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Social Subjecthood? The inclusion of (post)colonial migrants in Dutch, French, and British welfare states, 1945-1970

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9. Conclusion

9.1. Social security as cultural security

The prospect of telling welfare state scholarship the story of (post)colonial migrants was inviting. Contemporary observers acknowledged the heterogeneity they introduced,¹ but the time period in which they arrived is widely considered the Golden Age of welfare expansion.² This is difficult to explain with existing theory which argues that diversity undermines solidarity.³ Equally, the literature attesting to the importance of boundaries for distributive communities is vast. Decolonisation was a protracted and political process in which Europe was forced to refashion its boundaries. If there was ever a time to suspect a bonding-through-bounding dynamic,⁴ the arrival of (post)colonial migrants should have been it. Given the extensive racial exclusions documented by US-based welfare state scholars,⁵ I expected the post-war 'sphere of justice'⁶ to be constituted by the exclusion of racial others from the colonies, which would create the homogeneous conditions for solidarity to flourish.

Contrary to my expectations, the post-war welfare states of the Netherlands, France and the UK did not respond to (post)colonial migration from present-day Indonesia, Algeria, or the Caribbean by sealing off access to the distributive community. In part, this is because law and practice in the domains of citizenship and immigration were far more involved in drawing external boundaries than was social policy. It is also because there were no fixed, pre-existing categories of "racial others" to exclude. Among the heterogeneous millions arriving from these territories of origin, it was by no means obvious to contemporaries who belonged as cultural insiders. In all three cases, there were race-laden exclusions, usually accomplished through informal barriers rather than through legislative means. In the Netherlands and the UK, these exclusions were concentrated in the parts of the welfare state that disseminated noncontributory as opposed to contributory benefits, suggesting that these were subject to more rigorous efforts at boundary-making.

However, in general, inclusion on unequal terms was far more important than exclusion writ large. This was especially the case in Dutch and French welfare states, which fragmented to accommodate (post)colonial newcomers through hyper-assimilation (extending relatively generous, dignified provisions), paternalism (extending generous but disciplinary provisions), and ghettoisation (extending meagre, disciplinary provisions). In fact French and Dutch cases display striking commonality despite previously acknowledged institutional and programmatic differences (see 3.2.3). Meanwhile, the universalistic nature of the UK welfare state focused the debate on implementation and eventually on external boundary-making through immigration law.

1 Smith, "Introduction," 11.

2 Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*, 77.

3 Kymlicka and Banting, *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State*, 9.

4 Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*.

5 Lieberman, *Shifting the Color Line*; Fox, *Three Worlds of Relief*.

6 Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality*.

These patterns can be explained as efforts by welfare state agents to secure the social and cultural premises of the nation at a time of profound challenge to its integrity. After suffering severe losses of life and legitimacy in the Second World War, former colonial powers needed to articulate what membership in their community entailed, not only in terms of the rights it conferred (as T.H. Marshall had highlighted), but also the people it unified. Colonial legal codes could only take them so far before they needed to find a new source of fuel, not least as colonies began to wrest free from imperial arrangements. If in the late 19th and early 20th century, liberal and individualist ideologies had “limited what ... political instincts expected of the state,”⁷ collectivist ideologies of the immediate post-war period had enlarged these expectations, and welfare states bore considerable responsibility for meeting them. My findings show that the welfare state was implicated in providing for not only citizens’ material needs, but also less material aspects of nation-building, like structuring social space, subduing dissent, and dispelling cultural threats. The way that it discharged its duties differed somewhat across institutional contexts, while its effects on the form of welfare offered to (post)colonial migrants depended on available modes of classifying the population, the identities that they came to assume along these dimensions, and the outcomes of ideological contestation.

Race mattered here, in the sense that the patterns of inclusion produced were racialised. However, as I hope to have made clear, to locate the *cause* of inclusion in a beneficiary’s *race* is misguided since race is not an individual-level attribute but a doctrine that shifts shape across time and space, giving rise to identities that emerge in relation to one another.⁸ As such, the racial identity of a person cannot exercise independent influence on their inclusion. Instead, I show in the following sections how various constructions - of deservingness, power, and assimilability - relied on the blueprints of racial ideologies inherited from colonial rule in all three cases. Thus if the welfare state’s efforts at supporting nation-building meant different things for different people, it was not *because of race*, but rather because racecraft supplied a “way of economising”⁹ in the face of the multifaceted and complex challenge that boundary-making presented, as well as a moral justification for the stratified society to which boundary-making gave rise that could keep intact the image of the nation as a “community of value.”¹⁰ Moreover, the precise result of translating centuries-old racial ideology into a post-war context was not possible to deduce from theoretical priors or material conditions, in the same way that the location of redistributive boundaries was not inevitable.

Finally, the encounter between (post)colonial migrants and post-war welfare states offered an opportunity for the nation to redefine itself in moral terms. Persistent references to the *patria*, after the Latin word for fatherland, provide clues. In France and The Netherlands, *repatriate* and its translations served as the single most important determinant of inclusion, since targeted assistance schemes were conditional on formal repatriate status. Discursive gatekeeping of repatriate status supplemented legal criteria, with De Gaulle commenting that

7 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*, 102.

8 Fields and Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*, 177.

9 Hall, *The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations*, 100.

10 Anderson, *Us and Them?*

“the term ‘repatriates’ obviously does not apply to the Muslims,”¹¹ and Minister van Thiel of Social Work suggesting that Moluccans “repatriate” to Asia.¹² In the UK, where there were no targeted schemes, it is noteworthy that the first efforts at bounding the distributive community through immigration law rewarded only *patrials* - those British subjects born, adopted or naturalised in Britain, or whose parents or grandparents were born, adopted, or naturalised in Britain - with freedom of entry. Importantly, the language of the fatherland camouflaged and buttressed racial ideology. As many before me have argued, the function of patriality in British immigration law was to exclude non-white citizens without overt racial language.¹³ So it was in The Netherlands and France: the repatriate was intended for white bodies, but contained no references to race. The net effect of this discursive move was to imbue the nation both with parental authority, the conditional love of the father figure, and the nurturing qualities of home for a select subset of people. This had lasting consequences. Schneider and Ingram argue that the way that policy constructs target populations influence how they view themselves and, specifically, their orientation toward government.¹⁴ If so, then targeted policy for *repatriates* ought to thicken the ties between the migrant and the fatherland. Put differently, when High Commissioner Lamping adjudicated belonging based on who would “feel at home” in the Netherlands,¹⁵ he made some people more likely than others to feel at home. When Van Thiel suggested deporting Moluccans on the grounds that the Netherlands was “to them foreign and unknown,”¹⁶ he exacerbated the foreignness of the Netherlands to that group. Hence why a bachagha could say, “how can you feel like a *repatriate* when the *patria* that welcomes you treats you like a foreigner?”¹⁷

My account contrasts with the explanations given by public officials who consistently framed welfare choices as a technical response to need. The 1965 report by the French Ministry of Interior on repatriate assistance furnishes plenty of examples, its authors declaring that “the Government and Parliament *had no choice*. It was *necessary* to welcome, house, reclassify, protect, in order to then be able to integrate. It was therefore *necessary* to build a vast legal and financial system particularly protective of all repatriates...”¹⁸ When questioned in 1960 about the excessive attention being paid to regretants, the Dutch government had similarly invoked their need.¹⁹ Context is key: in both of these cases, cabinet representatives were offering an ex-post justification for policy decisions after they had raised attention. To suggest that the decision was apolitical, because necessary, is a useful rhetorical device for shirking responsibility

11 cited in Eldridge, *From Empire to Exile: History and Memory within the Pied-Noir and Harki Communities, 1962-2012*, 71.

12 van Amersfoort, “The Waxing and Waning of a Diaspora: Moluccans in the Netherlands, 1950-2002,” 104.

13 Gary Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies: The French and British Experience, 1945-1975* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 63; El-Enany, *Bordering Britain*; Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation*.

14 Schneider and Ingram, “Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy,” 340.

15 NL-HaNA-2.20.27-24- Speech Lamping, December 1951.

16 Jones, “Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten En Nederlanders: Nederlandse Politici over Burgers Uit Oost En West En Nederland, 1945-2005,” 112.

17 Jordi and Hamoumou, *Les Harkis, Une Mémoire Enfouie*, 21.

18 Emphasis added; FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, “sur l’application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961,” 1965, p 280 In this case, I am translating both the French verb *devoir* and *falloir* as versions of necessary.

19 NL-HaNa-2.27.02-1013-Minutes of Ministerial Council, 4 February 1960.

for its consequences. Meanwhile Laroque, an architect of the French social security regime, justified withholding family allowances from Algerians as the straightforward “application of the general principle of territoriality” upon which the welfare state was built.²⁰ This justification does not hold water, however, as in this case, the straightforward application of this principle required the neglect of another principle upon which the welfare state was built: the contributory logic according to which benefits are linked to contributions. Additionally, the principle of territoriality was not applied uniformly, as the families of Italian labour migrants in Italy were entitled to family allowance at metropolitan rates.²¹

The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. 9.2 deals with the form that redistributive boundaries took in my three country cases, while 9.3 is devoted to explaining the location of these boundaries. 9.4 provides an overview of my scholarly contributions and 9.5 discusses their societal relevance.

9.2. Boundaries of post-war welfare

9.2.1. Instruments of external boundaries

Social legislation is not the only site at which redistributive boundary-making takes place. Instead, the external boundaries of distributive communities are jointly worked out in the space, overlap and friction between different policy domains, on the one hand, and between policy and implementation, on the other. In my research, citizenship, immigration, and social policy appeared as three distinct levers, all of which affected inclusion or exclusion in the distributive community. Political circumstances and sociolegal constraints specific to a given time period and context shaped which lever was more attractive for a policy-maker interested in restricting or expanding access to welfare. Informal and extra-legal efforts complemented their choice. In the post-war period, citizenship rights were particularly central as declining colonial powers were forced to negotiate, with newly independent nations, the reach of national citizenship.

With this in mind, while the UK displayed one way of tightening the boundaries of the sphere of justice, France and the Netherlands pursued another. British policymakers opted for an inclusive citizenship regime. After Canada moved to establish its own citizenship in 1946, the 1948 British Nationality Act was penned as a political concession to stabilise the empire and reestablish its importance in the eyes of Commonwealth countries. The Act granted Citizenship of the UK and Colonies to all residents of colonial territories. Although El-Enany may consider it “little more than a euphemism for British subjecthood,”²² it did have legal consequences (which Hansen is quick to problematise).²³ In the early 1950s, however, recourse by Caribbean migrants to National Assistance came under scrutiny. Despite evidence presented by the National Assistance Board and the Ministry of Labour that the use of these individuals

20 Laroque, “Préface,” 1956.

21 Rager, *Les Musulmans Algériens En France et Dans Les Pays Islamiques*, 234.

22 El-Enany, *Bordering Britain*, 89.

23 Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation*.

was measured and proportionate, two different inquiries, led by Labour- and Conservative-appointed committees respectively, drew the conclusion that access to National Assistance was a welfare magnet attracting “coloured people from British Colonial territories,”²⁴ and that this was an urgent problem.

As the public increasingly came to adopt this view and their representatives in the House of Commons amplified their voices, enthusiasm around bounding the sphere of justice more tightly grew. However, British state officials did not see withdrawing citizenship rights as a viable option. Substantially revising the nationality code several years after it had been published would be difficult to justify, and Britain was still attached to its empire and to the unified status with which it was associated. There were practical concerns as well: as Hansen shows, the type of revision for which the public was advocating would require creating a unified citizenship for the UK and Ireland since there was no interest in restricting Irish entry into the sphere of justice.²⁵

In this context, British policy-makers interested in tightening the boundaries around the welfare state found immigration legislation an attractive domain in which to do so. This was true even when it meant stripping citizens of their right to enter the country of which they were a citizen: a movement in the opposite direction of the march toward social citizenship which Marshall had identified. In fact, Marshall had proclaimed that the harmonisation of rights across the British territory had “unfolded slowly and smoothly... very early in history.”²⁶ The choice to apparently re-fold these rights is on display in the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962, and its 1968 and 1971 successors. Prior to these acts, behind closed doors, the UK government had already activated to limit immigration. For example, they sought out the cooperation of the “Asian Dominions” (newly independent India and Pakistan) and “West Indian governments” (the governors of Caribbean territories) to restrict emigration by withholding passports or making access to passports more stringent.²⁷ The fact that the Home Office then appealed to the departments in charge of National Insurance for their help in policing the nation’s territorial boundaries by identifying (post)colonial migrants who had overstayed their visa only testifies to the interplay between immigration and welfare policy.

Dutch and French policymakers granted citizenship much more sparingly than their British counterpart. One year after the British Nationality Act created “Citizenship of the UK and the Colonies,” the Dutch and Indonesians agreed to assign Dutch citizenship only to those who had been Dutch citizens rather than subjects during colonial rule. This meant that access to citizenship was distributed on racial lines, since decisions about citizenship under colonial rule had been highly racialised. Since 1892, only those recognised as European, rather than indigenous or “Foreign Oriental,” had citizenship in the Netherlands Indies - several hundred thousand people out of a total population of 70 million. Moluccans who had risked their lives

24 UK-LoNA-Co 1028/22-Draft report, “Immigration of British subjects into the United Kingdom,” Committee of Ministers, 24 January 1951.

25 Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation*, 104.

26 cited in Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*, 38.

27 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878-Hansard, “Immigration from the Commonwealth,” 17 November 1959.

for the Dutch military during the Indonesian war of independence fell on the other side of this boundary. Instead they were assigned the nationality of Indonesia, their former enemy, and over three-quarters were stateless by the early 1970s.²⁸ Similarly, after the Algerian war in 1962, only about one-tenth of Algerians remained French citizens. Even though the 1947 Statute of Algeria had granted every resident of Algeria citizenship in the new French Union, citizens formerly known as “indigenous” or “Muslim” inherited a different civil status than those viewed as European, which was the basis for their exclusion from the French citizenry after Algerian independence. This meant that harkis who had devoted years fighting under the French flag were denied citizenship, but could nationalise by requesting nationality before a judge. Many harkis perceived this as humiliating,²⁹ which, according to existing literature on benefit take-up, is likely to have harmed the take-up of this right.³⁰

If British immigration law from 1961 to 1972 can be viewed as a form of cordoning off the boundaries of the distributive community, then the conservative distribution of citizenship rights after independence by Dutch and French negotiators must equally be seen in that light. Nonetheless, both continental European governments still attempted to cordon off entry rights as well. Unlike the UK, they balked at doing this by formally decoupling the right of entry from citizenship rights - although Dutch policymakers would later consider and ultimately reject this option in the context of Suriname immigration in the late 1960s and early 1970s.³¹ Instead, they informally facilitated and discouraged migration. Both French and Dutch officials offered migrants from Algeria and Indonesia, respectively, subsidies for the cost of transport to the metropole. These were called return benefits (*prestations de retour*) and Kingdom-sponsored advance payments (*rijksvoorschotten*) respectively. Transport subsidies were only made available after stringent conditions had been met, allowing them to function as instruments of boundary-making. They went hand-in-hand with informal barriers set up to dissuade harkis and “Eastern-oriented” Dutch citizens from making the journey. Confidential memos from May 1962 attributed to Louis Joxe, the Minister of Algerian Affairs under De Gaulle, forbade individual initiatives by harkis to settle in the metropole outside of military convoys, ordered prefects not to register anyone who had done so, and instructed the high commissioner in Algeria not to transport “Muslims” whose physical condition was too poor or who might “turn to prostitution.”³² Joxe perceived this parallel treatment of harkis as a means of keeping out “undesirable” migrants.³³

Meanwhile, in The Netherlands, transport subsidies were famously been conditioned on “Westernness.” Westernness was a racialised dimension that had roots in colonial law but had been formally introduced into Dutch policy circles by the jurist Philip Werner, who would in 1958 serve as chair of the public committee devoted to coordinating repatriate welfare

28 Jones, “Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten En Nederlanders: Nederlandse Politici over Burgers Uit Oost En West En Nederland, 1945-2005,” 129.

29 Jordi and Hamoumou, *Les Harkis, Une Mémoire Enfouie*, 21.

30 van Oorschot, “Non-Take-up of Social Security Benefits in Europe,” 20.

31 Schuster, *Poortwachters over Immigranten: Het Debat over Immigratie in Het Naoorlogse Groot-Britannië En Nederland*.

32 Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France*, 231.

33 Jordi and Hamoumou, *Les Harkis, Une Mémoire Enfouie*, 39.

(*Coördinatie-Commissie voor Gerepatrieerden*, CCG). Werner and his team had distinguished between “Western-oriented” and “Eastern-oriented” Dutch citizens, attributing to the latter a series of characteristics such as an “inherently slow pace of work.”³⁴ The report that they published ultimately recommended that Eastern citizens remain in Indonesia, where they ostensibly would feel more “socially at home.”³⁵ The Dutch government obliged with discouragement policy (*ontmoedigingsbeleid*), which included restricting transport subsidies of “Eastern-oriented” citizens for several years until the Minister of Social Work Marga Klompé put an end to the policy. It also included unconventional tactics, like the Dutch High Commissioner in Indonesia appealing in 1951, via radio, to the sensibilities of Dutch citizens, arguing that they ought to opt for Indonesian nationality and avoid coming to The Netherlands, a country facing, he argued, “diminishing opportunities for work and existential difficulties.”³⁶

9.2.2. Worlds of (post)colonial welfare

9.2.2.1. Hyper-assimilation

One way in which post-war Dutch and French welfare states interacted with (post)colonial migrants was through radical interventions to raise their standard of living. This happened through the creation of new schemes as well as through inclusion in existing programmes, even when it meant departing from key organising principles of each welfare state or going above and beyond that to which both systems had previously committed. In the Netherlands, this world of hyper-assimilation lasted from around 1946, when a “Repatriation Department” was established in the Ministry of Social Affairs, up until 1968, when the *Centraal Comité van Kerkelijk en Particulier initiatief voor de sociale zorg ten behoeve van gerepatrieerden* (CCKP) was discontinued. Regrettants were brought into this fold around 1960 after substantial lobbying efforts. In France, the dynamic emerged later and lasted shorter, stretching from the introduction of Boulin’s law at the end of 1961 up until around 1966, when the decree reserving social housing for repatriates expired.

In June 1961, as migration from Algeria to the French metropole picked up and negotiations with Algerian nationalists faltered, De Gaulle created a State Secretary for Repatriates, to be filled by Robert Boulin. One of Boulin’s first moves was to present a bill organising assistance for the *pieds-noirs*. The law of 26 December “relating to the reception and resettlement of French people from overseas” contained three pillars of material assistance. Reception benefits compensated for the cost of transport, as mentioned, but also included departure allowances, which for heads of household amounted to almost two times as much as the minimum monthly wage for a Parisian full-time worker (500 fr compared to 290 fr) and monthly subsistence allowances, which sat at just over said wage for a jobseeker.³⁷ The second pillar involved an expedited procedure for accessing municipal assistance, and the final pillar

34 Schuster, *Poortwachters over Immigranten: Het Debat over Immigratie in Het Naoorlogse Groot-Britannië En Nederland*, 101.

35 Schuster, 99.

36 NL-HaNA-2.20.27-24- Speech Lamping, December 1951.

37 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, “sur l’application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961,” 1965, p 25.

included housing subsidies. In 1962, the government ordered by decree that 10 per cent (and later 30 per cent) of social housing be reserved for repatriates up until December 31, 1966.³⁸ In effect, repatriates from Algeria would receive public assistance at a time and in a welfare system where central government had delegated this responsibility to occupation-based social security, municipalities and private charities.

Repatriates in The Netherlands would be able to make recourse to assistance under a similar regime of targeted care. In the Dutch case, private actors were particularly well-organised. The CCKP, a network whose primary source of funding came from government subsidies and which included religious and non-governmental organisations, headed up a well-oiled machine of private assistance. Public assistance also took the form of cash transfers however, the conditions of which were stipulated in national group schemes. Such schemes were not entirely unique in the Dutch context, but the extent of adjustments made for repatriates was extraordinary. Inclusion under the scheme for war victims was considered insufficient given the specific difficulties that coming from the “tropics” introduced.³⁹ A new scheme was drawn up to accommodate their circumstances, and regularly updated. It granted the right to an allowance similar to that which repatriates in France could expect, except that it was technically a loan. Additionally, central government would subsidise municipalities for extending poor relief to those who were ineligible for this scheme.⁴⁰ Like the French state, the Dutch state also provided in-kind benefits like temporary housing, with around 5 per cent of houses built for the 1962 Woningwet reserved for repatriates.⁴¹

The type of welfare to which repatriates had access scored high on the Somers dimension. In The Netherlands, attending to the psychological needs of claimants was paramount and an explicit aim of schemes in their name. The government and the CCKP agreed that the latter would be responsible for assuring the “spiritual care” of repatriates, a task it mostly delegated to the churches in its organisation,⁴² but official documents confirm its interest in looking after the “*mental* and physical well-being of the repatriates.”⁴³ Furthermore, when the CCKP argued against housing Moluccans in collective repatriate centres, it did so by invoking the “far-reaching psychological consequences” that the presence of Moluccans would have on the repatriates.⁴⁴ They thus privileged repatriates’ psychological comfort over the material needs of Moluccans. Equally, the stated aim of the national group schemes was to facilitate integration as quickly as possible,⁴⁵ and the fact that the CCKP contacted employers to sensitise them to the benefits of this new labour force is indicative of their commitment to this goal.⁴⁶

38 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, “sur l’application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961,” 1965, p 41.

39 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-Nota, MINUOR, 8 November 1950.

40 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-1008-“Rijks-groepregeling Gerepatrieerden,” 20 January 1961.

41 Ellemers and Vaillant, *Indische Nederlanders En Gerepatrieerden*, 47; Laarman, *Oude Onbekenden: Het Politieke En Publieke Debat over Postkoloniale Migranten, 1945-2005*.

42 NL-StRo-1402-614-“Leidraad,” August 1950, p 6.

43 NL-StRo-1402-614-“Leidraad,” August 1950, p 6.

44 NL-UtA-1405-11-Letter to Hoofd Bijzondere Maatschappelijke Zorg, Ministerie van Maatschappelijk Werk, 29 January 1953.

45 HaNA-2.27.02-Nota, MINUOR, 8 November 1950.

46 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-1037-Brochure ‘Voor Het Eerst Naar Nederland.’”

French national and local officials also responded to the psychological needs of repatriates and pushed toward their social integration. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the requests by former officials of social security institutions to be relocated to a new job after having already received one. The departmental archives of Bouches-du-Rhône, the department where Marseille is located, contains a folder of these requests. Many of the repatriates' requests make appeals - successfully - to their psychological, mental or social needs. Someone who had received a job at the Family Allowances Fund in Aveyron requested a transfer on the grounds that "my wife is often sick, physically and morally, since she arrived in Aveyron" on account of its climate.⁴⁷ He confirmed receipt of monthly subsistence allowance. The sensitivity of local-level officials to concerns like these is striking. The regional director of social security in Bouches-du-Rhône had previously responded to a similar request by that same individual by stating that he would personally keep an ear on the ground on this person's behalf: "I plan to be in Nice very soon and if I collect any information that might interest you I will not hesitate to let you know immediately."⁴⁸

Besides targeted social assistance schemes, the world of hyper-assimilation also featured the relaxation of criteria for accessing general social security. The French welfare state effectively dismantled any barriers that *pieds-noirs* might face in accessing social security. These efforts trace their roots back to 1953, when coordination mechanisms linked French and Algerian social security regimes, but picked up dramatically after the ordinance of February 14, 1962 removed all administrative burdens associated with accessing social security. The only proof they needed was a temporary social security card that would be provided to them as soon as they registered at a prefecture, and would be traded for a regular card corresponding with their profession after one year.⁴⁹ In the Netherlands, the Royal Decree instituted in 1956 to equalise residence in the Netherlands Indies and present-day Indonesia as part of residence in the Dutch kingdom speaks to a parallel effort, as do the subsequent modifications to this decree in 1961 to include specific groups of non-citizens. The private sector also removed informal barriers to take-up as the CCKP hosted information evenings to make sure that repatriates were made aware of their rights.

The importance of French officials removing administrative barriers to accessing general social security cannot be overstated. Existing literature has repeatedly highlighted that the French welfare regime is characterised by the fragmentation of its social insurance schemes on occupational lines; in other words, on employment being the gateway to inclusion, for better or for worse.⁵⁰ As mentioned, this was a concession made to reluctant middle classes in order to bring them on board with the idea of a nation-wide social security system. But assistance to repatriates evidently bucked this trend, as their entitlement was contingent not on employment but on repatriate status alone. The loosened eligibility criteria, decoupling from occupational status, and streamlined administrative procedure of the temporary special regime

47 FR-MaAD-172 W 2-Letter, 18 September 1964.

48 FR-MaAD-172 W 2-Letter, 12 September 1963.

49 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 76.

50 Manow and Palier, "A Conservative Welfare State Regime without Christian Democracy?"; Palier, "Les Transformations Du Modèle Social Français Hérité de l'après-Guerre."

for repatriates starts to resemble very closely Laroque's vision of an integrated, rationalised, and more solidaristic system – a vision which he never succeeded in fully implementing due to push-back from the private sector and mutual aid societies.

In both countries, access to this world was tightly constrained by access to repatriate status, which in turn was imbued with racial and cultural meaning. Repatriate status was conditioned in both countries by citizenship. As I described earlier, this was a racialised inheritance and largely excluded those that the colonial state had deemed 'indigenous,' 'Oriental,' or 'Muslim.' Repatriates were also meant to be *refugees*, although it was never named in so many words. Dutch candidates for repatriate status would need to have arrived from Indonesia after 27 December 1949, the date of the formal sovereignty transfer, and done so because of political circumstances. To qualify as a repatriate in France, an individual similarly needed to prove that they had left due to "political events" in a territory that had just become independent from France.⁵¹ The cross-case similarities may have been due to policy diffusion, as there is evidence that French observers took note of how the Dutch received repatriates, devoting an entire chapter to the Dutch experience in a policy memo focused on the future of overseas French citizens.⁵² Either way, the combined criteria ensured that this world was designed for white migrants fleeing persecution, and was relatively well-guarded. In France, an additional protective layer was supplied by the discretion awarded to administrators, who retained the right to refuse to grant an allowance or to grant only part of the package of benefits specified in the law.⁵³

9.2.2.2. *Paternalism*

A separate form of welfare operated either prior to or in parallel to the repatriate's world of hyper-assimilation in France and the Netherlands respectively. This was a world characterised by statutory inclusion, and scoring relatively high on the Marshall dimension barring the potential for discrimination. However, it was also characterised by welfare that was much less concerned with the dignity and psychological well-being of its recipients and comparatively more concerned with instilling cultural conformity and discipline. I argue that it characterises the welfare encountered by Algerian labour migrants from 1946, when free movement between Algeria and the metropole was restored, until 1962, when most Algerians lost French citizenship, and of Indische Nederlanders who were designated as "Eastern" from 1951, when the Werner report was published and as migration from the new Indonesian republic started to include fewer totoks, up until 1963, the last evidence I found of the Western-Eastern distinction being used.

Formally, both groups had full citizenship rights during the time in question: all Algerians were French citizens between 1947 until Algerian independence in 1962, while Indische Nederlanders retained Dutch citizenship at Indonesian independence in 1949. Both groups were formally entitled to social assistance, at least to the extent that all other residents were:

51 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 14.

52 Jean Vacher-Desvernais, *L'Avenir Des Français d'Outre-Mer* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962).

53 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857- Speech for the Commission de la Population du Conseil de l'Europe, M Christian Mellac, 5 October 1964.

in practice, in both countries, assistance was granted at the discretion of municipal services in at this time. They were also formally entitled to benefits under the 1956 General Old Age Act (AOW) of The Netherlands and the general social security regime of France established in 1945. The original draft of the AOW did contain some criteria for eligibility under the transitional rules (as laid out in Articles 43 and 46) that might have been hard for Indische Nederlanders to meet. Specifically, it required that claimants have built up six years of residence in the Dutch kingdom. In 1956, Indonesia had been independent for seven years, and many Indische Nederlanders had only just started to make their way to the metropole, especially because the peak of retaliation under Sukarno was yet to come (5 December 1957). This meant that many would not have built up enough years of residence. However, shortly after the bill was passed, a Royal Decree stipulated that living in former Netherlands Indies and Indonesia would be equalised with “living in the Kingdom” for the purposes of the law.⁵⁴

The inclusion of both groups was also marred by “special” treatment in at least two respects. First, in France, there is evidence of discrimination in law and practice. Second, social workers and institutions were heavily involved in promoting cultural assimilation, in ways that infringed on the privacy and autonomy of the recipients. The French case supplies the most obvious example of discrimination, which took place in the realm of family allowances. After becoming full and equal citizens of the French Republic in 1947, Algerian labour migrants were entitled to allowances for their families but, if these families lived in Algeria, only at the rates stipulated by local Algerian legislation rather than metropolitan law. This was true even though their salary deductions were set at metropolitan levels, meaning that they contributed just as much as their metropolitan colleagues to the family allowance funds, but got much less back. This discrepancy led to the accumulation of surplus by metropolitan family allowance funds, which did not escape the attention of increasingly disgruntled Algerian workers.⁵⁵ No comparably high-profile instance of discrimination occurred in the Dutch case, but there is some evidence that families were punished financially or in material terms for displaying “Eastern” characteristics. I can only cautiously repeat the claims of Pro Patria, an interest group representing Indische Nederlanders, that argued in 1954 that families labelled “Eastern” were receiving two times less financial assistance than those labelled “Western.”⁵⁶

This is linked to the second aspect of special treatment I mentioned above: the considerable involvement of social workers in the lives of individuals and their families. To be clear, Dutch social workers inserted themselves into the private lives of *all* (post)colonial migrants, including those designated “Western.” The recruitment of social workers was a central instrument through which the CCKP pursued its aims, and, as the 1963 survey sent by the Diaconal Committee for repatriate care in Breda indicated, social workers were expected to collect knowledge about various facets of intimate life, including the relationship between husband and wife, the extent to which the household was cleaned, and how the children were raised. Notably the data in which the committee is interested has everything to do with

54 NL-HaNA-2.20.27-24-SIWO no 57, “De AOW ook voor ‘spijtoptanten,’” November 1960.

55 Rager, *Les Musulmans Algériens En France et Dans Les Pays Islamiques*, 235.

56 Schuster, *Poortwachters over Immigranten: Het Debat over Immigratie in Het Naoorlogse Groot-Brittannië En Nederland*, 108.

measuring the degree of cultural conformity and very little to do with the beneficiary's own sense of well-being, perceived social position or happiness.⁵⁷ In this sense, all repatriates in the Netherlands had at least familiarity with a form of welfare in which psychological wellbeing was less important than whether a child was reared in conformity with local cultural standards. That said, feminist scholarship has long pointed out that the same measure or policy can have drastically different effects on "differently situated" individuals in a society.⁵⁸ In this sense, the scrutiny to which *all* repatriates in the Netherlands were subject will not have had an equal impact across the board. Here, I posit that Indische Nederlanders whom social workers designated as "Eastern" would have experienced this scrutiny with greater vigour, given the tenets of discouragement policy in place.

In the French case, meanwhile, the involvement of social workers came of age specifically for Algerian labour migrants, as Lyons argues in describing the "Algerian services network."⁵⁹ Many of the organisations in this network shared a social Catholic orientation with their Dutch counterparts. For example, the North African Family Social Service (SSFNA), one of the more prominent organisations receiving government subsidies for their work with Algerian labour migrants, was cut from this cloth. It shared many of the concerns that its Dutch brethren had, with the SSFNA hosting cleaning courses for women. These efforts arguably took on new heights in 1958, when the French government responded to protests at family allowance discrimination by establishing the "Social Assistance Fund For Muslim Workers and their Families" (*Fonds d'action sociale pour les travailleurs musulmans et leurs familles*, FAS).⁶⁰ Importantly, the Fund filled the gap in benefits and contributions that had emerged not with cash transfers, but with in-kind interventions by subsidising private organisations that offered cleaning courses to Algerian women alongside "centres of observation" for young "Muslims" who were having trouble "adapting to metropolitan life."⁶¹ This was not novel: the Fund was part of a longer heritage of French social security funds treating Algerians differently: the peculiar involvement of the CNSS in providing housing for "Muslim" workers testifies.

Compared to receiving a cash allowance to which one has earned entitlement by financial contributions, social interventions in the family are far less inclined to protect the autonomy and self-determination of their beneficiaries. Any engagement with the way in which a family raises their child or cleans their house infringes on the capacity for "competence, control and achievement"⁶² in the most intimate domains of human life. It is precisely the ability to fulfil care duties, which Chan and Bowpitt recognised as an important measure

57 NL-UtA-1405-392-Dioecane Commissie voor gerepatrieerdenzorg, "Onderzoek aanpassingsmoeilijkheden Gerepatrieerden," November 1963.

58 Ann Phillips, "Defending Equality of Outcome," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 12, no 1 (2004): 15.

59 Lyons, "Social Welfare, French Muslims and Decolonization in France," 79.

60 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Note, "Le Fonds d'Action Sociale pour les migrants algériens en France et pour leurs familles," 13 February 1963 See also: FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Note, "L'action sociale en faveur des travailleurs algériens en métropole," 1959, p 4.

61 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Note from Minister of Public Health and Population, "Sur l'Action Sociale du Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population susceptible de recevoir un financement complémentaire du Fonds d'action Sociale," 31 December 1959.

62 Granerud and Severinsson in Chan and Bowpitt, *Human Dignity and Welfare Systems*, 22.

of dignity,⁶³ that is at stake when a welfare state chooses to send a migrant's children to a youth centre run by a national social security fund rather than supplying their parents with an allowance. Additionally, although this world of welfare did contribute to human learning and development, the courses subsidised were devoted to activities that occupied the lowest rungs of the income ladder, like cleaning and manual labour. In this way, this particular world of social work and control promoted cultural assimilation but not socioeconomic mobility.

9.2.2.3. *Ghettoisation*

The final set of practices that my research lays bare are dynamics of ghettoisation. Welfare associated with ghettoisation scores low on both Marshall and Somers dimensions. There is either formal or substantive exclusion from mainstream welfare programs as individuals are redirected toward programmes characterised by surveillance, isolation and control. The physical needs of beneficiaries are met variably but their psychological needs are given little attention, there are few opportunities for learning and development that could promote social mobility, and self-determination and participation are limited. I argue that this was the form of welfare that Moluccans encountered when they arrived in the Netherlands in 1951, lasting until around 1970, when most camps were discontinued, and that a similar system welcomed harkis when they arrived in metropolitan France some ten years after Moluccans had made the trek, from July 1962 when SFIM was created until 1976 when Saint-Maurice l'Ardoise closed its doors.

Lacking Dutch citizenship, Moluccans were not eligible for the national group schemes designed for repatriates. On this basis they were also ineligible to access pensions under the transitional rules of the 1956 General Old Age Act (AOW) when it entered into force, and would fall outside the remit of the 1965 General Assistance Act. Their exclusion was ultimately reversed with a modification to a Royal Decree stipulating exceptional conditions under which a pension could be accessed under the transitional rules. In 1968 the Minister of Justice would admit that they were not the intended targets of this policy reform, but a byproduct of the Dutch government wishing to grant concessions to regrettants.⁶⁴ Additionally, the modification came in 1961, ten years after most Moluccans arrived and five years after the AOW came into force. Since the transitional rules are intended for those who are already too old to build up a sufficient contribution record, these years counted. As for the network of private assistance to which repatriates had access, the CCKP explicitly refused bringing the Moluccan community into the remit of the organisation.⁶⁵

The exclusion of harkis from welfare provisions was substantive rather than formal. Though assigned Algerian citizenship, they could become French citizens and thereby qualify under the Law of 26 December if they declared their allegiance to France. Some accessed welfare under the Law's provisions in this way.⁶⁶ However, as we know from the literature on take-up

63 Chan and Bowpitt, *Human Dignity and Welfare Systems*.

64 NL-HaNA-2.15.5142 -356-Letter from Minister of Justice to Ministry of Social Affairs, 12 November 1968,

65 NL-UtA-1405-34-Meeting minutes of CIO social care, 3 April 1951.

66 FR-PaAN-19920149/2-“États statistiques des harkis demandeurs d'emploi et de reclassements professionnels, mars 1963-décembre 1964.”

rates, the information clients have about their rights, the discretion available to local-level officials, and the administrative complexity or stigmatising nature of the claiming process can all affect the take-up of social benefits. In virtually all of these aspects, harkis' access to the Law of 26 December was substantively curtailed. First, as mentioned, many perceived the need to declare allegiance to a country they had fought for humiliating, creating a first obstacle toward accessing French nationality; the judge's discretion, which they did not hesitate to use in the instance of a harki who had relocated on their own accord, was the second. Administratively, allowances under the Law were not distributed in the camps,⁶⁷ and, if harkis knew of their rights at all, many had difficulty opening a file once they left because their documents were incomplete and they moved around frequently in search of a job.⁶⁸

Exclusions aside, the most glaring feature of ghettoisation was the camps in which harkis and Moluccans were accommodated, some of which had a former life as Nazi transit or internment camps. These locations had housed other (post)colonial migrants as well, but either under shorter or less stringent conditions. Indische Nederlanders stayed for less than a year in Schattenberg,⁶⁹ for example, compared to Moluccans, who were housed there for twenty. OAS officers - militarised white settlers whose fight to retain French control over Algeria included staging a putsch against the French government - were also kept in the camp Saint-Maurice L'Ardoise, but for less than a year and under "lax" conditions.⁷⁰ For harkis, in contrast, the camp constituted a "little colonial world in metropolitan France."⁷¹ The camps were an important, systematic part of their reception, and showed little mercy. Harkis were supposed to fall into a "regime of complete tutelage," of which the isolated barracks formed a central pillar.⁷²

In the early days of their arrival in camps, many of which were outfitted with tents rather than barracks, harkis' material needs like warmth and shelter were barely met and psychological needs were sidelined. Social workers intervened in the nutrition, leisure, sanitation, health, and behaviour of Algerian children. Meanwhile, opportunities for human learning and development were minimal, and officials at SFIM, a public organisation devoted to reclassifying harkis, mostly concentrated on integrating them into the agricultural sector - a waning sector in post-war France. Outside the camps, this "tutelage" followed harkis under the watchful eye of the Parodi Committee, although in 1964, committee members would quickly agree to call it "assistance" rather than tutelage. Moluccans, meanwhile, initially found their basic needs for food, clothing, and housing met by various ministries and the CAZ in an initial phase from 1951 to 1956. However, this care came at the cost of personal autonomy and privacy. CAZ, who ran the camps in which they stayed from 1952, transmitted data and personal details to the Ministry of Justice, who exercised oversight. Social workers were deployed and permission was needed for everything, including receiving visitors. From 1956, government involvement was

67 FR-PaAN-19920149/1-Circulaires, instructions et notes générales du Service et du Ministre des Rapatriés, January 1962-May 1964.

68 FR-PaAN-20120054-20110111-Letter from Alexandre Parodi to the Minister of Repatriates, François Missoffe, 29 January 1963.

69 van Gool, "70 Jaar Geleden Kwamen Indische Nederlanders Aan in De Schattenberg."

70 Lavrut, "S' évader de Saint-Maurice l'Ardoise," 17.

71 Charbit, "Un Petit Monde Colonial En Métropole: Le Camp de Harkis de Saint-Maurice-L'Ardoise (1962-1976)."

72 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 122.

rolled back to make room for greater autonomy, but labour market integration was minimal. Again there was little attention to Moluccans' psychological needs, with the Head of Police dismissing their anxieties about immigration control by stating that he found the "feelings expressed ... grossly exaggerated"⁷³ and Ministry of Justice officials complaining that they were "easily irritated."⁷⁴ In general, this combination of physical segregation and intense surveillance⁷⁵ closely resemble Goffman's notion of the *total institution*, as Charbit has noted with respect to the camps housing harkis.⁷⁶

9.3. Serving the patria

9.3.1. Summary of explanation

I document three distinct ways in which welfare contributed to the nation-building project. On their own, they explain the nature of redistributive boundaries, but not the type of welfare that an individual might encounter. For this, the three dynamics I name need to be combined with attention to ideological work, according to which different individuals are placed in different relationship to the overarching aim. This frequently involved some degree of racialisation, which helps explain why forms of inclusion clustered along racial lines. The fact that welfare can produce different outcomes for different people should not be surprising. As Meghji notes, "all racialised people - including whites - exist in the *same* racialised social system, and consequently ... there is a necessary relation that exists between their positions."⁷⁷

First, in contexts where institutional fragmentation was conceivable, welfare helped internally structure the nation's social space by distributing resources differently across different groups of (post)colonial migrants, sorting beneficiaries into distinct strata. This was mostly accomplished in extra-legal or informal ways, and explains variation across the Marshall dimension: those who were constructed as deserving received more welfare than those constructed otherwise. Second, welfare helped neutralise resistance to the national project. It sometimes achieved this by offering entitlements to welfare that scored high on the Marshall dimension, and sometimes by offering welfare that scored low on the Somers dimension as a means of supplying monitoring and surveillance capacity to the state. What exactly this meant for which beneficiaries depended on their perceived power in the national context. Finally, welfare dispelled threats of cultural vacuity either by removing the culturally deviant to the margins of social space through ghettoisation or including them under paternalistic schemes designed to shape their conduct. Where exactly someone fell depended on the extent to which they were constructed as assimilable.

73 NL-HaNA-2.09.52-264-Letter forwarded by Head of Police, 14 December 1959.

74 NL-HaNA-2.09.52-264-Letter from Th H.A Booms to dhr Hoofd van de Afdeling Toezicht Vreemdelingen en Grensbewaking, 4 June 1968.

75 Meghji, *The Racialized Social System*, 129.

76 Charbit, "Un Petit Monde Colonial En Métropole: Le Camp de Harkis de Saint-Maurice-L'Ardoise (1962-1976)."

77 Emphasis added; Meghji, *The Racialized Social System*, 130.

The following sections consider each of the three aims. At any given time, policy could have overlapping aims; I spell out their explanatory value one by one mainly for analytic intelligibility.

9.3.2. Agent of stratification

Some redistributive decisions responded to the logic of structuring social space. In these cases, when the welfare state acted, as Esping-Andersen suggested, as an “agent of stratification,”⁷⁸ the location of redistributive boundaries corresponded with prevalent constructions of deservingness, which in turn depended on the dimensions with salience in case-specific ideologies. In the Netherlands, cultural proximity (embodied by the criteria of Westernness or Western orientation) was the key dimension informing someone’s placement in social space. In the UK, reciprocity or work ethic played this role. The construction of cultural proximity in the Dutch case and reciprocity in the UK case both relied on racecraft and fed into a more general process of racialisation.

In The Netherlands, Westernness was associated with an ontology according to which Dutch citizens were divided into distinct groups, distinguished by inherited and learned tendencies. These tendencies ranged from an “inherently slow pace of work,”⁷⁹ according to Philip Werner, lethargy and apathy according to a Catholic MP, as well as a preference for rice over potatoes and sarongs over jeans. Much (though not all) of the ideological contestation over social rights that took place among local actors during this period concerned whether someone qualified as Western. The broad-based coalition in support of regrettants successfully moved them into the world of empathetic inclusion by describing them as Western; the contact official on the SS *Zuiderkruis* could pacify the Minister of Justice who boarded her ship by doing the same. Besides contesting the placement of a potential beneficiary along lines of Westernness, there was also confused, but constructive, disagreement over how Westernness ought to be defined. The hard copies of a series of radio speeches in 1960 trying to garner sympathy among the Dutch public for the plight of regrettants is revealing for its mark-ups, as certain features are crossed out (having Dutch names) and others are left to stand (remaining Dutch “in their appearance”). In 1963, social workers in Breda reportedly did not interpret the survey question of whether the families they worked with were “predominantly Western or Eastern” in the same way.⁸⁰ This is consistent with the generally empty and/or self-contradictory nature of racial classifications.

Either way, the question of whether Westernness was an appropriate yardstick with which to measure deservingness was subject to little to no meaningful debate. When the Werner report was leaked, the media and parliament were highly critical: one MP argued that the Werner committee proceeded from a “racial doctrine which does not differ much from that of Hitler and Alfred Rosenberg.”⁸¹ However, the following year, that same MP went on to

78 Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, 55.

79 Schuster, *Poortwachters over Immigranten: Het Debat over Immigratie in Het Naoorlogse Groot-Britannië En Nederland*, 101.

80 NL-UtA-1405-392-Diocesane Commissie voor gerepatrieerdenzorg, “Onderzoek aanpassingsmogelijkheden Gerepatrieerden,” November 1963.

81 Willems, *De Uittocht Uit Indië, 1945-1995*, 128.

govern one of the last Dutch colonies, Netherlands New Guinea, whose rule was justified to the international community on the grounds that the population belonged to a “negroid” race and was therefore far more “backwards” than the population of Indonesia.⁸² More important than the hypocrisy was the fact that critical comments did not succeed in changing government policy, at least not at the local level, where, as is obvious above, social workers were still using the distinction over a decade later.

Deservingness also played a role in the distribution of welfare in the UK, but it was constructed with relation to work ethic and reciprocity. Lengthy discussions over the use of welfare by so-called “coloured Colonials,” or “coloured British subjects” preceded the rollback of their entry rights. Throughout these discussions, which are captured in the archival record of the early 1950s, an ideological position emerged in which the central conflict was the “immigration into this country of coloured people from British territories.”⁸³ Casting the newcomers as idle and undeserving welfare recipients helped underline the problem that immigration posed in terms that contributors to a brand-new universal welfare system could understand. All police districts submitting evidence to the 1953 “Working Party on Coloured People Seeking Employment in the UK” - except Liverpool - impressed upon their interlocutors that “on the whole coloured people are work-shy.”⁸⁴ This, however, involved ideological work. When proponents of this ideological persuasion suggested that Caribbeans “come over to this country and live off the Welfare State...”⁸⁵ without any intention to work, the National Assistance Board protested that “our experience of Jamaicans has been that they are very ready to work...”⁸⁶ Indeed, neither committee of inquiry that investigated this question could ever provide evidence to the contrary. Nonetheless, the “work-shy” Jamaican who was nonetheless “able to have ‘a wonderful time’”⁸⁷ upset the tradition of viewing people of colour as undeserving of civil and political liberties, a position that justified ongoing colonial rule and, according to Shilliam, gained ground during the the 1865 Morant Bay rebellion.⁸⁸ This helps explain why the National Assistance Board and other advocates of the newcomers’ deservingness ultimately lost the ideological battle, and, in turn, why Caribbeans would ultimately find their access to the distributive community curtailed by restrictive immigration laws.

9.3.3. Hearts and minds

The second purpose that welfare served was to win over dissenting members of the population. Of all the dynamics I document, this one most closely approximates social interpretations of the function of welfare, according to which welfare is understood as compensating powerful groups

82 Kuitenbrouwer, “Beyond the ‘Trauma of Decolonisation’: Dutch Cultural Diplomacy during the West New Guinea Question (1950-62),” 312.

83 UK-LoNA-CO 1028/22-Draft report, “Immigration of British subjects into the United Kingdom,” Committee of Ministers, 24 January 1951.

84 UK-LoNA-CO 1028-Note by the Home Office, “Information obtained from the police about coloured communities in the United Kingdom,” 11 July 1953

85 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878, Hansard, 13 April 1961.

86 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878, Letter from Chair of National Assistance Board to Thompson, 26 August 1960.

87 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878, Letter from Thompson to Hutchinson, Chair of National Assistance Board, 3 August 1960.

88 Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor: From Abolition to Brexit*, 38.

to avoid social unrest. However, rather than subdue working class resistance, my findings suggest that it was used to sedate emergent nationalist sensibilities and the risk of insurgency. It did this either by cultivating sympathy for the imperial unit (with welfare that scored high on the Marshall dimension) or by subjecting the beneficiary to intensive surveillance (with welfare that scored low on the Somers dimension). In his study of late colonial British and French Africa, Cooper observed that the “corollary to the distribution of revenue was the surveillance of the recipients.”⁸⁹ The form of welfare that a given beneficiary encountered depended, under these circumstances, on how much power they had. This in turn was, at least partly, a colonial inheritance, and therefore differentiated along racial lines.

In the UK, this dynamic explains why Caribbeans had formal entitlements to social assistance and social security. The 1948 British Nationality Act, as mentioned, was passed to reinstate the primacy of British subjecthood over individual citizenship status.⁹⁰ The inclusive character of social legislation, which was introduced in the exact same window, can be seen as complementary to this project of stabilising the imperial order. In this case, the perceived power of (post)colonial migrants did not drive this outcome, however. Hansen is adamant that the target audience of these inclusive clauses were predominantly white settlers living in what were called the Dominions, but that “any tendency to differentiate between different types of British subjects” was viewed as antagonistic to the British conception of its own imperial identity at that time.⁹¹ This explains why the main way in which exclusions were felt by Caribbean migrants was in local-level discrimination, for which imperial policymakers could not be held responsible.

In France, the impulse to pacify Algerian nationalism goes far in explaining both the hyper-assimilation of *pieds-noirs* and the paternalism that Algerian labour migrants encountered. Speaking to the Council of Europe, Mellac had explained the “humanitarian efforts” of the Ministry of Repatriates with reference to Boulin and his colleagues knowing “how to win the confidence and the affection of the *Pieds noirs*,” which in turn allowed French policymakers to “surpass the atmosphere of defiance and hostility that characterised the first repatriations.”⁹² When the 26 December Law was passed, only three years had passed since the 1958 putsch had toppled the Fourth Republic and shown that the disaffection of former Algerian settlers could come at extraordinarily high political costs.

In previous decades, French policy-makers had used welfare to appease a different population: Algerian labour migrants. Lyons has argued that the FAS was the “metropolitan arm” of the Constantine Plan,⁹³ designed to win over hearts and minds of the Algerian workforce in order to quell their nationalist instincts, as the strength of the FLN grew and the Algerian war of independence reached the metropole. However, the form of welfare that emerged to meet this perceived need was distinct from that designed for *pieds-noirs*. Paternalism allowed for a careful balance of reward and supervision, and featured regular

89 Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa*, 319.

90 Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation*.

91 Hansen.

92 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)-Speech given by Mr Mellac, Director of Repatriates, for la commission de la Population du Conseil de l'Europe, 5 October 1964

93 Lyons, “Social Welfare, French Muslims and Decolonization in France,” 70.

incursions into their private lives which ultimately ended up stirring more hostility than they quelled. The fact that the Ministry of the Interior - “the Ministry mandated with public order and policing” - had the biggest budget of all ministries for the social protection of Algerian labour migrants was illustrative.⁹⁴

Stoler and Cooper have argued that securing the consent of subjects *in* the colonies eventually came at too high a cost for British and French elites, who shrank back from the “implications of extending the universalistic social engineering theories” that were associated with welfare expansion on the continent to the colonies.⁹⁵ In this section I have tried to argue that the opposite dynamic - in which the costs of *withholding* social rights from (post)colonial subjects who had already arrived in the metropole is too high - also has explanatory power.

9.3.4. Cultural change

Finally, I find evidence that welfare acted to dispel the threat of cultural vacuity. It did this either by promoting the adoption of specific cultural habits, or by segregating those with different cultural habits. In effect, both eliminate the possibilities for cultural deviance. I follow Charbit in viewing both segregation *and* efforts to survey and correct the conduct of beneficiaries as congruent with the legacies of colonial rule.⁹⁶ When coupled with constructions of cultural proximity, which determines what counts as cultural deviance, and with constructions of assimilability, which shape whether someone could be expected to respond well to the disciplinary interventions that a welfare state could provide, this dynamic helps explain the patterns of inclusion that a beneficiary received.

The world of paternalistic welfare to which Indische Nederlanders assigned “Eastern” identities and French citizens assigned “Muslim” identities had access can be largely explained with reference to this impulse. An official from the Ministry of Union and Overseas Affairs had clarified that the overarching policy goal of their involvement in repatriate affairs was to “integrate” repatriates into “normal Dutch affairs.”⁹⁷ “Normal” in this case was a euphemism for “European,” and, falling back on Durkheim’s approach of defining things by virtue of what is done in their name, integration into “normal Dutch affairs” was defined as mimicking the cultural scripts of a European household. This explains the government’s enthusiasm about, and willingness to subsidise, courses on interior design, washing clothes, nutrition, sewing, budgeting, heating a home, knitting, acquiring household items, and treating modern textiles, all for the price of 45 cents per person per lesson with the “number of ladies” varying from 8 to 10.⁹⁸ The same can be said of the specific courses and programmes subsidised by the FAS and other social security funds devoted to the care of Algerian labour migrants.

94 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Note for Mr Director-General, March 6 1959.

95 Stoler and Cooper, “Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda,” 24.

96 Charbit, “Un Petit Monde Colonial En Métropole: Le Camp de Harkis de Saint-Maurice-L’Ardoise (1962-1976).”

97 “Het inpassen van de gerepatriëerden in de normale Nederlandse verhoudingen,” NL-HaNA-2.27.02-Nota, MINUOR, 8 November 1950.

98 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-49-“Folder van de Protestantse Zorg t.b.v Hen Die Uit Nieuw Guinea Gekomen Zijn, Uitgaande van de Hervormde Stichting voor Kerkelijk Sociale Arbeid.”

Not everyone who was constructed as “Eastern” or “Muslim” was viewed as capable of assimilation, or undergoing the kind of transformation that this cultural mission required. For some observers, this was the case for Moluccans and harkis. The official who read the reports of the social worker who had stumbled upon a white Dutch woman adopting Moluccan cultural traits had betrayed this view when they wrote “nature is always stronger than nurture!”⁹⁹ One of Jordi and Hamoumou’s respondents had expressed their frustration that harkis were viewed in similarly fixed terms. “We hear people talk about ‘harkis’ or worse, ‘children of harkis,’ as if being harki was like being Black or Asian.”¹⁰⁰ At the same time, like any identity, it was subject to contestation. The French social worker at the forest hamlet in Lozère who justified her full-time involvement in the lives of harkis by clarifying that “the aim is to transform, as much as possible, these Muslims into Europeans”¹⁰¹ betrayed her clear faith in their “assimilability,” as did the applicant for the position of social worker with the Parodi Committee who mused that “[although] it’s hard to know exactly what a Muslim is thinking... when supervised, women and men often show a very good will.”¹⁰²

However, the ghettoisation that harkis and Moluccans faced suggests that, during an important moment in the history of their migration, the prevalent ideological consensus was that they lacked the potential to assimilate. In both cases, this consensus was built on racial stereotypes. For example, Moluccan internment was justified by officials, including Minister of Social Work Marga Klompé with reference to their “physical condition, “fitness for work,” “habits of life”¹⁰³ or “collective mentality.”¹⁰⁴ The same social worker who suggested that harkis can show “a very good will” “when supervised,” added a slew of racial qualifiers to her description, including calling them “very childish,” and exhibiting “natural indolence.”¹⁰⁵ In this context, reception camps could go some way toward incentivising cultural change, as some agents of the welfare state were taught to believe was possible, thereby protecting the benevolent image of elites. However, the segregation they experienced would pose an enormous obstacle to their cultural integration, which in turn would facilitate the sustained belief in the fixity of their ways.

In fact, if Saïd is to be believed - that modern society derives its identity “negatively” - in terms of what it is not rather than what it is - and that the (national, normal) Self is defined in terms of the (foreign, abnormal) Other¹⁰⁶ - then their presence at the margins is actually of greater service to the cultural identity of the nation than their exclusion would be. Saïd argues that because we rarely actually *understand* the Other, we represent other cultures in a “very

99 Laarman, *Oude Onbekenden: Het Politieke En Publieke Debat over Postkoloniale Migranten, 1945-2005*, 115.

100 Jordi and Hamoumou, *Les Harkis, Une Mémoire Enfouie*, 28.

101 Fr-PaAN-19920149-“Les harkis, à la recherche d’une patrie,” Christian Rudel, 17 July 1963.

102 FR-PaAN-F/1A/5137-Letter from Mme Etourneau-Copin to Mr Lienart, Service des Rapatriés d’AFN, 14 May 1963.

103 Laarman, *Oude Onbekenden: Het Politieke En Publieke Debat over Postkoloniale Migranten, 1945-2005*.

104 Jones, “Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten En Nederlanders: Nederlandse Politici over Burgers Uit Oost En West En Nederland, 1945-2005,” 150.

105 FR-PaAN-F/1A/5137-Letter from Mme Etourneau-Copin to Mr Lienart, Service des Rapatriés d’AFN, 14 May 1963.

106 Saïd, “Imaginative Geography and Its Representations,” 20.

unrigorous way,”¹⁰⁷ creating a “closed field, a theatrical stage affixed to Europe.”¹⁰⁸ Arguably, reception camps embody that stage, offering a site where the *negative* meaning of Frenchness, Dutchness, Europeanness and “normal affairs” could be worked out.

9.4. Revisiting the heterogeneity-redistribution trade-off

9.4.1. Summary of contributions

Earlier, I introduced the heterogeneity-redistribution trade-off thesis,¹⁰⁹ according to which diversity reduces social solidarity, and by extension, public support for redistribution. Overall my findings suggest that diversity and solidarity are related, but not in the way that the thesis implies. In fact, inquiring into the effects of diversity on welfare states is misplaced for at least three reasons. First, a focus on identity and racial difference is warranted, but only if it is viewed as the product of *racecraft*¹¹⁰ rather than inevitable. What existing literature has identified as the effect of *diversity* is actually the effect of racism, and it has indeterminate effects. Second, diversity does exist. However, agents of welfare states can actively shape, suppress, and eliminate it in their capacity as disciplinary agents, *homogenising* an ostensibly heterogeneous population. Because I have shown how this process contributes to cultivating consent and belonging, we can understand diversity and solidarity as co-constructed. In this sense, diversity cannot have independent effect. Finally, the heterogeneity-redistribution tradeoff relies on the assumption that public attitudes directly affect welfare policy. However, my project shows that attitudes are not decisive for a specific policy course.

9.4.2. Racecraft and racism, not diversity

As for the first, my findings indeed suggest that the identity of (post)colonial migrants mattered for their inclusion, and that their arrival prompted institutional change as French and Dutch welfare states departed from their central organising principles and created new schemes to integrate them in various ways. In the UK, I show that relaxed and inclusive redistributive boundaries towards Caribbeans were met with public resistance and then border control. However, it was not “racial heterogeneity” in the abstract which strained the solidaristic floorboards of the Beveridgean system and disfigured the Dutch and French systems. Instead it was racecraft and racism that did the work.

In this context of imprecise group definitions, welfare agents engaged in racialisation, interpreting cultural practices and collective outcomes as flowing from a group-based essence, and making racist statements to imbue these qualities with negative value. There was nothing inevitable about these characterisations, and the archival record furnishes several examples of conflicting interpretations. For example, employment and accident rates differed between Algerian French citizens and European French citizens. According to a 1952 thesis, workplace

107 Said, 21.

108 Said, 27.

109 Kymlicka and Banting, *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State*, 9.

110 Fields and Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*.

accidents among Algerian labour migrants were more serious and more frequent than among Europeans.¹¹¹ However, trade unions and labour inspectors interpreted this as a function of employers' inclination to assign North Africans "the most dangerous, the most difficult and the dirtiest" work¹¹² rather than of "the North African[s] temperament" as the report had.¹¹³ In the same way, while police districts read unemployment among Caribbeans as stemming from a "work-shy" attitude, a representative of the Ministry of Labour focused on the importance of labour market discrimination.¹¹⁴ This is partly what Said meant when he said that "rudimentary classification has a logic to it, but ... there is always a measure of the purely arbitrary in the way the distinctions between things are seen."¹¹⁵

When racial identities meet policy, they tend to furnish further evidence of themselves, as Fields and Fields have argued.¹¹⁶ Developing a "collective mentality," for example, is one way to respond to being denied access to general provisions and permanent housing. Meanwhile, if employers hear of the "natural indolence"¹¹⁷ of Algerian applicants, they will be less likely to recruit them, and the ensuing unemployment will produce even more evidence of the supposed "natural indolence." As Fields and Fields describe, race "acquires perfectly adequate moving parts when a person acts upon the reality of the imagined thing; the real action creates evidence for the imagined thing."¹¹⁸ The pathway to racism is cleared.

Racism itself may present challenges for solidarity. In the UK case, both the proponents and opponents of rights for Caribbean citizens could agree on this. The fact that MPs prefaced their parliamentary questions with reference to the views of their "concerned" white constituents is illustrative. As public representatives, this is perhaps unsurprising, but even civil servants linked their arguments back to the concerned public. For example, in the 1953 Working Party's final report, their concluding argument rested on the "affectionate feelings towards the mother-country" of white settlers, which they argued would be weakened by the presence of a "large coloured community as a noticeable feature of our social life" since "such a community is certainly no part of the concept of England or Britain to which people of British stock ... are attached."¹¹⁹ On the other end, the Board conceded that main issue they encountered with non-white claimants was that "their presence in the Board's offices leads to complaints about wasting the taxpayer's money."¹²⁰

That said, the influence even of racism on solidarity is not predetermined. As I have shown, one of the key ways that welfare states responded to (post)colonial migrants was by promoting cultural change among racialised citizens, or distributing resources so as to protect the dignity

111 Michel, *Les Travailleurs Algériens En France*, 128.

112 Michel, 30.

113 FR-PaAN-19830235/28-Report, "Les travailleurs nord-africains et la sécurité sociale." 14.

114 UK-LoNA-CO1028/22-Draft report, "Working Party on Coloured People Seeking Employment in the United Kingdom," 28 October 1953, p 9

115 Said, "Imaginative Geography and Its Representations," 19.

116 Fields and Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*.

117 FR-PaAN-F/1A/5137-Letter from Mme Etourneau-Copin to Mr Lienart, Service des Rapatriés d'AFN, 14 May 1963.

118 Fields and Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*, 22.

119 UK-LoNA-CO1028/22-Draft report, "Working Party on Coloured People Seeking Employment in the United Kingdom," 28 October 1953, p 9

120 UK-LoNA-CO 1028/22-Note by National Assistance Board, 5 October 1953.

of “Europeans.” In this sense, racism may well have produced incentives for an *increase* in social spending rather than its opposite.

9.4.3. Homogenising the heterogeneous¹²¹

If my first contribution redirects the attention of the heterogeneity-redistribution tradeoff away from race, my second contribution is to provide evidence for a different relationship between solidarity and diversity. In my dissertation, I have shown that welfare states can actively subdue and suppress diversity by *homogenising* an ostensibly heterogeneous population.

The welfare state can act as a powerful instrument for promoting behaviour change and by extension, cultural assimilation. In 9.3.4, I argued that disciplinary forms of welfare (like paternalism and ghettoisation) respond to this impulse. In this sense, the fact that Western-oriented Indische Nederlanders graduated from minority status by the 1980s is no accident. Decades of subsidising religious education and household courses, rewarding linguistic, culinary, and interior design preferences, and punishing undesirable practices like divorce and out-of-wedlock pregnancies, had nullified difference.

Policymakers also have other tools at their disposal, like conditionality. Thus, in the Netherlands, an applicant who had fallen on hard times because they were a divorcée or “pregnant and unmarried” would not be eligible, while someone fleeing persecution in Indonesia would.¹²² This disincentivised undesirable cultural practices, like divorce and out-of-wedlock pregnancy. The same tactic was at play when officials were instructed to reward self-employed repatriates more generously for opening a clinic than for opening a bar.¹²³

Welfare states also affect the perceived homogeneity or heterogeneity of a community by creating a shared fate. Social psychologists of the 1960s and 1970s stressed that group construction precedes group prejudice. In one experiment, Tajfel et al. find that the “interdependence of fate” - which they modelled in experiments by telling participants they would be working together on a common task - played a major role in the perception of groupness.¹²⁴ In other words, when participants have experiences in common and anticipate that they will continue to do so, they begin to perceive themselves as members of a group.

The welfare state creates fate interdependence not by instructing participants to work in groups, but rather by creating a sense of affiliation, reciprocity, and loyalty. In my research, contemporaries understood very well the power of welfare states to accomplish this. This was in part why I argued that welfare was deployed as a means of responding to (the threat of) dissidence (9.3.3). It is also why British policymakers convened conferences with the old Dominions in order to set up a system of “Imperial social insurance” wherein “contributions can be made in any one country of the empire and the benefits paid in any other country where the British citizen may find himself.”¹²⁵ Besides its symbolic clout, such an arrangement

121 For this formulation, I am indebted to Pavithra Suryanarayan.

122 NL-Ha-NA-2.27.02-1008-Verslag van de op vrijdag 15 oktober 1965 op het Districtskantoor te Arnhem gehouden bespreking omtrent vraagstukken betreffende de Rijksgroepsregeling Gerechtrepatrieerden.

123 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Circular from Secretary of State of Repatriates (Robert Boulin) to Regional Delegates, IGAME, and Prefects, 22 May 1962, p 10

124 Tajfel et al., “Social Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour,” 153.

125 UK-LoNA-CO 859/124/2-Daily Express article, “Hear the call of Empire,” 25 May 1948.

would ensure that Canadians and Rhodesians would be dependent on the vitality of the same funds. In this way, welfare states contribute to homogeneity, and therefore cannot be said to depend on it.

9.4.4. The malleability of attitudes

A final contribution that my project makes to the literature has to do with public opinion. As mentioned in the introduction (1.3.3), one of the central ways that European welfare state scholarship engages with discussions of immigration and welfare is by researching whether survey respondents punish hypothetical claimants for having specific cultural identities.

The justification for studying attitudes is that they are grounds for policy reform. The implication is that if a particular group falls out of favour with the electorate, the welfare state will respond by limiting its redistributive reach. However, my project suggests that these attitudes are not always decisive for the policy course to be charted. In fact, the public was not keen on the arrival and integration of *any* of the (post)colonial migrants that I studied. The most-likely case for public approval might have been *pieds-noirs* or repatriates, who had lighter skins and had enjoyed higher status in colonial status. Even then, the French and Dutch public reacted with at least some degree of hostility. The Dutch public bitterly called the earliest repatriates in The Netherlands, who by definition belonged to the higher echelons of colonial society, names like “coupon eaters.”¹²⁶ Meanwhile, as Jordi documents, repatriates arriving in Marseille reported encountering “anti-repatriate public opinion”¹²⁷ and stereotypes, including that they were “brute, racist, right-wing, [or] uneducated.”¹²⁸ Skirmishes between the Marseille population and repatriates ensued.

However, policymakers did not lament an “inevitable deservingness gap,” as some researchers today are inclined to do when encountering hostile attitudes.¹²⁹ Nor did they conclude, as Hansen had, that a restrictive course of action was a “difficult but essential decision.”¹³⁰ In fact, despite these negative attitudes, French policymakers concluded the exact opposite: that it was “*necessary* to welcome, house, reclassify, protect” and “*necessary* to build a vast legal and financial system particularly protective of all repatriates.”¹³¹ Rather than acquiesce to the restrictive attitudes of Marseille residents, policy-makers continued to maintain entitlements for *pieds-noirs* even though it only *increased the hostility* of Marseille residents, who felt neglected.¹³² Racist or exclusionary attitudes were not the be-all, end-all of public policy. Instead, they constituted one input of many into a policymaking process. If anything, given their influence on both discourse and material distribution of resources, welfare states are particularly adept at modifying public opinion, and the conditions under which they do so deserves much more scholarly attention than it currently receives.

126 Willems, *De Uittocht Uit Indië, 1945-1995*, 53.

127 Jordi, 1962: *L'arrivée Des Pieds-Noirs*, 55.

128 Jordi, 49.

129 Reeskens and van der Meer, “The Inevitable Deservingness Gap.”

130 Hansen, Randall. *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 78.

131 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, “sur l’application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961,” 1965, p 280. In this case, I am translating both the French verb *devoir* and *falloir* as versions of necessary.

132 Jordi, 1962: *L'arrivée Des Pieds-Noirs*, 55–56.

9.4.5. Society

Boundaries, like identities, are never fixed. El-Enany has argued that “the task of bordering Britain is an ongoing and centuries-old process.”¹³³ This is not just because new economic opportunities and constraints change the balance of power and give rise to new institutions, like the European community.¹³⁴ Nor is it because the global rise in xenophobia, alt-right nationalisms and populist right-wing parties force mainstream parties to continuously revisit the constitution of the national community and the identity of the insiders.¹³⁵ It is also because, as I have argued, boundary-making is a process with both ideological and material underpinnings and is thereby inherently unstable. Interpretations require varying degrees of evidence and ideological work in order to sustain themselves; reality is almost always a stubborn and fickle partner in this process.

In each of the country-cases I studied, the awkwardness of the post-war overlap between expanding social security provisions, on the one hand, and the legal and moral complexities and exclusions of imperial rule, on the other hand, continues to have present-day repercussions on the descendants of (post)colonial migrants. The cabinets of all three countries have in recent years taken responsibility for the exclusion of (post)colonial migrants.

In The Netherlands, the *missing pensions*, or the AOW-hole (*AOW-gat*) provides the most stark example.¹³⁶ For years, Dutch citizens of Surinamese origin have protested that thirty thousand elderly members of their community have been receiving a reduction on their old-age pension of 16 to 18 percent.¹³⁷ Following a 1954 Charter, Suriname was legally considered an equal, constituent component of the Dutch kingdom prior to its independence in 1975. Nonetheless the period in which these individuals lived in Suriname prior to 1975 is not equated with residence in the Netherlands, the central criterion for the build-up of pension rights under the General Old Age Act (AOW) of 1956. While the opportunity to compensate affected citizens shrank with time, the cabinet investigated the possibility of offering a one-off financial “gesture” to affected citizens.¹³⁸ In 2023, a one-time grant amounting to 5,000 euros was offered as compensation to those who had lived long enough to receive it.¹³⁹

133 El-Enany, *Bordering Britain*, 3.

134 El-Enany, 15.

135 V Spike Peterson, “State/Nation Histories, Structural Inequalities and Racialised Crises,” *New Political Economy* 26, no 2 (March 4, 2021): 291, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2020.1841142>.

136 Gijs Herderscheë, “Kamer wil spoed met AOW-compensatie voor Surinaamse Nederlanders,” *de Volkskrant*, November 17, 2022, <https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/kamer-wil-spoed-met-aow-compensatie-voor-surinaamse-nederlanders~b5b2a9b7/>.

137 Raoul du Pre, “Commissie: AOW-gat Surinaamse Nederlanders moet gerepareerd,” *de Volkskrant*, July 2, 2021, <https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/commissie-aow-gat-surinaamse-nederlanders-moet-gerepareerd~b86a2fdc/>.

138 Herderscheë, “Kamer wil spoed met AOW-compensatie voor Surinaamse Nederlanders.”

139 Franca van Hooren and Eline Westra, “Wanneer Volgt de Echte Reparatie van Het ‘AOW-Gat’ van Surinaamse Nederlanders?,” *NRC*, May 8, 2023, <https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2023/05/08/wanneer-volgt-de-echte-reparatie-van-het-aow-gat-van-surinaamse-nederlanders-a4164120>.

In France, the government has also taken responsibility for some of the exclusions it engineered during the period I studied. The Council of State (*Conseil d'Etat*)¹⁴⁰ issued a historic judgment in late 2018. Reversing the rulings of two prior administrative courts,¹⁴¹ the Council ruled that the French government was responsible for medical, psychological and social damage caused to the claimant, Charles Tamazount, while resident at camp Bias, one of the many reception camps for harkis.¹⁴² The Council ordered the government to pay Tamazount 15,000 euros in material and moral damages.¹⁴³ Seeking better redress, Tamazount and his siblings turned to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), where they have accused the French state of violating their right to life and to privacy, among other things.¹⁴⁴ The case is ongoing at the time of writing.

Three days after the ECHR requested observations on the same from the French government, and some six months before the end of his term, President Macron issued a formal presidential pardon to harkis in September 2021. In his address, Macron acknowledged that the French Republic had “abandoned” harkis. A few months later, he introduced a bill to the National Assembly enshrining a right to compensation for harki families imprisoned in collective reception centres. The law, which interest groups had demanded for a long time, eventually passed in February 2022.¹⁴⁵ The amount that claimants could access was set in relation to the amount that Tamazount was granted by the Council of State: 2,000 euros for three months spent in a camp, 3,000 euros for one year, and 1,000 euros for each additional year, with the total sum not exceeding 16 thousand euros.¹⁴⁶ As of September 2022, some 2,577 applications have been approved out of the 2,647 examined, with 21,273 submitted in total.¹⁴⁷

Last but not least, the infamous Windrush scandal rocked British public opinion in recent years. In a 2012 interview with the *Telegraph*, Theresa May, then Home Secretary, had announced her aim to “create, here in Britain, a really hostile environment for illegal

140 The French Council of State is sometimes translated into the “Supreme Administrative Court” of France, but this is somewhat misleading. Although it is the court of last appeal in the administrative system, the judicial and constitutional system are each subject to different courts of last appeal. Moreover, it also functions as a council, preparing bills, ordinances and decrees, and answering questions from ministers. Pierre Delvolvé, “The Council of State, the Supreme Court of the French Administrative System,” *Pouvoirs* 123, no 4 (2007): 51–56.

141 In the French legal system, the administrative courts deal with litigation concerning the public exercise of power.

142 Dalila Kerchouche, “« Entre Les Barbelés, Les Enfants de Harkis Du Camp de Bias Dribblent Pour Échapper à La Folie Postcoloniale »,” *Le Monde.Fr*, March 18, 2022, https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2022/03/18/entre-les-barbeles-les-enfants-de-harkis-du-camp-de-bias-dribblent-pour-echapper-a-la-folie-postcoloniale_6118036_3232.html.

143 Le Conseil d'Etat, “Responsabilité de l'État Concernant Les Conditions de Vie Réservées Aux Familles de Harkis,” Conseil d'État, October 3, 2018, <https://www.conseil-etat.fr/actualites/responsabilite-de-l-etat-concernant-les-conditions-de-vie-reservees-aux-familles-de-harkis>.

144 Mustapha Kessous, “La Cour européenne des droits de l'homme s'invite dans le débat sur les harkis,” *Le Monde.fr*, December 15, 2021, https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2021/12/15/la-cour-europeenne-des-droits-de-l-homme-s-invite-dans-le-debat-sur-les-harkis_6106080_823448.html.

145 Loi n° 2022-229 du 23 février 2022 portant reconnaissance de la nation envers les harkis et les autres personnes rapatriées d'Algérie anciennement de statut civil de droit local et réparation des préjudices subis par ceux-ci et leurs familles du fait de l'indignité de leurs conditions d'accueil et de vie dans certaines structures sur le territoire français, JORF n°0047.

146 Mustapha Kessous, “La délicate question de la réparation des harkis et de leurs enfants,” *Le Monde.fr*, September 20, 2022, https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2022/09/20/la-delicate-question-de-la-reparation-des-harkis-et-de-leurs-enfants_6142441_823448.html.

147 Kessous.

immigrants.”¹⁴⁸ The policy proposals and accompanying rules and regulations of the Immigration Act of 2014 would come to lay the foundations of the “hostile environment” that May envisaged.¹⁴⁹ The crux of these legislative acts was to enshrine the devolution or “deputisation” of immigration control.¹⁵⁰ Private and public bodies like employers, landlords, hospitals, police, and schools became required to verify their employee or client’s residence status; failing to do so would provoke sanctions. If no residence permit could be produced, the above actors became legally bound to revoke services - benefits, jobs, housing, a drivers’ license, bank accounts and medical treatment - until the Home Office can take over. The legislation remains intact to this day, though government officials prefer the title “compliant environment” policy.¹⁵¹

Among those groups most affected by the hostile environment policy are the ‘Windrush generation.’ Named after the *HMT Empire Windrush*, one of the earliest ships to carry fee-paying migrants from Jamaica to the British Isles, the Windrush generation refers usually to the thousands of Caribbean-born individuals who arrived on the British Isles anywhere from 1948 to 1962. At the time, their entry and residence rights were uncomplicated; they shared a citizenship with metropolitan UK citizens until the early 1960s.¹⁵² However, when their territories of origin gained independence, their rights of stay were subject to renegotiation. Many did not acquire residence permits. In late 2017, reporting by the Guardian revealed that they were being threatened with detention and deportation. Many of the affected were of retirement age and had lived in the UK for over half a century. As public outrage mounted, the Home Office apologised, creating a team dedicated to compensation and regularising their status.

In all of these cases, (post)colonial migrants themselves have introduced cracks in the ideologies that won out in the post-war period, where formal citizenship status did not guarantee a substantive right to *social* citizenship, and where new forms of inclusion in the distributive community emerged. I have titled this project *Social Subjecthood* as an homage to the disparate forms of belonging that accompanied welfare expansion. Like the “welfare state” itself, the concept bears the onerous responsibility of uniting an assemblage of different phenomena: from targeted assistance schemes to reception camps, from discrimination in the allocation of rent allowance to social security funds devoting their budget to cleaning courses for “Muslim” women. Nonetheless, if *social subjecthood* has any merit, it is its ability to cast aspersions on Marshall’s conception of social citizenship. It does so in a far less powerful way than the Surinamese activists who delivered a petition to the Dutch Parliament, than Tamazount who took his case to administrative courts, or the members of the Windrush generation who got an apology from the very same Home Office who recruited the Ministry of

148 Colin Yeo, “Briefing: What Is the Hostile Environment, Where Does It Come from, Who Does It Affect?,” May 1, 2018, <https://freemovement.org.uk/briefing-what-is-the-hostile-environment-where-does-it-come-from-who-does-it-affect/>.

149 Melanie Griffiths and Colin Yeo, “The UK’s Hostile Environment: Deputising Immigration Control,” *Critical Social Policy* 41, no 4 (November 2021): 521–44, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0261018320980653>.

150 Griffiths and Yeo, 525.

151 Russell Taylor, “Impact of ‘Hostile Environment’ Policy: Debate on 14 June 2018,” Library Briefing (London: House of Lords, June 11, 2018).

152 Grenada did not gain independence until 1974.

National Insurance to track them down just forty years earlier. But, to repeat Ferrera's mantra: if "*nomina sunt numina*" (names are like gods), and new ways of naming things can offer a window into new ways of seeing things,¹⁵³ then maybe the concept of social subjecthood will have something to offer activists of future generations who hold their national communities to the standards embedded in Marshall's declaration: that "the basic human equality of membership had been enriched with new substance."¹⁵⁴

153 Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*, 35.

154 Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class: And Other Essays*, 9.