to a less famous essay by [Hannah] Arendt, 'Philosophy and Politics.' Here we discover that, *pace* her critics, she does not accept the founding Platonic opposition of truth and opinion and then seek merely to revalue the subordinate term (opinion) in Plato's account of absolute truth. Far from simply revaluing opinion in the ineradicable opposition between truth and opinion that Plato bequeathed to political philosophy, Arendt tries to develop instead the Socratic idea of what she calls 'the truth of […] opinion.' She does so to undercut the difference that Plato drew 'between those who know and do not act and those who act and do not know,' for this 'Platonic separation of knowing and doing' obliterates freedom and plurality; it is 'at the root of all theories of domination,' she observes in *The Human Condition* and a concept of politics as *Herrschaft*, or rule.

[xx] Here I quote a blank space, with credit given to Michel Foucault, as he had a propensity to omit the serial "and" from long lists of concepts. For example, see Michel Foucault, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language* [first published 1969] (New York: Random House, 2010), 6-7:

> [T]hrough a mutation that is not of very recent origin, but which has still not come to an end, history has altered its position in relation to the document: it has taken as its primary task, not the interpretation of the document, nor the attempt to decide whether it is telling the truth or what is its expressive value, but to work on it from within and to develop it: history now organizes the document, divides it up, distributes it, orders it, arranges it in levels, establishes series, distinguishes between what is relevant and what is not, discovers elements, defines unities, describes relations. The document, then, is no longer for history an inert material through which it tries to reconstitute what men have done or said, the events of which only the trace remains; history is now trying to define within the documentary material itself unities, totalities, series, relations.

This blank space in which the "and" might otherwise be is what I quote here, as it is a potent example of meaning being contained within and conveyed through a specific type of absence or nothingness. It is also a stylistic trait that others influenced by Foucault have taken on in their own writing, including Hayden White, whose further developments of this meaning of omission in history were a particularly fruitful starting point for my reaction to the authenticity debate in Early Music, and Ann Laura Stoler, whose work provides significant conceptual structure to my own archival methodology along similar lines. Perhaps not by coincidence, this play on style as *generative* of meaning is itself the topic Foucault discusses in this quote, and which others following him, including White and Stoler, have also taken up. The writing of theory can, after all, be understood as an artistic practice in itself.

[xxi] To quote Henk Borgdorff, *The Conflict of the Faculties*, 10:

> In addition to being an essay on artistic research (in relation to academia), this book is also a project and a proposition. It is a project in the literal sense of 'that which is thrown forth', and this is done with a specific purpose: to achieve something in practice, to make a difference there. This performative dimension of the book, as I have pointed out in the beginning, is interwoven with the discursive dimension. Theories are not disinterested attempts to approach an ever-receding practice, nor are they imperfect representations of a constant reality. Theories, including ones about artistic research, co-constitute the practices they address—just as there are no practices that are not permeated by theories and beliefs. This intertwinement between theory and practices—acknowledged both in hermeneutics and in constructivism—is the departure point of my analysis in the first chapter. But this relationship between theory and practice also figures in the entire project of which this book forms a written account. No one, of course, is the sole owner of the viewpoints advanced here, as any certificate of ownership bears traces of things that others have left behind in intertextual space. These shared viewpoints exert their performative force on the practices they become involved with.

[xxii] This passage is entirely my own composition.

In this context I imagine, and indeed hope, that such a statement comes across as quite strange. Firstly, "this passage" might refer either to the section of the body text of this chapter for which it is an endnote, or it can refer to this particular endnote, which does not cite any external text. Do unquoted expressions demonstrate my sole

ownership of the constituent words? In what relation do these words sit with their context? In other words, is the meaning of this phrase entirely encapsulated within it or does it depend on its surroundings? Or perhaps the meaning would simply change were this phrase to be extracted? And if it depends on its context, how large is that context? How far extends the production of meaning by the assemblage of others' ideas? And how might the meaning of this passage further change as its scale increases or decreases in the interpretation of the reader? Secondly, regardless of the intended object, which I decline to singularize, I imagine that it's further unclear what I mean by "my own composition." The concepts and sentiments leading up to and following from this passage—as the shorter, endnoted member of the main body—are each tied to a diversity of literatures both within and without artistic research in music that exert a strong influence on this project whether or not they play an explicit role in the chapters that follow. Can such assemblage alone constitute knowledge production? Though each book or article from which I extract words or small phrases to build my research question plays a genuinely strong role in my overall project, one could reasonably argue that those specific words I choose to extract are not adequately representative of those works overall. It seems silly to credit such basic words as "opinion," for example, to any specific author. It's simply a word in the English language. But where did I learn what it means except from the document I cite for it? Is *all* writing outside of quotation marks plagiarism? With each set of marks here, and this almost weaponization of endnotes against themselves, I intend to convey the inconceivable depth of meaning implicit in any linguistic exercise. This is an effort to demonstrate the futility of crediting, let alone fully analyzing, all meaningful influences on and adjacents to any such project. The proposition of a founding paradox, in any case, is the observation I shared in the introduction that sets this whole project into motion. The dualisms I mention in my research question are impossible to fully separate from one another, which must mean that any practices following from them as founding principles must be similarly imperfect and entangled. But what are these practices, and what further meta-conceptuality binds them together as apparent wholes?

[xxiii] To quote Michel Foucault, trans. Alan Sheridan, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* [first published 1975] (New York: Random House, 1977):

> In the first instance, discipline proceeds from the distribution of individuals in space. To achieve this end, it employs several techniques.

1. Discipline sometimes requires *enclosure*, the specification of a place heterogeneous to all others and closed in upon itself. It is the protected place of disciplinary monotony. […]
2. But the principle of 'enclosure' is neither constant, nor indispensable, nor sufficient in disciplinary machinery. This machinery works space in a much more flexible and detailed way. It does this first of all on the principle of elementary location or *partitioning*. Each individual has his own place; and each place its individual. […]
3. The rule of *functional sites* would gradually, in the disciplinary institutions, code a space that architecture generally left at the disposal of several different uses. Particular places were defined to correspond not only to the need to supervise, to break dangerous communications, but also to create a useful space. […]
4. In discipline, the elements are interchangeable, since each is defined by the place it occupies in a series, and by the gap that separates it from the others. […]

In this "passage," Foucault is overtly describing "discipline" in its typically non-academic sense; as, perhaps, an

> instruction or teaching intended to mould the mind and character and instill a sense of proper, orderly conduct and action; training to behave or act in a controlled and effective manner; mental, intellectual, moral, or spiritual training or exercise. Also applied to the effect of an experience or undertaking (as, study, adversity, etc.) considered as imparting such training.
>
> Discipline (n.), sense II.4.a, *Oxford English Dictionary*, accessed 20 December 2023, https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/1894607904.

Yet I can't help but see shadows of another of the word's meanings.

> A branch of learning or knowledge; a field of study or expertise; a subject. Now also: a subcategory or element of a particular subject or field.
>
> Ibid., sense II.7.a.

And perhaps a relation between the two. How often does the maintenance of a consistent coherence of a discipline as a branch of learning or knowledge require the doling out of discipline as an effort to train, control, or mould others toward a pre-determined, value-producing end? Understood in this more complex sense—a cultural or formal institutionalization of a particular type of academic or artistic practice as a partitioning and enclosure of individual humans that transforms them into productive interoperable parts—what does discipline look like in music?

[xxiv] To quote Harry Haskell, *The Early Music Revival: A History* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1988), 9:

> What is 'early music'? The concept has meant different things at different periods in history. In 1731, England's Academy of Ancient Music formally defined the ancients as composers 'such ass lived before ye end of the Sixteenth Century'. In the eyes of Brahms and his late-nineteenth-century contemporaries, the early music repertoire encompassed the High Renaissance and Baroque periods, from Isaac, Praetorius, and Schutz up to Bach and Handel. Jerome and Elizabeth Roche stop short at Monteverdi in their recently published *Dictionary of Early Music*, while a prominent German musicologist describes it more broadly as any music having 'an interrupted interpretative tradition'. The definition has gradually been expanded to the point where almost anything from an ancient Greek hymn to an early-twentieth-century orchestral score can qualify as early music—that is, music for which a historically appropriate style of performance must be reconstructed on the basis of surviving instruments, treatises and other evidence. Whether this process constitutes a 'revival' is open to question: much of the music to which the above definition applies—Gregorian chant, Palestrina, Bach, Handel and so forth—is in fact part of a *continuous* interpretative tradition, in some cases reaching back hundreds of years. The conclusion is inescapable that something other than chronological age is the determining factor here. Historical performance, as the musicologist Joseph Kerman has written, 'is essentially an attitude of mind rather than a set of techniques applied to an arbitrarily delimited body of early music.'

There are many ideas of Early Music. Beyond Haskell's naming of the first iteration of the Academy of Ancient Music, Jerome and Elizabeth Roche, and Joseph Kerman, numerous authors have written about the activity of performing music that is older than living memory in a way that is arguably appropriate to it. Consider the compositional medievalism of Richard Wagner or Carl Orff, the historical organology of Arnold

Dolmetsch, the interpretive experimentation of David Munrow, Alfred Deller, and the Dufay Collective, and the historiographical reflections of Richard Taruskin, Daniel Leech-Wilkinson, Peter Kivy, John Butt, and Barthold Kuijken. Think also of the current popularity of Early Music festivals and ensembles across the U.S. and Europe such as the Festival Oude Muziek Utrecht, the London International Early Music Festival (formerly Greenwich Early Music Festival), the Boston Early Music Festival, the recent 'revival' of the Academy for Ancient Music, and the Akademie für Alte Musik Berlin. Keeping in mind Foucault's social techniques detailed above, the phrase "Early Music" can be understood to name this diverse set of activities as a stable, singular "discipline." Over the course of this text I often use the phrases "historical performance," "historically-informed performance," and "Early Music" somewhat interchangeably, but I do see a few important distinctions and strive throughout this project to apply them appropriately. In my understanding, "Early Music" can refer both to a musical culture or cultures of the distant past and to the aforementioned broader cultural movement dedicated to "reviving" it in contemporary practice. So this term can refer to both a particular *past* and a particular *discipline*. "Historical performance" and "historically-informed performance," on the other hand, refer more to a particular *methodology* that is presently hegemonic within "Early Music," though it was not always so. I do understand these two methodological terms, "historical performance" and "historically-informed performance," to be more closely related to each other than either is to "Early Music," but there is a further important distinction between the two. Namely, I find the word "informed" to be problematic in relation to the actual methodology applied, as it is only an attempt to wipe clean the practitioner's hands of their inevitable participation in *selection, interpretation,* and *judgment* of the so-called "historical information." For this reason, I prefer "historical performance," which retains the core idea that one is engaging in music-making as a historical activity but leaves the intense complexity of historical epistemology and ontology fully in play, as indeed it always is in practice.

[xxv] The other half of this puzzle is "New Music." To quote from the website of the Institute for New Music at Northwestern University, accessed 21 December 2023, https://music.northwestern.edu/newmusic):

> The Institute for New Music functions as the nerve center of all contemporary music activities at the Bienen School of Music. Founded in 2012, the Institute presents numerous events over the course of the academic year—from residencies of visiting ensembles and composers to workshops, lectures, and masterclasses, to the biennial conference/festival NUNC! Several critical assets make Northwestern an ideal site for

> a major new music initiative. These include a corps of talented performance students interested in new music; a strong composition program; the Michael Ludwig Nemmers Prize in Music Composition, which regularly brings world-renowned composers to campus; the Northwestern Music Library, which contains an unparalleled and internationally renowned archive of printed music composed since 1945; and proximity to Chicago's vibrant new music scene.

In lower case, "new music" can certainly be just as neutral a chronological indicator as "early music." When capitalized, however, "New Music" becomes specifically representative of that which intentionally departs from, reacts to, or invents beyond prior music. This framing appears in the pedagogy at Northwestern University—my undergraduate alma mater—as well as in the activities of those ensembles, festivals, and concert series with which I'm most intimately familiar—Ensemble Dal Niente, Eighth Blackbird, the Nieuw Ensemble, New Music Chicago, Gaudeamus, and November Music, among others. Understood through these groups and activities, "New Music" is as well-established and clearly-defined a *discipline*, again using Foucault's sense of the word, as "Early Music." My own expertise and activity in this field lies particularly in what's sometimes called "contemporary composition," which is the term I use more often than "New Music" in this text. In my understanding, "contemporary composition" specifically refers to the inscription of creative musical intent. Music notation is the medium here, though this can be anything from the received tradition of writing notes and rests on a five-line staff to any number of more experimental notations in graphic, prose, or other visual or sensory form. Though there are often aesthetic and ideological affinities between composed music and its improvised or otherwise non-notated cousins in New Music, my own methodology as both a historian and a musician works in and through musical notation, so my focus on it here is mostly a matter of pragmatics.

This can lead to what might perhaps serve as a concluding remark to this research question and (de facto) literature review. Though the scope of this project uses examples from my own highly specific practice as an archival historian and contemporary composer, my findings are by no means limited in relevance to only my own methodologies or interests. I use my own practice as both an experimental arena and a storehouse of examples in and through which to unpack the question above. But it is my anticipation and indeed hope that the novel epistemological, ontological, and methodological formations this project creates will be transferable in relatively straightforward ways to many other practices of music, art, history, and other forms of cultural production and theory.