Social Subjecthood? The inclusion of (post)colonial migrants in Dutch, French, and British welfare states, 1945-1970

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2. Drawing redistributive boundaries

2.1. Introduction

No evaluation of inclusion in a welfare state is complete without some effort to pin down what exactly this entails and the means through which it is accomplished. This chapter introduces a theoretical framework designed to aid in this respect. It concretises the notion of boundaries by highlighting the means through which they are drawn, the forms they take, the instruments of which they make use and the traces they leave. Assuming boundary-making as an agent-driven process that results from political choices rather than any kind of natural law, the framework also elucidates the manner in which decisions about boundaries are made.

In 2.2, I argue that for nations to exist, their members need to believe that they are coherent, self-contained entities with moral value. While boundaries made in other domains (like citizenship and immigration law) support this perception, the policies and practices associated with welfare states have an important contribution to make to this project as well (2.3). A statist lens of welfare expansion reveals how the welfare state secures the cultural and social perimeter of the nation using the tools at its disposal: redistributing resources, disciplining beneficiaries, and engaging in discourse. In the process it can supply the nation with internal boundaries, cultural heritage, and the sense that its members belong to a *community of value*.[1] Though these objectives are abstract, their consequences for hypothetical welfare claimants are concrete. Specifically, they affect the amount and character of welfare that is provided (2.4). I stylise these forms as gradations of inclusion and, for illustrative purposes, fix them into a matrix of four different ideal types.

2.5 is devoted to explaining how and why someone might end up receiving welfare commensurate with one part of the matrix or another. After introducing key concepts like ideology, identity, and race, and exposing how they work together to shape social reality, I lay out my argument. I propose that the amount and character of welfare a hypothetical beneficiary receives depends on their position in relation to the welfare state's contribution to the nation-building project. This position is not exogenously given or affixed to an individual body as a timeless attribute. Instead, it is constructed as state and non-state actors make sense of material conditions through ideology, creating a measure of deservingness and cultural proximity by locating individuals on the dimensions and values that ideology provides. I posit that constructions of deservingness shape variation on the Marshall dimension, while constructions of cultural proximity shape whose behaviour is deviant and whose is appropriate, and therefore influence variation on the Somers dimension. Both constructions can, but do not necessarily, involve racialisation, and are likely to reflect distributions of power and pre-existing interpretive templates.

In doing so, I challenge welfare state scholarship's dominant understanding of race and identity as fixed attributes of the individual, locating them instead as modes of classification linked to a hegemonic (and always unstable) ideology. I also complement existing scholarship

1 Bridget Anderson, *Us and Them? The Dangerous Politics of Immigration Control* (Oxford University Press, 2013), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691593.001.0001.

on deservingness by explaining where the public's criteria for come from and how they are developed.

2.2. Boundaries and integrity

Political communities are demarcated by territorial and social boundaries.[2] Boundaries are "sets of norms and rules that define the type and level of closure of a given collectivity vis-a-vis the exterior."[3] Territorial boundaries define the closure of topographical or geographical space, by limiting and facilitating physical access to it. Social boundaries represent a more abstract form of closure which involves shaping access to social space. For Bourdieu, social space is a system of invisible relations between actors.[4] Both territorial and social boundaries can be internal or external to the political community. External boundaries separate members (insiders) from non-members (outsiders), and are thereby responsible for distributing what Walzer saw as the primary good of membership.[5] Internal boundaries shape the relationship between members by differentiating the space of a given community.[6] In practice, the distinction between internal and external boundaries is not always useful, since whether someone is an outsider or a subordinately positioned insider depends on how the community defines membership.

The modern nation has been the most popular container for political affiliation during the twentieth century,[7] as the legitimacy of alternative forms of governance, like empire, kingship or caliphate, waned. Although supranational dynamics increasingly encroach on national sovereignty,[8] Longo argues that *debordering* (globalisation), has only prompted *rebordering* at the national level.[9] Immigration and nationality law have delimited the nation's external boundaries by regulating admission into its territorial and social space respectively. Its internal boundaries are mostly worked out in other policy areas, like criminal law, labour law and, importantly for our purposes, social policy. They are typically associated with inequality in access to resources or power. Centre-periphery dynamics and cleavages, or contrasts that meaningfully impact political life and divide national communities,[10] are commonly studied forms of internal boundary. Internal boundaries are often social *and* territorial. For example, from around 1917 to the mid 1960s, Dutch society was segmented along confessional lines into pillars (*zuilen*).[11] Pillarisation defined the (social) appropriateness of joining different

2 Social boundaries are sometimes known as symbolic or membership boundaries.
3 Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*, 3.
4 Pierre Bourdieu, "Social Space and Symbolic Power," *Sociological Theory* 7, no 1 (1989): 16, https://doi.org/10.2307/202060.
5 Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality*, 31.
6 Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*.
7 Thomas Hammar, "State, Nation, and Dual Citizenship," in *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America*, ed W.R Brubaker (Lanham, London: German Marshall Fund of the US, 1989).
8 David Jacobson, *Rights across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
9 Matthew Longo, *The Politics of Borders: Sovereignty, Security and the Citizen after 9/11* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 5.
10 Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*, 65.
11 Arend Lijphart, *Verzuiling, Pacificatie, En Kentering in de Nederlandse Politiek*, 9th ed (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007), 28.

labour movements or listening to different media sources, but also segmented public spaces like bakeries and universities by reserving them for members of specific pillars.[12] Equally, Meghji highlights how norms about how to interact in racialised societies are reinforced in the physical and built environment, as, for instance, certain forms of real estate are made available for some groups and not others, or streets are made more or less safe for different groups of people.[13]

Boundaries help serve the nation's most pressing needs. They would be unnecessary, Longo argues, if "sovereignty and identity [were] levelled smoothly" across territory, giving rise to self-evident, cohesive political units.[14] Instead, any given territorial expanse is subject to the influence of competing authorities and compatible with a variety of political configurations. Consequently, nations do not appear out of thin air, although for a long time they were portrayed as such. Prior to the 17th century, *nations* evoked "facts of nature" that "signified basic divisions of the human species," as, for example, a Norman bishop defined the Welsh *natio* to the pope in 1140.[15] Today, the nation is a cultural artefact[16] whose emergence depends on its perceived integrity. I mean integrity in both senses of the word: as the quality or state of being whole, entire, or unified, as well as the quality of adhering to moral values. Presenting a cogent argument for the former is one of the central contributions of Benedict Anderson's analysis in *Imagined Communities,*[17] although his account lacks sufficient appreciation for the role of culture and nationalism. Bridget Anderson's notion of *community of value* unpacks the meaning of the latter.[18]

Benedict Anderson argued that the nation, unlike the empire, exists as a "sociological organism," an entity that can move through history as a solid, modular unit or coherent whole.[19] For Anderson, this quality allows members of the newly constituted national community to imagine that they shared a past and a destiny with their compatriots. Boundary-making plays a key role in constructing nations in this light. In alternative arrangements, borders were "porous and indistinct, and sovereignties faded imperceptibly into another."[20] Longo concurs, suggesting that *spectral* sovereignty characterised empire.[21] Both internal and external boundaries contribute to the stabilisation of the nation as a sociological organism. Internal boundaries structure social space, setting the nation apart from its undifferentiated surroundings and creating a "stable pattern of social interactions"[22] within which members can envision their role. As internal boundaries form, agents and their resources are distributed in predictable ways and the relations between different positions become (more) entrenched.[23] Hence, Anderson saw 'nation-ness' as flowing from deliberate, elite-led strategies to order the

12 Lijphart, 28.
13 Ali Meghji, *The Racialized Social System* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2022), 77.
14 Longo, *The Politics of Borders: Sovereignty, Security and the Citizen after 9/11*, 42.
15 David A Bell, *The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680–1800* (Harvard University Press, 2001), 5, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvjghttm.
16 Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*.
17 Anderson.
18 Anderson, *Us and Them?*
19 Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 26.
20 Anderson, 19.
21 Longo, *The Politics of Borders: Sovereignty, Security and the Citizen after 9/11*, 13.
22 Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*, 65.
23 Bourdieu, "Social Space and Symbolic Power," 17.

social and spatial environment. Census-taking, for example, tethered individuals to the nation in clearly specified ways by assigning them categories and determining the relationship of these categories to the state. He argues that a key way in which empire acquired *national* meaning was by "circumscrib[ing]" the "ascent" of creole functionaries (European colonial settlers who lived in Latin America).[24] Ascent referred to both physical travels and career opportunities, linking the social and the territorial.

Cultural cohesion is an equally integral component of national integrity. For Smith, national identity stems from a combination of shared territory, common myths and memories, common legal rights and duties and, importantly, "common, mass culture."[25] Dieckhoff argues, for example, that although nineteenth century Hungary "presented the image of a complete society" due to its internal boundaries - "rural masses at its base, nobility at the top, and between the two the clergy, the gentry and an emerging middle class" - its "social completeness was hampered" by a kind of cultural vacuity due to its political subjection to Habsburg Austria and the predominance of Latin.[26] Disagreement about the extent to which this matters across countries prompted Meinecke to introduce a distinction between *staatsnation* and *kulturnation*.[27] Others then distinguished between civic and ethnic nationalism,[28] or state-led versus state-seeking nationalism.[29] In the former, national rulers acquired legitimacy from democratic procedure and adherence to republican values, while the latter refers to those nations whose borders were settled relatively late and whose shared linguistic, social and cultural practices/values imbued the nation with meaning. Traditionally, Germany exemplifies the *ethnic nation* and France the *civic nation*. The helpfulness of this dichotomy, however, has been called into question. For instance, Brubaker shows that French and German traditions of nationhood both have political and cultural components.[30] This underlines the contribution that cultural substance makes even to republican states.

Meanwhile, Bridget Anderson makes the case for considering the importance of a different kind of integrity. She argues that modern states portray themselves as a "community of value," in other words, as if their members "share common ideals and (exemplary) patterns of behaviour."[31] These patterns might be cultural practices, but they are distinct in that they are infused with moral substance. Anderson describes how a group will strive to view its own members in value-positive terms. Members imagine their compatriots in relation to the "Good Citizen," and imagine themselves as law-abiding, hard-working members of stable and respectable families.[32] This image is juxtaposed with that of the "Failed Citizen," represented

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24 Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 114.

25 Smith in Goodman, *Immigration and Membership Politics in Western Europe*.

26 Alain Dieckhoff, *Nationalism and the Multination State* (Oxford University Press, 2017), 21, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190607913.001.0001.

27 cited in Christian Albrekt Larsen, "Revitalizing the 'civic' and 'Ethnic' Distinction Perceptions of Nationhood across Two Dimensions, 44 Countries and Two Decades," *Nations and Nationalism*. 23, no 4 (2017): 970–93.

28 Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background* (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1961).

29 Charles Tilly, "States and Nationalism in Europe 1492-1992," *Theory and Society* 23, no 1 (1994): 133.

30 Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).

31 Anderson, *Us and Them?*, 2.

32 Anderson, 3.

by anyone from vagrants or criminals to rioters and sex workers, who emerge as distinctly unworthy of membership in the community of value.[33] Again, boundaries have a critical role to play in depicting the integrity of the nation. "The community of value is defined from outside by exclusion," Anderson explains, as the foreigner, migrant, etc. takes on the role of the outsider against which the insider's worth is defined.[34] Meanwhile, internal boundaries between the "Good Citizen" and the "Failed Citizen" define the community of value from the inside. This helps explain the proliferation of anti-vagrancy legislation in 15th and 16th century England. As Braddick argues, the "threat [vagrants] posed to society was not just physical but normative."[35] Vagrants distracted from and undermined the notion of the good, law-abiding Christian upon which social authority and meaning was based. In this sense, membership in the nation is not just about "legal status," but also about "status in the sense of worth and honour."[36]

In short, the nation owes its existence to the perception of its integrity. If a nation is perceived as an irrelevant container for difference or as lacking moral conscience, the consent of its members becomes difficult to secure. Here I borrow Gramsci's understanding of consent as the "knowing and willing participation of the dominated in their subjugation."[37] If external and internal boundaries are necessary for this perception, however, they are not sufficient; they must be continuously reinforced or renegotiated as societies undergo change. In the next section I argue that the welfare state is well positioned to contribute to this process.

2.3. The nation's dirty work

2.3.1. Defining the welfare state

To understand where the welfare state appears in these projects of boundary building, a definition is in order. Parting with the Weberian tradition of defining social phenomena by their relationship to ideals,[38] I follow Durkheim and define the welfare state according to a set of external, ascertainable characteristics;[39] that is, with what, precisely, is being done in its name.[40] In fact, the practice of assisting those in need predates, by many centuries, the entry of 'welfare state' into the public lexicon (see Chapter 4). The term emerged to describe particularly intensive periods of state-society relations in which government involvement in social and economic life was pronounced. The Dutch translation, *de verzorgingsstaat*, is often juxtaposed with the "night watchman state" (*nachtwakersstaat*) of the mid-1800s, which

33 Anderson, 4.
34 Anderson, 4.
35 cited in Anderson, 19.
36 Anderson, 4.
37 Michael Burawoy, *Symbolic Violence: Conversations with Bourdieu* (Duke University Press, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1515/9781478007173.
38 Ahmad Sadri, *Max Weber's Sociology of Intellectuals* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 105.
39 Emile Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method*, ed Steven Lukes, trans W.D Halls (1895; repr., New York: The Free Press, 1982), 76.
40 Gilbert Rist, *The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith*, trans Patrick Camiller, 5th ed (London: Zed Books, 2019).

intervened minimally in the lives of its citizens.[41] The French translation, *l'État-providence*, bears resemblance to the Dutch use, although appears to have older roots: in the mid-1800s liberals used it to denounce revolutionary political projects as overly interventionist and utopian.[42] It also had a normative bent in England, where it was used to elaborate on the distinctive (positive) qualities of British post-war reconstruction and on serving national interest with democratic rule of law.[43]

Since then, the welfare state, *de verzorgingsstaat* and *l'État-providence* has begun to refer to the body of legislation through which states intervene in the social and economic life of their citizens.[44] This new definition is distinct in at least two ways from the original usage. First, it is less abstract, referring to specific policies rather than a general interventionist posture.[45] Which exact programmes and policies count as instances of the 'welfare state' are subject to some debate, especially since modes of delivery and financing differ.[46] Social services like housing, education, and health care sometimes fall within its remit.[47] Income transfers or cash benefits (in Dutch: *uitkeringen*; in French: *les prestations sociales*) are almost always included, and feature several programmatic differences on which I elaborate later (3.2.3). Taxation has also begun to attract attention as the means through which the state generates the revenue for its redistributive aims,[48] especially as progressive taxation is one of the most widely acknowledged strategies to reduce inequality.[49] Labour law can be viewed in a similar light, as regulation of the labour market can narrow pay inequalities and improve labour standards.[50] The second innovation of the more recent definition of welfare states is that it leaves more room for non-state actors. Indeed, the actual apparatus responsible for redistribution is operated by both private and public actors. Private actors include charities, religious institutions, and employers.

For present purposes I lean on the more recent conceptualisation of the welfare state. I define it as a country-specific set of policies and practices that redistribute capital and other immaterial benefits both within a given population and across an individual's life cycle. Welfare states presuppose the existence of a collectivity in which redistribution takes place. This is the

41 Frits van der Meer, Jos Raadschelders, and Toon Kerkhoff, "Van Nachtwakersstaat Naar Waarborgstaat: Proliferatie En Vervlechting van Het Nederlandse Openbaar Bestuur in de Lange Twintigste Eeuw (1880-2005)," in *Duizend Jaar Openbaar Bestuur*, ed Pieter Wagenaar, Toon Kerkhoff, and Mark Rutgers (Bussum: Uitgeverij Coutinho, 2011), 251.

42 François-Xavier Merrien, "Aux Origines de l'État-Providence," *La Vie Des Idées*, October 8, 2019, https://laviedesidees.fr/Aux-origines-de-l-Etat-providence.

43 Ben Jackson, "Introduction," in *Essays on the Welfare State (Reissue)*, by Richard M Titmuss, 1st ed (Bristol University Press, 2018), vi, https://doi.org/10.46692/9781447349532.

44 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*.

45 Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*.

46 Nicholas Barr, *Economics of the Welfare State*, 5th ed (Oxford University Press, 2012).

47 Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* Lindsay B Flynn, "The Young and the Restless: Housing Access in the Critical Years," *West European Politics* 43, no 2 (2020): 321–43, https://doi.org/10:1080/01402382.2019.1603679.

48 Sven Steinmo, *Taxation and Democracy: Swedish, British and American Approaches to Financing the Modern State* (Yale University Press, 1993), https://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/stable/j.ctt32bsrs.

49 Bruno Gabriel Salvador Casara et al., "Tax the Élites! The Role of Economic Inequality and Conspiracy Beliefs on Attitudes towards Taxes and Redistribution Intentions," *British Journal of Social Psychology* 62, no 1 (January 2023): 104–18, https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12555.

50 Simon Deakin and Frank Wilkinson, "Labour Law, Social Security and Economic Inequality," *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 15, no 2 (1991): 125–48.

distributive community or the 'sphere of justice.' Like the nation, the community can also be bounded externally and internally. The welfare state has a close relationship to resources of major importance in social life, like material well-being and opportunity. Therefore, internal boundaries of the distributive community usually affect or intensify internal boundaries of the nation-state. To better grasp how they do so, an introduction to functionalist understandings of the welfare state is in order.

2.3.2. Social and statist views

There are at least two major explanations for the emergence of the welfare state, which correspond with rough interpretations of the function of welfare in modern society. The social interpretation builds on a long tradition of Marxist-materialist scholarship that underlines how a society's economic base influences social structures.[51] This refers to the nature of productive activity in a given society and the extent to which this activity can meet the needs of society's members. Productive activity can be geared toward different ends (e.g. profit, exchange, sustenance), powered by different sectors (e.g. industrial or agricultural), and affected by the abundance or scarcity of resources. Among the needs to be met are those which "life involves before everything else," including "eating and drinking, a habitation, [and] clothing."[52] Productive activity, whatever its form, does not lead immediately to the needs of all members of a society being met. Instead, its benefits accrue to particular people and generate inequalities across geographical and social space. Two ways in which this is manifest are the division of labour, which dictates which members are engaging in what kinds of activities, and the division of ownership, which relates to which members own the products of these activities and the necessary means to conduct them (e.g. land, capital, machinery, labour).[53] It is particularly pronounced when capitalists commodify what Polanyi calls "fictitious commodities," like land and labour, eroding the ability of those who sell their labour power to meet their basic needs.[54]

In the social interpretation, welfare is a concession won through the mobilisation of the working class as they demand a buffer from these market forces.[55] Redistributive efforts therefore correspond with the strength of the working class,[56] which flows from electoral

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51 David Harvey, "Population, Resources, and the Ideology of Science," in *Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography* (1974; repr., Edinburgh University Press, 2019), 52, https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9781474468954/html; Gøsta Esping-Andersen, "The Three Political Economies of the Welfare State," *International Journal of Sociology* 20, no 3 (1990): 96.

52 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology* (1846; repr., Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1991), 12.

53 Marx and Engels, 15.

54 Karl R Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (1944; repr., Boston: Beacon Press, 2001).

55 Peter Flora, ed., *Growth to Limits: The Western European Welfare States Since World War II* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1986); Peter Flora Alber Jens, "Modernization, Democratization, and the Development of Welfare States in Western Europe," in *Development of Welfare States in Europe and America* (Routledge, 1981).

56 Walter Korpi, *The Democratic Class Struggle*, Routledge Library Editions: The Labour Movement Series (Boston: Routledge & Kegan, 1983); Evelyne Huber and John D Stephens, *Development and Crisis of the Welfare State* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001).

numbers, unionisation, parliamentary power, and the ability to build successful coalitions.[57] Baldwin broadened the reach of the 'power resources approach', as the focus on class strength came to be known, with an analysis of how and when the *middle classes* supported redistributive efforts.[58] Consequently there is now some consensus within this tradition that solidaristic welfare follows from the effective synthesis of working- and middle-class demands.[59]

The statist interpretation, also called Bonapartism[60] or even "the conspiratorial model"[61] takes a different starting point. Instead of regarding welfare as a concession granted to an aggrieved class, scholars of this tradition see welfare in service of elite interests; deployed to pacify disorderly masses or "inculcate" practices that elites consider desirable.[62] This research is linked to a Foucauldian branch of intellectual history or critique that identifies *discipline* as a central project of government, especially in the classical period from the end of the 17th century to the 19th.[63] Foucault saw discipline as a form of power that involved meticulously controlling the individual bodies of the subjugated; "not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate *as* one wishes…"[64] This form of coercion was distinct from governance that treated the body-politic "as if it were an indissociable unity."[65] Discipline was seen in dialectical terms as consisting of both gratification and punishment, each corresponding with behaviour that was located on a spectrum between two opposing conceptions of good and evil conduct.[66]

Welfare scholars build on these foundations to depict welfare as a disciplinary instrument. Piven and Cloward argue that it is best understood in relation to the "dual imperatives" of "maintaining civil order and regulating labor."[67] They see different welfare policies performing these functions in cyclical fashion: expansive policies mute civil unrest that threatens established hierarchies, and restrictive policies or rollbacks enforce work norms and push people back into the market.[68] In both cases, the overarching aim is to establish social stability. When employed, the argument goes, people are "fixed in their work roles" and therefore also in their "activities and outlooks."[69] For Wacquant, the extent to which work "socialise[s]" the working class has diminished over time with the decline of stable, Fordist wage labour in

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57 Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, 101; Philip Manow, "Electoral Rules, Class Coalitions and Welfare State Regimes, or How to Explain Esping-Andersen with Stein Rokkan," *Socio-Economic Review* 7 (2009): 102.
58 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*.
59 Dennie Oude Nijhuis, "Middle-Class Interests, Redistribution and the Post-war Success and Failure of the Solidaristic Welfare State," *Journal of European Social Policy* 32, no 1 (February 2022): 33, https://doi.org/10.1177/09589287211035686.
60 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*, 39.
61 Derek Fraser, *Evolution of the British Welfare State*, 5th ed (1973; repr., London: Red Globe Press, 2017), 7.
62 Frances Fox Piven and Richard A Cloward, *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare*, 2nd ed (New York: Knopf Doubleday, 1993), 42.
63 Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon, 1977).
64 Foucault, 138.
65 Foucault, 136.
66 Foucault, 180.
67 Piven and Cloward, *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare*, 408.
68 Piven and Cloward, 16.
69 Piven and Cloward, 5.

favour of discontinuous and precarious work.[70] This, he argues, has been accompanied by a hardening of penal institutions in the late 20th century, which has given rise to two separate phenomena. On the one hand, the police, the courts, and the prison have expanded, displacing welfare institutions as agents of behavioural change.[71] On the other hand, welfare services are increasingly governed by a "punitive philosophy" as restrictive workfare policies push the poor into marginal segments of the labour market. Wacquant therefore places welfare squarely in the domain of corrective discipline, arguing that welfare, in its new incarnation as *workfare*, must be viewed as a corollary to *prisonfare*: the instinct to respond to intensifying urban deprivation with prisons, probation, parole, and assorted systems of surveillance and profiling.[72]

At stake in these views is whether social policy is an *alternative* to socialism or a form thereof.[73] However, statist and social explanations are not *a priori* mutually exclusive.[74] As Meghji puts it, theories are like maps: if you want to travel by car, a map of the London Underground is not helpful, but it is also not wrong.[75] At certain times and places, the welfare state may best be viewed through the map that statism supplies. At other times, a social lens may shed more light, for instance in order to explain generous social policy that goes beyond what might be considered necessary to maintain the existing order.[76] The relative dominance of the dynamic that each perspective foregrounds can be expected to change across time and space.

2.3.3. An agent of integration

Both social and statist interpretations help elucidate some of the important contributions that the welfare state can make to national integrity. If perceived national integrity is a fundamental part of nation-building, it is not always easy to achieve. Forming an integral, polished whole from the coarse and untidy nature of social relations requires acting upon independent and reflexive individuals in potentially morally ambiguous ways. Here I posit that the welfare state can do some of the nation's dirty work of integrating a stubbornly messy reality into a cohesive whole. Equipped with an ability to redistribute resources, discipline beneficiaries, and engage in discourse, the welfare state can set the nation apart as a "sociological organism"[77] in several ways. First, it can draw internal boundaries and structure social space. Second, it can subdue social dissent. Third, it can dispel the threat of cultural vacuity, and finally, it can imbue national belonging with moral substance. All these functions require different forms of integration.

Welfare structures social space when it distributes social rights unevenly across a population, integrating different beneficiaries into different roles. Despite the traditional

70 Loïc Wacquant, *Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), 4, https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822392255.
71 Loïc Wacquant, "Crafting the Neoliberal State: Workfare, Prisonfare, and Social Insecurity," *Sociological Forum* 25, no 2 (June 2010): 202, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1573-7861.2010.01173.x.
72 Wacquant, *Punishing the Poor*, 17.
73 Fraser, *Evolution of the British Welfare State*, 8.
74 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*, 39.
75 Meghji, *The Racialized Social System*, 32.
76 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*, 40.
77 Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 26.

view that it "flatten[s]" the "pyramid of social stratification,"[78] Esping-Andersen aptly argues that the welfare state is "not just a mechanism that intervenes in, and possibly corrects, the structure of inequality," but also, "in its own right, a system of stratification."[79] To this end he documents variations with which welfare states accomplish de-commodification, or decoupling individual standards of living from the market.[80] Building on prior attempts to classify welfare systems,[81] he then identifies three distinct models. Not only does each differ in its de-commodifying capacity, but it also privileges different classes of potential beneficiaries over others. The 'Bismarckian' conservative regime of France and Germany entrenches existing status differentials in the labour market, in particular offering unique status to the salaried industrial worker.[82] The liberal regime of Anglo-Saxon countries privileges market actors and consigns the needy to stigmatised, means-tested assistance programmes, while the generous universal schemes of social-democratic regimes in Scandinavia grant social rights more evenly.

Welfare states of all types are often accused of strengthening pre-existing internal boundaries. Feminist scholars have argued that social policies "reflect and reinforce relations of dominance and exploitation" between genders.[83] For instance, women are often granted entitlements by virtue of their dependent status as wives and mothers. This strengthens a patriarchal division of labour. Moreover, in all welfare states that Orloff studied, welfare claims based on motherhood or marriage were associated with lower benefit levels than employment-based claims,[84] reinforcing gendered income inequalities. Lewis argues that in 'strong' male-breadwinner states like Britain this effect is greater than in 'moderate' or 'weak' male breadwinner states like France and Sweden respectively.[85] Equally, Lieberman interpreted his findings (see 1.2.1) as evidence that "the institutions of American social policy have reflected and transmitted the particular historical configurations of race relations."[86] More recently, van Staalduinen has shown how social investment policies supply immigrants with skills sufficient only for jobs in secondary labour markets and stunt their opportunities to acquire the socio-cultural resources necessary for upward mobility in knowledge economies (see 1.3.2).[87]

Besides structuring social space, welfare states can also soften dissent, usually by directing a beneficiary into an advantageous segment of the labour market or other institutional hierarchy. The possibility of "sidestepping a threat of major reform" by granting modest welfare to the working classes is the lifeblood of statist perspectives.[88] The implication is that poverty is not just distasteful, but dangerous.[89] The empirical record has furnished some persuasive examples.

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78 Richard M Titmuss, *Essays on the Welfare State* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1958), 52.
79 Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, 23.
80 Esping-Andersen, 21.
81 Titmuss, *Essays on the Welfare State*.
82 Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, 61.
83 Ann Shola Orloff, "Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship: The Comparative Analysis of Gender Relations and Welfare States," *American Sociological Review* 58, no 3 (June 1993): 305, https://doi.org/10.2307/2095903.
84 Orloff, 315.
85 Jane Lewis, "Gender and the Development of Welfare Regimes," *Journal of European Social Policy* 2, no 3 (August 1992): 159–73, https://doi.org/10.1177/095892879200200301.
86 Lieberman, *Shifting the Color Line*, 13.
87 van Staalduinen, "Ethnic Inequality in the Welfare State."
88 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*, 39.
89 Anderson, *Us and Them?*, 20.

Bismarck's pioneering social insurance schemes in the late nineteenth century were famously reactionary, motivated by the perceived need to suppress social unrest.[90] Fraser calls this an overt "policy of killing socialism by kindness" and "social insurance not just in the actuarial sense but literally as an insurance for society against revolution."[91] More recently, Valat has argued that the social security regime in France was not designed only to improve the material condition of workers, but also to create a "new social order" in which workers would no longer suffer from an "inferiority complex" and would gain a sense of self-sufficiency.[92]

Meanwhile the potential for the welfare state to contribute to national integrity in a third, *cultural* sense stems from its disciplinary potential. Scholars of the statist persuasion have paid attention to the propensity of welfare to instil work ethic,[93] be it through the custodial institution of the workhouse (also called *indoor relief*), indirect coercion through domestic visits or through the benefit conditionality associated with modern "workfare" reforms. Work ethic is not the only norm that welfare is capable of inculcating. Manow and Palier have shown that social legislation in late nineteenth century France transmitted secular values to mothers, children, and the needy by supplanting religious care in a Third Republic deeply divided by a secular-confessional divide.[94] Welfare institutions may also promote civic integration, which is the process of ingraining in immigrants "citizen-like" or civic skills, like speaking the language of the host country, understanding its history, culture, and rules, and embodying its values.[95] As Goodman argues, civic integration tests as a means of gatekeeping nationality is a novel phenomenon, but also only the most recent articulation of a long-standing concern with the cultural fabric of national membership.[96] As gatekeeper of access to material benefits, the welfare state is particularly well-positioned to instil cultural norms associated with the "Good Citizen," although the conditions under which it does so are under-examined.

Finally, the welfare state can alter a nation's moral fabric in the eyes of its members by making the nation and its members look virtuous. Schneider and Ingram show how policy discourse shapes public perceptions of target populations: the people whose behaviour is linked to the achievement of a policy's intended end.[97] They argue that policies associate different images, cultural characterisations and descriptive terms with different target populations. These images "send messages" containing all kinds of moral blueprints, including about "what government is supposed to do, which citizens are deserving (and which not), and what kinds of attitudes and participatory patterns are appropriate in a democratic society."[98] This both

90 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*, 3.
91 Fraser, *Evolution of the British Welfare State*, 8.
92 Bruno Valat, "Les Retraites et La Création de La Sécurité Sociale En 1945 : Révolution Ou Restauration?," *Revue d'Histoire de La Protection Sociale* 1, no 13 (2020): 49.
93 Piven and Cloward, *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare*.
94 Philip Manow and Bruno Palier, "A Conservative Welfare State Regime without Christian Democracy? The French État-Providence, 1880–1960," in *Religion, Class Coalitions, and Welfare States*, ed Kees van Kersbergen and Philip Manow, Cambridge Studies in Social Theory, Religion and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 150, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511626784.007.
95 Goodman, *Immigration and Membership Politics in Western Europe*, 1.
96 Goodman, 30.
97 Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram, "Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy," *The American Political Science Review* 87, no 2 (June 1993): 335.
98 Schneider and Ingram, 334.

justifies the social structure that the welfare state has helped create, and gives shape to the notion of the "Good Citizen" in collective consciousness. In this sense, the welfare state is no different from any other policy domain. Institutions charged with making economic or climate policy equally depict target populations in a value-laden light. However, the welfare state does stand apart for the straightforward and obvious way in which it *rewards* those whom it depicts as deserving. This allows it to portray the nation as morally upstanding.

The likelihood that a welfare state will end up performing any or all of the aforementioned functions is an open empirical question. There are limits to the kind of cultural change that the welfare state can achieve; Kremer argues, for example, that changes in women's employment and care patterns across time and space derive more from women's own work-life preferences than they do from social policy.[99] These functions should thus be viewed as possibilities to be tapped – to varying degrees of success – in certain times and places.

Additionally, some clarity is needed on the exact way in which elites relate to these functions. Fraser's characterisation of the statist perspective as "conspiratorial"[100] betrays a widespread belief that statist scholars imagine ruling elites as nefariously colluding behind closed doors against the ruled. However, as I elaborate later (3.3.3), I do not assume that the "conscious intentions" of social or political actors are the "ultimate explanation of their activity."[101] Instead, elites can be expected to interact with their own social (bureaucratic) environment in an indeterminate manner, shaped partly by conscious intentions and self-interest, partly by a less conscious, practical sense of how they ought to behave or what ought to be done. Accordingly, Foucault saw state discipline as flowing not from conspiratorial intent but from "gradual, piecemeal, but continuous takeover by the state of a number of practices, ways of doing things."[102] This interpretation is entirely compatible with the notion of *raison d'état* as developed in 17th century international law.[103] I am particularly interested in the descriptive (and not normative) slant of *raison d'état,* namely, in its implication that the preservation and survival of the state takes precedence over other political considerations. In this vein, raison d'etat relies on the assumption that there is a "dimension of political reality and action which escapes the ordinary understanding of subjects."[104] In other words, the action of the political agent is subject to influences outside of their own conscience but deeply connected to their context.

99 Monique Kremer, *How Welfare States Care: Culture, Gender and Parenting in Europe* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007), 20.

100 Fraser, *Evolution of the British Welfare State*, 7.

101 Will Atkinson, *Bourdieu and after: A Guide to Relational Phenomenology* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2020), 59.

102 Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-79*, ed Michel Senellart, trans Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 77.

103 Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan, *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics*, 3rd ed (Oxford University Press, 2009), https://doi.org/10.1093/acref/9780199207800.001.0001.

104 Yves Charles Zarka, "Qu'est-Ce Que La Raison d'État?," *Cités* 2, no 94 (2023): 3–8.

2.4. Understanding inclusion

2.4.1. Two dimensions of inclusion

The debate about why states extend welfare - which is long-standing[105] - can be linked to the outcomes that follow from their decisions to do so. Social policy decisions affect the distribution of resources and power and result in several possible outcomes, the variation of which a simple dichotomy between inclusion and exclusion does a poor job at capturing.[106]

Here, I assess inclusion in the sphere of justice by locating an individual's social rights along two dimensions, both measured with a qualitative research design that I outline in chapter 3. The *Marshall dimension* refers to how much someone received, nodding to Marshall's definition of social rights as "the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society."[107] The Marshall dimension is predicated on both *formal rights* - the amount of in-kind or financial assistance to which someone is entitled - and *substantive rights* - the extent to which these entitlements genuinely deliver a higher standard of living to the beneficiary. The *Somers dimension*, meanwhile, relates to the *character* of inclusion, building on Somers' definition of social inclusion as "the right to recognition by others as a moral equal treated by the same standards and values and due the same level of respect and dignity as all other members."[108] I argue that one, but by no means the only, way of ascertaining whether the Somers criterion has been met is by assessing the dignity of the welfare to which someone has access, inspired by research on the same.

I reserve exclusion only for those cases to whom no formal rights are awarded in the domain of social legislation. I interpret this in one of two ways. First, the beneficiary might be excluded from the distributive community, *even though* some form of access to the underlying political community (through formal rights in the domain of immigration or citizenship law, for example) is granted. The *kafala* (sponsorship) system for migrants in the oil-rich Gulf Cooperation Council states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) points in this direction.[109] Gulf states have admitted growing numbers of labour migrants to national territory since the dramatic increases in oil prices of the 1970s, but have effectively offered no access to national welfare, as full responsibility for the migrant falls on the *kafeel* (sponsor) in the private sphere.[110] Alternatively, the beneficiary might be excluded from the distributive community because they could not pass through external boundaries that govern closure of the nation in which the welfare state is embedded. This could happen through immigration or citizenship law.

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105 for a review of the literature see Theda Skocpol and Edwin Amenta, "States and Social Policies," *Annual Review of Sociology* 12 (1986): 131–57.

106 Hammar, "State, Nation, and Dual Citizenship."

107 Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class: And Other Essays*, 11.

108 Somers, *Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness and the Right to Have Rights*, 6.

109 Ruhs, *The Price of Rights*, 98.

110 Ruhs, 97.

2.4.2. Amount of welfare – the Marshall dimension

2.4.2.1. Formal rights

The amount of assistance a (potential) beneficiary receives is partly a function of their formal status under several intersecting policies in social, citizenship, and immigration legislation. For example, right of entry into national territory has historically been a necessary condition for inclusion. In several different historical contexts, usually when accompanied by administrative proof of residence,[111] it was even sufficient. Needy foreigners were entitled to assistance under the 1834 poor law in England[112] and its 1854 Dutch counterpart.[113] Inter-war schemes in the UK manifestly included all residents, as did the National Insurance Act, which explicitly made "no distinction on grounds of nationality."[114] In this light, many foreign residents acquire social rights before citizenship rights.[115] Non-citizens may also receive targeted social rights in the field of language and skills training or subsidised housing.[116] The extent to which entry rights suffice for social rights varies. Cross-national comparison using 2014 data from 27 rich democracies shows that left-wing cabinets are less inclined to make social protection schemes available to immigrants and welfare states with an overall high level of generosity tend to provide more generous access.[117]

Citizenship or nationality legislation also has a bearing on inclusion.[118] Arendt famously defined citizenship as the "right to have rights."[119] Many have nuanced this perspective, noting, for example, that internal surveillance practices have eroded rights to privacy and freedom,[120] or that the conditioning of rights on working practices amounts to a market fundamentalism that violates the integrity of the state-citizen relationship.[121] Nonetheless, some observers are still adamant that national membership is the "human association that trumps all others,"[122]

111 Cecilia Bruzelius, "Freedom of Movement, Social Rights and Residence-Based Conditionality in the European Union," *Journal of European Social Policy* 29, no 1 (February 1, 2019): 70–83, https://doi.org/10.1177/0958928718756262.

112 This referred however to interparish migrants as parishes were the centre of political life; David Feldman, "Migrants, Immigrants and Welfare from the Old Poor Law to the Welfare State," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 13 (2003): 92.

113 Inventory of the archives of *Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken: Afdeling Armwezen, (1866) 1918-1947 (1966)* 2.04.55. Nationaal Archief, Den Haag. 2020.

114 Feldman, "Migrants, Immigrants and Welfare from the Old Poor Law to the Welfare State," 96.

115 Hammar, *European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study*, 55.

116 Hammar, *European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study*; Kalm and Lindvall, "Immigration Policy and the Modern Welfare State, 1880-1920," 465.

117 Carina Schmitt and Céline Teney, "Access to General Social Protection for Immigrants in Advanced Democracies," *Journal of European Social Policy* 29, no 1 (February 1, 2019): 45, https://doi.org/10.1177/0958928718768365.

118 Here, I use citizenship and nationality interchangeably; however, they have distinct meanings. Nationality tends to be used more frequently in international law and refers to a legal bond between an individual and a state, whereas citizenship (and translations thereof) is more frequent in domestic law and refer more to political membership in a state. Barbara von Rütte, "Citizenship and Nationality: Terms, Concepts and Rights," in *The Human Right to Citizenship* (Brill Nijhoff, 2022), 11–57, https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004517523_003.

119 Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (San Diego, New York, London: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1976), 296.

120 Longo, *The Politics of Borders: Sovereignty, Security and the Citizen after 9/11*, 42.

121 Somers, *Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness and the Right to Have Rights*, 23.

122 Christian Joppke, *Citizenship and Immigration* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2010), 23.

and at a basic level, it has historically granted the right to enter, exit, and settle the country[123] as well as access to social schemes conditional on citizenship. Only "British subjects" were eligible for pensions under the 1908 Old Age Pensions Act.[124] From the 1880s onward France used the nationality criterion ever more frequently to determine eligibility to social assistance, with decrees from Paris in 1895 and 1896 explicitly reserving long-term care for the sick, disabled and elderly to French nationals.[125] All in all, Sainsbury concludes that, "the best bellwether of inclusion or exclusion is the ease of difficulties of immigrants becoming citizens."[126]

Finally, social legislation that introduces and regulates welfare programmes or private providers thereof often stipulates its own criteria for eligibility and benefit levels. In France, the 1945 Social Security Code (*Le Code de la sécurité sociale*) extended coverage to contributing employees as well as select non-contributors like students, retirees, and unemployed members of the workforce.[127] In the UK, the 1946 National Insurance Act included married working women, although offered them lower rates of benefit than men for the same contributions, and excluded divorcées whose marriage had ended "through [their own] fault" or "with [their own] consent."[128] Thus, social, nationality and immigration law are all relevant for the legal entitlement to rights. In principle these laws belong to distinct policy areas but, in practice, they are often determined jointly,[129] as, for instance, citizenship rights are restricted to make entry and residence more difficult[130] or social rights are reigned in to make entry and residence less costly.[131] Assessing inclusion therefore involves attending to all three policy domains in tandem.

2.4.2.2. Substantive rights

Legal inclusion does not guarantee an acceptable standard of living as per Marshall's definition. Morissens and Sainsbury distinguish between *formal* and *substantive* social rights, with the former representing legal entitlements and the latter operationalised as veritable material gains from programme participation.[132] They assess the latter by comparing the economic situation of households before and after transfers and taxes, using market income and disposable income as proxies.[133] The authors find that, across six rich democracies, citizens are more likely to be above the poverty line than foreigners and, if not, more likely to be lifted above the poverty line from welfare transfers.[134]

123 Bruzelius, "Freedom of Movement, Social Rights and Residence-Based Conditionality in the European Union."
124 El-Enany, *Bordering Britain*, 70.
125 Alexandre Afonso, *Welfare States, Closed Borders: Welfare Protection and Birth of Immigration Control in Western Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Forthcoming).
126 Sainsbury and Morissens, "Immigrants' Social Rights across Welfare States," 262.
127 Valat, "Les Retraites et La Création de La Sécurité Sociale En 1945 : Révolution Ou Restauration?"
128 Sylvie Pierce, "Single Mothers and the Concept of Female Dependency in the Development of the Welfare State in Britain," *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* 11, no 1 (Winter 1980): 69.
129 Kalm and Lindvall, "Immigration Policy and the Modern Welfare State, 1880-1920," 463.
130 Christian Joppke, *Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
131 Ruhs, *The Price of Rights*.
132 Sainsbury, *Welfare States and Immigrant Rights*, 22.
133 Sainsbury and Morissens, "Immigrants' Social Rights across Welfare States," 118.
134 Sainsbury and Morissens, 121.

That formal rights do not translate seamlessly into substantive rights is also obvious from benefit claims data. In 2003, only 68 per cent of those eligible for a supplementary transfer in the Netherlands (*aanvullende bijstand*) claimed it.[135] In France, depending on the scheme, up to one third of potential beneficiaries do not receive the rights to which they are entitled.[136] A 2023 report by a UK-based policy think tank estimated the total amount of unclaimed income-related benefits and social tariffs at £18.7 billion a year.[137] When a household or individual receives less than that to which they are entitled, it is usually described as an issue of *take-up.*[138] This framing is imperfect as it implies responsibility is the client's alone. Certainly, clients may fear stigmatisation or have moral qualms with asking for help.[139] However, research into (non) take-up has also highlighted several potential informal barriers to accessing social rights that operate not at the level of the specific scheme or the welfare administration.[140] Schemes may be governed by dense rules and guidelines that are difficult to interpret, or poorly advertised. Claims may be handled in a humiliating or degrading way and street-level bureaucrats may use their discretion to discriminatory ends.[141] This could explain why we see group-level inequalities even where take-up is high.[142]

Informal barriers therefore matter for inclusion. The qualitative researcher can evaluate the service provider's efforts to inform potential clients of their rights, assess the extent of discretion available to local-level officials, look for evidence of how that discretion was used, and consider the administrative rules of the claiming process. Illustrative is Lieberman's discussion of the 1935 Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) (see 1.2.1). Lieberman attributed the substantial racial discrimination he found not to differences in formal entitlements, but to informal barriers and opportunities for discrimination. For example, claiming ADC required an entitled person to enter a county hall, where domestic workers would need to request assistance from someone likely to be related to a member of the rich white planter class for whom they worked.[143]

2.4.3. Character of welfare - the Somers dimension

I am interested not only in inclusion under specific schemes, but in the character of that inclusion in relation to basic human needs and values, like belonging. At the macro-level,

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135 Michael Fuchs et al., "Falling through the Social Safety Net? Analysing Non-Take-up of Minimum Income Benefit and Monetary Social Assistance in Austria," *Social Policy & Administration* 54, no 5 (2020): 831, https://doi.org/10.1111/spol.12581.

136 Vie Publique, "Prestations Sociales: Le Manque d'information, Principale Cause de Non-Recours," April 20, 2023, https://www.vie-publique.fr/en-bref/289086-prestations-sociales-quelles-sont-les-causes-de-non-recours.

137 Alex Clegg et al., "Missing out: £19 Billion of Support Goes Unclaimed Each Year" (London: Policy in Practice, 2023).

138 Wonsik Ko and Robert A Moffitt, "Take-up of Social Benefits," IZA DP (Institute of Labor Economics, June 2022).

139 Lilian Linders, "De Betekenis van Nabijheid: Een Onderzoek Naar Informele Zorg in Een Volksbuurt." (Tilburg, Tilburg University, 2010).

140 Wim van Oorschot, "Non-Take-up of Social Security Benefits in Europe," *Journal of European Social Policy* 1, no 15 (1991): 19.

141 van Oorschot, 20.

142 Sainsbury and Morissens, 121.

143 Lieberman, *Shifting the Color Line*, p.136.

Esping-Andersen's de-commodification index[144] goes some way toward fleshing out what a metric for the quality of social rights might look like. Ultimately, his yardstick still focuses on benefit levels, relying on proxies for benefit generosity and equality that included average replacement rates of different schemes, as well as the differential between the basic and maximum benefit levels of a given programme. Taking seriously Somers' conceptualisation of social inclusion requires additionally engaging with less (obviously) material aspects of welfare provision.

Table 1. Metrics to evaluate the dignity of a welfare system.[145]

Criteria	Metric
Accommodation of physical needs	Benefit levels Maximum period of entitlement Affordable or free access to in-kind assistance like health care or housing
Accommodation of psychological needs	Nature of application and claims procedures Preservation of privacy Social worker training
Capacity of recipients to fulfil care duties	Protection of parents' ability to provide for the health and education of their children Access of children to social activities
Social integration	Public image of claimants Their participation in social and cultural life
Human learning and development	Extent of (subsidised) education or training Encouragement of entrepreneurship
Self-determination and participation	Participation of claimants (or their representatives) in decision-making processes surrounding their benefits Right to appeal Freedom from compulsory duties (e.g. meeting with welfare staff, community work, or job training)
Equal value	Levels of benefits and development opportunities across different (types or groups of) claimants Discretion granted to local officials

Recent scholarship has unpacked the meaning of dignity in social policy. Demonstrating how to move beyond expenditure alone in the evaluation of welfare states, Chan and Bowpitt assess the extent to which Chinese, Hong Kong, Swedish, and British welfare systems safeguard the dignity of welfare recipients.[146] They start by conceptualising human dignity as a function of

144 Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, 21.
145 Adapted from Chan and Bowpitt, *Human Dignity and Welfare Systems*, 29.
146 Chak Kwan Chan and Graham Bowpitt, *Human Dignity and Welfare Systems* (Bristol: Policy Press, 2022), 6.

autonomy and mutuality. While autonomy focuses on the capacity for choice, "competence, control and achievement,"[147] mutuality refers to the interdependent and supportive social relationships through which humans satisfy our physical and psychological needs and develop our capacities.[148] These relationships involve fulfilling duties in family and society and participating in social life. This is in line with Kremer's proposal to consider the importance of the right both to give and receive care.[149] Consequently, they evaluate their four case studies with reference to seven criteria which I outline in Table 1.

These metrics facilitate more rigorous analysis of immaterial dimensions that are integral to the character of welfare. In this study, I assume that "accommodation of physical needs" is taken care of by the Marshall dimension, and that "equal value" can only be assessed through comparative research. I pay attention to the remaining indicators, during within-case analysis considering the extent to which welfare accommodates physical and psychological needs, protects its recipients' capacity to fulfil care duties, contributes to social integration, encourages human learning and development, and enshrines self-determination. Analysis of this nature is necessarily subjective, but I underpin my evaluation with as much transparency as possible, providing details of administrative procedures accompanying programmes where available.

2.4.4. Ideal-types of inclusion

Taken together, variation along the two dimensions I have outlined above produces drastically different welfare systems. Perfectly quantising either the Marshall or the Somers dimension is impossible without compromising on the complexity and depth of research it engenders. Nonetheless, over-simplification occasionally yields important insights. For this reason, the below table imagines four different forms that welfare could take, assuming that scores on both the Marshall and Somers dimensions are dichotomised. I imagine that the amount of welfare that someone receives, accounting for both formal and substantive rights, could be low or high relative either to the local population or to what might be warranted in terms of policy effectiveness.[150] Meanwhile, although Chan and Bowpitt elaborate on several different components of dignified welfare provisions, autonomy and mutuality are the key principles from which the other components of the Somers dimension are derived. Autonomy is associated with self-determination, freedom, and choice while mutuality refers to the possibility to develop supportive relationships.[151] Welfare characterised by very little dignity scores low on the Somers dimension, and vice versa. If we assume that this captures the possible variation, then at least four archetypical ways emerge in which the welfare state can interact with potential beneficiaries. Note that all quadrants represent gradients of inclusion in the distributive community rather than exclusion. I do not expect any of these four quadrants to perfectly correspond with empirical reality. They rather offer conceptual searchlights, in whose gleam pertinent aspects of redistributive boundaries and/or features of variation come into focus.

147 Granerud and Severinsson in Chan and Bowpitt, 22.
148 Chan and Bowpitt, 22.
149 Kremer, *How Welfare States Care: Culture, Gender and Parenting in Europe*.
150 Schneider and Ingram, "Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy," 337.
151 Chan and Bowpitt, *Human Dignity and Welfare Systems*, 22.

Table 2. Ideal types depicting different forms of welfare according to variation on the Marshall and Somers dimensions

		Amount	
		Low	**High**
Dignity	**Low**	Ghettoisation	Paternalism
	High	Symbolic empathy	Hyper-assimilation

Under this model, a recipient who encounters *hyper-assimilationist* welfare will enjoy a secure legal status and entitlement to welfare that surpasses either the generosity toward the average citizen or the level that might be warranted given the organising principles of the welfare state (for example, need or occupation). These entitlements will translate into actual material gains because outreach programmes will encourage take-up and for beneficiaries to "utilise the policy opportunities the have been made available."[152] The provisions themselves protect autonomy and mutuality in at least one of several ways. They might, for instance, allow recipients to participate in the decision-making processes surrounding their benefits (for example determining what kind of employment they are interested in seeking) or protect their capacity to care for their dependents. When there are conditions associated with the receipt of benefits, the recipients might be encouraged rather than forced, so that they "learn about the results of [their] behaviour and take appropriate action on a voluntary basis."[153] Their participation in social and cultural life will be stimulated and their use of welfare will be accepted.

Meanwhile, the beneficiary of *paternalist* welfare might find themselves entitled to equally generous entitlements in relative, quantitative terms, and will likely find these rights realised. However, their rights do not translate into autonomy or mutuality. Paternalism is defined as a "system under which an authority undertakes to supply needs or regulate conduct of those under its control,"[154] and in this stylised ideal-type, we assume that needs are supplied *and* conduct is regulated. Accessing welfare might require relinquishing control over key decisions (such as place of residence or occupation) as well as privacy. Their family and personal life may be subject to scrutiny, and their ability to care for their dependents might be infringed upon. They might suffer humiliation or other psychological harm due to laborious application procedures and means testing or social stigma associated with benefit use.

In the upper left quadrant is *ghettoisation*, which Meghji has described as the combination of physical segregation and intense surveillance.[155] Recipients that are included in the welfare state through ghettoisation will receive a "modicum of economic welfare and security,"[156] but not much more. Their basic physical needs, such as the right to food and shelter, will likely be met, but in ways that compromise their psychological well-being by restricting their freedom,

152 Schneider and Ingram, "Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy," 339.
153 Schneider and Ingram, 339.
154 Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, "Paternalism," October 28, 2023, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/paternalism.
155 Meghji, *The Racialized Social System*, 77.
156 Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class: And Other Essays*, 11.

mobility, and ability to fulfil care duties. Alternatively the rights which would meet basic physical needs may be conditioned on performance. Goffman's concept of the total institution as a place where "like-situated individuals [are] cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time [and] together lead an enclosed formally administered round of life" comes to mind.[157] Goffman saw total institutions as "machines" designed to meticulously and effectively produce a specific outcome.[158] Foucault would add that this outcome was achieved by "acting with precision upon individual subjects."[159] Notably, staff in total institutions view "the unique aspects of people as *material to work on*."[160] Workhouses, 'internal colonies' and correctional facilities fall into this category.

In the lower left quadrant of *symbolic empathy*, welfare provisions will be similarly residual or even less so, if the hypothetical recipients can meet their physical needs via the market. However, the provisions to which the recipient *does* have access enjoy a positive public image, preserve freedom of choice, and sidestep conditionality requirements that could be perceived as punitive, disciplinary or coercive.

2.5. Explaining inclusion

2.5.1. Building blocks

2.5.1.1. Ideology

The conditions under which someone ends up in one quadrant or another have to do with the role they are assigned in dominant ideology. Ideology is a set of conceptual schemes or heuristic devices that helps agents process and understand the reality they experience.[161] Research in psychology suggests that social agents find such devices useful. As Kahneman infamously argued, social behaviour stems from fast *and* slow thinking, i.e. both automatic, impulsive and subconscious thought (System 1), as well as deliberate, conscious reflection (System 2).[162] System 1 thinking exists due to what others have called the "law of less work,"[163] that is, the idea that humans gravitate toward the least demanding - in both cognitive and physical - course of action.[164] Interpretive shortcuts enable fast thinking. As Hall puts it, ideology provides a "way of economising in the face of excess or imperfect information."[165]

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157 cited in Christie Davies, "Goffman's Concept of the Total Institution: Criticisms and Revisions," *Human Studies*, Goffman's Sociology, 12, no 1/2 (1989): 77.

158 Tom Burns, *Erving Goffman* (London, New York: Routledge, 1992), 157.

159 Michel Foucault, "Prison Talk," in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham and Kate Soper, eds. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 40.

160 Burns, 157.

161 Meghji, *The Racialized Social System*, 57; Fields and Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*, 134.

162 Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011).

163 Wouter Kool et al., "Decision Making and the Avoidance of Cognitive Demand," *Journal of Experimental Psychology General* 139, no 4 (November 2010): 665–82, https://doi.org/10.1037/a0020198.

164 Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 35.

165 Peter A Hall, *The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), 100.

Ideology typically contains several components, including, but not limited to, ontological assumptions, narratives (in turn containing both conflict and characters), and normative judgments or values. It thus contains both "cognitive" and "moral content."[166]Ontological assumptions are those concerning how the world works and the stuff of which it is made.[167] Different ideologies tend to be associated with different ontologies. For example, while liberal ideologies consider freedom to be the *type of thing* which an individual might possess or lack, socialist ideologies will be more inclined to view it as *the type of thing* which characterises a collective condition.[168] These assumptions frame the perceptions and explanations of contemporaries. The reformer, Martin Luther, could explain his mother's asthma with the evil eye of a neighbour only because his worldview included "took for granted the existence of an active, well-populated invisible realm [of sorcery]."[169]

Table 3. Components of ideologies

Features	Type
Ontologies	Cognitive
Narrative (including a conflict and characters)	Cognitive
Values	Moral

Besides ontological assumptions, ideology is also likely to involve stringing together, or (again) articulating, several different components into a "chain of meanings."[170] Lévi-Strauss and Said have explained this with reference to the mind's need for order, which it achieves "by discriminating and taking note of everything, placing everything of which the mind is aware in a secure, refundable place, therefore giving things some role to play in the economy of objects … that make up an environment."[171] All cultures, Said argues, "impose [such] corrections upon raw reality."[172]

One way of understanding this chain of meanings is as a narrative, which consists of a conflict and a set of stock characters. While the conflict refers to a specific problem that is highlighted and the outline of its potential solution, the characters are abstract figures that relate to the problem in a specific way. Hall's work on the "moral panic" of post-war Britain is exemplary.[173] By the mid-1960s, Hall argues, the material conditions of British society

166 Fields and Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*, 202.
167 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics*, The New International Relations Series (London and New York: Routledge, 2011); Peter A Hall, "Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Research," in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, ed James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
168 Stuart Hall, "The Whites of Their Eyes," in *Selected Writings on Race and Difference*, ed Paul Gilroy and Ruth Wilson Gilmore (1981; repr., Durham: Duke University Press, 2021), 100.
169 Fields and Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*, 21.
170 Hall, "The Whites of Their Eyes," 100.
171 Edward Said, "Imaginative Geography and Its Representations," in *Race Critical Theories*, ed Philomena Essed and David Theo Goldberg (1978; repr., Malden and Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 19.
172 Said, 30.
173 Hall, "Race and 'Moral Panics' in Post-war Britain."

were marked by instability as economic growth slowed down. In this context, the central social conflict could have been described in several ways. For example, one narrative could have foregrounded the character of the *teenager* - which had only recently emerged as a "self-conscious generational grouping" - and depicted the central conflict as the teenager's affinity for going out, dating, dancing and leisure, their subsequent contribution to political unrest and their potential to undermine the traditional sources of social authority.[174] However, instead, a narrative of racial conflict took hold, for reasons that I discuss later (2.5.1.2).

Finally, ideologies will likely be associated with a set of values. Taylor has argued that any framework designed to present or produce knowledge "secrete[s] a certain value framework"; that any theoretical "map" of an empirical terrain inevitably has "its own built-in value-slope."[175] This is because any framework, as value-neutral as it may claim to be, describes phenomena by classifying them according to certain dimensions of variation.[176] These dimensions are always linked in some way to a "given conception of human needs, wants, and purposes."[177] For example, Lipset's typology of political regimes distinguishes democracies and autocracies by their score on variables like peace, liberty and representativeness. In so doing, the typology intrinsically presents democracies as more valuable than oligarchies and autocracies, because "obviously a society with the above characteristics is preferable to one without … because of the clear relation in which it stands to men's [*sic*] wants and needs."[178]

I argue that the ontologies and narratives contained within a given ideology are subject to the exact same constraints. No ontological assumption and no description of a conflict or character is possible without situating it along a given dimension of variation. These will necessarily be value-laden, and the researcher interested in social explanation will be well-served by attempting to recover underlying moral content. This is not a trivial task, as dominant ideologies, by their nature, operate beneath our consciousness.[179]

174 Stuart Hall, "The Young Englanders," in *Selected Writings on Race and Difference*, ed Paul Gilroy and Ruth Wilson Gilmore (1967; repr., Durham: Duke University Press, 2021), 42–50.

175 Charles Taylor, "Neutrality in Political Science," in *Philosophy and the Human Sciences*, vol II, Philosophical Papers (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 73.

176 To understand why this is the case requires a deeper foray into post-structuralism than I permit myself to indulge in full. The essence, however, is that in order to communicate, humans make use of signs, where abstract *signifiers* (like the word, 'laptop,' or a drawing thereof) stand in for concrete *signified* objects (like a specific small, portable computer with a screen and keyboard). Signifiers, for post-structuralists at least, are always relational; tied only loosely to the signified to which they are supposed to point, and tied much more meaningfully to *other signifiers*. For example, the meaning of the word *laptop* depends more on the meaning of words like *computer* or *tablet* than it does on its constituent materials. What matters most for its meaning is where the word *laptop* falls on a scale of "portability" vis-à-vis the signifier *computer*, or "functionality" vis-à-vis the tablet. It is much harder to admit a whirring, desk-bound machine without a keyboard into the ranks of 'laptop' than it is to admit a small, portable computer with a keyboard made out of glass. For more see Jacques Derrida, "Modern Criticism and Theory; a Reader," in *Structure, Sign and Play*, ed David Lodge (1966; repr., London, New York: Longman, 1988), 107–23..

177 Taylor, "Neutrality in Political Science," 75.

178 Taylor, 77.

179 Stuart Hall, "Gramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity," in *Selected Writings on Race and Difference*, ed Paul Gilroy and Ruth Wilson Gilmore (1986; repr., Durham: Duke University Press, 2021), 324.

2.5.1.2. Contestation

At any given time, a plurality of interpretations is possible. This diversity was of great interest to the Sardinian revolutionary Antonio Gramsci. For Gramsci, material conditions delimit and constrain ideological imaginations, creating a "terrain more favourable to the dissemination of certain modes of thought" as opposed to others.[180] However, nothing is inevitable. For their dissemination, each ideology requires an agent who will mobilise, transmit and activate it, through, for instance, emotional appeals.[181] State and non-state actors will use whatever arena is at their disposal, be it at subnational, national or international levels, formal or informal, democratic or otherwise, to express and activate their ideological persuasions. Hall places special emphasis on the media as an arena for this expression, arguing that its remit is the "production and transformation of ideologies."[182]

Expressing ideologies almost always leads to contestation, since most ideologies contain incompatible ontological assumptions, narrative structures, and normative positions. Gramsci invoked the term *hegemony* to depict a form of ideological settlement in which there is some degree of unification across different modes of production and thought.[183] Such unification entails ideological leadership, but rarely, if ever, the complete domination of one ideology over another.[184] For this reason, hegemony can be viewed as an unstable and temporary condition in a persistent struggle of ideas. Therefore, Hall suggests that analysing ideology starts with viewing it as a "differentiated terrain" of "discursive currents" whose "points of puncture and break, and the relations of power between them" ultimately determine the nature of thought at any given time.[185]

The conditions under which one, several, or an alliance of ideologies come to (provisionally) prevail is worthy of greater scrutiny. The agents acting as the ideology's transmission belt are critical. Of particular importance is their position within the overall division of labour and (capital) ownership. For Fields and Fields, racial doctrine would not have been as impactful "if the slaveholders had produced white supremacy without producing cotton,"[186] suggesting that the ideological dominance of white supremacy hinged on the economic power of slaveholders. An ideology's logical and formal coherence also matters, as does its ability to align with the "practical, everyday consciousness" of the masses.[187]

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180 cited in Hall, 304.
181 Meghji, *The Racialized Social System*, 63.
182 Hall, "The Whites of Their Eyes," 100.
183 Hall, "Gramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity," 324.
184 Stuart Hall, "Race, Articulation and Societies Structured in Dominance," in *Selected Writings on Race and Difference*, ed Paul Gilroy and Ruth Wilson Gilmore (1980; repr., Durham: Duke University Press, 2021), 228.
185 In Marxist thought, this differentiated terrain is called the superstructure - the ideological consciousness suspended over the material conditions of a given time and place. Hall, "Gramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity," 320.
186 Fields and Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*, 138.
187 Hall, "Gramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity," 317.

Table 4. Characteristics of a dominant ideology

Internally coherent
Transmitted by powerful agents
Complements existing ideas
Produces a classificatory schema that sustains or promotes economic order

In this way, the popularity of Catholic doctrine is at least partly attributable to its aptitude for organising mutually complementary ideas, and for generating hierarchies that slotted easily into cultural life and common sense.[188] Similarly, Afonso explores why Switzerland and Sweden adopted two different strategies despite facing the same labour shortages in the 1970s.[189] While Switzerland opted to recruit guestworkers, Sweden increased the number of women in the workforce. Afonso argues that this was due at least in part to prevalent gender norms in Switzerland, which mounted resistance to female employment, alongside the weakness of the Swiss labour movement, which was less able to resist recourse to foreign labour.[190]

Finally, in the previous section I called attention to the way that ideology is involved in sorting various components, including people, into a "chain of meanings."[191] Its success will be shaped by its ability to perform this classificatory function in a way that sustains or justifies a mode of production. Hall argues that actors "speak through" ideology to assign individuals or groups specific roles. For example, Thatcher spoke through free-market conservatism to position the worker on the same side as capital.[192] Fields and Fields' account of why racial ideology met success highlights the ways that race upheld and rationalised a political economy of slavery, clarifying the property rights of slaveholders and discouraging freed individuals from interacting with them.[193] Fanon stated that "the settler … has brought the native into existence,"[194] as the survival and economic success of the settler in the colonial context depended on maintaining an immutable and marked difference between themselves and the people they want to conquer.

Importantly, then, both material and symbolic path dependencies play a role in determining the success of a given ideology. Ideology neither follows immediately from material conditions, nor is it entirely divorced from them. This implies an inherent vulnerability of the ideological settlement. Material change, for instance in labour market conditions, will require interpretive work.

188 Hall, 319.
189 Alexandre Afonso, "Migrant Workers or Working Women? Comparing Labour Supply Policies in Post-War Europe," *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice* 21, no 3 (May 27, 2019): 251–69, https://doi.org/10.1080/13876988.2018.1527584.
190 Afonso, 255.
191 Hall, "The Whites of Their Eyes," 100.
192 Hall, 101.
193 Fields and Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*, 131.
194 Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 28.

2.5.1.3. Identity and race

Ideology is more than an intellectual exercise. When an ideology becomes dominant, it shapes the material reality out of which it developed. One way in which this happens is through the process of casting different individuals as different characters, who are related to one another in specific ways. When real individuals are assigned a role in the ideological narrative, or when they assume and/or are ascribed a value on a dimension rendered salient by (ideological) context, *identification* has taken place.[195] Identity can be understood as a positioning, or a symbol signifying one's location in a given system of meaning.[196]

Identity is never just an innate, individual-level attribute: it depends on the ideology's ontological assumptions and moral frameworks. For example, in an ideological landscape which views biological sex as binary and a key determinant of preferences, personalities, capabilities, and expression, only two gender identities are possible. In contrast, in an ideology with different ontological assumptions, for example according to which gender is a performance that relates only tenuously (if at all) to biological sex, then subjects may be assigned or voluntarily take up other gender identities. Equally, in an ideology where the relevant value-slope is between Europeanness and Orientalism, as Said has shown, European identity evolved by representing Asia ("the Orient") as "defeated and distant" in contrast to their own "powerful and articulate" nature.[197] For all of these reasons, survey experiments manipulating the "cultural proximity" of fictitious identities[198] operates on the false pretext that identity is affixed to individual bodies rather than created in the space between them in relation to preconceived ideas about what cultural proximity means.

Race is another important example of an identity that is predicated on several ideological features. Historically, race has relied on the belief that "nature produced humankind in distinct groups," each of which contains human genetic variation so neatly that members of one group are meaningfully distinct from members of another.[199] Goldberg argues that this evolved out of the ancient practice of cataloguing mythological beings and humans as a means of locating the self within the broader animal kingdom.[200] Consolidating racial ideology, Goldberg maintains, involved transplanting the 'exoticism' of ancient and medieval imagination onto the bodies of specific people that Europeans sought to colonise or encountered in their attempts at imperial expansion.[201] The act of imbuing phenotypical characteristics with racial meaning by clustering genetic variety into neat and self-contained racial units has been called racial formation.[202]

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195 Appiah, "Race, Culture, Identity."

196 Stuart Hall, "Cultural Identity and Diaspora," in *Selected Writings on Race and Difference*, ed Paul Gilroy and Ruth Wilson Gilmore (1989; repr., Durham: Duke University Press, 2021), 257–71.

197 Said, "Imaginative Geography and Its Representations," 21.

198 Kootstra, "Deserving and Undeserving Welfare Claimants in Britain and the Netherlands"; Ford, "Who Should We Help?"

199 Fields and Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*, 16.

200 David Theo Goldberg, "Modernity, Race, and Morality," ed Philomena Essed and David Theo Goldberg (Malden and Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 284.

201 Goldberg, 290.

202 Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States*, 3rd ed (London, New York: Routledge, 2015), 61.

Race is not complete without continued ideological work that Fields and Fields call *racecraft*.[203] The suffix "-craft" is used both to highlight the material processes of *making* or *doing* that prop up this set of beliefs, and to draw a parallel with witchcraft.[204] Racecraft and witchcraft, Fields and Fields argue, rely on similar ontologies. Both cultivate a belief in fictitious, invisible entities (witches and races, respectively) in defence of which modern science has furnished little to no evidence. For example, Hall describes the contours of a reigning moral panic in 1960s Britain due to "anxieties about the rapid process of social change," anti-government protests due to foreign policy, and the end of an economic boom.[205] Hall argues that political actors "*thematised*" these conditions "through race,"[206] suggesting that immigration from the colonies was the central problem. Political actors cast "the blacks" as central antagonists and the "'silent' and beleaguered majorities - the great underclasses, the great, silent, 'British Public'" - as protagonists in the struggle for social order.[207]

The process of assigning identities is protracted and uncertain, and race is no different. In 1790 the US Congress voted that a person must be "white" to become a naturalised US citizen.[208] A hundred years later, attorneys openly lamented the ambiguity around who exactly fell under the category of "white person."[209] Even in 1899, William Z. Ripley, author of *The Races of Europe*, had difficulty fitting real people into the grid he created.[210] This indeterminate and constructed character of racial identity explains how various groups can throughout time be said to have acquired whiteness[211] or blackness.[212] The survival of classificatory schema in the face of this confusion depends on maintaining faith in their rationale.

2

2.5.1.4. (Re)distribution and (re)production

The prescriptive content of classificatory schema exerts real influence on the material world, shaping social phenomena such as patterns of inclusion. This is partly because arranging individuals in an ideological landscape produces guidelines, or scripts, of how differently classed individuals ought to act and how resources ought to be redistributed. These prove useful in their decision-making processes. As Tajfel explains, an "undifferentiated social environment makes very little sense and provides no guidelines for actions."[213] In contrast, classifying individuals into groups lends "order and coherence to the social situation while at the same time enabling the individual to act, in a way which has been sanctioned as 'appropriate' in many other situations."[214]

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203 Fields and Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*, 16.
204 Fields and Fields, 202.
205 Hall, "Race and 'Moral Panics' in Post-war Britain," 61.
206 Hall, 63.
207 Hall, 63.
208 Roediger, "Whiteness and Ethnicity in the History of 'White Ethnics' in the United States," 324.
209 Roediger, 324.
210 Fields and Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*, 16.
211 Roediger, *Wages of Whiteness*; Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White*.
212 Magubane, *Bringing the Empire Home: Race, Class, and Gender in Britain and Colonial South Africa*; Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor: From Abolition to Brexit*.
213 Tajfel et al., "Social Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour," 153.
214 Tajfel et al., 153.

In these ways, ideology offers a blueprint for resource (re)distribution. This is how racial ideology can lead to race as a socially meaningful category. For Meghji and Bonilla-Silva, racialisation involves imagining discrete units of genetic difference, arrange them into a distinctive racial hierarchy and distribute resources unequally across this hierarchy.[215] Meghji demonstrates how this happens at micro, meso and macro levels of social systems.[216] At the meso level, for example, prescriptive norms prevail about which groups can interact with each other and how, which in turn affects the built environment as real estate is developed in line with a perceived imperative for segregation and control.[217] Similarly an employer might distribute positions in the organisational hierarchy, including pay, manual tasks, and, again, informal norms of behaviour (such as the social permission to raise one's voice) along racial lines.[218] Market actors like banks dispense credit, and insurance companies determine eligibility for private schemes, in accordance with racial norms. Thus, race depends on racial ideology, and racism depends on race.

As action conforms to ideological prescriptions and resources distribution reflects this, identities stop existing "purely in the mind" and become social facts, in the Durkheimian sense: "like six o'clock, both an idea and a reality."[219] Every time a redistributive decision is made in line with ideological priors, it furnishes ever *more evidence* for the original ideology. First, resource distribution gives life to the characters that ideology has constructed. This is partly what Du Bois meant when he said that "the black man is a person who must ride 'Jim Crow' in Georgia."[220] The identity of the "black man" is created by segregation that grows the social distance between specific people *and* the relevance of the categories that distinguish them.

Relatedly, existing research in psychology has pointed to the importance of an "interdependence of fate"[221] or a "shared quandary"[222] in generating "groupness." Put simply, we are thought to be more likely to identify as a member of a group when we feel like we have challenges in common with other members of that group. For this reason, when resources are distributed along imaginary lines, it creates groups with similar social realities. This then makes it much easier for future observers to declare their likeness.

Thirdly, belief in the existence of discrete identities offers an explanation for the inequalities that their belief facilitates.[223] For example, segregation of schools, housing, and social life fosters different speaking habits and vernacular, which then feeds racial doctrine.[224] As Fields and Fields put it, if someone believes in witches – or in race – then the evidence of witchcraft and racecraft is incontrovertible: "belief... constantly dumps factitious evidence of

215 Meghji, *The Racialized Social System*, 20.
216 Meghji, *The Racialized Social System*.
217 Meghji, 77.
218 Meghji, 103.
219 Fields and Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*, 25.
220 cited in Meghji, *The Racialized Social System*, 81.
221 Tajfel et al., "Social Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour."
222 Sen, *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny*, 27.
223 Fields and Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*, 202.
224 Fields and Fields, 103.

itself into the real world."[225] In this way, ideology sustains its own relevance when it manages to shape real world outcomes.

Finally, as material resources are distributed, the ownership over what might be called the *cultural* means of production tends to shift into the hands of dominant groups. The media has historically awarded representation in accordance with the views that are considered by prevailing ideology to be respectable, eloquently articulated, and in alignment with the majority consensus.[226] This enables a doubling-down of the ideology's central tenets as dominant groups use these to justify the status quo. Therefore, redistributive boundary-making is a self-serving and iterative cycle in which one stage feeds directly into the next, if not temporally then teleologically (see Figure 1).



Figure 1. How ideology impacts redistribution and vice versa

2.5.2. Rewarding the deserving, disciplining the deviant

As mentioned, the welfare state can service the nation's need for legitimacy in at least four ways: structuring social space (building internal boundaries), mollifying dissent, promoting cultural assimilation and imbuing the nation with moral substance. It accomplishes each through

225 Fields and Fields, 22.

226 Stuart Hall, "Black Men, White Media," in *Selected Writings on Race and Difference*, ed Paul Gilroy and Ruth Wilson Gilmore (1974; repr., Durham: Duke University Press, 2021), 52.

different forms of welfare. The form that a hypothetical claimant will encounter is a function of the identity they are assigned in relation to the nation, which is often located along dimensions of deservingness, cultural proximity (or deviance), and political power. The exact outcomes of this ideological work, however, can take infinite forms depending on the agency of the actors involved and the templates they inherit.

Welfare devoted to structuring social space, for example, looks different than that which aims to subdue dissent. The former is mainly achieved by adjusting the *amount* that a beneficiary receives. Variation on the Marshall dimension inevitably generates internal boundaries and cleavages within the social space, creating what Longo called the "heterogeneous inside."[227] Particularly generous and particularly meagre amounts might contribute to centre-periphery dynamics, one of the basic structures that Ferrera and Rokkan identify as associated with the presence of boundaries.[228] Hyper-assimilation could situate someone in the upper rungs of the labour market, while ghettoisation will inevitably confine them to the margins of social space. In this context, someone may come to be constructed as more or less deserving of occupying a central position in social space.

Winning over subversive factions, meanwhile, can involve centring hypothetical claimants in social space through welfare that scores high on the Marshall dimension, as high enough amounts of welfare can mitigate against resistance by compensating against the ills that accompany national belonging, like military service or taxation. It might also involve dignified treatment associated with high scores on the Somers dimension. On the other hand, it might involve the opposite - disciplinary treatment that allows policymakers to closely monitor the perceived political threat. If subduing dissent is the primary concern of policymakers, the type of welfare that someone receives will likely relate to their political importance or propensity to resist. In this case, components of material reality like the distribution of electoral strength or the histories of dissent are likely to shape (but not determine) interpretations of power.

Cultural assimilation, on the other hand, is most easily accomplished through downward movement on the Somers dimension. Welfare which assumes a highly disciplinary form (what I have called ghettoisation or paternalism), characterised by incursions into recipients' private lives, choices and freedoms, is particularly well-placed to induce behaviour change. More dignified forms of welfare can also affect the conduct of recipients, but efforts to do so will be less fervent and may include emphasising "capacity building," or encouraging specific choices by providing information about their results.[229] Here, potential beneficiaries who have been cast as culturally proximate characters will be better able to avoid disciplinary forms of intervention, while those depicted as culturally deviant or distant will be the target population.

Finally, protecting the "community of value"[230] by casting the nation in a positive light happens not necessarily through variation on either dimension, but in the discursive field in which policy rationale is articulated. Schneider and Ingram describe, for instance, how "the personal messages for the positively viewed, powerful segments of society are that they are

227 Longo, *The Politics of Borders: Sovereignty, Security and the Citizen after 9/11*.
228 Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*.
229 Schneider and Ingram, "Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy."
230 Anderson, *Us and Them?*

good, intelligent people. When they receive benefits from the government, it is not a special favour or because of their need but because they are contributing to public welfare."[231] In this sense, for the nation to be perceived as virtuous, the distributive outcomes themselves are less important than whether they align with policy rationale and messaging. For example, the marginalisation of someone constructed as the model "Good Citizen" would have deleterious effects on the image of the nation.

Again, none of these identities are fixed, nor are they mutually exclusive. They can overlap, for example if someone is constructed as deserving *by means of* their construction as culturally proximate. They will also not singularly determine the form of inclusion that a beneficiary will face. This is partly because identities can change, either when the dimensions against which the identities were constructed are called into question or because someone's placement along this dimension is contested. It is also because of the gap, as previously mentioned, between the intentions behind a policy and the outcomes that follow.

2.5.3. Identity in welfare state scholarship

One subbranch of welfare state scholarship has grappled somewhat explicitly with the meaning of identity for inclusion. Deservingness scholarship is concerned with identifying the invisible norms influencing the public's decision-making procedure; asking about "the public's answer to 'who should get what, and why?'"[232] Although this process is obviously internal, various research techniques can bring it into focus, including survey experiments which manipulate the values of different individual-level variables for hypothetical welfare claimants, and measure the effects on their perceived deservingness (for an overview of these experiments, see 1.2.4). Early findings by Van Oorschot suggest that five criteria form the cornerstone of the public's decision-making, of which identity is one. These are listed below in Table 5. Subsequent research suggests the continued relevance of these original five criteria - Control, Attitude, Reciprocity, Identity and Need, or "CARIN" for short.[233]

Insightful as van Oorschot's framework is, as I mentioned in the Introduction, it is not obvious where the CARIN criteria come from. They may well shape how the characters in a given ideology are defined at a certain historical conjuncture. For example, Hall documents the media's obsession in the 1970s with *reciprocity* as it churned out a "repertoire of scare stories about white 'welfare scroungers' drawing the dole on the Costa Brava."[234] However, they do not provide insight as to why these specific criteria mattered at this specific time, instead depicting the criteria as universal and timeless precepts. For example, Carsen and Petersen invoke "human evolutionary history," in which randomly occurring infections and injuries dwarfed lifestyle diseases, to explain why the public might "tag" the sick as deserving

231 Schneider and Ingram, "Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy," 342.
232 van Oorschot, "Who Should Get What, and Why?"
233 Wim van Oorschot and Femke Roosma, "The Social Legitimacy of Targeted Welfare and Welfare Deservingness," in *The Social Legitimacy of Targeted Welfare*, ed Bart Meuleman and Tim Reeskens (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017), 3–35, https://doi.org/10.4337/9781785367212.00010; Bart Meuleman, Femke Roosma, and Koen Abts, "Welfare Deservingness Opinions from Heuristic to Measurable Concept: The CARIN Deservingness Principles Scale," *Social Science Research* 85 (January 2020): 102352, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2019.102352.
234 Hall, "Race and 'Moral Panics' in Post-war Britain," 64.

of help.[235] Path dependency undoubtedly plays a role, but how and why have lifestyle diseases been constructed as undeserving? Alternatively, the criteria are explained with reference to the influence of the news media. Gilens focuses on biases in the portrayal of welfare beneficiaries by media outlets.[236] Even if media representation is significant, it is not suspended above social reality. In what cultural context were these portrayals viable? Failing to excavate the origins of these criteria is not only a missed opportunity empirically, but also has normative consequences, as it leads to the description of "deservingness gaps" as "inevitable" and "insurmountable."[237]

Table 6: Five dimensions of deservingness, adapted from van Oorschot[238]

Dimension	Logic
Need	The greater a claimant's neediness, the more deserving they are judged.
Control	The less a claimant's neediness can be attributed to their own shortcomings or decisions, the more deserving they are judged.
Identity	The more proximate the claimant's identity to the rich, the more deserving they are judged.
Attitude	The more docile, grateful, or compliant the claimant's attitude toward welfare, the more deserving they are judged.
Reciprocity	The more a claimant can be said to have contributed or earned their way financially, the more deserving they are judged.

In fact, these dimensions are historical artefacts, not universal laws: they change over time. Reciprocity makes sense only in an ideology according to which welfare ought to be awarded to people who have paid for this right. Historical research has gone far in illustrating that this has not always been the metric of deservingness. Shilliam charts the "constant shifting" of the "coordinates" of deservingness at various moments of struggle across the British empire and nation.[239] Under Elizabethan poor laws, the logic of deservingness had nothing to do with reciprocity. Instead, the deserving poor included the elderly, children, sick and disabled, while able-bodied men, vagrants and idle paupers without employment were viewed as less deserving.[240] Moreover, the CARIN framework effectively locates the site of inclusion or exclusion on the body of the potential claimant, rather than on the historical and contingent process to which that claimant is subject. For this reason (among others), Carmel and Sojka propose an alternative framework which distinguishes between organisational logics, or "rationales of

235 Carsten Jensen and Michael Bang Petersen, "The Deservingness Heuristic and the Politics of Health Care," *American Journal of Political Science* 61, no 1 (2017): 69.

236 Gilens, *Why Americans Hate Welfare*.

237 Reeskens and van der Meer, "The Inevitable Deservingness Gap."

238 van Oorschot, "Who Should Get What, and Why?," 168.

239 Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor: From Abolition to Brexit*, 6.

240 Shilliam, 9 See also van Oorschot and Roosma, "The Social Legitimacy of Targeted Welfare and Welfare Deservingness," 6; Anderson, *Us and Them?*

belonging."[241] Studying the logic behind these dimensions, rather than their application, offers a more honest portrayal of the drivers of inclusion or exclusion.

According to my framework, the content of deservingness - or any other value-slope that might govern patterns of inclusion, like cultural proximity - is a function of the ontological assumptions and moral frameworks of dominant ideology. More specifically, recalling the conditions under which ideologies prevail (2.5.1.2), it originates from at least two different sources. First, it will be more likely to reflect the qualities of those who occupy a central position within the division of labour and ownership in a given conjuncture. This is because proponents of this ideological move will be (relatively) more powerful, and because the construction will cohere with, and provide further justification for, the existing status quo. Second, deservingness will build on pre-existing templates for what the "Good Citizen"[242] looks like. In other words, they are path-dependent. This is the main reason why constructions of cultural proximity so frequently involve racialisation.

241 Carmel and Sojka, "Beyond Welfare Chauvinism and Deservingness Rationales of Belonging as a Conceptual Framework for the Politics and Governance of Migrants' Rights," 2.

242 Anderson, *Us and Them?*