Social Subjecthood? The inclusion of (post)colonial migrants in Dutch, French, and British welfare states, 1945-1970
Wolff, E.A.

1.   Introduction

1.1.   The Golden Age of welfare exclusion?

1.1.1.   The first and most important distributive question

In *Spheres of Justice,* political theorist Michael Walzer rebukes his colleagues for considering the socially just allocation of resources without asking "the first and most important distributive question," namely: how is the distributive community constituted?[1] By the distributive community, Walzer meant any space where members come together to share, divide, and exchange goods. The primary good to be distributed is that of membership in that same community. Because it cannot be distributed equally - not everyone can be a member of everywhere[2] - exclusion, Walzer argued, is necessary for "historically stable, ongoing associations of men and women [*sic*] with some special commitment to one another."[3]

Concerns about the constitution of groups and the just allocation of community membership are fundamentally concerns about *boundaries.* Boundaries can be defined as "sets of norms and rules that define the type and level of closure of a given collectivity vis-a-vis the exterior."[4] Classical sociologists and historians of state formation have long emphasised the importance of boundaries for political community.[5] For Anderson, boundaries play a critical role in explaining why the nation broke ahead of the pack of alternative forms of organising political life. Anderson contends that in alternative arrangements, like kinships, "borders were porous and indistinct, and sovereignties faded imperceptibly into another."[6] In contrast, the nation is "inherently limited."[7] These limits enabled it to be imaginable as a "sociological organism", an entity that could move through history as a solid, modular unit or coherent whole.[8] This, in turn, was a necessary condition for members of the newly constituted community to imagine that they shared a past and a destiny with their compatriots. Welfare state scholarship has picked up on this premise,[9] arguing that closure produces the conditions necessary for redistribution. Ferrera speaks of "internal bonding through external bounding"

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1   Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1983), 31.
2   Walzer, 31.
3   Walzer, 62.
4   Maurizio Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 3.
5   Stein Rokkan, *State Formation, Nation-Building and Mass Politics in Europe. The Theory of Stein Rokkan.*, ed Peter Flora, Stein Kuhlne, and Derek Urwin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Charles Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).
6   Benedict Richard O'Gorman Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso Books, 1991), 19.
7   Anderson, 6.
8   Anderson, 26.
9   Theresa Kuhn and Aaron Kamm, "The National Boundaries of Solidarity: A Survey Experiment on Solidarity with Unemployed People in the European Union," *European Political Science Review.* 11, no 2 (May 2019): 179–95, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773919000067; Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*; Michael Bommes and Andrew Geddes, *Immigration and Welfare: Challenging the Borders of the Welfare State* (London and New York: Routledge, 2000).

or the "bounding-bonding nexus" to refer to the mechanism by which restricting access to a space could allow expectations of reciprocity, mutual trust and loyalty to develop.[10] What is at stake with closure is social solidarity – the "willingness of people to see governments redistribute resources to the less advantaged."[11]

Surprisingly, given how much attention it has paid to boundaries, the canon of welfare state scholarship has failed to provide a satisfactory answer to Walzer's question. Instead, existing answers assume three forms. First, there is a widely held assumption that the distributive community is delimited by the location of national boundaries. The sociologist T.H. Marshall infamously argued, in his 1950 essay "Citizenship and Social Class" that the institution of citizenship had reached its apex, expanding to become *social* (rather than merely political or civic) in character.[12] Others share his confidence in the historical coincidence of national and redistributive boundaries, suggesting that as late as 1970, European welfare arrangements covered "virtually 100 per cent of national populations."[13] This approach to group constitution, however, fixes national boundaries as its point of reference as though these can be exogenously given. In fact, national boundaries were in considerable flux throughout the 20th century and well into the 'Golden Age' of welfare expansion: the three decades after the Second World War.[14] This related first to war and nationalism on the European continent: the Baltic states only gained independence from Russia in 1918, and Germany suffered major territorial losses in the Treaty of Versailles after which provinces like Alsace would be tossed back and forth between warring powers. It also had to do, however, with conquest, colonisation, and decolonisation abroad. Indeed, during the immediate post-war decades, three of Europe's biggest powers (Britain, France, and the Netherlands) shrunk in size by factors of around 125, 18, and 50 respectively.[15] Hence, this answer defers Walzer's question, relocating it to the domain of national territory without answering it. How, then, is the citizenry constituted?

A second approach has been to generate deterministic covering laws regarding the impact of group homogeneity on redistribution. This strand of research suggests that distributive communities are either naturally bounded by social identities or are bounded in some other way but suffer as a result. Racial difference has been particularly prominent in these accounts. Alesina and Glaeser construct 'fractionalisation' indices which measure the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from a population will belong to two different racial/ethnic groups.[16] They then analyse fractionalisation alongside social spending data and find that places that score higher on this index redistribute less than places that score lower, leading

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10 Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*, 4.

11 Peter A Hall, "The Political Sources of Social Solidarity," in *The Strains of Commitment: The Political Sources of Solidarity in Diverse Societies*, by Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 349.

12 T.H Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class: And Other Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950).

13 Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*, 48.

14 Ferrera, 77.

15 Linda Colley, "'This Small Island': Britain, Size and Empire," in *Proceedings of the British Academy*, vol 121 (The British Academy, 2003), 172–73; Jan C Jansen and Jürgen Osterhammel, *Decolonization: A Short History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2017), 3.

16 Alberto Alesina et al., "Fractionalization," *Journal of Economic Growth,* 8, no 2 (June 2003): 155–94.

them to conclude that racial cleavages "serve as a barrier to redistribution."[17] Contemporary research into the impact of the "diversity introduced by recent [21st century] immigration" on redistributive attitudes works from a similar point of departure.[18] The general argument is that solidarity disappears when racial difference appears in the distributive community. This is known as the 'heterogeneity-redistribution trade-off' thesis.[19] This second answer suffers from its naturalisation of concepts like *homogeneity, racial diversity,* and *ethnic difference*, all of which remain woefully underspecified. Appiah, Sen and many others have argued that individuals vary along infinite dimensions, none of which cluster neatly into fixed (racial) groups.[20] Instead these groups, and the similarity which supposedly constitutes them, are contested in social reality and vary across time and space, as Du Bois argued almost a century ago[21] and as research into the elusive nature of whiteness and the shifting racial identity of Irish and Italian immigrants has shown.[22] The second answer to Walzer's question, however, relegates this contestation to the status of a methodological issue.[23] In fact it presents an urgent ontological problem with potential endogeneity issues. If homogeneity affects solidarity, then what determines homogeneity?[24] How does one group become homogeneous?

A common approach is to toss these conceptual concerns back into the ring of public opinion by allowing the definition of similarity to emerge from survey data. Many survey experiments manipulate the "cultural proximity" and "social distance" of fictitious welfare

17   Alberto Alesina, Edward Glaeser, and Bruce Sacerdote, "Why Doesn't the US Have a European-Style Welfare System?" NBER Working Paper (National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2001), 248.

18   Allison Harell, Stuart Soroka, and Shanto Iyengar, "Race, Prejudice and Attitudes toward Redistribution: A Comparative Experimental Approach," *European Journal of Political Research*, 55, no 4 (November 2016): 724, https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12158., but see also Marc Hooghe et al., "Ethnic Diversity and Generalized Trust in Europe: A Cross-National Multilevel Study," *Comparative Political Studies* 42, no 2 (February 2009): 198–223, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414008325286, Robert Ford, "Who Should We Help? An Experimental Test of Discrimination in the British Welfare State," *Political Studies* 64, no 3 (October 2016): 630–50, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12194., Anouk Kootstra, "Deserving and Undeserving Welfare Claimants in Britain and the Netherlands: Examining the Role of Ethnicity and Migration Status Using a Vignette Experiment," *European Sociological Review* 32, no 3 (June 2016): 325–38, https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcw010.

19   Will Kymlicka and Keith G Banting, eds., *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 9.

20   K Anthony Appiah, "Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections," in *Color Conscious*, by Kwame Anthony Appiah and Amy Gutmann (Princeton University Press, 1998), 30–105, https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822096-002; Amartya Sen, *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny* (New York, London: WW Norton & Company, 2006).

21   W.E.B Du Bois, *Dusk of Dawn*, ed. Henry Louis Gates Jr., 2007, 50.

22   David Roediger, "Whiteness and Ethnicity in the History of 'White Ethnics' in the United States," in *Race Critical Theories*, ed Philomena Essed and David Theo Goldberg (Malden and Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 325–43; David Roediger, *Wages of Whiteness* (London, New York: Verso, 1999); Noel Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White* (Routledge, 2008).

23   Alberto Alesina and Edward L Glaeser, *Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: A World of Difference*, Rodolfo Debenedetti Lectures (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote, "Why Doesn't the US Have a European-Style Welfare System?"

24   Emily Anne Wolff, "Diversity, Solidarity and the Construction of the Ingroup among (Post)Colonial Migrants in The Netherlands, 1945–1968," *New Political Economy*, (June 23, 2023): 1–14, https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2023.2227120.

claimants by arranging them implicitly[25] or explicitly[26] into "ethnic hierarchies," ordered from most to least culturally proximate to the identity of the respondent in question. For example, the survey might ask British respondents about their willingness to share resources with Irish, Jamaican, and Pakistani claimants. Leaving aside the ethical risks of reifying a racialised national imaginary to conduct this research (what if a British respondent is also Pakistani?) the hierarchies are justified in bizarre acrobatics of circular logic. One study determines "the overall level of social distance" of a given community by the percentage of respondents who expressed "discomfort about social contact" with members of that community.[27] Thus, the "ethnic hierarchy" invoked to explain public attitudes (toward redistribution) is constructed using public attitudes (toward contact). We are left with the dizzying reasoning that outsiders are so designated because they are considered *culturally distant*, and subsequently excluded because they are so designated. Again, Walzer's question is deferred, but not answered. How then do groups come to be considered culturally distant?

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1.1.2. Empire shrinks as welfare state expands

In this dissertation, I approach Walzer's question about the ways in which the distributive community is constituted from a new angle. Specifically, I return to a historical moment during which the boundaries of the national community in Europe were under (re)construction and explore how decisions were made then about whom to grant membership. The three decades after the Second World War known as the *Trente Glorieuses*[28] are opportune for this kind of inquiry because they witnessed the coincidence of two major social processes: decolonisation and the birth of social citizenship. The canon of welfare state studies has paid little attention to this junction, even though it promises insight into redistributive boundary-making in at least two ways.

First, if bonding and bounding dynamics were linked at any point in history, this period should leave evidence of it. The "'hot' and most decisive phase of decolonisation"[29] coincided with a period of consensus around new, more generous forms of social provision. In the decades immediately following the Second World War, coverage of social insurance widened, the generosity of transfer payments increased, and the scope and quality of social services expanded.[30] The 1944 Atlantic Charter and the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights took their place in history alongside a wave of national declarations of commitment to egalitarianism, from the Wagner-Murray-Dingell plan in the US, to the van Acker plan in Belgium and the d'Aragona plan in Italy.[31] In tandem social spending rocketed up from

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25 Ford, "Who Should We Help?"; Tim Reeskens and Tom van der Meer, "The Inevitable Deservingness Gap: A Study into the Insurmountable Immigrant Penalty in Perceived Welfare Deservingness," *Journal of European Social Policy* 29, no 2 (May 2019): 166–81, https://doi.org/10.1177/0958928718768335; Harell, Soroka, and Iyengar, "Race, Prejudice and Attitudes toward Redistribution."

26 Kootstra, "Deserving and Undeserving Welfare Claimants in Britain and the Netherlands."

27 Ford, "Who Should We Help?" 637.

28 Bruno Palier, *Gouverner La Sécurité Sociale*, 1st ed (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2005).

29 Jansen and Osterhammel, *Decolonization: A Short History*, 3.

30 Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*.

31 Peter Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 108.

less than 10 per cent of GDP in most European countries to twice that by the 1970s.[32] As central governments assumed responsibility for welfare, Marshall saw citizenship evolve into its final form and "the basic human equality of membership ... enriched with new substance."[33] The lectures on which Marshall's essay was based were delivered seven years after the Liberal economist William Beveridge made the case for a universal system of social insurance in the Beveridge Report. Later Jessy Mair, former director of the London School of Economics, heralded the Report an "inauguration of a new relation within the state of man to man and of man to the state."[34]

At the same time, many economically downtrodden European states were attempting in the initial post-war period to "restore and revitalise" their empires, perceiving an urgent need for both labour and tropical products.[35] As a political institution European colonial empire dates back at least to the mid-16th century, with the Portuguese conquest of South and Middle America.[36] By the early 20th century, the French empire was 18 times the size of metropolitan France; the Dutch empire 50 times that of the Netherlands.[37] Denmark colonised three Caribbean islands for more than 200 years.[38] Sweden, which did not retain control over its overseas colonies very long, continued its involvement in the global colonial political economy through engagement in the Atlantic slave trade, the colonisation of indigenous people closer to home (for example, forced labour of Sami people in Swedish mining operations) and the exploitation of settler colonial projects in the United States.[39] Although colonial rule looked different at different times and places,[40] empires shared a reliance on creating and disciplining local subjects, exploiting resources, and inventing justifications for these extractive relations.[41] Colonial domination was rooted in what Mudimbe calls the domestication of difference, as Europeans sought to "engineer a rupture in the consciousness" of the colonised to legitimate subjugation.[42]

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32 Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*, 77.

33 Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class: And Other Essays*, 9.

34 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*, 108.

35 Antony Gerald Hopkins, "Globalisation and Decolonisation," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 45, no 5 (September 3, 2017): 735, https://doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2017.1370218 Matteo Rizzo, "What Was Left of the Groundnut Scheme? Development Disaster and Labour Market in Southern Tanganyika 1946-1952," *Journal of Agrarian Change* 6, no 2 (April 2006): 205–38, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0366.2006.00120.x.

36 Philip D Curtin, *The Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex: Essays in Atlantic History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 14.

37 Colley, "'This Small Island': Britain, Size and Empire," 172–73.

38 Bolette B Blaagaard, "Whose Freedom? Whose Memories? Commemorating Danish Colonialism in St Croix," *Social Identities* 17, no 1 (January 2011): 61–72.

39 Gurminder K Bhambra and John Holmwood, "Colonialism, Postcolonialism and the Liberal Welfare State," *New Political Economy* 23, no 5 (September 3, 2018): 583, https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2017.1417369.

40 Samir Amin, "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa - Origins and Contemporary Forms," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 10, no 4 (1972): 503–24.

41 Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961; repr., London: Penguin Books, 2001), 28; Gurminder K Bhambra, "Relations of Extraction, Relations of Redistribution: Empire, Nation, and the Construction of the British Welfare State," *The British Journal of Sociology* 73, no 1 (January 2022): 4–15, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.12896.

42 cited in Garth A Myers, "Late Colonial Lusaka and Postcolonial Geography," *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography* 27, no 3 (2006).

The Second World War ultimately sounded the knell of colonial empire. Resistance to colonial rule was as old as rule itself: in 1791, the successful Haitian revolution staged by self-liberated slaves demonstrated the willingness and ability of colonial subjects to hold Europeans to their commitment to *liberté, égalité,* and *fraternité.*[43] Still, the Second World War marked a watershed moment by dealing a fatal blow to the constitutive beliefs sustaining colonial society.[44] Nazism tarnished the image of authoritarian rule, military conquest and racial thinking.[45] The renewed normative salience of self-determination and freedom, as outlined in texts like the 1941 Atlantic Charter or the 1946 UN Charter, directly challenged colonial powers.[46] Additionally, the Allies had recruited hundreds of thousands of their colonial subjects in their war effort,[47] in the process reminding the conscripted of their value to, and by extension their bargaining power over, the colonial state.[48] Despite its relevance for the multidimensional nature of boundaries, there has been very little comprehensive research into the extent to which this process of decolonisation affected the development of post-war social citizenship.[49]

The second important contribution this period can make to welfare state studies is calling into question prevalent assumptions about the relationship between diversity and solidarity. In the first decades after the Second World War, between 5.4 and 6.8 million people made their way from (former) colonies to Western Europe.[50] As Stoler and Cooper quip, "the problem [of how to bound the European community] came home to the metropole."[51] Some migrants were former settlers or collaborators seeking refuge from the retaliatory violence that often accompanied decolonisation. Others came to work, either on their own or as part of employer- or state-led recruitment schemes. Historians and migration scholars have given increasing attention to the experiences of these "postcolonial migrants," as they are often known.[52] Importantly, Smith emphasises, they represented a "remarkably heterogeneous collection of

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43 Curtin, *The Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex: Essays in Atlantic History*.

44 Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 35.

45 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, "Empires After 1919: Old, New, Transformed," *International Affairs*, 2019, 98.

46 Tony Smith, "A Comparative Study of French and British Decolonization," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20, no 1 (January 1978): 70–102; Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2006), 57.

47 Pieter C Emmer and Leo Lucassen, "Migration from the Colonies to Western Europe since 1800," 2012, http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/europe-on-the-road/economic-migration/pieter-c-emmer-leo-lucassen-migration-from-the-colonies-to-western-europe-since-1800NonEuropeanSoldiersandContractLabourersinEuropeDuringthe WorldWars.

48 Kristen Stromberg Childers, "The Second World War as a Watershed in the French Caribbean," *Atlantic Studies* 9, no 4 (2012): 409–30.

49 But see Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), for the years prior to the Second World War.

50 Andrea L Smith, "Introduction," in *Europe's Invisible Migrants* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2003), 11.

51 Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, eds., "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda," in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in A Bourgeois World* (Oakland: University of California Press, 1997), 24.

52 Smith, "Introduction"; Elizabeth Buettner, "Postcolonial Migrations to Europe," in *The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire*, ed Martin Thomas and Andrew S Thompson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 601–20; Ulbe Bosma, Jan Lucassen, and Gert Oostindie, eds., *Postcolonial Migrants and Identity Politics: Europe, Russia, Japan and the United States in Comparison* (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2022), https://doi.org/10.1515/9780857453280.

populations."[53] According to Buettner, "their national, geographical, occupational, cultural, and socioeconomic diversity defies any attempt at summary description."[54] Although she doesn't explicitly mention racial diversity, Buettner later points out that up to three million were of "non-European" descent.[55]

The heterogeneity of millions of these newcomers presents a puzzle. If racial diversity is supposed to counteract solidarity and generosity by collapsing the boundary between insider and outsider, how did diversity of such scale coexist with the most solidaristic period in recent European history? As Buettner puts it, "much remains to be done to arrive at a full understanding of how Europe was *re-created* once its territorial expanse receded."[56] The insights that this research agenda promises into the making of redistributive boundaries and the relationship between welfare and race are timely. Today, anxiety about the impact of increasing levels of immigration on European welfare states proliferates in both academia and the public sphere. Goodman argues that "Britain today is significantly more diverse than it was 50 years ago."[57] Putnam lists "the increase in ethnic and social heterogeneity in virtually all advanced democracies" as "one of the most important challenges facing modern societies."[58] Familiarising themselves with literature from the US, which explains a weakening of welfare institutions with race, researchers in Europe "have begun to wonder if similar dynamics might operate on their side of the Atlantic."[59] The fear is that "growing ethnic diversity will eventually force European welfare states to reduce social spending."[60] Cavaillé and van der Straeten argue that, due to a "secular growth in non-Christian, non-white minority populations," the "conditions for prophesied americanisation of the European welfare state are met."[61] These concerns stem from a learned belief in the fundamental incompatibility between diversity and solidarity. If contradictory evidence exists from Europe's own historical record, this literature should contend with it.

53 Smith, "Introduction," 11.

54 Elizabeth Buettner, *Europe after Empire: Decolonization, Society, and Culture*, 1st ed (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 215–16, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139047777.

55 Buettner, "Postcolonial Migrations to Europe."

56 Buettner, *Europe after Empire*, 9.

57 Sara Wallace Goodman, *Immigration and Membership Politics in Western Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1433.

58 Robert D Putnam, "E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture," *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30, no 2 (June 2007): 137, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9477.2007.00176.x.

59 Ford, "Who Should We Help?," 632.

60 Steffen Mau and Christoph Burkhardt, "Migration and Welfare State Solidarity in Western Europe," *Journal of European Social Policy* 19, no 3 (July 2009): 213–29, https://doi.org/10.1177/0958928709104737.

61 Charlotte Cavaillé and Karine Van der Straeten, "Immigration and Support for Redistribution: Lessons from Europe," *Toulouse School of Economics Working Papers*, Journal of Economic Literature, N° 1358 (September 2022): 7.

1.2. My project

1.2.1. Research design

Aiming to contribute to the development of theory in the areas outlined above, I ask *how (post) colonial migrants were included in post-war welfare systems*. Taking advantage of productive synergies between history and interpretive social sciences, I develop a methodological toolkit that I call historical-interpretivism. Although the areas of overlap between history and interpretivism (discussed in detail in Chapter 3) might appear obvious, their integration into a cohesive framework has, to my knowledge, not yet been accomplished. Equipped with this toolkit, I revisit a moment of profound turbulence in European social history with an openness to the ways in which local actors interpreted and reacted to those changes. I pull into focus over one million people – tagged "remarkably heterogeneous" by observers[62] – who arrived in Europe during the Golden Age of welfare expansion. With *how* - Foucault's "little question... flat and empirical"[63] - I mean to both evaluate their inclusion and explain it.

The term (*post*)*colonial migrants* is imperfect for several reasons. First, a migrant is sometimes defined as a "non-citizen in any given country,"[64] but many of these newcomers held or formerly held citizenship in the host territory. Second, it was not used by the migrants to describe themselves (see Appendix B.3). Finally, Dahinden argues that the word 'migrant' amplifies the idea that migrants are fundamentally different from citizens, and that nation-states are required to manage this difference in a specific way.[65] Nonetheless, the alternatives available for describing this group have other shortcomings (for a more elaborate discussion, see 3.5). Following Obdeijn and Schrover, I use *migrant* to signify geographic mobility across borders with the intention of residence,[66] and *(post)colonial* with its prefix in parentheses in a nod to the relationship of the migrant to a colony, whether ongoing or not.

My inferences are largely powered by within-case analysis (abductive reasoning and contextualised self-interpretation), but I also engage in what I call entangled comparison across cases. My focus is on the response of Dutch, French, and British welfare states to newcomers from the former Netherlands Indies (present-day Indonesia), Algeria, and the former West Indies (which includes present-day Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, several other Caribbean islands, and Guyana) respectively. In line with historical-interpretivist practice, I selected cases based on where I expected (post)colonial migration to be socially significant, with an eye to ensuring contrast, and attentive to my own cultural and linguistic resources. The UK, France, and The Netherlands experienced, together with Portugal, the most (post) colonial migration relative to their populations from 1945 to the early 1990s.[67] I take interest in a relatively long time period, spanning 1945 and 1970, as Pierson has cautioned social scientists

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62 Smith, "Introduction," 11.
63 Bent Flyvbjerg, "Phronetic Planning: Theoretical and Methodological Reflections," *Planning Theory & Practice* 5, no 3 (2004): 298.
64 Tito Boeri, "Immigration to the Land of Redistribution," no 77 (2010): 655.
65 Janine Dahinden, "A Plea for the 'de-Migranticization' of Research on Migration and Integration," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 39, no 13 (October 20, 2016): 2209, https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2015.1124129.
66 H.L.M Obdeijn and Marlou Schrover, *Komen En Gaan. Immigratie En Emigratie in Nederland Vanaf 1550* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2008), 16.
67 Smith, "Introduction," 32.

against restricting their time horizons when studying outcomes with long time horizons and potentially slow-moving causal processes[68] - like, Ferrera argues, boundary changes.[69]

Because I expected the financing structure of different welfare schemes, as well as the type of risks against which they protected, to influence public perceptions of welfare claimants, I considered inclusion in contributory schemes designed to alleviate life-course risks (for example, old-age pensions in the Netherlands and family allowances in France) as well as non-contributory schemes tailored to labour market risks (for example, National Assistance in the UK). Historical materials constitute my primary data source. I draw from correspondence, draft legislation, meeting minutes, budgets, brochures and other primary sources consulted at state and municipal archives in each of my country cases. I consulted the collections of the *Nationaal Archief* (The Hague, NL), *Haags Gemeentearchief* (The Hague, NL), *Utrechts Archief* (Utrecht, NL), *Stadsarchief Rotterdam* (Rotterdam, NL), *Archives Nationales* (Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, FR), *Archives Nationales d'Outre-Mer* (Aix-en-Provence, FR), *Archives départementales Bouches-du-Rhône* (Marseille, FR) and National Archives (Richmond, UK) between September 2020 and May 2023. I did not assume that the archives perfectly transmitted an unadulterated truth, but instead sought to struggle "with and against the constraints and silences" associated with (especially state) archives.[70]

1.2.2. Findings

I find that across all three cases the "sphere of justice"[71] within which income redistribution took place was bounded externally through (formally and informally) expanding and restricting citizenship and entry rights. If they managed to cross the boundaries that citizenship and immigration law erected, migrants from (present-day) Indonesia, Algeria, and the Caribbean enjoyed formal entitlements to welfare under the schemes I studied. Put differently, I found no evidence of statutory exclusion from the distributive community once inclusion under citizenship and immigration law was granted.

On the other hand, my findings reveal Dutch and French welfare states mutating to accommodate the newcomers by departing from their central tenets (like their use of occupational categories or the link between benefits and contributions) and splintering to create different gradients, or worlds, of inclusion. Each can be differentiated not only by the *amount* of welfare they provide - a dimension I call the 'Marshall' dimension after his definition of social rights - but also by its *character* - a dimension I name the 'Somers' dimension after Margaret Somers' definition of social inclusion, which considers the "right to recognition by others as a moral equal."[72] In particular, there were vast differences in the extent to which welfare preserved the autonomy, mutuality and overall dignity of welfare recipients. The

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68 Paul Pierson, "Big, Slow-Moving, and.. Invisible: Macrosocial Processes in the Study of Comparative Politics," in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, ed James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, 1st ed (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 177–207, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511803963.006.

69 Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*, 4.

70 Hartman in Zine Magubane, *Bringing the Empire Home: Race, Class, and Gender in Britain and Colonial South Africa* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

71 Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality*.

72 Margaret R Somers, *Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness and the Right to Have Rights* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 6.

response of Dutch and French welfare states to (post)colonial migration was strikingly similar despite cross-case differences in programmatic features. In this sense, I follow Esping-Andersen in attending not just to incomes but also to "how nations differ in the structuring of social citizenship."[73] My findings suggest that social citizenship is structured differently not just between nations, but *within* them, and it is to these intra-national differences that the title of my dissertation refers. Access to welfare was distributed along racial lines, such that those assigned "European" or "Western" identities would receive different forms of welfare than those assigned "Muslim" or "Eastern" identities.

Fragmentation of this nature was unworkable in the UK, where key agents of the welfare state remained attached to universalist principles, limiting the possibilities for inclusion on unequal terms. There was, however, informal (rather than statutory) exclusion on racial lines due to local-level discrimination by officers against Caribbean claimants. Additionally, starting in 1962, the distributive community would become successively more difficult to access for Caribbeans with UK citizenship due to immigration reform that restricted entry for non-white citizens. Importantly, this policy move was justified with reference to the access that migrants of colour had to National Assistance, one of the few non-contributory parts of the British welfare system. In addition, the Home Office ultimately pressured the department responsible for National Insurance into cooperating in its efforts at immigration control, further highlighting the extent to which boundary-making was accomplished through social and immigration policy.

Although I document boundary-making on racial lines, racial diversity did not *cause* Dutch and French welfare states to fracture in the way that I describe, nor did the race of Caribbean migrants *cause* the informal discrimination they faced. Unlike most welfare state scholars who consider race an individual-level attribute with independent properties, I build on a mountain of literature in sociology and cultural theory to depict race as a mode of classification that groups humans, in all of our diversity, into fictitious but neatly contained units. If this is true, then neither race nor racial diversity can exert independent causal power. Instead, racial ideology and *racecraft* - that is, the practice of believing in, and acting in accordance with, the existence of races[74] - are the central drivers of internal structuration. In fact, I argue that race mattered in these cases by providing a blueprint for the construction of identities. In turn, these identities mattered for how an individual would be integrated into the welfare state as it discharged of its duties toward the nation.

To be precise, I argue that the distinct patterns of inclusion I find reflect the varying functions that the welfare state serves. Drawing from citizenship and state-building scholarship, I argue that nations depend for their survival on their perceived integrity. Welfare states support this perception by performing tasks that variably imbue the nation with social and cultural meaning. They might contribute to the nation-building project by structuring social space, muting dissent, promoting cultural assimilation, or making the nation appear virtuous to its members. Each of these different functions is associated with different forms of welfare.

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73 Gøsta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 57.
74 Karen E Fields and Barbara J Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life* (London and New York: Verso, 2012).

For example, welfare designed to influence cultural behaviours might score low on the Somers dimension as welfare is associated with more restrictions to a beneficiary's freedom. In this context, the specific form of welfare to which an individual has access depends on how they are related to these overarching aims. This, in turn, depends on a complex and indeterminate process of social construction which can involve racialisation and the creation of deserving or culturally proximate identities.

In fact, in my dissertation, I show how welfare states did not just passively transmit racial tropes. Instead, they were active agents of racecraft, helping to create the homogeneity that researchers identify. Social workers, private associations, and public officials variably disciplined (post)colonial migrants into conforming to distinct racial and cultural categories, contested and adjusted their classification, or renegotiated the substance of those categories. There was nothing inevitable about the exact location of the internal boundaries that I document here. White (post)colonial migrants also encountered resistance from their metropolitan compatriots, and if it had not been for the active efforts of welfare agents to include them in the "sphere of justice," they may have just as easily found themselves on the outside.

The rest of the introduction proceeds as follows. In section 1.3, I review existing literature on race and redistribution in welfare state scholarship, which takes three different forms depending on the strand of research. Section 1.4 steps outside of welfare state scholarship and surveys literature from history, postcolonial studies and migration in order to bring "social" and imperial history into one analytic field. This section also summarises existing research into (post)colonial migrants in these disciplines.

1.3.   Race and immigration in welfare state scholarship

1.3.1.   Racial inequality in the US welfare state

In welfare state scholarship, there are three main roads leading out of the junction of race and welfare. The first is historical research into the fracturing of social rights on racial lines. This body of scholarship is almost exclusively based on data from the US, which is often viewed as meaningfully distinct from Europe due to its history as a settler colony. Settler colonialism is a "distinct mode of domination" involving the establishment of permanent settlement by displacing and (violently) replacing indigenous communities.[75] This form of domination did not take place on continental European soil in recent history. But continental histories converge in other ways that receive inadequate attention. The project of settler colonialism from which the US emerged was a fundamentally *British* and *European* project nestled within large-scale efforts at European conquest. A reading of the European "cultural archive" that

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75   Lorenzo Veracini, "Settler Colonialism as a Distinct Mode of Domination," in *The Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism*, by Edward Cavanagh and Lorenzo Veracini (Routledge, 2017), 1–9, https://web-p-ebscohost-com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl/ehost/ebookviewer/ebook/bmxlYmtfXzEzMzcwMzhfX0FO0?sid=6ca0101c-50f5-4220-b27c-3f66c7014513@redis&vid=0&format=EB&rid=1.

remains open to the possibility that such a project has left its traces in national psyches is a valuable endeavour, even if these traces feature only sparingly in European self-representation.[76]

Key takeaways from scholarship into the US case for researchers interested in Walzer's question include the ability of race to shape boundary-making and of the welfare state to (actively) engender inequalities. Fox sets out to explore how different immigrants were incorporated into American social assistance programs from the end of the 19th century (the "Progressive Era") up until federal relief of the mid-1930s.[77] She finds that Mexican immigrants, European immigrants, and Black Americans were concentrated in separate regions of the country where they experienced the welfare state in three distinct ways, differentiated by variations in access to benefits, benefit levels, and the degrees of social stigma and risk of expulsion associated with receiving benefits. Institutionalised cooperation between welfare and immigration officials ensured that gatekeepers of both the welfare state and of the nation-state worked to exclude Mexican immigrants, weaponising their use of welfare relief and responding to it with an omnipresent threat of deportation. In contrast, the door to social assistance was largely shut in the faces of Black Americans, whilst social workers and industrial associations defended white European immigrants' right to the 'dole.' Nodding to Esping-Andersen, she argues for the existence of 'three worlds' of welfare relief, trading a singular focus on race, class, or any other variable for a view of the system in its entirety.[78] Causal power is attributed to a combination of factors, from labour relations and paternalistic attitudes of employers to a deeply embedded racial hierarchy, machine politics, and the agency of social workers.

Chronologically, Lieberman picks up where Fox left off by examining in greater depth three main programs of the 1935 Social Security Act.[79] He establishes that each policy was "race-laden," i.e. tended to divide the population along racial lines without explicit racial exclusions, and endeavours to explain how this became true for each different program.[80] He finds that Southern Democrats conditioned support for the programs on their ability to maintain labour-repressive political economies of racial disenfranchisement, but that this demand could not be met in the same way in each program. For example, Old Age Insurance (OAI) could accommodate it by excluding the occupations in which Black workers were dominant (agricultural and domestic work). However, for means-tested social assistance grants like the Assistance for Dependent Children (ADC), exclusion was not possible. Therefore the erosion of federal authority was offered as a functional substitute or concession to racist elites.[81] It allowed Southern Democrats to exercise discretion over benefit levels; which, in practice, translated into discrimination that was "beyond question," given the significant racial and regional discrepancies in ADC implementation that emerge out of Lieberman's analysis.[82]

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76 Gloria Wekker, *White Innocence: Paradoxes of Colonialism and Race* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016).

77 Cybelle Fox, *Three Worlds of Relief: Race, Immigration, and the American Welfare State from the Progressive Era to the New Deal* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691152233.001.0001.

78 Fox, 17. See also Appendix A.2.

79 Robert C Lieberman, *Shifting the Color Line: Race and the American Welfare State*, New edition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001).

80 Lieberman, 7.

81 Lieberman, p.51.

82 Lieberman, 136.

Every Southern state with an ADC program awarded benefits to Black children at a lower rate than their proportion in the population, and when Black families were deemed eligible they got smaller payments compared to white families.[83] Fox has also shown that children on ADC received less overall assistance than they would have if they had qualified for General Assistance.[84] Overall, Lieberman concludes that these exclusionary impulses inhibited the development of a strong, unitary welfare state.[85] In its place would develop a set of welfare programs with varying degrees of institutional capacity, centralisation and stigma.

In general, the US case shows that formal membership in the political community was not decisive in the cordoning off of the welfare state during critical moments of its evolution. Fox argues that "formal citizenship was not sufficient … nor was it even necessary for social citizenship,"[86] while Lieberman admits that there was "far less organised support for alien exclusion" compared to exclusion on racial lines.[87] He describes this as contestation not over citizenship, but over its "texture and character."[88] These accounts suggest that *racialised* internal structuration proved a powerful means of bounding the welfare state. In addition, both authors submit evidence of the active engagement of public officials and agencies in this structuration. In other words, neither views the reflection or transmission of inequalities as inevitable. Key moves that stand out in Fox' account include, for example, when the Department of Charities in Los Angeles, where Mexican immigrants were concentrated, created a "Deportation Division" that provided an immigration inspector with a desk space and a car,[89] or when social workers in the Northeast, where white European immigrants were concentrated, argued that Americans should treat immigrants "as a citizen of tomorrow, as a partner in the common American enterprise."[90] Equally, Lieberman documents relief officials in the South discriminating despite federal orders to the contrary, and in the North attempting to keep foreigners on the dole even if it meant certifying other eligible household members.[91]

1.3.2. Immigrant rights

The literature across the Atlantic that most closely resembles US scholarship on race focuses on immigrant rights rather than racial inequality for two reasons. First, there is a belief that racial cleavages are not prominent in Europe.[92] As Pontusson argues, this conclusion subsumes all of Europe into one category, neglecting the rich variation that comparative European politics has spent decades studying and overstating the homogeneity of European societies.[93] Pontusson elaborates that "many European countries have a long history of ethnic, regional, linguistic and

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83 Lieberman, p.135.

84 Fox, *Three Worlds of Relief*, 260.

85 Lieberman, *Shifting the Color Line*, 13.

86 Fox, *Three Worlds of Relief*, 279.

87 Lieberman, *Shifting the Color Line*, 221.

88 Lieberman, 222.

89 Fox, *Three Worlds of Relief*, 134.

90 Fox, 221.

91 Lieberman, *Shifting the Color Line*, 216.

92 Alesina and Glaeser, *Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe*, 140.

93 Jonas Pontusson, "The American Welfare State in Comparative Perspective: Reflections on Alberto Alesina and Edward L Glaeser, 'Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe,'" *Perspectives on Politics* 4, no 2 (2006): 315–26.

religious divisions" and summons the Belgian case as an example, where the divide between Flemish and Walloons has not obstructed the development of a welfare state.[94] He also points to current immigration patterns, arguing that the share of foreign-born inhabitants in Europe currently approximates that of the US, and referring to OECD statistics from 2001 that put this proportion at 11 per cent in the US and 9 per cent, 10 per cent and 12 per cent in Germany, France and Sweden respectively.[95] This evidence is important, but partial, since it ignores the highly racialised "domestication of difference" in law and in practice that European colonialism entailed.[96]

The second reason that race receives scant attention in European welfare state scholarship is theoretical. Race is consistently underspecified, afflicted either with conceptual ambiguity or clumsy essentialism. Sometimes, superficial discussion on appropriateness supplants thoughtful reflection on the meaning of race. Hansen, who is interested in immigration and citizenship policy in a decolonising Britain, explicitly names Britain a "multicultural" rather than "multiracial" nation "because it is the less offensive of the two terms,"[97] admitting to a lack of interest in delimiting the meaning of either. Others betray confusion about race by employing five substantively different measures for ethnic diversity: ethnic fractionalisation, the proportion of the foreign population, the foreign-born population, non-Western foreign-born population, and migration inflow.[98] The relationship of all these indicators to the concept of interest (ethnic diversity) is unclear in all except the first, which professes to capture this directly.

Ethnic or racialisation indices, however, are constructed by measuring the probability that two individuals randomly drawn from a population will belong to two different groups.[99] This is a more direct operationalisation, but none the more appropriate as it relies on race or ethnicity as constituting discrete groups. This contradicts the scientific consensus that human genetic diversity, while formidable, is not organised into discrete racial categories.[100] As Appiah argues, there is nothing in the theory of evolution to suggest that a group that shares one characteristic will have others in common as well, and continues that "however you define the major races, the biological variability within them is almost as great as the biological variation within the species as a whole."[101] The fact that race has no biological meaning does not mean that it does not exist. It does mean, however, that the classification acquires and loses meaning through social, political, and economic practices, all of which will be invisible to the colour-blind social scientist who opts to study multiculturalism rather than racism.

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94   Pontusson, 322.
95   Pontusson, 322.
96   Mudimbe cited in Garth A Myers, "Late Colonial Lusaka and Postcolonial Geography," *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography* 27, no 3 (2006).
97   Randall Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 3.
98   Mau and Burkhardt, "Migration and Welfare State Solidarity in Western Europe," 217.
99   Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote, "Why Doesn't the US Have a European-Style Welfare System?"
100 "The Meaning of Race in Science - Considerations for Cancer Research" (Bethesda, Maryland: National Cancer Institute, 1998).
101 Appiah, "Race, Culture, Identity," 68.

On this basis, virtually all research into race and redistribution in Europe has been subsumed into a research agenda that sits at the nexus of migration studies and welfare states. Nonetheless, research devoted to immigrant rather than immigration policy[102] - that is, the study of migrant social rights rather than entry and regulations[103] - has gone some way toward exposing racial inequalities between immigrants and "natives." Sainsbury's work is exemplary in this regard.[104] In a joint paper with Morissens, Sainsbury compares the social rights of immigrants in the US, the UK, Germany, France, Denmark, and Sweden. In all, they find a major disparity in the standard of living between citizens and immigrant households which increases for "visible ethnic minority households" for whom means-tested benefits make up a larger component in their overall income package compared to citizens.[105]

Sainsbury and Morissen's insights into racial inequality, while important, are limited by the data they use, which comes from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). Although the LIS data sets contain a variable for ethnicity/nationality, there are vast differences in the availability of data and content of these variables across countries, and the authors resolve this difficulty by identifying ethnic minority migrants as those who are not from member countries of the EU, North America and Australasia.[106] Even more extreme, in the UK context where data on immigrant status is not available, the authors "are forced to use ethnicity as a proxy for immigration," meaning that all British people of colour are assumed foreigners.[107] Although quantitative analysis relies on these kind of shortcuts, the net effect is a collapse in the distinction between immigrants and racial minorities, making it very difficult to comment on the boundary-making dynamics at play.

Indeed, much of the explanatory research within this line of inquiry focuses on drivers of immigrant rights rather than of inequality. Ruhs conducts a "systematic, dispassionate analysis" of immigration and immigrant policy across over 40 high-income countries as a means of grasping how and why they restrict migrant rights.[108] He finds that access to most types of rights are differentiated by the skill level of the migrant, such that programs targeting higher skilled workers tend to grant more rights[109] and concludes that rational cost-benefit analyses play a "powerful role in high-income countries' decisions."[110] Ruhs' data also points to a link

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102   Tomas Hammar, *European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Sara Kalm and Johannes Lindvall, "Immigration Policy and the Modern Welfare State, 1880-1920," *Journal of European Social Policy*, 2019, 1–15.

103   Gallya Lahav and Virginie Guiraudon, "Actors and Venues in Immigration Control: Closing the Gap between Political Demands and Policy Outcomes," *West European Politics* 29, no 2 (2006): 201–23.

104   Diane Sainsbury and Ann Morissens, "Immigrants' Social Rights across Welfare States," in *Welfare States and Immigrant Rights: The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 113–32; see also Diane Sainsbury, *Welfare States and Immigrant Rights: The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion* (Oxford University Press, 2012), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199654772.001.0001; Diane Sainsbury, "Immigrants' Social Rights in Comparative Perspective: Welfare Regimes, Forms of Immigration and Immigration Policy Regimes," *Journal of European Social Policy* 16, no 3 (2006): 229–44.

105   Sainsbury and Morissens, "Immigrants' Social Rights across Welfare States," 119.

106   Sainsbury and Morissens, 642.

107   Sainsbury and Morissens, 642.

108   Martin Ruhs, *The Price of Rights: Regulating International Labor Migration* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).

109   Ruhs, 83.

110   Ruhs, 7.

between immigration and immigrant policy: where extending rights is costly, countries appear to compensate by making entry more difficult. His work is useful in spelling out potential links and tradeoffs, but it invites further inquiry to the people and politics that made these connections.

Similarly, Koopmans and Michalowski set out to identify the drivers of differences in immigrant rights across 29 countries through quantitatively analysing rights against broad institutional characteristics.[111] They find that former colonial powers, former settler countries, and democracies are more likely to extend rights to immigrants. The authors, however, coded for "involvement in colonialism" by including a dummy variable to signify whether a country was a colonial power in 1945. Although this practice is not uncommon in migration scholarship,[112] it makes their finding that "colonialism has more to do with immigrant rights than has previously been acknowledged" difficult to interpret.[113] In what way are colonialism and immigrant rights linked? The authors themselves suggest that "former colonial powers have a heritage of centuries of interaction with races, cultures and religions in other parts of the world" which makes the electorate "more sympathetic to inclusive immigrant rights."[114] This proposed mechanism raises questions, for example about how a legacy of imperial domination[115] would incline colonial powers toward tolerance.

Van Staalduinen's recent work on occupational inequalities between ethnic "minority" and "majority" groups in Finland, Germany, and the UK represents a recent attempt to paint a more complex picture of the relationship between racial inequalities, on the one hand, and welfare states, on the other. Using data from the European Social Survey (ESS) on occupational rank, ethnic minority status, and a successive set of covariates from a 15-country sample, van Staalduinen shows that, with the same level of education, minority employees end up at lower ranking jobs.[116] Investigating why even welfare states that have been leaders of social investment, like Finland, have failed to secure equal opportunities for immigrants, Van Staalduinen finds that policymakers direct immigrants into segments of the labour market where opportunities to acquire the social and cultural resources for mobility in the knowledge economy are fewer.[117]

In sum, even though welfare state scholars find racial inequalities in access to social (and economic) rights in Europe, in-depth historical analyses of racialisation (as exist in the US) are mostly lacking, and macro-level inquiries into the drivers of immigrant rights take their place.

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111 Ruud Koopmans and Ines Michalowski, "Why Do States Extend Rights to Immigrants? Institutional Settings and Historical Legacies across 44 Countries Worldwide.," *Comparative Political Studies* 50, no 1 (2017): 41–74.

112 Douglas S Massey, *Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

113 Koopmans and Michalowski, "Why Do States Extend Rights to Immigrants? Institutional Settings and Historical Legacies across 44 Countries Worldwide.," 59.

114 Koopmans and Michalowski, 65–66.

115 Eva-Maria Asari, Daphne Halikiopoulou, and Steven Mock, "British National Identity and the Dilemmas of Multiculturalism," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 1 (2008): 11.

116 Briitta van Staalduinen, "Ethnic Inequality in the Welfare State" (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2022), 4.

117 van Staalduinen, 4.

1.3.3.   Welfare chauvinism

A final area of welfare state scholarship that deals with race and welfare is concerned with the effects of immigration on welfare states. Afonso and Devitt distinguish between the *functional* and *political* logics that underpin this concern.[118] Functional logic refers to the effects of immigration on the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state,[119] while political logic refers to the effects on solidarity.[120] In the latter, the heterogeneity-redistribution trade-off that I introduced earlier (1.1.1) constitutes the supposed link in the chain between immigration, on the one hand, and reduced solidarity, on the other. Often, this is interpreted to mean that racial difference erodes the public's propensity to redistribute.

One approach to testing this thesis has been to examine, at the macro-level, the relationship between open external borders (often measured in immigration flows or foreign-born proportion of the population) and redistribution (often measured in individual-level attitudes or social spending). Some find a positive relationship; that is, greater levels of immigration translate into greater levels of redistribution.[121] Others find a negative relationship.[122] Most stress the importance of mediating variables, like the type of program in question,[123] the universalism of the welfare regime[124] or the degree to which migrants are integrated socially.[125] Another approach has been to study the constituent assumptions of the trade-off thesis at the micro-level through surveys or survey experiments. Racial difference is thought to provoke either a decrease in support for welfare policies across the board, or a change in the character of support, such that the public still supports social spending but only for specific groups or for specific programs. Since Goul Andersen and Bjørkland coined the term in 1990, the idea that "welfare services should be restricted to 'our own'" has been referred to as welfare chauvinism.[126]

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118 Alexandre Afonso and Camilla Devitt, "Comparative Political Economy and International Migration," *Socio-Economic Review* 14, no 3 (2016): 597.

119 Evidence is mixed, but most studies find that the net "fiscal burden" associated with immigrants depends on a host of other factors, like the type of migration, the program in question, and the demographic and employment structure of the receiving economy. Gary Freeman, "Migration and the Political Economy of the Welfare State," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 485 (1986): 51–63 Boeri, "Immigration to the Land of Redistribution." Robert Rowthorn, "The Fiscal Impact of Immigration on the Advanced Economies," *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 24, no 3 (2008): 560–80.

120 Will Kymlicka and Keith Banting, "Immigration, Multiculturalism, and the Welfare State," *Ethics & International Affairs* 20, no 3 (September 2006): 282, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2006.00027.x.

121 Clare Fenwick, "The Political Economy of Immigration and Welfare State Effort: Evidence from Europe," *European Political Science Review* 11, no 3 (2019): 357–75.

122 Stuart N Soroka, Keith Banting, and Richard Johnston, "Migration and Redistribution in a Global Era.," in *Globalization And Egalitarian Redistribution*, ed Pranab K Bardhan, Samuel Bowles, and Michael Wallerstein (Princeton [N.J.]: Princeton University Press and Russell Sage Foundation, 2006), 261–68; Stuart N Soroka et al., "Migration and Welfare State Spending," *European Political Science Review* 8, no 2 (May 2016): 173–94, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773915000041.

123 Soroka et al., "Migration and Welfare State Spending."

124 Markus M L Crepaz and Regan Damron, "Constructing Tolerance: How the Welfare State Shapes Attitudes About Immigrants," *Comparative Political Studies* 42, no 3 (March 2009): 437–63, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414008325576.

125 Brian Burgoon, "Immigration, Integration, and Support for Redistribution in Europe," *World Politics* 66, no 3 (July 2014): 365–405, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887114000100.

126 Jørgen Goul Andersen and Tor Bjørklund, "Structural Changes and New Cleavages: The Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway," *Acta Sociologica* 33, no 3 (July 1990): 212, https://doi.org/10.1177/000169939003300303.

Carmel and Sojka consider the term a thinly veiled disguise of racism.[127] Indeed, one of the major contributions made by this strand of literature is the evidence it furnishes of racism vis-à-vis welfare claimants.

For example, Van Oorschot analyses public opinion data from the Netherlands in 1995 and uses this data to inductively derive five criteria for deservingness - understood as the extent to which individuals are considered worthy or unworthy of social rights based on their actions or characteristics.[128] One criterion that van Oorschot highlights is 'identity.' He finds that the Dutch public is more likely to support a hypothetical claimant whose identity is culturally proximate, and who can be considered "one of them."[129] Building on this interest in identity and its impact on deservingness, Ford fields two survey experiments in Britain in which respondents are asked about the extent to which they support a hypothetical claimant receiving welfare.[130] Manipulating the fictitious claimant's ethnicity and immigration status, Ford finds a "lack of sympathy across ethnic or national origin boundaries" - specifically, that white respondents favour white welfare claimants over foreign-born or ethnically different claimants.[131] Reeskens and van der Meer field a similar vignette experiment in the Netherlands. The authors find identity to be among the three most important criteria for the Dutch respondents' solidarity.[132] They draw this conclusion by varying the hypothetical claimant's country of origin between the Netherlands, Kosovo, Suriname, Morocco and Afghanistan, a choice justified in the following terms: "'Daan from The Netherlands' serves as control condition. In close proximity are 'Riza from Kosovo' ... and 'Aron from Surinam' ... More distant is 'Mohammed from Morocco' ... and most distant is 'Mullah from Afghanistan.'"[133]

Finally, in her vignette experiment, Kootstra makes similar methodological choices, varying "ethnic background" by creating fictitious British, Irish, Jamaican, and Pakistani claimants for British respondents to evaluate and fictitious Dutch, Belgian, Surinamese, and Moroccan claimants for Dutch respondents to evaluate.[134] She explains that "the Irish and Belgian are included as culturally proximate claimants," while "Muslims are generally regarded more negatively by the white majority than blacks," and that she therefore expects that "in Britain, the British are held most deserving, followed by the Irish and Jamaican, with Pakistani claimants being seen as least deserving. In The Netherlands, Dutch claimants are expected to be perceived as most deserving, followed by Belgians and Surinamese claimants, with Moroccans coming in last."[135]

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127 Emma Carmel and Božena Sojka, "Beyond Welfare Chauvinism and Deservingness Rationales of Belonging as a Conceptual Framework for the Politics and Governance of Migrants' Rights," *Journal of Social Policy*, July 24, 2020, 3, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279420000379.

128 Kootstra, "Deserving and Undeserving Welfare Claimants in Britain and the Netherlands," 327.

129 Wim van Oorschot, "Who Should Get What, and Why? On Deservingness Criteria and the Conditionality of Solidarity among the Public," *Policy & Politics* 28, no 1 (January 1, 2000): 33–48, https://doi.org/10.1332/0305573002500811.

130 Ford, "Who Should We Help?"

131 Ford, 631.

132 Reeskens and van der Meer, "The Inevitable Deservingness Gap."

133 Reeskens and van der Meer, 172.

134 Kootstra, "Deserving and Undeserving Welfare Claimants in Britain and the Netherlands," 330.

135 Kootstra, 328.

Although evidence that racism plays a role in redistributive decisions is important, these hierarchies obscure more than they reveal (as I argued in 1.1.1). Van Oorschot's original claim, that we are more likely to support those who are "one of us," has intuitive appeal. However, embedding the assumption that a Pakistani claimant is less likely to be "one of us" into the research design is problematic. Decades of sociological and cultural studies scholarship has shown that identity is a relative and dynamic positioning within a given ideological landscape (see 2.3.3.1). At best, ethnic hierarchies are unhelpful, as they fail to offer adequate insight into how perceptions of cultural proximity and distance are formed. In fact, some assume that mistrust across racial lines is intrinsic.[136] Putnam, for example, argues "most (though not all) empirical studies have tended... to support" the notion that "the more we are brought into physical proximity with people of another race or ethnic background, the more we stick to 'our own' and the less we trust 'the other.'"[137] The title of a recent publication - "the *inevitable* deservingness gap"[138] - betrays the popularity of the belief that preferences are intrinsic and natural in mainstream scholarship.

Many of the social psychology classics often cited to support this idea, however, contradict it, suggesting instead that a social process of self-identification and group formation precedes discriminatory preferences. Blumer, for example, argues that racial prejudice requires that individuals first come to identify themselves as part of a group. Rather than this being "spontaneous or inevitable," Blumer argues that this identification is "a result of experience," and a "*collective process*" whereby individuals assess their social positions in relation to one another.[139] This is a far cry from innate group conflict. Similarly, one of Tajfel's enduring legacies was to show "how easy it is to... modify the ingroup-outgroup perceptions" of subjects.[140] In two different experiments, after categorising participants into different groups on the basis of superficial information - in this case, their estimate of the number of dots on a screen, or their preferences between Klee and Kandinsky paintings - Tajfel himself was able to "activate... the norm of 'groupness'" despite "the flimsy criteria for social categorisation that were employed."[141]

Accordingly, more recent research views mistrust as stemming from political choice rather than inevitability. Kymlicka and Banting suggest that the effects of racial difference are actually reactions to the policies, like affirmative action, that are deployed in its presence - in the authors' view, these "multiculturalism" policies emphasise difference rather than commonalities.[142] Alesina and Glaeser see attitudes stemming from "entrepreneurial politicians" who "vilify particular ethnic groups" in order to gain votes, for example when their policies are likely to hurt those groups.[143] Gilens, meanwhile, highlights the role of the media after analysing decades of US American news and finding that from 1967 to 1992, people of colour represented

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136 Kymlicka and Banting, "Immigration, Multiculturalism, and the Welfare State," 3.
137 Putnam, "E Pluribus Unum," 142.
138 Reeskens and van der Meer, "The Inevitable Deservingness Gap."
139 Herbert Blumer, "Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position," *The Pacific Sociological Review* 1, no 1 (Spring 1958): 3.
140 Henri Tajfel et al., "Social Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour," *European Journal of Social Psychology* 1, no 2 (1971): 151.
141 Tajfel et al., 174.
142 Kymlicka and Banting, *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State*, 9.
143 Alesina and Glaeser, *Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe*, 137.

about 57 per cent of the poor people pictured in stories about poverty - about twice their true proportion among the nation's poor.[144] These constitute important strides toward understanding the connections between race and welfare, but they take up far too little space in the scholarship.

In short, while the body of work dealing with welfare chauvinism underscores the *relevance* of racism for redistributive attitudes, it pays inadequate attention to its *sources*. This is a regretful oversight, especially if prejudice follows a collective process of group construction, as social psychology suggests: questions around group solidarity often motivate welfare state scholars' interest in race in the first place.

1.4. Post-war Europe as empire

1.4.1. Linking colony, metropole and welfare

In the above section, I synthesised the key ways in which welfare state scholarship thus far has engaged issues of race and racism, pointing out remaining blindspots. My research, approaching the history of welfare expansion with attention to potential racial differences accompanying postcolonial migration, is situated in these gaps. However, research in other disciplines, like history, migration scholarship and postcolonial theory has laid important foundations for inquiries like mine.

For example, postcolonial theorists advocate studying colony and metropole through the same analytic lens, a necessary move when studying political dynamics in decolonising countries.[145] Gilroy described the circulation of ideas between Africa, the Caribbean and the Afro-Caribbean diaspora as the 'Black Atlantic'.[146] Hansen and Jonsson have shown how visionaries of European integration in the 20th century recognised and sought to protect the proliferation of constitutional ties between Europe and Africa by institutionalising the notion of "Eurafrica."[147] Stoler and Cooper, in their edited volume *Tensions of Empire,* argue adamantly that the boundaries between metropole and colony were always porous. They claim that, "Europe was made by its imperial projects [and] colonial encounters were shaped by conflicts within Europe itself."[148] Colonial experience taught metropolitan policymakers about the possibilities and limits of rule by elite subjugation and disciplining projects.[149] Agents of modern states learned how to exercise power in the "capillary" fashion that Foucault documented, seeping into all facets of social life through surveillance, measurement and intimate control, in the colonies. It also enabled policymakers to practice constructing racial categories as an instrument for the exercise of power. Stoler documents Dutch colonial

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144 Gilens, *Why Americans Hate Welfare*, 114.
145 Magubane, *Bringing the Empire Home: Race, Class, and Gender in Britain and Colonial South Africa*, 9.
146 Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
147 Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, *Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism* (London, New York, Toronto: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014).
148 Stoler and Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda," 1.
149 Stoler and Cooper, 3.

rulers trying to racially classify European-educated children in the Indies and of Indies-born European children.[150] Saada shows how children of mixed parentage in French Indochina forced similar efforts to define the racial character of membership in the French nation.[151]

In this way, colonies directly challenged the discourse of inclusive citizenship upon which European ruling elites, after the Enlightenment, had based their legitimacy. For Stoler and Cooper, ruling elites "were forced to confront a basic question: whether those principles were applicable - and to whom - in old overseas empires and in newly conquered territory."[152] This was not a question they could contemplate in peace, as colonised peoples borrowed language they heard used during social struggles waged in the metropole. Cooper's own research into labour codes of late colonialism in French and British Africa shows how two different colonial powers responded to the growing pressure to eliminate forced labour by creating an "cultural, asocial, and ahistorical category of the wage worker" on the African continent.[153] Indeed, Cooper shows how Africans' escalating demands for equal treatment contributed to the crisis of colonial rule, which policymakers came to associate more with costs and responsibilities than with reward.

The link that Cooper draws between labour unrest in Europe and on the African continent suggests the intra-imperial transfer of ideas about the right to welfare. This interplay had real material consequences for colonised peoples, for example, in French Africa where officials promulgated social security systems that resembled those of the metropole.[154] However, the arrow also ran in the opposite direction. Ideas about welfare were equally shaped by conflicts in the colonies. Magubane analyses figurative language in England and South Africa and argues that colonised male bodies provided a "stock set of images and metaphors for reconstituting public knowledge about the destitute in England,"[155] with blackness functioning metaphorically as "shorthand for social marginality" and deployed to rationalise an unequal division of labour in a capitalist society.[156]

In recent years the effect of colonialism on welfare expansion has been made even more explicit, although only in the British context. In *Race and the Undeserving Poor,* Shilliam examines how the "white working class" emerged as a constituency deemed deserving of welfare by the British public.[157] He traces the roots of the title back to 19th century efforts to isolate a "discretely Anglo-Saxon family" of British subjects, a means of protecting imperial order when revolts like the Morant Bay rebellion in 1865 threatened its integrity.[158] If colonialism was implicated in the birth of the white working class as a constituency, it equally underlined the urgency of *caring* for this constituency. During the Boer Wars, when the British army

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150 Ann Laura Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton University Press, 2008), 58, https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400835478.

151 Emmanuelle Saada, *Empire's Children: Race, Filiation, and Citizenship in the French Colonies*, trans Arthur Goldhammer (University of Chicago Press, 2012).

152 Stoler and Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda," 1.

153 Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa*, 263.

154 Cooper, 389.

155 Magubane, *Bringing the Empire Home: Race, Class, and Gender in Britain and Colonial South Africa*, 4.

156 Magubane, 4.

157 Robbie Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor: From Abolition to Brexit* (Newcastle Upon Tyme: Agenda Publishing, 2018).

158 Shilliam, 43.

fought Afrikaans-speaking farmers to unite its colonial territories, the public widely believed that up to 60 per cent of English volunteers were rejected due to physical fitness.[159] Indeed, in 1904 an interdepartmental committee on "Physical Deterioration" found evidence of "physical unfitness" of the British people, and drew the link between these conditions and national security.[160] The fear was that the British working class was incapable of protecting colonial rule.

Shilliam argues that early social legislation was motivated by these anxieties. He suggests that the 1911 National Insurance Act was designed to ensure that the British working class could rival the "industrial vitality" of the Germans.[161] He also reveals eugenicist concerns underpinning post-war legislation. In a lecture to the Eugenics Society in 1943, Beveridge himself admitted an interest in improving the "British race," protecting the "heritable ability" of the working class, discouraging the "breeding" of "those who are less successful, and defending the "pride of race" that (white) British people ostensibly felt.[162] In short, Shilliam suggests that welfare expansion in the 20th century was part of a broader effort to contain threats to British imperial dominance by improving the conditions of the (white) British worker, supposedly preserving the dignity, superiority and military capability of the imperial nation.

To this account, Bhambra adds fiscal considerations, arguing that the British colonial project not only incentivised welfare expansion, but also *enabled* it. Bhambra shows how returning East India Company employees known as "Nabobs"[163] made significant contributions to poor relief, as did colonial subjects in British India who paid "tribute" - levies extracted at irregular intervals by colonial states from conquered peoples - even when income tax was discontinued for the working and middle classes on the British isles.[164] Besides these contributions, Britain also benefited financially from low interest rates on loans from India, and dollars earned by exporting colonies which were controlled by Britain.[165] These sources of income facilitated welfare expansion by filling the public coffers without demanding any major sacrifice from the middle classes.[166]

There are conflicting views about how the dynamic between colonialism and welfare withstood the test of decolonisation. Strang argues that decolonisation freed up cash for domestic affairs and reduced Britain (and France) to "second-rate powers" who were "forced to turn inward."[167] Bhambra and Holmwood see decolonisation as exerting pressure in the opposite direction. They agree with Shilliam that Britain's "domestically inclusive welfare state regime" was starkly juxtaposed against the global system of exploitation that was colonialism.[168]

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159 Shilliam, 52.
160 Bentley B Gilbert, "Health and Politics: The British Physical Deterioration Report of 1904," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*. 39, no 2 (April 1965): 144.
161 Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor: From Abolition to Brexit*, 53.
162 Shilliam, 74–75.
163 Bhambra, "Relations of Extraction, Relations of Redistribution," 8.
164 Bhambra, 7.
165 Bhambra, 12.
166 Daniel Tarschys, "Tributes, Tariffs, Taxes and Trade: The Changing Sources of Government Revenue," *British Journal of Political Science*. 18, no 1 (January 1988): 1–20, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123400004932.
167 David Strang, "British and French Political Institutions and the Patterning of Decolonization," in *The Comparative Political Economy of the Welfare State*, ed Janowski and Hicks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 292.
168 Bhambra and Holmwood, "Colonialism, Postcolonialism and the Liberal Welfare State," 581.

In this way, they challenge simplistic arguments about the incompatibility of diversity and solidarity, pointing out that a "failure of [transnational, imperial] solidarity" was actually at the heart of welfare expansion.[169] However, they also lend muted support to this argument because, unlike Strang, Bhambra and Holmwood argue that postcolonial migration (provoked by decolonisation) *reduced* British commitment to welfare. However, the evidence provided in support of this thesis is limited to the recognition that the introduction of non-white citizens of the UK, the political backlash against these citizens (see 5.4), and the rolling back of social rights coincided - somewhat - in time.[170] An in-depth empirical analysis of these decisions is lacking; for example, the erosion of rights due to Commonwealth immigration took place mainly in the domain of entry rights, as citizenship came to be decoupled from entry rights. Without more detail on specific welfare programs or agencies, it is not clear whether the erosion of solidarity to which the authors point was felt in social legislation itself, as authors like Lieberman have illustrated in the US case.

1.4.2. The rights of postcolonial migrants
1.4.2.1. Summary
Although welfare state scholarship might not have paid them so much attention, (post)colonial migrants have been the subject of a growing volume of literature. In many country contexts, research into the experience and rights of these groups forms part of distinctive research agendas, for example into the repatriation of displaced compatriots or immigration reform.

In this section I first provide an overview of literature in my three country cases by scholars of different disciplinary affiliations. The literature is more expansive in France and the UK than in The Netherlands, although according to Buettner, historians of Britain are "among the worst offenders of the wider tendency" to examine national histories in silos and in isolation from their neighbours.[171]

I then look at several English-language volumes that seek to bring these cases into dialogue with one another to shed light on the phenomenon of postcolonial migration as an object of study. Most of these studies focus on *repatriates*, i.e. those (post)colonial migrants who fled the colonies after decolonisation rather than in search of work. They focus mostly on white people of "European ancestry" but also sometimes those descendants of mixed-race partnerships.[172]

1.4.2.2. Symbolic foreigners to the Netherlands
Several Dutch scholars have undertaken comprehensive research into migrants from the Netherlands Indies, in particular those with Dutch citizenship who were called repatriates (*gerepatrieerden*). Some studies focus more on the demographic qualities of the group and others on the cultural, political, economic context which they encountered upon arrival, trying to evaluate the extent to which this context shaped their prospects. At least two study

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169 cited in Lisa Tilley and Robbie Shilliam, "Raced Markets: An Introduction," *New Political Economy* 23, no 5 (2018): 540.
170 Bhambra and Holmwood, "Colonialism, Postcolonialism and the Liberal Welfare State," 582.
171 Buettner, *Europe after Empire*, 14.
172 Buettner, 215.

political discourse and observe the post-war period as a pivotal moment at which the meaning of national belonging was revisited.

The sociologists Ellemers and Vaillant offer an overview of repatriates after Indonesian independence.[173] Their book contains descriptive demographic details as well as information about the types of public assistance to which these individuals had access, most notably in the realm of social services like labour market activation and housing, but also targeted assistance programs that were provided by the private sector. The Dutch government's post-war efforts to organise the return of thousands of displaced citizens - Indonesian repatriates included - is the subject of Bossenbroek's work.[174] Using government archives and interviews with repatriates, Willems explores why the reception of this group by the Dutch public was so lukewarm despite an ostensibly "successful" integration trajectory.[175] His focus is on how the administration reacted and tried to steer the migration against a backdrop of housing scarcity and economic reconstruction.

Jones is curious about the effects of postcolonial migration on the image that Dutch society has of itself.[176] He studies how politicians thought and spoke about the national belonging of overseas citizens from both the Western and the Eastern parts of Dutch empire. He argues that although these migrants were "formal citizens," they were "symbolically and juridically excluded" from national belonging.[177] Jones' focus on discursive belonging is indispensable. He recognises that he lacks information about their actual integration, stating: "the question of how postcolonial citizens have fared in the last 50 years, socially and politically, is outside the scope of this study, despite being of immense importance from the perspective of full citizenship," as are "the effects of law and policy and the details of policy implementation."[178]

Laarman's focus is similar to Jones' in that she uses discourse analysis to study the inclusion and exclusion of postcolonial migrants from 1945 to 2005.[179] This historical moment, she concurs, is a "moment of debate when the 'we' - the nation - is defined and redefined."[180] Like Jones, she argues that they occupied an "in-between category, at the intersection of discursive and judicial citizenship."[181] She elucidates how a racialised Dutchness emerged as, for example, mixed-race individuals were named separately from the Dutch although, juridically, they belonged to the same group.[182] Her work is one of few Dutch studies that answers the call to build a bridge "between colonial and postcolonial research" as a means of discovering "how colonial views and rhetorics have influenced contemporary thinking about 'us' and 'them.'"[183]

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173 J.E Ellemers and R.E.F Vaillant, *Indische Nederlanders En Gerepatrieerden* (Muiderberg: Coutinho, 1985).
174 Martijn Bossenbroek, *De Meelstreep* (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Bakker, 2004).
175 Wim Willems, *De Uittocht Uit Indië, 1945-1995* (Uitgeverij Bert Bakker, 2001).
176 Guno Jones, "Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten En Nederlanders: Nederlandse Politici over Burgers Uit Oost En West En Nederland, 1945-2005" (Amsterdam, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 2007).
177 Jones, 30.
178 Jones, 40.
179 Charlotte Laarman, *Oude Onbekenden: Het Politieke En Publieke Debat over Postkoloniale Migranten, 1945-2005* (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2013).
180 Laarman, 27.
181 Laarman, 15.
182 Laarman, 55.
183 Laarman, 18.

Finally, framing the UK and the Netherlands as most-similar systems, Schuster compares how Dutch and British governments (tried to) regulate post-war immigration from the colonies.[184] He looks at migrants from Indonesia, the Antilles and Suriname, and the Caribbean, South Asia, and East Africa for each country respectively. He is particularly interested in the recruitment of labour migrants, and shows how post-war cabinets in both countries found themselves at the helm of an economy in need of manpower. Each acted quite distinctly towards their colonies in this context. Recruitment from Suriname, even by the Dutch private sector, was ad hoc, slow, and late compared to recruitment of British employers from British colonies. In addition, Schuster shows that the move to deny overseas citizens entry rights was considered in The Netherlands, but only actually implemented in the UK.[185] Still, Schuster clarifies that in the Dutch and British context there were "citizens, juridical foreigners, and symbolic foreigners,"[186] emphasising that researchers interested in the sources of national belonging must look beyond nationality law.

In this dissertation, I build on the mountain of empirical work produced by historians of migration in the Netherlands while answering Jones' call to consider material forms of inclusion and exclusion.

1.4.2.3. France: welfare as a material and rhetorical tool

For about two decades starting from the 1930s, French research into North African migrants proliferated. During this time, Algeria still belonged to the French Republic, and unlike the repatriates from Indonesia, Algerians in the metropole were mostly labour migrants. In general, research then was less concerned with social rights than with studying the demographic characteristics of the migrants and their position in the French economy using (descriptive) statistical and ethnographic methods. Nonetheless, these early studies produced both valuable background information and, due to the heavy influence of colonial (racial) thought, also supply insight into how race was operative at the time.

In 1938, Ray wrote a doctoral thesis on Moroccans in France[187] and prime minister Blum commissioned Pierre Laroque - later credited with the founding of the French social security system - and his colleague in the Council of State, to study Algerian labourers.[188] Each author discussed "North Africans" as a distinct population with internally coherent characteristics, compiling data on a number of dimensions to lend credence to this classification. Studies then responded to what was seen as the "question" or "problem" of North Africans in the metropole. For example, Rager frames his book as an attempt to capture how North African labour migrants adapt to a "lifestyle and civilisation completely different from theirs," thereby contributing to the image of the newcomers as cultural outsiders.[189] Equally, when he surveys

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184 John Schuster, *Poortwachters over Immigranten: Het Debat over Immigratie in Het Naoorlogse Groot-Britannië En Nederland* (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1999).
185 Schuster, 216.
186 Schuster, 222.
187 Joanny Ray, "Les Marocains en France" (Paris, France: Librairie du recueil Sirey, 1938).
188 PaSP-JU11-Pierre Laroque and Ollive Français, "Les Nord-Africains En France," March 1938.
189 Jean-Jacques Rager, *Les Musulmans Algériens En France et Dans Les Pays Islamiques* (Paris: Sociétes Éditions Les Belles Lettres, 1950), 8.

various push and pull factors contributing to migration patterns, Rager includes consideration of the "psychological factor," assigning specific psychological traits to North Africans.[190]

One exception to the colonial-ethnographic tradition is a 1958 study by Michel. Although Michel sets out with similar aims as her forebears - providing a comprehensive analysis of the position of Algerian labour migrants in the French (political) economy - she is much more sensitive to the colonial context in which industrial relations were situated. In fact, she is explicitly interested in the nature of the relationship between Algerian and "European" workers in the metropole, as well as in their working conditions, places of settlement, employment profiles, and reasons for migration. Notably, and unlike Dutch scholars, she concentrates not on public or private initiatives to ameliorate their conditions but on their *results* which, in general, she argues, "do not correspond with the efforts undertaken."[191] In other words, she finds the results meagre.

In recent years, research into Algerian labour migrants in the post-war period has placed greater emphasis on the social rights to which they had access. Pitti studies the assistance and working conditions of Algerian labour migrants in the automobile industry, a highly competitive sector in the post-war period. Specifically, she focuses on a Renault factory complex situated on an island (Île Sequin) on the river Seine, to the southwest of Paris in Boulogne-Billancourt. Firms looked to this factory, which employed the greatest number of Algerians out of any factory between 1946 and 1974, as a model for structuring their own production.[192] Assigned the most difficult and dangerous parts of production - in metal foundries, for example - and only rarely moved to different positions throughout their career at the factory, Algerians filled gaps left by increasingly unionised French workers reluctant to perform dangerous labour.[193] Pitti shows how resistance to this differential treatment became part and parcel of a broader mobilisation of the Algerian workforce.

More recently, Lyons, particularly in *The Civilising Mission in the Metropole,* focuses specifically on the character and purposes of assistance for Algerian labour migrants.[194] As I elaborate in 7.3.1, Lyons identifies a "services network" with over one hundred private actors supported by various public agencies. She argues that this network displayed continuity pre- and post-independence, with programs, techniques, personnel of immigrant social services networks directly reflecting their colonial legacies. Additionally, surveying welfare efforts during the Algerian war of independence, she positions welfare as the "quintessential material and rhetorical tool on all levels and both sides of the conflict."[195]

After Algerian independence, the focus of the scholarship turns to repatriates and specifically *pieds-noirs*: a formerly pejorative designation that white settlers in Algeria with

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190 Rager, 8.

191 Andrée Michel, *Les Travailleurs Algériens En France* (Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1956), 7.

192 Laure Pitti, "La Main d'oeuvre Algérienne Dans l'industrie Automobile (1945-1962), Ou Les Oubliés de l'histoire," *Hommes et Migrations*, Immigration et marché du travail Un siècle d'histoire, n°1263 (October 2006): 49.

193 Pitti, 52.

194 Amelia H Lyons, *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: The French Welfare State during Decolonization* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2013).

195 Lyons, 142.

French citizenship ultimately appropriated for themselves.[196] Jordi, who has been called the "father" of pieds-noir studies,[197] juxtaposes interviews with the newcomers against media reports and departmental archives in Bouches-du-Rhône (the department in which Marseille is located).[198] He chronicles welfare efforts by governments in passing as he paints a general picture of "anti-repatriate public opinion," and documents the effects that this sentiment had on the lives of individual pieds-noirs.[199] Meanwhile Scioldo-Zürcher's landmark study covers integration policy for Algerian repatriates in the metropole from 1954 to 2005. He analyses a corpus of laws (over 400 bills) pertaining to repatriates and then tries to dislodge the calculations that drove them and the effects that succeeded them. He consulted 10 (of the 1.5 million) files at the *Service central des rapatriés* in Ages, which is still in use. By mapping targeted assistance for different groups of Algerian migrants, historians like Lyons and Scioldo-Zürcher cleared the way for this dissertation.

There is comparatively less scholarship on harkis - those repatriates fleeing the Algerian war who were not white, but inherited a status as "Muslim" French (previously "indigenous" under colonial rule). Jordi and Hamoumou[200] pen an earnest and emotive account of the betrayal of harkis, the policies that engendered it, and, principally, the collective memory of both among second-generation harkis, whose testimonies constitute the book's main source. The authors explore the violence harkis faced, their difficulties repatriating, the camps to which they were assigned and the control to which they were subject, the professional resettlement schemes, and how harkis and their children have forged an identity around these histories.

1.4.2.4. *The UK: Colour and citizenship*

The tradition of research into postcolonial migrants in the UK is long, but not usually labelled as such. Instead, the interested student finds these texts mostly under the header of legal or sociolegal studies into 20th century immigration reform which progressively unravelled overseas citizens' right to reside in the UK from 1962 onward (for more details, see 5.4.5). This literature mostly focuses on entry rather than social rights. There is an additional strand of research offering details about the rights of postcolonial migrants by means of telling a story about the history of race in the UK.

A seminal, ambitious effort in the first respect is Hansen's *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain.* Hansen sets out to explain the exceptional openness of the British immigration regime in the post-war period, during which 800 million British subjects had entry rights in the British Isles, followed by the swift retraction of these rights in the 1960s.[201] He argues that pre-1962 immigration policy was a function of foreign policy considerations; specifically, the UK's perceived need to maintain positive ties with "Old Commonwealth"

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196 Buettner, *Europe after Empire*, 239.
197 Yann Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir Métropolitain: Politique d'intégration et Parcours de Rapatriés d'Algérie En Métropole (1954-2005)* (Paris: EHESS, 2010), 21.
198 Jean-Jacques Jordi, *1962: L'arrivée Des Pieds-Noirs* (Paris: Les Éditions Autrement, 1995).
199 Jordi, 93.
200 Jean-Jacques Jordi and Mohand Hamoumou, *Les Harkis, Une Mémoire Enfouie* (Paris: Éditions Autrement, 1999).
201 Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation*, 6.

or Dominion countries like Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Post-1962 immigration reform, meanwhile, was due to a "hardening of the Ministry of Labour against unrestricted labour" due to their preoccupation with a "migration-driven surge in unemployment during periods of recession."[202] Notably, Hansen rejects a 'racialisation thesis,' according to which British restrictionism can be chalked up to a state-led project of banishing Blackness. Hansen proclaims adamantly that such a thesis "finds *no* support in the archival sources."[203] Although there were racists in the administration, Hansen argues, they were outnumbered.

Hansen's contribution is valuable for its testament to path dependency, intra-ministerial distribution of power, and the dissolution of empire on domestic immigration policy outcomes. However, his account would be enhanced by resisting the temptation to engage discussions of race. One reason is because his own beliefs about race are hidden in plain sight. Hansen frames immigration restriction as a "degree of policy success...unknown to [other] countries"[204] and a "difficult but essential decision,"[205] without providing any evidence as to why it was necessary. He does refer to streams of British public opinion that were increasingly "restrictionist"[206] or "illiberal."[207] But to imply that a policy is *successful* and *essential* because members of the public favour it is to also suggest that unpopular policies are failures and impossible. Moreover, it begs the question - *unpopular for whom?* At no point in the book are the opinions or voices of the migrants themselves given any attention. Indeed, his research question itself seems poised to answer the question of why there are people of colour in the UK.[208]

A second reason to be sceptical of Hansen's take on race is that his rejection of the 'racialisation thesis' is based on a straw man. Certainly, the evidence does not support the idea of a unitary, monolith state manipulating an otherwise sympathetic British public into racist mania. However, a persistent and deeply entrenched racism is obvious even from Hansen's own data. He documents plainly the "deep unease among senior bureaucrats and Cabinet ministers about non-white migration,"[209] the instructions to colonial governments to curb emigration, and repeated attempts to block the entry of non-white subjects, including on the grounds that "a large coloured community... is certainly no part of the concept of England or Britain to which people of British stock throughout the Commonwealth are attached."[210]

Hansen does not view any of these opinions or actions as racist because they do not explicitly reference racial inferiority. This reflects a superficial view of race and racism, which is surprising given that UK-based scholars had been publishing for the better part of the century on the systemic nature of racism and its material consequences. Hall, for example, though known for his contribution to cultural theory, relied on a wealth of empirical research into the experience of postcolonial migrants in the UK. In 'Race and Moral Panics in Post-war Britain,' Hall historicises the "appearance of a black proletariat in Birmingham [and] Bradford

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202 Hansen, 84.
203 Hansen, 15.
204 Hansen, VII.
205 Hansen, 78.
206 Hansen, 86.
207 Hansen, VII.
208 Hansen, 17.
209 Hansen, 63.
210 Hansen, 67.

in the 1950s."[211] He describes the settlement of Caribbean "postcolonial migrants" in the late 1940s, lingers on the first signs of an "open and emergent racism" in the late 1950s when white youths attacked Black migrants in Notting Hill and Nottingham, and documents the rise of anti-immigrant voices in mainstream politics.[212] He unambiguously positions the "excessive… preoccupation with race" of the British public that Hansen had also documented as a projection onto immigrants of social and cultural problems internal to Britain, such as the "rapid process of social change" that Britain underwent after the war.

In *Bordering Britain*, the legal scholar El-Enany studies the same immigration reform that Hansen had.[213] Presenting a much more critical view, she argues that the legislation stripped British rights-bearers of their status in language coded as post-racial. She also evaluates this legislation normatively, but does so in a much more explicit way, adamant that citizens of British empire should have been entitled to the wealth that their labour was exploited to produce. She argues that immigration law since these reforms has continued to carve out racial inequalities by selectively, and on the state's own terms, dispensing legal statuses to people with histories of British colonial domination and dispossession.[214] For present purposes, her work is noteworthy for its decisive conclusions about the nature of boundaries - racial and otherwise - in Britain, arguing that Britain has emerged out of the post-war period no different than it entered it; namely, as a "racially and colonially configured space."[215]

Moving more explicitly out of the terrain of immigration policy and towards immigrant policy - or rights - Lucassen studies the integration of Caribbean migrants.[216] He documents their concentration in the lower rungs of the labour market, but concludes that "[skin] colour" is not to blame,[217] citing favourable "intermarriage" rates between Caribbean British and white British citizens and arguing, without having conducted a discourse analysis like Laarman or Jones did in the Dutch case, that Caribbeans were "perceived as… less alien than the more physically similar immigrants from Asian colonies."[218] Instead of racism, he suggests that "they simply did not have the required skills to enter the more promising sectors of the economy."[219] Like Hansen, Lucassen simultaneously puts forward contradictory evidence to his claim, for example that shopkeepers feared Black employees would put off white clients.[220] Like Hansen, Lucassen's conclusions betray a misguided understanding of how racialisation operates in social systems.

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211 Stuart Hall, "Race and 'Moral Panics' in Post-war Britain," in *Selected Writings on Race and Difference*, ed Paul Gilroy and Ruth Wilson Gilmore (1978; repr., Durham: Duke University Press, 2021), 56–70.

212 Hansen, 62.

213 Nadine El-Enany, *Bordering Britain* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2020).

214 El-Enany, 29.

215 El-Enany, 3.

216 Leo Lucassen, *The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe since 1850* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2005).

217 Lucassen, 141.

218 Lucassen, 140.

219 Lucassen, 131.

220 Lucassen, 122.

1.4.2.5. Comparative research

Thus far, I have documented country-specific research into the (post)colonial migrant population of Europe, scattered across various research areas and disciplines. Recently, however, there have been a handful of attempts to bring this scholarship together into a clearer research agenda. These are sometimes united under the banner of 'new imperial history,' which looks beyond political, military, and economic questions of empire to consider the influence of imperialism on everyday cultures in Europe.[221]

Smith assembles English-language work on (post)colonial migrants.[222] She argues that disciplinary and conceptual silos have obstructed our understanding of these migrations, as we rarely consider voluntary and involuntary migrants, labour migrants and refugees in the same breath.[223] Nonetheless, contributions to the volume focus on repatriates, which usually means those migrants with citizenship and a (variably) accepted cultural affinity with the metropole who arrive as refugees after decolonisation. Smith betrays a particular interest in white migrants with her title (*Europe's Invisible Migrants*), and her critique of existing literature for its "uncritical targeting of the more visibly different migrants."[224] The volume offers a comparison of the background, trajectory, and reception of repatriates from Indonesia in The Netherlands, from Algeria, Indochina, Morocco and Tunisia in France, and from Angola and Mozambique in Portugal. The various contributions refer to social rights only intermittently, as Smith summarises that "the little research completed on this question so far suggests that the government programs that promoted the social and economic integration of [former] colonists were mitigated successes."[225] Taken together, however, the research contained in this volume stresses the importance of taking postcolonial migrants seriously, as they problematise the neat distinction between insider and outsider categories and underline the existence of "imperial imagined communities" in the post-war period.[226]

Some ten years later, a similarly ambitious volume emerged with different case studies as its focus. In *Postcolonial Migrants and Identity Politics*, editors Bosma, Lucassen and Oostindie compare the integration of postcolonial migrants across a broad swath of countries, bringing French, British and Dutch cases into dialogue with Russian, Japanese, and American cases.[227] In general, the contributions imply a migrant group that, although heterogenous, is relatively privileged, citing the ease with which they could access or retain metropolitan citizenship rights, as well a "pre-migration socialisation which gave them a competitive edge" and included cultural, linguistic and sometimes religious affinities that they shared with members of the host country.[228] The authors note the existence of various public assistance schemes, though admit that this assistance varied in intensity across host countries.[229] Additionally, they leave

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221 Buettner, *Europe after Empire*, 8.
222 Smith, "Introduction."
223 Smith, 18.
224 Smith, 23.
225 Smith, 23.
226 Smith, 27.
227 Bosma, Lucassen, and Oostindie, *Postcolonial Migrants and Identity Politics*.
228 Bosma, Lucassen, and Oostindie, 11.
229 Bosma, Lucassen, and Oostindie, 7.

room for nuances, like the fact that returnees themselves rarely appraised their experiences as positive, and indeed often developed an identity that ran counter to this designation.[230]

Finally, Buettner explores the ramifications of decolonisation in Britain, France, the Netherlands, Portugal and Belgium. She charts the decolonisation process in each country before considering the backgrounds and experiences of repatriates.[231] There is some mention of social assistance, but the focus is more on integration. Foregrounding the importance of race, Buettner argues that these repatriates "often continued to count as a part of the national community - in other words, as 'us' - in public understandings," although the extent to which this was true varied according to their ability to count "as 'white' and/or as 'European.'"[232] Her book finishes with a plea for scholars of European metropoles and former empires to consider more meaningfully the contributions of authors whose research is focused on different country cases.[233]

1.5.   Plan

The dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I present a conceptual framework for evaluating inclusion in welfare states and redistributive boundary-making. It is split into two sections. The first section offers conceptual guidelines for identifying how redistributive boundaries are drawn and the means through which inclusion is accomplished. In this section I introduce the distinction between the Marshall and Somers dimension, stressing the importance of the *character* of welfare and not just its amount. The second section provides the floorboards of explanatory research, offering insight into how boundary-making decisions are made and why boundaries are drawn in one place and not another. I argue that boundary-making decisions are made in a multi-step process whereby state and non-state actors interpret material conditions (relating to the economic base or the distribution of power) and deploy ideologies to make sense of them. In these ideologies, certain characters emerge and are positioned as more or less deserving. Material resources are then redistributed in accordance with this ideological positioning, lending it ever more credence.

Chapter 3 is devoted to outlining my methodological considerations. In it, I specify the logic that powered my descriptive and causal inference. I explain my adherence to an epistemological-ontological paradigm that I call historical-interpretivism, whose principles are derived from historical and post-positivist social sciences. I propose six pillars of a historical-interpretivist strategy: curiosity, abduction, contextualised self-interpretation, critical archival praxis, narrative, and entangled comparison. I identify the role of comparison within this paradigm and justify my case selection. I elaborate on my data sources, explain my choice of nomenclature, and identify limitations.

Chapters 4 and 5 begin my empirical analysis. Chapter 4 explores the history of welfare expansion in each of my three country cases. This allows me not only to specify exactly which

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230 Bosma, Lucassen, and Oostindie, 12.
231 Buettner, *Europe after Empire*, 213.
232 Buettner, 215.
233 Buettner, 16.

programmes were involved in receiving (post)colonial migrants in the post-war period, but also to begin to identify the logic with which these programmes were developed. Chapter 5 introduces the (post)colonial migrants in each country case. It does this by setting their post-war arrival against a backdrop of each country's colonial history. In particular, it traces the history of citizenship and immigration legislation in each empire and clarifies the citizenship and entry rights to which each group had access: a key part of my analysis.

Chapters 6 through 8 are country-specific chapters in which inclusion in specific welfare programmes are pulled into focus. Chapter 6 studies how Indonesian migrants were included in the Dutch welfare state. It is divided by programme, considering general and targeted schemes of social assistance before considering inclusion in old-age pensions and their transitional rules specifically. Chapter 7 analyses sequentially the inclusion in France of different subgroups of the Algerian migrant population, including labour migrants and refugees. Chapter 8, which studies the provisions available to Caribbean migrants in the UK, is structured by programme as well. Its first section considers inclusion in National Assistance and its second section analyses the ways in which National Insurance affected the rights of Caribbean claimants.

In the final chapter, I summarise my findings, linger on the comparisons and discuss the implications for welfare state scholarship. I explore the continued relevance of my research question in light of current events.