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The persistence of space: formalizing the polysemy of spatial relations in functional elements

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Biblical Hebrew *kī* ‘that’ as a marker of Common Ground

4

Abstract The Biblical Hebrew clausal connective כִּי *kī* has many functions: introducing object and subject clauses as well as causal, temporal, conditional, adversative, concessive, and resultative adverbials. How are these functions related, and can they be reduced to a single semantic core? In this chapter I describe *kī* as a marker of Common Ground. This imposes significant constraints on the contexts in which *kī* can be expected, and distinguishes *kī* from other words with similar functions. The chapter also explains why *kī* should mark Common Ground: this follows from the recycling of an original [+distal] feature of the Proto-Semitic morpheme **ka*. I further argue that most of the different adverbial readings of *kī* are not the result of lexicalization, but rather pragmatically inferred, based on the general notion of Common Ground together with context-specific information. This provides a more economical description of this problematic lexeme.

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter it was argued that the presence or absence of “neutral” complementizers like English *that* can depend on the information status of the content of the complement clause: *that* is more often used when the information in the complement clause is in the Common Ground. This is most easily seen in exclamatives:

(4.1) *That bio industry is still allowed!* (= [3.3a])

Unlike a declarative sentence without *that*, (4.1) cannot be used to convince the Addressee of the fact that bio industry is still allowed. In the analysis of chapter 3, the presuppositional status of the propositional content is marked by the presence of complementizer *that*.

This chapter is first published here. I am grateful to Ellen van Wolde and Johan Rooryck for useful feedback on this chapter. Any remaining mistakes are mine alone.

Other clausal connectives are also sensitive to information status. As just one example, English *for* is typically used to introduce parenthetical causal clauses, which contain backgrounded information that may already be familiar to the Addressee. Thus, speakers for whom *for* is still productive prefer *for* over *because* in (4.2a), while *because* is preferred in (4.2b), where new information is introduced.¹ In sentences like (4.2a), the Speaker assumes that the information in the *for*-clause is known, or can readily be assumed by, the Addressee.²

- (4.2) a. *An automatic timer would soon turn [the light] off, for we [Ladover Jews] do not tamper with electricity on Shabbos.*
(Chaim Potok, 1990, *The gift of Asher Lev*)
- b. *My mother's sister ..., who had been unable to attend the funeral because her husband had undergone bypass surgery ..., flew in from Boston.*
(Chaim Potok, 1990, *The gift of Asher Lev*)

In this chapter I extend the analysis of chapter 3 to a highly polysemous clausal connective in an unrelated language to demonstrate the wide applicability of the theory. I work out the case of the Biblical Hebrew clausal connective כִּי *kī* and illustrate the different discursive effects a reference to the Common Ground can have. I will argue below that like English *that*, *kī* carries a [+distal] feature, which makes a Common Ground analysis a priori likely. A look at any dictionary suggests a plethora of different uses for *kī*: introducing object and subject clauses ('that'), causal 'because, for', temporal 'when', conditional 'if', adversative 'but', concessive 'though', resultative 'so that', and more. Previous scholarship has failed to reduce these different uses to a single semantic core. I argue that marking Common Ground could constitute this semantic core, and that the different uses can be derived from syntactic and pragmatic clues based on this general semantics.

The chapter thus makes two contributions: it shows that clausal connectives in unrelated languages are sensitive to reference to Common Ground, and it discusses in depth the different discursive effects reference to Common Ground can have. The remainder of the introduction summarizes the framework of chapter 3 which forms the basis for this analysis (section 4.1.1),

1 Similarly, *since* introduces specifically not-at-issue causal clauses compared to *because* (Charnavel 2017). There is some correlation between discourse-old information status and not-at-issueness, since discourse-new information content is typically at-issue.

2 *For*-clauses can be analyzed as right dislocations (De Vos in preparation), which are associated with discourse-old or inferential information status (e.g. Grosz & Ziv 1998).

and also provides a brief history of scholarship on *kī* (section 4.1.2). In section 4.2 I describe my method and provide an overview of the data. The following sections present an in depth analysis of the different ways in which *kī* can be used, in which I show how each use derives from the core function of marking Common Ground (sections 4.3 to 4.7). Section 4.8 concludes.

4.1.1 Theoretical framework

This subsection briefly summarizes the framework developed in chapter 3. Readers who have read chapter 3 can safely skip ahead to section 4.1.2.

One of the main claims of chapter 3 was that the [+distal] feature of the English demonstrative *that* is still present, but differently interpreted, when *that* is used as a complementizer. English *that* marks not only spatial distance (**this/that book over there*) but also involvement with the Addressee, who is “far” from the Speaker. This notion is interpreted in different ways depending on the context; in the sentential domain, complementizer *that* refers to Common Ground between Speaker and Addressee.³ In particular, the Common Ground is conceptualized as accessible and “close” to the Addressee and, as a result, “far” from the Speaker.

Figure 4.1 (reproduced from figure 3.1) clarifies the model. The circle around S stands for the information content tracked by the Speaker; the circle around A for the information content tracked by the Addressee. The intersection of these sets (shaded dark gray) can, under some assumptions, be seen as the Common Ground.⁴ The light gray shaded region represents the Speaker-private information content; information that is not tracked by the Addressee. Even though both gray regions are equally accessible to the Speaker, languages use [–distal] and [+distal] forms to refer to the light and the dark region, respectively. Thus, while the distance is measured from the Speaker’s origo, it reflects the accessibility to the Addressee, i.e., Common Ground status.

3 Chapter 3 introduced the term “Shared Discourse Space” for the region tracked by both the Speaker and the Addressee. Shared Discourse Space is more general than Common Ground and does not only contain information content. Since this chapter deals exclusively with the sentential domain, the more common term “Common Ground” suffices here. The argument is fully compatible with an analysis based on Shared Discourse Space, should this be needed for data not covered in this study.

4 Most importantly, the circle around the Addressee represents what *the Speaker assumes to be* tracked by the Addressee (see section 3.2).




Figure 4.1 The information content tracked by the Speaker and Addressee. The intersection, the Common Ground, is seen as “far” from the Speaker.

Most notably, Addressee involvement plays a role in the interpretation of complementizer *that*. Since *that* is [+distal], it refers to the discourse-old information content in the Shared Discourse Space. This explains why *that* is used in exclamatives, whose propositional content is presupposed (see [4.1] above), as well as in other contexts discussed in chapter 3.

Speakers can interact with the spatial model in figure 4.1 in different ways. In the most basic cases, [+distal] forms are used to refer to discourse-old information content (which is in the Common Ground), and [–distal] forms are used to refer to discourse-new information content. However, there are two cases in which discourse-new information content can be presented as part of the Common Ground: when the content can be *accommodated* by the Addressee and when it is *imposed* by the Speaker. Declarative sentences with discourse-new information content are typically modeled as a request or proposal to update the Common Ground (cf. Farkas & Bruce 2010: 92). However, by explicitly placing the content “near” the Addressee with a [+distal] element, the Speaker can present it as if it is already part of the Common Ground. The Speaker does so to signal that they expect that the request for a Common Ground update will be granted, or, alternatively, to emphasize that they do not permit the Addressee to reject the proposal to update the Common Ground. In the first case, the Speaker assumes that the Addressee can *accommodate* the information content; in the second case, the Speaker *imposes* the content on the Common Ground.⁵

These three types of reference (to discourse-old, accommodated, and imposed information content) can all be seen as referencing information

5 For more details and references, see Kocher (2022: 176–177). Some examples may be helpful here. The reader may browse ahead and compare cases of accommodation (e.g. [4.4; 4.17; 4.20; 4.23–4.24]) with those of imposition (e.g. [4.11; 4.19; 4.25]).

conceptually “near” the Addressee. Discourse-old information content is “near” the Addressee because it is known and accessible to her. When new information content is placed “near” the Addressee by the Speaker, she can thereby suggest that the Addressee should easily be able to accommodate it. When this is not the case, this forces the Addressee to react; this is a case of information content imposed on the Common Ground. It is not surprising, then, that an originally [+distal] deictic element like English *that* can be used to interact with the Common Ground in these different ways: [+distal] *that* refers to a space “far” from the Speaker, but “near” the Addressee.

4.1.2 Biblical Hebrew *kī*

As mentioned above, Biblical Hebrew *kī* has many different uses: introducing object and subject clauses (‘that’), causal ‘because, for’, temporal ‘when’, conditional ‘if’, adversative ‘but’, concessive ‘though’, resultative ‘so that’, and more.⁶ It is generally accepted that *kī* derives from an originally deictic morpheme **ka*, so we are not dealing with multiple, accidentally homonymous particles. The morpheme **ka* is clearly ancient, given its appearance in at least Phoenician, Aramaic, and Arabic with similar functions (Lipiński 2001: §49.9). Many authors have pointed to this morpheme as evidence for a general “deictic” meaning of *kī* (e.g. Muilenburg 1961; Schoors 1981). What has not been given attention, however, is that **ka* is specifically a [+distal] deictic morpheme, referring to things at some distance from the Speaker.⁷ This

6 Note that the distinction between main and subordinate clauses is not as strict in Hebrew as it is in, for example, English. For simplicity I will sometimes refer to *kī*-clauses as “subordinate” to a corresponding “main” clause, but it should be kept in mind that the relation between the two clauses is often more paratactic than hypotactic.

7 Lipiński (2001: §36.35, 36.37, 36.41) lists a handful of demonstratives in Semitic and beyond where **ka* appears to be proximal, but these are only a handful of isolated instances. Distal demonstratives take **ka* more often and more consistently. This is especially clear in West Semitic, where **ka* also appears in demonstratives. According to Hasselbach (2007: 3), **ka* in demonstratives “regularly marks far deixis in those languages in which it occurs”. In some languages where demonstratives going back to **ka* are in paradigmatic contrast with the third person personal pronoun used as a [+distal] demonstrative, it appears that the forms based on **ka* are specifically used to refer to something near or known to the Addressee (e.g., ‘give me *that* (from **ka*)’ referring to an object near the Addressee in Jewish Babylonian Aramaic; Bar-Asher Siegal 2013: 82). This would align with the notion of Addressee involvement, but a discussion of these demonstrative forms is out of scope here.

[+distal] feature forms the basis for an interpretation based on Addressee involvement within the framework of chapter 3, summarized above.

There is no consensus as to how the different meanings of *kī* are related to each other and to original **ka*. In very broad strokes, the literature can be divided into those scholars who claim that all (or at least most) uses of *kī* can be reduced to a single semantic core (e.g. Muilenburg 1961; Schoors 1981), and those scholars who claim that diachronic processes like grammaticalization have led to a highly polysemous lexeme (e.g. Locatell 2017, 2020).⁸ The synchronic approach has been abandoned by most recent authors with the exception of Follingstad (2001), because the ways in which functions of *kī* can be said to be “deictic” are not well-defined, so that the theory is not constrained enough. Furthermore, it is unclear how some functions, like the causal one, can be reduced to the very general notion of deixis. On the other hand, diachronic developments can often be made conceivable but not proven. A diachronic account also does not answer the question how speakers could have understood which function of *kī* is used in a particular instance, given the high degree of polysemy.

I argue that a primarily synchronic account is possible using the notion of Addressee involvement introduced above.⁹ I will show, for example, that *kī* is not used to introduce just any object clause, but specifically those object clauses whose information content is in the Common Ground. The same goes for other uses: *kī* cannot introduce just any temporal, conditional, or adversative (etc.) clause, but only those whose information content is in the Common Ground. This provides a more economical description of *kī* than a diachronic approach: roughly, *kī* is used when the information content of the complement clause is in the Common Ground. The particular interpretation (as causal, temporal, etc.), largely depends on context.¹⁰

8 See further Redslob (1835), Vriezen (1958), Muilenburg (1961), Schoors (1981), Bandstra (1982), Claassen (1983), Thorion (1984), Aejmelaeus (1986), Gross (1991), Benigni (1999), Follingstad (2001), Park (2016), and Locatell (2017, 2020). Some passages in works with a broader scope are relevant as well, in particular Watts (1964: 118–149); Muraoka (1985: 158–164); Van der Merwe (1993: 38–41); and Conklin (2011: 46–59). I will not summarize related work here, as this has recently been done by Locatell (2017), and only refer to these earlier sources where relevant to my own argument.

9 In two contexts I do need to assume a semantic shift, but in both cases the shift is typologically plausible.

10 One occasionally finds generic arguments against such a reductionist approach (Aejmelaeus 1986: 195; Locatell 2017: 114). However, the persistence of lexical meaning is,

4.2 Method and overview of the data

My analysis is based on an exhaustive analysis of the 808 uses of *kī* with a clausal complement in the narrative portions of the biblical books Genesis, Judges, Samuel, and Ruth. These books are considered to be similar in terms of time and place of origin, and thus form a relatively homogeneous corpus. I focus on narrative texts because these contain most direct speech, where we can expect the interaction with Common Ground to be the largest.¹¹ However, I also included uses of *kī* outside direct speech, where the narrator is the “Speaker” and the reader is the Addressee.

Each instance of *kī* was classified as belonging to one use type.¹² My classification of each instance can be found in the data set accompanying this chapter (Staps 2023b). The types are based on categories commonly found in reference works and literature on *kī*: (a) introducing object and subject clauses (‘that’; tagged as “complementizer”), (b) causal ‘because, for’, (c) adversative ‘but’, (d) causal-adversative ‘not X, *because/but rather* Y’, (e) conditional ‘if’, (f) temporal ‘when’, (g) resultative ‘so that’, and (h) concessive ‘though’.¹³ Instances where the *kī*-clause does not seem to relate to a corresponding “main” clause were classified as (i) standalone; this group will be further subcategorized in section 4.7. Five cases were ambiguous; I will mostly ignore these for ease of exposition.¹⁴ The distribution over the vari-

in fact, expected in grammaticalization processes (Hopper 1991: 28–30). It is therefore not surprising if aspects of the [+distal] deictic meaning of **ka* are preserved in *kī*, and my claim is that this is the most economical description of the data.

- 11 It is conceivable that the use of *kī* in poetry follows a different, but comparable, distribution (see e.g. Meyer 2001). In poetry it is often less clear what the Common Ground contains, so this may be a weaker factor in choosing between *kī* and alternatives in poetic texts. It is also possible that there are differences in distribution between narrative (the Speaker is the author) and direct speech reports (the Speaker is a character in the text). I will have to leave both questions for further study, however.
- 12 I excluded instances of the fossilized construction $\text{כִּי} \text{יִ} \text{כִּי} \text{’im}$, and two instances of bare *kī*, in the meaning ‘except’, which I assume to have grammaticalized independently.
- 13 Naturally, there are cases that can be classified as one of two categories, in particular in the temporal/causal, temporal/conditional, and causal/resultative categories (cf. Locatelli 2020). My argument does not depend on a sharp distinction between these categories, so I have in these cases selected what seemed to be the most relevant category without spending too much thought on it.
- 14 Gen. 8:21 (causal/concessive); 21:7 (adversative/standalone); 38:16c (conditional/resultative); 1 Sam. 15:24a (resultative/standalone); 2 Sam. 18:3b (causal *or* adversative, but not causal-adversative). See the data set for more details.

ous types is shown in figure 4.2. More than half of the occurrences are causal, and approximately one in four instances of $k\bar{i}$ introduces an object or subject clause.

Each instance was also tagged for the way it interacts with Common Ground. As explained in section 4.1.1, the information content of the $k\bar{i}$ -clause can be (a) discourse-old and thus part of the Common Ground, (b) easily accommodated by the Addressee as new Common Ground, (c) imposed on the Common Ground by the Speaker for discursive effect. There are some cases where the information content in the $k\bar{i}$ -clause does not fit either of these cases; these were classified as (d) rest. I will discuss these separately below, to show why they do not constitute counter-examples for my claim that $k\bar{i}$ marks reference to Common Ground. Nevertheless I also include many examples where information *is* in the Common Ground, in order to illustrate the various discursive effects this can have.

Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of types of reference to the Common Ground for each use type of $k\bar{i}$; the numbers from which this graph has been compiled are given in table 4.1. It can immediately be seen that in the vast majority of cases, the information content of the $k\bar{i}$ -clause is discourse-old, easily accommodated, or imposed: in only 7% of the total number of cases there is no reference to Common Ground. The cases where $k\bar{i}$ apparently does not interact with Common Ground are mostly isolated in a few use types (causal, adversative, and causal-adversative).

Type	Discourse-old		Accommodated		Imposed		Rest	
Complementizer	150	75%	29	15%	18	9%	2	1%
Causal	245	57%	124	29%	23	5%	41	9%
Adversative	7	44%	3	19%	1	6%	5	31%
Causal-adversative	15	60%	5	20%	1	4%	16	25%
Conditional	4	57%	3	43%	0		0	
Temporal	15	50%	15	50%	0		0	
Resultative	35	85%	3	7%	3	7%	0	
Concessive	4	100%	0		0		0	
Standalone	15	47%	4	13%	12	38%	1	3%
Total	490	62%	186	24%	58	7%	53	7%

Table 4.1 Distribution of instances of $k\bar{i}$ in the data set, and the use of Common Ground per type.




Figure 4.2 Distribution of *kī* over use types.




Figure 4.3 Distribution of types of reference to the Common Ground for each use type of *kī*. Column width indicates type frequency (not to scale).

4.3 Object and subject clauses introduced with *kī*

This section concerns cases of *kī* classified as “complementizer”, in which *kī* is used to introduce an object or subject clause. It is cross-linguistically common for complementizers such as *kī* to develop from deictic elements.¹⁵ I will not concern myself here with the question why an originally [+distal] deictic element becomes a complementizer; this has been addressed in great detail elsewhere.¹⁶ Rather, I will compare complement clauses introduced by *kī* with other complementation strategies to show that *kī*-clauses are used specifically when reference to Common Ground is being made.

Object clauses introduced by *kī* can be divided into four categories depending on the type and semantic field of the matrix predicate. By far the most common are (a) verbs of perception (הִרְאָה *rā'ā* ‘see’; שָׁמַע *šāma* ‘hear’) and (b) cognitive verbs (יָדָע *yāda* ‘know’); less common are (c) speech verbs (הִגִּיד *higgīd* ‘inform’) (see Miller 2003: 98 on the relative rarity of this category). The last category contains (d) miscellaneous constructions: cases where the object clause is governed by a noun (עַד *ed* ‘witness’) or preposition (עַד *ad* ‘until’), as well as cases where *kī* introduces a subject clause.

4.3.1 Verbs of perception

The verb הִרְאָה *rā'ā* ‘see’ occurs 65 times with *kī* in my corpus, שָׁמַע *šāma* ‘hear’ 20 times, and הִתְבַּשֵּׂר *hitbaššer* ‘receive good news’ once. These verbs are most frequently used to describe an event in which the subject becomes

15 For example, English *that* is both a distal demonstrative (*that book*) and a complementizer (*I know that ...*); it shares these functions with Semitic **ka*. In Latin, the complementizer *quod* (*Scio quod ...* ‘I know that ...’) is made up of the interrogative element *qu* and the medial demonstrative *-id*. In Russian, the complementizer *što* (*ya znayu što ...* ‘I know that ...’) is related to the demonstrative *eto* (*eto dom* ‘this house’).

16 It is usually assumed that the English complementizer *that* developed from a cataphoric pronoun: *Galileo said that_i: [the earth is round]_i > Galileo said [CP that the earth is round]* (Roberts & Roussou 2003: 113, and references therein). This grammaticalization path is somewhat problematic for Hebrew *kī*, which never was a demonstrative. However, this grammaticalization path has been challenged in recent work (Kayne 2014: 189; Axel-Tober 2017), for example because it does not explain why complementizers are typically based on [+distal] elements (**Galileo said this the earth is round*). For this reason, I assume that complementizers are not simply reanalyzed demonstratives, but lexicalizations of the same deictic [+distal] feature in a different syntactic environment (C rather than D); see section 3.3.4.

aware of information that was already known to the Addressee (usually, the reader of the text). It is better understood as ‘realize’ than as ‘see’, as in (4.3), where the information is clearly discourse-old, and therefore in the Common Ground for the Addressee (the reader).

- (4.3) Gen. 16:4: וַיָּבֹא אֶל-הַגֵּר וַתְּהַר וַתֵּרָא בִּי הַרְתָּהּ
way-y-ābō-∅ *’el hāgār wat-t-ahar-∅* *wat-t-ēre’-∅*
 WAYQ-3M-come-SG to Hagar WAYQ-F-conceive-3SG WAYQ-F-see-3SG
kī hārā-tā
 COMP conceive\PFV-3F.SG

‘And he (Abraham) came into Hagar and she conceived, and she saw *that* she had conceived.’

The information can also be accommodated. In (4.4), the fact that the man cannot overpower Jacob can be accommodated by the Addressee given the information that they wrestle for a long time (until daybreak).

- (4.4) Gen. 32:25–26: וַיִּאָבֵק אִישׁ עִמּוֹ עַד עֲלוֹת הַשָּׁחַר: וַיֵּרָא בִּי לֹא יָכַל לוֹ
way-y-ē’ābēq-∅ *’iš imm-ō* *’ad ’ālōt* *haš=šāḥar*
 WAYQ-3M-wrestle-SG man with-him until go_up\INF.of the=daybreak
way-y-ar’-∅ *kī lō’ yākōl-∅* *l-ō*
 WAYQ-3M-see-SG COMP not be_able\PFV-3M.SG to-him

‘And a man wrestled with him (Jacob) until daybreak, and he realized *that* he could not overpower him.’

A comparison with other complementation strategies is most helpful to show that *kī*-clauses are associated with Common Ground; I will use רָאָה *rā’ā* ‘see’ as a running example. This verb occurs with three types of clausal complements in my corpus: besides *kī*, an interrogative pronoun can be used, or the complement can be introduced with וְהִנֵּה *wə-hinnē* ‘and behold’. Unsurprisingly, complement clauses headed by an interrogative pronoun express a lack of information and are therefore incompatible with *kī*, which marks Common Ground:

- (4.5) Gen. 37:20: וַעֲתָה | לְכוּ וְנִהְרָגְהוּ ... וְנִרְאָה מִה־יְהִי חֲלֹמְתָיו:
wə=’attā lāk-ū *wə=n-aharḡ-ēhū* ... *wə=n-ir’ē*
 and=now go\IMP-M.PL and=1PL-kill\IPFV-him ... and=1PL-see\IPFV
mah y-ihy-ū *ḥālōm-ōt-āyw*
 what 3M-be\IPFV-PL dream(M)-PL-his

‘Now, let’s kill him ... and we’ll see *what* will become of his dreams!’

More interesting is the division of labor between *kī* and *hinnē* ‘behold’. With the latter, the information given in the complement clause is new and not anticipated by the Addressee:¹⁷

- (4.6) Gen. 22:13: וַיֵּשׂא אַבְרָהָם אֶת־עֵינָיו וַיֵּרָא וְהִנֵּה־אֵיל אַחֲרַי בְּקִרְנָיו בְּסֹבֵב דְּבַרְקָנָיו
way-y-issā'-Ø 'abrāhām 'et 'ēn-āyw way-y-ar'-Ø wə=hinnē
 WAYQ-3M-lift-SG Abraham OBJ eye-DU.his WAYQ-3M-see-SG and=behold
 'ayil 'aḥar ne'ēḥaz-Ø *b=as=səbak bə=qarn-āyw*
 ram behind hold\MID.PFV-3M.SG in=the=bush in=horn-PL.its
 ‘As Abraham looked up, he saw — *and behold!* — a ram behind¹⁸ [him]; it had been caught with its horns in a bush.’

However, in some cases with *hinnē* ‘behold’, the information in the complement clause is not new to the Addressee (the reader), but new to the subject of *rā'ā* ‘see’:¹⁹

- (4.7) Gen. 8:13: חָרְבוּ הַמַּיִם מֵעַל הָאָרֶץ וַיֵּסֶר נֹחַ אֶת־מִכְסֵה הַתְּבֹה וַיֵּרָא וְהִנֵּה
 חָרְבוּ פְּנֵי הָאָדָמָה:
ḥārāb-ū ham=mayim mē='al ḥā'='āreš
 dry_up\PFV-3PL the=water(PL) from=on the=earth
way-y-āsar-Ø nōaḥ 'et mikse
 WAYQ-3M-move_away\CAUS-SG Noah OBJ covering.of
hat=tēbā way-y-ar'-Ø wə=hinnē ḥārāb-ū paṇ-ē
 the=ark WAYQ-3M-see-SG and=behold dry_up\PFV-3PL face(PL)-of
ḥā'='ādāmā
 the=earth

‘The waters dried up from the earth. Then Noah removed the covering of the ark, and saw — *and behold!* — the surface of the earth was drying.’

I consider cases of this latter type identical: the Addressee (the reader) takes the perspective of the subject of *rā'ā* ‘see’, as it were, and thus sees

17 Also Gen. 19:28; Jdg. 21:21. With a participle the complement can be either clausal or nominal: Gen. 18:2; 24:63; 26:8; 29:2; 37:25; Jdg. 3:24; 9:43; 1 Sam. 10:11; 2 Sam. 13:34. The following are ambiguous between participle and suffix conjugation: Gen. 33:1; 2 Sam. 18:24.

18 Alternatively, based on manuscript evidence, emend אַחֲרַי to אַחֲרַי 'εḥād ‘one’.

19 The distinction is not always clear. In Gen. 19:28, Abraham sees the smoke of Sodom and Gomorrah, of which the existence can be deduced by the Addressee from the sulfur and fire in 19:24. The smoke itself has, however, not been mentioned yet. All instances are mentioned in footnote 17, whether the information is only new to the subject or also to the Addressee.

- (4.10) 1 Sam. 15:35b: נָחַמְתִּי כִּי־הִמְלַכְתִּי אֶת־שָׂאוּל לְמֶלֶךְ
nīham-tī kī himlak-tī 'el šā'ul la=melek
 regret\PFV-1SG COMP be_king\CAUS.PFV-1SG OBJ Saul to=king
 'I have come to regret *that* I have made Saul king.'

The verb *yāda* 'know' is often used in the same sense as *rā'ā* 'see', meaning 'realize', and then has a complement that is obviously discourse-old or accommodated by the Addressee. However, *yāda* 'know' can be used more easily to impose information on the Common Ground:

- (4.11) 1 Sam. 28:1: וַיֹּאמֶר אַכִּישׁ אֶל־דָּוִד יְדַע תְּדַע כִּי אֶתְּלִי הַצָּא בַּמַּחְנֶה
way-y-ō'mer-Ø 'ākīš 'el dāwid yādōa' t-ēda'-Ø
 WAYQ-3M-say-SG Achish to David know\INFABS 2-know\IPFV-M.SG
kī 'itt-ī t-ēšē'-Ø b=am=maḥāne
 COMP with-me 2-go_out\IPFV-M.SG in=the=camp

'And Achish said to David: "You should know for sure *that* you will go out with me in battle."

Here, David has sought refuge with the Philistine king Gath. When the Philistines prepare to fight Israel, Achish makes sure that David understands that he has to fight on Achish's side now, and cannot refuse to participate. This is not something they discussed before. Using *kī* here imposes the information on the Common Ground, which works well for a command, and is reinforced by the infinitive absolute. Other than cases of imposition, however, *kī*-clauses with cognitive verbs are quite similar to those with verbs of perception.

4.3.3 Speech verbs

The most frequent speech verb with *kī*-clauses is *higgīd* 'inform' (13 times, and 5 times in the passive voice); we also have *nišba* 'swear' (2 times), and *āmar* 'say', *bisšēr* 'bring good news', and *gālā 'ōzen* 'uncover the ear' (1 time each).²⁰ The large number of occurrences with

²⁰ I follow Miller (2003: 103–116) in rejecting the idea that *kī* can introduce direct speech: *kī* either introduces indirect speech, or it is the first word in the reported direct speech. I discuss cases of the former here; when *kī* is part of the reported speech it can have any other function, which I discuss throughout the rest of this chapter.

- (4.14) Gen. 12:18: :ואִקְרָא פַרְעֹה לְאַבְרָם וְאָמַר ... לָמָּה לֹא־הִגַּדְתָּ לִּי כִּי אִשְׁתְּךָ הִיא
way-y-iqrā'-∅ par'ōh la='abrām way-y-ō'mer-∅ ... lāmmā lō'
 WAYQ-3M-call-SG Pharaoh to=Abram WAYQ-3M-say-SG ... why not
higgad-tā l-ī kī 'išt-əkā hū
 inform\PFV-2M.SG to-me COMP wife-yours she

'So Pharaoh called Abram and said: "... Why have you not told me *that* she is your wife?'"

In (4.13), Abram's idea to pretend that Sarai is his sister is new to the Addressee (Sarai), and there is no reason why it should be easily accommodated. As a result, *kī* is not used. However, in (4.14), Pharaoh has found out that Sarai is Abram's sister. The information is in his and Abram's Common Ground, and the indirect speech is introduced with *kī* accordingly.²²

One could object that the pair in (4.13–4.14) is not minimal because two different verbs are used: *higgīd* 'inform' with *kī* in (4.14) and *'āmar* 'say' without in (4.13). Since asyndetic indirect speech complements are only ever found with *'āmar* 'say' (Miller 2003: 121), a better minimal pair cannot be given.²³ However, note that the simple fact that *kī* appears with one verb and not the other can and should be seen as reflecting the function of the complementizer to mark Common Ground: meaning 'inform', *higgīd* is simply much more suitable to talk about common knowledge, whereas *'āmar* 'say' is more often used in contexts where the Addressee is given new information, such as imperatives (4.13). This distribution therefore confirms the hypothesis concerning *kī*.

4.3.4 Miscellaneous complementation structures

Although nominalized *kī*-clauses are usually object clauses complementing verbs, they can also complement nouns and prepositions, or function as subject clauses. With nouns we only find *עֵד* 'ēd 'witness' (1 Sam. 12:5; Ruth 4:9)

22 In Gen. 12:19, Pharaoh continues to ask: 'why did you say, "she is my sister"?', without *kī*. But *kī* is here excluded since the complement is a direct speech report, as can be seen from the pronominal reference (Miller 2003: 120).

23 The one example of *'āmar* 'say' with a *kī*-clause has the verb in the meaning 'think, say to oneself': 'I thought that you really hated [your bride], so I gave her to your best man' (Jdg. 15:2). Common Ground is imposed here; the Speaker informs the Addressee of an assumption he made based on the Addressee's earlier behavior.

and עֲדָה *‘ēdā* ‘legal proof’ (Gen. 21:30b); with prepositions we only have עד *‘ad* ‘until’ (3 times).

The nouns *‘ed* ‘witness’ and *‘ēdā* ‘legal proof’ are used with *kī* only to establish who can corroborate a certain fact. This is always a known fact, that is, a fact in the Common Ground:

(4.15) 1 Sam. 12:4–5: וַיֹּאמְרוּ לֹא עָשִׂקְתָּנוּ וְלֹא רָצוּתָנוּ וְלֹא לָקַחְתָּ מִיַּד־אִישׁ מֵאֹמֶה: וַיֹּאמֶר אֵלֵיהֶם עַד יְהוָה בְּכֶם וְעַד מְשִׁיחוֹ הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה כִּי לֹא מִצְאָתֶם בְּיַדִּי מֵאֹמֶה

way-y-ō’mar-ū lō’ ‘āšaq-tā-nū wə=lō’
 WAYQ-3M-say-PL not wrong\PFV-2M.SG-us and=not
raššō-tā-nū wə=lō’ lāqah-tā miy=yad
 oppress\PFV-2M.SG-us and=not take\PFV-2M.SG from=hand.of
‘iš mə’umā way-y-ō’mer-Ø ‘ālē-hem ‘ed yhw
 anyone anything WAYQ-3M-say-SG to-them witness Yahweh
bā-kem wə=‘ed məših-ō hay=yōm haz=ze kī
 against-you and=witness anointed-his the=day the=this COMP
lō’ məšā-tem bə=yād-ī mə’umā
 not find\PFV-2M.PL in=hand-mine anything

‘And they said: “You have not wronged us or oppressed us, and you have not taken anything from anyone.” So he said to them: “Today Yahweh is a witness against you, and his anointed is a witness, *that* you have not found any [charge] against me.”

Here, the complement clause simply reiterates what has already been said in the previous verse. Without *kī*, *‘ed* ‘witness’ can be used with new information. In the following example, it is clear that Laban and Jacob are going to form some kind of covenant, but the preceding context provides no information based on which the Addressee can deduce that the cairn will be a marker of the border between them. Therefore *kī* would be inappropriate:

(4.16) Gen. 31:52: עַד הַגֵּל הַזֶּה וְעַד הַמַּצְבָּה אִם־אֶנִּי לֹא־אֶעְבֵּר אֵלָיְךָ אֶת־הַגֵּל הַזֶּה וְאִם־אָתָּה לֹא־תֵעָבֵר אֵלַי אֶת־הַגֵּל הַזֶּה וְאֶת־הַמַּצְבָּה הַזֹּאת לְרַעָה:

‘ed hag=gal haz=ze wə=‘ēdā ham=maššēbā ‘im ‘ānī lō’
 witness the=cairn the=this and=witness the=pillar if I not
’-ε’ēbōr ‘ēle-kā ’et hag=gal haz=ze wə=’im ‘attā
 1SG-pass_over\IPFV to-you OBJ the=cairn the=this and=if you

lō' t-a'ābōr-∅ 'ēla-y 'ēt hag=gal haz=zē wə'=ēt
 not 2-pass_over\IPFV-M.SG to-me OBJ the=cairn the=this and=OBJ
ham=maššēbā haz=zōt lə=rā'ā
 the=pillar the=this for=evil

(Laban to Jacob:) “This cairn is a witness, and the pillar is a witness: ∅ I will not pass this cairn to you, and you will not pass this cairn and this pillar to me to do harm.”

Each instance with 'ad 'until' (Gen. 26:13; 41:49; 2 Sam. 23:10) describes the direct consequence of the matrix clause. For instance, in (4.17), being very wealthy is a direct consequence of becoming more and more wealthy. The *kī*-clause is therefore easily accommodated in the Common Ground:

(4.17) Gen. 26:13: וַיִּגְדַּל הָאִישׁ וַיְלֵךְ הַלֹּחֶץ וַיִּגְדַּל עַד כִּי־יִגְדַּל מְאֹד׃
way-y-iḡdal-∅ *hā'=iš* *way-y-ēlek-∅* *hālōk*
 WAYQ-3M-be_great-SG the=man WAYQ-3M-go-SG go\INFABS
wə=gāḏēl-∅ 'ad *kī* *ḡādal-∅* *mə'ōd*
 and=be_great\PTCP-M.SG until COMP be_great\PFV-3M.SG very

'The man was wealthy, and he became more and more wealthy²⁴ to the point that he was very wealthy.'

The remaining cases are subject clauses. Two of these begin with *כִּי* אַךְ *ap kī* ' [it is] even [the case] that' (Gen. 3:1; 1 Sam. 14:30). I first discuss the other four, which are more straightforward: they all nominalize a previously introduced proposition, and thus refer to Common Ground (1 Sam. 25:30; 2 Sam. 9:1; 18:3; Ruth 2:22). For instance, in (4.18), the nominalized clause refers to the same proposition as the earlier 'you will not go out':

(4.18) 2 Sam. 18:2–3c: וַיֹּאמֶר הַמֶּלֶךְ אֶל־הָעָם יֵצֵא אִצָּא גַם־אֲנִי עִמָּכֶם׃ וַיֹּאמֶר הָעָם לֹא תֵצֵא ... וַעֲתָה טוֹב בִּי־תְהִי־הַלְנֵנוּ מֵעִיר לְעִזּוֹר׃²⁵
way-y-ō'mer-∅ *ham=melek* 'el *hā'=ām* *yāšō'*
 WAYQ-3M-say-SG the=king to the=people go_out\INFABS
 'ēšē' *gam* 'ānī 'imm-ākem *way-y-ō'mer-∅*
 ISG-go_out\IPFV also I with-you WAYQ-3M-say-SG

²⁴ Reading *ḡāḏōl* (INFABS) for *ḡāḏēl*; for the durative interpretation cf. Gzella (2008).

²⁵ The consonantal text has לעזיר; a misspelling or the same form with distant assimilation (Tsumura 2014: 137–138).

hā̄=‘ām *lō’* *t-ēšē’-Ø* ... *wə=‘attā̄* *ṭōb*
 the=people(M) not 2-go_out\IPFV-M.SG ... and=now good
kī *t-ihayε-Ø* *lā̄-nū* *mē=‘ir* *la=‘zōr*
 COMP 2-be\IPFV-M.SG for-us from=city for=help

‘The king said to the people: “I myself will also go out with you.” But the people said: “[You will not go out]_i ...; now, it is better *that* [you provide support for us from the city]_i.”’

These cases thus confirm the hypothesis that *kī* marks the use of Common Ground (unfortunately, however, they cannot be compared to asyndetic finite subject clauses; these do not exist).

The cases with *‘ap̄ kī* ‘[it is] even [the case] that ...’ are as follows:²⁶

- (4.19) Gen. 3:1: הַנָּחִי אָמַר אֶל-הָאִשָּׁה וְאָמַר בְּיָדְךָ אֵלֶּיךָ לֵאמֹר אֲכָלְתְּ מִכֹּל עֵץ הַגָּן וְעַתָּה לֹא תֹאכַל מִכֹּל עֵץ הַגָּן
way-y-ō‘mer-Ø ‘el *hā̄=iššā̄* *‘ap̄* *kī* *‘amar-Ø* ‘ēlohīm
 WAYQ-3M-say-SG to the=woman **even** COMP say\PFV-3M.SG God
lō’ *t-ō‘kal-ū* *mik=kōl* ‘ēš *hag=gān*
 not 2-eat\IPFV-M.PL from=all.of tree.of the=garden

‘And [the snake] said to the woman: “Is it *really* the case *that* God has said: ‘You shall not eat from any tree of the garden?’”

- (4.20) 1 Sam. 14:30a: אָמַר דָּוִד לְיֹאשֶׁבֶב הַיִּזְרְעֵלִי הֲיֵשׁ עֵץ אֶבְרָהָם לֵאמֹר אֲכָלְתָּ מִכֹּל עֵץ הַגָּן וְעַתָּה לֹא תֹאכַל מִכֹּל עֵץ הַגָּן
‘ap̄ *kī* *lū’* *‘ākōl* *‘ākal-Ø* *hayyōm* *hā̄=‘ām*
even COMP had_not eat\INFABS eat\PFV-3M.SG today the=army(M)
miš=šəlal ‘ōyab-‘āyw ‘āšer *māšā̄’-Ø* *kī* *‘attā̄*
 from=provision.of enemy-PL.its REL find\PFV-3M.SG COMP now
lō’ *rā̄bə-tā̄* *makkā̄* *b=ap=pəlišṭi-m*
 not be_great\PFV-3F.SG slaughter(F) against=the=Philistine-PL

‘(See how my eyes gleamed when I tasted just a little of this honey.) It’s *certainly* the case *that*, had the army today eaten from the enemies’ provision which it found, that now the slaughter of the Philistines would have been greater.’

Example (4.19) is a case of imposed Common Ground: the snake presumably knows that God has only forbidden the people to eat from one tree,

²⁶ The construction *‘ap̄ kī* can sometimes be read as ‘how much more/less’, introducing a clause that provides a stronger reason for an implicit assertion than the reason provided in the previous clause (Van der Merwe et al. 2017: §40.14.1b). Three cases where *‘ap̄ kī* should be read together are classified as causal (1 Sam. 21:6b; 23:3; 2 Sam. 16:11a).

but gains the woman's trust by pretending he is asking a simple question. By pretending that he is ill-informed, the snake presents itself as harmless to the woman, which it will subsequently exploit.

In (4.20), Common Ground is accommodated. In the previous clause, the Speaker has suggested that he was strengthened by eating just a little of the enemies' provisions; the following verse simply extends this to the rest of the army.

4.3.5 Summary

In conclusion, both the distribution of complementizer *kī* over different matrix predicates and a comparison with other complementation strategies support the hypothesis that *kī* marks information in the Common Ground, or information that is easily accommodated in the Common Ground. In terms of distribution we may note the frequent use with $\text{רָאָה} \text{ } rā'ā$ in the sense 'realize (old information)' rather than the literal 'see (something new)', as well as the preference for $\text{הִגִּיד} \text{ } higgīd$ 'inform (of old information)' over $\text{אָמַר} \text{ } 'āmar$ 'say (something new)'. I have compared *kī* to various other complementation strategies, such as $\text{וַיַּבְהִיט} \text{ } wə-hinnē$ 'and behold' and asyndetic indirect speech, which can all be shown to be used when the complement is not in the Common Ground yet, in contrast to the cases with *kī*. The following sections proceed with the analysis of adverbial *kī*-clauses.

4.4 Causal *kī*

As mentioned in section 4.2, *kī* most frequently introduces a causal clause, which gives the cause, reason, or ground for the event described in the main clause.²⁷ In the majority of cases (almost 90%), the cause given in the clause is either already in the Common Ground or easily accommodated by the Addressee.²⁸ It is not uncommon for causal conjunctions to be sensitive to

²⁷ The discussion of causal-adversative *kī* is delayed until section 4.5, where adversative *kī* is discussed as well.

²⁸ Some brief remarks are in order about my classification of causal *kī* when a proper name is explained. There are 23 cases in my corpus, of which 20 in Genesis. In the data set these are marked as "naming": Gen. 2:23; 3:20; 4:25a; 10:25; 11:9; 16:11, 13; 17:5, 15; 21:31; 26:20, 22; 29:32ab, 33a; 32:29b, 31; 35:7; 41:51, 52; 1 Sam. 1:20; 2 Sam. 7:27; Ruth 1:20. One of these is causal-adversative with no reference to Common Ground (Gen. 17:15). The other 22 are causal: 17 with reference to discourse-old information (Gen. 2:23; 3:20;

In (4.23), it is said that the grain that Joseph is storing is ‘a very great quantity’, and eventually he has to stop counting it. Based on this, the information in the *kī*-clause (that the stored grain had become immeasurable) is easily accommodated.

(4.23) Gen. 41:49b: וַיִּצְבֹּר יוֹסֵף בָּרַךְ כְּחֹל הַיָּם הַרְבֵּה מְאֹד עַד כִּי־חָדַל לִסְפֹּר כִּי־אֵין מִסְפָּר:

way-y-išbōr-Ø yōsēp bār kə=hōl hay=yām
 WAYQ-3M-store-SG Joseph grain like=sand.of the=sea
harbe məʔōd ʾad kī ḥādal-Ø li=spōr
 be_great\CAUS.INF very until COMP stop\PFV-3M.SG to=count\INF
kī ʿen mispār
 COMP not_exist number

‘And Joseph stored grain — as much as the sand of the sea, a very great quantity — to the point that he stopped counting it *because* it was immeasurable.’

Similarly, in (4.24), Samuel has to take oil and go to Jesse. Based on this (and the fact that Saul has been rejected as a king in the preceding chapter), it is easily accommodated that someone in Jesse’s family will be the new king.

(4.24) 1 Sam. 16:1: מִלֵּא קִרְנָךְ שֶׁמֶן וְלֵךְ אֶשְׁלַחְךָ אֶל־יִשָּׁי בֵּית־הַלְחָמִי כִּי־רְאִיתִי בְּבִנָּיו לִי מֶלֶךְ:

mallēʔ-Ø qarn-akā šemen wə=lēk-Ø
 fill\IMP-M.SG horn-yours oil and=go\IMP-M.SG
ʾ-əšlāḥ-ākā ʾel yišay bēt hallahmī
 1SG-send_out\IPFV-you.OBJ to Jesse the_Bethlehemite
kī rāʾt-tī bə=bān-āyw l-tī mēlek
 COMP see\PFV-1SG in=son-PL.his for-me king

‘Fill your horn with oil and go, I will send you to Jesse the Bethlehemite, *for* I have seen a king for me amongst his sons.’

Things become more interesting in cases where Common Ground is imposed. In the following example, David has just sneaked into Saul’s camp while Abner was on guard. David then says to Abner that he could have killed Saul. Using *kī*, David pretends that Abner should know that an enemy soldier (David himself) came into the camp, thus emphasizing that Abner did not do a very good job protecting Saul:

- (4.25) 1 Sam. 26:15: וְלָמָּה לֹא שָׁמַרְתָּ אֶל־אֲדֹנָיְךָ הַמֶּלֶךְ כִּי־בָא אֶחָד הָעָם לְהַשְׁחִית
אֶת־הַמֶּלֶךְ אֲדֹנָיְךָ:

wə=lāmmā lō' šāmar-tā 'el 'ădōne-kā ham=melek kī
and=why not guard\PFV-2M.SG to lord-yours the=king COMP
bā'-Ø 'ahad hā='ām lə=hašhūt 'et ham=melek
come\PFV-3M.SG one.of the=army to=destroy\INF OBJ the=king
ădōne-kā
lord-yours

‘And why haven’t you protected your lord the king, *given that* a soldier came to kill the king your lord?’

In all the examples in (4.21–4.25), the Speaker positions a sentential complement close to the Addressee using [+distal] *kī*. Depending on the context, this can have several effects: it may signal to the Addressee that discourse-old information is being referenced (4.21–4.22), or the Addressee may be prompted to accommodate some new information in the Common Ground (4.23–4.24), or the Speaker may present information as something the Addressee should have known, knowing full well that they do not (4.25).

As further evidence for the fact that causal *kī* marks Common Ground, it is interesting to see that when a cause consists of partially new information, the new information can be introduced by *wə-hinnē* ‘and behold’.²⁹ In (4.26), the theory predicts that simply *ʔwə* ‘and’ would be infelicitous, because that would incorrectly suggest that the Addressee already knows that the land is good:

- (4.26) Jdg. 18:9: קוּמָה וְנַעֲלֶה עֲלֵיהֶם כִּי רָאִינוּ אֶת־הָאָרֶץ וְהִנֵּה טוֹבָה מְאֹד
qūm-ā wə=n-a'āle 'ālē-hem kī rā'ī-nū
stand_up\IMP-M.SG and=1PL-go_up\IPFV to-them COMP see\PFV-1PL
'et hā='āreṣ wə=hinnē tōb-ā mə'ōd
OBJ the=land(F) and=behold good-F.SG very

‘(And the Danites returned to their brothers in Zorah and Eshtaol, and their brothers said to them: “How did it go?” And they said:) “Come on, let’s go up against them, *for* we saw their land, *and look*: it’s very good!”’

29 McCarthy (1980: 333–334) claims that *wə-hinnē* ‘and behold’ can have a causal sense and practically replace *kī*, but the examples are not convincing so I will not compare the two.

4.4.1 Backgrounded causal clauses

There are, however, cases of causal *kī* where Common Ground is not being referred to or even imposed. Here the original [+distal] feature of *kī* is often still relevant. There are plenty of cases where the cause is backgrounded, and in that sense placed at a distance from the main topic of conversation. Quite often the *kī*-clause provides the reason for a positive or negative command (16 out of 39 cases without reference to Common Ground):³⁰

- (4.27) Jdg. 13:5b: הַנְּדָה הָרָה וְיִלְדֶתָ בֵּן וּמִזְרָה לְאֵי־עֵלָהּ עַל־רֹאשׁוֹ כִּי־נָזִיר אֶלֶהֶים יִהְיֶה הַנְּעָר מִן־הַבֶּטֶן

hinn-āk hār-ā wə-yōlad-t bēn ū=mōrā lō'
 look-you pregnant-F.SG WQAT-bear-2F.SG son and=razor(M) not
y-a'āle-∅ 'al rōš-ō kī nāzīr 'ēlohīm
 3M-go_up\IPFV-SG on head-his COMP dedicated.of God
y-ihye-∅ han=na'ar min hab=bāṭen
 3M-be\IPFV-SG the=boy from the=womb

'Look, you are pregnant and will give birth to a son, but a razor shall not come on his head, *for* the boy will be dedicated to God from the womb.'

- (4.28) Gen. 43:16: הָבֵא אֶת־הָאֲנָשִׁים הַבְּיָתָהּ וּטְבַח טֶבֶח וְהָזֶן כִּי אֶתִּי יֹאכְלוּ הָאֲנָשִׁים בְּצָהֳרָיִם:

hābē' ∅ 'et hā=ʾānāš-īm hab=bāyāt-ā
 bring\IMP-M.SG OBJ the=man-PL the=house-ALL
ū=ṭəbōaḥ-∅ ṭəbaḥ wə=hākēn-∅ kī
 and=slaughter\IMP-M.SG animal and=prepare\IMP-M.SG COMP
'itt-ī y-ō'kəl-ū hā=ʾānāš-īm b=aš=šāhā'āyim
 with-me 3M-eat\IPFV-PL the=man-PL at=the=noon

'Bring the men to the house and slaughter an animal and prepare it, *for* the men will eat with me at noon.'

In such cases, the *kī*-clause provides an explanation, but it is most important to the Speaker that the command is followed. For this reason, the explanation in the causal clause can be backgrounded and hence marked

³⁰ In the data set these are marked with "command". Positive commands: Gen. 21:12; 31:12; 40:15a; 43:16; 1 Sam. 14:39a; 16:11; 23:27; Ruth 3:18a. Negative commands: Gen. 2:17; 21:17; 26:24; 35:17; Jdg. 13:5b; 1 Sam. 4:20; 16:7a; 2 Sam. 13:32a.

with [+distal] *kī*. In the remaining cases, the *kī*-clause often provides information that is not crucial for the main story line and can therefore be seen as backgrounded as well.³¹

4.4.2 Lexicalized causal meaning

However, there remain some exceptions:

(4.29) Gen. 25:21: וַיַּעֲתֵר יִצְחָק לַיהוָה לְנִכְחַ אִשְׁתּוֹ כִּי עָקְרָה הִוא וַיַּעֲתֵר לוֹ יְהוָה
וַתֵּהָר רֵבֶקָה אִשְׁתּוֹ:

<i>way-y-ε'tar-Ø</i>	<i>yishāq</i>	<i>l=yhwh</i>	<i>lənōkah</i>	<i>īšt-ō</i>	
WAYQ-3M-pray-SG	Isaac	to=Yahweh	on_behalf_of	wife-his	
<i>kī</i>	<i>āqār-ā</i>	<i>hī</i>	<i>way-y-ē'āter-Ø</i>	<i>l-ō</i>	<i>yhwh</i>
COMP	barren-F.SG	she	WAYQ-3M-listened-SG	to-him	Yahweh
<i>wat-t-ahar-Ø</i>	<i>ribqā</i>	<i>īšt-ō</i>			
WAYQ-F-conceive-3SG	Rebekah	wife-his			

‘And Isaac prayed to Yahweh on behalf of his wife, *since* she was barren, and God heard his prayer and Rebekah his wife conceived.’

In (4.29), it is not known to the Addressee that Rebekah is barren, nor is there any reason why it should be easily accommodated. However, the information is not backgrounded either, since it is picked up at the end of the verse: ‘and Rebekah his wife conceived’. For the 10 exceptions of this type I have no explanation based on a synchronic interpretation of the [+distal] feature.³² I propose that the causal meaning of *kī* is lexicalized on the basis of the examples where Common Ground or distancing is relevant, so that the causal meaning could then be extended to other contexts.

Note that the causal meaning is more than frequent enough for such lexicalization to have taken place. Furthermore, the lexicalization is plausible since there is a clear developmental path. In an earlier stage of the language, there were only causal instances that are derived from a [+distal] feature (such as examples [4.21–4.28]). Speakers then reanalyzed *kī* as a simple marker of causation. This allowed for the spread to cases where the [+distal] feature does not seem to be interpretable anymore (4.29).

31 In the data set these are marked with “backgrounded”: Gen. 5:24; 10:25; 15:16; 21:16; 42:4; Jdg. 4:3; 16:17; 1 Sam. 20:26a; 30:12; 2 Sam. 13:2; 14:15; Ruth 1:6a; 3:17.

32 In the data set these are marked as “lexicalized meaning”, for reasons explained below: Gen. 25:21; 37:17; Jdg. 6:30ab; 1 Sam. 4:13; 6:19a; 13:19; 30:6a; 2 Sam. 6:6; 19:27a.

I classified cases where the contrasting clause provides the reason or cause for a preceding negative statement as causal-adversative. Here again, the adverbial clause is in the Common Ground, because its propositional content has already been introduced in the preceding verse:

- (4.31) Gen. 45:8: וַעֲתָה לֹא־אֶתְּחַם שְׁלַחְתֶּם אֵתִי הֲנֵה כִּי הֵאֲלֵהֶם
wə=’attā lō’ ʾattem šəlah-tem ʾōt-ī hēnnā kī hā=’ēlohīm
 and=now not you send\PFV-2M.PL OBJ-me here COMP the=God
 ‘(God sent me ahead of you ...) So now, it is not you who have sent me here, *but/because* [it is] God.’

A comparison with other adversative strategies again shows that the degree of reference to Common Ground is especially high when *kī* is used. When the adversative clause presents new information, we often find the more neutral conjunction $\text{ʔ} wə$ ‘and, but, ...’ instead:³³

- (4.32) Gen. 2:16–17: מִכָּל עֵץ הַגֶּן אֲכַל תֹּאכַל: וּמֵעֵץ הַדְּעִת טוֹב וְרָע לֹא תֹאכַל מִמֶּנּוּ
mik=kōl ʿēš hag=gān ʾākōl t-ō’kēl-∅
 from=all.of tree.of the=garden eat\INFABS 2-eat\IPFV-M.SG
ū=mē=’ēš had=da’at tōb wā=rā’ lō’
 and=from=tree.of the=knowledge.of good and=evil not
t-ō’kal-∅ mimmen-nū
 2-eat\IPFV-M.SG from-it

‘You may eat from all the trees of the garden, *but* from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you may not eat.’

A more marked way to introduce an adversative clause with new information content is to use *raq* ‘however, but’.³⁴ In the following example, the clause introduced by *raq* provides information that is not yet in the Common Ground:

33 Simply searching for “but” in an English translation yields many more examples where *wə* introduces new information (e.g. Gen. 6:8, 18; 8:9).

34 However, $\text{ʔ} ak$ ‘indeed, just, only, but’ regularly refers to discourse-old information content when used adversatively (see Levinsohn 2011: 92–94 for cases where adversative $\text{ʔ} ak$ is used to emphasize a previously introduced point). Though $\text{ʔ} ak$ has cognates in Tigrē and Ge‘ez, I am not aware of a widely accepted etymology. It is tempting to associate this particle, like *kī*, with **ka*, but this is not necessary, as the existence of some other particles sensitive to the contents of the Common Ground is not in itself problematic for my hypothesis.

- (4.33) Exod. 8:24: אֲנִי אֲשַׁלַח אֶתְכֶם וְזָבַחְתֶּם לַיהוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם בְּמִדְבָּר רָק הַרְחֵק לֹא-תִרְחִיקוּ לְלֶכֶת

ʾānōkī ʾ-āšallah ʾet-kem ū-zəbah-tem l=yhwh
 I 1SG-send_away\IPFV OBJ-you WQAT-sacrifice-2M.PL to=Yahweh
ʾēlohē-kem b=am=midbār raq harhēq lōʾ
 God-yours in=the=desert **however** be_far\CAUS.INFABS not
t-arhūq-ū lā=lēket
 2-be_far\CAUS.IPFV-M.PL to=go\INF

‘I will let you go so that you may sacrifice to Yahweh your God in the desert, *however*, be sure not to go very far.’

Though most instances of adversative and causal-adversative *kī* make reference to Common Ground, both categories are characterized by a relatively high number of instances that cannot be explained using a [+distal] feature. In both adversative (4.34) and causal-adversative (4.35), the *kī*-clause provides information that is not easily accommodated and cannot be seen as backgrounded either:

- (4.34) Jdg. 1:19a: וַיִּרֶשׂ אֶת-הַהָרָר כִּי לֹא לְהוֹרִישׁ אֶת-יִשְׂבֵי הַנְּעֻמָּק בִּי-רֶכֶב בְּרִזְל לָהֶם: *way-y-ōreš-Ø ʾet hā=hār kī lōʾ lə=hōriš ʾet*
 WAYQ-3M-conquer-SG OBJ the=hill COMP not to=conquer\INF OBJ
yōšəb-ē hā=ʿemeq kī rekeb barzel lā-hem
 inhabit\PTCP-M.PL.of the=plain COMP chariot iron to-them

‘And [Judah] conquered the hill country, *but* they could not conquer the people living in the plains, because they had iron chariots.’

- (4.35) Gen. 24:3-4: לֹא-תִקַּח אִשָּׁה לְבְנִי מִבְּנוֹת הַכְּנַעֲנִי אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי יוֹשֵׁב בְּקִרְבּוֹ: כִּי אֶל-אֶרֶצִי וְאֶל-מִוְלַדְתִּי תֵלֵךְ וְלִקַּחְתָּ אִשָּׁה לְבְנִי לִיְצַחָק:

lōʾ t-iqqah-Ø ʾiššā li=bn-ī mib=bən-ōt
 not 2-take\IPFV-M.SG woman for=son-mine from=child-F.PL
hak=kənaʿānī ʾāšer ʾānōkī yōšəb-Ø bə=qirb-ō kī
 the=Canaanite REL I live\PTCP-M.SG in=midst-its COMP
ʾel ʾarš-ī wə=ʾel mōladt-ī t-ēlēk-Ø
 to land-mine and=to motherland-mine 2-go\IPFV-M.SG
wə-lāqah-tā ʾiššā li=bn-ī lə=yiṣṣāq
 WQAT-take-2M.SG woman for=son-mine for=Isaac

‘You must not acquire a wife for my son from the women of the Canaanites among whom I am living, *but/because* you must go to my country and my motherland (instead) and take a wife for my son, for Isaac.’

These cases are therefore exceptional in the same way as causal (4.29) above. As with causal *kī*, a diachronic account remains necessary for these cases.

Given the relatively low number of occurrences of both adversative and causal-adversative, it is unlikely that these functions developed from the general meaning of *kī* directly. It is more likely that they are the result of a semantic shift, starting out with the already lexicalized causal meaning. It is easy to see how a causal meaning could expand to causal-adversative, and eventually lose the necessarily causal interpretation to become plain adversative; such a development is also widely attested cross-linguistically (cf. Locatell 2017: 247–248 and references therein).

In my corpus, lexicalized meanings are needed for 10 exceptional cases of causal *kī*, 4 cases of causal-adversative *kī*, and 5 cases of adversative *kī*.³⁵ Since the number of causal-adversative cases is roughly half of the number of causal cases, I consider it more likely that the lexicalized causal-adversative meaning (and subsequently, the adversative meaning) developed from the lexicalized causal meaning, than that it developed independently from the general meaning of *kī*.

4.6 Remaning adverbial uses

Having discussed causal and adversative *kī*-clauses in sections 4.4 and 4.5, respectively, this section reviews the evidence of the remaining, lower-frequency types of adverbial clauses introduced by *kī*: temporal and conditional clauses (section 4.6.1), resultative clauses (section 4.6.2), and concessive clauses (section 4.6.3).

In all these types of adverbial clauses, the information provided in the *kī*-clause is already in the Common Ground or easily accommodated, or (rarely) imposed on the Common Ground. There will therefore be no need to assume that any of these uses of *kī* are lexicalized, as expected given the low frequency of these categories. All instances can be derived synchronically from a [+distal] feature.

³⁵ These are marked with “lexicalized meaning” in the data set. For the causal cases, see footnote 32. Causal-adversative cases are Gen. 17:15; 24:4; 32:29a; 35:10; adversative cases are Gen. 40:14; Jdg. 1:19a; 4:9a; 1 Sam. 15:35a; 2 Sam. 17:11.

- (4.37) Gen.18:26: אִם-אֶמְצָא בְּסֹדֹם חַמְשִׁים צְדִיקִים בְּתוֹךְ הָעִיר וְנִשְׁאַתִּי לְכָל-הַמָּקוֹם
:בְּעִבְרָם

’im ʿ-emšā́ bi=sdōm ḥāmišš-īm šaddiq-im bə=tōk
if 1SG-find\IPFV in=Sodom five-PL righteous-PL in=middle.of
hā=’ir wə-nāšā’-tī lə=kāl ham=māqōm
the=city WQAT-forgive-1SG for=whole.of the=place
ba=’ābūr-ām
for=sake-theirs

‘If/*When I find at Sodom fifty righteous in the city, I will forgive the whole place for their sake.’

This is consistent with the fact that when *kī* and *’im* are combined, *kī* introduces a general condition, while *’im* introduces a more specific condition (Van der Merwe et al. 2017: §40.11(1a)). In such a construction, the condition in the *kī*-clause is more likely to be met than the condition in the *’im*-clause:

- (4.38) Lev. 1:2–3: אֲדָם כִּי-יִקְרִיב מִכֶּם קֶרְבָּן לַיהוָה מִן-הַבְּהֵמָה וּמִן-הַצֹּאן
תִּקְרִיבוּ אֶת-קֶרְבַּנְכֶם: אִם-עֹלָה קֶרְבָּנוּ מִן-הַבְּקָר זָכָר תָּמִים יִקְרִיבֶנּוּ

ādām kī y-aqrīb-Ø mikk-em qārbān
man COMP 3M-present\IPFV-SG from-you offering
l=yhw min hab=bəhēmā min hab=bāqār ū=min
to=Yahweh from the=animals from the=herd or=from
haš=šō’n t-aqrīb-ū ’et qārbān-kem ’im
the=flock 2-present\IPFV-M.PL OBJ offering-yours if
’olā qārbān-ō min hab=bāqār zākār tāmūm
burnt_offering offering-his from the=herd male perfect
y-aqrīb-Ø-ennū
3M-present\IPFV-SG-it.OBJ

‘If/When (*kī*) a man amongst you brings a sacrifice to Yahweh, you must bring your offer from the animals of the herd or the flock. If/*When (*’im*) it is a burnt offering from the herd, he shall offer a male without blemish.’

This fits with the general meaning described for *kī* above: the adverbial clause does not introduce entirely unexpected information, but only information which is already expected, or at least easily accommodated given the Common Ground. In (4.36) above, with *kī*, Jacob’s servant is going towards Esau and will therefore surely meet him, while in (4.37), with *’im*, it is not certain at all that there will be fifty righteous at Sodom. In (4.38), not all

sacrifices are burnt offerings, so the condition in the *'im*-clause is less likely to be met than the condition in the *kī*-clause.

Temporal clauses with future reference time can, in a way, be seen as an extreme case of such “expected conditionals”; they are essentially conditionals of which the condition is certain to be met at some future point in time:

- (4.39) Gen. 31:49: יֵצֵף יְהוָה בֵּינִי וּבֵינְךָ כִּי נִסְתַּר אִישׁ מֵרֵעֵהוּ:
y-iṣēp-Ø *y/hwh* *bēn-ī* *ū=bēn-ekā* *kī*
 3M-guard\JUSS-SG Yahweh between-me and=between-you COMP
n-issātēr יֵצֵ *mē=rē'ēhū*
 1PL-hide\MID.IPFV one from=companion-his

‘May Yahweh watch between me and you *when* we are hidden from each other.’

Temporal clauses with past reference time are similar. They require the described event to have occurred; *kī* cannot be used, for example, for counterfactuals, which are typically marked by לִּי *lū* ‘if only’.³⁷

In some instances, a *kī*-clause with past reference time is frequentative (‘whenever’), as in (4.40). This specific interpretation is only contextually inferred, however, and not contributed by *kī*, as it is not always available (4.41):³⁸

- (4.40) Jdg. 1:28: וַיְהִי כִּי-חִזַּק יִשְׂרָאֵל וַיִּשֶׂם אֶת-הַכְּנַעֲנִי לְמַס וְהוֹרִישׁ לֹא הוֹרִישׁוּ:

³⁷ Note that a counterfactual, like a temporal or conditional clause, can be described as augmenting the Common Ground. The only difference is that a counterfactual augments the Common Ground with information known to be false. If *kī* were simply described as *augmenting* the Common Ground, there would be no way to exclude a counterfactual interpretation. But since *kī* is [+distal] and therefore marks information that is in the Common Ground or at least easily accommodated, a counterfactual interpretation is excluded.

³⁸ A frequentative interpretation is also possible in Jdg. 2:18a; 12:5; 16:16; 2 Sam. 6:13; and we have a durative interpretation (‘while’) in 1 Sam. 1:12; 17:48. Such interpretations are excluded in Gen. 6:1; 26:8; 31:37; 43:21; 44:24; Jdg. 6:5, 7; 8:1; 1 Sam. 14:29b; 22:22a; 2 Sam. 4:10, 11; 7:1, 12; 19:26. There does not appear to be a difference in the contribution of *kī* when preceded by וַיְהִי *wə-hāyā* ‘and it will be’ or וַיְהִי *wa-yəhī* ‘and it was’, compared to when *kī* stands alone. The contribution of these temporal markers can be seen as shifting the reference time (e.g. Van der Merwe et al. 2017: §40.24–25) independent from the discursive contribution made by *kī*.

wa-y-əhī-Ø kī ḥāzaq-Ø yiśrā'el way-y-āsem-Ø
 WAYQ-3M-be-SG COMP be_strong\PFV-3M.SG Israel WAYQ-3M-put-SG
 'et hak=kəna'ānī lā=mas wə=hōrēš lō'
 OBJ the=Canaanite to=forced_labor but=conquer\INFABS not
hōriš-Ø-ō
 conquer\PFV-3M.SG-it.OBJ

‘And *whenever* Israel was strong they would put the Canaanites to work, but they did not totally conquer them.’

- (4.41) Gen. 27:1: וַיְהִי כִּי־זָקַן יִצְחָק וַתִּכְהֶיז עֵינָיו מִרְאֵת וַיִּקְרָא אֶת־עֲשָׂו בְּנֵו הַגָּדֹל
wa-y-əhī-Ø kī zāqēn-Ø yiṣḥāq wat-t-ikhe-nā
 WAYQ-3M-be-SG COMP be_old\PFV-3M.SG Isaac WAYQ-F-be_weak-3PL
 'en-āyw mē=rə'ōt way-y-iqrā'-Ø 'et 'ēsāw bən-ō
 eye(F)-DU.his from=see\INF WAYQ-3M-call-SG OBJ Esau son-his
hag=gāḏōl
 the=big

‘And *when* Isaac was old and his eyes were too weak to see, he called Esau, his oldest son.’

To return to the second way in which temporal and conditional *kī* interacts with Common Ground: in most instances of temporal or conditional *kī*, the event or condition described in the adverbial clause is already salient in the surrounding discourse, and in that sense tracked by both Speaker and Addressee. Consider:

- (4.42) Gen. 44:24: וַיְהִי כִּי עָלִינוּ אֶל־עַבְדְּךָ אָבִי
wa-y-əhī-Ø kī 'ālī-nū 'el 'abd-əkā 'āb-ī
 WAYQ-3M-be-SG COMP go_up\PFV-1PL to servant-yours father-mine
 ‘And *when* we went up to your servant my father, ...’

- (4.43) Jdg. 2:16–18: וַיִּקֶּם יְהוָה שְׁפָטִים ... וַיְכִי־הֵקִים יְהוָה לָהֶם שְׁפָטִים
way-y-āqem-Ø yhwh šōpāt-īm ... wə=kī
 WAYQ-3M-establish-SG Yahweh judge-PL ... and=COMP
hēqīm-Ø yhwh lā-hem šōpāt-īm
 establish\PFV-3M.SG Yahweh for-them judge-PL

‘And Yahweh established judges ... *Whenever* Yahweh established judges for them, (Yahweh would be with the judge ...)’

(4.44) 1 Sam. 14:27–29b: אָרוּ עֵינָיו כִּי טָעַמְתִּי וַיֵּשֶׁב יָדוֹ אֶל-פִּי וַתֵּאָרְגֶה³⁹ עֵינָיו: ...
מֵעַט דָּבַשׁ הַזֶּה:

way-y-āšəb-Ø *yād-ō* *ʾel pī-w* *wat-t-āʾōr-ənā*
WAYQ-3M-return\CAUS-SG hand-his to mouth-his WAYQ-F-light_up-3PL
ʿen-āyw ... *ʾōr-ū* *ʿen-ay* *kī* *ṭāʾam-tī*
eye(F)-DU.his ... light_up\PFV-3PL eye-DU.mine COMP taste\PFV-1SG
məʾaṭ *dabaš* *haz=zē*
little.of honey the=this

‘And [Jonathan] returned his hand to his mouth and his eyes lit up. (A soldier spoke up ..., “Your father swore ..., ‘Cursed is the man who eats anything today” (...)) But Jonathan said: “My father has brought misfortune on the land. See that) my eyes lit up *when* I tasted a little of this honey!”

In (4.42), it is clear from the context to Joseph (the Addressee) that his brothers (the Speaker) have been to their father. It is therefore assumed to be part of the Common Ground, and *kī* can be used to refer to this event. In (4.43) this is even clearer, as the fact that Yahweh established judges has been introduced just a few sentences before. Example (4.44) is similar: the event described by the *kī*-clause is introduced in v. 27, and v. 28 (only given in translation) shows that the Addressee (the soldier) is aware of it as well.

To conclude this subsection: there are two ways in which temporal and conditional *kī*-clauses interact with the Common Ground. As we just saw, in many cases the event or condition is already tracked by both the Speaker and the Addressee, independent of whether it is likely to occur or have occurred. More importantly, however, in all instances the event or condition is certain or likely to occur or have occurred. As a result, if the event or condition is not yet in the Common Ground, it is at least easily accommodated. In this way these cases support the hypothesis about the general discursive contribution of *kī*.

4.6.2 Resultative clauses

Resultative clauses (sometimes called “consequential clauses”) describe the result of the event described in the matrix clause; in English, resultative *kī* can often be translated with (*so*) *that*. When the result is also the purpose for a volitional act described in the matrix clause, a resultative clause is quite similar to a causal clause:

39 Consonantal text: וַתֵּאָרְגֶה וַתֵּרְאֶה *wat-t-ir’ē-nā* WAYQ-F-see-3PL ‘and [his eyes] saw’.

- (4.45) Gen. 31:36: מָה חַטָּאתִי כִּי דָלַקְתָּ אַחֲרַי׃
mah haṭṭāʾ-tī kī dālaq-tā ʾahār-āy
 what sin\PFV-1SG COMP chase\PFV-2M.SG behind-me

‘How have I (Jacob) sinned *that* you (Laban) have chased after me?’

In (4.45), it is in the Common Ground that the Addressee chased after the Speaker, as the Addressee has just caught up with the Speaker when (4.45) is uttered. Note that there is no reason why a purpose or resultative clause in general should refer to a result in the Common Ground, as the following example with another resultative connective, לְמַעַן *lamaʿan*, shows:

- (4.46) Gen. 37:22: וַיֹּאמֶר אֲלֵהֶם | רְאוּבֵן אֶל־תִּשְׁפֹּכוּדָם הַשְּׁלִיכוּ אֹתוֹ אֶל־הַבּוֹר׃
 הַזֶּה אֲשֶׁר בַּמִּדְבָּר וְיָד אֶל־תִּשְׁלַחוּ־בּוֹ לְמַעַן הַצִּיל אֶת־מִיָּדָם לְהַשִּׁיבוּ אֶל־אָבוֹי׃
way-y-ōʾmer-Ø ʾālē-hem rəʾūbēn ʾal t-išpək-ū dām
 WAYQ-3M-say-SG to-them Reuben not 2-shed\JUSS-M.PL blood
hašlik-ū ʾōt-ō ʾel hab=bōr haz=zē ʾāšer b=am=midbār
 throw\IMP-M.PL OBJ-him to the=pit the=this REL in=the=desert
wə=yād ʾal t-išləḥ-ū b-ō lamaʿan
 but=hand not 2-send\JUSS-M.PL against-him **in_order_to**
haššil ʾōt-ō miy=yād-ām la=haššib-ō ʾel
 rescue\INF OBJ-him from=hand-theirs to=return\CAUS.INF-him to
ʾābī-w
 father-his

‘But Reuben said to them, “Don’t shed blood; throw him into this pit in the desert but do not stretch out your hand against them,” *in order to* rescue him out of their hand to return him to his father.’

In (4.46), the fact that Reuben tries to save Joseph is not yet known to the Addressee (the reader). It can be accommodated based on the contents of the direct speech report, but even this is not always the case. For instance, in (4.47) with the purposive construction לְ *lə* ‘to’ + infinitive, there is no reason in particular to think that Laban should go shear his sheep at this moment:

- (4.47) Gen. 31:19: וַלָּבָן הָלַךְ לְגִזּוֹת אֶת־צֹאֲנוֹ׃
wə=lābān hālak-Ø li=gzōz ʾet šōʾn-ō
 and=Laban go\PFV-3M.SG to=shear\INF OBJ flock-his

‘And Laban had gone *in order to* (*lə* ‘to’ + infinitive) shear his sheep.’

Nevertheless, we do not find such cases with resultative *kī*. Even in cases with future reference time, the resultative clause refers to the Common Ground because the prospected result has already been discussed. For instance, in (4.48), though the resultative is an irrealis with future time reference, it refers directly back to Saul’s proposal in the previous verse.

(4.48) 1 Sam. 18:18: מִי אֲנִי ... כִּי־אֶהְיֶה חָתָן לְמֶלֶךְ:
mī ʾānōkī ... kī ʿ-ehye ḥātān l=am=melek
 who I ... COMP 1SG-be\IPFV son_in_law to=the=king

‘(Saul said to David: “Here is my oldest daughter Merab; I want to give her to you in marriage ...” But David said to Saul:) “Who am I ... *that* I should be the king’s son-in-law?”’

This supports the hypothesis that *kī* is marked for reference to the Common Ground.

4.6.3 Concessive clauses

With a concessive clause (English *though*) the Speaker concedes some information to the Addressee, but at the same time denies that this information is incompatible with the assertion made in the matrix clause:

(4.49) 2 Sam. 12:12: כִּי אַתָּה עָשִׂיתָ בְּסֵתֶר וְאֲנִי אֶעֱשֶׂה אֶת־הַדְּבָר הַזֶּה נֶגְדְךָ כְּלִי־שֵׁרָא:
kī ʾattā ʾāsi-tā b=as=sāter wa=ʾāni ʿ-εʿése ʾet
 COMP you do\PFV-2M.SG in=the=secret and=I 1SG-do\IPFV OBJ
had=dābār haz=ze neḡed kâl yisrāʾel
 the=thing the=this before all.of Israel

‘*Though* you have acted in secret, I will do this before all of Israel.’

A concessive usually presupposes that the Addressee knows or can easily accommodate the conceded information. For instance, in English I can utter (4.50) only to someone of whom I know that they share my belief about France’s likelihood to win; I have to assume that *France won’t win this World Championship* is in the Common Ground or easily accommodated.

(4.50) *Though France won’t win this World Championship, they are a treat to watch.*

The fact that concessive clauses always refer to Common Ground makes it pointless to compare *kī* with other markers of concessive clauses, such as ׀ *im* (Job 9:15; Jer. 15:1) or ׀ *wə* (e.g. Jdg. 16:15). However, the fact that

the cases with *kī* all refer to information in the Common Ground or easily accommodated is of course entirely expected.

4.6.4 Low-frequency adverbial clauses: summary

This section reviewed four types of less frequent adverbial *kī*-clauses: temporal, conditional, resultative, and concessive clauses. It is particularly important that these lower frequency uses of *kī* adhere to the predicted patterns, since they are a priori less likely to have lexicalized and lost the [+distal] feature. The data reveals that in these *kī*-clauses the information provided in the clause is indeed always in the Common Ground, easily accommodated, or (rarely) imposed on the Common Ground for a discursive effect. This confirms the hypothesis that *kī* still has a [+distal] feature, which is interpreted as referring to the Addressee, and thus to the Common Ground.

4.7 Standalone *kī*-clauses

As is well-known and seen in the previous sections, *kī* usually connects two clauses. After classifying all instances of *kī* for the relation it establishes between the two clauses, some instances remained for which it is not clear that *kī* really connects two clauses. In the literature, these cases have often been referred to as “emphatic” or “asseverative”, but in order not to make any assumptions I have classified them as “standalone”. Reviewing these cases, it becomes clear that there are three ways in which standalone *kī* can be used: to introduce oaths (section 4.7.1), conducive and rhetorical polar questions (section 4.7.2), or exclamatives (section 4.7.3). It is true that each of these functions can reasonably be called “emphatic”, but it is nevertheless valuable to make precise what kinds of emphasis can be provided by *kī*, exactly. By spelling out what types of “emphatic” interpretations there are, exactly, we can prevent this category from becoming a universal catch-all.

4.7.1 Oaths

Oaths can be described as sincere and earnest speech acts meant to assure the Addressee of a certain assertion or promise (Conklin 2011: 2). They are typically accompanied by what Conklin (2011: 13–30) calls an “authenticating element” that is meant to assure the Addressee of the Speaker’s sincer-

ity. Oaths introduced by *kī* with two different authenticating elements are shown in (4.51–4.52):

- (4.51) 2 Sam. 3:9ab: כֹּה יַעֲשֶׂה אֱלֹהִים לְאַבְנֵר וְכֵן יִסִּיף לוֹ כִּי כְּאֲשֶׁר נִשְׁבַּע יְהוָה
לְדָוִד בֶּן-נֹנִן אֲעֲשֶׂה-לוֹ:

kōh *y-a'āśe-Ø* 'ēlōhīm *lā=ʾabnēr* *wā=kōh* *y-ōsīp-Ø*
thus 3M-do\IPFV-SG God to=Abner and=thus 3M-continue\IPFV-SG
l-ō *kī* *ka=āšer* *nišba'-Ø* *yhwh* *lā=dāwid* *kī*
to-him COMP like=REL swear\PFV-3M.SG Yahweh to=David COMP
kēn 'e-āśe *l-ō*
thus 1SG-do\IPFV for-him

‘(And Abner said: “...”) So do God to Abner, and even more — *that* as what Yahweh has promised David, *that* I do thus for him!’

- (4.52) 2 Sam. 12:5: חַי יְיָ הִיא הַמָּוֶת הַחַיִּשׁ הָעֹשֶׂה זֹאת: חַי יְיָ הִיא הַמָּוֶת הַחַיִּשׁ הָעֹשֶׂה זֹאת:
hay *yhwh* *kī* *ben* *māwet* *hā=ʾiš* *hā=ʾōse-Ø* *zōt*
life.of⁴⁰ Yahweh COMP son.of death the=man the=do\PTCP-M.SG this

‘By the life of Yahweh, *that* the man who does this is a dead man!’

There are 17 cases of standalone *kī* introducing an oath in my corpus, of which six refer to discourse-old information content.⁴¹ For example, in (4.53), the previous verse has already made the question of when the people will stop pursuing their brothers a topic of discussion, and therefore tracked in the Common Ground:

- (4.53) 2 Sam. 2:27a: וַיֹּאמֶר יוֹאָב חַי הָאֱלֹהִים כִּי לֹא דְבַרְתָּ כִּי אֲנִי מִהַבְּקָר נַעֲלֶה
הָעָם אִישׁ מֵאַחֲרָי אַחֲרָיו:

way-y-ōmer-Ø *yōʾāb* *hay* *hā=ʾēlōhīm* *kī* *lūleʾ*
WAYQ-3M-say-SG Joab life.of⁴² the=God COMP had_not
dibbar-tā *kī* *ʾāz* *mē=hab=bōqer*
speak\PFV-2M.SG COMP then from=the=morning
naʾālā-Ø *hā=ʾām* *ʾiš* *mē=ahāre*
go_up\MID.PFV-3M.SG the=people(M) one from=behind
ʾāhī-w
brother-his

40 For the analysis of this form as a construct state, see Conklin (2011: 24–26).

41 1 Sam. 20:13; 25:34ab; 29:6a; 2 Sam. 2:27a; Ruth 1:17.

42 On this form see footnote 40.

‘(Abner called out to Joab: “... How long won’t you tell the people to return from after their brothers?”) And Joab said: “By the life of God, ([I swear] *that*) had you not spoken, (*that*) then [only] from the morning onwards would the people have ceased [pursuing], each from behind his brother.”

In the remaining cases Common Ground cannot be accommodated either, but is imposed.⁴³ This is the case in (4.51–4.52) above. It is precisely the imposition that creates the interpretation as an oath. Forcing the Addressee to accept an assertion in the Common Ground, the Speaker effectively assures the Addressee of their own sincerity and commitment to this assertion, which is precisely what an oath does (Conklin 2011: 2).

Besides *kī*, a number of other particles can be used to introduce oaths. However, the most frequent of these (אם *’im*) introduces conditional oaths (Conklin 2011: 31–45) and is not comparable to oaths with *kī*. There are a number of other ways to introduce oaths (Conklin 2011: 60–65), but they do not appear often enough to enable a comparison with *kī*. We can compare oaths with *kī* to other strong assertions, however. In the following fragment, the Speaker (Joseph) asserts up to three times that the Addressees (his brothers) are spies:

- (4.54) Gen. 42:9–16: וַיֹּאמֶר אֲלֵהֶם מְרֻגְלִים אַתֶּם לְרֹאֲוֹת אֶת־עֲרֹנֹת הָאָרֶץ בְּאֵתָם:
way-y-ō’mer-Ø ʔlê-hem m-əraggəl-īm ʔattem li=r’ōt ʔet
 WAYQ-3M-say-SG to-them PTCp-spy-M.PL you to=see\INF OBJ
 ʔerwa-t hā=ʔāreš bāʔ-tem ...
 weakness-of the=land come\PFV-2M.PL ...

‘(And Joseph saw his brothers, ... he said, “Where do you come from?” And they said: “From the land of Canaan, to buy grain for food.”) ...And he said to them: “Spies is what you are; to check out the weakness of the land you have come.”

- וַיֹּאמֶר אֲלֵהֶם לֹא בִי־עֲרֹנֹת הָאָרֶץ בְּאֵתָם לְרֹאֲוֹת:
way-y-ō’mer-Ø ʔlê-hem lō’ kī ʔerwa-t hā=ʔāreš
 WAYQ-3M-say-SG to-them no COMP weakness-of the=land
 bāʔ-tem li=r’ōt ...
 come\PFV-2M.PL to=see\INF ...

(But they said to him: “No, my lord! ... We are all the sons of one man; we are honest men! ...”) But he said to them: “No, *for* you have come to check out the weakness of the land!”

43 1 Sam. 14:39b; 20:3b; 20:12; 26:10, 16; 2 Sam. 3:9ab, 35; 12:5; 15:21ab.

וַיֹּאמֶר אֲלֵהֶם יוֹסֵף הוּא אֲשֶׁר דִּבַּרְתִּי אֲלֵכֶם לֵאמֹר מְרַגְלִים אַתֶּם:

way-y-ō³mer-Ø ḏlē-hem yōsēp hū' ḏšer dibbar-tī ḏlē-kem
 WAYQ-3M-say-SG to-them Joseph it REL speak\PFV-1SG to-you
 lē='mōr m-əraggal-īm ḏttem ...
 to=say\INF PTCP-spy-M.PL you ...

(They said: "... We are the sons of one man in the land of Canaan; the youngest is with our father at the moment, and one is no longer alive.") But Joseph said to them: "It is as I said, saying 'you are spies!'"

וַיִּבְחַנּוּ דְבָרֵיכֶם הָאֵמֶת וְאִם-לֹא חַי פְּרֻעָה בִּי מְרַגְלִים אַתֶּם:

wə=y-ibbāḥān-ū dibr-ē-kem ha='ēmet ḏtt-əkem
 and=3M-test\MID.IPFV-PL word(M)-PL-yours Q=true with-you
 wə='im lō' ḥ-ē p̄ar-ōh kī m-əraggal-īm ḏttem
 and=if not life-of Pharaoh COMP PTCP-spy-M.PL you

(... send one of you to take your brother, while the rest of you is in prison.) And so your words will be tested, whether they are true — and if not, by the life of Pharaoh, ([I swear] *that*) you are spies!"

Note that the first time that Joseph asserts that his brothers are spies, the clause is unmarked. The second time is marked by *kī*, but this *kī* is probably causal-adversative. The third time is a direct quotation of the first, and therefore does not contain *kī*, but the fourth is clearly an oath with *kī*, preceded by the authenticating element 'life of Pharaoh'.

We can explain the use of *kī* in two ways. On the one hand, the question of whether his brothers are spies is clearly under discussion in the Common Ground. We could therefore argue that *kī* marks this reference to Common Ground. On the other hand, we could also note that there is an increased level of certainty that Joseph wishes to express: if his brothers fail the test, how can they still claim to be honest men? This allows Joseph to impose the assertion on the Common Ground in the form of an oath. Of course, regular declarative sentences (like the first 'spies is what you are') can also be used when the information content is already in the Common Ground. Nevertheless, patterns like the one in (4.54) lend further support to the hypothesis that *kī* is marked for the use of Common Ground.

Conklin's explanation for the use of *kī* to mark oaths is that *kī* is a remnant of an originally longer formula (*I swear that ...*) after elision of the pred-

icate (2011: 59).⁴⁴ While this is possible, some questions remain. For example, it is unclear why the complementizer would not have been elided together with the predicate in oath formulas, with only intonation serving to distinguish the exclamative from a declarative (as in some rhetorical questions, like *I said something funny?*, and interrogatives more generally in languages like Italian). The theory proposed here provides an explanation why the complementizer was retained: it is crucial to oaths that they impose information on the Common Ground, and this aspect is marked by the [+distal] complementizer.

4.7.2 Conducive and rhetorical questions

There are five instances in my corpus of conducive and rhetorical questions using the polar interrogative marker η *hă* followed by *kī*, two of which are negated (η לֹא η *hă-lō’ kī*).⁴⁵ In one instance (2 Sam. 9:1), *hă-kī* introduces a regular question which happens to nominalize a clause of which the content is under discussion in the Common Ground;⁴⁶ this instance is excluded here and classified as a subject clause. I will rely on Moshavi (2009) for my analysis of the five instances under discussion here; references to theoretical linguistic work on these types of questions can be found in her article.

A rhetorical question has the form of an interrogative but is, at the discursive level, an implicit assertion rather than a request for information (Moshavi 2009: 32). The implicit assertion contributed by a rhetorical polar question is the negation of its propositional content: *Are you the president?* implies you are not the president (Moshavi 2009: 33). A conducive question is similar to a rhetorical question in that the Speaker has a certain prior belief regarding the correct answer, and may not expect an answer, but do not function as implicit assertions; for example, *Is that you, Henry?* does not im-

44 Note that a similar account has been proposed for English exclamatives with *that* (*I am surprised that he is still not here* > *That he is still not here!*; cf. Ross 1970). While there may be some diachronic truth to this account, it is unlikely that the elided predicate still plays a role synchronically. The reason for this is that if the underlying structure of an exclamative like *That he is still not here!* is *I am surprised that he is still not here*, there is no way to rule out that the actual underlying structure is *I tell you that I am surprised that he is still not here*, and so on ad infinitum (cf. Speas & Tenny 2003: 338 and chapter 3, footnote 13 for more discussion).

45 Without *lō’*: Gen. 27:36; 29:15; 2 Sam. 23:19. With *lō’*: 1 Sam. 10:1; 2 Sam. 13:28.

46 Similar to one more example outside my corpus, Job 6:22.

ply that you are Henry but merely conveys an expectation (Moshavi 2009: 38). Moshavi describes the discursive functions of conducive questions in Biblical Hebrew as (a) confirming a belief of the Speaker, (b) expressing surprise, (c) showing the Addressee that the Speaker knows something to be true, and (d) drawing attention to a fact (2009: 38 n. 38).

The questions with *hā-kī* 'is [it] that' are conducive, implying that the information content of the *kī*-clause is true:

- (4.55) Gen. 27:36: הַכִּי קָרָא שְׁמוֹ יַעֲקֹב וַיַּעֲקֹבֵנִי זֶה פַעַמַּיִם
hā=kī qārā'-Ø šam-ō ya'āqōb way-y-a'qab-Ø-ēnī
 Q=COMP call\PFV-3M.SG name(M)-his Jacob WAYQ-3M-deceive-SG-me
 זε *pā'am-ayim*
 this time-DU
 'Isn't his name Jacob?⁴⁷ He has deceived me these two times!'

In the case of conducive questions with *kī*, the information content is not only implied but also well-known to be true, and thus in the Common Ground. Compared to conducive questions without *kī*, the questions with *kī* convey a much stronger belief with respect to the expected answer. In (4.56) without *kī* the Speaker is much less certain that Saul should now be considered a prophet than that the Speaker in (4.55) is certain about Jacob's name. This explains why *kī* can be used in (4.55) but not (4.56): only in (4.55) can the propositional content be assumed to be in the Common Ground. In (4.56), the Speaker does not even want to impose it on the Common Ground.

- (4.56) 1 Sam. 10:11: וַיְהִי כִלְיֹודֶעוּ מֵאַתְמוֹל שְׁלֹשׁוֹם וַיֵּרְאוּ וְהִנֵּה עִם־נְבִיאִים נִבָּא
 וַיֵּאמֶר הָעָם אִישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵהוּ מֵה־זֶּה הִיָּה לְבִן־קִישׁ הַגִּם שְׂאוֹל בְּנֵי־אִיִּם:
wa-y-ahī-Ø kāl yōdā'-Ø-ō mē='ittamōl šilšōm
 WAYQ-3M-be-SG all.of know\PTCP-M.SG-him from=before
way-y-ir'-ū wā=hinnē 'im nabi'-im nibbā'-Ø
 WAYQ-3M-see-PL and=behold with prophet-PL prophesy\PTCP-M.SG
way-y-ō'mer-Ø hā='ām 'iš 'el rē'-ehū mah ze
 WAYQ-3M-say-SG the=people(M) one to companion-his what this
hāyā'-Ø lə=bēn qiš hā=gam šā'ul b=an=nabi'-im
 be\PFV-3M.SG to=son.of Kish Q=also Saul in=the=prophet-PL

47 The name Jacob translates as 'he-will-deceive'. Note that my translation uses a rhetorical question, and thus adds negation. Another option is "No wonder his name is Jacob" (NLT; cf. also NET). One can also take this *kī* as causal ('Is it because his name is Jacob that ...'), which is also possible in Gen. 29:15 but not in 2 Sam. 23:19.

‘And when all who knew him (Saul) from before saw how he prophesied with prophets, the people said to each other: “What happened to the son of Kish? *Is* Saul also among the prophets?”’

The questions with *hā-lō’ kī* ‘isn’t [it] that’ are rhetorical. Due to double negation (once for *lō’* ‘not’ and once for the rhetorical question), these questions also imply that the information content of the *kī*-clause is true:

(4.57) 1 Sam. 10:1: וַיִּקַּח שָׁמוּאֵל אֶת־פֶּצֶד הַשֶּׁמֶן וַיִּצַק עַל־רֹאשׁוֹ וַיִּשְׁקָהוּ וַיֹּאמֶר הֲלוֹא
כִּי־מִשְׁחָהּ יְהוָה עַל־נַחְלָתוֹ לְנָגִיד:

way-y-iqqah-Ø šamū’el ’et pak haš=šemen way-y-išōq-Ø
WAYQ-3M-take-SG Samuel OBJ flask.of the=oil WAYQ-3M-pour-SG
’al rō’š-ō way-y-iššāq-Ø-ēhū way-y-ō’mer-Ø hā=lō’ kī
on head-his WAYQ-3M-kiss-SG-him WAYQ-3M-say-SG Q=not COMP
māšāh-Ø-ākā yhw h ’al nahālāt-ō lə=nāgīd
anoint\PFV-3M.SG-you.OBJ Yahweh over inheritance-his for=leader
‘Then Samuel took a flask of oil and poured it on his (Saul’s) head, and he kissed him and said: “*Has* Yahweh *not* anointed you as leader over his inheritance?”’

In the other rhetorical question, Common Ground is imposed by making an implicit assertion (2 Sam. 13:28). A rhetorical question does not leave room for the Addressee to reject the implied assertion, which has the effect of imposing it on the Common Ground. Though the use of *kī* is not necessary to form these types of questions (see Moshavi 2009 for many examples without *kī*), it is still well-suited because of this interaction with the Common Ground.

4.7.3 Exclamatives

The third way in which standalone *kī* is used is to form exclamatives.⁴⁸ Exclamatives are sentences that “express the speaker’s affective response to

⁴⁸ This includes many examples traditionally analyzed as “emphatic” or “asseverative”. I analyze these as exclamatives, which can be defined more precisely based on the theoretical linguistic literature. Though some scholars have been skeptical towards the existence of emphatic/asseverative *kī* (e.g. Bandstra 1982; Aejmelaeus 1986; Locatell 2017), most authorities still assume this notion is useful in at least some instances (e.g. Waltke & O’Connor 1990: §40.2.2b; Joüon & Muraoka 2006: §164; Miller 2003: 103–116; Holmstedt 2010: 85, 92). Schoors (1981), following Gordis (1943) and Dahood (1965, 1966, 1968, 1970) to some extent, sees many cases of emphatic *kī* in poetry. I will have nothing to say about this issue, since this study is limited to narrative texts.

a situation” (Michaelis 2001: 1039). As with conducive and rhetorical questions, a proposition can be recovered from an exclamative: *How nice weather it is!* implies that it is nice weather. Crucially, the Speaker of an exclamative assumes this propositional content to be in the Common Ground (Zanutini & Portner 2003): *How nice weather it is!* cannot be used to convince the addressee that it is nice weather. This distinguishes exclamatives from both declarative sentences, which make no such assumption, and rhetorical questions, which impose information on the Common Ground rather than assuming it is already shared with the Addressee. Nevertheless, this reference to Common Ground makes *kī* a natural element to mark exclamatives (cf. section 3.3.1).

In the examples found in the Hebrew Bible, exclamatives with *kī* express shock/outrage (4.58),⁴⁹ remorse (4.59), or commitment (4.60) with respect to the recoverable proposition, though there is no reason to think other emotions could not be expressed this way as well.

- (4.58) Gen. 18:20ab: זַעֲקַת סֹדִם וְעִמְרָה כִּי־רַבָּה וְחַטָּאתָם כִּי כְבֹדָה מְאֹד:
za'āqa-t sadōm wa=ʾāmōrā kī rābb-ā
 outcry(F)-of Sodom and=Gomorrah COMP be_great\PFV-3F.SG
wə=hattāʾt-ām kī kābəd-ā məʾōd
 and=sin(F)-theirs COMP be_heavy\PFV-3F.SG very
 ‘That the outcry of/concerning Sodom and Gomorrah is so great! And *that* their sin is so heavy!’

- (4.59) Jdg. 10:10: וַיִּזְעֻקוּ בְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶל־יְהוָה לֵאמֹר חָטֵאנוּ לְךָ וְכִי עָזַבְנוּ אֶת־אֱלֹהֵינוּ
way-y-izʾāq-ū bən-ē yisrāʾel ʾel yhwh lē=ʾmōr
 WAYQ-3M-call_out-PL son-PL.of Israel to Yahweh to=say\INF
hāʾtāʾ-nū l-āk wə=kī ʾāzab-nū ʾet ʾēlōhē-nū
 sin\PFV-1PL to-you and=COMP abandon\PFV-1PL OBJ God-ours

‘And the Israelites called out to Yahweh, saying: “We have sinned! And *that* we have abandoned our God!”

- (4.60) 1 Sam. 10:24: וַיֹּאמֶר שְׂמוּאֵל אֶל־כָּל־הָעָם הֲרֵאיתֶם אֲשֶׁר בָּחַרְבוּ יְהוָה כִּי
 אֵין כְּמֹהוּ בְּכָל־הָעָם

49 Also 1 Sam. 17:28. We can also include Gen. 45:26a here, if we assume that the brothers are in part speaking to each other. This explanation is not ideal, but I have no better alternative at this point.

way-y-ō'mer-Ø šəmū'el 'el kāl hā=ā'm har=rə'i-t'em ʾāšer
 WAYQ-3M-say-SG Samuel to all.of the=people Q=see\PFV-2M.PL REL
 bāhar-Ø b-ō yhw h kī ʿen kāmō-hū
 choose\PFV-3M.SG in-him Yahweh COMP not_exists like-him
 bə=kāl hā=ā'm
 in=all.of the=people

‘Then Samuel said to all the people: “Have you seen whom Yahweh has chosen? *That* there is no one like him (David) among all the people!”

These examples refer to Common Ground in the following way. First, in (4.58), God speaks to Abraham. Abraham has already had previous contact with Sodom in Genesis 13–14, where he has been able to see that the Sodomites are wicked sinners (13:13). This allows the Speaker to presuppose this information, and thus permits the interpretation as an exclamative. The use of Common Ground is even clearer in (4.59), where the Addressee (Yahweh) must know that the Israelites have abandoned him. Finally, I classified (4.60) as accommodated information content: the people can infer, based on the information that Yahweh has chosen David, that there is no one better suited for the task.

It is also possible to express commitment towards a wish, which has the effect of strengthening a wish (4.61).⁵⁰ It should be noted that in these cases the fact that the Speaker has a certain desire should already be in the Common Ground: in (4.61), it is already clear to the Addressee that the Speaker wants the spoil to be divided equally. It thus does not appear to be possible to strengthen just any wish with *kī*.

(4.61) 1 Sam. 30:24: :יְהִי חֵלְקֵנוּ יַחְדָּו עַל-הַבָּלִים הַיֵּשֵׁב וְכַחֲלֹק וְכַחֲלֹמָה הַיֵּרֶד בְּמִלְחָמָה | הַיֵּרֶד בְּחֵלְקֵנוּ
kī kə=hēleq hay=yōrēd-Ø b=am=miḥāmā
 COMP like=part.of the=go_down\PTCP-M.SG in=the=battle
ū=kə=hēleq hay=yōšēb-Ø 'al hak=kēl-īm yaḥdāw
 and=like=part.of the=sit\PTCP-M.SG on the=item-PL together
y-aḥālōq-ū
 3M-divide\IPFV-PL

“(“Since they didn’t go with me, we will not give them from the spoil. ...”
 But David said: “No! ...) *That* as the part of he who goes down in battle,
 so be the part of he who remains with the equipment! Together they shall
 divide it.”

⁵⁰ Also 1 Sam. 8:9; 14:44 (if not an oath); 25:28a.

Exclamatives are clearly emphatic, but it is a much narrower category than “emphatic” or “asseverative” *kī*. Before classifying an instance of *kī* as an exclamative it must be shown that the propositional content is in the Common Ground or easily accommodated by the Addressee.⁵¹

4.8 Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued that the Biblical Hebrew particle *kī* has inherited a [+distal] feature, which can be interpreted on the discourse level in various ways. Contrary to previous accounts, I propose that this [+distal] feature is not only relevant for a historical description of the development of the various functions of this particle, but is still present around the time of Biblical Hebrew. This greatly simplifies the description of the semantic-pragmatic contribution of this particle.

Though distancing a clause can have the effect of backgrounding its information content, most commonly it marks the information content as belonging to the Common Ground.⁵² The reason for this is that the Common Ground involves the Addressee, who is seen as distal from the Speaker. A comparison of *kī* with other grammatical strategies performing similar functions shows that *kī* is used in particular when the information content in the *kī*-clause is already in the Common Ground or can easily be accommodated by the Addressee. In some cases, this function is used by the Speaker to im-

51 I therefore do not support Schoors' (1981: 251) claim that adversative *kī* is a special kind of asseverative clause: contrary to standalone *kī*, adversative *kī* links two clauses, and the latter also appears far more often without reference to Common Ground (see section 4.5). I also find it unlikely that exclamative *kī* developed from the use in oaths, as suggested by (Williams 2007: §449), since oaths impose content on the Common Ground, which is a less basic operation than assuming that content is in the Common Ground as exclamative *kī* does. The reverse development seems to be more likely.

52 Follingstad (2001) attempts to reduce *kī* to a “discourse deictic particle” with the function of setting up a new Mental Space and shifting viewpoint to this space. This can perhaps be seen as a form of “distancing”, and in some instances, Follingstad recognizes reference to Common Ground (e.g., *kī* is said to be able to “point to’ a previously explicitly stated proposition”; 2001: 152). However, it is not clear that the Mental Space Theory is precise enough to exclude uses of *kī* that do not occur, and in some cases it actually makes incorrect predictions. For example, Follingstad (2001: 268–269) claims that *kī* can introduce a “hypothetical” conditional to which the Speaker does not need to commit, while the Speaker does need to commit to the truth of conditionals introduced by כִּי־אִם ‘if’. This is contrary to the consensus, which I have supported in section 4.6.2.

pose information on the Common Ground, with various discursive effects (e.g., assuring the Addressee of a certain assertion in an oath). The various functions that scholars have identified as being expressed by *kī* can, with only two exceptions, be seen as contextually derived from this general notion of Common Ground.

Exceptions to this general pattern mostly occur in the most common function, causal *kī*: here we find instances that do not refer to Common Ground and cannot even be seen as backgrounding (section 4.4). I therefore conclude that some lexicalization must have occurred here, which subsequently transferred to the categories of causal-adversative and adversative *kī* (section 4.5). In all other functions, the vast majority of instances refer to the Common Ground. Though grammaticalization is required to account for the use of *kī* to introduce subject and object clauses (section 4.3), we do not need to assume lexicalization to account for the various adverbial uses of *kī* (section 4.6; contra e.g. Locatell 2017, 2020). These are more economically described as pragmatically inferred uses based on the general function of marking Common Ground; since some of these functions are very infrequent, assuming semantic shifts for which we do not have evidence is problematic. Taking all of this into account, I propose a description of *kī* with only three distinct functions:⁵³

1. Referring to Common Ground (including easily accommodated and imposed information content)
 - (a) As a complementizer introducing subject and object clauses
 - (b) When connecting two clauses: introducing adverbials (adversative, causal, causal-adversative, concessive, conditional, resultative, temporal)⁵⁴

53 Park (2016), like me, aims to reduce the description of *kī*, but uses the notion of “nominalization”. In South Asian languages, nominalization constructions can have a wide variety of functions (Yap et al. 2011) that indeed show a curious overlap with the functions of *kī*. Unfortunately, the notion of “nominalization” is not very well-defined, and we must be careful not to simply replace one ill-defined notion (“emphasis”, “asseveration”) with another one. At the very least, an explanation should be given why “nominalizers” across unrelated languages take on similar functions, and what the relation between the form and function of these “nominalizers” is.

54 Given that some of these types are very infrequent, it is conceivable that there are still other types of adverbials that could be marked by *kī*, which have not made their way into the corpus. This is fine, as long as the information content is in the Common Ground and the discursive function can be inferred from context.

- (c) When standalone: introducing oaths, conducive and rhetorical questions (with $\bar{\eta}$ *hǎ*), and exclamatives
2. Lexicalized causal meaning ('because', 'for', etc.)
 3. Lexicalized adversative meaning ('but'), developed from causal via causal-adversative ('not X, *but/because* Y')

Many authors, Aejmelaeus (1986: 193–194) most verbosely, have wondered how native speakers could have distinguished between the many uses of *kī*. My answer to this question is as follows. The most common and default function of *kī* is to mark Common Ground. When the Addressee cannot accommodate the information content of a *kī*-clause, this triggers them to use one of the lexicalized meanings instead; choosing between causal and adversative is possible based on context. In its default function of marking Common Ground, one of the three subfunctions can be selected based on simple cues: the existence of a matrix predicate or the place of the *kī*-clause in subject position for complementizer *kī*, authenticating elements for oaths, the interrogative particle for questions, and intonation for exclamatives; anything else is adverbial. The appropriate kind of adverbial meaning can be selected based on context.