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Social Subjecthood? The inclusion of (post)colonial migrants in Dutch, French, and British welfare states, 1945-1970

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SOCIAL SUBJECTHOOD?

The Inclusion of (Post)Colonial Migrants in Dutch, French, and British Welfare States, 1945 - 1970

EMILY ANNE WOLFF

Social subjecthood?

The inclusion of (post)colonial migrants in
Dutch, French, and British welfare states, 1945-1970

By Emily Anne Wolff

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To those who moved from colony to metropole in search of a better life, and to their families. Without asking you first, I borrowed your stories – or the silences in the archives where your stories should be – to tell this one. Thank you.

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E.A. Wolff
Rotterdam, March 2024

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Abbreviations

ABW	General Assistance Act (*Algemene Bijstandswet*)
ADC	Assistance for Dependent Children
AEF	French Equatorial Africa (*Afrique equatorial française*)
AGIRC	General Association of Retirement Schemes for Cadres (*Association générale des institutions de retraites des cadres*)
AKW	General Child Benefit Act (*Algemene Kinderbijslagwet*)
AMANA	Moral Assistance and Aid to North Africans (*Assistance morale et aide aux nord-africains*)
AOW	Old Age Assistance Act (*Algemene Ouderdomswet*)
ARBVO	Directorate-General of Employment Services (*Directoraat-Generaal Arbeidsvoorziening*)
ARP	Anti-Revolutionary Party (*Anti-Revolutionaire Partij*)
AWW	General Widow and orphans Act (*Algemene weduwen- en wezenwet*)
BIS	Social Intervention Offices (*Bureaux d'interventions sociales*)
BSP	Basic State Pension
CARIN	Control, Attitude, Reciprocity, Identity, and Need
CAVI	Commission for Indonesian Affairs (*Commissie voor Aangelegenheden van Indonesië*)
CAZ	Commission of Ambonese Assistance (*Commissariaat Ambonezenzorg*)
CBVO	Central Bureau for the Care of War Victims (*Centraal Bureau Verzorging Oorlogsslachtoffers*)
CCG	Commission for the Coordination of Repatriates (*Commissie-Coördinatie Gerepatrieerden*)
CCKP	Central Committee of Religious and Private Initiative for Repatriates (*Centraal Comité van Kerkelijk en Particulier Initiatief*)
CFLN	French Committee of National Liberation (*Comité Français de la Libération National*)
CFTC	French Confederation of Christian Workers (*Confédération française des travailleurs chrétiens*)
CGT	General Confederation of Labour (*Confédération générale du travail*)
CHA	Comparative-historical analysis
CICC	Citizenship of Independent Commonwealth Countries
CNAF	National Family Allowance Fund (*Caisse nationale d'allocations familiales*)
CNPF	National Council of French Employers (*Conseil national du patronat français*)
CNSS	National Fund for Social Security (*Caisse nationale de sécurité sociale*)
CRM	Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work (*Ministerie van Cultuur, Recreatie en Maatschappelijk Werk*)

CTAM	Technical Consultant for Muslim Affairs (*Conseillers techniques pour les affaires musulmanes*)
CUKC	Citizenship of the UK and the Colonies
DHSS	Department of Health and Social Security
DMZ	Service of Social Care (*Dienst Maatschappelijke Zorg*)
DP	Displaced person
ESS	European Social Survey
FAS	Social Assistance Fund for Muslim Workers and Their Families (*Fonds d'action sociale pour les musulmans travailleurs et leurs familles*); later, Social Assistance Fund for Foreign Workers (*Fonds d'action sociale pour les travailleurs immigrés*)
FLN	National Liberation Front (*Front de Libération Nationale*)
FMA	Muslim French of Algeria (*Français musulman d'Algérie*)
FR-AixAN	Archives Nationales d'Outre Mer, Aix-en-Provence, France
FR-MaAD	Departmental Archives of Bouches-du-Rhône, Marseille, France
FR-PaAN	Archives Nationales, Pierrefiette-sur-Seine, Paris, France
FR-PaSP	Archives of Julien Charles-André, Sciences Po Centre d'Histoire, Paris
FSNA	French of North African origin (*Français de souche nord-africaine*)
GPRF	Provisional Government of the French Republic (*Gouvernement provisoire de la République française*)
IEV	Indo-European Association (*Indo-Europeesch Verbond)*
IGAME	General Administrative Inspectors on Special Assignment (*Inspectors généraux de l'administration en mission extraordinaire*)
KLM	Royal Dutch Airlines (*Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij*)
KNAF	Catholic Civil Servants and Private Employees from former Netherlands Indies (*Katholieke Ambtenaren en Particuliere Werknemers uit het Voormalige Nederlands-Indië*)
KNIL	Royal Dutch army in the Netherlands Indies (*Koninklijk Nederlands Indische Leger*)
KVP	Catholic Peoples' Party (*Katholieke Volkspartij*)
LIS	Luxembourg Income Study
MINUOR	Ministry of Union Affairs and Overseas Kingdom (*Ministerie van Uniezaken en Overzeeserijksdelen*)
MP	Member of Parliament
MPNI	Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance
NASSI	Committee of National Action Supporting Regrettants From Indonesia (*Comité Nationale Actie Steunt Spijtoptanten Indonesië*)
NHS	National Health Service
NI	National Insurance

NIBEG	Dutch-Indisch Alliance for Ex-Prisoners of War and Internees (*Nederlands-Indische Bond van Ex-Krijgsgevangenen en Geïnterneerden*)
NL-HaHG	Haags Gemeentearchief, The Hague, The Netherlands
NL-HaNA	Het Nationaal Archief, The Hague, The Netherlands
NL-StRo	Rotterdam Stadsarchief, The Netherlands
NL-UtA	Het Utrechts Archief, Utrecht, The Netherlands
OAI	Old-Age Insurance
OAS	Secret Army Organisation (*Organisation armée secrète*)
ONI	National Office of Immigration (*Office national d'immigration*)
RAF	Royal Air Force
RAPWI	Recovery of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees
RAVI	Council for Indonesian Matters (*Raad voor Aangelegenheden met Indonesië*)
RTC	Round Table Conference
SAS	Specialised Administrative Sections (*Sections administrative spécialisées*)
SFIM	Reception and Reclassification Service for French people from Indochina and Muslim French (*Service d'accueil et de reclassement des Français d'Indochine et musulmans*)
SGI	General Society of Agricultural and Industrial Immigration (*Société générale d'immigration agricole et industriel*)
SSFNA	North African Family Social Service (*Service social familial nord africain*)
SVB	Social Insurance Bank (*Sociale Verzekeringsbank*)
UK-LoNA	The National Archives, Richmond, London, The UK
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
VOC	Dutch East Indian Company (*Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie*)
WIC	Dutch West Indian Company (*West-Indische Compagnie*)

1. Introduction

1.1. The Golden Age of welfare exclusion?

1.1.1. The first and most important distributive question

In *Spheres of Justice,* political theorist Michael Walzer rebukes his colleagues for considering the socially just allocation of resources without asking "the first and most important distributive question," namely: how is the distributive community constituted?[1] By the distributive community, Walzer meant any space where members come together to share, divide, and exchange goods. The primary good to be distributed is that of membership in that same community. Because it cannot be distributed equally - not everyone can be a member of everywhere[2] - exclusion, Walzer argued, is necessary for "historically stable, ongoing associations of men and women [*sic*] with some special commitment to one another."[3]

Concerns about the constitution of groups and the just allocation of community membership are fundamentally concerns about *boundaries.* Boundaries can be defined as "sets of norms and rules that define the type and level of closure of a given collectivity vis-a-vis the exterior."[4] Classical sociologists and historians of state formation have long emphasised the importance of boundaries for political community.[5] For Anderson, boundaries play a critical role in explaining why the nation broke ahead of the pack of alternative forms of organising political life. Anderson contends that in alternative arrangements, like kinships, "borders were porous and indistinct, and sovereignties faded imperceptibly into another."[6] In contrast, the nation is "inherently limited."[7] These limits enabled it to be imaginable as a "sociological organism", an entity that could move through history as a solid, modular unit or coherent whole.[8] This, in turn, was a necessary condition for members of the newly constituted community to imagine that they shared a past and a destiny with their compatriots. Welfare state scholarship has picked up on this premise,[9] arguing that closure produces the conditions necessary for redistribution. Ferrera speaks of "internal bonding through external bounding"

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1 Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1983), 31.

2 Walzer, 31.

3 Walzer, 62.

4 Maurizio Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 3.

5 Stein Rokkan, *State Formation, Nation-Building and Mass Politics in Europe. The Theory of Stein Rokkan.*, ed Peter Flora, Stein Kuhlne, and Derek Urwin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Charles Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).

6 Benedict Richard O'Gorman Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso Books, 1991), 19.

7 Anderson, 6.

8 Anderson, 26.

9 Theresa Kuhn and Aaron Kamm, "The National Boundaries of Solidarity: A Survey Experiment on Solidarity with Unemployed People in the European Union," *European Political Science Review.* 11, no 2 (May 2019): 179–95, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773919000067; Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*; Michael Bommes and Andrew Geddes, *Immigration and Welfare: Challenging the Borders of the Welfare State* (London and New York: Routledge, 2000).

or the "bounding-bonding nexus" to refer to the mechanism by which restricting access to a space could allow expectations of reciprocity, mutual trust and loyalty to develop.[10] What is at stake with closure is social solidarity – the "willingness of people to see governments redistribute resources to the less advantaged."[11]

Surprisingly, given how much attention it has paid to boundaries, the canon of welfare state scholarship has failed to provide a satisfactory answer to Walzer's question. Instead, existing answers assume three forms. First, there is a widely held assumption that the distributive community is delimited by the location of national boundaries. The sociologist T.H. Marshall infamously argued, in his 1950 essay "Citizenship and Social Class" that the institution of citizenship had reached its apex, expanding to become *social* (rather than merely political or civic) in character.[12] Others share his confidence in the historical coincidence of national and redistributive boundaries, suggesting that as late as 1970, European welfare arrangements covered "virtually 100 per cent of national populations."[13] This approach to group constitution, however, fixes national boundaries as its point of reference as though these can be exogenously given. In fact, national boundaries were in considerable flux throughout the 20th century and well into the 'Golden Age' of welfare expansion: the three decades after the Second World War.[14] This related first to war and nationalism on the European continent: the Baltic states only gained independence from Russia in 1918, and Germany suffered major territorial losses in the Treaty of Versailles after which provinces like Alsace would be tossed back and forth between warring powers. It also had to do, however, with conquest, colonisation, and decolonisation abroad. Indeed, during the immediate post-war decades, three of Europe's biggest powers (Britain, France, and the Netherlands) shrunk in size by factors of around 125, 18, and 50 respectively.[15] Hence, this answer defers Walzer's question, relocating it to the domain of national territory without answering it. How, then, is the citizenry constituted?

A second approach has been to generate deterministic covering laws regarding the impact of group homogeneity on redistribution. This strand of research suggests that distributive communities are either naturally bounded by social identities or are bounded in some other way but suffer as a result. Racial difference has been particularly prominent in these accounts. Alesina and Glaeser construct 'fractionalisation' indices which measure the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from a population will belong to two different racial/ethnic groups.[16] They then analyse fractionalisation alongside social spending data and find that places that score higher on this index redistribute less than places that score lower, leading

10 Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*, 4.

11 Peter A Hall, "The Political Sources of Social Solidarity," in *The Strains of Commitment: The Political Sources of Solidarity in Diverse Societies*, by Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 349.

12 T.H Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class: And Other Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950).

13 Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*, 48.

14 Ferrera, 77.

15 Linda Colley, "'This Small Island': Britain, Size and Empire," in *Proceedings of the British Academy*, vol 121 (The British Academy, 2003), 172–73; Jan C Jansen and Jürgen Osterhammel, *Decolonization: A Short History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2017), 3.

16 Alberto Alesina et al., "Fractionalization," *Journal of Economic Growth,* 8, no 2 (June 2003): 155–94.

them to conclude that racial cleavages "serve as a barrier to redistribution."[17] Contemporary research into the impact of the "diversity introduced by recent [21st century] immigration" on redistributive attitudes works from a similar point of departure.[18] The general argument is that solidarity disappears when racial difference appears in the distributive community. This is known as the 'heterogeneity-redistribution trade-off' thesis.[19] This second answer suffers from its naturalisation of concepts like *homogeneity, racial diversity,* and *ethnic difference*, all of which remain woefully underspecified. Appiah, Sen and many others have argued that individuals vary along infinite dimensions, none of which cluster neatly into fixed (racial) groups.[20] Instead these groups, and the similarity which supposedly constitutes them, are contested in social reality and vary across time and space, as Du Bois argued almost a century ago[21] and as research into the elusive nature of whiteness and the shifting racial identity of Irish and Italian immigrants has shown.[22] The second answer to Walzer's question, however, relegates this contestation to the status of a methodological issue.[23] In fact it presents an urgent ontological problem with potential endogeneity issues. If homogeneity affects solidarity, then what determines homogeneity?[24] How does one group become homogeneous?

A common approach is to toss these conceptual concerns back into the ring of public opinion by allowing the definition of similarity to emerge from survey data. Many survey experiments manipulate the "cultural proximity" and "social distance" of fictitious welfare

17 Alberto Alesina, Edward Glaeser, and Bruce Sacerdote, "Why Doesn't the US Have a European-Style Welfare System?" NBER Working Paper (National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2001), 248.

18 Allison Harell, Stuart Soroka, and Shanto Iyengar, "Race, Prejudice and Attitudes toward Redistribution: A Comparative Experimental Approach," *European Journal of Political Research*, 55, no 4 (November 2016): 724, https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12158., but see also Marc Hooghe et al., "Ethnic Diversity and Generalized Trust in Europe: A Cross-National Multilevel Study," *Comparative Political Studies* 42, no 2 (February 2009): 198–223, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414008325286, Robert Ford, "Who Should We Help? An Experimental Test of Discrimination in the British Welfare State," *Political Studies* 64, no 3 (October 2016): 630–50, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12194., Anouk Kootstra, "Deserving and Undeserving Welfare Claimants in Britain and the Netherlands: Examining the Role of Ethnicity and Migration Status Using a Vignette Experiment," *European Sociological Review* 32, no 3 (June 2016): 325–38, https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcw010.

19 Will Kymlicka and Keith G Banting, eds., *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 9.

20 K Anthony Appiah, "Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections," in *Color Conscious*, by Kwame Anthony Appiah and Amy Gutmann (Princeton University Press, 1998), 30–105, https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822096-002; Amartya Sen, *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny* (New York, London: WW Norton & Company, 2006).

21 W.E.B Du Bois, *Dusk of Dawn*, ed. Henry Louis Gates Jr., 2007, 50.

22 David Roediger, "Whiteness and Ethnicity in the History of 'White Ethnics' in the United States," in *Race Critical Theories*, ed Philomena Essed and David Theo Goldberg (Malden and Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 325–43; David Roediger, *Wages of Whiteness* (London, New York: Verso, 1999); Noel Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White* (Routledge, 2008).

23 Alberto Alesina and Edward L Glaeser, *Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: A World of Difference*, Rodolfo Debenedetti Lectures (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote, "Why Doesn't the US Have a European-Style Welfare System?"

24 Emily Anne Wolff, "Diversity, Solidarity and the Construction of the Ingroup among (Post)Colonial Migrants in The Netherlands, 1945–1968," *New Political Economy*, (June 23, 2023): 1–14, https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2023.2227120.

claimants by arranging them implicitly[25] or explicitly[26] into "ethnic hierarchies," ordered from most to least culturally proximate to the identity of the respondent in question. For example, the survey might ask British respondents about their willingness to share resources with Irish, Jamaican, and Pakistani claimants. Leaving aside the ethical risks of reifying a racialised national imaginary to conduct this research (what if a British respondent is also Pakistani?) the hierarchies are justified in bizarre acrobatics of circular logic. One study determines "the overall level of social distance" of a given community by the percentage of respondents who expressed "discomfort about social contact" with members of that community.[27] Thus, the "ethnic hierarchy" invoked to explain public attitudes (toward redistribution) is constructed using public attitudes (toward contact). We are left with the dizzying reasoning that outsiders are so designated because they are considered *culturally distant*, and subsequently excluded because they are so designated. Again, Walzer's question is deferred, but not answered. How then do groups come to be considered culturally distant?

1.1.2. Empire shrinks as welfare state expands

In this dissertation, I approach Walzer's question about the ways in which the distributive community is constituted from a new angle. Specifically, I return to a historical moment during which the boundaries of the national community in Europe were under (re)construction and explore how decisions were made then about whom to grant membership. The three decades after the Second World War known as the *Trente Glorieuses*[28] are opportune for this kind of inquiry because they witnessed the coincidence of two major social processes: decolonisation and the birth of social citizenship. The canon of welfare state studies has paid little attention to this junction, even though it promises insight into redistributive boundary-making in at least two ways.

First, if bonding and bounding dynamics were linked at any point in history, this period should leave evidence of it. The "'hot' and most decisive phase of decolonisation"[29] coincided with a period of consensus around new, more generous forms of social provision. In the decades immediately following the Second World War, coverage of social insurance widened, the generosity of transfer payments increased, and the scope and quality of social services expanded.[30] The 1944 Atlantic Charter and the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights took their place in history alongside a wave of national declarations of commitment to egalitarianism, from the Wagner-Murray-Dingell plan in the US, to the van Acker plan in Belgium and the d'Aragona plan in Italy.[31] In tandem social spending rocketed up from

25 Ford, "Who Should We Help?"; Tim Reeskens and Tom van der Meer, "The Inevitable Deservingness Gap: A Study into the Insurmountable Immigrant Penalty in Perceived Welfare Deservingness," *Journal of European Social Policy* 29, no 2 (May 2019): 166–81, https://doi.org/10.1177/0958928718768335; Harell, Soroka, and Iyengar, "Race, Prejudice and Attitudes toward Redistribution."

26 Kootstra, "Deserving and Undeserving Welfare Claimants in Britain and the Netherlands."

27 Ford, "Who Should We Help?" 637.

28 Bruno Palier, *Gouverner La Sécurité Sociale*, 1st ed (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2005).

29 Jansen and Osterhammel, *Decolonization: A Short History*, 3.

30 Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*.

31 Peter Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 108.

less than 10 per cent of GDP in most European countries to twice that by the 1970s.[32] As central governments assumed responsibility for welfare, Marshall saw citizenship evolve into its final form and "the basic human equality of membership … enriched with new substance."[33] The lectures on which Marshall's essay was based were delivered seven years after the Liberal economist William Beveridge made the case for a universal system of social insurance in the Beveridge Report. Later Jessy Mair, former director of the London School of Economics, heralded the Report an "inauguration of a new relation within the state of man to man and of man to the state."[34]

At the same time, many economically downtrodden European states were attempting in the initial post-war period to "restore and revitalise" their empires, perceiving an urgent need for both labour and tropical products.[35] As a political institution European colonial empire dates back at least to the mid-16th century, with the Portuguese conquest of South and Middle America.[36] By the early 20th century, the French empire was 18 times the size of metropolitan France; the Dutch empire 50 times that of the Netherlands.[37] Denmark colonised three Caribbean islands for more than 200 years.[38] Sweden, which did not retain control over its overseas colonies very long, continued its involvement in the global colonial political economy through engagement in the Atlantic slave trade, the colonisation of indigenous people closer to home (for example, forced labour of Sami people in Swedish mining operations) and the exploitation of settler colonial projects in the United States.[39] Although colonial rule looked different at different times and places,[40] empires shared a reliance on creating and disciplining local subjects, exploiting resources, and inventing justifications for these extractive relations.[41] Colonial domination was rooted in what Mudimbe calls the domestication of difference, as Europeans sought to "engineer a rupture in the consciousness" of the colonised to legitimate subjugation.[42]

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32 Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*, 77.

33 Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class: And Other Essays*, 9.

34 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*, 108.

35 Antony Gerald Hopkins, "Globalisation and Decolonisation," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 45, no 5 (September 3, 2017): 735, https://doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2017.1370218 Matteo Rizzo, "What Was Left of the Groundnut Scheme? Development Disaster and Labour Market in Southern Tanganyika 1946-1952," *Journal of Agrarian Change* 6, no 2 (April 2006): 205–38, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0366.2006.00120.x.

36 Philip D Curtin, *The Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex: Essays in Atlantic History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 14.

37 Colley, "'This Small Island': Britain, Size and Empire," 172–73.

38 Bolette B Blaagaard, "Whose Freedom? Whose Memories? Commemorating Danish Colonialism in St Croix," *Social Identities* 17, no 1 (January 2011): 61–72.

39 Gurminder K Bhambra and John Holmwood, "Colonialism, Postcolonialism and the Liberal Welfare State," *New Political Economy* 23, no 5 (September 3, 2018): 583, https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2017.1417369.

40 Samir Amin, "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa - Origins and Contemporary Forms," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 10, no 4 (1972): 503–24.

41 Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961; repr., London: Penguin Books, 2001), 28; Gurminder K Bhambra, "Relations of Extraction, Relations of Redistribution: Empire, Nation, and the Construction of the British Welfare State," *The British Journal of Sociology* 73, no 1 (January 2022): 4–15, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.12896.

42 cited in Garth A Myers, "Late Colonial Lusaka and Postcolonial Geography," *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography* 27, no 3 (2006).

The Second World War ultimately sounded the knell of colonial empire. Resistance to colonial rule was as old as rule itself: in 1791, the successful Haitian revolution staged by self-liberated slaves demonstrated the willingness and ability of colonial subjects to hold Europeans to their commitment to *liberté, égalité,* and *fraternité.*[43] Still, the Second World War marked a watershed moment by dealing a fatal blow to the constitutive beliefs sustaining colonial society.[44] Nazism tarnished the image of authoritarian rule, military conquest and racial thinking.[45] The renewed normative salience of self-determination and freedom, as outlined in texts like the 1941 Atlantic Charter or the 1946 UN Charter, directly challenged colonial powers.[46] Additionally, the Allies had recruited hundreds of thousands of their colonial subjects in their war effort,[47] in the process reminding the conscripted of their value to, and by extension their bargaining power over, the colonial state.[48] Despite its relevance for the multidimensional nature of boundaries, there has been very little comprehensive research into the extent to which this process of decolonisation affected the development of post-war social citizenship.[49]

The second important contribution this period can make to welfare state studies is calling into question prevalent assumptions about the relationship between diversity and solidarity. In the first decades after the Second World War, between 5.4 and 6.8 million people made their way from (former) colonies to Western Europe.[50] As Stoler and Cooper quip, "the problem [of how to bound the European community] came home to the metropole."[51] Some migrants were former settlers or collaborators seeking refuge from the retaliatory violence that often accompanied decolonisation. Others came to work, either on their own or as part of employer- or state-led recruitment schemes. Historians and migration scholars have given increasing attention to the experiences of these "postcolonial migrants," as they are often known.[52] Importantly, Smith emphasises, they represented a "remarkably heterogeneous collection of

43 Curtin, *The Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex: Essays in Atlantic History*.

44 Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 35.

45 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, "Empires After 1919: Old, New, Transformed," *International Affairs*, 2019, 98.

46 Tony Smith, "A Comparative Study of French and British Decolonization," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20, no 1 (January 1978): 70–102; Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2006), 57.

47 Pieter C Emmer and Leo Lucassen, "Migration from the Colonies to Western Europe since 1800," 2012, http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/europe-on-the-road/economic-migration/pieter-c-emmer-leo-lucassen-migration-from-the-colonies-to-western-europe-since-1800NonEuropeanSoldiersandContractLabourersinEuropeDuringtheWorldWars.

48 Kristen Stromberg Childers, "The Second World War as a Watershed in the French Caribbean," *Atlantic Studies* 9, no 4 (2012): 409–30.

49 But see Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), for the years prior to the Second World War.

50 Andrea L Smith, "Introduction," in *Europe's Invisible Migrants* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2003), 11.

51 Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, eds., "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda," in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in A Bourgeois World* (Oakland: University of California Press, 1997), 24.

52 Smith, "Introduction"; Elizabeth Buettner, "Postcolonial Migrations to Europe," in *The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire*, ed Martin Thomas and Andrew S Thompson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 601–20; Ulbe Bosma, Jan Lucassen, and Gert Oostindie, eds., *Postcolonial Migrants and Identity Politics: Europe, Russia, Japan and the United States in Comparison* (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2022), https://doi.org/10.1515/9780857453280.

populations."[53] According to Buettner, "their national, geographical, occupational, cultural, and socioeconomic diversity defies any attempt at summary description."[54] Although she doesn't explicitly mention racial diversity, Buettner later points out that up to three million were of "non-European" descent.[55]

The heterogeneity of millions of these newcomers presents a puzzle. If racial diversity is supposed to counteract solidarity and generosity by collapsing the boundary between insider and outsider, how did diversity of such scale coexist with the most solidaristic period in recent European history? As Buettner puts it, "much remains to be done to arrive at a full understanding of how Europe was *re-created* once its territorial expanse receded."[56] The insights that this research agenda promises into the making of redistributive boundaries and the relationship between welfare and race are timely. Today, anxiety about the impact of increasing levels of immigration on European welfare states proliferates in both academia and the public sphere. Goodman argues that "Britain today is significantly more diverse than it was 50 years ago."[57] Putnam lists "the increase in ethnic and social heterogeneity in virtually all advanced democracies" as "one of the most important challenges facing modern societies."[58] Familiarising themselves with literature from the US, which explains a weakening of welfare institutions with race, researchers in Europe "have begun to wonder if similar dynamics might operate on their side of the Atlantic."[59] The fear is that "growing ethnic diversity will eventually force European welfare states to reduce social spending."[60] Cavaillé and van der Straeten argue that, due to a "secular growth in non-Christian, non-white minority populations," the "conditions for prophesied americanisation of the European welfare state are met."[61] These concerns stem from a learned belief in the fundamental incompatibility between diversity and solidarity. If contradictory evidence exists from Europe's own historical record, this literature should contend with it.

53 Smith, "Introduction," 11.

54 Elizabeth Buettner, *Europe after Empire: Decolonization, Society, and Culture*, 1st ed (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 215–16, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139047777.

55 Buettner, "Postcolonial Migrations to Europe."

56 Buettner, *Europe after Empire*, 9.

57 Sara Wallace Goodman, *Immigration and Membership Politics in Western Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1433.

58 Robert D Putnam, "E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture," *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30, no 2 (June 2007): 137, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9477.2007.00176.x.

59 Ford, "Who Should We Help?," 632.

60 Steffen Mau and Christoph Burkhardt, "Migration and Welfare State Solidarity in Western Europe," *Journal of European Social Policy* 19, no 3 (July 2009): 213–29, https://doi.org/10.1177/0958928709104737.

61 Charlotte Cavaillé and Karine Van der Straeten, "Immigration and Support for Redistribution: Lessons from Europe," *Toulouse School of Economics Working Papers*, Journal of Economic Literature, N° 1358 (September 2022): 7.

1.2. My project

1.2.1. Research design

Aiming to contribute to the development of theory in the areas outlined above, I ask *how (post) colonial migrants were included in post-war welfare systems*. Taking advantage of productive synergies between history and interpretive social sciences, I develop a methodological toolkit that I call historical-interpretivism. Although the areas of overlap between history and interpretivism (discussed in detail in Chapter 3) might appear obvious, their integration into a cohesive framework has, to my knowledge, not yet been accomplished. Equipped with this toolkit, I revisit a moment of profound turbulence in European social history with an openness to the ways in which local actors interpreted and reacted to those changes. I pull into focus over one million people – tagged "remarkably heterogeneous" by observers[62] – who arrived in Europe during the Golden Age of welfare expansion. With *how* - Foucault's "little question… flat and empirical"[63] - I mean to both evaluate their inclusion and explain it.

The term *(post)colonial migrants* is imperfect for several reasons. First, a migrant is sometimes defined as a "non-citizen in any given country,"[64] but many of these newcomers held or formerly held citizenship in the host territory. Second, it was not used by the migrants to describe themselves (see Appendix B.3). Finally, Dahinden argues that the word 'migrant' amplifies the idea that migrants are fundamentally different from citizens, and that nation-states are required to manage this difference in a specific way.[65] Nonetheless, the alternatives available for describing this group have other shortcomings (for a more elaborate discussion, see 3.5). Following Obdeijn and Schrover, I use *migrant* to signify geographic mobility across borders with the intention of residence,[66] and *(post)colonial* with its prefix in parentheses in a nod to the relationship of the migrant to a colony, whether ongoing or not.

My inferences are largely powered by within-case analysis (abductive reasoning and contextualised self-interpretation), but I also engage in what I call entangled comparison across cases. My focus is on the response of Dutch, French, and British welfare states to newcomers from the former Netherlands Indies (present-day Indonesia), Algeria, and the former West Indies (which includes present-day Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, several other Caribbean islands, and Guyana) respectively. In line with historical-interpretivist practice, I selected cases based on where I expected (post)colonial migration to be socially significant, with an eye to ensuring contrast, and attentive to my own cultural and linguistic resources. The UK, France, and The Netherlands experienced, together with Portugal, the most (post) colonial migration relative to their populations from 1945 to the early 1990s.[67] I take interest in a relatively long time period, spanning 1945 and 1970, as Pierson has cautioned social scientists

62 Smith, "Introduction," 11.

63 Bent Flyvbjerg, "Phronetic Planning: Theoretical and Methodological Reflections," *Planning Theory & Practice* 5, no 3 (2004): 298.

64 Tito Boeri, "Immigration to the Land of Redistribution," no 77 (2010): 655.

65 Janine Dahinden, "A Plea for the 'de-Migranticization' of Research on Migration and Integration," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 39, no 13 (October 20, 2016): 2209, https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2015.1124129.

66 H.L.M Obdeijn and Marlou Schrover, *Komen En Gaan. Immigratie En Emigratie in Nederland Vanaf 1550* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2008), 16.

67 Smith, "Introduction," 32.

against restricting their time horizons when studying outcomes with long time horizons and potentially slow-moving causal processes[68] - like, Ferrera argues, boundary changes.[69]

Because I expected the financing structure of different welfare schemes, as well as the type of risks against which they protected, to influence public perceptions of welfare claimants, I considered inclusion in contributory schemes designed to alleviate life-course risks (for example, old-age pensions in the Netherlands and family allowances in France) as well as non-contributory schemes tailored to labour market risks (for example, National Assistance in the UK). Historical materials constitute my primary data source. I draw from correspondence, draft legislation, meeting minutes, budgets, brochures and other primary sources consulted at state and municipal archives in each of my country cases. I consulted the collections of the *Nationaal Archief* (The Hague, NL), *Haags Gemeentearchief* (The Hague, NL), *Utrechts Archief* (Utrecht, NL), *Stadsarchief Rotterdam* (Rotterdam, NL), *Archives Nationales* (Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, FR), *Archives Nationales d'Outre-Mer* (Aix-en-Provence, FR), *Archives départementales Bouches-du-Rhône* (Marseille, FR) and National Archives (Richmond, UK) between September 2020 and May 2023. I did not assume that the archives perfectly transmitted an unadulterated truth, but instead sought to struggle "with and against the constraints and silences" associated with (especially state) archives.[70]

1.2.2. Findings

I find that across all three cases the "sphere of justice"[71] within which income redistribution took place was bounded externally through (formally and informally) expanding and restricting citizenship and entry rights. If they managed to cross the boundaries that citizenship and immigration law erected, migrants from (present-day) Indonesia, Algeria, and the Caribbean enjoyed formal entitlements to welfare under the schemes I studied. Put differently, I found no evidence of statutory exclusion from the distributive community once inclusion under citizenship and immigration law was granted.

On the other hand, my findings reveal Dutch and French welfare states mutating to accommodate the newcomers by departing from their central tenets (like their use of occupational categories or the link between benefits and contributions) and splintering to create different gradients, or worlds, of inclusion. Each can be differentiated not only by the *amount* of welfare they provide - a dimension I call the 'Marshall' dimension after his definition of social rights - but also by its *character* - a dimension I name the 'Somers' dimension after Margaret Somers' definition of social inclusion, which considers the "right to recognition by others as a moral equal."[72] In particular, there were vast differences in the extent to which welfare preserved the autonomy, mutuality and overall dignity of welfare recipients. The

68 Paul Pierson, "Big, Slow-Moving, and.. Invisible: Macrosocial Processes in the Study of Comparative Politics," in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, ed James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, 1st ed (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 177–207, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511803963.006.

69 Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*, 4.

70 Hartman in Zine Magubane, *Bringing the Empire Home: Race, Class, and Gender in Britain and Colonial South Africa* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

71 Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality*.

72 Margaret R Somers, *Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness and the Right to Have Rights* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 6.

response of Dutch and French welfare states to (post)colonial migration was strikingly similar despite cross-case differences in programmatic features. In this sense, I follow Esping-Andersen in attending not just to incomes but also to "how nations differ in the structuring of social citizenship."[73] My findings suggest that social citizenship is structured differently not just between nations, but *within* them, and it is to these intra-national differences that the title of my dissertation refers. Access to welfare was distributed along racial lines, such that those assigned "European" or "Western" identities would receive different forms of welfare than those assigned "Muslim" or "Eastern" identities.

Fragmentation of this nature was unworkable in the UK, where key agents of the welfare state remained attached to universalist principles, limiting the possibilities for inclusion on unequal terms. There was, however, informal (rather than statutory) exclusion on racial lines due to local-level discrimination by officers against Caribbean claimants. Additionally, starting in 1962, the distributive community would become successively more difficult to access for Caribbeans with UK citizenship due to immigration reform that restricted entry for non-white citizens. Importantly, this policy move was justified with reference to the access that migrants of colour had to National Assistance, one of the few non-contributory parts of the British welfare system. In addition, the Home Office ultimately pressured the department responsible for National Insurance into cooperating in its efforts at immigration control, further highlighting the extent to which boundary-making was accomplished through social and immigration policy.

Although I document boundary-making on racial lines, racial diversity did not *cause* Dutch and French welfare states to fracture in the way that I describe, nor did the race of Caribbean migrants *cause* the informal discrimination they faced. Unlike most welfare state scholars who consider race an individual-level attribute with independent properties, I build on a mountain of literature in sociology and cultural theory to depict race as a mode of classification that groups humans, in all of our diversity, into fictitious but neatly contained units. If this is true, then neither race nor racial diversity can exert independent causal power. Instead, racial ideology and *racecraft* - that is, the practice of believing in, and acting in accordance with, the existence of races[74] - are the central drivers of internal structuration. In fact, I argue that race mattered in these cases by providing a blueprint for the construction of identities. In turn, these identities mattered for how an individual would be integrated into the welfare state as it discharged of its duties toward the nation.

To be precise, I argue that the distinct patterns of inclusion I find reflect the varying functions that the welfare state serves. Drawing from citizenship and state-building scholarship, I argue that nations depend for their survival on their perceived integrity. Welfare states support this perception by performing tasks that variably imbue the nation with social and cultural meaning. They might contribute to the nation-building project by structuring social space, muting dissent, promoting cultural assimilation, or making the nation appear virtuous to its members. Each of these different functions is associated with different forms of welfare.

73 Gøsta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 57.

74 Karen E Fields and Barbara J Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life* (London and New York: Verso, 2012).

For example, welfare designed to influence cultural behaviours might score low on the Somers dimension as welfare is associated with more restrictions to a beneficiary's freedom. In this context, the specific form of welfare to which an individual has access depends on how they are related to these overarching aims. This, in turn, depends on a complex and indeterminate process of social construction which can involve racialisation and the creation of deserving or culturally proximate identities.

In fact, in my dissertation, I show how welfare states did not just passively transmit racial tropes. Instead, they were active agents of racecraft, helping to create the homogeneity that researchers identify. Social workers, private associations, and public officials variably disciplined (post)colonial migrants into conforming to distinct racial and cultural categories, contested and adjusted their classification, or renegotiated the substance of those categories. There was nothing inevitable about the exact location of the internal boundaries that I document here. White (post)colonial migrants also encountered resistance from their metropolitan compatriots, and if it had not been for the active efforts of welfare agents to include them in the "sphere of justice," they may have just as easily found themselves on the outside.

The rest of the introduction proceeds as follows. In section 1.3, I review existing literature on race and redistribution in welfare state scholarship, which takes three different forms depending on the strand of research. Section 1.4 steps outside of welfare state scholarship and surveys literature from history, postcolonial studies and migration in order to bring "social" and imperial history into one analytic field. This section also summarises existing research into (post)colonial migrants in these disciplines.

1.3. Race and immigration in welfare state scholarship

1.3.1. Racial inequality in the US welfare state

In welfare state scholarship, there are three main roads leading out of the junction of race and welfare. The first is historical research into the fracturing of social rights on racial lines. This body of scholarship is almost exclusively based on data from the US, which is often viewed as meaningfully distinct from Europe due to its history as a settler colony. Settler colonialism is a "distinct mode of domination" involving the establishment of permanent settlement by displacing and (violently) replacing indigenous communities.[75] This form of domination did not take place on continental European soil in recent history. But continental histories converge in other ways that receive inadequate attention. The project of settler colonialism from which the US emerged was a fundamentally *British* and *European* project nestled within large-scale efforts at European conquest. A reading of the European "cultural archive" that

75 Lorenzo Veracini, "Settler Colonialism as a Distinct Mode of Domination," in *The Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism*, by Edward Cavanagh and Lorenzo Veracini (Routledge, 2017), 1–9, https://web-p-ebscohost-com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl/ehost/ebookviewer/ebook/bmxlYmtfXzEzMzcwMzhfX0FO0?sid=6ca0101c-50f5-4220-b27c-3f66c7014513@redis&vid=0&format=EB&rid=1.

remains open to the possibility that such a project has left its traces in national psyches is a valuable endeavour, even if these traces feature only sparingly in European self-representation.[76]

Key takeaways from scholarship into the US case for researchers interested in Walzer's question include the ability of race to shape boundary-making and of the welfare state to (actively) engender inequalities. Fox sets out to explore how different immigrants were incorporated into American social assistance programs from the end of the 19th century (the "Progressive Era") up until federal relief of the mid-1930s.[77] She finds that Mexican immigrants, European immigrants, and Black Americans were concentrated in separate regions of the country where they experienced the welfare state in three distinct ways, differentiated by variations in access to benefits, benefit levels, and the degrees of social stigma and risk of expulsion associated with receiving benefits. Institutionalised cooperation between welfare and immigration officials ensured that gatekeepers of both the welfare state and of the nation-state worked to exclude Mexican immigrants, weaponising their use of welfare relief and responding to it with an omnipresent threat of deportation. In contrast, the door to social assistance was largely shut in the faces of Black Americans, whilst social workers and industrial associations defended white European immigrants' right to the 'dole.' Nodding to Esping-Andersen, she argues for the existence of 'three worlds' of welfare relief, trading a singular focus on race, class, or any other variable for a view of the system in its entirety.[78] Causal power is attributed to a combination of factors, from labour relations and paternalistic attitudes of employers to a deeply embedded racial hierarchy, machine politics, and the agency of social workers.

Chronologically, Lieberman picks up where Fox left off by examining in greater depth three main programs of the 1935 Social Security Act.[79] He establishes that each policy was "race-laden," i.e. tended to divide the population along racial lines without explicit racial exclusions, and endeavours to explain how this became true for each different program.[80] He finds that Southern Democrats conditioned support for the programs on their ability to maintain labour-repressive political economies of racial disenfranchisement, but that this demand could not be met in the same way in each program. For example, Old Age Insurance (OAI) could accommodate it by excluding the occupations in which Black workers were dominant (agricultural and domestic work). However, for means-tested social assistance grants like the Assistance for Dependent Children (ADC), exclusion was not possible. Therefore the erosion of federal authority was offered as a functional substitute or concession to racist elites.[81] It allowed Southern Democrats to exercise discretion over benefit levels; which, in practice, translated into discrimination that was "beyond question," given the significant racial and regional discrepancies in ADC implementation that emerge out of Lieberman's analysis.[82]

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76 Gloria Wekker, *White Innocence: Paradoxes of Colonialism and Race* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016).

77 Cybelle Fox, *Three Worlds of Relief: Race, Immigration, and the American Welfare State from the Progressive Era to the New Deal* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691152233.001.0001.

78 Fox, 17. See also Appendix A.2.

79 Robert C Lieberman, *Shifting the Color Line: Race and the American Welfare State*, New edition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001).

80 Lieberman, 7.

81 Lieberman, p.51.

82 Lieberman, 136.

Every Southern state with an ADC program awarded benefits to Black children at a lower rate than their proportion in the population, and when Black families were deemed eligible they got smaller payments compared to white families.[83] Fox has also shown that children on ADC received less overall assistance than they would have if they had qualified for General Assistance.[84] Overall, Lieberman concludes that these exclusionary impulses inhibited the development of a strong, unitary welfare state.[85] In its place would develop a set of welfare programs with varying degrees of institutional capacity, centralisation and stigma.

In general, the US case shows that formal membership in the political community was not decisive in the cordoning off of the welfare state during critical moments of its evolution. Fox argues that "formal citizenship was not sufficient … nor was it even necessary for social citizenship,"[86] while Lieberman admits that there was "far less organised support for alien exclusion" compared to exclusion on racial lines.[87] He describes this as contestation not over citizenship, but over its "texture and character."[88] These accounts suggest that *racialised* internal structuration proved a powerful means of bounding the welfare state. In addition, both authors submit evidence of the active engagement of public officials and agencies in this structuration. In other words, neither views the reflection or transmission of inequalities as inevitable. Key moves that stand out in Fox' account include, for example, when the Department of Charities in Los Angeles, where Mexican immigrants were concentrated, created a "Deportation Division" that provided an immigration inspector with a desk space and a car,[89] or when social workers in the Northeast, where white European immigrants were concentrated, argued that Americans should treat immigrants "as a citizen of tomorrow, as a partner in the common American enterprise."[90] Equally, Lieberman documents relief officials in the South discriminating despite federal orders to the contrary, and in the North attempting to keep foreigners on the dole even if it meant certifying other eligible household members.[91]

1.3.2. Immigrant rights

The literature across the Atlantic that most closely resembles US scholarship on race focuses on immigrant rights rather than racial inequality for two reasons. First, there is a belief that racial cleavages are not prominent in Europe.[92] As Pontusson argues, this conclusion subsumes all of Europe into one category, neglecting the rich variation that comparative European politics has spent decades studying and overstating the homogeneity of European societies.[93] Pontusson elaborates that "many European countries have a long history of ethnic, regional, linguistic and

83 Lieberman, p.135.
84 Fox, *Three Worlds of Relief*, 260.
85 Lieberman, *Shifting the Color Line*, 13.
86 Fox, *Three Worlds of Relief*, 279.
87 Lieberman, *Shifting the Color Line*, 221.
88 Lieberman, 222.
89 Fox, *Three Worlds of Relief*, 134.
90 Fox, 221.
91 Lieberman, *Shifting the Color Line*, 216.
92 Alesina and Glaeser, *Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe*, 140.
93 Jonas Pontusson, "The American Welfare State in Comparative Perspective: Reflections on Alberto Alesina and Edward L Glaeser, 'Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe,'" *Perspectives on Politics* 4, no 2 (2006): 315–26.

religious divisions" and summons the Belgian case as an example, where the divide between Flemish and Walloons has not obstructed the development of a welfare state.[94] He also points to current immigration patterns, arguing that the share of foreign-born inhabitants in Europe currently approximates that of the US, and referring to OECD statistics from 2001 that put this proportion at 11 per cent in the US and 9 per cent, 10 per cent and 12 per cent in Germany, France and Sweden respectively.[95] This evidence is important, but partial, since it ignores the highly racialised "domestication of difference" in law and in practice that European colonialism entailed.[96]

The second reason that race receives scant attention in European welfare state scholarship is theoretical. Race is consistently underspecified, afflicted either with conceptual ambiguity or clumsy essentialism. Sometimes, superficial discussion on appropriateness supplants thoughtful reflection on the meaning of race. Hansen, who is interested in immigration and citizenship policy in a decolonising Britain, explicitly names Britain a "multicultural" rather than "multiracial" nation "because it is the less offensive of the two terms,"[97] admitting to a lack of interest in delimiting the meaning of either. Others betray confusion about race by employing five substantively different measures for ethnic diversity: ethnic fractionalisation, the proportion of the foreign population, the foreign-born population, non-Western foreign-born population, and migration inflow.[98] The relationship of all these indicators to the concept of interest (ethnic diversity) is unclear in all except the first, which professes to capture this directly.

Ethnic or racialisation indices, however, are constructed by measuring the probability that two individuals randomly drawn from a population will belong to two different groups.[99] This is a more direct operationalisation, but none the more appropriate as it relies on race or ethnicity as constituting discrete groups. This contradicts the scientific consensus that human genetic diversity, while formidable, is not organised into discrete racial categories.[100] As Appiah argues, there is nothing in the theory of evolution to suggest that a group that shares one characteristic will have others in common as well, and continues that "however you define the major races, the biological variability within them is almost as great as the biological variation within the species as a whole."[101] The fact that race has no biological meaning does not mean that it does not exist. It does mean, however, that the classification acquires and loses meaning through social, political, and economic practices, all of which will be invisible to the colour-blind social scientist who opts to study multiculturalism rather than racism.

94 Pontusson, 322.
95 Pontusson, 322.
96 Mudimbe cited in Garth A Myers, "Late Colonial Lusaka and Postcolonial Geography," *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography* 27, no 3 (2006).
97 Randall Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 3.
98 Mau and Burkhardt, "Migration and Welfare State Solidarity in Western Europe," 217.
99 Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote, "Why Doesn't the US Have a European-Style Welfare System?"
100 "The Meaning of Race in Science - Considerations for Cancer Research" (Bethesda, Maryland: National Cancer Institute, 1998).
101 Appiah, "Race, Culture, Identity," 68.

On this basis, virtually all research into race and redistribution in Europe has been subsumed into a research agenda that sits at the nexus of migration studies and welfare states. Nonetheless, research devoted to immigrant rather than immigration policy[102] - that is, the study of migrant social rights rather than entry and regulations[103] - has gone some way toward exposing racial inequalities between immigrants and "natives." Sainsbury's work is exemplary in this regard.[104] In a joint paper with Morissens, Sainsbury compares the social rights of immigrants in the US, the UK, Germany, France, Denmark, and Sweden. In all, they find a major disparity in the standard of living between citizens and immigrant households which increases for "visible ethnic minority households" for whom means-tested benefits make up a larger component in their overall income package compared to citizens.[105]

Sainsbury and Morissen's insights into racial inequality, while important, are limited by the data they use, which comes from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). Although the LIS data sets contain a variable for ethnicity/nationality, there are vast differences in the availability of data and content of these variables across countries, and the authors resolve this difficulty by identifying ethnic minority migrants as those who are not from member countries of the EU, North America and Australasia.[106] Even more extreme, in the UK context where data on immigrant status is not available, the authors "are forced to use ethnicity as a proxy for immigration," meaning that all British people of colour are assumed foreigners.[107] Although quantitative analysis relies on these kind of shortcuts, the net effect is a collapse in the distinction between immigrants and racial minorities, making it very difficult to comment on the boundary-making dynamics at play.

Indeed, much of the explanatory research within this line of inquiry focuses on drivers of immigrant rights rather than of inequality. Ruhs conducts a "systematic, dispassionate analysis" of immigration and immigrant policy across over 40 high-income countries as a means of grasping how and why they restrict migrant rights.[108] He finds that access to most types of rights are differentiated by the skill level of the migrant, such that programs targeting higher skilled workers tend to grant more rights[109] and concludes that rational cost-benefit analyses play a "powerful role in high-income countries' decisions."[110] Ruhs' data also points to a link

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102 Tomas Hammar, *European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Sara Kalm and Johannes Lindvall, "Immigration Policy and the Modern Welfare State, 1880-1920," *Journal of European Social Policy*, 2019, 1–15.

103 Gallya Lahav and Virginie Guiraudon, "Actors and Venues in Immigration Control: Closing the Gap between Political Demands and Policy Outcomes," *West European Politics* 29, no 2 (2006): 201–23.

104 Diane Sainsbury and Ann Morissens, "Immigrants' Social Rights across Welfare States," in *Welfare States and Immigrant Rights: The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 113–32; see also Diane Sainsbury, *Welfare States and Immigrant Rights: The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion* (Oxford University Press, 2012), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199654772.001.0001; Diane Sainsbury, "Immigrants' Social Rights in Comparative Perspective: Welfare Regimes, Forms of Immigration and Immigration Policy Regimes," *Journal of European Social Policy* 16, no 3 (2006): 229–44.

105 Sainsbury and Morissens, "Immigrants' Social Rights across Welfare States," 119.

106 Sainsbury and Morissens, 642.

107 Sainsbury and Morissens, 642.

108 Martin Ruhs, *The Price of Rights: Regulating International Labor Migration* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).

109 Ruhs, 83.

110 Ruhs, 7.

between immigration and immigrant policy: where extending rights is costly, countries appear to compensate by making entry more difficult. His work is useful in spelling out potential links and tradeoffs, but it invites further inquiry to the people and politics that made these connections.

Similarly, Koopmans and Michalowski set out to identify the drivers of differences in immigrant rights across 29 countries through quantitatively analysing rights against broad institutional characteristics.[111] They find that former colonial powers, former settler countries, and democracies are more likely to extend rights to immigrants. The authors, however, coded for "involvement in colonialism" by including a dummy variable to signify whether a country was a colonial power in 1945. Although this practice is not uncommon in migration scholarship,[112] it makes their finding that "colonialism has more to do with immigrant rights than has previously been acknowledged" difficult to interpret.[113] In what way are colonialism and immigrant rights linked? The authors themselves suggest that "former colonial powers have a heritage of centuries of interaction with races, cultures and religions in other parts of the world" which makes the electorate "more sympathetic to inclusive immigrant rights."[114] This proposed mechanism raises questions, for example about how a legacy of imperial domination[115] would incline colonial powers toward tolerance.

Van Staalduinen's recent work on occupational inequalities between ethnic "minority" and "majority" groups in Finland, Germany, and the UK represents a recent attempt to paint a more complex picture of the relationship between racial inequalities, on the one hand, and welfare states, on the other. Using data from the European Social Survey (ESS) on occupational rank, ethnic minority status, and a successive set of covariates from a 15-country sample, van Staalduinen shows that, with the same level of education, minority employees end up at lower ranking jobs.[116] Investigating why even welfare states that have been leaders of social investment, like Finland, have failed to secure equal opportunities for immigrants, Van Staalduinen finds that policymakers direct immigrants into segments of the labour market where opportunities to acquire the social and cultural resources for mobility in the knowledge economy are fewer.[117]

In sum, even though welfare state scholars find racial inequalities in access to social (and economic) rights in Europe, in-depth historical analyses of racialisation (as exist in the US) are mostly lacking, and macro-level inquiries into the drivers of immigrant rights take their place.

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111 Ruud Koopmans and Ines Michalowski, "Why Do States Extend Rights to Immigrants? Institutional Settings and Historical Legacies across 44 Countries Worldwide.," *Comparative Political Studies* 50, no 1 (2017): 41–74.

112 Douglas S Massey, *Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

113 Koopmans and Michalowski, "Why Do States Extend Rights to Immigrants? Institutional Settings and Historical Legacies across 44 Countries Worldwide.," 59.

114 Koopmans and Michalowski, 65–66.

115 Eva-Maria Asari, Daphne Halikiopoulou, and Steven Mock, "British National Identity and the Dilemmas of Multiculturalism," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 1 (2008): 11.

116 Briitta van Staalduinen, "Ethnic Inequality in the Welfare State" (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2022), 4.

117 van Staalduinen, 4.

1.3.3. Welfare chauvinism

A final area of welfare state scholarship that deals with race and welfare is concerned with the effects of immigration on welfare states. Afonso and Devitt distinguish between the *functional* and *political* logics that underpin this concern.[118] Functional logic refers to the effects of immigration on the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state,[119] while political logic refers to the effects on solidarity.[120] In the latter, the heterogeneity-redistribution trade-off that I introduced earlier (1.1.1) constitutes the supposed link in the chain between immigration, on the one hand, and reduced solidarity, on the other. Often, this is interpreted to mean that racial difference erodes the public's propensity to redistribute.

One approach to testing this thesis has been to examine, at the macro-level, the relationship between open external borders (often measured in immigration flows or foreign-born proportion of the population) and redistribution (often measured in individual-level attitudes or social spending). Some find a positive relationship; that is, greater levels of immigration translate into greater levels of redistribution.[121] Others find a negative relationship.[122] Most stress the importance of mediating variables, like the type of program in question,[123] the universalism of the welfare regime[124] or the degree to which migrants are integrated socially.[125] Another approach has been to study the constituent assumptions of the trade-off thesis at the micro-level through surveys or survey experiments. Racial difference is thought to provoke either a decrease in support for welfare policies across the board, or a change in the character of support, such that the public still supports social spending but only for specific groups or for specific programs. Since Goul Andersen and Bjørkland coined the term in 1990, the idea that "welfare services should be restricted to 'our own'" has been referred to as welfare chauvinism.[126]

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118 Alexandre Afonso and Camilla Devitt, "Comparative Political Economy and International Migration," *Socio-Economic Review* 14, no 3 (2016): 597.

119 Evidence is mixed, but most studies find that the net "fiscal burden" associated with immigrants depends on a host of other factors, like the type of migration, the program in question, and the demographic and employment structure of the receiving economy. Gary Freeman, "Migration and the Political Economy of the Welfare State," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 485 (1986): 51–63 Boeri, "Immigration to the Land of Redistribution." Robert Rowthorn, "The Fiscal Impact of Immigration on the Advanced Economies," *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 24, no 3 (2008): 560–80.

120 Will Kymlicka and Keith Banting, "Immigration, Multiculturalism, and the Welfare State," *Ethics & International Affairs* 20, no 3 (September 2006): 282, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2006.00027.x.

121 Clare Fenwick, "The Political Economy of Immigration and Welfare State Effort: Evidence from Europe," *European Political Science Review* 11, no 3 (2019): 357–75.

122 Stuart N Soroka, Keith Banting, and Richard Johnston, "Migration and Redistribution in a Global Era.," in *Globalization And Egalitarian Redistribution*, ed Pranab K Bardhan, Samuel Bowles, and Michael Wallerstein (Princeton [N.J.]: Princeton University Press and Russell Sage Foundation, 2006), 261–68; Stuart N Soroka et al., "Migration and Welfare State Spending," *European Political Science Review* 8, no 2 (May 2016): 173–94, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773915000041.

123 Soroka et al., "Migration and Welfare State Spending."

124 Markus M L Crepaz and Regan Damron, "Constructing Tolerance: How the Welfare State Shapes Attitudes About Immigrants," *Comparative Political Studies* 42, no 3 (March 2009): 437–63, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414008325576.

125 Brian Burgoon, "Immigration, Integration, and Support for Redistribution in Europe," *World Politics* 66, no 3 (July 2014): 365–405, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887114000100.

126 Jørgen Goul Andersen and Tor Bjørklund, "Structural Changes and New Cleavages: The Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway," *Acta Sociologica* 33, no 3 (July 1990): 212, https://doi.org/10.1177/000169939003300303.

Carmel and Sojka consider the term a thinly veiled disguise of racism.[127] Indeed, one of the major contributions made by this strand of literature is the evidence it furnishes of racism vis-à-vis welfare claimants.

For example, Van Oorschot analyses public opinion data from the Netherlands in 1995 and uses this data to inductively derive five criteria for deservingness - understood as the extent to which individuals are considered worthy or unworthy of social rights based on their actions or characteristics.[128] One criterion that van Oorschot highlights is 'identity.' He finds that the Dutch public is more likely to support a hypothetical claimant whose identity is culturally proximate, and who can be considered "one of them."[129] Building on this interest in identity and its impact on deservingness, Ford fields two survey experiments in Britain in which respondents are asked about the extent to which they support a hypothetical claimant receiving welfare.[130] Manipulating the fictitious claimant's ethnicity and immigration status, Ford finds a "lack of sympathy across ethnic or national origin boundaries" - specifically, that white respondents favour white welfare claimants over foreign-born or ethnically different claimants.[131] Reeskens and van der Meer field a similar vignette experiment in the Netherlands. The authors find identity to be among the three most important criteria for the Dutch respondents' solidarity.[132] They draw this conclusion by varying the hypothetical claimant's country of origin between the Netherlands, Kosovo, Suriname, Morocco and Afghanistan, a choice justified in the following terms: "'Daan from The Netherlands' serves as control condition. In close proximity are 'Riza from Kosovo' … and 'Aron from Surinam' … More distant is 'Mohammed from Morocco' … and most distant is 'Mullah from Afghanistan.'"[133]

Finally, in her vignette experiment, Kootstra makes similar methodological choices, varying "ethnic background" by creating fictitious British, Irish, Jamaican, and Pakistani claimants for British respondents to evaluate and fictitious Dutch, Belgian, Surinamese, and Moroccan claimants for Dutch respondents to evaluate.[134] She explains that "the Irish and Belgian are included as culturally proximate claimants," while "Muslims are generally regarded more negatively by the white majority than blacks," and that she therefore expects that "in Britain, the British are held most deserving, followed by the Irish and Jamaican, with Pakistani claimants being seen as least deserving. In The Netherlands, Dutch claimants are expected to be perceived as most deserving, followed by Belgians and Surinamese claimants, with Moroccans coming in last."[135]

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127 Emma Carmel and Bożena Sojka, "Beyond Welfare Chauvinism and Deservingness Rationales of Belonging as a Conceptual Framework for the Politics and Governance of Migrants' Rights," *Journal of Social Policy*, July 24, 2020, 3, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279420000379.

128 Kootstra, "Deserving and Undeserving Welfare Claimants in Britain and the Netherlands," 327.

129 Wim van Oorschot, "Who Should Get What, and Why? On Deservingness Criteria and the Conditionality of Solidarity among the Public," *Policy & Politics* 28, no 1 (January 1, 2000): 33–48, https://doi.org/10.1332/0305573002500811.

130 Ford, "Who Should We Help?"

131 Ford, 631.

132 Reeskens and van der Meer, "The Inevitable Deservingness Gap."

133 Reeskens and van der Meer, 172.

134 Kootstra, "Deserving and Undeserving Welfare Claimants in Britain and the Netherlands," 330.

135 Kootstra, 328.

Although evidence that racism plays a role in redistributive decisions is important, these hierarchies obscure more than they reveal (as I argued in 1.1.1). Van Oorschot's original claim, that we are more likely to support those who are "one of us," has intuitive appeal. However, embedding the assumption that a Pakistani claimant is less likely to be "one of us" into the research design is problematic. Decades of sociological and cultural studies scholarship has shown that identity is a relative and dynamic positioning within a given ideological landscape (see 2.3.3.1). At best, ethnic hierarchies are unhelpful, as they fail to offer adequate insight into how perceptions of cultural proximity and distance are formed. In fact, some assume that mistrust across racial lines is intrinsic.[136] Putnam, for example, argues "most (though not all) empirical studies have tended... to support" the notion that "the more we are brought into physical proximity with people of another race or ethnic background, the more we stick to 'our own' and the less we trust 'the other.'"[137] The title of a recent publication - "the *inevitable* deservingness gap"[138] - betrays the popularity of the belief that preferences are intrinsic and natural in mainstream scholarship.

Many of the social psychology classics often cited to support this idea, however, contradict it, suggesting instead that a social process of self-identification and group formation precedes discriminatory preferences. Blumer, for example, argues that racial prejudice requires that individuals first come to identify themselves as part of a group. Rather than this being "spontaneous or inevitable," Blumer argues that this identification is "a result of experience," and a "*collective process*" whereby individuals assess their social positions in relation to one another.[139] This is a far cry from innate group conflict. Similarly, one of Tajfel's enduring legacies was to show "how easy it is to... modify the ingroup-outgroup perceptions" of subjects.[140] In two different experiments, after categorising participants into different groups on the basis of superficial information - in this case, their estimate of the number of dots on a screen, or their preferences between Klee and Kandinsky paintings - Tajfel himself was able to "activate... the norm of 'groupness'" despite "the flimsy criteria for social categorisation that were employed."[141]

Accordingly, more recent research views mistrust as stemming from political choice rather than inevitability. Kymlicka and Banting suggest that the effects of racial difference are actually reactions to the policies, like affirmative action, that are deployed in its presence - in the authors' view, these "multiculturalism" policies emphasise difference rather than commonalities.[142] Alesina and Glaeser see attitudes stemming from "entrepreneurial politicians" who "vilify particular ethnic groups" in order to gain votes, for example when their policies are likely to hurt those groups.[143] Gilens, meanwhile, highlights the role of the media after analysing decades of US American news and finding that from 1967 to 1992, people of colour represented

136 Kymlicka and Banting, "Immigration, Multiculturalism, and the Welfare State," 3.
137 Putnam, "E Pluribus Unum," 142.
138 Reeskens and van der Meer, "The Inevitable Deservingness Gap."
139 Herbert Blumer, "Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position," *The Pacific Sociological Review* 1, no 1 (Spring 1958): 3.
140 Henri Tajfel et al., "Social Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour," *European Journal of Social Psychology* 1, no 2 (1971): 151.
141 Tajfel et al., 174.
142 Kymlicka and Banting, *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State*, 9.
143 Alesina and Glaeser, *Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe*, 137.

about 57 per cent of the poor people pictured in stories about poverty - about twice their true proportion among the nation's poor.[144] These constitute important strides toward understanding the connections between race and welfare, but they take up far too little space in the scholarship.

In short, while the body of work dealing with welfare chauvinism underscores the *relevance* of racism for redistributive attitudes, it pays inadequate attention to its *sources*. This is a regretful oversight, especially if prejudice follows a collective process of group construction, as social psychology suggests: questions around group solidarity often motivate welfare state scholars' interest in race in the first place.

1.4. Post-war Europe as empire

1.4.1. Linking colony, metropole and welfare

In the above section, I synthesised the key ways in which welfare state scholarship thus far has engaged issues of race and racism, pointing out remaining blindspots. My research, approaching the history of welfare expansion with attention to potential racial differences accompanying postcolonial migration, is situated in these gaps. However, research in other disciplines, like history, migration scholarship and postcolonial theory has laid important foundations for inquiries like mine.

For example, postcolonial theorists advocate studying colony and metropole through the same analytic lens, a necessary move when studying political dynamics in decolonising countries.[145] Gilroy described the circulation of ideas between Africa, the Caribbean and the Afro-Caribbean diaspora as the 'Black Atlantic'.[146] Hansen and Jonsson have shown how visionaries of European integration in the 20th century recognised and sought to protect the proliferation of constitutional ties between Europe and Africa by institutionalising the notion of "Eurafrica."[147] Stoler and Cooper, in their edited volume *Tensions of Empire,* argue adamantly that the boundaries between metropole and colony were always porous. They claim that, "Europe was made by its imperial projects [and] colonial encounters were shaped by conflicts within Europe itself."[148] Colonial experience taught metropolitan policymakers about the possibilities and limits of rule by elite subjugation and disciplining projects.[149] Agents of modern states learned how to exercise power in the "capillary" fashion that Foucault documented, seeping into all facets of social life through surveillance, measurement and intimate control, in the colonies. It also enabled policymakers to practice constructing racial categories as an instrument for the exercise of power. Stoler documents Dutch colonial

144 Gilens, *Why Americans Hate Welfare*, 114.
145 Magubane, *Bringing the Empire Home: Race, Class, and Gender in Britain and Colonial South Africa*, 9.
146 Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
147 Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, *Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism* (London, New York, Toronto: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014).
148 Stoler and Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda," 1.
149 Stoler and Cooper, 3.

rulers trying to racially classify European-educated children in the Indies and of Indies-born European children.[150] Saada shows how children of mixed parentage in French Indochina forced similar efforts to define the racial character of membership in the French nation.[151]

In this way, colonies directly challenged the discourse of inclusive citizenship upon which European ruling elites, after the Enlightenment, had based their legitimacy. For Stoler and Cooper, ruling elites "were forced to confront a basic question: whether those principles were applicable - and to whom - in old overseas empires and in newly conquered territory."[152] This was not a question they could contemplate in peace, as colonised peoples borrowed language they heard used during social struggles waged in the metropole. Cooper's own research into labour codes of late colonialism in French and British Africa shows how two different colonial powers responded to the growing pressure to eliminate forced labour by creating an "cultural, asocial, and ahistorical category of the wage worker" on the African continent.[153] Indeed, Cooper shows how Africans' escalating demands for equal treatment contributed to the crisis of colonial rule, which policymakers came to associate more with costs and responsibilities than with reward.

The link that Cooper draws between labour unrest in Europe and on the African continent suggests the intra-imperial transfer of ideas about the right to welfare. This interplay had real material consequences for colonised peoples, for example, in French Africa where officials promulgated social security systems that resembled those of the metropole.[154] However, the arrow also ran in the opposite direction. Ideas about welfare were equally shaped by conflicts in the colonies. Magubane analyses figurative language in England and South Africa and argues that colonised male bodies provided a "stock set of images and metaphors for reconstituting public knowledge about the destitute in England,"[155] with blackness functioning metaphorically as "shorthand for social marginality" and deployed to rationalise an unequal division of labour in a capitalist society.[156]

In recent years the effect of colonialism on welfare expansion has been made even more explicit, although only in the British context. In *Race and the Undeserving Poor,* Shilliam examines how the "white working class" emerged as a constituency deemed deserving of welfare by the British public.[157] He traces the roots of the title back to 19th century efforts to isolate a "discretely Anglo-Saxon family" of British subjects, a means of protecting imperial order when revolts like the Morant Bay rebellion in 1865 threatened its integrity.[158] If colonialism was implicated in the birth of the white working class as a constituency, it equally underlined the urgency of *caring* for this constituency. During the Boer Wars, when the British army

150 Ann Laura Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton University Press, 2008), 58, https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400835478.
151 Emmanuelle Saada, *Empire's Children: Race, Filiation, and Citizenship in the French Colonies*, trans Arthur Goldhammer (University of Chicago Press, 2012).
152 Stoler and Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda," 1.
153 Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa*, 263.
154 Cooper, 389.
155 Magubane, *Bringing the Empire Home: Race, Class, and Gender in Britain and Colonial South Africa*, 4.
156 Magubane, 4.
157 Robbie Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor: From Abolition to Brexit* (Newcastle Upon Tyme: Agenda Publishing, 2018).
158 Shilliam, 43.

fought Afrikaans-speaking farmers to unite its colonial territories, the public widely believed that up to 60 per cent of English volunteers were rejected due to physical fitness.[159] Indeed, in 1904 an interdepartmental committee on "Physical Deterioration" found evidence of "physical unfitness" of the British people, and drew the link between these conditions and national security.[160] The fear was that the British working class was incapable of protecting colonial rule.

Shilliam argues that early social legislation was motivated by these anxieties. He suggests that the 1911 National Insurance Act was designed to ensure that the British working class could rival the "industrial vitality" of the Germans.[161] He also reveals eugenicist concerns underpinning post-war legislation. In a lecture to the Eugenics Society in 1943, Beveridge himself admitted an interest in improving the "British race," protecting the "heritable ability" of the working class, discouraging the "breeding" of "those who are less successful, and defending the "pride of race" that (white) British people ostensibly felt.[162] In short, Shilliam suggests that welfare expansion in the 20th century was part of a broader effort to contain threats to British imperial dominance by improving the conditions of the (white) British worker, supposedly preserving the dignity, superiority and military capability of the imperial nation.

To this account, Bhambra adds fiscal considerations, arguing that the British colonial project not only incentivised welfare expansion, but also *enabled* it. Bhambra shows how returning East India Company employees known as "Nabobs"[163] made significant contributions to poor relief, as did colonial subjects in British India who paid "tribute" - levies extracted at irregular intervals by colonial states from conquered peoples - even when income tax was discontinued for the working and middle classes on the British isles.[164] Besides these contributions, Britain also benefited financially from low interest rates on loans from India, and dollars earned by exporting colonies which were controlled by Britain.[165] These sources of income facilitated welfare expansion by filling the public coffers without demanding any major sacrifice from the middle classes.[166]

There are conflicting views about how the dynamic between colonialism and welfare withstood the test of decolonisation. Strang argues that decolonisation freed up cash for domestic affairs and reduced Britain (and France) to "second-rate powers" who were "forced to turn inward."[167] Bhambra and Holmwood see decolonisation as exerting pressure in the opposite direction. They agree with Shilliam that Britain's "domestically inclusive welfare state regime" was starkly juxtaposed against the global system of exploitation that was colonialism.[168]

159 Shilliam, 52.

160 Bentley B Gilbert, "Health and Politics: The British Physical Deterioration Report of 1904," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*. 39, no 2 (April 1965): 144.

161 Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor: From Abolition to Brexit*, 53.

162 Shilliam, 74–75.

163 Bhambra, "Relations of Extraction, Relations of Redistribution," 8.

164 Bhambra, 7.

165 Bhambra, 12.

166 Daniel Tarschys, "Tributes, Tariffs, Taxes and Trade: The Changing Sources of Government Revenue," *British Journal of Political Science*. 18, no 1 (January 1988): 1–20, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123400004932.

167 David Strang, "British and French Political Institutions and the Patterning of Decolonization," in *The Comparative Political Economy of the Welfare State*, ed Janowski and Hicks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 292.

168 Bhambra and Holmwood, "Colonialism, Postcolonialism and the Liberal Welfare State," 581.

In this way, they challenge simplistic arguments about the incompatibility of diversity and solidarity, pointing out that a "failure of [transnational, imperial] solidarity" was actually at the heart of welfare expansion.[169] However, they also lend muted support to this argument because, unlike Strang, Bhambra and Holmwood argue that postcolonial migration (provoked by decolonisation) *reduced* British commitment to welfare. However, the evidence provided in support of this thesis is limited to the recognition that the introduction of non-white citizens of the UK, the political backlash against these citizens (see 5.4), and the rolling back of social rights coincided - somewhat - in time.[170] An in-depth empirical analysis of these decisions is lacking; for example, the erosion of rights due to Commonwealth immigration took place mainly in the domain of entry rights, as citizenship came to be decoupled from entry rights. Without more detail on specific welfare programs or agencies, it is not clear whether the erosion of solidarity to which the authors point was felt in social legislation itself, as authors like Lieberman have illustrated in the US case.

1.4.2. The rights of postcolonial migrants

1.4.2.1. Summary

Although welfare state scholarship might not have paid them so much attention, (post)colonial migrants have been the subject of a growing volume of literature. In many country contexts, research into the experience and rights of these groups forms part of distinctive research agendas, for example into the repatriation of displaced compatriots or immigration reform.

In this section I first provide an overview of literature in my three country cases by scholars of different disciplinary affiliations. The literature is more expansive in France and the UK than in The Netherlands, although according to Buettner, historians of Britain are "among the worst offenders of the wider tendency" to examine national histories in silos and in isolation from their neighbours.[171]

I then look at several English-language volumes that seek to bring these cases into dialogue with one another to shed light on the phenomenon of postcolonial migration as an object of study. Most of these studies focus on *repatriates*, i.e. those (post)colonial migrants who fled the colonies after decolonisation rather than in search of work. They focus mostly on white people of "European ancestry" but also sometimes those descendants of mixed-race partnerships.[172]

1.4.2.2. Symbolic foreigners to the Netherlands

Several Dutch scholars have undertaken comprehensive research into migrants from the Netherlands Indies, in particular those with Dutch citizenship who were called repatriates (*gerepatrieerden*). Some studies focus more on the demographic qualities of the group and others on the cultural, political, economic context which they encountered upon arrival, trying to evaluate the extent to which this context shaped their prospects. At least two study

169 cited in Lisa Tilley and Robbie Shilliam, "Raced Markets: An Introduction," *New Political Economy* 23, no 5 (2018): 540.
170 Bhambra and Holmwood, "Colonialism, Postcolonialism and the Liberal Welfare State," 582.
171 Buettner, *Europe after Empire*, 14.
172 Buettner, 215.

political discourse and observe the post-war period as a pivotal moment at which the meaning of national belonging was revisited.

The sociologists Ellemers and Vaillant offer an overview of repatriates after Indonesian independence.[173] Their book contains descriptive demographic details as well as information about the types of public assistance to which these individuals had access, most notably in the realm of social services like labour market activation and housing, but also targeted assistance programs that were provided by the private sector. The Dutch government's post-war efforts to organise the return of thousands of displaced citizens - Indonesian repatriates included - is the subject of Bossenbroek's work.[174] Using government archives and interviews with repatriates, Willems explores why the reception of this group by the Dutch public was so lukewarm despite an ostensibly "successful" integration trajectory.[175] His focus is on how the administration reacted and tried to steer the migration against a backdrop of housing scarcity and economic reconstruction.

Jones is curious about the effects of postcolonial migration on the image that Dutch society has of itself.[176] He studies how politicians thought and spoke about the national belonging of overseas citizens from both the Western and the Eastern parts of Dutch empire. He argues that although these migrants were "formal citizens," they were "symbolically and juridically excluded" from national belonging.[177] Jones' focus on discursive belonging is indispensable. He recognises that he lacks information about their actual integration, stating: "the question of how postcolonial citizens have fared in the last 50 years, socially and politically, is outside the scope of this study, despite being of immense importance from the perspective of full citizenship," as are "the effects of law and policy and the details of policy implementation."[178]

Laarman's focus is similar to Jones' in that she uses discourse analysis to study the inclusion and exclusion of postcolonial migrants from 1945 to 2005.[179] This historical moment, she concurs, is a "moment of debate when the 'we' - the nation - is defined and redefined."[180] Like Jones, she argues that they occupied an "in-between category, at the intersection of discursive and judicial citizenship."[181] She elucidates how a racialised Dutchness emerged as, for example, mixed-race individuals were named separately from the Dutch although, juridically, they belonged to the same group.[182] Her work is one of few Dutch studies that answers the call to build a bridge "between colonial and postcolonial research" as a means of discovering "how colonial views and rhetorics have influenced contemporary thinking about 'us' and 'them.'"[183]

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173 J.E Ellemers and R.E.F Vaillant, *Indische Nederlanders En Gerepatrieerden* (Muiderberg: Coutinho, 1985).
174 Martijn Bossenbroek, *De Meelstreep* (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Bakker, 2004).
175 Wim Willems, *De Uittocht Uit Indië, 1945-1995* (Uitgeverij Bert Bakker, 2001).
176 Guno Jones, "Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten En Nederlanders: Nederlandse Politici over Burgers Uit Oost En West En Nederland, 1945-2005" (Amsterdam, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 2007).
177 Jones, 30.
178 Jones, 40.
179 Charlotte Laarman, *Oude Onbekenden: Het Politieke En Publieke Debat over Postkoloniale Migranten, 1945-2005* (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2013).
180 Laarman, 27.
181 Laarman, 15.
182 Laarman, 55.
183 Laarman, 18.

Finally, framing the UK and the Netherlands as most-similar systems, Schuster compares how Dutch and British governments (tried to) regulate post-war immigration from the colonies.[184] He looks at migrants from Indonesia, the Antilles and Suriname, and the Caribbean, South Asia, and East Africa for each country respectively. He is particularly interested in the recruitment of labour migrants, and shows how post-war cabinets in both countries found themselves at the helm of an economy in need of manpower. Each acted quite distinctly towards their colonies in this context. Recruitment from Suriname, even by the Dutch private sector, was ad hoc, slow, and late compared to recruitment of British employers from British colonies. In addition, Schuster shows that the move to deny overseas citizens entry rights was considered in The Netherlands, but only actually implemented in the UK.[185] Still, Schuster clarifies that in the Dutch and British context there were "citizens, juridical foreigners, and symbolic foreigners,"[186] emphasising that researchers interested in the sources of national belonging must look beyond nationality law.

In this dissertation, I build on the mountain of empirical work produced by historians of migration in the Netherlands while answering Jones' call to consider material forms of inclusion and exclusion.

1.4.2.3. France: welfare as a material and rhetorical tool

For about two decades starting from the 1930s, French research into North African migrants proliferated. During this time, Algeria still belonged to the French Republic, and unlike the repatriates from Indonesia, Algerians in the metropole were mostly labour migrants. In general, research then was less concerned with social rights than with studying the demographic characteristics of the migrants and their position in the French economy using (descriptive) statistical and ethnographic methods. Nonetheless, these early studies produced both valuable background information and, due to the heavy influence of colonial (racial) thought, also supply insight into how race was operative at the time.

In 1938, Ray wrote a doctoral thesis on Moroccans in France[187] and prime minister Blum commissioned Pierre Laroque - later credited with the founding of the French social security system - and his colleague in the Council of State, to study Algerian labourers.[188] Each author discussed "North Africans" as a distinct population with internally coherent characteristics, compiling data on a number of dimensions to lend credence to this classification. Studies then responded to what was seen as the "question" or "problem" of North Africans in the metropole. For example, Rager frames his book as an attempt to capture how North African labour migrants adapt to a "lifestyle and civilisation completely different from theirs," thereby contributing to the image of the newcomers as cultural outsiders.[189] Equally, when he surveys

184 John Schuster, *Poortwachters over Immigranten: Het Debat over Immigratie in Het Naoorlogse Groot-Britannië En Nederland* (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1999).
185 Schuster, 216.
186 Schuster, 222.
187 Joanny Ray, "Les Marocains en France" (Paris, France: Librairie du recueil Sirey, 1938).
188 PaSP-JU11-Pierre Laroque and Ollive Français, "Les Nord-Africains En France," March 1938.
189 Jean-Jacques Rager, *Les Musulmans Algériens En France et Dans Les Pays Islamiques* (Paris: Sociétes Éditions Les Belles Lettres, 1950), 8.

various push and pull factors contributing to migration patterns, Rager includes consideration of the "psychological factor," assigning specific psychological traits to North Africans.[190]

One exception to the colonial-ethnographic tradition is a 1958 study by Michel. Although Michel sets out with similar aims as her forebears - providing a comprehensive analysis of the position of Algerian labour migrants in the French (political) economy - she is much more sensitive to the colonial context in which industrial relations were situated. In fact, she is explicitly interested in the nature of the relationship between Algerian and "European" workers in the metropole, as well as in their working conditions, places of settlement, employment profiles, and reasons for migration. Notably, and unlike Dutch scholars, she concentrates not on public or private initiatives to ameliorate their conditions but on their *results* which, in general, she argues, "do not correspond with the efforts undertaken."[191] In other words, she finds the results meagre.

In recent years, research into Algerian labour migrants in the post-war period has placed greater emphasis on the social rights to which they had access. Pitti studies the assistance and working conditions of Algerian labour migrants in the automobile industry, a highly competitive sector in the post-war period. Specifically, she focuses on a Renault factory complex situated on an island (Île Sequin) on the river Seine, to the southwest of Paris in Boulogne-Billancourt. Firms looked to this factory, which employed the greatest number of Algerians out of any factory between 1946 and 1974, as a model for structuring their own production.[192] Assigned the most difficult and dangerous parts of production - in metal foundries, for example - and only rarely moved to different positions throughout their career at the factory, Algerians filled gaps left by increasingly unionised French workers reluctant to perform dangerous labour.[193] Pitti shows how resistance to this differential treatment became part and parcel of a broader mobilisation of the Algerian workforce.

More recently, Lyons, particularly in *The Civilising Mission in the Metropole,* focuses specifically on the character and purposes of assistance for Algerian labour migrants.[194] As I elaborate in 7.3.1, Lyons identifies a "services network" with over one hundred private actors supported by various public agencies. She argues that this network displayed continuity pre- and post-independence, with programs, techniques, personnel of immigrant social services networks directly reflecting their colonial legacies. Additionally, surveying welfare efforts during the Algerian war of independence, she positions welfare as the "quintessential material and rhetorical tool on all levels and both sides of the conflict."[195]

After Algerian independence, the focus of the scholarship turns to repatriates and specifically *pieds-noirs*: a formerly pejorative designation that white settlers in Algeria with

190 Rager, 8.

191 Andrée Michel, *Les Travailleurs Algériens En France* (Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1956), 7.

192 Laure Pitti, "La Main d'oeuvre Algérienne Dans l'industrie Automobile (1945-1962), Ou Les Oubliés de l'histoire," *Hommes et Migrations*, Immigration et marché du travail Un siècle d'histoire, n°1263 (October 2006): 49.

193 Pitti, 52.

194 Amelia H Lyons, *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: The French Welfare State during Decolonization* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2013).

195 Lyons, 142.

French citizenship ultimately appropriated for themselves.[196] Jordi, who has been called the "father" of pieds-noir studies,[197] juxtaposes interviews with the newcomers against media reports and departmental archives in Bouches-du-Rhône (the department in which Marseille is located).[198] He chronicles welfare efforts by governments in passing as he paints a general picture of "anti-repatriate public opinion," and documents the effects that this sentiment had on the lives of individual pieds-noirs.[199] Meanwhile Scioldo-Zürcher's landmark study covers integration policy for Algerian repatriates in the metropole from 1954 to 2005. He analyses a corpus of laws (over 400 bills) pertaining to repatriates and then tries to dislodge the calculations that drove them and the effects that succeeded them. He consulted 10 (of the 1.5 million) files at the *Service central des rapatriés* in Ages, which is still in use. By mapping targeted assistance for different groups of Algerian migrants, historians like Lyons and Scioldo-Zürcher cleared the way for this dissertation.

There is comparatively less scholarship on harkis - those repatriates fleeing the Algerian war who were not white, but inherited a status as "Muslim" French (previously "indigenous" under colonial rule). Jordi and Hamoumou[200] pen an earnest and emotive account of the betrayal of harkis, the policies that engendered it, and, principally, the collective memory of both among second-generation harkis, whose testimonies constitute the book's main source. The authors explore the violence harkis faced, their difficulties repatriating, the camps to which they were assigned and the control to which they were subject, the professional resettlement schemes, and how harkis and their children have forged an identity around these histories.

1.4.2.4. The UK: Colour and citizenship

The tradition of research into postcolonial migrants in the UK is long, but not usually labelled as such. Instead, the interested student finds these texts mostly under the header of legal or sociolegal studies into 20th century immigration reform which progressively unravelled overseas citizens' right to reside in the UK from 1962 onward (for more details, see 5.4.5). This literature mostly focuses on entry rather than social rights. There is an additional strand of research offering details about the rights of postcolonial migrants by means of telling a story about the history of race in the UK.

A seminal, ambitious effort in the first respect is Hansen's *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain*. Hansen sets out to explain the exceptional openness of the British immigration regime in the post-war period, during which 800 million British subjects had entry rights in the British Isles, followed by the swift retraction of these rights in the 1960s.[201] He argues that pre-1962 immigration policy was a function of foreign policy considerations; specifically, the UK's perceived need to maintain positive ties with "Old Commonwealth"

196 Buettner, *Europe after Empire*, 239.
197 Yann Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir Métropolitain: Politique d'intégration et Parcours de Rapatriés d'Algérie En Métropole (1954-2005)* (Paris: EHESS, 2010), 21.
198 Jean-Jacques Jordi, *1962: L'arrivée Des Pieds-Noirs* (Paris: Les Éditions Autrement, 1995).
199 Jordi, 93.
200 Jean-Jacques Jordi and Mohand Hamoumou, *Les Harkis, Une Mémoire Enfouie* (Paris: Éditions Autrement, 1999).
201 Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation*, 6.

or Dominion countries like Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Post-1962 immigration reform, meanwhile, was due to a "hardening of the Ministry of Labour against unrestricted labour" due to their preoccupation with a "migration-driven surge in unemployment during periods of recession."[202] Notably, Hansen rejects a 'racialisation thesis,' according to which British restrictionism can be chalked up to a state-led project of banishing Blackness. Hansen proclaims adamantly that such a thesis "finds *no* support in the archival sources."[203] Although there were racists in the administration, Hansen argues, they were outnumbered.

Hansen's contribution is valuable for its testament to path dependency, intra-ministerial distribution of power, and the dissolution of empire on domestic immigration policy outcomes. However, his account would be enhanced by resisting the temptation to engage discussions of race. One reason is because his own beliefs about race are hidden in plain sight. Hansen frames immigration restriction as a "degree of policy success…unknown to [other] countries"[204] and a "difficult but essential decision,"[205] without providing any evidence as to why it was necessary. He does refer to streams of British public opinion that were increasingly "restrictionist"[206] or "illiberal."[207] But to imply that a policy is *successful* and *essential* because members of the public favour it is to also suggest that unpopular policies are failures and impossible. Moreover, it begs the question - *unpopular for whom?* At no point in the book are the opinions or voices of the migrants themselves given any attention. Indeed, his research question itself seems poised to answer the question of why there are people of colour in the UK.[208]

A second reason to be sceptical of Hansen's take on race is that his rejection of the 'racialisation thesis' is based on a straw man. Certainly, the evidence does not support the idea of a unitary, monolith state manipulating an otherwise sympathetic British public into racist mania. However, a persistent and deeply entrenched racism is obvious even from Hansen's own data. He documents plainly the "deep unease among senior bureaucrats and Cabinet ministers about non-white migration,"[209] the instructions to colonial governments to curb emigration, and repeated attempts to block the entry of non-white subjects, including on the grounds that "a large coloured community… is certainly no part of the concept of England or Britain to which people of British stock throughout the Commonwealth are attached."[210]

Hansen does not view any of these opinions or actions as racist because they do not explicitly reference racial inferiority. This reflects a superficial view of race and racism, which is surprising given that UK-based scholars had been publishing for the better part of the century on the systemic nature of racism and its material consequences. Hall, for example, though known for his contribution to cultural theory, relied on a wealth of empirical research into the experience of postcolonial migrants in the UK. In 'Race and Moral Panics in Post-war Britain,' Hall historicises the "appearance of a black proletariat in Birmingham [and] Bradford

202 Hansen, 84.
203 Hansen, 15.
204 Hansen, VII.
205 Hansen, 78.
206 Hansen, 86.
207 Hansen, VII.
208 Hansen, 17.
209 Hansen, 63.
210 Hansen, 67.

in the 1950s."[211] He describes the settlement of Caribbean "postcolonial migrants" in the late 1940s, lingers on the first signs of an "open and emergent racism" in the late 1950s when white youths attacked Black migrants in Notting Hill and Nottingham, and documents the rise of anti-immigrant voices in mainstream politics.[212] He unambiguously positions the "excessive… preoccupation with race" of the British public that Hansen had also documented as a projection onto immigrants of social and cultural problems internal to Britain, such as the "rapid process of social change" that Britain underwent after the war.

In *Bordering Britain*, the legal scholar El-Enany studies the same immigration reform that Hansen had.[213] Presenting a much more critical view, she argues that the legislation stripped British rights-bearers of their status in language coded as post-racial. She also evaluates this legislation normatively, but does so in a much more explicit way, adamant that citizens of British empire should have been entitled to the wealth that their labour was exploited to produce. She argues that immigration law since these reforms has continued to carve out racial inequalities by selectively, and on the state's own terms, dispensing legal statuses to people with histories of British colonial domination and dispossession.[214] For present purposes, her work is noteworthy for its decisive conclusions about the nature of boundaries - racial and otherwise - in Britain, arguing that Britain has emerged out of the post-war period no different than it entered it; namely, as a "racially and colonially configured space."[215]

Moving more explicitly out of the terrain of immigration policy and towards immigrant policy - or rights - Lucassen studies the integration of Caribbean migrants.[216] He documents their concentration in the lower rungs of the labour market, but concludes that "[skin] colour" is not to blame,[217] citing favourable "intermarriage" rates between Caribbean British and white British citizens and arguing, without having conducted a discourse analysis like Laarman or Jones did in the Dutch case, that Caribbeans were "perceived as… less alien than the more physically similar immigrants from Asian colonies."[218] Instead of racism, he suggests that "they simply did not have the required skills to enter the more promising sectors of the economy."[219] Like Hansen, Lucassen simultaneously puts forward contradictory evidence to his claim, for example that shopkeepers feared Black employees would put off white clients.[220] Like Hansen, Lucassen's conclusions betray a misguided understanding of how racialisation operates in social systems.

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211 Stuart Hall, "Race and 'Moral Panics' in Post-war Britain," in *Selected Writings on Race and Difference*, ed Paul Gilroy and Ruth Wilson Gilmore (1978; repr., Durham: Duke University Press, 2021), 56–70.
212 Hansen, 62.
213 Nadine El-Enany, *Bordering Britain* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2020).
214 El-Enany, 29.
215 El-Enany, 3.
216 Leo Lucassen, *The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe since 1850* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2005).
217 Lucassen, 141.
218 Lucassen, 140.
219 Lucassen, 131.
220 Lucassen, 122.

1.4.2.5. Comparative research

Thus far, I have documented country-specific research into the (post)colonial migrant population of Europe, scattered across various research areas and disciplines. Recently, however, there have been a handful of attempts to bring this scholarship together into a clearer research agenda. These are sometimes united under the banner of 'new imperial history,' which looks beyond political, military, and economic questions of empire to consider the influence of imperialism on everyday cultures in Europe.[221]

Smith assembles English-language work on (post)colonial migrants.[222] She argues that disciplinary and conceptual silos have obstructed our understanding of these migrations, as we rarely consider voluntary and involuntary migrants, labour migrants and refugees in the same breath.[223] Nonetheless, contributions to the volume focus on repatriates, which usually means those migrants with citizenship and a (variably) accepted cultural affinity with the metropole who arrive as refugees after decolonisation. Smith betrays a particular interest in white migrants with her title (*Europe's Invisible Migrants*), and her critique of existing literature for its "uncritical targeting of the more visibly different migrants."[224] The volume offers a comparison of the background, trajectory, and reception of repatriates from Indonesia in The Netherlands, from Algeria, Indochina, Morocco and Tunisia in France, and from Angola and Mozambique in Portugal. The various contributions refer to social rights only intermittently, as Smith summarises that "the little research completed on this question so far suggests that the government programs that promoted the social and economic integration of [former] colonists were mitigated successes."[225] Taken together, however, the research contained in this volume stresses the importance of taking postcolonial migrants seriously, as they problematise the neat distinction between insider and outsider categories and underline the existence of "imperial imagined communities" in the post-war period.[226]

Some ten years later, a similarly ambitious volume emerged with different case studies as its focus. In *Postcolonial Migrants and Identity Politics*, editors Bosma, Lucassen and Oostindie compare the integration of postcolonial migrants across a broad swath of countries, bringing French, British and Dutch cases into dialogue with Russian, Japanese, and American cases.[227] In general, the contributions imply a migrant group that, although heterogenous, is relatively privileged, citing the ease with which they could access or retain metropolitan citizenship rights, as well a "pre-migration socialisation which gave them a competitive edge" and included cultural, linguistic and sometimes religious affinities that they shared with members of the host country.[228] The authors note the existence of various public assistance schemes, though admit that this assistance varied in intensity across host countries.[229] Additionally, they leave

221 Buettner, *Europe after Empire*, 8.
222 Smith, "Introduction."
223 Smith, 18.
224 Smith, 23.
225 Smith, 23.
226 Smith, 27.
227 Bosma, Lucassen, and Oostindie, *Postcolonial Migrants and Identity Politics*.
228 Bosma, Lucassen, and Oostindie, 11.
229 Bosma, Lucassen, and Oostindie, 7.

room for nuances, like the fact that returnees themselves rarely appraised their experiences as positive, and indeed often developed an identity that ran counter to this designation.[230]

Finally, Buettner explores the ramifications of decolonisation in Britain, France, the Netherlands, Portugal and Belgium. She charts the decolonisation process in each country before considering the backgrounds and experiences of repatriates.[231] There is some mention of social assistance, but the focus is more on integration. Foregrounding the importance of race, Buettner argues that these repatriates "often continued to count as a part of the national community - in other words, as 'us' - in public understandings," although the extent to which this was true varied according to their ability to count "as 'white' and/or as 'European."[232] Her book finishes with a plea for scholars of European metropoles and former empires to consider more meaningfully the contributions of authors whose research is focused on different country cases.[233]

1.5. Plan

The dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I present a conceptual framework for evaluating inclusion in welfare states and redistributive boundary-making. It is split into two sections. The first section offers conceptual guidelines for identifying how redistributive boundaries are drawn and the means through which inclusion is accomplished. In this section I introduce the distinction between the Marshall and Somers dimension, stressing the importance of the *character* of welfare and not just its amount. The second section provides the floorboards of explanatory research, offering insight into how boundary-making decisions are made and why boundaries are drawn in one place and not another. I argue that boundary-making decisions are made in a multi-step process whereby state and non-state actors interpret material conditions (relating to the economic base or the distribution of power) and deploy ideologies to make sense of them. In these ideologies, certain characters emerge and are positioned as more or less deserving. Material resources are then redistributed in accordance with this ideological positioning, lending it ever more credence.

Chapter 3 is devoted to outlining my methodological considerations. In it, I specify the logic that powered my descriptive and causal inference. I explain my adherence to an epistemological-ontological paradigm that I call historical-interpretivism, whose principles are derived from historical and post-positivist social sciences. I propose six pillars of a historical-interpretivist strategy: curiosity, abduction, contextualised self-interpretation, critical archival praxis, narrative, and entangled comparison. I identify the role of comparison within this paradigm and justify my case selection. I elaborate on my data sources, explain my choice of nomenclature, and identify limitations.

Chapters 4 and 5 begin my empirical analysis. Chapter 4 explores the history of welfare expansion in each of my three country cases. This allows me not only to specify exactly which

230 Bosma, Lucassen, and Oostindie, 12.
231 Buettner, *Europe after Empire*, 213.
232 Buettner, 215.
233 Buettner, 16.

programmes were involved in receiving (post)colonial migrants in the post-war period, but also to begin to identify the logic with which these programmes were developed. Chapter 5 introduces the (post)colonial migrants in each country case. It does this by setting their post-war arrival against a backdrop of each country's colonial history. In particular, it traces the history of citizenship and immigration legislation in each empire and clarifies the citizenship and entry rights to which each group had access: a key part of my analysis.

Chapters 6 through 8 are country-specific chapters in which inclusion in specific welfare programmes are pulled into focus. Chapter 6 studies how Indonesian migrants were included in the Dutch welfare state. It is divided by programme, considering general and targeted schemes of social assistance before considering inclusion in old-age pensions and their transitional rules specifically. Chapter 7 analyses sequentially the inclusion in France of different subgroups of the Algerian migrant population, including labour migrants and refugees. Chapter 8, which studies the provisions available to Caribbean migrants in the UK, is structured by programme as well. Its first section considers inclusion in National Assistance and its second section analyses the ways in which National Insurance affected the rights of Caribbean claimants.

In the final chapter, I summarise my findings, linger on the comparisons and discuss the implications for welfare state scholarship. I explore the continued relevance of my research question in light of current events.

2. Drawing redistributive boundaries

2.1. Introduction

No evaluation of inclusion in a welfare state is complete without some effort to pin down what exactly this entails and the means through which it is accomplished. This chapter introduces a theoretical framework designed to aid in this respect. It concretises the notion of boundaries by highlighting the means through which they are drawn, the forms they take, the instruments of which they make use and the traces they leave. Assuming boundary-making as an agent-driven process that results from political choices rather than any kind of natural law, the framework also elucidates the manner in which decisions about boundaries are made.

In 2.2, I argue that for nations to exist, their members need to believe that they are coherent, self-contained entities with moral value. While boundaries made in other domains (like citizenship and immigration law) support this perception, the policies and practices associated with welfare states have an important contribution to make to this project as well (2.3). A statist lens of welfare expansion reveals how the welfare state secures the cultural and social perimeter of the nation using the tools at its disposal: redistributing resources, disciplining beneficiaries, and engaging in discourse. In the process it can supply the nation with internal boundaries, cultural heritage, and the sense that its members belong to a *community of value*.[1] Though these objectives are abstract, their consequences for hypothetical welfare claimants are concrete. Specifically, they affect the amount and character of welfare that is provided (2.4). I stylise these forms as gradations of inclusion and, for illustrative purposes, fix them into a matrix of four different ideal types.

2.5 is devoted to explaining how and why someone might end up receiving welfare commensurate with one part of the matrix or another. After introducing key concepts like ideology, identity, and race, and exposing how they work together to shape social reality, I lay out my argument. I propose that the amount and character of welfare a hypothetical beneficiary receives depends on their position in relation to the welfare state's contribution to the nation-building project. This position is not exogenously given or affixed to an individual body as a timeless attribute. Instead, it is constructed as state and non-state actors make sense of material conditions through ideology, creating a measure of deservingness and cultural proximity by locating individuals on the dimensions and values that ideology provides. I posit that constructions of deservingness shape variation on the Marshall dimension, while constructions of cultural proximity shape whose behaviour is deviant and whose is appropriate, and therefore influence variation on the Somers dimension. Both constructions can, but do not necessarily, involve racialisation, and are likely to reflect distributions of power and pre-existing interpretive templates.

In doing so, I challenge welfare state scholarship's dominant understanding of race and identity as fixed attributes of the individual, locating them instead as modes of classification linked to a hegemonic (and always unstable) ideology. I also complement existing scholarship

1 Bridget Anderson, *Us and Them? The Dangerous Politics of Immigration Control* (Oxford University Press, 2013), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691593.001.0001.

on deservingness by explaining where the public's criteria for come from and how they are developed.

2.2. Boundaries and integrity

Political communities are demarcated by territorial and social boundaries.[2] Boundaries are "sets of norms and rules that define the type and level of closure of a given collectivity vis-a-vis the exterior."[3] Territorial boundaries define the closure of topographical or geographical space, by limiting and facilitating physical access to it. Social boundaries represent a more abstract form of closure which involves shaping access to social space. For Bourdieu, social space is a system of invisible relations between actors.[4] Both territorial and social boundaries can be internal or external to the political community. External boundaries separate members (insiders) from non-members (outsiders), and are thereby responsible for distributing what Walzer saw as the primary good of membership.[5] Internal boundaries shape the relationship between members by differentiating the space of a given community.[6] In practice, the distinction between internal and external boundaries is not always useful, since whether someone is an outsider or a subordinately positioned insider depends on how the community defines membership.

The modern nation has been the most popular container for political affiliation during the twentieth century,[7] as the legitimacy of alternative forms of governance, like empire, kingship or caliphate, waned. Although supranational dynamics increasingly encroach on national sovereignty,[8] Longo argues that *debordering* (globalisation), has only prompted *rebordering* at the national level.[9] Immigration and nationality law have delimited the nation's external boundaries by regulating admission into its territorial and social space respectively. Its internal boundaries are mostly worked out in other policy areas, like criminal law, labour law and, importantly for our purposes, social policy. They are typically associated with inequality in access to resources or power. Centre-periphery dynamics and cleavages, or contrasts that meaningfully impact political life and divide national communities,[10] are commonly studied forms of internal boundary. Internal boundaries are often social *and* territorial. For example, from around 1917 to the mid 1960s, Dutch society was segmented along confessional lines into pillars (*zuilen*).[11] Pillarisation defined the (social) appropriateness of joining different

2 Social boundaries are sometimes known as symbolic or membership boundaries.
3 Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*, 3.
4 Pierre Bourdieu, "Social Space and Symbolic Power," *Sociological Theory* 7, no 1 (1989): 16, https://doi.org/10.2307/202060.
5 Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality*, 31.
6 Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*.
7 Thomas Hammar, "State, Nation, and Dual Citizenship," in *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America*, ed W.R Brubaker (Lanham, London: German Marshall Fund of the US, 1989).
8 David Jacobson, *Rights across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
9 Matthew Longo, *The Politics of Borders: Sovereignty, Security and the Citizen after 9/11* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 5.
10 Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*, 65.
11 Arend Lijphart, *Verzuiling, Pacificatie, En Kentering in de Nederlandse Politiek*, 9th ed (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007), 28.

labour movements or listening to different media sources, but also segmented public spaces like bakeries and universities by reserving them for members of specific pillars.[12] Equally, Meghji highlights how norms about how to interact in racialised societies are reinforced in the physical and built environment, as, for instance, certain forms of real estate are made available for some groups and not others, or streets are made more or less safe for different groups of people.[13]

Boundaries help serve the nation's most pressing needs. They would be unnecessary, Longo argues, if "sovereignty and identity [were] levelled smoothly" across territory, giving rise to self-evident, cohesive political units.[14] Instead, any given territorial expanse is subject to the influence of competing authorities and compatible with a variety of political configurations. Consequently, nations do not appear out of thin air, although for a long time they were portrayed as such. Prior to the 17th century, *nations* evoked "facts of nature" that "signified basic divisions of the human species," as, for example, a Norman bishop defined the Welsh *natio* to the pope in 1140.[15] Today, the nation is a cultural artefact[16] whose emergence depends on its perceived integrity. I mean integrity in both senses of the word: as the quality or state of being whole, entire, or unified, as well as the quality of adhering to moral values. Presenting a cogent argument for the former is one of the central contributions of Benedict Anderson's analysis in *Imagined Communities,*[17] although his account lacks sufficient appreciation for the role of culture and nationalism. Bridget Anderson's notion of *community of value* unpacks the meaning of the latter.[18]

Benedict Anderson argued that the nation, unlike the empire, exists as a "sociological organism," an entity that can move through history as a solid, modular unit or coherent whole.[19] For Anderson, this quality allows members of the newly constituted national community to imagine that they shared a past and a destiny with their compatriots. Boundary-making plays a key role in constructing nations in this light. In alternative arrangements, borders were "porous and indistinct, and sovereignties faded imperceptibly into another."[20] Longo concurs, suggesting that *spectral* sovereignty characterised empire.[21] Both internal and external boundaries contribute to the stabilisation of the nation as a sociological organism. Internal boundaries structure social space, setting the nation apart from its undifferentiated surroundings and creating a "stable pattern of social interactions"[22] within which members can envision their role. As internal boundaries form, agents and their resources are distributed in predictable ways and the relations between different positions become (more) entrenched.[23] Hence, Anderson saw 'nation-ness' as flowing from deliberate, elite-led strategies to order the

12 Lijphart, 28.
13 Ali Meghji, *The Racialized Social System* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2022), 77.
14 Longo, *The Politics of Borders: Sovereignty, Security and the Citizen after 9/11*, 42.
15 David A Bell, *The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680–1800* (Harvard University Press, 2001), 5, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvjghttm.
16 Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*.
17 Anderson.
18 Anderson, *Us and Them?*
19 Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 26.
20 Anderson, 19.
21 Longo, *The Politics of Borders: Sovereignty, Security and the Citizen after 9/11*, 13.
22 Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*, 65.
23 Bourdieu, "Social Space and Symbolic Power," 17.

social and spatial environment. Census-taking, for example, tethered individuals to the nation in clearly specified ways by assigning them categories and determining the relationship of these categories to the state. He argues that a key way in which empire acquired *national* meaning was by "circumscrib[ing]" the "ascent" of creole functionaries (European colonial settlers who lived in Latin America).[24] Ascent referred to both physical travels and career opportunities, linking the social and the territorial.

Cultural cohesion is an equally integral component of national integrity. For Smith, national identity stems from a combination of shared territory, common myths and memories, common legal rights and duties and, importantly, "common, mass culture."[25] Dieckhoff argues, for example, that although nineteenth century Hungary "presented the image of a complete society" due to its internal boundaries - "rural masses at its base, nobility at the top, and between the two the clergy, the gentry and an emerging middle class" - its "social completeness was hampered" by a kind of cultural vacuity due to its political subjection to Habsburg Austria and the predominance of Latin.[26] Disagreement about the extent to which this matters across countries prompted Meinecke to introduce a distinction between *staatsnation* and *kulturnation*.[27] Others then distinguished between civic and ethnic nationalism,[28] or state-led versus state-seeking nationalism.[29] In the former, national rulers acquired legitimacy from democratic procedure and adherence to republican values, while the latter refers to those nations whose borders were settled relatively late and whose shared linguistic, social and cultural practices/values imbued the nation with meaning. Traditionally, Germany exemplifies the *ethnic nation* and France the *civic nation*. The helpfulness of this dichotomy, however, has been called into question. For instance, Brubaker shows that French and German traditions of nationhood both have political and cultural components.[30] This underlines the contribution that cultural substance makes even to republican states.

Meanwhile, Bridget Anderson makes the case for considering the importance of a different kind of integrity. She argues that modern states portray themselves as a "community of value," in other words, as if their members "share common ideals and (exemplary) patterns of behaviour."[31] These patterns might be cultural practices, but they are distinct in that they are infused with moral substance. Anderson describes how a group will strive to view its own members in value-positive terms. Members imagine their compatriots in relation to the "Good Citizen," and imagine themselves as law-abiding, hard-working members of stable and respectable families.[32] This image is juxtaposed with that of the "Failed Citizen," represented

24 Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 114.
25 Smith in Goodman, *Immigration and Membership Politics in Western Europe*.
26 Alain Dieckhoff, *Nationalism and the Multination State* (Oxford University Press, 2017), 21, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190607913.001.0001.
27 cited in Christian Albrekt Larsen, "Revitalizing the 'civic' and 'Ethnic' Distinction Perceptions of Nationhood across Two Dimensions, 44 Countries and Two Decades," *Nations and Nationalism*. 23, no 4 (2017): 970–93.
28 Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background* (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1961).
29 Charles Tilly, "States and Nationalism in Europe 1492-1992," *Theory and Society* 23, no 1 (1994): 133.
30 Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).
31 Anderson, *Us and Them?*, 2.
32 Anderson, 3.

by anyone from vagrants or criminals to rioters and sex workers, who emerge as distinctly unworthy of membership in the community of value.[33] Again, boundaries have a critical role to play in depicting the integrity of the nation. "The community of value is defined from outside by exclusion," Anderson explains, as the foreigner, migrant, etc. takes on the role of the outsider against which the insider's worth is defined.[34] Meanwhile, internal boundaries between the "Good Citizen" and the "Failed Citizen" define the community of value from the inside. This helps explain the proliferation of anti-vagrancy legislation in 15th and 16th century England. As Braddick argues, the "threat [vagrants] posed to society was not just physical but normative."[35] Vagrants distracted from and undermined the notion of the good, law-abiding Christian upon which social authority and meaning was based. In this sense, membership in the nation is not just about "legal status," but also about "status in the sense of worth and honour."[36]

In short, the nation owes its existence to the perception of its integrity. If a nation is perceived as an irrelevant container for difference or as lacking moral conscience, the consent of its members becomes difficult to secure. Here I borrow Gramsci's understanding of consent as the "knowing and willing participation of the dominated in their subjugation."[37] If external and internal boundaries are necessary for this perception, however, they are not sufficient; they must be continuously reinforced or renegotiated as societies undergo change. In the next section I argue that the welfare state is well positioned to contribute to this process.

2.3. The nation's dirty work

2.3.1. Defining the welfare state

To understand where the welfare state appears in these projects of boundary building, a definition is in order. Parting with the Weberian tradition of defining social phenomena by their relationship to ideals,[38] I follow Durkheim and define the welfare state according to a set of external, ascertainable characteristics;[39] that is, with what, precisely, is being done in its name.[40] In fact, the practice of assisting those in need predates, by many centuries, the entry of 'welfare state' into the public lexicon (see Chapter 4). The term emerged to describe particularly intensive periods of state-society relations in which government involvement in social and economic life was pronounced. The Dutch translation, *de verzorgingsstaat*, is often juxtaposed with the "night watchman state" (*nachtwakersstaat*) of the mid-1800s, which

33 Anderson, 4.
34 Anderson, 4.
35 cited in Anderson, 19.
36 Anderson, 4.
37 Michael Burawoy, *Symbolic Violence: Conversations with Bourdieu* (Duke University Press, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1515/9781478007173.
38 Ahmad Sadri, *Max Weber's Sociology of Intellectuals* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 105.
39 Emile Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method*, ed Steven Lukes, trans W.D Halls (1895; repr., New York: The Free Press, 1982), 76.
40 Gilbert Rist, *The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith*, trans Patrick Camiller, 5th ed (London: Zed Books, 2019).

intervened minimally in the lives of its citizens.[41] The French translation, *l'État-providence*, bears resemblance to the Dutch use, although appears to have older roots: in the mid-1800s liberals used it to denounce revolutionary political projects as overly interventionist and utopian.[42] It also had a normative bent in England, where it was used to elaborate on the distinctive (positive) qualities of British post-war reconstruction and on serving national interest with democratic rule of law.[43]

Since then, the welfare state, *de verzorgingsstaat* and *l'État-providence* has begun to refer to the body of legislation through which states intervene in the social and economic life of their citizens.[44] This new definition is distinct in at least two ways from the original usage. First, it is less abstract, referring to specific policies rather than a general interventionist posture.[45] Which exact programmes and policies count as instances of the 'welfare state' are subject to some debate, especially since modes of delivery and financing differ.[46] Social services like housing, education, and health care sometimes fall within its remit.[47] Income transfers or cash benefits (in Dutch: *uitkeringen*; in French: *les prestations sociales*) are almost always included, and feature several programmatic differences on which I elaborate later (3.2.3). Taxation has also begun to attract attention as the means through which the state generates the revenue for its redistributive aims,[48] especially as progressive taxation is one of the most widely acknowledged strategies to reduce inequality.[49] Labour law can be viewed in a similar light, as regulation of the labour market can narrow pay inequalities and improve labour standards.[50] The second innovation of the more recent definition of welfare states is that it leaves more room for non-state actors. Indeed, the actual apparatus responsible for redistribution is operated by both private and public actors. Private actors include charities, religious institutions, and employers.

For present purposes I lean on the more recent conceptualisation of the welfare state. I define it as a country-specific set of policies and practices that redistribute capital and other immaterial benefits both within a given population and across an individual's life cycle. Welfare states presuppose the existence of a collectivity in which redistribution takes place. This is the

41 Frits van der Meer, Jos Raadschelders, and Toon Kerkhoff, "Van Nachtwakersstaat Naar Waarborgstaat: Proliferatie En Vervlechting van Het Nederlandse Openbaar Bestuur in de Lange Twintigste Eeuw (1880-2005)," in *Duizend Jaar Openbaar Bestuur*, ed Pieter Wagenaar, Toon Kerkhoff, and Mark Rutgers (Bussum: Uitgeverij Coutinho, 2011), 251.

42 François-Xavier Merrien, "Aux Origines de l'État-Providence," *La Vie Des Idées*, October 8, 2019, https://laviedesidees.fr/Aux-origines-de-l-Etat-providence.

43 Ben Jackson, "Introduction," in *Essays on the Welfare State (Reissue)*, by Richard M Titmuss, 1st ed (Bristol University Press, 2018), vi, https://doi.org/10.46692/9781447349532.

44 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*.

45 Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*.

46 Nicholas Barr, *Economics of the Welfare State*, 5th ed (Oxford University Press, 2012).

47 Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* Lindsay B Flynn, "The Young and the Restless: Housing Access in the Critical Years," *West European Politics* 43, no 2 (2020): 321–43, https://doi.org/10:1080/01402382.2019.1603679.

48 Sven Steinmo, *Taxation and Democracy: Swedish, British and American Approaches to Financing the Modern State* (Yale University Press, 1993), https://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/stable/j.ctt32bsrs.

49 Bruno Gabriel Salvador Casara et al., "Tax the Élites! The Role of Economic Inequality and Conspiracy Beliefs on Attitudes towards Taxes and Redistribution Intentions," *British Journal of Social Psychology* 62, no 1 (January 2023): 104–18, https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12555.

50 Simon Deakin and Frank Wilkinson, "Labour Law, Social Security and Economic Inequality," *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 15, no 2 (1991): 125–48.

distributive community or the 'sphere of justice.' Like the nation, the community can also be bounded externally and internally. The welfare state has a close relationship to resources of major importance in social life, like material well-being and opportunity. Therefore, internal boundaries of the distributive community usually affect or intensify internal boundaries of the nation-state. To better grasp how they do so, an introduction to functionalist understandings of the welfare state is in order.

2.3.2. Social and statist views

There are at least two major explanations for the emergence of the welfare state, which correspond with rough interpretations of the function of welfare in modern society. The social interpretation builds on a long tradition of Marxist-materialist scholarship that underlines how a society's economic base influences social structures.[51] This refers to the nature of productive activity in a given society and the extent to which this activity can meet the needs of society's members. Productive activity can be geared toward different ends (e.g. profit, exchange, sustenance), powered by different sectors (e.g. industrial or agricultural), and affected by the abundance or scarcity of resources. Among the needs to be met are those which "life involves before everything else," including "eating and drinking, a habitation, [and] clothing."[52] Productive activity, whatever its form, does not lead immediately to the needs of all members of a society being met. Instead, its benefits accrue to particular people and generate inequalities across geographical and social space. Two ways in which this is manifest are the division of labour, which dictates which members are engaging in what kinds of activities, and the division of ownership, which relates to which members own the products of these activities and the necessary means to conduct them (e.g. land, capital, machinery, labour).[53] It is particularly pronounced when capitalists commodify what Polanyi calls "fictitious commodities," like land and labour, eroding the ability of those who sell their labour power to meet their basic needs.[54]

In the social interpretation, welfare is a concession won through the mobilisation of the working class as they demand a buffer from these market forces.[55] Redistributive efforts therefore correspond with the strength of the working class,[56] which flows from electoral

51 David Harvey, "Population, Resources, and the Ideology of Science," in *Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography* (1974; repr., Edinburgh University Press, 2019), 52, https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9781474468954/html; Gøsta Esping-Andersen, "The Three Political Economies of the Welfare State," *International Journal of Sociology* 20, no 3 (1990): 96.

52 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology* (1846; repr., Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1991), 12.

53 Marx and Engels, 15.

54 Karl R Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (1944; repr., Boston: Beacon Press, 2001).

55 Peter Flora, ed., *Growth to Limits: The Western European Welfare States Since World War II* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1986); Peter Flora Alber Jens, "Modernization, Democratization, and the Development of Welfare States in Western Europe," in *Development of Welfare States in Europe and America* (Routledge, 1981).

56 Walter Korpi, *The Democratic Class Struggle*, Routledge Library Editions: The Labour Movement Series (Boston: Routledge & Kegan, 1983); Evelyne Huber and John D Stephens, *Development and Crisis of the Welfare State* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001).

numbers, unionisation, parliamentary power, and the ability to build successful coalitions.[57] Baldwin broadened the reach of the 'power resources approach', as the focus on class strength came to be known, with an analysis of how and when the *middle classes* supported redistributive efforts.[58] Consequently there is now some consensus within this tradition that solidaristic welfare follows from the effective synthesis of working- and middle-class demands.[59]

The statist interpretation, also called Bonapartism[60] or even "the conspiratorial model"[61] takes a different starting point. Instead of regarding welfare as a concession granted to an aggrieved class, scholars of this tradition see welfare in service of elite interests; deployed to pacify disorderly masses or "inculcate" practices that elites consider desirable.[62] This research is linked to a Foucauldian branch of intellectual history or critique that identifies *discipline* as a central project of government, especially in the classical period from the end of the 17th century to the 19th.[63] Foucault saw discipline as a form of power that involved meticulously controlling the individual bodies of the subjugated; "not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate *as* one wishes…"[64] This form of coercion was distinct from governance that treated the body-politic "as if it were an indissociable unity."[65] Discipline was seen in dialectical terms as consisting of both gratification and punishment, each corresponding with behaviour that was located on a spectrum between two opposing conceptions of good and evil conduct.[66]

Welfare scholars build on these foundations to depict welfare as a disciplinary instrument. Piven and Cloward argue that it is best understood in relation to the "dual imperatives" of "maintaining civil order and regulating labor."[67] They see different welfare policies performing these functions in cyclical fashion: expansive policies mute civil unrest that threatens established hierarchies, and restrictive policies or rollbacks enforce work norms and push people back into the market.[68] In both cases, the overarching aim is to establish social stability. When employed, the argument goes, people are "fixed in their work roles" and therefore also in their "activities and outlooks."[69] For Wacquant, the extent to which work "socialise[s]" the working class has diminished over time with the decline of stable, Fordist wage labour in

57 Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, 101; Philip Manow, "Electoral Rules, Class Coalitions and Welfare State Regimes, or How to Explain Esping-Andersen with Stein Rokkan," *Socio-Economic Review* 7 (2009): 102.

58 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*.

59 Dennie Oude Nijhuis, "Middle-Class Interests, Redistribution and the Post-war Success and Failure of the Solidaristic Welfare State," *Journal of European Social Policy* 32, no 1 (February 2022): 33, https://doi.org/10.1177/09589287211035686.

60 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*, 39.

61 Derek Fraser, *Evolution of the British Welfare State*, 5th ed (1973; repr., London: Red Globe Press, 2017), 7.

62 Frances Fox Piven and Richard A Cloward, *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare*, 2nd ed (New York: Knopf Doubleday, 1993), 42.

63 Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon, 1977).

64 Foucault, 138.

65 Foucault, 136.

66 Foucault, 180.

67 Piven and Cloward, *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare*, 408.

68 Piven and Cloward, 16.

69 Piven and Cloward, 5.

favour of discontinuous and precarious work.[70] This, he argues, has been accompanied by a hardening of penal institutions in the late 20th century, which has given rise to two separate phenomena. On the one hand, the police, the courts, and the prison have expanded, displacing welfare institutions as agents of behavioural change.[71] On the other hand, welfare services are increasingly governed by a "punitive philosophy" as restrictive workfare policies push the poor into marginal segments of the labour market. Wacquant therefore places welfare squarely in the domain of corrective discipline, arguing that welfare, in its new incarnation as *workfare*, must be viewed as a corollary to *prisonfare*: the instinct to respond to intensifying urban deprivation with prisons, probation, parole, and assorted systems of surveillance and profiling.[72]

At stake in these views is whether social policy is an *alternative* to socialism or a form thereof.[73] However, statist and social explanations are not *a priori* mutually exclusive.[74] As Meghji puts it, theories are like maps: if you want to travel by car, a map of the London Underground is not helpful, but it is also not wrong.[75] At certain times and places, the welfare state may best be viewed through the map that statism supplies. At other times, a social lens may shed more light, for instance in order to explain generous social policy that goes beyond what might be considered necessary to maintain the existing order.[76] The relative dominance of the dynamic that each perspective foregrounds can be expected to change across time and space.

2.3.3. An agent of integration

Both social and statist interpretations help elucidate some of the important contributions that the welfare state can make to national integrity. If perceived national integrity is a fundamental part of nation-building, it is not always easy to achieve. Forming an integral, polished whole from the coarse and untidy nature of social relations requires acting upon independent and reflexive individuals in potentially morally ambiguous ways. Here I posit that the welfare state can do some of the nation's dirty work of integrating a stubbornly messy reality into a cohesive whole. Equipped with an ability to redistribute resources, discipline beneficiaries, and engage in discourse, the welfare state can set the nation apart as a "sociological organism"[77] in several ways. First, it can draw internal boundaries and structure social space. Second, it can subdue social dissent. Third, it can dispel the threat of cultural vacuity, and finally, it can imbue national belonging with moral substance. All these functions require different forms of integration.

Welfare structures social space when it distributes social rights unevenly across a population, integrating different beneficiaries into different roles. Despite the traditional

70 Loïc Wacquant, *Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), 4, https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822392255.
71 Loïc Wacquant, "Crafting the Neoliberal State: Workfare, Prisonfare, and Social Insecurity," *Sociological Forum* 25, no 2 (June 2010): 202, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1573-7861.2010.01173.x.
72 Wacquant, *Punishing the Poor*, 17.
73 Fraser, *Evolution of the British Welfare State*, 8.
74 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*, 39.
75 Meghji, *The Racialized Social System*, 32.
76 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*, 40.
77 Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 26.

view that it "flatten[s]" the "pyramid of social stratification,"[78] Esping-Andersen aptly argues that the welfare state is "not just a mechanism that intervenes in, and possibly corrects, the structure of inequality," but also, "in its own right, a system of stratification."[79] To this end he documents variations with which welfare states accomplish de-commodification, or decoupling individual standards of living from the market.[80] Building on prior attempts to classify welfare systems,[81] he then identifies three distinct models. Not only does each differ in its de-commodifying capacity, but it also privileges different classes of potential beneficiaries over others. The 'Bismarckian' conservative regime of France and Germany entrenches existing status differentials in the labour market, in particular offering unique status to the salaried industrial worker.[82] The liberal regime of Anglo-Saxon countries privileges market actors and consigns the needy to stigmatised, means-tested assistance programmes, while the generous universal schemes of social-democratic regimes in Scandinavia grant social rights more evenly.

Welfare states of all types are often accused of strengthening pre-existing internal boundaries. Feminist scholars have argued that social policies "reflect and reinforce relations of dominance and exploitation" between genders.[83] For instance, women are often granted entitlements by virtue of their dependent status as wives and mothers. This strengthens a patriarchal division of labour. Moreover, in all welfare states that Orloff studied, welfare claims based on motherhood or marriage were associated with lower benefit levels than employment-based claims,[84] reinforcing gendered income inequalities. Lewis argues that in 'strong' male-breadwinner states like Britain this effect is greater than in 'moderate' or 'weak' male breadwinner states like France and Sweden respectively.[85] Equally, Lieberman interpreted his findings (see 1.2.1) as evidence that "the institutions of American social policy have reflected and transmitted the particular historical configurations of race relations."[86] More recently, van Staalduinen has shown how social investment policies supply immigrants with skills sufficient only for jobs in secondary labour markets and stunt their opportunities to acquire the socio-cultural resources necessary for upward mobility in knowledge economies (see 1.3.2).[87]

Besides structuring social space, welfare states can also soften dissent, usually by directing a beneficiary into an advantageous segment of the labour market or other institutional hierarchy. The possibility of "sidestepping a threat of major reform" by granting modest welfare to the working classes is the lifeblood of statist perspectives.[88] The implication is that poverty is not just distasteful, but dangerous.[89] The empirical record has furnished some persuasive examples.

78 Richard M Titmuss, *Essays on the Welfare State* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1958), 52.
79 Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, 23.
80 Esping-Andersen, 21.
81 Titmuss, *Essays on the Welfare State*.
82 Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, 61.
83 Ann Shola Orloff, "Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship: The Comparative Analysis of Gender Relations and Welfare States," *American Sociological Review* 58, no 3 (June 1993): 305, https://doi.org/10.2307/2095903.
84 Orloff, 315.
85 Jane Lewis, "Gender and the Development of Welfare Regimes," *Journal of European Social Policy* 2, no 3 (August 1992): 159–73, https://doi.org/10.1177/095892879200200301.
86 Lieberman, *Shifting the Color Line*, 13.
87 van Staalduinen, "Ethnic Inequality in the Welfare State."
88 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*, 39.
89 Anderson, *Us and Them?*, 20.

Bismarck's pioneering social insurance schemes in the late nineteenth century were famously reactionary, motivated by the perceived need to suppress social unrest.[90] Fraser calls this an overt "policy of killing socialism by kindness" and "social insurance not just in the actuarial sense but literally as an insurance for society against revolution."[91] More recently, Valat has argued that the social security regime in France was not designed only to improve the material condition of workers, but also to create a "new social order" in which workers would no longer suffer from an "inferiority complex" and would gain a sense of self-sufficiency.[92]

Meanwhile the potential for the welfare state to contribute to national integrity in a third, *cultural* sense stems from its disciplinary potential. Scholars of the statist persuasion have paid attention to the propensity of welfare to instil work ethic,[93] be it through the custodial institution of the workhouse (also called *indoor relief*), indirect coercion through domestic visits or through the benefit conditionality associated with modern "workfare" reforms. Work ethic is not the only norm that welfare is capable of inculcating. Manow and Palier have shown that social legislation in late nineteenth century France transmitted secular values to mothers, children, and the needy by supplanting religious care in a Third Republic deeply divided by a secular-confessional divide.[94] Welfare institutions may also promote civic integration, which is the process of ingraining in immigrants "citizen-like" or civic skills, like speaking the language of the host country, understanding its history, culture, and rules, and embodying its values.[95] As Goodman argues, civic integration tests as a means of gatekeeping nationality is a novel phenomenon, but also only the most recent articulation of a long-standing concern with the cultural fabric of national membership.[96] As gatekeeper of access to material benefits, the welfare state is particularly well-positioned to instil cultural norms associated with the "Good Citizen," although the conditions under which it does so are under-examined.

Finally, the welfare state can alter a nation's moral fabric in the eyes of its members by making the nation and its members look virtuous. Schneider and Ingram show how policy discourse shapes public perceptions of target populations: the people whose behaviour is linked to the achievement of a policy's intended end.[97] They argue that policies associate different images, cultural characterisations and descriptive terms with different target populations. These images "send messages" containing all kinds of moral blueprints, including about "what government is supposed to do, which citizens are deserving (and which not), and what kinds of attitudes and participatory patterns are appropriate in a democratic society."[98] This both

90 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*, 3.
91 Fraser, *Evolution of the British Welfare State*, 8.
92 Bruno Valat, "Les Retraites et La Création de La Sécurité Sociale En 1945 : Révolution Ou Restauration?," *Revue d'Histoire de La Protection Sociale* 1, no 13 (2020): 49.
93 Piven and Cloward, *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare*.
94 Philip Manow and Bruno Palier, "A Conservative Welfare State Regime without Christian Democracy? The French État-Providence, 1880–1960," in *Religion, Class Coalitions, and Welfare States*, ed Kees van Kersbergen and Philip Manow, Cambridge Studies in Social Theory, Religion and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 150, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511626784.007.
95 Goodman, *Immigration and Membership Politics in Western Europe*, 1.
96 Goodman, 30.
97 Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram, "Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy," *The American Political Science Review* 87, no 2 (June 1993): 335.
98 Schneider and Ingram, 334.

justifies the social structure that the welfare state has helped create, and gives shape to the notion of the "Good Citizen" in collective consciousness. In this sense, the welfare state is no different from any other policy domain. Institutions charged with making economic or climate policy equally depict target populations in a value-laden light. However, the welfare state does stand apart for the straightforward and obvious way in which it *rewards* those whom it depicts as deserving. This allows it to portray the nation as morally upstanding.

The likelihood that a welfare state will end up performing any or all of the aforementioned functions is an open empirical question. There are limits to the kind of cultural change that the welfare state can achieve; Kremer argues, for example, that changes in women's employment and care patterns across time and space derive more from women's own work-life preferences than they do from social policy.[99] These functions should thus be viewed as possibilities to be tapped – to varying degrees of success – in certain times and places.

Additionally, some clarity is needed on the exact way in which elites relate to these functions. Fraser's characterisation of the statist perspective as "conspiratorial"[100] betrays a widespread belief that statist scholars imagine ruling elites as nefariously colluding behind closed doors against the ruled. However, as I elaborate later (3.3.3), I do not assume that the "conscious intentions" of social or political actors are the "ultimate explanation of their activity."[101] Instead, elites can be expected to interact with their own social (bureaucratic) environment in an indeterminate manner, shaped partly by conscious intentions and self-interest, partly by a less conscious, practical sense of how they ought to behave or what ought to be done. Accordingly, Foucault saw state discipline as flowing not from conspiratorial intent but from "gradual, piecemeal, but continuous takeover by the state of a number of practices, ways of doing things."[102] This interpretation is entirely compatible with the notion of *raison d'état* as developed in 17th century international law.[103] I am particularly interested in the descriptive (and not normative) slant of *raison d'état,* namely, in its implication that the preservation and survival of the state takes precedence over other political considerations. In this vein, raison d'etat relies on the assumption that there is a "dimension of political reality and action which escapes the ordinary understanding of subjects."[104] In other words, the action of the political agent is subject to influences outside of their own conscience but deeply connected to their context.

99 Monique Kremer, *How Welfare States Care: Culture, Gender and Parenting in Europe* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007), 20.

100 Fraser, *Evolution of the British Welfare State*, 7.

101 Will Atkinson, *Bourdieu and after: A Guide to Relational Phenomenology* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2020), 59.

102 Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-79*, ed Michel Senellart, trans Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 77.

103 Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan, *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics*, 3rd ed (Oxford University Press, 2009), https://doi.org/10.1093/acref/9780199207800.001.0001.

104 Yves Charles Zarka, "Qu'est-Ce Que La Raison d'État?," *Cités* 2, no 94 (2023): 3–8.

2.4. Understanding inclusion

2.4.1. Two dimensions of inclusion

The debate about why states extend welfare - which is long-standing[105] - can be linked to the outcomes that follow from their decisions to do so. Social policy decisions affect the distribution of resources and power and result in several possible outcomes, the variation of which a simple dichotomy between inclusion and exclusion does a poor job at capturing.[106]

Here, I assess inclusion in the sphere of justice by locating an individual's social rights along two dimensions, both measured with a qualitative research design that I outline in chapter 3. The *Marshall dimension* refers to how much someone received, nodding to Marshall's definition of social rights as "the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society."[107] The Marshall dimension is predicated on both *formal rights* - the amount of in-kind or financial assistance to which someone is entitled - and *substantive rights* - the extent to which these entitlements genuinely deliver a higher standard of living to the beneficiary. The *Somers dimension*, meanwhile, relates to the *character* of inclusion, building on Somers' definition of social inclusion as "the right to recognition by others as a moral equal treated by the same standards and values and due the same level of respect and dignity as all other members."[108] I argue that one, but by no means the only, way of ascertaining whether the Somers criterion has been met is by assessing the dignity of the welfare to which someone has access, inspired by research on the same.

I reserve exclusion only for those cases to whom no formal rights are awarded in the domain of social legislation. I interpret this in one of two ways. First, the beneficiary might be excluded from the distributive community, *even though* some form of access to the underlying political community (through formal rights in the domain of immigration or citizenship law, for example) is granted. The *kafala* (sponsorship) system for migrants in the oil-rich Gulf Cooperation Council states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) points in this direction.[109] Gulf states have admitted growing numbers of labour migrants to national territory since the dramatic increases in oil prices of the 1970s, but have effectively offered no access to national welfare, as full responsibility for the migrant falls on the *kafeel* (sponsor) in the private sphere.[110] Alternatively, the beneficiary might be excluded from the distributive community because they could not pass through external boundaries that govern closure of the nation in which the welfare state is embedded. This could happen through immigration or citizenship law.

105 for a review of the literature see Theda Skocpol and Edwin Amenta, "States and Social Policies," *Annual Review of Sociology* 12 (1986): 131–57.
106 Hammar, "State, Nation, and Dual Citizenship."
107 Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class: And Other Essays*, 11.
108 Somers, *Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness and the Right to Have Rights*, 6.
109 Ruhs, *The Price of Rights*, 98.
110 Ruhs, 97.

2.4.2. Amount of welfare – the Marshall dimension

2.4.2.1. Formal rights

The amount of assistance a (potential) beneficiary receives is partly a function of their formal status under several intersecting policies in social, citizenship, and immigration legislation. For example, right of entry into national territory has historically been a necessary condition for inclusion. In several different historical contexts, usually when accompanied by administrative proof of residence,[111] it was even sufficient. Needy foreigners were entitled to assistance under the 1834 poor law in England[112] and its 1854 Dutch counterpart.[113] Inter-war schemes in the UK manifestly included all residents, as did the National Insurance Act, which explicitly made "no distinction on grounds of nationality."[114] In this light, many foreign residents acquire social rights before citizenship rights.[115] Non-citizens may also receive targeted social rights in the field of language and skills training or subsidised housing.[116] The extent to which entry rights suffice for social rights varies. Cross-national comparison using 2014 data from 27 rich democracies shows that left-wing cabinets are less inclined to make social protection schemes available to immigrants and welfare states with an overall high level of generosity tend to provide more generous access.[117]

Citizenship or nationality legislation also has a bearing on inclusion.[118] Arendt famously defined citizenship as the "right to have rights."[119] Many have nuanced this perspective, noting, for example, that internal surveillance practices have eroded rights to privacy and freedom,[120] or that the conditioning of rights on working practices amounts to a market fundamentalism that violates the integrity of the state-citizen relationship.[121] Nonetheless, some observers are still adamant that national membership is the "human association that trumps all others,"[122]

111 Cecilia Bruzelius, "Freedom of Movement, Social Rights and Residence-Based Conditionality in the European Union," *Journal of European Social Policy* 29, no 1 (February 1, 2019): 70–83, https://doi.org/10.1177/0958928718756262.

112 This referred however to interparish migrants as parishes were the centre of political life; David Feldman, "Migrants, Immigrants and Welfare from the Old Poor Law to the Welfare State," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 13 (2003): 92.

113 Inventory of the archives of *Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken: Afdeling Armwezen, (1866) 1918-1947 (1966)* 2.04.55. Nationaal Archief, Den Haag. 2020.

114 Feldman, "Migrants, Immigrants and Welfare from the Old Poor Law to the Welfare State," 96.

115 Hammar, *European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study*, 55.

116 Hammar, *European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study*; Kalm and Lindvall, "Immigration Policy and the Modern Welfare State, 1880-1920," 465.

117 Carina Schmitt and Céline Teney, "Access to General Social Protection for Immigrants in Advanced Democracies," *Journal of European Social Policy* 29, no 1 (February 1, 2019): 45, https://doi.org/10.1177/0958928718768365.

118 Here, I use citizenship and nationality interchangeably; however, they have distinct meanings. Nationality tends to be used more frequently in international law and refers to a legal bond between an individual and a state, whereas citizenship (and translations thereof) is more frequent in domestic law and refer more to political membership in a state. Barbara von Rütte, "Citizenship and Nationality: Terms, Concepts and Rights," in *The Human Right to Citizenship* (Brill Nijhoff, 2022), 11–57, https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004517523_003.

119 Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (San Diego, New York, London: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1976), 296.

120 Longo, *The Politics of Borders: Sovereignty, Security and the Citizen after 9/11*, 42.

121 Somers, *Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness and the Right to Have Rights*, 23.

122 Christian Joppke, *Citizenship and Immigration* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2010), 23.

and at a basic level, it has historically granted the right to enter, exit, and settle the country[123] as well as access to social schemes conditional on citizenship. Only "British subjects" were eligible for pensions under the 1908 Old Age Pensions Act.[124] From the 1880s onward France used the nationality criterion ever more frequently to determine eligibility to social assistance, with decrees from Paris in 1895 and 1896 explicitly reserving long-term care for the sick, disabled and elderly to French nationals.[125] All in all, Sainsbury concludes that, "the best bellwether of inclusion or exclusion is the ease of difficulties of immigrants becoming citizens."[126]

Finally, social legislation that introduces and regulates welfare programmes or private providers thereof often stipulates its own criteria for eligibility and benefit levels. In France, the 1945 Social Security Code (*Le Code de la sécurité sociale*) extended coverage to contributing employees as well as select non-contributors like students, retirees, and unemployed members of the workforce.[127] In the UK, the 1946 National Insurance Act included married working women, although offered them lower rates of benefit than men for the same contributions, and excluded divorcées whose marriage had ended "through [their own] fault" or "with [their own] consent."[128] Thus, social, nationality and immigration law are all relevant for the legal entitlement to rights. In principle these laws belong to distinct policy areas but, in practice, they are often determined jointly,[129] as, for instance, citizenship rights are restricted to make entry and residence more difficult[130] or social rights are reigned in to make entry and residence less costly.[131] Assessing inclusion therefore involves attending to all three policy domains in tandem.

2.4.2.2. Substantive rights

Legal inclusion does not guarantee an acceptable standard of living as per Marshall's definition. Morissens and Sainsbury distinguish between *formal* and *substantive* social rights, with the former representing legal entitlements and the latter operationalised as veritable material gains from programme participation.[132] They assess the latter by comparing the economic situation of households before and after transfers and taxes, using market income and disposable income as proxies.[133] The authors find that, across six rich democracies, citizens are more likely to be above the poverty line than foreigners and, if not, more likely to be lifted above the poverty line from welfare transfers.[134]

123 Bruzelius, "Freedom of Movement, Social Rights and Residence-Based Conditionality in the European Union."
124 El-Enany, *Bordering Britain*, 70.
125 Alexandre Afonso, *Welfare States, Closed Borders: Welfare Protection and Birth of Immigration Control in Western Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Forthcoming).
126 Sainsbury and Morissens, "Immigrants' Social Rights across Welfare States," 262.
127 Valat, "Les Retraites et La Création de La Sécurité Sociale En 1945 : Révolution Ou Restauration?"
128 Sylvie Pierce, "Single Mothers and the Concept of Female Dependency in the Development of the Welfare State in Britain," *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* 11, no 1 (Winter 1980): 69.
129 Kalm and Lindvall, "Immigration Policy and the Modern Welfare State, 1880-1920," 463.
130 Christian Joppke, *Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
131 Ruhs, *The Price of Rights*.
132 Sainsbury, *Welfare States and Immigrant Rights*, 22.
133 Sainsbury and Morissens, "Immigrants' Social Rights across Welfare States," 118.
134 Sainsbury and Morissens, 121.

That formal rights do not translate seamlessly into substantive rights is also obvious from benefit claims data. In 2003, only 68 per cent of those eligible for a supplementary transfer in the Netherlands (*aanvullende bijstand*) claimed it.[135] In France, depending on the scheme, up to one third of potential beneficiaries do not receive the rights to which they are entitled.[136] A 2023 report by a UK-based policy think tank estimated the total amount of unclaimed income-related benefits and social tariffs at £18.7 billion a year.[137] When a household or individual receives less than that to which they are entitled, it is usually described as an issue of *take-up.*[138] This framing is imperfect as it implies responsibility is the client's alone. Certainly, clients may fear stigmatisation or have moral qualms with asking for help.[139] However, research into (non) take-up has also highlighted several potential informal barriers to accessing social rights that operate not at the level of the specific scheme or the welfare administration.[140] Schemes may be governed by dense rules and guidelines that are difficult to interpret, or poorly advertised. Claims may be handled in a humiliating or degrading way and street-level bureaucrats may use their discretion to discriminatory ends.[141] This could explain why we see group-level inequalities even where take-up is high.[142]

Informal barriers therefore matter for inclusion. The qualitative researcher can evaluate the service provider's efforts to inform potential clients of their rights, assess the extent of discretion available to local-level officials, look for evidence of how that discretion was used, and consider the administrative rules of the claiming process. Illustrative is Lieberman's discussion of the 1935 Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) (see 1.2.1). Lieberman attributed the substantial racial discrimination he found not to differences in formal entitlements, but to informal barriers and opportunities for discrimination. For example, claiming ADC required an entitled person to enter a county hall, where domestic workers would need to request assistance from someone likely to be related to a member of the rich white planter class for whom they worked.[143]

2.4.3. Character of welfare - the Somers dimension

I am interested not only in inclusion under specific schemes, but in the character of that inclusion in relation to basic human needs and values, like belonging. At the macro-level,

135 Michael Fuchs et al., "Falling through the Social Safety Net? Analysing Non-Take-up of Minimum Income Benefit and Monetary Social Assistance in Austria," *Social Policy & Administration* 54, no 5 (2020): 831, https://doi.org/10.1111/spol.12581.

136 Vie Publique, "Prestations Sociales: Le Manque d'information, Principale Cause de Non-Recours," April 20, 2023, https://www.vie-publique.fr/en-bref/289086-prestations-sociales-quelles-sont-les-causes-de-non-recours.

137 Alex Clegg et al., "Missing out: £19 Billion of Support Goes Unclaimed Each Year" (London: Policy in Practice, 2023).

138 Wonsik Ko and Robert A Moffitt, "Take-up of Social Benefits," IZA DP (Institute of Labor Economics, June 2022).

139 Lilian Linders, "De Betekenis van Nabijheid: Een Onderzoek Naar Informele Zorg in Een Volksbuurt." (Tilburg, Tilburg University, 2010).

140 Wim van Oorschot, "Non-Take-up of Social Security Benefits in Europe," *Journal of European Social Policy* 1, no 15 (1991): 19.

141 van Oorschot, 20.

142 Sainsbury and Morissens, 121.

143 Lieberman, *Shifting the Color Line*, p.136.

Esping-Andersen's de-commodification index[144] goes some way toward fleshing out what a metric for the quality of social rights might look like. Ultimately, his yardstick still focuses on benefit levels, relying on proxies for benefit generosity and equality that included average replacement rates of different schemes, as well as the differential between the basic and maximum benefit levels of a given programme. Taking seriously Somers' conceptualisation of social inclusion requires additionally engaging with less (obviously) material aspects of welfare provision.

Table 1. Metrics to evaluate the dignity of a welfare system.[145]

Criteria	Metric
Accommodation of physical needs	Benefit levels Maximum period of entitlement Affordable or free access to in-kind assistance like health care or housing
Accommodation of psychological needs	Nature of application and claims procedures Preservation of privacy Social worker training
Capacity of recipients to fulfil care duties	Protection of parents' ability to provide for the health and education of their children Access of children to social activities
Social integration	Public image of claimants Their participation in social and cultural life
Human learning and development	Extent of (subsidised) education or training Encouragement of entrepreneurship
Self-determination and participation	Participation of claimants (or their representatives) in decision-making processes surrounding their benefits Right to appeal Freedom from compulsory duties (e.g. meeting with welfare staff, community work, or job training)
Equal value	Levels of benefits and development opportunities across different (types or groups of) claimants Discretion granted to local officials

Recent scholarship has unpacked the meaning of dignity in social policy. Demonstrating how to move beyond expenditure alone in the evaluation of welfare states, Chan and Bowpitt assess the extent to which Chinese, Hong Kong, Swedish, and British welfare systems safeguard the dignity of welfare recipients.[146] They start by conceptualising human dignity as a function of

144 Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, 21.
145 Adapted from Chan and Bowpitt, *Human Dignity and Welfare Systems*, 29.
146 Chak Kwan Chan and Graham Bowpitt, *Human Dignity and Welfare Systems* (Bristol: Policy Press, 2022), 6.

autonomy and mutuality. While autonomy focuses on the capacity for choice, "competence, control and achievement,"[147] mutuality refers to the interdependent and supportive social relationships through which humans satisfy our physical and psychological needs and develop our capacities.[148] These relationships involve fulfilling duties in family and society and participating in social life. This is in line with Kremer's proposal to consider the importance of the right both to give and receive care.[149] Consequently, they evaluate their four case studies with reference to seven criteria which I outline in Table 1.

These metrics facilitate more rigorous analysis of immaterial dimensions that are integral to the character of welfare. In this study, I assume that "accommodation of physical needs" is taken care of by the Marshall dimension, and that "equal value" can only be assessed through comparative research. I pay attention to the remaining indicators, during within-case analysis considering the extent to which welfare accommodates physical and psychological needs, protects its recipients' capacity to fulfil care duties, contributes to social integration, encourages human learning and development, and enshrines self-determination. Analysis of this nature is necessarily subjective, but I underpin my evaluation with as much transparency as possible, providing details of administrative procedures accompanying programmes where available.

2.4.4. Ideal-types of inclusion

Taken together, variation along the two dimensions I have outlined above produces drastically different welfare systems. Perfectly quantising either the Marshall or the Somers dimension is impossible without compromising on the complexity and depth of research it engenders. Nonetheless, over-simplification occasionally yields important insights. For this reason, the below table imagines four different forms that welfare could take, assuming that scores on both the Marshall and Somers dimensions are dichotomised. I imagine that the amount of welfare that someone receives, accounting for both formal and substantive rights, could be low or high relative either to the local population or to what might be warranted in terms of policy effectiveness.[150] Meanwhile, although Chan and Bowpitt elaborate on several different components of dignified welfare provisions, autonomy and mutuality are the key principles from which the other components of the Somers dimension are derived. Autonomy is associated with self-determination, freedom, and choice while mutuality refers to the possibility to develop supportive relationships.[151] Welfare characterised by very little dignity scores low on the Somers dimension, and vice versa. If we assume that this captures the possible variation, then at least four archetypical ways emerge in which the welfare state can interact with potential beneficiaries. Note that all quadrants represent gradients of inclusion in the distributive community rather than exclusion. I do not expect any of these four quadrants to perfectly correspond with empirical reality. They rather offer conceptual searchlights, in whose gleam pertinent aspects of redistributive boundaries and/or features of variation come into focus.

147 Granerud and Severinsson in Chan and Bowpitt, 22.
148 Chan and Bowpitt, 22.
149 Kremer, *How Welfare States Care: Culture, Gender and Parenting in Europe*.
150 Schneider and Ingram, "Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy," 337.
151 Chan and Bowpitt, *Human Dignity and Welfare Systems*, 22.

Table 2. Ideal types depicting different forms of welfare according to variation on the Marshall and Somers dimensions

		Amount	
		Low	**High**
Dignity	**Low**	Ghettoisation	Paternalism
	High	Symbolic empathy	Hyper-assimilation

Under this model, a recipient who encounters *hyper-assimilationist* welfare will enjoy a secure legal status and entitlement to welfare that surpasses either the generosity toward the average citizen or the level that might be warranted given the organising principles of the welfare state (for example, need or occupation). These entitlements will translate into actual material gains because outreach programmes will encourage take-up and for beneficiaries to "utilise the policy opportunities the have been made available."[152] The provisions themselves protect autonomy and mutuality in at least one of several ways. They might, for instance, allow recipients to participate in the decision-making processes surrounding their benefits (for example determining what kind of employment they are interested in seeking) or protect their capacity to care for their dependents. When there are conditions associated with the receipt of benefits, the recipients might be encouraged rather than forced, so that they "learn about the results of [their] behaviour and take appropriate action on a voluntary basis."[153] Their participation in social and cultural life will be stimulated and their use of welfare will be accepted.

Meanwhile, the beneficiary of *paternalist* welfare might find themselves entitled to equally generous entitlements in relative, quantitative terms, and will likely find these rights realised. However, their rights do not translate into autonomy or mutuality. Paternalism is defined as a "system under which an authority undertakes to supply needs or regulate conduct of those under its control,"[154] and in this stylised ideal-type, we assume that needs are supplied *and* conduct is regulated. Accessing welfare might require relinquishing control over key decisions (such as place of residence or occupation) as well as privacy. Their family and personal life may be subject to scrutiny, and their ability to care for their dependents might be infringed upon. They might suffer humiliation or other psychological harm due to laborious application procedures and means testing or social stigma associated with benefit use.

In the upper left quadrant is *ghettoisation*, which Meghji has described as the combination of physical segregation and intense surveillance.[155] Recipients that are included in the welfare state through ghettoisation will receive a "modicum of economic welfare and security,"[156] but not much more. Their basic physical needs, such as the right to food and shelter, will likely be met, but in ways that compromise their psychological well-being by restricting their freedom,

152 Schneider and Ingram, "Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy," 339.
153 Schneider and Ingram, 339.
154 Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, "Paternalism," October 28, 2023, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/paternalism.
155 Meghji, *The Racialized Social System*, 77.
156 Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class: And Other Essays*, 11.

mobility, and ability to fulfil care duties. Alternatively the rights which would meet basic physical needs may be conditioned on performance. Goffman's concept of the total institution as a place where "like-situated individuals [are] cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time [and] together lead an enclosed formally administered round of life" comes to mind.[157] Goffman saw total institutions as "machines" designed to meticulously and effectively produce a specific outcome.[158] Foucault would add that this outcome was achieved by "acting with precision upon individual subjects."[159] Notably, staff in total institutions view "the unique aspects of people as *material to work on*."[160] Workhouses, 'internal colonies' and correctional facilities fall into this category.

In the lower left quadrant of *symbolic empathy*, welfare provisions will be similarly residual or even less so, if the hypothetical recipients can meet their physical needs via the market. However, the provisions to which the recipient *does* have access enjoy a positive public image, preserve freedom of choice, and sidestep conditionality requirements that could be perceived as punitive, disciplinary or coercive.

2.5. Explaining inclusion

2.5.1. Building blocks

2.5.1.1. Ideology

The conditions under which someone ends up in one quadrant or another have to do with the role they are assigned in dominant ideology. Ideology is a set of conceptual schemes or heuristic devices that helps agents process and understand the reality they experience.[161] Research in psychology suggests that social agents find such devices useful. As Kahneman infamously argued, social behaviour stems from fast *and* slow thinking, i.e. both automatic, impulsive and subconscious thought (System 1), as well as deliberate, conscious reflection (System 2).[162] System 1 thinking exists due to what others have called the "law of less work,"[163] that is, the idea that humans gravitate toward the least demanding - in both cognitive and physical - course of action.[164] Interpretive shortcuts enable fast thinking. As Hall puts it, ideology provides a "way of economising in the face of excess or imperfect information."[165]

157 cited in Christie Davies, "Goffman's Concept of the Total Institution: Criticisms and Revisions," *Human Studies*, Goffman's Sociology, 12, no 1/2 (1989): 77.

158 Tom Burns, *Erving Goffman* (London, New York: Routledge, 1992), 157.

159 Michel Foucault, "Prison Talk," in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham and Kate Soper, eds. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 40.

160 Burns, 157.

161 Meghji, *The Racialized Social System*, 57; Fields and Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*, 134.

162 Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011).

163 Wouter Kool et al., "Decision Making and the Avoidance of Cognitive Demand," *Journal of Experimental Psychology General* 139, no 4 (November 2010): 665–82, https://doi.org/10.1037/a0020198.

164 Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 35.

165 Peter A Hall, *The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), 100.

Ideology typically contains several components, including, but not limited to, ontological assumptions, narratives (in turn containing both conflict and characters), and normative judgments or values. It thus contains both "cognitive" and "moral content."[166]Ontological assumptions are those concerning how the world works and the stuff of which it is made.[167] Different ideologies tend to be associated with different ontologies. For example, while liberal ideologies consider freedom to be the *type of thing* which an individual might possess or lack, socialist ideologies will be more inclined to view it as *the type of thing* which characterises a collective condition.[168] These assumptions frame the perceptions and explanations of contemporaries. The reformer, Martin Luther, could explain his mother's asthma with the evil eye of a neighbour only because his worldview included "took for granted the existence of an active, well-populated invisible realm [of sorcery]."[169]

Table 3. Components of ideologies

Features	Type
Ontologies	Cognitive
Narrative (including a conflict and characters)	Cognitive
Values	Moral

Besides ontological assumptions, ideology is also likely to involve stringing together, or (again) articulating, several different components into a "chain of meanings."[170] Lévi-Strauss and Said have explained this with reference to the mind's need for order, which it achieves "by discriminating and taking note of everything, placing everything of which the mind is aware in a secure, refundable place, therefore giving things some role to play in the economy of objects … that make up an environment."[171] All cultures, Said argues, "impose [such] corrections upon raw reality."[172]

One way of understanding this chain of meanings is as a narrative, which consists of a conflict and a set of stock characters. While the conflict refers to a specific problem that is highlighted and the outline of its potential solution, the characters are abstract figures that relate to the problem in a specific way. Hall's work on the "moral panic" of post-war Britain is exemplary.[173] By the mid-1960s, Hall argues, the material conditions of British society

166 Fields and Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*, 202.

167 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics*, The New International Relations Series (London and New York: Routledge, 2011); Peter A Hall, "Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Research," in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, ed James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

168 Stuart Hall, "The Whites of Their Eyes," in *Selected Writings on Race and Difference*, ed Paul Gilroy and Ruth Wilson Gilmore (1981; repr., Durham: Duke University Press, 2021), 100.

169 Fields and Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*, 21.

170 Hall, "The Whites of Their Eyes," 100.

171 Edward Said, "Imaginative Geography and Its Representations," in *Race Critical Theories*, ed Philomena Essed and David Theo Goldberg (1978; repr., Malden and Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 19.

172 Said, 30.

173 Hall, "Race and 'Moral Panics' in Post-war Britain."

were marked by instability as economic growth slowed down. In this context, the central social conflict could have been described in several ways. For example, one narrative could have foregrounded the character of the *teenager* - which had only recently emerged as a "self-conscious generational grouping" - and depicted the central conflict as the teenager's affinity for going out, dating, dancing and leisure, their subsequent contribution to political unrest and their potential to undermine the traditional sources of social authority.[174] However, instead, a narrative of racial conflict took hold, for reasons that I discuss later (2.5.1.2).

Finally, ideologies will likely be associated with a set of values. Taylor has argued that any framework designed to present or produce knowledge "secrete[s] a certain value framework"; that any theoretical "map" of an empirical terrain inevitably has "its own built-in value-slope."[175] This is because any framework, as value-neutral as it may claim to be, describes phenomena by classifying them according to certain dimensions of variation.[176] These dimensions are always linked in some way to a "given conception of human needs, wants, and purposes."[177] For example, Lipset's typology of political regimes distinguishes democracies and autocracies by their score on variables like peace, liberty and representativeness. In so doing, the typology intrinsically presents democracies as more valuable than oligarchies and autocracies, because "obviously a society with the above characteristics is preferable to one without ... because of the clear relation in which it stands to men's [*sic*] wants and needs."[178]

I argue that the ontologies and narratives contained within a given ideology are subject to the exact same constraints. No ontological assumption and no description of a conflict or character is possible without situating it along a given dimension of variation. These will necessarily be value-laden, and the researcher interested in social explanation will be well-served by attempting to recover underlying moral content. This is not a trivial task, as dominant ideologies, by their nature, operate beneath our consciousness.[179]

174 Stuart Hall, "The Young Englanders," in *Selected Writings on Race and Difference*, ed Paul Gilroy and Ruth Wilson Gilmore (1967; repr., Durham: Duke University Press, 2021), 42–50.

175 Charles Taylor, "Neutrality in Political Science," in *Philosophy and the Human Sciences*, vol II, Philosophical Papers (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 73.

176 To understand why this is the case requires a deeper foray into post-structuralism than I permit myself to indulge in full. The essence, however, is that in order to communicate, humans make use of signs, where abstract *signifiers* (like the word, 'laptop,' or a drawing thereof) stand in for concrete *signified* objects (like a specific small, portable computer with a screen and keyboard). Signifiers, for post-structuralists at least, are always relational; tied only loosely to the signified to which they are supposed to point, and tied much more meaningfully to *other signifiers*. For example, the meaning of the word *laptop* depends more on the meaning of words like *computer* or *tablet* than it does on its constituent materials. What matters most for its meaning is where the word *laptop* falls on a scale of "portability" vis-à-vis the signifier *computer*, or "functionality" vis-à-vis the tablet. It is much harder to admit a whirring, desk-bound machine without a keyboard into the ranks of 'laptop' than it is to admit a small, portable computer with a keyboard made out of glass. For more see Jacques Derrida, "Modern Criticism and Theory; a Reader," in *Structure, Sign and Play*, ed David Lodge (1966; repr., London, New York: Longman, 1988), 107–23..

177 Taylor, "Neutrality in Political Science," 75.

178 Taylor, 77.

179 Stuart Hall, "Gramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity," in *Selected Writings on Race and Difference*, ed Paul Gilroy and Ruth Wilson Gilmore (1986; repr., Durham: Duke University Press, 2021), 324.

2.5.1.2. Contestation

At any given time, a plurality of interpretations is possible. This diversity was of great interest to the Sardinian revolutionary Antonio Gramsci. For Gramsci, material conditions delimit and constrain ideological imaginations, creating a "terrain more favourable to the dissemination of certain modes of thought" as opposed to others.[180] However, nothing is inevitable. For their dissemination, each ideology requires an agent who will mobilise, transmit and activate it, through, for instance, emotional appeals.[181] State and non-state actors will use whatever arena is at their disposal, be it at subnational, national or international levels, formal or informal, democratic or otherwise, to express and activate their ideological persuasions. Hall places special emphasis on the media as an arena for this expression, arguing that its remit is the "production and transformation of ideologies."[182]

Expressing ideologies almost always leads to contestation, since most ideologies contain incompatible ontological assumptions, narrative structures, and normative positions. Gramsci invoked the term *hegemony* to depict a form of ideological settlement in which there is some degree of unification across different modes of production and thought.[183] Such unification entails ideological leadership, but rarely, if ever, the complete domination of one ideology over another.[184] For this reason, hegemony can be viewed as an unstable and temporary condition in a persistent struggle of ideas. Therefore, Hall suggests that analysing ideology starts with viewing it as a "differentiated terrain" of "discursive currents" whose "points of puncture and break, and the relations of power between them" ultimately determine the nature of thought at any given time.[185]

The conditions under which one, several, or an alliance of ideologies come to (provisionally) prevail is worthy of greater scrutiny. The agents acting as the ideology's transmission belt are critical. Of particular importance is their position within the overall division of labour and (capital) ownership. For Fields and Fields, racial doctrine would not have been as impactful "if the slaveholders had produced white supremacy without producing cotton,"[186] suggesting that the ideological dominance of white supremacy hinged on the economic power of slaveholders. An ideology's logical and formal coherence also matters, as does its ability to align with the "practical, everyday consciousness" of the masses.[187]

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180 cited in Hall, 304.

181 Meghji, *The Racialized Social System*, 63.

182 Hall, "The Whites of Their Eyes," 100.

183 Hall, "Gramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity," 324.

184 Stuart Hall, "Race, Articulation and Societies Structured in Dominance," in *Selected Writings on Race and Difference*, ed Paul Gilroy and Ruth Wilson Gilmore (1980; repr., Durham: Duke University Press, 2021), 228.

185 In Marxist thought, this differentiated terrain is called the superstructure - the ideological consciousness suspended over the material conditions of a given time and place. Hall, "Gramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity," 320.

186 Fields and Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*, 138.

187 Hall, "Gramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity," 317.

Table 4. Characteristics of a dominant ideology

Internally coherent
Transmitted by powerful agents
Complements existing ideas
Produces a classificatory schema that sustains or promotes economic order

In this way, the popularity of Catholic doctrine is at least partly attributable to its aptitude for organising mutually complementary ideas, and for generating hierarchies that slotted easily into cultural life and common sense.[188] Similarly, Afonso explores why Switzerland and Sweden adopted two different strategies despite facing the same labour shortages in the 1970s.[189] While Switzerland opted to recruit guestworkers, Sweden increased the number of women in the workforce. Afonso argues that this was due at least in part to prevalent gender norms in Switzerland, which mounted resistance to female employment, alongside the weakness of the Swiss labour movement, which was less able to resist recourse to foreign labour.[190]

Finally, in the previous section I called attention to the way that ideology is involved in sorting various components, including people, into a "chain of meanings."[191] Its success will be shaped by its ability to perform this classificatory function in a way that sustains or justifies a mode of production. Hall argues that actors "speak through" ideology to assign individuals or groups specific roles. For example, Thatcher spoke through free-market conservatism to position the worker on the same side as capital.[192] Fields and Fields' account of why racial ideology met success highlights the ways that race upheld and rationalised a political economy of slavery, clarifying the property rights of slaveholders and discouraging freed individuals from interacting with them.[193] Fanon stated that "the settler … has brought the native into existence,"[194] as the survival and economic success of the settler in the colonial context depended on maintaining an immutable and marked difference between themselves and the people they want to conquer.

Importantly, then, both material and symbolic path dependencies play a role in determining the success of a given ideology. Ideology neither follows immediately from material conditions, nor is it entirely divorced from them. This implies an inherent vulnerability of the ideological settlement. Material change, for instance in labour market conditions, will require interpretive work.

188 Hall, 319.
189 Alexandre Afonso, "Migrant Workers or Working Women? Comparing Labour Supply Policies in Post-War Europe," *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice* 21, no 3 (May 27, 2019): 251–69, https://doi.org/10.1080/13876988.2018.1527584.
190 Afonso, 255.
191 Hall, "The Whites of Their Eyes," 100.
192 Hall, 101.
193 Fields and Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*, 131.
194 Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 28.

2.5.1.3. Identity and race

Ideology is more than an intellectual exercise. When an ideology becomes dominant, it shapes the material reality out of which it developed. One way in which this happens is through the process of casting different individuals as different characters, who are related to one another in specific ways. When real individuals are assigned a role in the ideological narrative, or when they assume and/or are ascribed a value on a dimension rendered salient by (ideological) context, *identification* has taken place.[195] Identity can be understood as a positioning, or a symbol signifying one's location in a given system of meaning.[196]

Identity is never just an innate, individual-level attribute: it depends on the ideology's ontological assumptions and moral frameworks. For example, in an ideological landscape which views biological sex as binary and a key determinant of preferences, personalities, capabilities, and expression, only two gender identities are possible. In contrast, in an ideology with different ontological assumptions, for example according to which gender is a performance that relates only tenuously (if at all) to biological sex, then subjects may be assigned or voluntarily take up other gender identities. Equally, in an ideology where the relevant value-slope is between Europeanness and Orientalism, as Said has shown, European identity evolved by representing Asia ("the Orient") as "defeated and distant" in contrast to their own "powerful and articulate" nature.[197] For all of these reasons, survey experiments manipulating the "cultural proximity" of fictitious identities[198] operates on the false pretext that identity is affixed to individual bodies rather than created in the space between them in relation to preconceived ideas about what cultural proximity means.

Race is another important example of an identity that is predicated on several ideological features. Historically, race has relied on the belief that "nature produced humankind in distinct groups," each of which contains human genetic variation so neatly that members of one group are meaningfully distinct from members of another.[199] Goldberg argues that this evolved out of the ancient practice of cataloguing mythological beings and humans as a means of locating the self within the broader animal kingdom.[200] Consolidating racial ideology, Goldberg maintains, involved transplanting the 'exoticism' of ancient and medieval imagination onto the bodies of specific people that Europeans sought to colonise or encountered in their attempts at imperial expansion.[201] The act of imbuing phenotypical characteristics with racial meaning by clustering genetic variety into neat and self-contained racial units has been called racial formation.[202]

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195 Appiah, "Race, Culture, Identity."

196 Stuart Hall, "Cultural Identity and Diaspora," in *Selected Writings on Race and Difference*, ed Paul Gilroy and Ruth Wilson Gilmore (1989; repr., Durham: Duke University Press, 2021), 257–71.

197 Said, "Imaginative Geography and Its Representations," 21.

198 Kootstra, "Deserving and Undeserving Welfare Claimants in Britain and the Netherlands"; Ford, "Who Should We Help?"

199 Fields and Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*, 16.

200 David Theo Goldberg, "Modernity, Race, and Morality," ed Philomena Essed and David Theo Goldberg (Malden and Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 284.

201 Goldberg, 290.

202 Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States*, 3rd ed (London, New York: Routledge, 2015), 61.

Race is not complete without continued ideological work that Fields and Fields call *racecraft.*[203] The suffix "-craft" is used both to highlight the material processes of *making* or *doing* that prop up this set of beliefs, and to draw a parallel with witchcraft.[204] Racecraft and witchcraft, Fields and Fields argue, rely on similar ontologies. Both cultivate a belief in fictitious, invisible entities (witches and races, respectively) in defence of which modern science has furnished little to no evidence. For example, Hall describes the contours of a reigning moral panic in 1960s Britain due to "anxieties about the rapid process of social change," anti-government protests due to foreign policy, and the end of an economic boom.[205] Hall argues that political actors "*thematised*" these conditions "through race,"[206] suggesting that immigration from the colonies was the central problem. Political actors cast "the blacks" as central antagonists and the "'silent' and beleaguered majorities - the great underclasses, the great, silent, 'British Public'" - as protagonists in the struggle for social order.[207]

The process of assigning identities is protracted and uncertain, and race is no different. In 1790 the US Congress voted that a person must be "white" to become a naturalised US citizen.[208] A hundred years later, attorneys openly lamented the ambiguity around who exactly fell under the category of "white person."[209] Even in 1899, William Z. Ripley, author of *The Races of Europe*, had difficulty fitting real people into the grid he created.[210] This indeterminate and constructed character of racial identity explains how various groups can throughout time be said to have acquired whiteness[211] or blackness.[212] The survival of classificatory schema in the face of this confusion depends on maintaining faith in their rationale.

2.5.1.4. (Re)distribution and (re)production

The prescriptive content of classificatory schema exerts real influence on the material world, shaping social phenomena such as patterns of inclusion. This is partly because arranging individuals in an ideological landscape produces guidelines, or scripts, of how differently classed individuals ought to act and how resources ought to be redistributed. These prove useful in their decision-making processes. As Tajfel explains, an "undifferentiated social environment makes very little sense and provides no guidelines for actions."[213] In contrast, classifying individuals into groups lends "order and coherence to the social situation while at the same time enabling the individual to act, in a way which has been sanctioned as 'appropriate' in many other situations."[214]

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203 Fields and Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*, 16.
204 Fields and Fields, 202.
205 Hall, "Race and 'Moral Panics' in Post-war Britain," 61.
206 Hall, 63.
207 Hall, 63.
208 Roediger, "Whiteness and Ethnicity in the History of 'White Ethnics' in the United States," 324.
209 Roediger, 324.
210 Fields and Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*, 16.
211 Roediger, *Wages of Whiteness*; Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White*.
212 Magubane, *Bringing the Empire Home: Race, Class, and Gender in Britain and Colonial South Africa*; Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor: From Abolition to Brexit*.
213 Tajfel et al., "Social Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour," 153.
214 Tajfel et al., 153.

In these ways, ideology offers a blueprint for resource (re)distribution. This is how racial ideology can lead to race as a socially meaningful category. For Meghji and Bonilla-Silva, racialisation involves imagining discrete units of genetic difference, arrange them into a distinctive racial hierarchy and distribute resources unequally across this hierarchy.[215] Meghji demonstrates how this happens at micro, meso and macro levels of social systems.[216] At the meso level, for example, prescriptive norms prevail about which groups can interact with each other and how, which in turn affects the built environment as real estate is developed in line with a perceived imperative for segregation and control.[217] Similarly an employer might distribute positions in the organisational hierarchy, including pay, manual tasks, and, again, informal norms of behaviour (such as the social permission to raise one's voice) along racial lines.[218] Market actors like banks dispense credit, and insurance companies determine eligibility for private schemes, in accordance with racial norms. Thus, race depends on racial ideology, and racism depends on race.

As action conforms to ideological prescriptions and resources distribution reflects this, identities stop existing "purely in the mind" and become social facts, in the Durkheimian sense: "like six o'clock, both an idea and a reality."[219] Every time a redistributive decision is made in line with ideological priors, it furnishes ever *more evidence* for the original ideology. First, resource distribution gives life to the characters that ideology has constructed. This is partly what Du Bois meant when he said that "the black man is a person who must ride 'Jim Crow' in Georgia."[220] The identity of the "black man" is created by segregation that grows the social distance between specific people *and* the relevance of the categories that distinguish them.

Relatedly, existing research in psychology has pointed to the importance of an "interdependence of fate"[221] or a "shared quandary"[222] in generating "groupness." Put simply, we are thought to be more likely to identify as a member of a group when we feel like we have challenges in common with other members of that group. For this reason, when resources are distributed along imaginary lines, it creates groups with similar social realities. This then makes it much easier for future observers to declare their likeness.

Thirdly, belief in the existence of discrete identities offers an explanation for the inequalities that their belief facilitates.[223] For example, segregation of schools, housing, and social life fosters different speaking habits and vernacular, which then feeds racial doctrine.[224] As Fields and Fields put it, if someone believes in witches – or in race – then the evidence of witchcraft and racecraft is incontrovertible: "belief… constantly dumps factitious evidence of

215 Meghji, *The Racialized Social System*, 20.
216 Meghji, *The Racialized Social System*.
217 Meghji, 77.
218 Meghji, 103.
219 Fields and Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*, 25.
220 cited in Meghji, *The Racialized Social System*, 81.
221 Tajfel et al., "Social Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour."
222 Sen, *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny*, 27.
223 Fields and Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*, 202.
224 Fields and Fields, 103.

itself into the real world."[225] In this way, ideology sustains its own relevance when it manages to shape real world outcomes.

Finally, as material resources are distributed, the ownership over what might be called the *cultural* means of production tends to shift into the hands of dominant groups. The media has historically awarded representation in accordance with the views that are considered by prevailing ideology to be respectable, eloquently articulated, and in alignment with the majority consensus.[226] This enables a doubling-down of the ideology's central tenets as dominant groups use these to justify the status quo. Therefore, redistributive boundary-making is a self-serving and iterative cycle in which one stage feeds directly into the next, if not temporally then teleologically (see Figure 1).



Figure 1. How ideology impacts redistribution and vice versa

2.5.2. Rewarding the deserving, disciplining the deviant

As mentioned, the welfare state can service the nation's need for legitimacy in at least four ways: structuring social space (building internal boundaries), mollifying dissent, promoting cultural assimilation and imbuing the nation with moral substance. It accomplishes each through

225 Fields and Fields, 22.

226 Stuart Hall, "Black Men, White Media," in *Selected Writings on Race and Difference*, ed Paul Gilroy and Ruth Wilson Gilmore (1974; repr., Durham: Duke University Press, 2021), 52.

different forms of welfare. The form that a hypothetical claimant will encounter is a function of the identity they are assigned in relation to the nation, which is often located along dimensions of deservingness, cultural proximity (or deviance), and political power. The exact outcomes of this ideological work, however, can take infinite forms depending on the agency of the actors involved and the templates they inherit.

Welfare devoted to structuring social space, for example, looks different than that which aims to subdue dissent. The former is mainly achieved by adjusting the *amount* that a beneficiary receives. Variation on the Marshall dimension inevitably generates internal boundaries and cleavages within the social space, creating what Longo called the "heterogeneous inside."[227] Particularly generous and particularly meagre amounts might contribute to centre-periphery dynamics, one of the basic structures that Ferrera and Rokkan identify as associated with the presence of boundaries.[228] Hyper-assimilation could situate someone in the upper rungs of the labour market, while ghettoisation will inevitably confine them to the margins of social space. In this context, someone may come to be constructed as more or less deserving of occupying a central position in social space.

Winning over subversive factions, meanwhile, can involve centring hypothetical claimants in social space through welfare that scores high on the Marshall dimension, as high enough amounts of welfare can mitigate against resistance by compensating against the ills that accompany national belonging, like military service or taxation. It might also involve dignified treatment associated with high scores on the Somers dimension. On the other hand, it might involve the opposite - disciplinary treatment that allows policymakers to closely monitor the perceived political threat. If subduing dissent is the primary concern of policymakers, the type of welfare that someone receives will likely relate to their political importance or propensity to resist. In this case, components of material reality like the distribution of electoral strength or the histories of dissent are likely to shape (but not determine) interpretations of power.

Cultural assimilation, on the other hand, is most easily accomplished through downward movement on the Somers dimension. Welfare which assumes a highly disciplinary form (what I have called ghettoisation or paternalism), characterised by incursions into recipients' private lives, choices and freedoms, is particularly well-placed to induce behaviour change. More dignified forms of welfare can also affect the conduct of recipients, but efforts to do so will be less fervent and may include emphasising "capacity building," or encouraging specific choices by providing information about their results.[229] Here, potential beneficiaries who have been cast as culturally proximate characters will be better able to avoid disciplinary forms of intervention, while those depicted as culturally deviant or distant will be the target population.

Finally, protecting the "community of value"[230] by casting the nation in a positive light happens not necessarily through variation on either dimension, but in the discursive field in which policy rationale is articulated. Schneider and Ingram describe, for instance, how "the personal messages for the positively viewed, powerful segments of society are that they are

227 Longo, *The Politics of Borders: Sovereignty, Security and the Citizen after 9/11*.
228 Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*.
229 Schneider and Ingram, "Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy."
230 Anderson, *Us and Them?*

good, intelligent people. When they receive benefits from the government, it is not a special favour or because of their need but because they are contributing to public welfare."[231] In this sense, for the nation to be perceived as virtuous, the distributive outcomes themselves are less important than whether they align with policy rationale and messaging. For example, the marginalisation of someone constructed as the model "Good Citizen" would have deleterious effects on the image of the nation.

Again, none of these identities are fixed, nor are they mutually exclusive. They can overlap, for example if someone is constructed as deserving *by means of* their construction as culturally proximate. They will also not singularly determine the form of inclusion that a beneficiary will face. This is partly because identities can change, either when the dimensions against which the identities were constructed are called into question or because someone's placement along this dimension is contested. It is also because of the gap, as previously mentioned, between the intentions behind a policy and the outcomes that follow.

2.5.3. Identity in welfare state scholarship

One subbranch of welfare state scholarship has grappled somewhat explicitly with the meaning of identity for inclusion. Deservingness scholarship is concerned with identifying the invisible norms influencing the public's decision-making procedure; asking about "the public's answer to 'who should get what, and why?'"[232] Although this process is obviously internal, various research techniques can bring it into focus, including survey experiments which manipulate the values of different individual-level variables for hypothetical welfare claimants, and measure the effects on their perceived deservingness (for an overview of these experiments, see 1.2.4). Early findings by Van Oorschot suggest that five criteria form the cornerstone of the public's decision-making, of which identity is one. These are listed below in Table 5. Subsequent research suggests the continued relevance of these original five criteria - Control, Attitude, Reciprocity, Identity and Need, or "CARIN" for short.[233]

Insightful as van Oorschot's framework is, as I mentioned in the Introduction, it is not obvious where the CARIN criteria come from. They may well shape how the characters in a given ideology are defined at a certain historical conjuncture. For example, Hall documents the media's obsession in the 1970s with *reciprocity* as it churned out a "repertoire of scare stories about white 'welfare scroungers' drawing the dole on the Costa Brava."[234] However, they do not provide insight as to why these specific criteria mattered at this specific time, instead depicting the criteria as universal and timeless precepts. For example, Carsen and Petersen invoke "human evolutionary history," in which randomly occurring infections and injuries dwarfed lifestyle diseases, to explain why the public might "tag" the sick as deserving

231 Schneider and Ingram, "Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy," 342.

232 van Oorschot, "Who Should Get What, and Why?"

233 Wim van Oorschot and Femke Roosma, "The Social Legitimacy of Targeted Welfare and Welfare Deservingness," in *The Social Legitimacy of Targeted Welfare*, ed Bart Meuleman and Tim Reeskens (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017), 3–35, https://doi.org/10.4337/9781785367212.00010; Bart Meuleman, Femke Roosma, and Koen Abts, "Welfare Deservingness Opinions from Heuristic to Measurable Concept: The CARIN Deservingness Principles Scale," *Social Science Research* 85 (January 2020): 102352, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2019.102352.

234 Hall, "Race and 'Moral Panics' in Post-war Britain," 64.

of help.[235] Path dependency undoubtedly plays a role, but how and why have lifestyle diseases been constructed as undeserving? Alternatively, the criteria are explained with reference to the influence of the news media. Gilens focuses on biases in the portrayal of welfare beneficiaries by media outlets.[236] Even if media representation is significant, it is not suspended above social reality. In what cultural context were these portrayals viable? Failing to excavate the origins of these criteria is not only a missed opportunity empirically, but also has normative consequences, as it leads to the description of "deservingness gaps" as "inevitable" and "insurmountable."[237]

Table 6: Five dimensions of deservingness, adapted from van Oorschot[238]

Dimension	Logic
Need	The greater a claimant's neediness, the more deserving they are judged.
Control	The less a claimant's neediness can be attributed to their own shortcomings or decisions, the more deserving they are judged.
Identity	The more proximate the claimant's identity to the rich, the more deserving they are judged.
Attitude	The more docile, grateful, or compliant the claimant's attitude toward welfare, the more deserving they are judged.
Reciprocity	The more a claimant can be said to have contributed or earned their way financially, the more deserving they are judged.

In fact, these dimensions are historical artefacts, not universal laws: they change over time. Reciprocity makes sense only in an ideology according to which welfare ought to be awarded to people who have paid for this right. Historical research has gone far in illustrating that this has not always been the metric of deservingness. Shilliam charts the "constant shifting" of the "coordinates" of deservingness at various moments of struggle across the British empire and nation.[239] Under Elizabethan poor laws, the logic of deservingness had nothing to do with reciprocity. Instead, the deserving poor included the elderly, children, sick and disabled, while able-bodied men, vagrants and idle paupers without employment were viewed as less deserving.[240] Moreover, the CARIN framework effectively locates the site of inclusion or exclusion on the body of the potential claimant, rather than on the historical and contingent process to which that claimant is subject. For this reason (among others), Carmel and Sojka propose an alternative framework which distinguishes between organisational logics, or "rationales of

235 Carsten Jensen and Michael Bang Petersen, "The Deservingness Heuristic and the Politics of Health Care," *American Journal of Political Science* 61, no 1 (2017): 69.
236 Gilens, *Why Americans Hate Welfare*.
237 Reeskens and van der Meer, "The Inevitable Deservingness Gap."
238 van Oorschot, "Who Should Get What, and Why?," 168.
239 Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor: From Abolition to Brexit*, 6.
240 Shilliam, 9 See also van Oorschot and Roosma, "The Social Legitimacy of Targeted Welfare and Welfare Deservingness," 6; Anderson, *Us and Them?*

belonging."[241] Studying the logic behind these dimensions, rather than their application, offers a more honest portrayal of the drivers of inclusion or exclusion.

According to my framework, the content of deservingness - or any other value-slope that might govern patterns of inclusion, like cultural proximity - is a function of the ontological assumptions and moral frameworks of dominant ideology. More specifically, recalling the conditions under which ideologies prevail (2.5.1.2), it originates from at least two different sources. First, it will be more likely to reflect the qualities of those who occupy a central position within the division of labour and ownership in a given conjuncture. This is because proponents of this ideological move will be (relatively) more powerful, and because the construction will cohere with, and provide further justification for, the existing status quo. Second, deservingness will build on pre-existing templates for what the "Good Citizen"[242] looks like. In other words, they are path-dependent. This is the main reason why constructions of cultural proximity so frequently involve racialisation.

241 Carmel and Sojka, "Beyond Welfare Chauvinism and Deservingness Rationales of Belonging as a Conceptual Framework for the Politics and Governance of Migrants' Rights," 2.

242 Anderson, *Us and Them?*

3. Methodology and inference

3.1. Logic of inquiry

3.1.1. Qualitative case studies

My project explores the social inclusion of (post)colonial migrants in order to join the conversation in welfare state scholarship about the theoretical relationship(s) between welfare, race, nation-building, solidarity, and culture. It is therefore comfortably situated in the broad field of sociohistorical research; that is, "historical investigation informed by social scientific perspectives."[1] In this chapter, I justify the methodological choices I made with considerable transparency, as qualitative researchers across traditions generally agree on the importance of openly sharing how evidence was collected and analysed.[2]

Qualitative researchers treat the gap between the reality of the social world and the concepts deployed to make sense of it[3] as fertile ground for analysis. For example, Anderson's conclusions regarding the value-laden character of national communities were drawn through careful study of the historical deployment and construction of terms like 'skilled worker,' 'national labour market,' and even 'citizen.'[4] Equally, Cooper argues that British colonial administrators exploited the ambiguity of the word 'development,' which doubled as a reference both to an increase in productive output *and* an improvement in the welfare of colonial citizens, in order to disguise the tenuous relationship between the two.[5] In my case, the instability across time and space of key historical terms, like *repatriate* and *refugee,* underscored the benefits of exploring the conceptual terrain in depth and expanding the types of observations that could be admitted as evidence. This was particularly useful in the descriptive phase, as it was unclear what kind of data existed until I had the chance to visit the archives.

Within the qualitative research tradition, case studies are common. A case is a specific, spatially and temporally delimited context or phenomenon.[6] My project combines synchronic (variation at a single point in time) and diachronic (variation in a single case over time) analysis, and thereby falls within the tradition of comparative-historical analysis, or CHA.[7] CHA has a long pedigree: the first generation of CHA scholars included some of the founding figures of

1 Michael R Hill, *Archival Strategies and Techniques*, Qualitative Research Methods Series 31 (Newbury Park, London and New Delhi: SAGE Publications, Inc., 1993), 3.

2 Alan M Jacobs et al., "The Qualitative Transparency Deliberations: Insights and Implications," *Perspectives on Politics* 19, no 1 (March 2021): 184, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592720001164.

3 This idea comes from (post-)structuralist theory, according to which language is a system of interdependent signs whose relationship to reality is variable and uncertain. For the structuralist thinker, concepts offer clues about individual and collective understanding, but they do not seamlessly transmit an underlying truth. Derrida, "Modern Criticism and Theory; a Reader."

4 Anderson, *Us and Them?*

5 Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa*, 206.

6 John Gerring, *Case Study Research* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 19.

7 John Gerring, "What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?," *American Political Science Review* 98, no 2 (May 2004): 27, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055404001182.

the social sciences more broadly, from Alexis de Tocqueville to Karl Marx and Max Weber.[8] After the Second World War, CHA experienced a revival as complex sociopolitical processes such as the civil rights movement, the Cold War and economic modernisation prompted renewed attention to larger scale causal analysis with longer time horizons.[9] CHA allowed me to develop theory at the midrange, which, according to Baldwin, is the only level at which a "satisfactory approach to the welfare state is possible."[10] Further advantages of CHA came from my commitment to historical-interpretivism.

3.1.2. Historical interpretivism

Ontology refers to assumptions about the nature of the social world and, specifically, the operations of cause and effect within it.[11] It concerns what things are made of, and always has implications on *how knowledge of those things ought to be generated* - i.e. epistemology.[12] A central point of ontological contention in the social sciences concerns whether events in the social world are governed by mechanistic, law-like regularity, or whether they stem from meaning-making practices and emerge in a contingent manner. Karl Popper's comparison between a cloud and a clock is illustrative. In Popperian terms, systems can exhibit either the properties of a clock – "regular, orderly and highly predictable" or of a cloud - "highly irregular, disorderly, and more or less unpredictable."[13] I share the belief in a cloud-like world with interpretive scholars and historians, whose distinctive contributions I merge into a single paradigm that I call historical-interpretivism, which comes with distinct epistemological consequences.

In the 1950s, the belief in clock-like regularity of the social world grew in dominance after the influence of the logical positivists, a group of philosophers who developed tools for systematically verifying empirical claims.[14] For today's neopositivists, "all clouds are clocks - even the most cloudy of clouds."[15] The gold standard in this research tradition involves isolating a single causal factor by keeping all other variables constant, something experimental and statistical methods accomplish by exposing one of two equivalent groups to a stimulus (or mathematically manipulating the same).[16] Comparative approaches are attractive to the neopositivist because a single case study is considered unlikely to exhibit sufficient variation for

8 Marcus Kreuzer, "Varieties of Time in Comparative Historical Analysis," in *The Oxford Handbook of Time and Politics*, ed Klaus H Goetz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).
9 Matthew Lange, *Comparative-Historical Methods* (SAGE Publications Ltd., 2012).
10 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*, 39.
11 Hall, "Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Research," 376.
12 Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics*, 73.
13 Karl R Popper, "Of Clouds and Clocks" (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 207.
14 Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics*, 50 Dvora Yanow, "Interpretation in Policy Analysis: On Methods and Practice.," *Critical Policy Analysis* 1, no 1 (2007): 112.
15 Popper, "Of Clouds and Clocks," 222.
16 Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *The American Political Science Review* 65, no 3 (September 1971): 683.

a researcher to observe regular empirical association of two variables.[17] Comparative case studies approximate the experiment when cases are carefully selected based on attributes of interest, like J.S. Mill proposed.[18] If neopositivism reserves a privileged place for comparison, however, it downplays the importance of history. In a clock-like world, the past is not substantively different from the present, but is instead, "quite simply, the time before the present."[19] Studying the past has value mainly because it increases the number of observations of a given study.[20] Context, idiosyncrasy or peculiarities distract from, rather than illuminate, the underlying covering laws.

Historical-interpretivism, meanwhile, rejects any regular association between two isolated variables. It borrows from the interpretivist scholar the assumption that objects acquire properties as they are experienced and made sense of by subjects in a process of individual and collective meaning-making.[21] Unlike natural laws (like gravity), cause and effect in the social world are mediated by reflexive agents. Humans do not mechanically respond to stimuli. Instead, we understand stimuli, interpret their relevance, and react to our interpretation.[22] Any causal mechanism is "parasitic" on human beliefs and practices - if, "at any point, the mechanism [finds] it has lost its necessary support… in the relevant subjects," it loses its causal power.[23] In this way, Du Bois criticises his contemporaries who blame impersonal economic forces, like the development of manufacturing in the North or agrarian feudalism in the South, for the abolition of slavery.[24] Du Bois argues that in a "sweeping mechanistic interpretation" like this, "there is no room for the *real plot of the story*, for the clear mistake and guilt… for the triumph of sheer moral courage and sacrifice… for the hurt and struggle of degraded black millions in their fight for freedom."[25]

In this view, social reality is not reducible to meaning-making, but cannot be explained without it.[26] Additionally, it takes from the historian's ontological toolkit[27] the notion that the past is "not just prior to the present but also different from it."[28] As the novelist L.P. Hartley quipped, "the past is a foreign country, they do things differently there."[29] Time is

17 Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, *Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2013).

18 Gary King, Robert O Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).

19 Zachary Sayre Schiffman, *The Birth of the Past* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), 2.

20 Kreuzer, "Varieties of Time in Comparative Historical Analysis," 9.

21 Yanow, "Interpretation in Policy Analysis: On Methods and Practice.," 110.

22 Scott, *Institutions and Organizations: Ideas, Interests and Identities*, 15.

23 Jason Glynos and David Howarth, *Logics of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Science* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 97.

24 W.E.B Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction in America: An Essay Toward the History of the Part Which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860-1880* (1935; repr., Frank Cass & Co Ltd., 1966).

25 Du Bois, 714.

26 Glynos and Howarth, *Logics of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Science*, 13.

27 Of course, the ontologies of a discipline as vast as history do vary; see Herman Paul and Ethan Kleinberg, "Are Historians Ontological Realists? An Exchange," *Rethinking History* 22, no 4 (October 2, 2018): 546–57, https://doi.org/10.1080/13642529.2018.1530820 for an overview of ontological disagreements within the historical field.

28 Schiffman, *The Birth of the Past*, 2.

29 cited in Fraser, *Evolution of the British Welfare State*, 3.

fateful: every action "leaves a historical residue" by changing, no matter how subtly, the context in which it happened and remaining in the memory of those it affects.[30] *When* something happens thus has profound effects on *how* it happens, as well as the magnitude or character of its consequences. For example, the consequences of an action as mundane as failing to nod to a colleague in the hallway will be more severe, for instance, if it followed a set of disparaging or encouraging comments about that person's research in a department meeting.[31] Cause and effect are necessarily context-specific.

A historical-interpretivist ontology has several epistemological implications. First, unravelling local meanings and motivations becomes central to grasping reality.[32] The search for *reasons* joins or crowds out the search for *causes*.[33] For example, although Joan of Arc's death was preceded by heat generated by the combustion of oxygen and hydrocarbons, it can only be *explained* with the beliefs in witchcraft and heresy that motivated her execution.[34] This makes single case studies popular, since meanings are necessarily local and context-specific, and recovering them in sufficient detail requires considerable labour.[35] Simultaneously, historical-interpretivist research must explain why some meanings and beliefs influence social action and others do not[36] by studying material and immaterial cultural, social and political constraints. Cross-case comparison can help in this process by shedding light on how distinct settings affect the production of meaning. In an influential 1980 article, Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers introduce a *contrast-oriented* approach to CHA.[37] Contrast-oriented CHA holds that any event is unique and unprecedented, but uses comparison to illuminate the pertinent features of its uniqueness. Put differently, European feudalism can be "more sharply defined" in comparison with Japanese feudalism.[38] Comparison helps refine theory by demonstrating how case-specific features affect "the working-out of putatively general social processes."[39]

My adherence to historical-interpretivism thus both motivated and required a theoretical framework which emphasises interpretation and ideology alongside material conditions (see section 2.3). My analysis employs comparative tactics at three different levels where contrasts are present. I assume that each case represents a complex system, irreducible to the sum of its parts; that each could be classified in alternative and potentially more fruitful ways, and that comparison necessitates describing each case in discrete terms which will always mask

30 William H Sewell Jr., *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 7.
31 Sewell Jr., 7.
32 Mark Bevir and Rod Rhodes, "Interpretation and Its Others," *Australian Journal of Political Science* 40, no 2 (2005): 170.
33 Markus Haverland and Dvora Yanow, "A Hitchhiker's Guide to the Public Administration Research Universe: Surviving Conversations on Methodologies and Methods," *Public Administration Review* 72, no 3 (2012): 404.
34 Frederick Erickson, "Comments on Causality in Qualitative Inquiry" 18, no 8 (2012): 686.
35 Dvora Yanow, "Interpretive Analysis and Comparative Research," in *Comparative Policy Studies*, ed Isabelle Engeli and Christine Rothmayr Allison (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014), 146, https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137314154_7.
36 Erickson, "Comments on Causality in Qualitative Inquiry," 686.
37 Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, "The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 22, no 2 (April 1980): 174–97.
38 cited in Skocpol and Somers, 180.
39 Skocpol and Somers, 178.

a more complex reality. The function of comparison is to ascertain how salient, case-specific features affect a broader social process of encountering (post)colonial migrations in the post-war period. I do not assume that, removed from their context, any given feature will perform in an equivalent manner.

3.2. Case selection

3.2.1. Guiding principles

Historical-interpretivism has two consequences for case selection. The first concerns its importance. For a neopositivist, the ability to isolate relevant causal factors depends on cases exhibiting equivalence along key dimensions, or on one's own ability to control for key differences.[40] Poorly selected cases undermine the conclusions drawn.[41] In contrast, inference in historical-interpretivist research is predominantly powered by "deep insights into the structures and motivations of actors"[42] and other forms of within-case analysis (the details of which I will unpack in section 3.3). Thoughtful case selection still matters, but it is not the foundation upon which inference hinges. The second consequence is that selecting cases by their scores on specific variables is no longer viable. The historian is adamant that societies are complex, dynamic systems that "cannot be broken apart at will into analytically manipulable variables."[43] The interpretivist, meanwhile, is reluctant to establish in advance the location of a case on a given continuum, preferring to remain modest about what can be known at a distance about any given context, and open to the insights and concepts that emerge "from within" throughout the entire research process.[44] The process of case selection, therefore, starts from different principles. I derive four from existing methodological texts and use them in the selection of country-level, programme-level and group-level cases.

First, the historical-interpretivist should locate contexts in which the phenomenon of interest is expected to be socially significant. This is encapsulated by Dvora Yanow's question, *"where [else] might X [the topic of study] be meaningful in key ways?"*[45] Just like in neopositivist research, theoretical priors are required to ascertain this. However, these priors are loose conjectures, analogous to the air photos an archeologist might use before deciding where to dig. Rather than reflecting fixed attributes of a case, theoretical priors are entry points into the in-depth study of local dynamics. The assumption is that the situated meanings of X will differ to some extent across cases, but the magnitude of these differences is left open.[46] The

40 Gerring, *Case Study Research*.
41 Barbara Geddes, "How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics," *Political Analysis* 2 (1990): 131–50.
42 Joachim Blatter and Till Blume, "In Search of Co-Variance, Causal Mechanisms or Congruence? Towards a Plural Understanding of Case Studies," *Swiss Political Science Review* 14, no 2 (2008): 323–24.
43 Skocpol and Somers, "The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry," 193–94.
44 Yanow, "Interpretive Analysis and Comparative Research," 144.
45 Yanow, 149.
46 Yanow, 149.

contrast-oriented comparative historian is equally open to being surprised, inclined to "ask the same or at least similar questions of divergent materials and leave from for divergent answers."[47]

The second guiding principle is to 'case.' Casing is the deliberate process of considering the various concepts to which a unit can speak and reflecting on the advantages and disadvantages of each. For Soss, casing differs from case selection.[48] Case selection implies deciding among a universe of potential units, each relating in some way to the concepts of interest. Soss argues that a single unit will never correspond to only one single conceptual class. For instance, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 may be an instance ('case') of nuclear deterrence, strong leadership personality, or coercive diplomacy.[49] Every casing brings the unit "into dialogue with a different set of empirical phenomena," creating constraints on the comparisons that are viable.[50] If a researcher intends to case the Cuban Missile Crisis as an instance of nuclear deterrence, then comparing with the Vietnam War or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the 'Iran deal') could be suitable. If it is cased as an instance of coercive diplomacy, then a comparison with EU trade sanctions would be more appropriate. The point is to stage a moment of deliberate reflection about the interpretive possibilities that open up when a complex system is classified and compared along a given gradient. A good starting point is Soss' question: "what can be learned from treating this phenomenon as a case of X?"[51]

Third, the contrast-oriented historian reminds us to, where possible, select cases that are expected to contrast with one another in meaningful ways according to the casing decision. This is different from the neopositivist notion of variation, which implies *variables*: distinct features of social reality that can be extracted from context and put in relation with other variables. Contrast, rather than variation, implies "respect[ing] the "historical integrity of each case as a whole."[52] Identifying relevant contrasts across cases can be done in reference to broad themes, orienting questions or even ideal-types that act as "sensitising devices - benchmarks against which to establish the particular features of each case."[53] This is how Geertz justifies his choice to compare Morocco and Indonesia: "their most obvious likeness is... their religious affiliation [but] they stand at the eastern and western extremities of the narrow band of classical Islamic civilisation... they have participated in the history of that civilisation in quite different ways, to quite different degrees, and with quite different results." Rather than a most-different-systems design,[54] Geertz' contrasting cases enable them to "form a kind of commentary on one another's character."[55]

Finally, a fourth principle considers a researcher's ability to meaningfully engage with the material from a case. The researcher should consider their own position in relation to their research and their aptitude at navigating local meanings. An interpretive scholar engages in

47 cited in Skocpol and Somers, "The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry," 180.
48 Joe Soss, "On Casing a Study vs Studying a Case," *Qualitative and Multi-Method Research* 16, no 1 (2018): 23.
49 George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005, 70.
50 Soss, "On Casing a Study vs Studying a Case," 23.
51 Soss, 23.
52 Skocpol and Somers, "The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry," 180.
53 Skocpol and Somers, 178.
54 Gerring, *Case Study Research*.
55 Skocpol and Somers, "The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry," 179.

reflexivity, which means self-consciously evaluating the ways in which their own subjectivity affects the research process.[56] The value of reflexivity stems from the epistemological premise that neutralising subjective bias is impossible and potentially undesirable.[57] Since the historical-interpretivist ontology rests on a world of context-specific truths, researchers of this tradition endeavour to derive knowledge from *within* the context in which it is situated, and are well-served by a familiarity with this context. As Bourdieu considered in the opening to his book, "if I were Japanese I would dislike most of the things that non-Japanese people write about Japan."[58] With this in mind, case selection will likely take seriously any logistical opportunities and constraints that the researcher faces. Language skills, local networks, and access to government documents and officials become relevant.[59] Access is not only a matter of formal permission, but also of interpersonal relationships, for example, the likelihood of establishing rapport with participants in a study that involves interviewing.[60]

3.2.2. Country-level contrasts

At a basic level, country-level case selection was limited to the countries who experienced (post) colonial migration. This could include post-war Japan, which managed repatriations from Manchuria and Korea, and the US, who received migrants from Cuba and the Philippines.[61] Given my interest in speaking to anxieties about immigration into Europe, I considered only European countries. Spain, Belgium, and Italy received migration flows from (former) colonies "of some consequence," but these have remained smaller than their neighbours.[62] In absolute numbers, according to the best available estimates, movement to metropole from colony was most significant in France and the UK (see Table 7). In relative terms, both in share of the total population and in proportion to the number of foreign migrants, the migration was most significant in France, the United Kingdom, Portugal and the Netherlands.

Assuming that social significance is a function of relative and not absolute impact, any four of these countries would be promising places to start my inquiry. However, I lack Portuguese language skills. In contrast, I have lived in France, the UK and the Netherlands, and have sufficient knowledge of French, English and Dutch to read primary sources in their original language. Therefore I was better positioned to conduct in-depth analysis in these country cases. I am confident that conducting a comparable inquiry into the inclusion of migrants from Angola and Mozambique in Portugal between 1974 and 1976[63] would yield theoretically relevant insights, but I leave the pursuit of that lead in the hands of a Portuguese speaker.

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56 Francisco M Olmos-Vega, "A Practical Guide to Reflexivity in Qualitative Research: AMEE Guide No 149" 45, no 3 (2023): 242.

57 Olmos-Vega, 242.

58 Pierre Bourdieu, *Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 1.

59 Kendra L Koivu and Annika Marlen Hinze, "Cases of Convenience? The Divergence of Theory from Practice in Case Selection in Qualitative and Mixed-Methods Research," *PS: Political Science & Politics* 50, no 4 (October 2017): 1025, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096517001214.

60 Peregrine Schwartz-Shea and Dvora Yanow, *Interpretive Research Design*, 0 ed (Routledge, 2013), 58, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203854907.

61 Bosma, Lucassen, and Oostindie, *Postcolonial Migrants and Identity Politics*, 3.

62 Bosma, Lucassen, and Oostindie, 16.

63 Bosma, Lucassen, and Oostindie, *Postcolonial Migrants and Identity Politics*, 15.

Table 7: numbers of (post)colonial migrants moving to Europe after decolonisation, 1945 - early 1990s (low and high estimates, in thousands)

	Total arrivals[64]	Total "European" arrivals[65]	As share of total population[66] (in reference year)[67]	In proportion to number of foreign migrants[68] (in reference year)
France	1,750 - 2,200	1,400 - 1,700	3,9 per cent	37,9 per cent
United Kingdom	1,730 - 2,250	380 - 500	3,6 per cent	67,6 per cent
Portugal	575 - 750	500 - 600	6,5 per cent	249,5 per cent[69]
The Netherlands	520 - 580	270 - 300	3,9 per cent	112,0 per cent
Belgium	105 - 140	90 - 120	1,2 per cent	14,4 per cent
Spain	180 - 220	170 - 200	0,4 per cent	12,1 per cent
Italy	500 - 630	480 - 580	0,9 per cent	26,6 per cent

As far as 'casing' goes, I contemplated treating these countries with respect to their position on the 'three worlds of welfare capitalism' typology. Esping-Andersen's seminal typology recast welfare states as welfare regimes, defined in terms of how society, state, market, and family interact.[70] Specifically, he was concerned with de-commodification: the extent to which an individual or family's ability to uphold socially acceptable living standards is independent from their participation in the market.[71] Esping-Andersen assessed the scores of 18 countries on a variety of quantitative indicators using OECD data from 1980 (10-35 years *after* the period under study here). One such indicator was the 'combined decommodification' score, which encompassed replacement rate generosity, stringency of eligibility criteria and duration of benefit pay-out for old-age pensions, sickness and unemployment cash benefits. These indicators were used to argue for the existence of 'social democratic' regimes with universal, generous benefits, 'liberal' Beveridgean regimes featuring mainly means-tested social assistance and modest universal transfers for the very poor, and 'conservative' Bismarckian regimes in which

64 Smith, "Introduction," 32.

65 Unspecified definition of 'European,' but likely signifying legal status in colonies Smith, 32.

66 Bosma, Lucassen, and Oostindie, *Postcol*onial Migrants and Identity Politics, 5.

67 The reference years used for columns 3 and 4 are drawn from Bosma and co-authors (2012) who selected the date at which the majority of first-generation (post)colonial migrants had settled. Reference years were as follows: France (1970), the UK (1970), Portugal (1980), the Netherlands (1980), Belgium (2000), Spain (2000), Italy (2000). The share therefore offers insight into the significance of the migration, but not its precise magnitude throughout the entire period at which it occurred.

68 United Nations Population Division, "International Migrant Stock, Total" (The World Bank, 2012), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.TOTL. To calculate, I used the average between the two estimates given in column 1.

69 Note that Portugal was predominantly a sending country until well into the 1970s, explaining the particularly high ratio.

70 Christopher Deeming, "The Lost and the New 'Liberal World' of Welfare Capitalism: A Critical Assessment of Gøsta Esping-Andersen's *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* a Quarter Century Later," *Social Policy and Society* 16, no 3 (July 2017): 405–22, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474746415000676.

71 Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, 37.

occupation-based insurance schemes predominated.[72] The de-commodification scores of the UK, France and the Netherlands put them into distinct clusters, as Table 8 shows.

Table 8: Clustering welfare regimes by combined de-commodification scores (1980)[73]

Country	De-commodification score
Australia	13.0
United States	13.8
New Zealand	17.1
Canada	22.0
Ireland	23.3
United Kingdom	**23.4**
Italy	24.1
Japan	27.1
France	**27.5**
Germany	27.7
Finland	29.2
Switzerland	29.8
Austria	31.1
Belgium	32.2
Netherlands	**32.4**
Denmark	38.1
Norway	38.3
Sweden	39.1

The typology has consistently provided the foundations for case selection in comparative social policy. However, it is insufficiently granular and 'casing' the UK, France and the Netherlands strictly as instances of the three regimes concealed more than it revealed. Although the UK is usually seen as the most liberal of Europe's welfare regimes,[74] the British welfare state was initially founded on principles that appear social-democratic in their emphasis on universal eligibility. The cornerstone of proposals for post-war British welfare was that "all citizens were included, classified by groups in relation to the causes of economic insecurity and the protection required to meet them."[75] The French welfare regime, meanwhile, is usually classified as a conservative welfare regime in the literature, but, as Manow and Palier argue, is "not

72 Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*.
73 Esping-Andersen, 52.
74 Paul Pierson, ed., *The New Politics of the Welfare State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
75 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*, 117.

particularly conservative, patriarchic, or Catholic when it comes to family policy."[76] Finally, the Dutch case is often classified as a hybrid between social-democratic and conservative regimes.[77] During the first thirteen years of the post-war period, Dutch social insurance was split into four programmes, all governed by strict eligibility criteria and associated with only modest benefits.[78] This plus a heavy influence of the social partners and confessional parties approximates the ideal-type of the 'conservative' welfare regime. However, the Netherlands has since reached high levels of generosity and social spending (as a social-democratic regime might) whilst retaining an important role for the market in, for example, old-age pensions (as a liberal regime might).[79]

These observations align with the findings of Scruggs and Allan. Replicating and reassessing the 'decommodification index,' they find clear differences between countries but little evidence of clustering, undermining support for distinctive national regimes.[80] For these reasons, I do not treat the Netherlands, France, and the UK as instances of three distinct worlds of welfare. However, I did use the typology as a sensitising device. It drew my attention to at least two types of contrasts that these countries might exhibit. The first are differences in programmatic features of each welfare state. Esping-Andersen's data indicates that, in 1980, the French welfare state was particularly fragmented on occupational lines in comparison to the Netherlands and the UK, while France spent more on means-tested poor relief (as a percentage of total social expenditure) than the UK or the Netherlands. The UK stood alone in offering equal benefit levels.[81] The typology also underlines differences in social cleavages associated with welfare states. In particular, Esping-Andersen saw conservative regimes as protecting traditional status differentials based on family or occupation against the throes of capitalist transformation, while liberal welfare regimes were thought to enshrine the inequalities associated with market participation, and social democratic regimes to minimise them.[82] In these respects, the Netherlands, the UK, and France offered three distinct welfare contexts in which (post)colonial migration was likely to have been significant.

3.2.3. Programme-level contrasts

Existing literature suggests that programme-level differences affect perceived deservingness of recipients. Barr distinguishes between cash transfers that provide poverty relief by redistributing income and wealth across a given population, and those that redistribute wealth

76 Manow and Palier, "A Conservative Welfare State Regime without Christian Democracy?," 146.

77 Bernard Ebbinghaus, "Comparing Welfare State Regimes: Are Typologies an Ideal or Realistic Strategy?," in *European Social Policy Analysis Network* (ESPAnet Conference, Edinburgh, UK, 2012).

78 Dennie Oude Nijhuis, *Religion, Class and the Post-war Development of the Dutch Welfare State* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018).

79 Oude Nijhuis; Ebbinghaus, "Comparing Welfare State Regimes: Are Typologies an Ideal or Realistic Strategy?"

80 Lyle Scruggs and James Allan, "Welfare-State Decommodification in 18 OECD Countries: A Replication and Revision," *Journal of European Social Policy* 16, no 1 (February 2006): 55, https://doi.org/10.1177/0958928706059833.

81 Lyle A Scruggs and James P Allan, "Social Stratification and Welfare Regimes for the 21st Century: Revisiting the 'Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism'" (15th International Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, IL, 2006), 657.

82 Scruggs and Allan, 645.

across the life cycle of individuals.[83] The former generally refers to non-contributory schemes tailored to labour market risks (like unemployment or low income) and financed by general tax revenue, which I refer to as *social assistance* (in Dutch: *bijstand*; in French: *l'assistance* or *l'aide sociale*). The latter are contributory schemes designed to alleviate life-course risks (like sickness and ageing).[84] They are usually financed by the contributions of beneficiaries, which I refer to as *social security* (in Dutch: *sociale zekerheid*; in French: *la sécurité sociale*).[85]

Research shows that recipients of benefits under schemes aimed at mitigating against labour market risks are viewed as less deserving than those falling under schemes devoted to life-course risks. This is true even though health and poverty, for example, share a similar sociodemographic risk profile, suggesting that citizens "appear to reason *as if* exposure to health problems is randomly distributed across social strata."[86] Additionally, the deservingness literature emphasises reciprocity. Contributory schemes, i.e. those financed by the contributions of those they protect, might create the perception that recipients have 'earned' their benefits, unlike non-contributory schemes financed by general revenue, which involve redistribution from middle-class taxpayers to needier beneficiaries. This is one explanation for Suari Andreu and van Vliet's finding that the gap in receipt of benefits between EU migrants and Dutch natives takes only two years to close for contributory transfers but six years for non-contributory transfers.[87]

With this in mind, I opted to limit my scope to the study of two programmes that exhibit clear contrast along these lines: social security and social assistance. Old-age pensions were an attractive focus for the former, as they were the biggest item in the social security budget and "*the* major source of contention in the post-war welfare state debate in developed nations."[88] This implied potentially pronounced salience. Additionally, during the post-war period, the old-age public pension schemes between the UK and the Netherlands, on the one hand, and France, on the other, exhibited contrasts that I was interested in exploring. The UK system was introduced in the National Insurance Act of 1946, and the Dutch system in the General Old Age Act (*Algemene Ouderdomswet,* AOW) exactly one decade later. Both programmes guaranteed universal flat-rate benefits (geared toward providing a minimum level of subsistence), financed mostly by insurance contributions on a Pay-as-You-Go basis with a small, but in the case of the Netherlands, growing, government subsidy, to all national residents.[89] Contributions in the Netherlands were based on earnings, while in the UK they were flat-rate. This allowed the former to have ultimately more redistributive impact, since

83 Barr, *Economics of the Welfare State*, 7.

84 Carsten Jensen, "Labour Market- versus Life Course-Related Social Policies: Understanding Cross-Programme Differences," *Journal of European Public Policy* 19, no 2 (March 2012): 275–91, https://doi.org/10.1080/1350 1763.2011.599991.

85 This dichotomy is stylised; sometimes, the alleviation of life-course needs like old age are met by tax-funded programs, and contributory schemes can also be subsidised by the state.

86 Jensen and Petersen, "The Deservingness Heuristic and the Politics of Health Care," 70.

87 Eduard Suari-Andreu and Olaf Van Vliet, "Intra-EU Migration, Public Transfers and Assimilation," *Economica* 90, no 360 (October 2023): 4, https://doi.org/10.1111/ecca.12484.

88 Dennie Oude Nijhuis, *Labor Divided in the Post-war European Welfare State: The Netherlands and the United Kingdom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 63.

89 Oude Nijhuis, 66.

in the UK, contributions were limited to what the poorest could afford.[90] Private pension schemes continued to operate alongside this system.[91] In this project, I evaluated inclusion of (post)colonial migrants under the National Insurance Act in the UK and the AOW in the Netherlands.

Public pensions in the French system, in contrast, were neither universal nor state-run. Although French policymakers initially pushed for universal state-sponsored social security, their ambitions were quickly tempered by resistance from well-paid salaried employees.[92] This group disliked earnings-based contributions that required them to subsidise their lower paid colleagues.[93] Therefore, only about half the population was covered by the general social security regime at the time of its establishment, with pre-existing occupational schemes operating in parallel.[94] That half, however, earned the right to an old-age pension, financed by contributions, at age 65. Their benefits were administered by regional funds known as *caisses régionales* which were managed by the social partners. This was the system I focused on. Pre-existing occupational schemes existed in parallel, institutionalised in subsequent years as a 'special' regime, and in 1956, a tax-financed supplement (*Fonds national de sécurité*, National Solidarity Fund) raised the incomes of retirees whose contributions had been insufficient to ensure an adequate pension. I additionally considered family allowances, which emerged as highly salient and important axes of inclusion. Family allowances were inaugurated by employers in France at the end of the First World War in response to multiple strike waves.[95] By 1932, the state mandated that employers compensate workers for running a family.[96] In the post-war period, this elaborate, employer-run system was integrated into the general social security regime.

In the domain of social assistance, my three country cases again exhibit significant contrasts in the post-war period. The difference between the Netherlands and France, whose system reserved a privileged role for charitable and local actors, and the UK, where national assistance played a larger role, is stark. In the Netherlands, until 1965 social assistance remained regulated under a medieval system of poor relief, according to which responsibility for looking after the needy was concentrated in the hands of religious institutions, charities, and municipal 'poor councils' (*armenraden*) whose role increased with time.[97] In France, the churches, charities, and municipalities which had historically also led efforts to assist the destitute continued to offer in-kind assistance, like servicing retirement homes in the post-war period,[98] although they were overshadowed by the social security regime in many ways and came under increasing

90 Oude Nijhuis, 66.
91 Oude Nijhuis, *Religion, Class and the Post-war Development of the Dutch Welfare State*, 106.
92 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*, 166.
93 Paul V Dutton, *Origins of the French Welfare State: The Struggle for Social Reform in France, 1914-1947*, New Studies in European History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 39.
94 Denis Kessler, "Histoire et Avenir Du Système de Retraite En France," *Revue d'économie Financière*, 465-590, Caisse des dépôts et consignations (1991): 473.
95 Dutton, *Origins of the French Welfare State: The Struggle for Social Reform in France, 1914-1947*, 30.
96 Timothy B Smith, *The Two World Wars and Social Policy in France*, vol 1 (Oxford University Press, 2018), 137, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198779599.003.0005.
97 Marco H.D van Leeuwen, "Armenzorg 1912-1965: Van Centrum Naar Periferie," in *Studies over Zekerheidsarrangementen Risico's, Risicobestrijding En Verzekeringen in Nederland Vanaf de Middeleeuwen.*, ed J van Gerwen and Marco H.D van Leeuwen (Amsterdam: NEHA, 1998).
98 Dutton, *Origins of the French Welfare State: The Struggle for Social Reform in France, 1914-1947*.

purview of the state.[99] In contrast, the UK replaced its Victorian-era poor laws with the 1948 National Assistance Act, which introduced a universal social safety net.[100] Financed by general tax revenue, it provided means-tested financial assistance grants for the unemployed, for those who do not pay insurance contributions and others whose resources are not sufficient to meet their needs. By disregarding some capital and income in its means tests, the programme was relatively generous.[101]

Therefore, in the UK case I was interested in eligibility under the National Assistance Act. In France and the Netherlands, in contrast, access to benefits for a given group was harder to ascertain as it was granted in a highly decentralised manner, contingent on the decision-making practices of local-level agencies. Adjusting to this surprise as historical-interpretivism encourages researchers to do, I approached this challenge in two ways. First, I expanded my scope to consider targeted assistance programmes designed for the specific needs of (post) colonial migrants. Such schemes confer assistance based on membership in a given group rather than on means tests and included the *Rijksgroepregeling Gerepatrieerden* (1961) in the Netherlands and *La loi relative à l'accueil et à la réinstallation des Français d'outre-mer* (1961) in France. Because these were legislated at the national level, I could examine centralised criteria for eligibility. My second strategy was to examine the records of private and municipal archives to shed light on decision-making process at local levels. I could only adopt this strategy in the Netherlands. I did so by consulting the decision-making practices of the Centraal Comité voor Kerkelijk en Particular Initiatief voor Sociale Zorg ten Behoefte van Gerepatrieerden in Utrecht, as well as of three municipalities: Rotterdam, Utrecht, The Hague.

3.2.4. Group-level contrasts

My three country cases collectively received around 5 million migrants from (former) colonies during the second half of the twentieth century. Because I did not want to assume ex ante the constitution of any given people as a coherent group, I selected which experiences to focus on by region of origin.[102] For each case, the critical years of welfare expansion fall squarely within the first two decades after the Second World War. For the UK and France, the legal foundations of the welfare state were established in the first few years after the war, and several major legislative acts of the Dutch welfare state had entered into force by 1965. Thus, I considered the region of origin from which the most socially significant migrations took place during this time period. I estimated social significance using the size of the migration relative to others and the degree of political attention that migration attracted.

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99 Frédéric Viguier, "Chapitre 2 L'assistance sociale délégitimée par la Sécurité sociale mais toujours indispensable," in *La cause des pauvres en France*, Académique (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2020), 53–79, https://www.cairn.info/la-cause-des-pauvres-en-france--9782724625400-p-53.htm.

100 Barr, *Economics of the Welfare State*, 34.

101 Derek Fraser, *Evolution of the British Welfare State: A History of Social Policy since the Industrial Revolution* (London and Basingstoke: MacMillan Education Ltd., 1973), 214.

102 I look for 'region' as opposed to 'country' for several reasons. First, the status of former colonies as 'countries' depends on whether they were independent during the period in question. Also, especially in the UK case, migration from some countries so paralleled that of other countries (as was the case with Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, for example) that it made sense to consider them in tandem.

In the Netherlands, my focus is on migrants coming from the Netherlands Indies/ Indonesia. In 1945, Dutch colonial possessions included what was then known as the East and West Indies. The East Indies encompassed present-day Indonesia (which also included the Moluccan islands) and Western New Guinea. The West Indies included Suriname on the Latin American continent, as well as the Caribbean islands of the Dutch Antilles: Aruba, Curacao, Bonaire, Saba, Sint-Eustacius and Sint-Maarten.[103] Migration from the East involved the migration of around 300,000 (former) Dutch citizens and subjects between 1945 and 1963,[104] making it by far the most significant migration in numbers from any former colony. The story of Surinamese migration is an important one, but it starts in earnest later. Until the 1970s and the build-up to Surinamese migration, arrivals were persistent, but ad hoc and smaller scale.[105]

Meanwhile, migration from Algeria to (metropolitan) France both before and after its independence was greater in size, concentration and political significance than migration from any other (former) French colony or protectorate. The first such movements started in 1954, after the French defeat at Diên Biên Phu formalised the independence of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos and prompted the migration of some 12,000 French civilians and soldiers to France.[106] This migration triggered minimal state intervention. In 1956, when Tunisia and Morocco gained independence, over 300,000 French from the former protectorates moved to the metropole, prompting a more elaborate system of reception for the newcomers.[107] However, migration from Algeria was by far the most significant numerically, as between 1962 and 1968 almost 900,000 French citizens from Algeria migrated to the metropole.[108] Moreover, Algerian migrants were contributing to the French economy as labour migrants long before Algerian independence in 1962. From 1946 to 1949, 255,000 Algerians arrived in metropolitan France - more than the number of guest worker recruits from all other countries combined - with a further 868,000 arriving in the next six years, far outpacing arrivals of guest workers recruited by the national overseas recruitment agency.[109]

For the UK case, I studied the inclusion of Caribbean migrants. At the end of the Second World War, British empire loosely included 'dominions' like Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and maintained a relationship via the Commonwealth with those who had gained independence: India and Pakistan (1947), Sri Lanka and Myanmar (1948). However, in numbers, migration from the Caribbean (then known as the 'West Indies,' containing nineteen islands and Guyana) outnumbered that of other regions. In 1948, almost 500 passengers on the *SS Empire Windrush* docked in Britain, heralding a new era of migration from the

103 Guno Jones, "What Is New about Dutch Populism? Dutch Colonialism, Hierarchical Citizenship and Contemporary Populist Debates and Policies in the Netherlands," *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 37, no 6 (2016): 608.

104 Wim Willems, "No Sheltering Sky: Migrant Identities of Dutch Nationals from Indonesia," in *Europe's Invisible Migrants* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2003), 33–60.

105 Schuster, *Poortwachters over Immigranten: Het Debat over Immigratie in Het Naoorlogse Groot-Britannië En Nederland*, 122.

106 Yann Scioldo-Zürcher, "Faire des Français d'Algérie des métropolitains," *Pôle Sud* 24, no 1 (2006): 17, https://doi.org/10.3917/psud.024.0015.

107 Scioldo-Zürcher, 17.

108 Anthony Edo, "Migrations et salaires : le cas des rapatriés d'Algérie," n.d.

109 Marie-Claude Henneresse, "Le Patronat et La Politique Française d'Immigration, 1945-1975" (Paris, L'Institut d'Etudes Politiques, 1979), 73.

Caribbean.[110] From 1955-1960, the Home Office estimated around 160,000 arrivals from the Caribbean compared to 50,000 from India and Pakistan combined.[111] Of this figure, Jamaicans represented about three-quarters of the total.[112] Their salience derived from more than just their numbers. In 1952, when numbers were still modest, racist political campaigns against their immigration were launched.[113] One street-level bureaucrat at the Ministry of Labour and National Service said in 1959 that, "in the last twelve years, a new type of coloured person has arrived in Britain, mainly West Indian immigrants, and it is these who are mainly in mind when the colour problem is discussed today."[114]

It is worth noting that other volumes devoted to analysing the dynamics of migration and integration in this time in the UK, France and the Netherlands selected the same cases, suggesting some degree of consensus around the significance of these migrations. Smith's *Invisible Migrants* focuses on migration from Indonesia when discussing the Dutch case and Algeria when discussing the French,[115] while Lucassen's *The Immigrant Threat* considers Caribbean migrants in the UK and Algerians in France.[116]

3.3. Strategies of inference

3.3.1. Three pillars

Earlier, I described interpretive inferences as powered by local meanings and reasons, rigorously contextualised against the material constraints that their agents faced. Although several formal methods have been developed to meet interpretive research needs, like grounded theory, event structure analysis or critical discourse analysis, researchers approach the overarching challenge of linking empirical findings to theoretical conclusions in different ways, remaining "flexible, iterative and adaptive" to the needs of specific projects.[117] In a review of studies looking at how to perform the 'conceptual leap,' that is the movement from empirics to theory, the authors identify numerous contradictions.[118] Researchers are often encouraged both to make deliberate use of heuristic devices, *and* to sit back and submit to serendipity and chance; to immerse themselves in the data but simultaneously to detach, or to leverage both their experience and theoretical priors *and* naïveté. In this confusion the authors conclude that conceptual leaping

110 Shinder S Thandi, "Postcolonial Migrants in Britain: From Unwelcome Guests to Partial and Segmented Assimilation," ed Ulbe Bosma, Jan Lucassen, and Gert Oostindie, International Studies in Social History (Oxford, New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 73.

111 El-Enany, *Bordering Britain*, 102.

112 Colin Grant, *Homecoming: Voices of the Windrush Generation* (London: Vintage, 2020), 4.

113 Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation*, 70.

114 LoTNA-AST 7/1878-Editorial by R.H Woodcock.

115 Smith, "Introduction."

116 Lucassen, *The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe since 1850*.

117 Melissa N.P Johnson and Ethan McLean, "Discourse Analysis," in *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*, 2020.

118 Malvina Klag and Ann Langley, "Approaching the Conceptual Leap in Qualitative Research," *International Journal of Management Reviews* 15 (2013): 149–66.

is a form of bricolage, "a 'do-it-yourself' process of 'cobbling together' that one undertakes with [a wide variety of] tools at hand."[119]

To provide structure to this process of cobbling together, I introduce 3 pillars of a historical-interpretivist strategy: abduction, contextualised self-interpretation, and entangled comparison. Each refers to a technique that underpinned the inference in my project. I derived these pillars from methodological texts as well as by carefully reading works that I locate within the historical-interpretivist tradition, as they contain both descriptive and explanatory accounts of historical outcomes, consider the interaction of ideas/meanings and actions, use comparison but maintain the integrity of each individual case, and study race without attributing it causal power. Taken together, the pillars supply the foundations for a rigorous analysis that is historical and social scientific, descriptive and explanatory, but also transparent and open to critique.

3.3.2. 'Curious activities' and abduction

The conventional standard of systematicity involves an unwavering commitment to applying predetermined procedures strictly and at the expense of sensitivity to context or other distractions.[120] The standard of rigour is different for historical-interpretivists. They might still benefit from predetermined rules in choosing where to start; for example, repeating identical search terms in the inventory of available archival holdings for all of their cases. However, they should interpret what they access as an "arbitrary slice or cut from the stream of ongoing activity,"[121] a landing strip in an unknown territory. There is no expectation that they will land on a tower with a clear view of the goings-on below, nor that they understand the dialect or the customs of the people they encounter well enough to converse with them. They should assume instead that they have landed in the middle of a crowded street corner, or in an adjacent field facing away from the episode in which they are interested. The researcher needs to orient themselves in their new environment, and systematicity in this process is not much help. A fixed itinerary for when they will arrive where, or whom they will visit and when, will limit their ability to respond in an agile manner to what they find. They may even find that the objects in view are more relevant for their research question than their intended objects. Indeed, the researcher can only analyse what they find, which they cannot know in advance - and what they analyse shapes what they look for.[122]

Therefore, one standard of rigour relates to how energetically the researcher engages in abduction. If induction is 'data-driven' and deduction is 'theory-driven' analysis, then abduction is 'breakdown-driven,'[123] meaning it starts from situations where the ability of existing theory to explain the data breaks down or falls short. Originally introduced to the social sciences by the philosopher and scientist C.S. Peirce, abductive reasoning involves a 'back

119 Klag and Langley, 161.
120 Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, *Interpretive Research Design*, 27.
121 cited in Hill, *Archival Strategies and Techniques*, 65.
122 Hill, 6.
123 Svend Brinkmann, "Doing Without Data," *Qualitative Inquiry*, Qualitative Data Analysis After Coding, 20, no 6 (2014), https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800414530254.

and forth' between theoretical propositions and empirical evidence.[124] The researcher looks for explanations that make the "surprise less surprising,"[125] by asking, "how is it possible?"[126] What conditions, material and otherwise, need to hold for this to make sense? Brinkmann offers the example of someone flailing their arms in a context in which it is unexpected; i.e. not an aerobics class.[127] Upon observation, we might guess that a wasp is attacking them, which would make their behaviour understandable until a better interpretation is available. This is at the crux of abductive reasoning. Conducting research in this way involves taking one's time with the data, resisting the urge to "clean" it from its contradictions, enthusiastically pursuing any leads that emerge and returning regularly to revisit original theoretical propositions. This question needs to be asked in an *iterative* and recursive way, i.e. repetitively, but to changing objects of inquiry as new discoveries are made and the researcher performs "abduction within abduction within abduction."[128] Each new insight "inform[s] and fold[s] back on the others," in a "circle-spiral" of sense-making that continues throughout the entirety of the research.[129] This circular trajectory aligns with the "necessarily provisional and iterative essence of ongoing archival work" according to Hill.[130] Curiosity is paramount because it supplies the fuel for these efforts.

My research started from the surprise that welfare state scholarship cannot explain how massive waves of migration from Europe's colonies coexisted with the evolution of generous welfare states, given existing assumptions about the incompatibility of diversity and solidarity. My original conjecture was that racially distinct (post)colonial migrants were excluded. However, I quickly ran into both conceptual and empirical dead-ends. Conceptually, I was forced to acknowledge that race was not a fixed attribute of any given group, but was assigned, resisted, and variably given meaning. As such, my account made room for *racialisation*. Even more surprisingly, empirically, my findings did not suggest the uniform exclusion of (post) colonial migrants, even on racial grounds. Both discoveries prompted a return to theory and a reevaluation of the ways in which race operates in social phenomena, and a subsequent return to the empirical evidence. I continued this process in an iterative manner until I had a theoretical framework which made the surprise less surprising. The current iteration outlined in Chapter 2 is the fourth version.

3.3.3. Contextualised self-interpretation

Recovering local meanings is an important part of historical-interpretivism, but what exactly does this mean? Some (pure) *subjectivists* assume that people ultimately "know what they are doing" and that we can therefore take their "conscious intentions" as the "ultimate explanation of their activity."[131] In this view, uncovering meanings is as simple as asking people what they

124 Kerry Earl Rinehart, "Abductive Analysis in Qualitative Inquiry," *Qualitative Inquiry* 27, no 2 (February 2021): 303–11, https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800420935912.
125 Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, *Interpretive Research Design*, 28.
126 Brinkmann, "Doing Without Data."
127 Brinkmann.
128 Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, *Interpretive Research Design*, 32.
129 Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 34.
130 Hill, *Archival Strategies and Techniques*, 6.
131 Atkinson, *Bourdieu and after: A Guide to Relational Phenomenology*, 59.

understand or perceive. Others, speaking from an *objectivist* angle, view human behaviour is the result of hidden social structures of which people have no knowledge themselves.[132] Such a perspective, which allows room for false consciousness, renders someone's own interpretations moot.

I follow Bourdieu, whose philosophy fell somewhere in the middle. He argued that agents have a set of assumptions that shape how they behave; for example, they have a sense of what makes a 'man' or 'woman,' or what types of people there are.[133] These assumptions are unlikely to be easily articulated, however, because they are shaped by experiences, upbringing and social conditioning which are difficult to identify, and because they take the form not of formal reasoning but of a practical sense of what is to be done in any situation. Akin to a "'feel' for the game" in sports, Bourdieu called this *habitus*.[134] Habitus grants human action agency but bases it on cognitive schema shaped by social structures. Incumbent upon the researcher interested in meaning-making, therefore, is an excavation of this "feel for the game." They should not expect stated intentions to conform to clear logic, because, as Bourdieu cautions, "practice has a logic which is not that of logic, and thus to apply practical logic to logical logic is to run the risk of destroying the logic one wants to describe with the instrument used to describe it."[135] The researcher must accept that human meaning-making is messy and applied, in the sense of being geared toward action in a specific context.

Bevir and Rhodes offer insight into how exactly to accomplish this with a technique they call "contextualised self-interpretation."[136] As a first step, the researcher pays attention to utterances - what has been said in written or verbal form about the phenomena of interest. As such, Foucault advocated reading archives not as bodies of theoretical or scientific knowledge but as windows into the "regular, daily practice" of local actors.[137] Utterances are treated as windows into the 'self-interpretation' of actors, not as facts. This is common practice in historical research which typically involves archival research. Critical archival studies point out that archives never seamlessly transmit events or stories exactly as they occurred. On one level, they may record events that never happened, or letters that were never sent to their intended recipients.[138] On another level, they only contain records that someone judged "worthy of preservation."[139] Records belonging to the powerful are more likely to be archived, such that archives reflect the power relations of the societies in which they are embedded.[140] State archives in particular are vulnerable to this, given that their creation and organisation was central to modern nation-building efforts.[141] Those who were excluded from these efforts - all too often,

132 Atkinson, 60.
133 Atkinson, 61.
134 Pierre Bourdieu, *Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 26.
135 Bourdieu, 82.
136 Glynos and Howarth, *Logics of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Science*.
137 Flyvbjerg, "Phronetic Planning: Theoretical and Methodological Reflections," 294.
138 Hill, *Archival Strategies and Techniques*, 67.
139 Scott A Frisch et al., "Taking the Road Less Traveled," in *Doing Archival Research in Political Science* (Amherst, New York: Cambria Press, 2012), 2.
140 Hill, *Archival Strategies and Techniques*, 17.
141 J J Ghaddar and Michelle Caswell, "'To Go beyond': Towards a Decolonial Archival Praxis," *Archival Science* 19, no 2 (June 1, 2019): 79, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10502-019-09311-1.

the indigenous or racialised Other - are also excluded from the historical record that these archives are used to construct.[142] Reconstructing history involves struggling "with and against the constraints and silences" that the archive presents.[143] As a result, knowing what is absent from the collection may be as important as knowing what is present.[144] In short, utterances, whether in the archive or elsewhere, reflect the self-interpretation of specific actors, not a perfect picture of events as they transpired.

The researcher then tries to pin down habitus by reconstructing the material and ideological environment in which the speaker spoke. It is impossible to draw up an exhaustive list of relevant contextual factors for this exercise. However, leading discourse analysts highlight several features worth the researcher's attention, such as the personalities and (historical) experiences of speaker and audience, the time and place at which the utterance occurred, the larger event(s) of which it may have been a part (for example an interview, or a sermon) and the purpose it was designed to serve.[145] Periodisation, which involves dissecting the "historical chronology of places into analytically useful periods," usually bounded by noteworthy events,[146] is a useful instrument for identifying relevant aspects of a setting from the historian's toolkit. Finally, the researcher generates narratives which "postulat[e] significant relationships, connections, or similarities" between different contextual elements and utterances.[147] Narratives are evaluated by how well they fit the empirical record in relation to other narratives.

Existing scholarship offers ample examples of the rigorous application of these pillars. For a snapshot from Du Bois' work, see Appendix A.1. For this project, I viewed the archives as a means not only of familiarising myself with key events and personalities, but in order to enter their lifeworlds. I considered the terms and linguistic associations with which they described the phenomena they encountered and the dilemmas they faced. I contextualised these self-interpretations using information available in secondary sources, engaging in periodisation. I was attentive to the personalities and experiences of the speakers when these had been described in secondary literature, or as they emerged from the archival record. For example, a biography of Minister Klompé supplemented my analysis of her choices.[148] I engaged in rigorous efforts to recover the material and ideological landscape of each of my cases (see Chapters 4 and 5). This not only allowed me to assess the 'evidentiary value' of various parts of the archival record,[149] but facilitated a narrative explanation of why things unfolded the way that they did.

142 Ghaddar and Caswell, 79.
143 Hartman in Magubane, *Bringing the Empire Home: Race, Class, and Gender in Britain and Colonial South Africa*.
144 Hill, *Archival Strategies and Techniques*, 66.
145 Gillian Brown and George Yule, *Discourse Analysis*, Cambridge Textbooks in Linguistics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 39, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511805226.
146 Evan S Lieberman, "Causal Inference in Historical Institutional Analysis: A Specification of Periodization Strategies," *Comparative Political Studies* 34, no 9 (November 2001): 1016.
147 cited in Jason Glynos and David Howarth, "Structure, Agency and Power in Political Analysis: Beyond Contextualised Self-Interpretations," *Political Studies Review* 6 (2008): 158.
148 Gerard Mostert, *Marga Klompé 1912-1986: Een Biografie* (Boom uitgevers Amsterdam, 2011).
149 George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 99.

3.3.4. Entangled comparison

As I explained in 3.1.2, comparison associated with historical-interpretivism is distinct from that common to neopositivist research, which aims to mimic experimental conditions and isolate the effect of individual variables. A preoccupation with disentanglement can distract from social reality rather than illuminate it. Imagine a bisexual woman of colour from a neighbouring town is denied entry into a nightclub. Researching whether her sexuality, her gender identity, her skin colour or her origins caused her exclusion neither serves her needs particularly well nor offers much insight into her reality. In the real world, none of these factors are manipulable. Moreover, generations of Black feminists have argued that different facets of our identity intersect to shape how we are viewed.[150] They do not have individual additive effects but operate in tandem. Extracting individual features produces a theoretical landscape divorced from the reality that most actors face.

The historical-interpretivist therefore engages in *entangled* comparison, considering complex, whole systems alongside one another and resisting the temptation to entertain counterfactuals (see Appendix A for examples of this analysis). In my project, I assume that each context is distinct, but that the agents within them may be subject to comparable cross-pressures. Controlled comparison is impossible given sizeable differences between settings. For example, Dutch 'repatriates' from present-day Indonesia arrived in the Netherlands almost twenty years before Algerian 'repatriates' arrived in France, and while Caribbeans in the UK migrated in search of job opportunities, most migrants from present-day Indonesia were refugees. Just like Fox, I pay attention instead to geographically and temporally specific experiences and allow for theoretical explanations that foreground different factors to complement rather than compete with each other. Meanwhile, just like Cooper, I embed the comparison in my story-telling, allowing it to highlight distinctive responses to the social phenomena these three countries had in common.

3.4. Data collection

3.4.1. Archival sources

The national archives of each of my three country cases constituted the main sources for my analysis. In line with my commitment to abductive reasoning, consultation was a back-and-forth process that stretched from 2020 to 2023. Archival closures in line with outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic occasionally interrupted this process.

My search began in the archives of public agencies responsible for the implementation of social insurance and assistance. I searched for terms that evoked the experience of (post)colonial migrants. In Dutch and French, I started with the word for 'repatriates' (*gerepatrieerden*,

150 Kimberlé W Crenshaw, "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics," *University of Chicago Legal Forum* 139 (1989); bell hooks, *Ain't I A Woman* (London: Pluto Press, 1987); Akashia Gloria Hull, Patricia Bell-Scott, and Barbarad Smith, eds., *All the Women Are White, All the Blacks Are Men, But Some of Us Are Brave* (New York: Feminist Press, 1982).

rapatriés); in the UK, I started with a more general search for 'colonial' and 'citizens.' From there, I pursued leads as they appeared. I kept an eye out for "large collections of … highly probable relevance to the research project."[151] Existing literature also furnished clues about where to look and key historical details. I made extensive use of inventories and finding aids. I asked archivists in-person or via email (especially during the pandemic) if I was searching for something specific.

The Dutch national archives are in The Hague (*Het Nationaal Archief,* here abbreviated NL-HaNA). I visited these from September 2020 to January 2021. The collections I consulted included the Ministry of Social Work (*Ministerie van Maatschappelijk Werk*) and its successor, the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work (*Ministerie van Culture, Recreatie en Maatschappelijk Werk*), the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (*Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid*), and the Ministry of Justice and in particular its department on Alien Affairs and Border Control (*Ministerie van Justitie: Vreemdelingenzaken en Grensbewaking*). During this time I learned of other bodies whose archives were also available at the same location. These included the Committee of Coordination for Repatriates (*Coördinatie-Commissie voor Gerepatrieerden*) and the Committee for National Action Supporting for Regrettants from Indonesia (*Stichting Comité Nationale Actie Steunt Spijtoptanten Indonesië*). Via a small column in a periodical, I learned about the exception to the transitional rules for the AOW (see 6.4). With help from archivist Erik Mul, I delved further into this topic by consulting archives like those of the Cabinet of the Queen (*Kabinet der Koningin*) and of the Dutch Senate (*Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal*). These were delivered as scans in April 2021. I consulted the archives of the Council for Indonesian Matters (*Raad voor Aangelegenheden met Indonesië*, RAVI) to read the original Werner report. I also requested and obtained permission from the Protestant Church to consult the archives of the Central Committee of Religious and Private Initiative for Repatriates (*Centraal Comité van Kerkelijk en Particulier Initiatief voor Sociale Zorg ten behoeve van gerepatriëerden*, CCKP), which had emerged as a central actor in the reception of repatriates. These archives are in the Utrecht Archives (*Het Utrechts Archief*, NL-UtA), which I visited in August 2021.

The French national archives (*Les Archives Nationales*) have several locations. The Pierrefitte-sur-Seine site (PaAN) contains records of the French state after the revolution. I visited this site from November 2021 to April 2022, starting with the archives of Charles de Gaulle, which contained a large report prepared for De Gaulle detailing everything that the state had done in repatriates' favour. I continued in the collections of the Ministry of Public Health and Population (*Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population*) and the Ministry of the Interior (*Ministère de l'Intérieur*). As in the Dutch case, when I learned of new agencies I pursued those leads as well. This led me to the archives of, for example, the National Committee for Muslim French (*Comité national pour les musulmans Français*) and the Reception and Reclassification Service for French People from Indochina and Muslim French (*Service d'accueil et de reclassement des Français d'Indochine et des Français musulmans*).

151 Hill, *Archival Strategies and Techniques*, 49.

Up until 1962, Algeria was a department of France. Therefore archives relating to its governance are in the national archives of overseas France (*Archives Nationales d'Outre-mer*, AixAN), located in Aix-en-Provence. I visited these in February 2022 to consult the archives relating to the harmonisation of social security legislation between France and Algeria, located in the archives of the Minister of Algerian Affairs. In May 2023, I returned to France to answer several outstanding questions, for example about the financing structure and activities of the Social Assistance Fund, and to explore a lead regarding the involvement of social security institutions in social assistance-like activities. This brought me to the archives of the General Control of Social Security (*Contrôle général de la sécurité sociale*) and the Ministry of Labour (*Travail et Sécurité sociale*), both housed at the Pierrefitte-sur-Seine site. Finally, having read references to a report penned by Pierre Laroque on Algerian labour migrants in the 1930s, I requested and received access to consult it at the private archives of Julien Charles-André at Sciences Po Centre d'Histoire, Paris (PaSP).

In the UK, I visited the National Archives in Richmond, London (UK-LoNA) in the summer of 2022. I consulted archives relating to "Commonwealth immigrants," as (post) colonial migrant from the Caribbean, India and Pakistan were known in the archival record, stored in the archives of the Colonial Office, Home Office and the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance. I also read the original version of the Beveridge report.

During analysis, it became obvious that local or municipal governments were key sites at which decisions about inclusion and exclusion took place, particularly in the implementation of social assistance in France and the Netherlands. In April 2023, I therefore returned to collect data from the archives of three different municipalities in the Netherlands: Utrecht, Rotterdam (*Stadsarchief Rotterdam*, NL-StRo) and The Hague (*Haags Gemeentearchief,* NL-HaHG). In May 2023, I returned to France to consult the archives of the department Bouches-du-Rhône (FR-MaAD) which includes Marseille, the city through which well over half of the Algerian repatriates who arrived in 1962 passed.[152]

In general, these collections contained correspondence (mainly letters, with an occasional telegraph, and often between ministries), draft legislation, meeting minutes or financial records of specific committees, records of applicants to a vacancy or a programme, and many reports. My sources are cited transparently and carefully, using the reference codes cited above for each archive and inventory number. This permits "the kind of double-checking" that "the most stringent rules of scientific investigation" require.[153] The archives supplied key historical details about context, clued me in to which actors mattered for which event, and, when read as 'daily practices' of these actors, offered an entry point into their reality.

The appearance and availability of material across cases shaped the structure and focus of my analysis. For example, I found evidence of discrimination in UK sources that I did not find elsewhere; therefore, discrimination features prominently in my analysis of the UK case but not in the Dutch and French cases. Similarly, the coordination of social insurance between metropolitan France and Algerian France received more attention in the archives than did any comparable efforts at coordination between The Netherlands and Indonesia. This is also

152 "Marseille, 1962 : Le Cauchemar Des Rapatriés d'Algérie," *L'Obs*, July 6, 2012.
153 Hill, *Archival Strategies and Techniques*, 71.

because, during the period under study, Algeria was an integral part of France, while Indonesia acquired independence much earlier. These asymmetries are completely compatible with my methodology, which explores contrasts without expecting to hold any historical detail constant.

3.4.2. Other sources: statistics, legislation and parliamentary debates

Drawing inspiration from Fox, who analyses census and relief spending data alongside archives,[154] I occasionally consulted other sources to glean insight into the material conditions and constraints in which historical actors made their decisions. I also needed to access formal legislative acts, since it was sometimes unclear which version of a draft in an archival collection had been passed and implemented and which had not. Edited transcripts of parliamentary debates were helpful when the politics behind a given policy move were unclear. I also used newspaper articles sporadically, to get a sense of how an event was discussed in the mainstream media.

In the Netherlands, welfare spending data is available from the Central Bureau of Statistics, which has digitised five million hand-written and printed pages from the 1800s up until 2000 and made them available online (cbs.nl/historisch). Population censuses are digitised and provide extensive demographic and socio-economic information for the time period in question. I looked at the 12th general population census (31 May 1947), housing, occupation and commuting census (30 June 1956), and the 13th general population census (13 May 1960). All are available on the Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) and the Dutch Research Council (NWO) (easy.dans.knaw.nl). Meanwhile, a government-run website (officielebekendmakingen.nl) keeps a record of the *Staatsblad*, the journal which publishes laws and regulation, and parliamentary records. Finally, the Royal Library (*Koninklijke Bibliotheek*) has digitised Dutch newspapers, magazines and radio bulletins from as early as the 17th century (delpher.nl).

In France, comparable statistics are available at the website of the Digital Library of Public Statistics (*Bibliothèque Numérique de la Statistique Publique,* bnsp.insee.fr). This includes population censuses, which were carried out every six to eight years from 1946 to 2004 by the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (*L'Institut national de la astatistique et des études économiques,* INSEE). I consulted the general census from 10 March 1946, 1954, and 1962. Meanwhile, the official journal (*Journal Official de la République Française*) is available at Gallica, the digital database of the National Library of France (*Bibliothèque nationale de France;* gallica.bnf.fr). Gallica has also digitised old journals and media outlets. Finally, the period in which I am interested covers both the Fourth (1946-1958) and the Fifth Republic (1958- present day). Complete summaries of National Assembly debates during the Fourth and Fifth Republic are available online (4e.republique.jo-an.fr and archives.assemblee-nationale.fr respectively). Reports of debates in the upper house, of the Fourth Republic (*Conseil de la République*) and of the Fifth (*le Sénat*), are both available on the current website of the Senate (www.senat.fr/seances/seances.html).

154 Fox, *Three Worlds of Relief.*

In the UK, the Hansard is the official record of parliamentary debates, speeches, questions, and answers of both the House of Commons and the House of Lords. It is available on the website of the UK Parliament (hansard.parliament.uk). London, Edinburgh and Belfast Gazettes publish legislative acts. Those which were either wholly or partly in force in 1988 are available on the Legislation.gov.uk, which is managed by the National Archives on behalf of the government. This included the three key Commonwealth Immigrants Acts of 1962, 1968 and 1971. Census-taking - which gained popularity after demographic Thomas Malthus published an essay about population growth in 1798 - has taken place every ten years except in 1941 since 1801. The records for the 1951 and 1961 census are available in the library at the Office for National Statistics headquarters in London. Meanwhile, collaboration between British Library and Findmypast has made historical newspaper collections available on the British Newspaper Archive (britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk).

3.5. Nomenclature

3.5.1. Key considerations

In 3.2.4, I explained that I studied group-level contrasts without assuming ex ante the existence of groups. This is challenging: terminology typically implies the existence of something. It is in this sense that Mignolo credits Mahan with "inventing" the Middle East: "there was no Middle East before the name was invented and got us used to 'seeing' that a region existed..."[155] So is it with references to second-generation migrants, which too often creates a category of second-class citizens by lending credence to the idea that migrant status can be passed down across generations, and that national membership has ethnic meaning. Even more, Dahinden argues that the category *migrant* is loaded as it emerged in tandem with the nation-state's project of boundary-making, and with the idea that mobility is abnormal rather than normal.[156]

Dahinden advises that scholars facing this dilemma distinguish between *analytical* and *common-sense* categories. While common-sense categories are used by actors in their day-to-day lives, including to discriminate among each other, analytical categories are used to shed light on social processes. Common-sense categories usually address group boundaries in a "quasi-natural way."[157] For example, in Europe nations were for a long time "facts of nature," representing basic divisions of the human species, not products of complex political processes.[158] When researchers conflate common-sense and analytical categories, Dahinden argues, they risk naturalising the boundaries implied by common-sense categories, reproducing the social inequalities that they engender, and missing the entire internal and external processes through which the community determines these boundaries. Instead, researchers are well-served by approaching both with a critical curiosity, and subsequently choosing analytic categories that

155 Walter Mignolo, *The Politics of Decolonial Investigations* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2021), 122.
156 Dahinden, "A Plea for the 'de-Migranticization' of Research on Migration and Integration," 2213.
157 Dahinden, 2216.
158 Bell, *The Cult of the Nation in France*, 5.

illuminate rather than obscure, naturalise or take for granted the social processes through which group membership is worked out.[159]

Generating analytical categories comes with its own set of challenges. Scholars interested in decolonising the academy have emphasised that "names and classifications do not refer to *what there is* but frame what we perceive."[160] Behind each classification is a classifier, and no classifier is neutrally positioned in relation to the subject matter.[161] This matters because, as Tuhiwai Smith describes, the process of classifying has always had consequences for the lived experience of the classifier, as specific (usually European) ways of viewing, classifying, and evaluating the world come to assume dominance.[162] With this in mind, researchers must consider the categories that actors use to describe *themselves* and their relation to the rest of the world.[163] Honouring the 'right to self-determination' entails centring the voices of the communities under study and respecting their cultural and epistemological protocols.[164] Please see Appendix B for an excavation of the vocabulary used by historical state and non-state actors, contemporary observers, and (post)colonial migrants themselves.

3.5.2. Chosen nomenclature

In order to discuss the entire group to which all of these individuals belong, I originally opted for the term *imperial citizen*. However, this aligned poorly with the self-determined categories of the individuals in question (see Appendix B.3). Thereafter I was tempted by a slightly modified version of Goodfellow's term, i.e. "people … who lived in colonies and former colonies [who] decided to make the journey to the metropole."[165] Of course, the impracticality of committing to such a lengthy designation in a dissertation is obvious. With all this in mind, I opted for *(post)colonial migrant*. It is not a wholly satisfactory term (see 1.1.3). However, the word *migrant* draws attention to the experience of mobility, even if that mobility is intra-imperial. I parenthesise the prefix of *postcolonial* since the Caribbean islands and Algeria had not yet become independent during much of the period under study. In each chapter, I trade this general designation for case-specific analytical categories. Ultimately, I opted for the nomenclature that seemed to align the closest with the self-determined categories of the groups in question. Therefore, for the most part I consider the inclusion of *Algerians, harkis,* and *pieds-noirs* in (metropolitan) France, *Caribbeans* in England, and *Indische Nederlanders* and *Moluccans* in the Dutch case.

Departing from common-sense categories presents one significant challenge for the historical researcher. Because common-sense categories appear (by definition) in the archives,

159 Dahinden, "A Plea for the 'de-Migranticization' of Research on Migration and Integration," 2214.
160 Mignolo, *The Politics of Decolonial Investigations*, 85.
161 Mignolo, 86.
162 Linda Tuhiwai Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples* (Zed Books, 2021), 50, https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350225282.
163 Mignolo, *The Politics of Decolonial Investigations*, 262.
164 Vivetha Thambinathan and Elizabeth Anne Kinsella, "Decolonizing Methodologies in Qualitative Research: Creating Spaces for Transformative Praxis," *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 2021, https://doi.org/10.1177/16094069211014766.
165 Maya Goodfellow, *Hostile Environment: How Immigrants Became Scapegoats* (London, New York: Verso, 2020), 57–58.

the researcher needs to develop literacy in these categories and translate any key information they transmit about the subject in question into their new analytic categories. For example, I have chosen to translate *Ambonezen* as Moluccans in an effort to respect the diversity of the islands from which Moluccans hailed and my best estimate at self-identification. However, if a letter mentions *Ambonezen*, it is theoretically possible that the writer actually meant to refer only to those Moluccans who came from Ambon. In the face of challenges like these, I did my best to estimate the meaning of the category by identifying the speaker or author of the text in question and considering their interests and social position. Where I was not confident in my estimation, I used common-sense categories in quotes and offered my interpretation transparently. This interpretation is likely imperfect: sceptical readers are invited to return to my sources, the precise inventory numbers of which are cited fully in footnotes.

3.6. Limitations

3.6.1. Missing voices

My research has several limitations. First and foremost is a methodological limitation with ethical dimensions. I aim to evaluate the inclusion of groups to which I do not belong, which I pursued through careful analysis of the archival record along the lines outlined in this chapter. These archival traces, however, were left by public and private welfare agencies with an incentive to exaggerate their inclusive character. Although in each country case, I had exploratory conversations with at least one person whose family had migrated from the region of interest, the voices and perspectives of the individuals whose inclusion was under question were largely missing from my research. This presents both an ethical and an empirical limitation. Ethically, it affects the story that is told about the lives of these community members. This is a story that they have a right to tell for themselves. Although trying to respect the cultural and epistemological vocabularies of your research subjects is important, it is no replacement for their participation and leadership in the research design, analysis and write-up. Tuhwai Smith suggests that researchers who are not from a given community should, when their research is intimately related to these communities, work with them to determine their research needs and priorities and hold themselves accountable to outcomes for these communities.[166] From an empirical perspective, evaluating inclusion is incomplete without the *experience* of the groups whose inclusion is in question. They will not have the same incentive to exaggerate the care that they received, and they will have more intimate knowledge about how welfare officials used their discretion than policymakers do. The risk therefore is that I have engaged in what Shilliam calls a form of "sympathetic ventriloquism."[167]

However, time constraints prevented the collection of data from both archival sources and interviews. My main interest was in how state and non-state agents imagined and reconciled complementary and competing cross-pressures, such as the demand for welfare generosity and the need for solidarity, in the negotiation of redistributive boundaries. Boundary-making

166 Tuhiwai Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies*, 249.
167 Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor: From Abolition to Brexit*, 5.

is a macro-level process that played out in policy circles and at the street level, making the perspective of state officials particularly important for understanding its causes. The preferences, resistance, and interpretations of the migrants themselves no doubt also contributed to the boundary-making process in ways that I did not capture. Future research building on the foundations that my research lays in order to integrate these voices would make an invaluable contribution to our growing body of knowledge about the context-specific ways in which solidarity is created.

3.6.2. Controlled comparison

A second set of limitations relate to the relative strength and reliability of my inferences as a result of having conducted "imperfect" comparisons. The migrations in question take place at different times, with relative peaks in migration occurring in 1951 (in the Netherlands), 1958 (in the UK), and 1962 (in France). Additionally, while whiteness is a relative social position rather than a fixed attribute of any given group, France and the Netherlands welcomed far more migrants whose whiteness was broadly recognised compared to the UK, who largely saw white migration in the opposite direction as hundreds of millions emigrated to its self-governing "Dominion" settler colonies throughout the twentieth century. Finally, the motivation for migration differed across groups, as the French and the British case deal with labour migration, while the French and the Dutch cases deal more with refugees.

For these reasons, there may be concerns about the comparability of the cases I selected. As I described in 3.3, my project does not rely on Mill's methods of induction for its inferential power. Rather, I was interested in how common social processes and dynamics played out in contrasting contexts. Nonetheless, positivist researchers would view this as a limitation, and I can certainly recognise the potential epistemic gains from a more targeted positivist inquiry into cases with more similarities. In particular, the mass exodus of British citizens with Asian origins from Kenya in the mid-1960s could be explored alongside the case of Algerian repatriates, as they are more temporally proximate and both concern refugees. This would be a valuable use of resources which I have left for future researchers.

3.6.3. Generalisability

Positivist-minded readers will be interested in whether the results emerging out of this kind of inquiry are generalisable. Generalisability relates to the extension of research results based on a study of particular individuals, settings, times or institutions, to other individuals, settings, times or institutions.[168] For the positivist researcher, controlled comparisons are important because they allow specific variables to be isolated. Specific variables then form the basis for generalisations, which are delineated by careful attention to the context in which the research was carried out. In a similar enough context, the variable might have the same independent effect that was recorded in the research.

168 Joseph A Maxwell and Margaret Chmiel, "Generalization in and from Qualitative Analysis," in *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis*, ed Uwe Flick (London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2013).

Interpretive researchers tend to have the opposite concern - whether the results are sufficiently contextualised so as to be locally embedded.[169] Broadly speaking, historical-interpretivists are more intent both to highlight the contingency and context-specificity of any causal mechanisms,[170] and to highlight that any mechanism is "parasitic upon human practices" and beliefs.[171] Foucault, for example, developed new or majorly revised theoretical instruments for each new intellectual project and for each phenomenon he sought to explain.[172] All of these starting points suggest that this kind of research might not be generalisable. This is partly true, but needs nuance.

Historical-interpretivist research is compatible with the development and revision of theoretical propositions, which in turn are very capable of offering analytic leverage on new cases. In other words, *analytic* generalisation is still possible whereby the local, the concrete and the particular move to the abstract 'world of ideas.'[173] In fact, as I suggested in section 3.2.1 on *casing,* historical-interpretivists are interested in deliberating on the benefits of bringing one context into dialogue with another. The difference with positivism is that the theory to be applied in a new context never takes the form of general covering laws that are expected to hold across time and space; but rather, presents a new lens with which to view and interpret, in a curious and abductive manner, local dynamics.

In this case, my empirical findings are specific to their context, and cannot be transplanted onto different or larger populations and cases. I did not seek to uncover a universal law that would explain the relationship between diversity and solidarity across all times and places. However, the theory I build on identity, racialisation, and the consolidation of community and nation can offer suggestions of where else to look for answers. Concepts from the experience of post-war UK, France and the Netherlands can be distilled and used in a different context. With this in mind, any context in which assuring the material welfare of group members requires readjusting or determining the boundaries of the 'sphere of justice'[174] would be a site worth breaking ground. For example, the possibilities for European social citizenship and the future of the European 'denizen' in the context of EU enlargement comes to mind.[175]

169 Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, *Interpretive Research Design*, 47.

170 Blatter and Blume, "In Search of Co-Variance, Causal Mechanisms or Congruence? Towards a Plural Understanding of Case Studies," 339.

171 Glynos and Howarth, *Logics of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Science*, 97.

172 This is partly why his trajectory of thought can be so difficult to follow; David Garland, "What Is a '"History of the Present"'? On Foucault's Genealogies and Their Critical Preconditions," *Punishment & Society* 16, no 4 (2014): 366, https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1177/1462474514541711.

173 Denise F Polit and Cheryl Tatano Beck, "Generalization in Quantitative and Qualitative Research: Myths and Strategies," *International Journal of Nursing Studies* 47 (2010): 1451–58.

174 Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality*.

175 Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*; Hammar, "State, Nation, and Dual Citizenship."

4. Post-war welfare states in the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom

4.1. Introduction

In the post-war period, all industrialised countries increased their public and private social expenditure. However, the magnitude of this increase, as well as various structural features, like the "mix" between public and private provisions, the degree of central government involvement and the organisation of welfare have always differed from country to country.[1] The chapter therefore introduces the welfare state in each country case. Each section starts with brief historical analysis, which is intended neither to comprehensively document the entirety of the historical record, nor to engage functionalist assumptions according to which the history of any given case led inexorably to a given outcome. Recognising that institutions have changed in meaningful ways that affect their character and function, I set out to "trace the erratic and discontinuous process whereby the past became the present."[2] Specifically, I focus on the histories of social assistance and social security and their ideological underpinnings.

4.2. The Dutch welfare state: a laggard?

4.2.1. Overview

The Dutch welfare state is complex compared to many other European systems, containing an array of individual regulations: some universal, others with specific target groups.[3] Social security (*sociale verzekeringen*) plays a larger role in meeting citizen needs compared to social assistance (*sociale voorzieningen* or *bijstand*). Around 3/5th of expenditure on benefits and social security implementation is financed by premiums or contributions, with employers responsible for the majority of these contributions.[4] Historically, social partners have played a major role in implementation. Social security is in turn split into national insurance (*volksverzekering*) and employee insurance (*werknemersverzekering*). National insurance schemes are intended for all residents of the Netherlands regardless of their employment status and provide solidaristic benefits that are independent of previous earnings. Employee insurance, meanwhile, is intended for salaried workers only and offers wage-related benefits.

1 Oude Nijhuis, *Labor Divided in the Post-war European Welfare State: The Netherlands and the United Kingdom*.
2 Garland, "What Is a '"History of the Present"'? On Foucault's Genealogies and Their Critical Preconditions," 372.
3 Marcel Hoogenboom, *Standenstrijd En Zekerheid: Een Geschiedenis van Oude Orde En Sociale Zorg* (Amersfoort: Drukkerij Wilco, 2004), 19.
4 K.P Goudswaard, C.A de Kam, and C.G.M Sterks, *Sociale Zekerheid Op Het Breukvlak van Twee Eeuwen* (Alphen aan de Rijn: Samsom, 2000), 19.

Among other features, this combination of universal *and* earnings-based schemes has earned the Dutch system a classification as a hybrid of social-democratic and conservative regimes.[5]

A second characteristic of the Dutch system is its late emergence. For most of their history the Dutch relied largely on a system of poor relief organised into religious, charitable and municipal initiatives. Central government merely set rules, gathered information about poor relief, monitored local activities and occasionally offered subsidies (via municipalities).[6] Organised religious interests, unions, employers and a cross-party coalition of conservative aristocrats all viewed state involvement with skepticism. Their resistance softened as industrialisation reached new heights at the end of the nineteenth century, as in other European countries. However, unlike in other European countries, the modern welfare state would need to wait almost another century for its big breakthrough. Employee insurance schemes were introduced in fits and starts. National insurance schemes did not emerge until after the Second World War. By that point, German workers had been covered by compulsory industrial accident and old-age insurance schemes for over half a century.

From its slow start, the Dutch made up for lost time in the 1960s by closing the remaining gaps quickly. Expansion happened during the leadership not of leftwing parties but of confessional-liberal coalitions.[7] In 1956, among thirteen western European countries, only three devoted less of their GDP to social insurance spending than the Netherlands.[8] Oude Nijhuis has described the Dutch system as a "vanguard among welfare states" for its accessible, cradle-to-grave system of care for all citizens.[9]

4.2.2. Poor boards and religious influence

During the Dutch Republic (1581-1795), which was a confederacy of seven different provinces, religious poor boards (*kerkelijke armbesturen*) in the Netherlands offered 'indoor' and 'outdoor' relief.[10] The former refers to almshouses, orphanages, institutions or workhouses. Outdoor relief involves periodical cash transfers to a recipient's home. In the Netherlands, religious boards were of Calvinist (Reformed Protestant), Lutheran, Catholic or Jewish denomination.[11] Private poor boards (*particuliere armbesturen*, also known as *bijzondere armenzorg*) administered by

5 Rik van Berkel and Willibrord de Graaf, "The Liberal Governance of a Non-Liberal Welfare State? The Case of the Netherlands," in *The Governance of Active Welfare States in Europe*, ed Rik van Berkel, Willibrord de Graaf, and Tomáš Sirovátka, Work and Welfare in Europe (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2011), 132–52, https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230306714_7; Christian Albrekt Larsen, "The Institutional Logic of Welfare Attitudes: How Welfare Regimes Influence Public Support," *Comparative Political Studies* 41, no 2 (February 2008): 145–68, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414006295234; Gøsta Esping-Andersen, *Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

6 Henk Boels, "Van Statenbond Naar Eenheidsstaat: De Groei van Een Natie (1795-1880)," in *Duizend Jaar Openbaar Bestuur in Nederland*, ed Pieter Wagenaar, Toon Kerkhoff, and Mark Rutgers (Bussum: Uitgeverij Coutinho, 2011), 195.

7 Here, I follow Dennie Oude Nijhuis in using 'confessional' to signify that a political party or group is religiously affiliated, regardless of the religion to which it is affiliated.

8 Flora, cited in Oude Nijhuis, *Religion, Class and the Post-war Development of the Dutch Welfare State*, 76.

9 Oude Nijhuis, 19.

10 Marco H.D van Leeuwen, "Armenzorg 1800-1912: Erfenis van de Republiek," in *Studies over Zekerheidsarrangementen Risico's, Risicobestrijding En Verzekeringen in Nederland Vanaf de Middeleeuwen.*, ed J van Gerwen and Marco H.D van Leeuwen (Amsterdam: NEHA, 1998), 199.

11 Goudswaard, de Kam, and Sterks, *Sociale Zekerheid Op Het Breukvlak van Twee Eeuwen*, 116.

independent individuals operated alongside these religious boards. Both could eventually ask for subsidies from local (city-level) officials to support their operations.[12] Political affiliation was mostly local and organised into local (urban) communities.[13]

Early attempts at centralising this system coincided with the consolidation of the Dutch nation. In the late eighteenth century, dissidents joined forces with French Napoleonic armies to topple the Republic.[14] During the French occupation that followed, fiscal and bureaucratic reforms expanded the role of the state. In 1795, state citizenship was instituted.[15] After Napoleon's defeat, the brand-new Kingdom of the Netherlands[16] maintained a central role for the state in the domain of poor relief. From 1814, all charities involved in poor relief were required to fill out surveys sent to them by central government.[17] Additionally, each municipality was mandated to establish a *civic* poor board (*burgelijke armbestuur*), appointed by and financially accountable to the municipal council.[18] A long tradition of subsidiarity vis-à-vis religious institutions, however, left its traces: neither benefit levels nor conditions for eligibility were standardised.[19]

A window of opportunity for welfare expansion opened and then closed in the mid-nineteenth century. In 1848, growing anxiety about public unrest prompted the redaction of a new Dutch constitution that would take power away from the king. Its author, the liberal[20] statesman Thorbecke included a provision according to which poor relief would become an object of state intervention.[21] However, contemporaries viewed Thorbecke's attempts to transform this provision into legislation as falling "out of thin air."[22] His reform stirred considerable opposition from religious authorities, who viewed social assistance as analogous to raising a child and refused to trust a secularising state with this responsibility.[23] Moreover, state-led assistance could financially threaten churches, who relied on donations made by members in search of salvation. Accordingly, an 1854 Poor Law (*Armenwet*) eventually only *enshrined,* rather than diminished (as Thorbecke had originally envisioned), the responsibility

12 Boels, "Van Statenbond Naar Eenheidsstaat: De Groei van Een Natie (1795-1880)," 72.

13 Mart Rutjes, "Useful Citizens Citizenship and Democracy in the Batavian Republic, 1795-1801," in *Useful Citizens Citizenship and Democracy in the Batavian Republic, 1795-1801* (Amsterdam University Press, 2015), 74, https://doi.org/10.1515/9789048522415-008.

14 Hoogenboom, *Standenstrijd En Zekerheid: Een Geschiedenis van Oude Orde En Sociale Zorg*, 54.

15 C. Rooijackers and J.F. Vroomans-de Greef, inventory of the archive of *Ministerie van Justitie: Algemene En Juridische Zaken (AJZ) van de Hoofdafdeling Vreemdelingenzaken En Grensbewaking,* 2.09.52, Nationaal Archief, The Hague. 1981, 7.

16 This territory included Belgium until 1830.

17 van Leeuwen, "Armenzorg 1912-1965: Van Centrum Naar Periferie," 545.

18 Annemarie van Geloven, "De Rol van de Burgerlijk Armbesturen in de Plaatselijke Armenzorg" (Brabants Historisch Informatie Centrum, 2017), https://www.bhic.nl/ontdekken/verhalen/de-rol-van-de-burgerlijk-armbesturen-in-de-plaatselijke-armenzorg.

19 van Leeuwen, "Armenzorg 1800-1912: Erfenis van de Republiek."

20 In Dutch politics, liberal refers to a loosely organised group of either secular or 'latitudinarian' - i.e with liberal standards of religious belief and conduct - individuals; see Rudy B Andeweg and Galen A Irwin, *Governance and Politics of the Netherlands*, 2nd ed (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 19.

21 Joost J. Dankers, "Thorbecke En de Armenwet van 1854. Armenzorg Tussen Staats vermogen En Particulier Initiatief," in *Geschiedenis & Cultuur 18 Opstellen Ter Gelegenheid van Het Afscheid van Prof Dr H.W von Der Dunk* ('s Gravenhage: Staatsuitgeverij, 1990), 119.

22 Hoogenboom, *Standenstrijd En Zekerheid: Een Geschiedenis van Oude Orde En Sociale Zorg*, 57.

23 van Leeuwen, "Armenzorg 1800-1912: Erfenis van de Republiek," 279.

of charitable and religious institutions over welfare.[24] Benefit levels remained unspecified and, on the whole, inadequate; criteria for receiving benefits (as an individual) or municipal subsidies (as a board) opaque.[25] Additionally civic boards saw their room for manoeuvre restricted: they could only offer an absolute minimum level of assistance, and only if the beneficiary in question received no contributions whatsoever from religious (or private) institutions.[26]

The character of welfare reflected the dominant influence of the church. Social assistance was profoundly entangled with moral doctrine. Some religious boards withheld assistance for prostitution, begging, crime, drunkenness, extramarital affairs, public fights, or failure to attend the service.[27] In Rotterdam, a religious board conditioned full assistance on church attendance. Beneficiaries would turn in a card signifying the date of their attendance and a signature. Without the card, a fraction of the benefit was withheld and deposited into a pot for clothing and church books, to be later distributed amongst recipients who *had* attended church.[28] Private and civic boards were also concerned with a potential recipient's moral conduct. This only increased with the introduction of the 'Elberfelder system,' a form of welfare originating from the German city of Elberfeld in the late nineteenth century according to which volunteer social workers conducted thorough investigations of the potential beneficiary, their family, their habits and their vices in order to determine eligibility.[29] If approved for assistance, visits continued.

4.2.3. Stagnation

Eventually the inability of the prevalent system to meet the demand for social assistance became clear.[30] In the 1870s, a fall in grain prices had pushed farmers to the cities in search of work, triggering widespread deprivation.[31] At the same time, the cleavage between Calvinists and Catholics had narrowed, partly because liberalism had grown in popularity.[32] For confessionals, the question was no longer *whether* there would be state involvement in social rights, but how to design it.[33] They largely agreed that the state should sanction initiatives agreed upon at local levels by the social partners.[34] When Calvinists and Catholics governed together for the first time, they passed laws forbidding child labour and establishing minimum working condition standards. In 1897, a progressive liberal cabinet carried on its predecessors' efforts

24 van Leeuwen, 283.
25 Oude Nijhuis, *Religion, Class and the Post-war Development of the Dutch Welfare State*.
26 J.F.L Blankenberg, "De Armenwet 1912," *Onze Eeuw*, 1923, 31.
27 van Leeuwen, "Armenzorg 1800-1912: Erfenis van de Republiek."
28 van Leeuwen, 312.
29 Hoogenboom, *Standenstrijd En Zekerheid: Een Geschiedenis van Oude Orde En Sociale Zorg*, 99.
30 van der Meer, Raadschelders, and Kerkhoff, "Van Nachtwakersstaat Naar Waarborgstaat: Proliferatie En Vervlechting van Het Nederlandse Openbaar Bestuur in de Lange Twintigste Eeuw (1880-2005)," 267.
31 Hoogenboom, *Standenstrijd En Zekerheid: Een Geschiedenis van Oude Orde En Sociale Zorg*, 75.
32 This was in part due to the electoral weight of the middle class in a context where wealth determined voting rights For more on this, see confessionals' response to Liberal efforts to secularise the public educational system in the 1870s This was known as the 'schoolstrijd.' Kees van Kersbergen, "Religion and the Welfare State in the Netherlands," in *Religion, Class Coalitions, and Welfare States*, ed Kees van Kersbergen and Philip Manow (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 121.
33 Hoogenboom, *Standenstrijd En Zekerheid: Een Geschiedenis van Oude Orde En Sociale Zorg*, 23.
34 Coen Helderman, "De Hoge Raad van Arbeid, 1919-1940(-1950)," *Tijdschrift Voor Sociale En Economische Geschiedenis* 1, no 2 (2004): 51.

at social legislation. The most noteworthy act was a 1901 workplace accident insurance scheme (*Ongevallenwet*) in which employees were mandated to take out insurance for workplace accidents.[35] It was characterised by 'dualistic' implementation: the state, via a new agency called the National Insurance Bank (*Rijksverzekeringsbank*), would receive implementation power, but employers retained important discretion regarding the extent of risk they wanted to bear.[36] Hoogenboom considers the law a "prelude to the development of the welfare state" although it did maintain the dependency of employees on their employers.[37]

Following these innovations, the development of the Dutch welfare state both in the realm of social assistance and social insurance ground to a virtual halt for the next decade.[38] Van Leeuwen calls the new 1912 Poor Law a law "standing with its back to the future."[39] The law preserved the subsidiarity principle and explicitly rejected any formal right to relief. The law did introduce the "poor council" (*armenraad*),[40] a municipal-level institution representing members of different charities and intending to facilitate cooperation. However, participation in the council was mandatory only for civic poor boards, and many religious boards did not participate or even agree to share data.[41] A department for the poor (*Afdeling Armwezen*) at the Ministry of the Interior carried out the functions of central government, which were limited to monitoring and oversight.[42]

Social insurance fared similarly. In 1913, the progressive Calvinist minister Talma managed to pass legislation establishing insurance for sickness, disability and old-age.[43] Following these modest innovations, five Calvinist-led governments of the 1920s and 1930s consistently failed to make progress on the social insurance front.[44] Van Kersbergen notes that the dominant Calvinist party, the ARP (*Anti-Revolutionaire Partij*), had advocated vehemently for "sovereignty in one's own circle," an organisational structure in which responsibility over general social affairs was devolved to lower levels where autonomy ruled.[45] This philosophy was at odds with state involvement. Instead, the reigning cross-partisan concern of the 1920s and 1930s was *maladjustment* (in Dutch: *onmaatschappelijkheid*).

Despite its imprecise definition, the concept effectively birthed a new type of social work devoted to morally elevating citizens whose way of life was deemed "problematic" through intense supervision and etiquette instruction. These efforts at "social elevation" (*sociale verheffing*)[46] were consistent with the historical practice of offering 'indoor' poor

35 Abram de Swaan, *Zorg En de Staat: Welzijn, Onderwijs En Gezondheidszorg in Europa En de Verenigde Staten in de Nieuwe Tijd* (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Bert Bakker, 1989).
36 Goudswaard, de Kam, and Sterks, *Sociale Zekerheid Op Het Breukvlak van Twee Eeuwen*, 116.
37 Hoogenboom, *Standenstrijd En Zekerheid: Een Geschiedenis van Oude Orde En Sociale Zorg*, 132.
38 Hoogenboom, 136.
39 van Leeuwen, "Armenzorg 1912-1965: Van Centrum Naar Periferie," 521.
40 van Leeuwen, 523.
41 van Leeuwen, 524.
42 "BiZa/Armwezen, 1918-1947."
43 Hoogenboom, *Standenstrijd En Zekerheid: Een Geschiedenis van Oude Orde En Sociale Zorg*, 160.
44 Oude Nijhuis, *Religion, Class and the Post-war Development of the Dutch Welfare State*, 24.
45 van Kersbergen, "Religion and the Welfare State in the Netherlands," 125.
46 Jesse Frederik, *Waarom Ik Me Een Sociaaldemocraat Voel, Maar Nooit PvdA Heb Gestemd*, Den Uyl-Lezing, 2017, https://decorrespondent.nl/7731/lees-en-luister-waarom-ik-me-een-sociaaldemocraat-voel-maar-nooit-pvda-heb-gestemd/465107002569-7a288df1.

relief. The establishment of "re-education villages," (*heropvoedingsdorpen, woonscholen,* or *gezinsoorden*) were exemplary. These were essentially neighbourhoods that functioned as live-in schools where the conduct of residents was closely supervised.[47] Some of these operated as extensions of religious schools: the Rudolph Foundation (*Rudolphstichting*), founded in 1927 by deacons of the *Gereformeerde Kerk,*[48] ran a live-in village for "neglected children" in De Glind, Gelderland.[49] These were not purely religious initiatives. In Amsterdam, local officials from the social democratic party[50] designed such neighbourhoods for entire families.[51] At the Zeeburgerdorp in Amsterdam, families had to pay an allowance to live in the neighbourhood, into which entry was strictly controlled. Their belongings were disinfected upon arrival, and supervisors regularly checked if the women kept the house clean.[52] Congruent with poor relief practices of the past, this assistance was punitive and stigmatising. A psychiatrist who worked at the Zeeburgerdorp classified its residents as "backwards,"[53] on account of their "utter lack of interest outside the narrowest circle of interests; in an inability to exercise foresight; in carelessness and lack of responsibility; in self-righteousness, mild stubbornness, and in slavishly following an ingrained routine."[54]

4.2.4. Van Rhijn and social security

Unlike in Britain or France, the Second World War represented only a modest break in social policy traditions. However, the war did increase policymakers' ambition and contributed to a general belief in the malleability of social institutions.[55] After Germany invaded the Netherlands in May 1940, Queen Wilhelmina and the cabinet fled to London, where one year later, a committee under Beveridge's leadership would begin to plan for collective life after the war. The Dutch cabinet-in-exile, led by the Calvinist Pieter Sjoerd Gerbrandy, engaged with similar questions and convened a committee in 1943 to improve the coherence and

47 This was a tradition that had nineteenth century roots. In 1818, the Society of Benevolence (Maatschappij der Weldadigheid) was founded by Johannes an der Bosch. It involved removing poor residents from urban areas and directing them towards designated areas in the Netherlands and Belgium. Residents of 'colonies' had to perform laborious agricultural work, and attend church and school in exchange for help becoming an independent farmer. Originally they were voluntary, but they served as a blueprint for punishment colonies to which relocation was mandatory for the delinquent poor. See "Maatschappij van weldadigheid," Canon van Nederland, accessed March 21, 2023, https://www.canonvannederland.nl/nl/drenthe/drenthe-vo/maatschappij-van-weldadigheid.

48 In 1834 and 1880, some orthodox Protestants broke away from the Dutch Reformed Church (Hervormde Kerk), the main Protestant domination, and formed several Gereformeerde churches. In English, this also translates into 'Reformed' - so I follow Andeweg and Irwin, *Governance and Politics of the Netherlands*, 20 and use the Dutch term to avoid confusion.

49 "Rudolphstichting Bereidt Zich Voor Op Zilveren Feest," *Nieuwe Leidsche Courant*, January 14, 1953, https://leiden.courant.nu/issue/NLC/1953-01-14/edition/null/page/3.

50 Social democratic interests were represented by the SDAP (*Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiderspartij*) from 1894 until 1946, at which point it merged with a liberal and a Christian social democratic party to form the PvdA (*Partij van de Arbeid*).

51 "Zeeburgerdorp" (Gemeente Amsterdam Stadsarchief, April 23, 2019), https://www.amsterdam.nl/stadsarchief/stukken/verdwenen-amsterdam/zeeburgerdorp/.

52 "Zeeburgerdorp."

53 This is a translation of a Dutch word, *achterlijk,* which is also an offensive term for a learning disability.

54 Frederik, *Waarom Ik Me Een Sociaaldemocraat Voel, Maar Nooit PvdA Heb Gestemd*.

55 van der Meer, Raadschelders, and Kerkhoff, "Van Nachtwakersstaat Naar Waarborgstaat: Proliferatie En Vervlechting van Het Nederlandse Openbaar Bestuur in de Lange Twintigste Eeuw (1880-2005)," 267.

administration of the social security system system.[56] Drawing similar conclusions as Beveridge had, the 'Van Rhijn' committee would eventually advocate for a solidaristic state-administered social system, in which the entire population would be covered equally but contribution levels would vary according to income.[57]

Van Rhijn's universalist vision was discarded almost immediately after his commission published its report in 1945.[58] This was somewhat surprising, since the first elections after the war had ushered in a change of political leadership to a 'Roman-red' coalition between Catholics and Labour that should have been more sympathetic to state-led social assistance than its Calvinist predecessors.[59] This coalition would govern from 1946 to 1958, under the Catholic leadership for two brief years with Louis Beel and Labour leadership with Willem Drees for the remaining ten.[60] Strange bedfellows at first glance, both Catholic and Labour eyed the working-class vote.[61] Compared to Calvinists, van Kersbergen argues that Catholics could formulate state intervention in a positive sense, as an expression of the state's duty to assist the needy.[62]

However, ultimately, conflict over implementation of a new social insurance system prevailed. The contradictory ambitions to both preserve the character of the system as insurance-based and bring vulnerable groups under its wing proved challenging.[63] The guided wage policy (*geleide loonpolitiek*), a cornerstone of a post-war package of Keynesian policies, posed an additional obstacle.[64] Under this policy, trade unions agreed to accept artificially low wages to make Dutch exports more competitive and promote full employment. The policy achieved its aims: the Dutch economy grew around 5 percent per year between 1950 and 1973.[65] The welfare state, however, had limited room to levy social insurance premiums, which would be taken out of workers' pockets.

Although no major reforms of the Dutch welfare state took place under the first Roman-red coalitions, a handful of "emergency provisions" repaired a porous social safety net. Acts like these compensated workers for wage moderation and kept spending power high in the context of low wages. The most important stopgap was one of Drees' most notable legacies: the 1947 Emergency Law on Old-Age Provisions (*Noodwet Ouderdomsvoorziening*).[66] This

56 Oude Nijhuis, *Religion, Class and the Post-war Development of the Dutch Welfare State*, 71.
57 Susanne Liesbeth Kuipers, "Cast in Concrete? The Institutional Dynamics of Belgian and Dutch Social Policy Reform" (Amsterdam, Leiden University, 2004), 149.
58 Oude Nijhuis, *Religion, Class and the Post-war Development of the Dutch Welfare State*, 71.
59 A month after liberation, Queen Wilhelmina had appointed an emergency cabinet, which took the reins up until elections could be held in May 1946.
60 Although the KVP emerged the winner of the 1948 elections, Beel failed to secure the support necessary to form a majority coalition. Only by offering the premiership to Labour did this become possible. The close friendship between Drees and Beel is one of the reasons cited for the longevity of the Roman-red cooperation. Bert van Nieuwenhuizen, *Willem Drees: Vernieuwer Voor, in En Na de Oorlog* (Utrecht: Aspekt B.V Uitgeverij, 2010), 49.
61 van Kersbergen, "Religion and the Welfare State in the Netherlands," 133.
62 van Kersbergen, 131.
63 Oude Nijhuis, *Religion, Class and the Post-war Development of the Dutch Welfare State*, 76.
64 Andeweg and Irwin, *Governance and Politics of the Netherlands*, 237.
65 Rita Bhageloe-Datadin and Jurriën de Jong, "De Naoorlogse Economische Ontwikkeling van Nederland En Duitsland" (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2010), 221.
66 Hoogenboom, *Standenstrijd En Zekerheid: Een Geschiedenis van Oude Orde En Sociale Zorg*, 273.

was a tax-financed, means-tested programme which offered every Dutch citizen bar married women a benefit if they were age 65 or over and had an income below a certain threshold.[67] In 1949, an unemployment insurance act (to be implemented by social partners) entered into force (*Werkloosheidswet*). Like Talma's law, this was an employee insurance scheme, intended for salaried workers only, with benefit levels set in accordance with (previous) earnings. In 1952, a law re-organising social insurance administration transferred implementation of employee insurance schemes to works' councils.[68] Organised by industry, these were private organisations with responsibilities under public law.

The first national insurance scheme was the General Old Age Act (*Algemene Ouderdomswet*, AOW). National insurance schemes were intended for all residents (rather than just salaried workers), implemented by the Social Insurance Bank (*Sociale Verzekeringsbank*, SVB) and governed by the "solidarity principle," meaning equivalent benefit for everyone.[69] Signed on 31 May 1956 (Stb. 281) and entering into force on 1 January 1957, the AOW enjoyed cross-party support in Parliament.[70] Under the AOW, all persons above 65, irregardless of "status, income, or wealth" were entitled to an old-age pension.[71] It was redistributive in the sense that it was financed on a pay-as-you-go basis by worker contributions,[72] which were calculated based on earnings, but offered a flat-rate benefit set at around two times the level of the average manufacturing wage.[73] The AOW was complemented by a second national insurance scheme, the General Widows and Orphans Act (*Algemene weduwen- en wezenwet*, AWW), signed on 9 April 1959 (Stb. 139). Under the AWW, most widows and orphans received a benefit upon the death of their insured spouse or parent.

Besides social insurance (both national and employee), private insurance is important in the Dutch post-war context. By the late nineteenth century, trade unions had set up funds (*kassen)*, to which union members contributed and from which they could draw funds in the event of unemployment or sickness.[74] Meanwhile, life-insurance companies, which had historically been small, rural, and behind the times on actuarial technologies (like the use of mortality rates and premiums) began to grow in size and shrink in number.[75] Unlike social

67 "Sociale Regelingen Door de Jaren Heen," Sociale Verzekeringsbank, accessed March 16, 2023, https://www.svb.nl/nl/over-de-svb/wie-zijn-we/geschiedenis-sociale-regelingen.

68 Since 2002, they have been implemented by the Employee Insurance Agency (UWV, Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen) Goudswaard, de Kam, and Sterks, *Sociale Zekerheid Op Het Breukvlak van Twee Eeuwen*, 117.

69 Goudswaard, de Kam, and Sterks, 31.

70 van Nieuwenhuizen, *Willem Drees: Vernieuwer Voor, in En Na de Oorlog*, 30.

71 K.P Companje et al., *Two Centuries of Solidarity: German, Belgian and Dutch Social Health Insurance, 1770-2008* (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2009).

72 Since 2002, tax revenues have filled in the deficits.

73 In the Netherlands, the AOW constitutes just one of the three pillars which assure retirees of old-age insurance. The others are occupational pensions, which are financed by capital funding, and private insurance that individuals take out on their own accord. Oude Nijhuis, *Religion, Class and the Post-war Development of the Dutch Welfare State*.

74 Leon van Damme, "Werkloosheidsregelingen in Nederland: Een Parlementaire Geschiedenis" (Arnhem, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, 2021), 12, https://repository.ubn.ru.nl/bitstream/handle/2066/239433/239433.pdf.

75 Nationale-Nederlanden, "De Geschiedenis van NN Group," n.d., https://www.nn.nl/Over-NationaleNederlanden/Wie-zijn-wij/Onze-geschiedenis/Historische-collectie.htm.

insurance, private insurance is not mandatory, and is usually financed more with the principle of equivalence rather than solidarity, meaning that the relationship between contributions and benefits is usually stricter than with social insurance schemes.[76]

4.2.5. Ongoing municipal involvement and a new Ministry

Throughout the mid-twentieth century, expenditure on social insurance in the Netherlands steadily but surely surpassed expenditure on poor relief.[77] However, social assistance persisted and changed form. On paper, it remained governed by the subsidiarity principle of the 1854 and 1912 Poor Laws. In practice, however, prior to the Second World War, municipalities had gradually increased their remit vis-à-vis religious poor boards. Many had dissolved their civic poor boards and turned (the oversight of) poor relief into a normal municipal service whose form evolved in sophistication over time.[78] For example, in 1922, Rotterdam dissolved its poor council (*Armenraad*) and in 1943 renamed it the Municipal Service for Social Affairs (*Gemeentelijke Dienst voor Sociale Zaken*).[79] This transition was made easier by the fact that the government had placed responsibility for implementation of many of the new social insurance schemes with municipalities, and not with civic poor boards.[80]

That said, religious charities remained important. They had been active throughout German occupation, with the church performing a critical unifying function.[81] Moreover, contemporaries interpreted the lawlessness of the occupation as having corrupted Dutch morals, heightening the perceived relevance of religion.[82] Concern with family values animated social life: in an early post-war address to the nation, the Queen stressed the importance of preventing divorce in the same breath as keeping the empire intact.[83] At issue, however, was the fact that churches lacked sufficient financial resources to meet the needs of a war-torn population.[84] Therefore, from 1954 onward, the churches would distribute financial assistance and monitor its use, but the municipality would pay for it.[85] Central government, for its part, offered subsidies to municipalities for this purpose but continued to shy away from responsibility for citizen welfare. One exception was assistance to war victims. In 1945, the Ministry of Interior set up a Central Bureau for the Care of War Victims (*Centraal Bureau Verzorging Oorlogsslachtoffers,* CBVO).[86] In 1947, this department merged with another to become the department of Social Care (*Maatschappelijke Zorg*). This department remained in

76 Goudswaard, de Kam, and Sterks, *Sociale Zekerheid Op Het Breukvlak van Twee Eeuwen*, 106..
77 Goedhart in van Leeuwen, "Armenzorg 1912-1965: Van Centrum Naar Periferie," 539.
78 van Leeuwen, 527.
79 Stadsarchief Rotterdam, "Archief van de Gemeentelijke Dienst Voor Sociale Zaken, Vanaf 1965 Gemeentelijke Sociale Dienst," October 9, 2021, https://stadsarchief.rotterdam.nl/zoek-en-ontdek/archieven/zoekresultaat-archieven/?mivast=184&mizig=210&miadt=184&miview=inv2&milang=nl&micode=1402&minr=43315813&miaet=1inv3t1.
80 van Leeuwen, "Armenzorg 1912-1965: Van Centrum Naar Periferie," 527.
81 van Leeuwen, 535.
82 NL-HaNA-2.21.257-1, van Lier, "Review of the Press," November 1, 1945.
83 NL-HaNA-2.21.257-1, "Review of the Press," July 29, 1946.
84 van Leeuwen, "Armenzorg 1912-1965: Van Centrum Naar Periferie," p.536.
85 van Leeuwen, p.536.
86 Inventory of the archives of *Het Centraal Bureau Verzorging Oorlogsslachtoffers En de Rijksdienst Voor Maatschappelijke Zorg, 1945-1949*, 2.04.48.14, Nationaal Archief, Den Haag. 1986.

tact until the Ministry of Social Work (*Ministerie van Maatschappelijk Werk*) was founded in 1952 - the same year as the implementation of social insurance was re-organised - for political reasons.

Louis Beel, the Catholic statesman in charge of cabinet formation, needed a new ministry to more equally distribute ministerial posts among Catholics. Beel's choice to focus on social work symbolised the commitment of the Catholic Peoples' Party (*Katholieke Volkspartij,* KVP) to taking on a greater role in its direction.[87] Jones interprets this as an attempt to institutionalise the long-standing "civilising mission" of promoting social improvement.[88] Beel selected his friend and KVP colleague, Philip Werner, as the highest ranking civil servant (Secretary-General) of the new Ministry.[89] The ministry fell under Catholic leadership for almost its entire lifespan (1952-1965), first under Frans-Joseph van Thiel (1952-1956) and then Marga Klompé (1956-1963), the first female minister.[90] The new ministry oversaw assistance schemes that had fallen under the aforementioned department of Social Care, including assistance to war victims. It also assumed responsibility over the implementation and review of the 1912 Poor Law. The poor councils became 'social councils' and fell under its wings.[91] Additionally, from its establishment the Ministry offered subsidies to civic and religious poor boards.[92] These subsidies helped win the churches' approval for the effective abandonment of the subsidiarity principle exactly a century after it had been enshrined in the first Poor Law. Following the 1954 report from a committee on Poor Law replacement (*Staatscommissie Vervanging Armenwet*), municipalities would take charge of welfare transfers while churches would focus on 'immaterial' activities like social work and nursing homes.[93] The legacy of moral elevation that had animated re-education villages was obvious. For example, the elderly were said to find the curfew, set meal times, and need to ask for a permit to leave the premises of nursing homes "intolerable."[94] Social control was also achieved by continuing the tradition of conditioning benefit access on upholding religious values. Recipients of social care were expected to attend church and to avoid practices deemed immoral (like extramarital affairs or alcoholism) or wasteful (like keeping a pet or, apparently, listening to vinyl records).[95] In Catholic circles in particular, cleanliness (of home and soul) was considered important.[96]

87 H. Libretto, inventory of the archives of *Ministerie van Maatschappelijk Werk, (1936) 1952-1965 (1970),* 2.27.02, Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, 2019, 10.

88 Jones, "Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten En Nederlanders: Nederlandse Politici over Burgers Uit Oost En West En Nederland, 1945-2005," 173.

89 PDC, "Mr Ph.H.M (Philip) Werner," accessed April 3, 2023, https://www.parlement.com/id/vg09llzypcqj/ph_h_m_philip_werner.

90 Klompé, an accomplished and highly regarded politician in her own right, had inherited a privileged take on these institutions; her father had been a member of a Roman Catholic poor board Mostert, *Marga Klompé 1912-1986: Een Biografie*, 37.

91 To this end, in Amsterdam, a poor council was established in Amsterdam in 1913 to unite different charitable institutions and improve poor relief. In 1939 the council was connected to 206 institutions. After the Second World War, the name changed to social councils, and its work was terminated in the second half of the 1960s.

92 van Leeuwen, "Armenzorg 1912-1965: Van Centrum Naar Periferie," p.536.

93 van Leeuwen, p.537.

94 van Leeuwen, p.559.

95 van Leeuwen, p.563.

96 Mostert, *Marga Klompé 1912-1986: Een Biografie*, 31.

Major reforms to social assistance would have to wait for Labour to leave government. In 1958 confessionals returned to power under Beel. This Catholic-led coalition oversaw the increase in national insurance benefits and two major legislative acts instilling the involvement of government in social assistance. In 1963, the General Child Benefit Act (*Algemene Kinderbijslagwet,* AKW) entered into force with clear aims of promoting natality as it guaranteed a per-child benefit for every child born after the third. The 1965 General Assistance Act (*Algemene Bijstandswet*, ABW), which has been called the "tailpiece" of the Dutch social system,[97] offered an income transfer equal to the social minimum for the entire citizenry. In the event of an income drop below the given threshold, all citizens in need would receive financial assistance. Financed by general tax revenue, the new law enshrined a right to social assistance for the first time in Dutch history. Municipal services were responsible for extending the financial assistance to which a claimant had a right via the ABW.[98]

4.3. The French welfare state: work, family, fatherland

4.3.1. Overview

The modern French welfare state has been called an "uneasy compromise between Beveridgean goals and Bismarckian means."[99] Since the Second World War, its aim has been to offer a comprehensive, universal regime characterised by administrative cohesion and rationalisation, à la Beveridge. Indeed, like their Dutch counterparts, the main civil servants responsible for envisioning a reformed French welfare state were London-based when they made their recommendations. However, the self-employed as well as well-paid salaried employees known as *cadres* were reluctant to give up autonomous insurance schemes that had developed in prior decades. The result, as codified in two ordinances of 1945, was an ambitious but highly fragmented, multi-tiered system of occupation-specific insurance schemes. Financed by wage-deducted contributions and offering wage-related benefits, the system is usually classified as a conservative regime type, with all the caveats that apply (see 3.2.2).[100]

The legal cornerstone of the system is a "general social security regime" which directs a single contribution from each registered worker into funds administered by labour representatives. The funds are grouped into three different administrative levels, each corresponding to different type of benefit. Additionally, like the Dutch, the French privilege social security over social assistance as a means of meeting citizen needs.[101] However, the French welfare state is more unified than its Dutch equivalent, possibly due to a long French tradition

97 Goudswaard, de Kam, and Sterks, *Sociale Zekerheid Op Het Breukvlak van Twee Eeuwen*, 35.

98 Stadsarchief Rotterdam, "Archief van de Gemeentelijke Dienst Voor Sociale Zaken, Vanaf 1965 Gemeentelijke Sociale Dienst."

99 Bruno Palier, "The Dualizations of the French Welfare System," in *A Long Goodbye to Bismarck?*, The Politics of Welfare Reform in Continental Europe (Amsterdam University Press, 2010), 73–100, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt46n02d.7.

100 Manow and Palier, "A Conservative Welfare State Regime without Christian Democracy?," 146.

101 Bruno Palier, "Les Transformations Du Modèle Social Français Hérité de l'après-Guerre," *Modern & Contemporary France* 16, no 4 (2008): 438.

of statism (étatisme). Nonetheless, the general social security regime sits alongside a number of complementary, pre-existing schemes.

A unique role is reserved for family and childcare policy. Indeed, for one observer, "the French welfare state is as much if not more about family than about social security."[102] A system of family allowances developed organically out of voluntary employer initiatives in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[103] In 1945, after several partially successful attempts at state regulation of the funds that had emerged, reformers moved to integrate this system within the general social security regime. The newly named family allowance funds (*Caisses d'Allocations Familiales*) co-existed alongside other primary (local-level) funds of the social security system, but changed slightly in character. The Minister of Labour and Social Security gained an oversight function (albeit indirect).[104] Employers lost their influence over allowances as the administration of the funds was transferred to labour representatives.[105] From 1967, the principal institution in charge of implementation was the National Family Allowance Fund (*Caisse Nationale d'Allocations Familiales,* CNAF). State involvement in family life speaks to its broader concern with moral conduct and social order.

4.3.2. Providence, mutualism and sanitation

According to Pierre Laroque, who would later be considered its founding father, the French welfare state owes its origins to the tradition of *prévoyance libre*.[106] This refers to the voluntary adoption of protective insurance measures against the consequences of unforeseeable events, driven ostensibly by the virtues of providence, prudence and farsightedness. This term found its expression in 1750s France in spontaneous, local-level savings initiatives or mutual aid/relief societies launched by peasants, artisans, and merchants.[107] In 1818, Paris-based bankers founded the first *Caisse d'épargne,* a more institutionalised savings association that took the form of a public limited company authorized by King Louis XVIII. The fund redistributed voluntary grants from founders and directors alongside contributions by depositors, on the occurrence of specific events, like unemployment or sickness.[108]

Local funds (*caisses*) then proliferated, modeled vaguely after the *Caisse d'Epargne*, but relatively diverse in institutional form. The redistributive capacity of the funds was initially

102 Philip Nord, "The Welfare State in France, 1870-1914," *French Historical Studies* 18, no 3 (Spring 1994): 829.
103 Cicely Watson, "Population Policy in France: Family Allowances and Other Benefits I," *Population Studies* 7, no 3 (March 1954): 265.
104 Cicely Watson, "Population Policy in France: Family Allowances and Other Benefits II," *Population Studies* 8, no 1 (July 1954): 50.
105 Dutton, *Origins of the French Welfare State: The Struggle for Social Reform in France, 1914-1947*, 213.
106 Pierre Laroque, *La Sécurité Sociale de Pierre Laroque: Sélection d'articles, Conférences et Écrits (1932-1996) de Pierre Laroque* (Paris: Comité d'histoire de la sécurité sociale, 2020), 63.
107 Carole Christen-Lécuyer, "Histoire Des Caisses d'épargne En France 1818-1881 Une Étude Sociale: Thèse de Doctorat En Histoire Sous La Direction d'André Gueslin, Université Paris 7-Denis Diderot, 1040 F°., Soutenue Le 6 Novembre 2003 Devant Un Jury Composé de Jean-Pierre Chaline (Président), Francis Démier, André Gueslin, Yannick Marec, Bernard Vogler.," *Revue d'histoire Du XIXe Siècle*, no 28 (June 1, 2004), https://doi.org/10.4000/rh19.681; Laroque, *La Sécurité Sociale de Pierre Laroque: Sélection d'articles, Conférences et Écrits (1932-1996) de Pierre Laroque*, 63.
108 Christen-Lécuyer, "Histoire Des Caisses d'épargne En France 1818-1881 Une Étude Sociale"; Laroque, *La Sécurité Sociale de Pierre Laroque: Sélection d'articles, Conférences et Écrits (1932-1996) de Pierre Laroque*, 63.

limited partly because they lacked the trust of their depositors.[109] The state mitigated against mistrust by guaranteeing and administering the deposited funds, first via the treasury and then the *Caisse des dépôts* - the national development bank.[110] With this backing, the volume of deposits grew rapidly, from 100 million fr in 1837 to 300 million fr by 1843.[111] In 1881, the first national savings bank was founded, retaining a private-public format.

Family allowances simultaneously took off in the private sector. In the last decade of the nineteenth century, employers in various sectors, including municipally owned public utilities, railways, civil service and textile firms, introduced children's allowances.[112] Although payments were meagre, employers were keen to "promote the reproduction of their labour force" whilst simultaneously keeping wages low to avoid inflationary pressure.[113]

State involvement in social assistance remained modest, although a series of laws were passed to govern, or oversee the governance of, pressing social issues. 1838 and 1851 legislation for the mentally and physically ill, respectively, spearheaded these efforts.[114] An 1893 law offered free healthcare to the needy although the care was still provided by private physicians whom the state would reimburse.[115] Nord locates part of the cause for this particular law in a general obsession of the republican movement in the 1860s with "hygiene."[116] This in turn is partly explained by the fact that the Chamber of Deputies[117] was stocked with "physician-legislators."[118] In addition, the law obliged every commune to have an office for public assistance.[119] However, in the early 1900s, a typical private charity in a city outspent municipal bodies charged with public assistance by the order of ten to fifteen.[120] Philanthropic efforts remained centre-stage. Republicans had long considered voluntary, bottom-up initiatives by unions, mutual societies or charities as a silver bullet for various social issues.[121] These liberal and individual ideologies "limited what French political instincts expected of the state."[122]

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109 Christen-Lécuyer, 4; Laroque, 63.
110 Christen-Lécuyer, 5; Laroque, 63.
111 Michel Margairaz, "Les crises de l'épargne en France dans la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle La construction de la politique de prudence de la Caisse des dépôts et consignations," in *Crises financières, crises politiques en Europe dans le second XIXe siècle*, Publications d'histoire économique et sociale internationale (Genève: Librairie Droz, 2011), 3, https://doi.org/10.3917/droz.aglan.2011.01.0121.
112 Watson, "Population Policy in France: Family Allowances and Other Benefits I," 264.
113 Laura Levine Frader, *Breadwinners and Citizens: Gender in the Making of the French Social Model* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2008), 4.
114 Laroque, *La Sécurité Sociale de Pierre Laroque: Sélection d'articles, Conférences et Écrits (1932-1996) de Pierre Laroque*, 64.
115 Nord, "The Welfare State in France, 1870-1914," 834.
116 Note that from the infamous French Revolution in 1798 until the late nineteenth century, French political taste was mostly divided between republicans on the left and monarchists on the right Nord, 829.
117 This was the lower house in the Third Republic (1875-1940). Note that after the French Revolution and the abolition of the monarchy, the classification of political systems has been organised into Republics. A change of Republic usually happens due to a change of the constitution.
118 Nord, "The Welfare State in France, 1870-1914," 833.
119 Nord, 822.
120 Smith, *The Two World Wars and Social Policy in France*, 1:128.
121 Nord, "The Welfare State in France, 1870-1914," 837.
122 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*, 102.

4.3.3. Moving toward social insurance

Legislation of the nineteenth century laid the floorboards for the modern French welfare state: based on occupational insurance schemes but profoundly concerned with moral conduct. After France lost to a newly unified Germany in 1871, it embarked on a social trajectory modelled after the German example though at a slower pace. Bismarckian Germany was a pioneer of *Sozialpolitik*, with national schemes of compulsory health, accident and old-age insurance dating back to the 1880s.[123] French legislators eventually followed suit, approving funding for veteran pensions, and free, universal primary education.[124] The latter was accomplished via the 1881-1882 "Ferry laws" (*lois Ferry*). Named after their chief advocate (Jules Ferry), these laws removed the influence of the Catholic Church from public school provision and cleared the way for the state to become involved in "moral education," which was defined as "rooting in the souls of students … those essential notions of human morality … necessary to all civilised men."[125]

Other legislation focused on improving working conditions. An 1874 child labour law raised the minimum working age to twelve years and created a state inspectorate located at the newly established labour department (*Direction du travail*) of the Ministry of Commerce.[126] In 1898, a law of work accidents was passed, marking the first national insurance scheme.[127] In 1910, after a decade of discussions, the parliament adopted a law on workers' and peasant pensions. However, the scheme was voluntary; workers could choose not to participate, and the benefits were of limited generosity compared to the Lloyd George plan in England of roughly the same time period (1908).[128] There was also at least one noteworthy development in the realm of private and voluntary social assistance: in 1890, a central office was created to mediate between charities and the state (*Office central des oeuvres de bienfaisance*), which had the net effect of promoting coordination among charitable organisations.[129]

During the interwar period, state intervention increased. The French had suffered heavily during the First World War, with over a million soldiers killed, leaving hundreds of thousands of needy dependents.[130] Inflation was rampant, partly because France had borrowed heavily to finance the war without an accompanying increase in productive capacity. Given their sacrifice, French leaders rewarded the public with social benefits.[131] Much expenditure took place at the local level, with departmental expenses increasing by 720 per cent between 1920 and 1940.[132] Examples of spending items for state and voluntary associations included family allowances, subsidised public housing for large families, and subsidies designed for the postnatal care and

123 Nord, "The Welfare State in France, 1870-1914," 821.
124 Smith, *The Two World Wars and Social Policy in France*, 127.
125 Lucien Jaume, "La laïcité selon Jules Ferry," *Commentaire* Numéro155, no 3 (2016): 8, https://doi.org/10.3917/comm.155.0591.
126 Nord, "The Welfare State in France, 1870-1914," 823.
127 Michel Laroque, "Préface," in *La Sécurité Sociale de Pierre Laroque: Sélection d'articles, Conférences et Écrits (1932-1996) de Pierre Laroque*, by Pierre Laroque (Paris: Comité d'histoire de la sécurité sociale, 2020), 61–68.
128 Nord, "The Welfare State in France, 1870-1914," 821.
129 Viguier, "Chapitre 2 L'assistance sociale délégitimée par la Sécurité sociale mais toujours indispensable," 3.
130 Thomas R Christofferson and Michael S Christofferson, "France during World War II: From Defeat to Liberation," in *France during World War II* (Fordham University Press, 2022), 2, https://doi.org/10.1515/9780823291595.
131 Smith, *The Two World Wars and Social Policy in France*, 135.
132 Smith, 139.

education of young children.[133] These policies maintained an overall emphasis on natalism and reversing demographic decline. Indeed by 1920 the idea of children's allowances had "firmly taken root" in French society.[134] At the national level, important legislation passed in this time period. The first Family Allowance Bill of 1931 was passed unanimously, setting minimum standards but otherwise making very few changes to the voluntary system already in existence.[135] In general, this natalist emphasis constrained women's opportunities in the labour market, reinforcing their role as family carers instead. The Ministry of Labour updated its workplace accident laws and monitored the transition to an 8-hour day.[136] A 1928 social insurance bill established sickness, retirement and disability insurance, with supplemental benefits for maternity and death.[137] This would soon come in handy: although the Great Depression began in earnest at a later date in France than elsewhere (1931 compared to 1929), it lasted longer.[138] The government avoided devaluing its currency, harming the competitiveness of French exports. The ensuing pain suffered by the agricultural sector translated into a decline of the peasantry, a social change that sparked anxieties about departure from French tradition and even spiritual decay which would later serve as ammunition for the promises of renewal made by Vichy France.[139]

4.3.4. Increasing expenditure in a divided nation

The Second World War engineered considerable rupture in French political life. Not only was France occupied, but it was divided into two zones. Moreover, up to three leaders laid claim to the legitimacy and authority of the French state at once. The chaos of this period had profound consequences for the social reform agenda of the post-war period.

France surrendered to Nazi forces in June 1940, when General Philippe Pétain, who had been promoted to the highest ranks of the French military after the First World War, opted to negotiate an armistice with Nazi Germany rather than continue fighting. The terms of peace including splitting metropolitan France in two parts, with two-thirds of the territory (including Paris and the entire Atlantic coast) handed over to the Germans and the southern part of the country becoming a client state under full French sovereignty.[140] Vichy, a "sleepy spa town" located in this southern part, eventually became the seat of Pétain's new government which replaced the Third Republic.[141] Pétain promised and promoted national renewal under the mantra "Work, Family, Fatherland," replacing the revolutionary slogan of "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity."[142] Although Pétain criticised the social legislation of the 1930s as decadent and ineffective, spending on highly pronatalist family and health policy actually increased

133 Smith, 137.
134 Watson, "Population Policy in France: Family Allowances and Other Benefits I," 265.
135 Watson, 267.
136 Smith, *The Two World Wars and Social Policy in France*, 129.
137 Smith, 138.
138 Christofferson and Christofferson, "France during World War II," 4.
139 Christofferson and Christofferson, 8.
140 Christofferson and Christofferson, 35.
141 Julian Jackson, *France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 142.
142 Christofferson and Christofferson, "France during World War II," 38.

in Vichy France,[143] with the family considered the "essential cell" of the social order.[144] The number of families receiving benefits increased and state subsidies made bigger contributions to family allowance funds than they had previously.[145] Hand-in-hand with this emphasis on the family was a highly racialised conception of the French nation. The Vichy government passed a series of exclusionary and anti-Semitic laws, stripping 15,000 naturalised citizens (of which 6,000 Jews) of their French nationality, excluding them from the workforce and legalising the internment of Jewish people in foreign camps.[146]

Meanwhile, General Charles de Gaulle led a minority of French into exile in London to continue the war from overseas.[147] De Gaulle had been one of the most adamant opponents of a Franco-German armistice.[148] In London, the British - sometimes somewhat begrudgingly - recognised him as "leader of the Free French," offering financial and (some) material support in exchange for help fighting German forces.[149] De Gaulle's ideological or political leanings were obscure, and he recruited followers from across the political spectrum.[150] Another set of French troops also fought on the side of the Allies - those under the leadership of Henri Giraud, an Algiers-based general. By the end of 1943, the two generals merged their efforts into a committee led by De Gaulle called the French Committee of National Liberation *(Comité Français de la Libération National,* CFLN). Some half a million troops had now been recruited, more than half from the colonies. Ultimately, this was the most powerful and unified movement against Nazi occupation of any occupied power.[151]

One year later, the CFLN was replaced by the Provisional Government of the French Republic (*Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Française,* GPRF). The GPRF, which was led by De Gaulle for most of its lifespan, enjoyed exceptional legislative and executive powers. Its mandate was considerable: to govern liberated French territories, continue the war against the Axis powers and reconstruct transport, production and distribution infrastructure destroyed under German occupation.[152] By the end of 1944, Pétain had fled to Germany, the Vichy regime had ended, and the US recognised the GPRF, with considerable military and economic resources at its behest, as the legitimate government of France.[153]

The resumption of political life required institutional upgrading.. While the Vichy regime had been discredited, the Third Republic was accused of having permitted French defeat in

143 Smith, *The Two World Wars and Social Policy in France*, 1:139.
144 Jackson, *France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944*, 149.
145 Watson, "Population Policy in France: Family Allowances and Other Benefits I," 283.
146 Christofferson and Christofferson, "France during World War II," 104.
147 Christofferson and Christofferson, 34.
148 Jackson, *France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944*, 389.
149 Jackson, 390.
150 Jackson, 397.
151 Christofferson and Christofferson, "France during World War II," 166.
152 Eric Jabbari, "The Genesis of the Laroque Plan (1944–1945)," in *Pierre Laroque and the Welfare State in Post-War France*, ed Eric Jabbari (Oxford University Press, 2012), 108, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289639.003.0006.
153 C M C., "The French Committee of National Liberation," *Bulletin of International News* 21, no 12 (1944): 471.

1940.[154] Therefore, an (elected) Constituent Assembly was to establish new institutions.[155] The Constituent Assembly was elected on 21 October 1945. Its first constitutional draft, however, was rejected in a May 1946 referendum. Upon its rejection, the responsible assembly resigned.[156] A new Constituent Assembly was elected on 2 June 1945. The second constitutional draft was accepted on October 13, 1946, at which point the GPRF was dissolved and replaced by the first government of the Fourth Republic.

4.3.5. The Laroque Plan

Ambition for universal, Beveridgean social security among leaders of the French resistance ran high. With the political right in ill repute after Pétain, the path was cleared for a planned economy.[157] However, initially, the GPRF had no equivalent plan despite an abundance of reformist ambition and rhetoric among members of the Resistance.[158] This is surprising, as ostensibly "the chief concern of those seeking to re-establish French democracy was how to remould social relations in the direction of fairness and equality."[159] Some argue that more pressing matters, like waging war itself, took precedence.[160] Additionally, information about the financial stability of the existing insurance system was scarce since the Vichy regime had not made it available.[161] Either way, the difficulties facing the existing system of social insurance became quickly clear to the Ministry of Labour of the GPRF.

De Gaulle had chosen Alexandre Parodi as Minister of Labour. Parodi had served in the Ministry of Labour prior to the war until he was dismissed by the Vichy government in 1940. Member of the Council of State since 1930,[162] Parodi was also a leading member of the Resistance, having co-founded a committee devoted to preparing the legislative agenda and judicial reforms for after the war.[163] He had a close personal relationship with De Gaulle.[164] Parodi appointed Laroque director of social insurance. Laroque's principal interest was in replacing existing social legislation with a system of universal coverage.[165] He saw this as part of a broader policy package devoted to full employment and the promotion of public health.[166] Consistent with the idealism and drive of the French Resistance, it also served pragmatic ends, since, as Palmer points out, the French Communist Party was mobilising around 25 per cent of the popular vote in general elections.[167]

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154 Joachim E Goma-Thethet, "Les Élections à l'Assemblée Nationale Constituante de 1945 Dans La Circonscription Du Gabon-Moyen-Congo," *Outre-Mers* tome 95, no 358–359 (2008): 230.
155 Goma-Thethet, 229.
156 Betts, *France and Decolonisation, 1900-1960*, 70.
157 Rosanvallon, cited in Smith, *The Two World Wars and Social Policy in France*, 1:139.
158 Jabbari, "The Genesis of the Laroque Plan (1944–1945)," 110.
159 Smith, *The Two World Wars and Social Policy in France*, 1:142.
160 Jabbari, "The Genesis of the Laroque Plan (1944–1945)," 110.
161 Jabbari, 110.
162 Jabbari, 111.
163 Diane de Bellescize, "Le Comité Général D'études De La Résistance," *Revue d'histoire de La Deuxième Guerre Mondiale* 25, no 99 (1975): 1–24.
164 Jabbari, "The Genesis of the Laroque Plan (1944–1945)," 111.
165 Jabbari, 114.
166 Jabbari, 117.
167 Palier, "The Dualizations of the French Welfare System," 74.

In 1944 mutual aid societies responsible for various *caisses* sent Parodi a note outlining the financial difficulties they faced.[168] A report from the Ministry of Labour echoed their concerns, pointing out that the link between contributions and benefits had been severed: for example, old age allowance and insurance benefits came from the same financial pot.[169] The report incentivised short-term measures designed to plug the gap in the system.[170] Convinced that more drastic reform was needed, the Ministry of Labour quickly got to work designing a plan for revamping the entire system. The lynchpin of the Laroque plan, as it would come to be known, was the *caisse unique,* which would collect all contributions and administer all benefits in a given geographic locality.[171] Key also was the incorporation of other benefit schemes into a broad, umbrella regime, including family benefits and workplace accidents which were hitherto governed by distinct legislation.[172] State sponsorship was minimal. In fact, the intention was to keep the system as "independent as possible."[173] In truth the French state lacked sufficient resources to play any more central a role.[174]

In the summer of 1945, the Ministry of Labour presented a modified version of the Laroque plan to the consultative assembly of the GPRF, which lacked formal legislative powers. On 11 July 1945, Alexandre Parodi went before the labour commission of the same body to present its rationale.[175] Support for the plan was highly divided, even among labour: the largest trade union confederation, the General Confederation of Labour (*Confédération g*énérale du *travail,* CGT), supported the government, while the French Confederation of Christian Workers (*Confédération française des travailleurs chrétiens*, CFTC) opposed it, likely in no small part because Catholic organisations already had established their own network of funds.[176] Existing mutual aid societies were similarly critical of administrative rationalisation. They had been providing contributory workers' insurance to the industrial class for some time, and were not interested in seeing their power diminish.[177]

Furthermore, Laroque was banking on the solidaristic sentiment of the middle class, which proved lacking. Their support was crucial as their premiums would no longer go merely toward those of their own standing who had fallen on hard times but to the "needy and indigent."[178] However, executives and managers known as *cadres* according to a standard class designation (including senior managers, commercial executives, administrators)[179] - hesitated to relinquish

168 Jabbari, "The Genesis of the Laroque Plan (1944–1945)," 113.
169 Jabbari, 115.
170 Jabbari, 116.
171 Jabbari, 120.
172 Jabbari, 120.
173 Palier, "The Dualizations of the French Welfare System," 75.
174 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*, 159.
175 Jabbari, "The Genesis of the Laroque Plan (1944–1945)," 124.
176 Jabbari, 126.
177 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*, 161.
178 Baldwin, 159.
179 This designation includes senior managers, commercial executives and administrators Olivier Godechot, Mirna Safi, and Matthew Soener, "The Intersection of Organizational Inequalities: How Gender, Migrant Status, and Class Inequality Relate to Each Other in French Workplaces," May 1, 2021, https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4740556.

their autonomous insurance schemes built up in prior decades.[180] By the same token, the self-employed viewed contributing to such a system as an unnecessary fiscal burden.[181] In addition, they would lose the right to affiliate with the fund of their choosing.[182] Despite these concerns, the assembly voted their approval for their plan, paving the way for a new generation of social security legislation.

4.3.6. La Sécurité sociale

The legal foundations of the new regime were ultimately enshrined in two ordinances of October 4 and October 19, 1945. The ordinance of October 4 centralised the administration of benefit distribution. From then on, unified worker contributions would be directed into funds[183] at the local, regional and national level.[184] Funds at the local and regional level were self-administered, meaning run by councils composed mostly of representatives of organised labour. At the local level, primary funds *(caisses primaires*) handled health-related benefits and family allowance funds (*caisses d'allocations familiales*) were responsible for family allowances. Up one level, regional funds *(caisses régionales)* distributed benefits under all remaining programmes, including old-age insurance.[185] This insurance guaranteed registered workers a pension set at around 40 per cent of their average salary (reevaluated for inflation-related increases) over the last 10 years and payable at age 65. Finally, the National Fund for Social Security (*la Caisse nationale de sécurité sociale*, CNSS), the only public fund, exercised coordination, compensation and oversight functions. The ordinance of October 19 set the level of benefits and the scope of coverage. Combined, the system offered old-age, sickness, and workplace accident insurance.

There was some resistance to integrating family allowance funds into the general social security regime. For Parodi, they had become too chaotic. He found differences in benefit levels offered by different employers within the same sector too extreme and lamented that various funds had overlapping jurisdictions.[186] On the other hand, opponents of integration argued that family needs required special attention from family associations rather than councils made of labour representatives.[187] In the end, the law of October 4 represented a compromise: family allowance funds were distinct and retained their autonomy, compared to the primary funds at the same level. However, the Minister of Labour and Social Security, aided by the General Directorate of Social Security (*Direction Générale de la Sécurité Sociale*) at his Ministry, had the final say over the fate of social security and family allowance funds.

Although the ordinances ultimately enshrined Laroque's ideas, the resistance of previously insured workers left its mark. Not all workers fell under the general regime. Laroque would later lament that, if implemented half a century earlier, the system would have united all

180 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*, 158–59.
181 Baldwin, 158–59.
182 Jabbari, "The Genesis of the Laroque Plan (1944–1945)," 121.
183 Manow and Palier, "A Conservative Welfare State Regime without Christian Democracy?," 146.
184 Palier, *Gouverner La Sécurité Sociale*, 82.
185 Palier, 90.
186 Watson, "Population Policy in France: Family Allowances and Other Benefits II," 48.
187 Watson, 48.

workers without exception.[188] Instead, alongside the general regime was a special regime uniting existing public schemes for specific categories of workers like civil servants, railway workers and miners.[189] Many of these schemes already contained retirement provisions. In the domain of old-age insurance, *cadres* created a complementary regime in 1947, managed by the General Association of Retirement Schemes for Cadres (*Association générale des institutions de retraites des cadres,* AGIRC). Meanwhile, a 1948 law called for a system of separate pension systems for non-salaried/self-employed workers of artisanal, merchant, and liberal professions.[190] Smith argues that "the result was a welfare state that gave state sanction to existing social divisions."[191] One of the only exceptions to this fragmented picture was the National Solidarity Fund. Established in 1956, the National Solidarity Fund provided a supplementary, tax-funded minimum allowance for elderly French citizens without resources.[192]

Social assistance did not disappear in this context, although it received much less attention both by scholars and by contemporaries, who observed that it was barely discussed except at local levels of government.[193] Viguier contends that social security had defeated it ideologically and financially.[194] Organisations who had been providing social assistance did not accept what they perceived as its *nationalisation*, language which landed with particular salience due to the nationalisation of different companies after Liberation.[195] In 1947, several charities, including *Le Secours Catholique* and the French Red Cross banded together in *l'Uniopss* (the National Interfederal Union of Private Sanitary and Social Organizations) to protest the incursion of the state into their terrain. L'Uniopss was relatively successful at returning at least some attention to social assistance. By the early 1950s, it was clear that social security had not covered a sufficient proportion of the population, as those dependent on public or private assistance had increased during the post-war period.[196] It cost some municipalities about half of their budget.[197]

Accordingly, new legislation established a regulatory regime for social assistance, from then on to be called "social aid" in French (*l'aide sociale*).[198] In 1953, the law of November 29 was passed, and its provisions incorporated almost without modification into the 1958 Family and Social Assistance Code (*Le Code de la famille et de l'aide sociale*) following a decree of 1961.[199] The new laws upgraded the system of public assistance and created new institutions for handling claims. The main institution was the office for social assistance (*Le Bureau*

188 Laroque, *La Sécurité Sociale de Pierre Laroque: Sélection d'articles, Conférences et Écrits (1932-1996) de Pierre Laroque*, 74.
189 Laroque, 73.
190 Liberal professions usually referred to the self-employed working in intellectual domains, but including lawyers, doctors, architects Éric Jabbari, *Pierre Laroque and the Welfare State in Post-war France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
191 Smith, *The Two World Wars and Social Policy in France*, 1:144.
192 Albert Gazier, "Circulaire ministérielle du N° 85-SS" (July 27, 1956).
193 Maurice Thire, "L'aide sociale et le décret du 29 novembre 1953," *La Revue Administrative* 7, no 41 (1954): 506–12.
194 Viguier, "Chapitre 2 L'assistance sociale délégitimée par la Sécurité sociale mais toujours indispensable."
195 Viguier, 3.
196 Viguier, 6.
197 Viguier, 6.
198 Viguier, "Chapitre 2 L'assistance sociale délégitimée par la Sécurité sociale mais toujours indispensable."
199 Pascal Berthet, "La Récupération Des Prestations d'aide Sociale," *Journal Du Droit Des Jeunes* 2, no 212 (2002): 3.

d'aide sociale), which would conduct means-testing in a given commune in liaison with public and private organisations.[200] It would then transmit claims to local admissions committees consisting mostly of civil servants appointed by the prefect. The state could command this kind of authority over private providers of social assistance because it was their main creditor. Charities' reliance on state finances had only increased over time: donations, their former lifeblood, had dried up as the bourgeoisie found themselves less well-off than they had been before the war.[201] In addition, medical innovations had increased the cost of medical care.

4.4. The British welfare state: from poor law to Beveridge

4.4.1. Overview

The British welfare state is given as one of the quintessential examples of a liberal regime, and often the only European[202] state included in this cluster.[203] This classification is consistent with the substantial role the British system awards to means-tested, tax-financed social assistance, even if this was not the intention of its leading architect, the British India-born liberal economist William Beveridge. The history of social assistance in the UK is characterised by a long tradition of poor relief which was inextricable from local religious life. Existing scholarship has emphasised the punitive character of this poor relief, which is said to have instilled discipline in the working class. However, whereas the Netherlands did not overhaul its poor laws until 1965, British legislators had replaced poor law institutions by 1948. In addition, benefits under the act were more modest than Beveridge, an advocate of national minimum standards, had intended.

At the same time, the British regime represents the most unified and universal system of all three country cases here. The National Assistance Act and its precursor, the National Insurance Act of 1946, broke decisively with a fragmented system that had for centuries relied on poor relief as administered by parishes and, later, on friendly societies as managed by their members. The 1942 Beveridge Report, which represented the culmination of wartime efforts to imagine a new future for British welfare, and which was to serve as the blueprint for legislation passed under a Labour government in subsequent years, explicitly called for centralising and streamlining the various pre-existing services. Neither the National Insurance Act nor the National Assistance Act were targeted to a clientele of low-income state dependents, as would be expected from a liberal regime.[204] Instead, both are resolutely universal, revealing at least one important similarity with social-democratic regimes.

200 Décret n°53-1186 du 29 novembre 1953, décret n°54-611 du 11 Juin 1954, 1016 § (1954), 4.
201 Viguier, "Chapitre 2 L'assistance sociale délégitimée par la Sécurité sociale mais toujours indispensable."
202 The question of whether Britain is European is a complex one Timothy Garton Ash, "Is Britain European?," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 77, no 1 (2001): 1–13.
203 Pierson, *The New Politics of the Welfare State*.
204 Esping-Andersen, "The Three Political Economies of the Welfare State," 111.

4.4.2. Medieval history

Resting on a 400-year-old common law, the welfare system of England and Wales is the oldest continuous surviving legal system of its kind in Europe.[205] In its various iterations, 'poor law' - a collection of different legislative acts dating back principally to the Elizabethan Poor Relief Act of 1601[206] - reigned in England and Wales[207] from the early seventeenth century until 1948. Poor law obliged parishes to collect local taxes called rates[208] to support the poor. How this 'poor rate' would be used was the prerogative of volunteer overseers, who redistributed it among those could not work as an early form of relief.[209] Although these overseers enjoyed discretion,[210] they were accountable to local officials known as 'Justices of the Peace'[211] who could overrule the overseers' decisions.[212] Thus, poor law was a national system supported by compulsory taxation at the local level.[213]

Parochial responsibilities for poor relief reflected the broader architecture of governance at the time. Parishes and local governments held so much sway relative to central government that "the only agent of the central state whom the provincial citizen could regularly expect to encounter was the benign post office clerk."[214] Belief systems around the potential moral harm of state interference helped shape the relative size of central government. Just like in the Dutch Republic, any interference of central government in personal welfare was thought to undermine the "independence, self-reliance and initiative" of the individual.[215]

Historians have drawn attention to early expressions of what would later come to be known as welfare chauvinism in the British system. By the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the movement of a worker in England from one parochial jurisdiction to another was a frequent occurrence.[216] The question of which jurisdiction was responsible for which poor worker took centre-stage.[217] Ultimately, the Poor Relief Act of 1662 enshrined the responsibility of a parish over all the needy who had lived there for 40 days. In practice, parishes took this as permission to actively remove those inter-parish migrants who had not yet reached the 40-day threshold

205 Lorie Charlesworth, "Welfare's Forgotten Past: A Socio-Legal History of the Poor Law," *Amicus Curiae*, no 81 (Spring 2010): 16.

206 UK-LoNA-CO 859/124/2-National Insurance Bill-June 1944 "Memo C.M No 5: "Social Security in the Colonial Territories."

207 From 1536 to 1707, the Kingdom of England included Wales. From the 1707 Act of Union onwards, this kingdom united with the Kingdom of Scotland to form the Kingdom of Great Britain. Scotland and Ireland have distinct welfare histories. Here we focus on the welfare history of England and Wales, since these were the precursor to welfare legislation of Great Britain.

208 Rates were local taxes, payable by all who owned or rented property.

209 Ray Cocks, "The Poor Law," in *The Oxford History of the Laws of England*, vol XIII (Oxford University Press, 2010), 473, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239757.001.0001.

210 Feldman, "Migrants, Immigrants and Welfare from the Old Poor Law to the Welfare State," 89.

211 These were Elizabethan England's answer to the challenge of ensuring rule of law at local levels. Today this function is fulfilled by magistrates. Then, as now, it was a voluntary function. Unlike today, however, Justices of the Peace played a critical role in the administration of local government.

212 Cocks, "The Poor Law," 474.

213 Feldman, "Migrants, Immigrants and Welfare from the Old Poor Law to the Welfare State," 80.

214 Thane, cited in Julia Moses, *The First Modern Risk: Workplace Accidents and the Origins of European Social States*, 1st ed (Cambridge University Press, 2018), 22, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108657853.

215 A.D.K Owen, "From Poor Law to Beveridge Report," *Foreign Affairs* 21, no 4 (July 1943): 746.

216 Feldman, "Migrants, Immigrants and Welfare from the Old Poor Law to the Welfare State," 80.

217 Feldman, 83.

back to their 'parish of settlement.'[218] Up until 1795, it was also possible to remove someone preventatively, that is, on the "suspicion that at some time in the future they would apply for poor relief."[219]

With time, the impression grew that, despite an array of legislation, the poor were not adequately cared for. In 1795, the Speenhamland law was proposed, stipulating that parishes top up the wages of the poor with an allowance, the level of which would be set in accordance with the price of bread or other basic necessities.[220] It amounted, in essence, to a minimum income for the poor regardless of their earnings.[221] Although never formally adopted, the Speenhamland law did become informal practice in several counties in the British countryside. Austro-Hungarian political economist Karl Polanyi argues that Speenhamland provided workers an informal "right to live," buffering them from the violent throes of a competitive labour market.[222] Nonetheless, the system came under fire from its critics for distorting market prices and work incentives, as well as resulting in excessive costs for the middle and upper classes.

In the mid-nineteenth century, British welfare underwent dramatic reform, taking on a more punitive character that would leave a lasting imprint on subsequent attitudes to welfare. In 1834, a Poor Law amendment removed the buffer that Polanyi had mentioned. Widely regarded as a "calamity for the labouring poor,"[223] the amendment required that the able-bodied poor commodify their skills by doing menial jobs, like picking oakum[224] or breaking stones, in exchange for a right to be housed, clothed and fed in indoor relief houses or workhouses. Parishes could even send paupers to the colonies, although relatively few seem to have taken this step.[225] Only the poor classified as 'non able-bodied,' which included the sick, the aged, children, and the mentally ill, could receive 'outdoor relief,' that is, financial assistance delivered to their homes.[226] The amendment also created a central bureaucracy known as the Poor Law Board, with the task of monitoring local practice and promoting uniformity.[227] These closely resemble the poor councils created by Dutch lawmakers some eighty years later.

Several scandals erupted after the harsh, prison-like conditions of workhouses emerged.[228] For Charlesworth, the 1834 reform marks a critical juncture in the "pathologizing" of poverty and the trend of viewing the poor as a "problem to be contained, controlled and stigmatised"

218 Widows and deserted wives would find themselves removed to the parish of their husband's birth; see Pat Thane, "Women and the Poor Law in Victorian and Edwardian England," *History Workshop*, no 6 (Autumn 1978): 32 for more.

219 Feldman, "Migrants, Immigrants and Welfare from the Old Poor Law to the Welfare State," 85.

220 Cocks, "The Poor Law," 475.

221 Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, 82.

222 Polanyi, 86.

223 Feldman, "Migrants, Immigrants and Welfare from the Old Poor Law to the Welfare State," 91.

224 This was a common task given to prisoners sentenced to hard labour and involved twisting, rolling and pulling out the individual fibres of unmaking old rope so it could be reused in the shipping industry.

225 Zolberg in Freddy Foks, "Emigration State: Race, Citizenship and Settler Imperialism in Modern British History, c 1850–1972," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 35, no 2 (June 2022): 176, https://doi.org/10.1111/johs.12366.

226 Thane, "Women and the Poor Law in Victorian and Edwardian England."

227 Feldman, "Migrants, Immigrants and Welfare from the Old Poor Law to the Welfare State."

228 The National Archives, "1834 Poor Law," 2014, https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/resources/1834-poor-law/.

rather than focusing on the rights of individuals to assistance.[229] Indeed, the voluntary imprisonment associated with poor relief gave the 'pauper' a social status on par with that of a criminal.[230] Charlesworth argues that this norm continues to influence the principles and practices of modern welfare provision.[231] Similarly, for Shilliam, although the poor law was presented as an instrument of "Christian benefaction," it actually came to serve as a "legal device to discipline the working poor," instilling industriousness, prudence and patriarchal values.[232] Of note, nonetheless, is the relatively inclusive character of welfare following the 1834 reform. One aim of the reformers had been to facilitate rural-urban migration and restore the free movement of labour, which they felt had been discouraged by settlement and removal laws; therefore, from 1834 on, urban authorities were forced to take responsibility for the welfare of their (inter-parish) migrant poor.[233]

4.4.3. Moving toward social insurance

By the end of the nineteenth century, the importance of poor law in the provision of welfare started to decline. Ever-expanding industrialisation destabilised the public's confidence in the ability of local efforts to manage its associated social ills.[234] Observations from the likes of Friedrich Engels, Thomas Carlyle and Charles Dickinson had brought extensive deprivation to the attention of the general public.[235] Moreover, the evidence submitted to royal commissions had suggested that the poor were not nearly as "idle," "improvident," drunk and irresponsible as the disciplinary character of the 1834 poor law reform had suggested.[236] This undermined its appeal.

Finally, the same period saw the proliferation of friendly societies, which closely resemble the French mutual aid organisations of the mid-eighteenth century. Running on insurance principles, friendly societies collected regular payments from their members who could receive a lump sum payment in the event of a specific occurrence, like illness or old age. Friendly societies may have taken off due to higher wages associated with new types of work, or due to a need for insurance and community in the context of rapid urbanisation.[237] Either way, they were viewed as promoting desirable qualities in British workers by allowing them to be not just passive recipients of poor relief, but active agents of their own fate.[238] Friendly societies laid the foundations for the development of social insurance.

Enjoying a comfortable majority in the House of Commons, Liberal governments at the end of the nineteenth century began to pass national legislation affecting the welfare of workers

229 Charlesworth, "Welfare's Forgotten Past: A Socio-Legal History of the Poor Law," 17.
230 Noel Whiteside, "The Beveridge Report and Its Implementation: a Revolutionary Project?," *Histoire@Politique* 24, no 3 (2014): 2, https://doi.org/10.3917/hp.024.0024.
231 Charlesworth, "Welfare's Forgotten Past: A Socio-Legal History of the Poor Law," 20.
232 Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor: From Abolition to Brexit*, 13–19.
233 Feldman, "Migrants, Immigrants and Welfare from the Old Poor Law to the Welfare State," 92–93.
234 Owen, "From Poor Law to Beveridge Report," 747.
235 Moses, *The First Modern Risk*, 29.
236 Doreen Collins, "The Introduction of Old Age Pensions in Great Britain," *The Historical Journal* 8, no 2 (1965): 249.
237 Martin Gorsky, "The Growth and Distribution of English Friendly Societies in the Early Nineteenth Century," *The Economic History Review* 51, no 3 (August 1998): 499.
238 Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor: From Abolition to Brexit*, 61.

and citizens. The new legislation did not conform to one specific logic. In 1897, a workmen's compensation law was introduced, which allowed, although did not require, employers to insure themselves against claims for compensation by workers who had been the victims of accidents "suffered in the course of their employment."[239] Reforms extended coverage of the workmen's compensation act to new sectors. 'Employment exchanges' – or government offices established to help match employers and jobseekers – were set up.[240] The civil servant in the Board of Trade responsible for overseeing employment exchanges was William Beveridge, a Liberal[241] and British India-born economist who promoted employment exchanges as a means of disciplining the work-shy and whose contribution to British welfare will be covered in the next section.[242]

Several nation-wide schemes launched under the leadership of Chancellor David Lloyd George became particularly prominent features of the social landscape.[243] George was purportedly motivated by a desire to "match the industrial vitality and stability" of Germany.[244] The schemes varied significantly in nature. In 1908, a non-contributory national old age pension was inaugurated, providing between 1 and 5 shillings per week to people over 7 years of age, following similar moves by New Zealand and Denmark.[245] It offered particularly generous benefits,[246] albeit only for British subjects. However, the "blotter had scarcely come down on the royal signature in 1908… before reformers took off in the opposite direction" – away from tax-financed means-tested schemes.[247] Their first stop on the way to contributory insurance schemes, however, included poor relief-style domestic labour colonies. In 1909 George legislated to reclaim rural land to create labour colonies for the urban poor, which charities then set up.[248] This initiative bears resemblance to the *heropvoedingsdorpen* in the Netherlands.

One of Lloyd George's most central contributions to British welfare, however, were the contributory insurance schemes against unemployment and sickness launched under the National Insurance Act. The 1911 National Insurance Act insured four fifths of the working population of the United Kingdom against sickness and debilitation.[249] Workers earning no more than £160 a year were obliged to insure themselves against illness by paying a contribution that would be topped up by their employers and the state. Meanwhile, workers in specific sectors - notably sectors considered in need of high-skilled labour - were insured against unemployment. Shilliam interprets these two distinct features of the Act as reflective of a broader pronatalist and even eugenicist agenda. By improving the general social hygiene

239 Moses, *The First Modern Risk*, 61.
240 Owen, "From Poor Law to Beveridge Report," 748.
241 At least, initially; he later toyed with the idea of running for office as Liberal, Labour, Independent or as a candidate for one of the university seats according to Jose Harris (1997, 445).
242 Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor: From Abolition to Brexit*, 51.
243 The Chancellor of the Exchequer is the British equivalent of a finance minister.
244 Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor: From Abolition to Brexit*, 53.
245 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*, 99.
246 Nord, "The Welfare State in France, 1870-1914," 821.
247 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*, 99.
248 Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor: From Abolition to Brexit*, 63.
249 Michael Heller, "The National Insurance Acts 1911-1947, the Approved Societies and the Prudential Assurance Company," *Twentieth Century British History* 19, no 1 (2008): 1–28.

of the less skilled worker and preventing the more skilled worker from the "degeneration" that (especially urban) unemployment was seen to risk, the Act promoted the vitality of the English working population, and in Shilliam's view, the "reproduction of deserving stock."[250] Originally, the 1911 National Insurance Act was only payable following a nationality and residence test. However, eventually a cross-party coalition of parliamentarians forced Lloyd George's hand and by 1918, access to all provisions were extended to non-subjects, if only because it was costly to administer the exclusion of foreigners.[251]

During the First World War, existing social services for mothers, children, and the elderly were extended, and workers who were not covered by national insurance schemes could voluntarily sign up.[252] Although the poor laws remained in place, the Unemployment Act of 1934 moved to assume some of its clientele. An Unemployment Assistance Board was established, which was intended to assist the unemployed but able-bodied people who had may have previously been reliant on outdoor poor relief by public assistance authorities.[253] Unemployment assistance did remain quite selective.[254] However, the Board's mandate only expanded with time. In 1940, it received the responsibility of administering supplementary old-age pensions, and in 1943 it took over from the Board of Customs and Excise the administration of the non-contributory old-age pensions established in 1908.[255]

By the outbreak of the Second World War, a plethora of different government departments were responsible for welfare. The Ministry of Pensions and the Ministry of Labour had been established in 1916. The Ministry of Labour handled employment exchanges, the Home Office supervised workmen's compensation, and the Unemployment Assistance Board dealt with the long-term unemployed.[256] Moreover, benefit levels differed widely. Workmen's compensation offered a pay-out proportionate to previous earnings, while the benefit under the contributory old-age pensions scheme was related to perceived subsistence needs.[257] This was the context in which reformers in the Second World War, most notably William Beveridge, reimagined a new future for the post-war British welfare state.

4.4.4. The Beveridge Report

Just like the Dutch and the French, several British civil servants spent the Second World War cultivating a vision for radical reform of the existing welfare system. Orthodox historiography holds that the Second World War catalysed this reformism. Richard Titmuss, in his 1950

250 Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor: From Abolition to Brexit*, 54.
251 Feldman, "Migrants, Immigrants and Welfare from the Old Poor Law to the Welfare State," 96.
252 Owen, "From Poor Law to Beveridge Report," 749.
253 The National Archives, "Records of the Unemployment Assistance Boards, the Supplementary Benefits Commission, and of Related Bodies" (Catalogue description), accessed August 2, 2022, https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C17.
254 UK-LoNA-LCO 2/3775-Beveridge, "Social Insurance and Allied Services," November 1942.
255 The National Archives, "Records of the Unemployment Assistance Boards, the Supplementary Benefits Commission, and of Related Bodies."
256 Jose Harris, *William Beveridge: A Biography* (Oxford University Press, 1997), 365, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198206859.001.0001.
257 Harris, 366.

Problems of Social Policy, argued that the 1940 blitz[258] mounted pressure for a "higher standard of welfare" by revealing the inadequacies of existing health and welfare services.[259] Indeed, the relentless bombing campaign prompted the central government to intervene on behalf of the vulnerable: a large-scale evacuation of women and children into the countryside was organised and school meals and milk were provided. On the other hand, Harris argues that the desire for post-war social change was not uniform.[260] For example, the left had long favoured universal benefits while conservatives preferred targeted schemes.[261] By Harris' account, social reformers during and after the Second World War were merely acting on a momentum that had been building for decades.[262]

Either way, in June 1941, several years before the war's end, Minister without Portfolio Arthur Greenwood, then in charge of post-war reconstruction, commissioned an inquiry into welfare reform. Greenwood called for an interdepartmental 'Social Insurance' committee to "undertake, with special reference to the inter-relation of the schemes, a survey of the existing national schemes of social insurance and allied services, including workmen's compensation and to make recommendations."[263] Eventually, Beveridge was appointed Chairman, flanked by representatives from government agencies as diverse as the Home Office, Ministry of Labour and National Service, Ministry of Pensions, and Registry of Friendly Societies.[264]

Whether he rode a crest of pre-existing demand for social reform or generated it himself, Beveridge managed to overcome cleavages that reformers of the nineteenth century had not. Right from the start, Beveridge was interested in grand questions. He asked himself how one might "plan social insurance now if one had a clear field, that is to say if one could plan an ideal scheme, using all the experience gathered in the past, but without being hampered by regard for vested interests of any kind?"[265] Beveridge saw the reforms as a means of boosting morale by offering the Allies the opportunity to "plan for a better peace even while waging war."[266] To this end, a cheap version was published for "compulsory discussion" among the armed services.[267] Beveridge's idealism put other committee members – all of whom were civil servants – in a complicated position, as each was reluctant to signal a readiness for sweeping post-war change on behalf of the department they represented. Hence, the final report was signed by Beveridge alone.[268]

His final report, which was published in 1942, recommended a new welfare system based on several principles, some of which appear conflicting at first. First, the scheme was to be

258 This was a bombing campaign by Nazi Germany on British urban areas, with particular focus on London It started in September 1940 and lasted for nine months

259 John Welshman, "Evacuation, Hygiene, and Social Policy: The Our Towns Report of 1943," *The Historical Journal* 42, no 3 (September 1999): 782, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3020921.

260 Welshman, 783.

261 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*, 118.

262 see also Owen, "From Poor Law to Beveridge Report."

263 UK-LoNA-LCO 2/3775-"Social Insurance and Allied Services," November 1942.

264 UK-LoNA-CAB/66/31/27- War Cabinet: Social Insurances and Allied Services, Summary of Report by Sir William Beveridge, 25 November 1942.

265 Harris, *William Beveridge: A Biography*, 376.

266 Harris, 414.

267 Harris, 427.

268 Harris, 414.

mostly contributory. Beveridge wanted to preserve the cooperative spirit of the community and the prudence of the family.[269] Additionally, Beveridge felt that social insurance, rather than "free allowances from the State" was "what the people of Britain desire[d]."[270] The task of offering tax-financed, means-tested social assistance would be transferred from local authorities to the exchequer, but would also be reserved "for the limited number of cases of need not covered by social insurance."[271] Second, all citizens would be included, including the self-employed, those "not gainfully employed," and employees whose wages had been too low to qualify them under previous arrangements.[272] Third, benefits and contributions would be uniform (flat rate). According to Baldwin, this move gave the proposals of Beveridge, especially when compared to those of Laroque, a "redistributionally rather bland effect," since both high and low earners would contribute the same amount.[273] However, it also had the effect of making the proposed reform more palatable to the middle classes than Laroque's proposal had been.[274] Fourthly, benefit levels would be linked to subsistence needs, except long-term work accident benefits which would be based on previous earnings, and old-age pensions, which would build up to subsistence levels over twenty years.[275] Finally, administrative responsibility would be unified and centralised. The insured would owe a single weekly contribution whose amount would vary in accordance with the 'class' of contributors to which they were assigned. This, in turn, depended on their potential reasons for financial insecurity (employees, traders, pensioners, etc.)

The Conservative wartime cabinet convened a committee of officials under Sir Thomas Phillips to examine the report. The committee's enthusiasm was tepid.[276] In contrast, the Labour Party received the report more fervently, which may have helped secure their overwhelming victory in 1945 elections.[277] Once in power, Labour under Clement Attlee passed successive acts to give life to the Beveridge report.

4.4.5. National Insurance, National Assistance

The 1942 Beveridge Report served as the blueprint for a complete overhaul of existing social provisions, directly influencing key legislation from 1946 to 1951. A series of statutes falling under the header of the (new) National Insurance Act – the Ministry of National Insurance Act (1945), the Disabled Persons Act (1945), the Family Allowances Act (1945), the National Health Service Act (1946), and the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act (1946) –

269 Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor: From Abolition to Brexit*, 73.
270 This popular will may well have been affected by the stigma associated with poor relief since the 1834 reform, a stigma which reached new heights as families were subjected to intrusive means tests during the Great Depression (Whiteside 2014).
271 The exchequer would also be responsible for covering family allowances, the NHS, and policies for full employment (Harris 1997: 413).
272 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*, 118.
273 Baldwin, 118.
274 Baldwin, 119.
275 Harris, *William Beveridge: A Biography*, 414.
276 Harris, 419.
277 Whiteside, "The Beveridge Report and Its Implementation," 7. This is complicated, however, because Beveridge himself was defeated by a Conservative candidate in Berwick Harris, *William Beveridge: A Biography*, 448.

together with the Children Act (1946) and the National Assistance Act (1948) formed the cornerstones of the post-war welfare state.[278]

Beveridge had recommended that a new ministry administer the reforms he was proposing. To this end, a Ministry of National Insurance was established in 1944, with the mandate of recording the contributions and benefits of the insured, supplying information to local National Insurance offices, and paying out long-term benefits under the scheme.[279] Its headquarters were located in Newcastle as part of a policy to decentralise government departments and to take advantage of readily available labour in that part of the country.[280]

The Family Allowances Act of 1945 provided an allowance of 5 shillings weekly at the birth of the second and subsequent children of a family.[281]

The National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act of 1946 introduced the new National Insurance scheme, which made weekly contributions obligatory for "all persons in Great Britain who [we]re over school leaving age."[282] It eliminated all prior restrictions on the basis of income, type of work or age. As Beveridge had suggested, the contributions of insured persons would be divided into three classes: Class 1 for employed persons, Class 2 for self-employed persons, and Class 3 for non-employed persons.[283] Contributions were tripartite, made by employee, employer, and state, with the state's contribution representing around one-fifth of the total up until 1961.[284] All workers would in turn receive flat-rate benefits on the event of an "interruption of earnings." They could receive injury benefits for a period of no more than six months following an accident or illness that took place on the job. Disability benefits could be paid thereafter, calculated as a function of the *degree of incapacity* a person experienced in general. Widows could receive benefits on the death of an insured person. Finally, upon reaching age 65 or 60, men and women respectively could claim a Basic State Pension (BSP). The BSP was a pay-as-you-go, contributory system that departed from the non-contributory state pensions of Lloyd George in that retirees were only eligible for the full BSP in retirement if they had an appropriate contributory record through paying National Insurance (NI) contributions out of their payroll.[285] An appropriate contributory record was defined as 156 contributions in total, and a yearly average of 50 contributions paid.[286] Again as recommended by Beveridge, coverage for all of these risks would be ensured by a "single contribution," with each insured person carrying "one card to which the stamp of the appropriate value covering

278 Rosalind Chambers, "The National Assistance Act, 1948," *The Modern Law Review* 12, no 1 (January 1949): 69.

279 R Mendelsohn, "Ministry of National Insurance: Central Offices, Newcastle-upon-Tyne," *Social Service Review* 25, no 2 (June 1951): 210–16.

280 Mendelsohn, 210.

281 "The British Family Allowances Act, 1945," *International Labour Review* 52 (1945): 548.

282 UK-LoNA-CO 859/124/2: Leaflet N.I.38 October 1948 Persons Entering or Leaving Great Britain Ministry of National Insurance.

283 UK-LoNA-CAOG 15/168-Leaflet N.I 38, "Persons entering or leaving Great Britain," October 1948: 3.

284 A.F Young, *Industrial Injuries Insurance: An Examination of British Policy*, vol 3 (1964; repr., London: Routledge, 2002), 98.

285 Daniel Béland and Alex Waddan, "Policy Change in Flat Pensions: Comparing Canada and the UK," *Canadian Public Administration* 57, no 3 (2014): 387.

286 UK-LoNA-PIN 57/10-Report from Commonwealth Conference on National Insurance, May 1947.

the combined weekly contribution is to be fixed."[287] Contrary to Beveridge's wishes, however, insurance benefits would be paid out by the post rather than by friendly society visitors who were intended to grant "more humanity" to the receipt of benefits.[288]

Next, the National Assistance Act entered into force in 1948. The Act was to be administered by the National Assistance Board (hereafter 'the Board'), founded that same year. Assuming responsibility over the extension of cash assistance until 1966, its emergence marked the dissolution of both the poor law and the Unemployment Assistance Board founded in 1934. National Assistance was designed to alleviate absolute poverty but to retain an incentive to work.[289] Although Beveridge had proposed – to great popular reception – the abolition of means testing, the Board determined basic eligibility for assistance by a form of means testing that involved interviews after an individual had made an application. Implementation was devolved to local levels, where "home visits" by Board officers formed the principal link between individuals and the Board.[290] Additionally, the Board had substantial discretion over the dispersal and amount of benefits.[291] This was in direct contrast to National Insurance benefits, which were uniform and paid by post. That said, regulations under the Act offered guidelines and minimum standards. On top of regular allowances, officers were meant to add a rent allowance, which was supposed to cover net rent in full provided it was reasonable for the general level of rent in the district.[292] Any applicant or beneficiary "aggrieved" by the Board's decisions could turn to the Appeal Tribunal.[293]

The ultimate result contained some important deviations from Beveridge's vision. For example, Beveridge had envisioned a transitional period during which the benefit levels of old-age pensions would be built up towards subsistence levels, but this commitment was not realised.[294] In addition, the benefit was not based on a minimum standard of living, and married or divorced women, women looking after parents, and housewives were excluded in many ways.

287 UK-LoNA-CAOG 15/168-Leaflet N.I 20, "Employer's guide to National Insurance," April 1948.
288 Harris, *William Beveridge: A Biography*, 453.
289 Gareth Millward, *Sick Note: A History of the British Welfare State*, 1st ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022).
290 UK-LoNA-PIN 95/16-"XIII: Visiting," 3 June 1965.
291 "National Assistance Act 1948," Pub L No c 29 (1948), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo6/11-12/29/enacted.
292 Chambers, "The National Assistance Act, 1948," 70.
293 National Assistance Act 1948.
294 Harris, *William Beveridge: A Biography*, 451.

5. Migration and boundary-making in colonial empires

5.1. Introduction

Over a 35-year period that began during the Second World War, between 5.4 and 6.8 million people from European empires moved to the metropole, marking the continent's transition from a place of net emigration to net immigration.[1] Contemporaries called some of these newcomers repatriates, others refugees, and still others labour migrants. Smith describes the group as "remarkably heterogeneous" given the "complexity of individual colonial histories and... distinct decolonisation experiences."[2] This chapter is dedicated to unpacking this complexity. It introduces the imperial history of each country case and outlines the legal contours of colonial citizenship and subjecthood as it pertained to residents of the territories of origin that I have selected for this study (Algeria, present-day Indonesia and the British Caribbean islands). It analyses the formal and substantive rights of (post)colonial migrants in the domains of citizenship and immigration legislation leading up to and during the post-war period. It also tells a story of racialisation, and constitutive processes of constructing cultural proximity and deservingness. While Chapter 4 focused on developments on the European continent or British isles, this chapter is mostly concerned with developments overseas.

5.2. Totoks, Indische Nederlanders, Moluccans

5.2.1. Overview

When the dust from the Second World War settled, the Dutch empire was the third biggest after the UK and France, occupying territory fifty times the size of the Dutch metropole.[3] The principles of constitutional law in force in the Netherlands were not applied to its colonial territories.[4] This made it possible for some 99 per cent of the total population in the Netherlands Indies to be disenfranchised subjects - and not citizens - of The Netherlands. This distinction was accomplished by way of a racialised nationality code. In the Netherlands Indies, residents were grouped into one of three distinct legal categories: 'Foreign Oriental,' 'native' and 'European.' Only the latter had citizenship. Although some contest the assertion that these were racial categories,[5] they emerged within a racial ideology whose classificatory schema

1 Smith, "Introduction," 9.
2 Smith, 11.
3 Colley, "'This Small Island': Britain, Size and Empire," 172–73.
4 Cornelis Fasseur, *The Politics of Colonial Exploitation: Java, The Dutch, and the Cultivation System*, *The Politics of Colonial Exploitation* (Cornell University Press, 2018), https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501719127.
5 Bart Luttikhuis, "Beyond Race: Constructions of 'Europeanness' in Late-Colonial Legal Practice in the Dutch East Indies," *European Review of History - Revue Européenne d'histoire* 20, no 4 (2013): 539–58; Ulbe Bosma, *Terug Uit De Koloniën: 60 Jaar Postkoloniale Migranten En Hun Organisaties* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2009).

emphasised Europeanness and civilisation.[6] Between 1945 and 1968, almost all Dutch citizens from the former East Indies migrated to The Netherlands.[7] Many would become known as repatriates (*gerepatrieerden*). Several special admissions schemes, however, accommodated a select number of Indonesian citizens, who otherwise required an entry visa, and many Dutch citizens were discouraged from exercising their entry rights.

5.2.2. Dutch empire

Dutch colonialism dates to the era of the Dutch Republic. In 1602 United East Indian Company (VOC, *Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie*) was founded; in 1621 the West Indian Company (WIC, *West-Indische Compagnie*) followed. From the early seventeenth century, overseas possessions fell under the authority of the States-General,[8] an assembly of representatives from all seven united provinces. Initially these possessions took on three forms: colonial settlement, like in North America (~1624-1664); capturing and occupying trading posts, like in Brazil (1630-1654); and expanding conquest by the VOC (1600-1796) followed by the gradual introduction of governmental institutions under the authority of the States-General, like in the former Netherlands Indies (1796-1949).[9] In 1795, the Dutch state, which had just come under French rule, dissolved the VOC and WIC, and took over their responsibilities.[10] The state thus 'inherited' several territories, many of which it would subsequently lose to England. In the Netherlands Indies, it opted to depart from the old VOC model of direct rule over a small number of Europeans and indirect rule over all other residents, instead pursuing a more centralised administrative system based on direct rule and control over the entire population.[11] The result was an administrative structure for Europeans whose highest civil servant was the Governor-General, assisted by a council (*Raad van Indië*).[12] Alongside this structure was an 'Indigenous Administration' run by regents and local officials known as *wedono's*. The judicial system was also divided, such that there was a high court and justice councils available for Europeans and residence courts for non-Europeans. The highest civil servant in the Netherlands Indies was the governor-general,

From 1813 until Indonesian independence in 1949, Dutch colonial territories could be divided into the West and East Indies. The Dutch West Indies included Suriname on the South American continent, as well as the Caribbean islands of the Dutch Antilles: Aruba, Curacao, Bonaire, Saba, Sint-Eustacius and Sint-Maarten.[13] The Netherlands Indies, also called the Dutch East Indies, spanned present-day Indonesia, which also includes the Moluccan islands and

6 Bart Verheijen, "Staatsburgerschap en Nederlanderschap in Nederlands-Indië in de negentiende eeuw," *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 134, no 3 (December 1, 2021): 453, https://doi.org/10.5117/TVG2021.3.006.VERH.

7 Willems, "No Sheltering Sky: Migrant Identities of Dutch Nationals from Indonesia," 34.

8 Simon Groenveld and Pieter Wagenaar, "De Republiek Der Verenigde Nederlanden: Het 'makelaarskarakter' van Het Nederlandse Openbaar Bestuur (1555-1795)," in *Duizend Jaar Openbaar Bestuur in Nederland*, ed Pieter Wagenaar, Toon Kerkhoff, and Mark Rutgers (Bussum: Uitgeverij Coutinho, 2011), 124.

9 Groenveld and Wagenaar, 125.

10 Boels, "Van Statenbond Naar Eenheidsstaat: De Groei van Een Natie (1795-1880)," 187.

11 Boels, 187.

12 Boels, 187.

13 Jones, "Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten En Nederlanders: Nederlandse Politici over Burgers Uit Oost En West En Nederland, 1945-2005," 608.

Western New Guinea. Colonial territories were central to Dutch economic development. For example, in 1830, the governor-general of the Netherlands Indies introduced the "Cultivation System" (*Cultuurstelsel*) on the island of Java, a law under which the indigenous population was forced to cultivate products like coffee, indigo, sugar, and tea for the metropolitan market.[14] Farmers were paid a price well below market value. A state-owned enterprise would transport these goods back to the metropole. The system generated enormous profits for the Dutch treasury, while aristocrats in The Hague and Amsterdam acquired the most lucrative contracts.[15]

In 1945, metropolitan Netherlands contained fewer than nine million inhabitants, while the Netherlands Indies counted 70 million.[16] Suriname, despite its size (almost 150,000 square kilometres) had a far smaller population of around 140,000 individuals, while the six Caribbean islands taken together had 108,000.[17] In the twentieth century, colonial administration fell under the remit of the Department of Colonies and its successors: the Ministry of Overseas Kingdom (1949) and the Ministry of Overseas Affairs (1957). In 1959, the administration of Western New Guinea was placed in the hands of the Ministry of the Interior.[18]

5.2.3. A nation without citizens

Racialisation shaped citizenship law. This is manifest in the ongoing coexistence of slavery and subjecthood with the institution of citizenship. Some have argued that the Dutch lack an 'internal' tradition of slavery.[19] If 'internal' is understood as taking place on metropolitan soil, this is only partly true. Slavery was uncommon, but not unheard of in the Dutch metropole: Blakely documents 130 African slaves in the province of Zeeland in 1596, and "hundreds of black servants and slaves" serving as domestic workers, coachmen and in military roles in the mid-eighteenth century.[20] That said, slavery was more visible in other parts of Dutch empire. Enslaved Africans, whose labour on plantations powered the Surinamese contribution to the Dutch economy, formed a "mainstay of Suriname's population"[21] beginning in the 1650s. In 1821, the Dutch government in the West Indies clarified that slaves were not citizens because "they are the property of their master."[22] When slavery was abolished in 1863, the two systems of law that divided the free and enslaved merged into one, and all inhabitants of the Dutch

14 Hoogenboom, *Standenstrijd En Zekerheid: Een Geschiedenis van Oude Orde En Sociale Zorg*, 61.
15 Hoogenboom, 61.
16 Gert Oostindie, "Postcolonial Migrants in the Netherlands: Identity Politics versus the Fragmentation of Community," in *Postcolonial Migrants and Identity Politics: Europe, Russia, Japan and the United States in Comparison*, ed Ulbe Bosma, Jan Lucassen, and Gert Oostindie, vol 18, International Studies in Social History (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2012), 96.
17 Oostindie, 96 A.E Bayer, *Surinaamse Arbeiders in Nederland* (Assen: Van Gorcum & Comp N.V., 1965).
18 Vincent Kuitenbrouwer, "Beyond the 'Trauma of Decolonisation': Dutch Cultural Diplomacy during the West New Guinea Question (1950-62)," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 44, no 2 (2016): 306–27.
19 Lucassen, *The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe since 1850*; Mies van Niekerk, "Afro-Caribbeans and Indo-Caribbeans in the Netherlands: Premigration Legacies and Social Mobility," *International Migration Review* 38, no 1 (2004): 158–83.
20 Allison Blakely, *Blacks in the Dutch World: The Evolution of Racial Imagery in a Modern Society* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), 225.
21 Karwan Fatah-Black, *White Lies and Black Markets: Evading Metropolitan Authority in Colonial Suriname, 1650-1800* (BRILL, 2015), 27, https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004283350.
22 Jones, "Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten En Nederlanders: Nederlandse Politici over Burgers Uit Oost En West En Nederland, 1945-2005," 61.

West Indies were formally granted full Dutch citizenship. Substantive rights followed later, as the enslaved were forced to remain in service with their old "master" for a further ten years.[23] The institution of slavery stretched to the Netherlands Indies as well, where rough estimates point to a VOC slave trade of approximately the same scale as the Dutch-Atlantic slave trade, even if the enslaved proportion of the total colonial populations was lower than in the West.[24]

Moreover, in the East, even if they were not enslaved, most inhabitants lacked citizenship rights. The 1892 *Nationaliteitswet* divided the population into citizens (with political rights) and subjects (without them). The vast majority of residents were assigned subject status. This status was then subdivided into a status for *inlanders* ('indigenous' Indonesians – an overwhelming majority) and so-called 'Foreign Orientals' (*Vreemde Oosterlingen;* mostly of Chinese origin).[25] Meanwhile, citizenship was granted white Europeans, who were also known as *totoks*, after a Malay word for 'foreign-born,'[26] as well as a select number of non-Europeans. To become Dutch citizens, those assigned subject status needed to have a European father (a white mother did not count), and they or their ancestors needed to have been officially recognised by their father before 1892.[27] This constituency was known as *Indische Nederlanders*. A 1910 law kept this citizen-subject distinction but gave it a new name: inlanders became 'indigenous Dutch subjects non-Dutch citizens' (*Inheemse Nederlandse onderdanen niet-Nederlanders*) and Foreign Orientals became 'non-indigenous Dutch subjects non-Dutch citizens' (*Uitheemse Nederlandse onderdanen niet-Nederlanders)*.[28] Dutch citizens remained Dutch citizens (about 60-70 per cent of which were Indische Nederlanders and 30-40 per cent totoks).

Some scholars have argued that these classifications were not racial, because they were about Europeanness, religion, class, or education.[29] They cite the fact that, for instance, 'Europeanness' was a status also granted to Africans recruited from the Gold Coast for military service from the 1820s on.[30] However, race has been historically related, but not logically reducible, to skin colour. It is a mode of classification that divides human subjects based on dimensions whose relationship to phenotypes is tenuous. In this case, citizenship categories in the Netherlands Indies were racial because they used cultural markers like 'Europeanness' and 'civilisation(al attainment)' to create discrete categories of human subjects,[31] clearly arranged

23 Bayer, *Surinaamse Arbeiders in Nederland*, 18.
24 Reggie Baay, *Daar Werd Wat Gruwelijks Verricht; Slavernij in Indië* (Amsterdam: Athenaeum, 2015).
25 Oostindie, "Postcolonial Migrants in the Netherlands: Identity Politics versus the Fragmentation of Community," 96.
26 Residents of the Netherlands Indies who were born in China were also called *totok* Chinese, as opposed to *peranakan* Chinese who were born in the colony.
27 Schuster, *Poortwachters over Immigranten: Het Debat over Immigratie in Het Naoorlogse Groot-Britannië En Nederland*, 83.
28 Jones, "Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten En Nederlanders: Nederlandse Politici over Burgers Uit Oost En West En Nederland, 1945-2005," 82 Laarman, *Oude Onbekenden: Het Politieke En Publieke Debat over Postkoloniale Migranten, 1945-2005*, 36.
29 Luttikhuis, "Beyond Race: Constructions of 'Europeanness' in Late-Colonial Legal Practice in the Dutch East Indies." Verheijen, "Staatsburgerschap en Nederlanderschap in Nederlands-Indië in de negentiende eeuw." Bosma, *Terug Uit De Koloniën: 60 Jaar Postkoloniale Migranten En Hun Organisaties*.
30 Blakely, *Blacks in the Dutch World: The Evolution of Racial Imagery in a Modern Society*, 240.
31 Verheijen, "Staatsburgerschap en Nederlanderschap in Nederlands-Indië in de negentiende eeuw," 453.

into a hierarchy where rights and freedoms accrued to one end and lacked in another. In practice, such schema are always unruly and messy.[32]

5.2.4. Decolonisation

The Second World War marked the beginning of several years of fighting over the future of the Netherlands Indies. By the 1930s, powerful pro-independence movements had emerged. During the Second World War, their mobilisation capacity grew.[33] In 1942, anticipating that their authority in the colonies might suffer, the Dutch government-in-exile called for a 'kingdom congress' (*Rijksconferentie*). The idea was to renegotiate the relationship between different parts of the kingdom.[34] Queen Wilhelmina had envisioned "a new kingdom, in which… each entity would be independent, but certain problems would be decided jointly by an authority in which both parties would be represented."[35] Indonesian nationalists had other plans and declared independence two days after Japanese capitulation on 17 August 1945. The Dutch government, however, was not ready to grant it. Joseph Luns, the Catholic foreign minister, cited a fear of descending to the "rank of Denmark" in international politics if the Netherlands Indies were lost.[36] The Dutch private sector also had substantial economic interests that mainstream political parties were keen to defend.[37] Subsequently the government deployed nearly 220,000 troops in major military operations known euphemistically as 'police actions' designed to thwart Indonesian independence[38] and, ostensibly, to protect Dutch lives in the colony.[39] From the perspective of the Dutch government, these campaigns succeeded militarily in (re)capturing territories and independence leaders.[40] However, they came at a high political cost. A recent analysis of witness accounts suggests that Dutch forces committed at least 800 and possibly more like 'tens of thousands' of war crimes during this time.[41] The Netherlands became one of the first countries to be condemned by the new UN Security Council.[42] In March 2020, the king of the Netherlands offered his apologies to the Indonesian government for the "excessive violence on the part of the Dutch" in those years.[43] Indonesia achieved its independence in 1949. The Netherlands and Indonesia cooperated in a new federal

32 Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain*.
33 Oostindie, "Postcolonial Migrants in the Netherlands: Identity Politics versus the Fragmentation of Community," 98.
34 Ryçond Santos do Nascimento, "Het Koninkrijk Ontsluierd" (Groningen, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 2016), 248.
35 van Nieuwenhuizen, *Willem Drees: Vernieuwer Voor, in En Na de Oorlog*, 96.
36 Kuitenbrouwer, "Beyond the 'Trauma of Decolonisation': Dutch Cultural Diplomacy during the West New Guinea Question (1950-62)," 309.
37 van Nieuwenhuizen, *Willem Drees: Vernieuwer Voor, in En Na de Oorlog*, 102.
38 Arend Lijphart, *The Trauma of Decolonization: The Dutch and West New Guinea* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966) Gert Oostindie, Ireen Hoogenboom, and Jonathan Verwey, "The Decolonization War in Indonesia, 1945–1949: War Crimes in Dutch Veterans' Egodocuments," *War in History* 25, no 2 (April 2018): 254–76, https://doi.org/10.1177/0968344517696525.
39 van Nieuwenhuizen, *Willem Drees: Vernieuwer Voor, in En Na de Oorlog*, 100.
40 Andeweg and Irwin, *Governance and Politics of the Netherlands*, 9.
41 Gert Oostindie, *Soldaat in Indonesië, 1945-1950* (Amsterdam: Prometheus Books, 2017), 176.
42 Andeweg and Irwin, *Governance and Politics of the Netherlands*, 9.
43 Royal House of the Netherlands, "Statement by King Willem-Alexander at the Beginning of the State Visit to Indonesia" (Jakarta, March 10, 2020), https://www.royal-house.nl/documents/speeches/2020/03/10/statement-by-king-willem-alexander-at-the-beginning-of-the-state-visit-to-indonesia.

structure known as the Netherlands-Indonesia Union until Indonesia left it in 1956. Relations between Indonesia and its former coloniser soured rapidly. Diplomatic ties were severed in 1960. Western New Guinea remained Dutch up until 1962.[44] The Netherlands had historically justified their control over Western New Guinea in racial terms, arguing that the Papuans who lived there differed from other populations in the Indonesian archipelago on account of their "negroid" race and benefited from Dutch tutelage.[45] Kuitenbrouwer argues that this logic became problematic after UNESCO published a report condemning race as a social myth.[46]

Immediately after Indonesian independence, Antillean and Surinamese colonies acquired new importance in Dutch domestic politics.[47] With an eye to avoiding another colony unilaterally terminating the colonial relationship, a Round Table Conference (RTC) was prepared.[48] This conference served as the basis for the 1954 Charter of the Dutch Kingdom (*Het Statuut*), which entered into force on 29 December 1954. The Charter established the new legal structure of the Kingdom of the Netherlands as a voluntary relationship between the 'equal' and 'autonomous' countries of the Netherlands, Suriname, and the Antilles.[49] Dutch citizens enjoyed freedom of movement within the empire, but because of an asymmetry in overall economic and political power across the countries, Oostindie considers these promises of equality "utterly fictitious."[50] Governance would be assured by a ministerial council of the kingdom (which included ministers from Suriname and the Antilles), but there was no representative assembly, creating "the democratic deficit of a kingdom government without a corresponding kingdom parliament."[51]

Not long after the RTC, Dutch attachment to its colonies waned. In 1959, Prime Minister Drees had asked whether the Netherlands could unilaterally restrict entry of citizens from its colonies, as migration from the Caribbean picked up. The Ministry of Justice answered in the negative, concluding that such a restriction would require approval of the ministerial council of the kingdom and be "virtually impossible."[52] Between 1961 and 1970, an average of 4,000 new entrants from this region had arrived per year.[53] In 1970, there were 40,000 Surinamese and Antillean Dutch citizens living in the Netherlands.[54] By the early 1970s, Labour MP van Lier spoke of a "rising tide" of immigration, and the headline of an interview

44 Kuitenbrouwer, "Beyond the 'Trauma of Decolonisation': Dutch Cultural Diplomacy during the West New Guinea Question (1950-62)," 309.
45 Kuitenbrouwer, 312.
46 Kuitenbrouwer, "Beyond the 'Trauma of Decolonisation': Dutch Cultural Diplomacy during the West New Guinea Question (1950-62)."
47 Jones, "Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten En Nederlanders: Nederlandse Politici over Burgers Uit Oost En West En Nederland, 1945-2005," 182.
48 Jones, 182.
49 Jones, 187.
50 "Black Power, Popular Revolt, and Decolonization in the Dutch Caribbean," in *Black Power in the Caribbean*, ed Kate Quinn (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2014), 240.
51 Oostindie, "Black Power, Popular Revolt, and Decolonization in the Dutch Caribbean."
52 Schuster, *Poortwachters over Immigranten: Het Debat over Immigratie in Het Naoorlogse Groot-Britannië En Nederland*, 131.
53 Jones, "Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten En Nederlanders: Nederlandse Politici over Burgers Uit Oost En West En Nederland, 1945-2005," 209.
54 Oostindie, "Postcolonial Migrants in the Netherlands: Identity Politics versus the Fragmentation of Community," 100.

with the Christian Democratic Prime Minister van Agt read: "the Surinamese current must be dammed."[55] Schuster notes the impact of these metaphors in Dutch national discourse after the North Sea flood of 1953 (*Watersnoodramp*), an unprecedented natural disaster for the twentieth century during which dykes were breached in over 150 locations and 1,836 people lost their lives.[56] Suriname became independent in 1975.

5.2.5. Citizenship after Indonesian independence

In this section, I chart how the legal status of former Dutch citizens and subjects of the East Indies changed with Indonesian independence. A 1949 agreement (*Toescheidingsovereenkomst*) between the Netherlands and the new Indonesian Republic crystallised citizenship rights. The agreement borrowed the racial distinctions from the colonial nationality code to divvy up citizenship rights. Those with Dutch citizenship according to 1892 and 1910 law (less than one per cent of the population) would receive Dutch citizenship, while former Dutch subjects would become Indonesian citizens. Dutch citizens could opt for Indonesian nationality within two years if they were born in Indonesia or had lived there for at least six months.[57] The jurist Kollewijn, who chaired the Dutch delegation of negotiators with Indonesia in 1947, explained that this clause was mainly aimed at dissuading Indische Nederlanders from keeping Dutch citizenship.[58] His team had pushed for a longer time period, but the Indonesians had wanted only six months, and two years was seen as an acceptable compromise. Dutch multinationals like Shell and Unilever also encouraged the adoption of Indonesian nationality so as to retain their employees.[59] Notably, the largest interest group representing Indische Nederlanders, the IEV (*Indo-Europeesch Verbond*), also supported staying in Indonesia, having crossed over from the Dutch to Indonesian side during the immediate post-war years.[60] However, IEV membership dramatically decreased due to this move.[61]

The Dutch government used creative tactics to cordon off access to political membership in the wake of Indonesian independence. As the two-year period drew to a close, and less than 20 per cent of Indische Nederlanders with the right to opt for Indonesian nationality had done so,[62] High Commissioner Lamping delivered an impassioned radio speech pleading for the adoption of Indonesian nationality. In Lamping's speech he argued for his listeners "not to keep [their] sights set too firmly on the Netherlands or on Dutch citizenship."[63] The speech is noteworthy for its deployment of multiple rhetorical devices, including appeals to reason ("I would like to encourage everyone who stands before this difficult choice not to be

55 Schuster, *Poortwachters over Immigranten: Het Debat over Immigratie in Het Naoorlogse Groot-Britannië En Nederland*, 134.
56 Schuster, 134.
57 Schuster, 93.
58 Schuster, 83.
59 Rosen Jacobson, *'The Eurasian Question': The colonial position and postcolonial options of colonial mixed ancestry groups from British India, Dutch East Indies and French Indochina compared.* (Hilversum: Verloren, 2018), 151.
60 Rosen Jacobson, *'The Eurasian Question',* 137.
61 Rosen Jacobson, *'The Eurasian Question'*, 138.
62 Jones, "Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten En Nederlanders: Nederlandse Politici over Burgers Uit Oost En West En Nederland, 1945-2005," 147.
63 NL-HaNA-2.20.27-24- Speech Lamping, December 1951.

seduced by sentiments and impulsivity"), reference to employment prospects (warning against the "diminishing opportunities for work and existential difficulties"), and imbuing the choice with the moral and family values animating Dutch life at the time ("this is a decision of vital importance for your offspring"). He concludes that "only those who know the Netherlands well enough to know that they will feel at home there, and will be in a position to eke out a reasonable existence there, despite the *fierce and increasing* competition on the labour market of an *overpopulated* country with *specialised labour power* in every field, should hold on to their Dutch nationality."[64] When the two-year time period elapsed on 27 December 1951, there were approximately 13,600 requests to swap Dutch for Indonesian nationality (about half of which took place in December); since these were per family, about 31,000 former Dutch citizens became Indonesian.[65] From that moment on, Dutch opted for a new tactic of scrutinising the rights of existing citizens. The case of the intellectual Guus Cleintuar is illustrative. Having come to the Netherlands in 1946 with a Dutch passport, Cleintuar reported to his local municipality in 1952 only to find out that his passport was being taken back because his great-grandfather had not recognized his grandfather by Dutch law before 1892.[66]

5.2.6. Repatriates and regrettants

The word 'repatriate' (*repatriant* or *gerepatrieerde*) first appeared in official Dutch statistics in 1931, but gained traction during the Second World War, which provoked mass dislocation. In May 1943, a committee was established in London with the goal of "preparing for the repatriation of Dutch citizens abroad." There were an estimated 11 million Displaced Persons (DPs), including former prisoners of war, fugitives, concentration camp survivors, and forced labourers, throughout Europe, of which 3 per cent had Dutch nationality.[67] The committee eventually suggested installing a formal "Repatriation Commissioner."[68] As of 13 September 1944, the Repatriation Commissioner was responsible for getting Dutch citizens to the Netherlands, upon which their integration would become a task for the Director-General of the Dutch Employment Office (*Rijksarbeidsbureau*), supported by the municipalities. From 1 January 1946, a "Repatriation Department" (*Afdeling Repatriëring)* was established in the Ministry of Social Affairs to take over any remaining duties.[69] Initially, repatriation from the Netherlands Indies was explicitly excluded from its mandate.[70]

This repatriation, however, was to quickly reach the same magnitude as the repatriation of DPs. Roughly half of the 250,000 Dutch citizens in the Netherlands Indies had been

64 Emphasis added; NL-HaNA-2.20.27-24- Speech Lamping, December 1951.

65 Ringeling, *Beleidsvrijheid van ambtenaren: het spijtoptantenprobleem als illustratie van de activiteiten van ambtenaren bij de uitvoering van beleid.* (Alphen aan den Rijn: Samson Uitgeverij, 1978), 80.

66 Jones, "Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten En Nederlanders: Nederlandse Politici over Burgers Uit Oost En West En Nederland, 1945-2005," 149.

67 This statistic comes from 1944; Marlou Schrover and Tycho Walaardt, "Displaced Persons, Returnees and 'Unsuitables': The Dutch Selection of DPs (1945–1951)," *Continuity and Change* 33, no 3 (December 2018): 413–40, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0268416018000255.

68 J.Th Janssen, G Leenders, and G.V.W.L van Rooij, inventory of the archives of *Ministerie van Sociale Zaken: Regeringscommissaris Voor Repatriëring; Afdeling Repatriëring En Opsporing; Missie Tot Opsporing van Vermiste Personen Uit de Bezettingstijd, 1943-1952*. 2.15.43. 2022, 10.

69 Janssen, Leenders, and van Rooij, 12.

70 Janssen, Leenders, and van Rooij, 13.

interned in Japanese camps during the Second World War.[71] Between 1945 and 1949, British allied forces helped to evacuate around 100,000 of these former internees, who had a right to recuperation.[72] This initial wave consisted mainly of totoks,[73] not least because the evacuation policy of the Netherlands stipulated that only those war victims "for whom the Netherlands was the mother country" should be allowed to enter, whereas Indische Nederlanders were thought to need to recuperate in "an Asian country."[74] With time, the proportion of Indische Nederlanders grew as retaliatory violence against those associated with Dutch colonial rule picked up.[75] In December 1957, on "Black Sinterklaas," all Dutch were declared an enemy to the state and were summoned to leave.[76] Indonesia implemented a landing ban on KLM flights, forbade Dutch publications, confiscated Dutch assets and dissolved Dutch companies.[77]

Overall, between 1949 and 1962, approximately 90 per cent of everyone who had Dutch citizenship left Indonesia.[78] They were accompanied by non-Dutch citizens with links to Dutch colonial rule, notably highly educated Indonesians and Christians and seven thousand Chinese.[79] At this time, labour shortages were acute. In April 1955, the Directorate-General of Employment Services of the Ministry of Social Affairs (*Directoraat-Generaal Arbeidsvoorziening,* ARBVO) made a plea for temporary guest workers.[80] This followed efforts by individual employers, like directors of Dutch mines, to recruit foreigners from displaced person (DP) camps, which began in 1947.[81] The war had cost the lives of about three per cent of the Dutch population in the metropole, and between 1946 and 1969, 460,000 Dutch metropolitan citizens had emigrated.[82] In quantitative terms, Canada and Australia were the most important destinations.[83] Housing shortages, the slow pace of reconstruction efforts, and fears of unemployment or another world war were the main reasons for emigration.[84] Additionally, there was a severe shortage of coal, which according to newspapers only an increase in the number of coal miners could solve.[85] Dutch coal mines were located in South

71 Ulbe Bosma, ed., *Post-Colonial Immigrants and Identity Formations in the Netherlands* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), 9.
72 Willems, *De Uittocht Uit Indië, 1945-1995*, 19.
73 Oostindie, "Postcolonial Migrants in the Netherlands: Identity Politics versus the Fragmentation of Community," 106.
74 Jones, "Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten En Nederlanders: Nederlandse Politici over Burgers Uit Oost En West En Nederland, 1945-2005," 147.
75 Jones, 65.
76 Laarman, *Oude Onbekenden: Het Politieke En Publieke Debat over Postkoloniale Migranten, 1945-2005*, 65.
77 Ellemers and Vaillant, *Indische Nederlanders En Gerepatrieerden*.
78 Bosma, *Terug Uit De Koloniën: 60 Jaar Postkoloniale Migranten En Hun Organisaties*.; see also Schuster, *Poortwachters over Immigranten: Het Debat over Immigratie in Het Naoorlogse Groot-Britannië En Nederland*, 83.
79 Bosma, *Post-Colonial Immigrants and Identity Formations in the Netherlands*, 9. Oostindie, "Postcolonial Migrants in the Netherlands: Identity Politics versus the Fragmentation of Community," 102.
80 Schuster, *Poortwachters over Immigranten: Het Debat over Immigratie in Het Naoorlogse Groot-Britannië En Nederland*.
81 Schrover and Walaardt, "Displaced Persons, Returnees and 'Unsuitables,'" 413.
82 J.H Elich and P.W Blauw, *En Toch Terug* (Rotterdam: Erasmus University, 1981).
83 van Faassen, *Polder en Emigratie* (Groningen: Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 2014), 25.
84 van Faassen, *Polder en Emigratie*, 5.
85 Schrover and Walaardt, "Displaced Persons, Returnees and 'Unsuitables,'" 413.

Limburg, a thin strip of land in the south of the country bordering Germany and Belgium.[86] In 1964 and 1969, the Netherlands signed labour recruitment agreements with Turkey and Morocco, respectively; but it took until 1972 for the number of work permits for these migrants to exceed 100,000.[87] At 300,000, the number of migrants from the Netherlands Indies made up the lion's share of immigration flows prior to this date.[88]

The entry rights of those without Dutch citizenship were not guaranteed. This became increasingly problematic as conditions for those with ties to the former colonisers deteriorated. Declining work and career prospects, in particular, became primary motives to seek refuge in the Netherlands.[89] This concerned "regrettants" (*spijtoptanten*, regretting optants) – those who had eventually opted to give up their Dutch nationality at independence, about 32,000 people – as well as those who never had Dutch nationality but considered themselves, and were seen by the Indonesians, as such.[90] The latter were known as the social Dutch (*maatschappelijke Nederlanders*) or, if they had received formal recognition of their de facto Dutchness, the equalised (*gelijkgestelden*). Definitions of these groups were fuzzy, as even the Minister of Justice Beerman, a Christian Democrat, admitted. "We talk about regrettants and social Dutch, but if we were obliged to define these concepts, it would be difficult."[91] Regrettants was sometimes used to refer to all, and for simplicity I adopt this practice here as well.

Some regrettants managed to reverse their decision to opt for Indonesian nationality and become naturalised Dutch citizens. However, as Ringeling writes, "this naturalisation did not reach great proportions," as it was not customary to naturalise people who did not live in the Netherlands.[92] This practice ended in 1956, after which naturalisation often only took place years (sometimes decades) after their arrival in the Netherlands.[93] Sometimes, regrettants could acquire citizenship on their own, for example through (sham) divorces or adoptions. At that time, marrying a foreigner as a woman meant losing Dutch citizenship. The exact numbers who acquired citizenship in this way is unclear, although Laarman records around 9,000 married Dutch women wanted their Dutch nationality back.[94] What is clear is that in principle, without citizenship, regrettants would need to apply for a visa like any other foreigner.[95] Presumably in order to stem the flow of refugees from Indonesia, the foreign minister had pushed through a visa requirement for Indonesian citizens on short notice on 1 December 1952, citing "political reasons" and the desire to ensure the "safety of the Netherlands" by keeping out "unwanted

86 After the Second World War, the importance of these mines only grew, and thanks to mechanisation, production increased rapidly at first. However, outcompeted by US coal mines, the last coal was mined from Limburg in 1974. Jack Voncken, "Ontstaansgeschiedenis van de Steenkoolwinning in Nederland," *Human Resources for Health - HUM RESOUR HEALTH*, January 1, 2008, 37.

87 Obdeijn and Schrover, *Komen En Gaan. Immigratie En Emigratie in Nederland Vanaf 1550*, 286.

88 Willems, *De Uittocht Uit Indië, 1945-1995*, 34.

89 Rosen Jacobson, *'The Eurasian Question'*, 172.

90 Laarman, *Oude Onbekenden: Het Politieke En Publieke Debat over Postkoloniale Migranten, 1945-2005*, 65. 32,000 is the total number of individuals with Dutch citizenship who became Indonesian, reached because 13,000 (male) heads of household opted for Indonesian citizenship.

91 cited in Laarman, 58.

92 Ringeling, *Beleidsvrijheid van ambtenaren*, 84.

93 Laarman, *Oude Onbekenden*, 69.

94 Laarman, 68.

95 Laarman, 69.

Indonesians" prior to their arrival.[96] Substantively, obtaining a visa proved had proven difficult, as the high commissioner in Indonesia complained that one of the requirements - namely that Indonesian citizens possess a return ticket - was impossible to obtain because shipping companies in Indonesia did not give return tickets.[97]

Although the government attested that it had no *juridical* duty toward these Indonesian citizens, the argument that they had a *moral* duty had eventually gained traction.[98] In 1956, the government implemented a special admissions policy for regrettants (regrettant policy, or *spijtoptantenbeleid*), to be administered by the Ministry of Justice.[99] However, very few managed to get a visa through it: no more than 600 in 1956 and 1,200 in 1957, out of 14,000 applicants.[100] Partly this is because the guidelines included an "extremely restrictive" quota[101] and admission was granted on a case-by-case basis, with eligibility criteria leaving much to the discretion of desk-level bureaucrats at the Ministry of Justice.[102] Indeed, there were "internal" admission guidelines for Indonesians that one official from the Ministry of Justice stressed were of "strictly internal character" and "should not be made public, especially in Indonesia,"[103] presumably out of fear that it would make stemming the inflow and discerning the authentic requests from the inauthentic requests more difficult. Under mounting critique from parliamentarians and pressure groups (see 6.4.4), guidelines were revised in 1959 and in 1960.[104] The increasing numbers of regrettants admitted – 3,531 in 1961 compared to 1,200 in 1957 – testify somewhat to the mild relaxation of admissions criteria in the guidelines but mainly, as Ringeling argues, to a more liberal interpretation of said guidelines.[105] In late 1963, the decision was made to end the policy. Indonesians were informed that the deadline for requesting a visa under this special admissions scheme was possible until April 1, 1964, after which "normal" criteria under immigration policy would apply.[106] The last decisions pertaining to requests submitted under the special admissions scheme were issued in 1968.[107] Overall, the scheme accommodated about 6,800 requests which, because they were submitted per household, admitted approximately 25,000 regrettants to the Netherlands.[108]

5.2.7. Stateless soldiers

There was another group of arrivals from the Netherlands Indies who did not have Dutch citizenship. The Moluccans (formerly known as *Ambonese*) were the former residents of

96 NL-HaNA-2.09.52-134-Letter from Minister of Foreign Affairs to Minister of Justice, October 23 1951.
97 NL-HaNA-2.09.52-136-Letter from Drs H Warner to Head of Visa diets, 5 February 1955.
98 Laarman, *Oude Onbekenden: Het Politieke En Publieke Debat over Postkoloniale Migranten, 1945-2005*, 70.
99 Ellemers and Vaillant, *Indische Nederlanders En Gerepatrieerden*, 43.
100 Willems, *De Uittocht Uit Indië, 1945-1995*, 161.
101 Ringeling, *Beleidsvrijheid van ambtenaren*, 86.
102 Laarman, *Oude Onbekenden: Het Politieke En Publieke Debat over Postkoloniale Migranten, 1945-2005*, 72.
103 NL-HaNA-2.09.52-134-Letter from W.G Tenkink to the Minister of Justice.
104 NL-HaNA-2.20.27-24-"Onze Indische Nederlanders," 1960 Willems, *De Uittocht Uit Indië, 1945-1995*, 162.
105 Ringeling, *Beleidsvrijheid van ambtenaren*, 116.
106 Ringeling, 86.
107 Ringeling, 86.
108 Ringeling, 30.

South Moluccan islands of Ambon, Seram, Haruku, Saparua and Nusu Laut.[109] These islands were among the first colonised by the Dutch, among the most influenced by early Protestant missions, and targeted for recruitment with the royal Dutch army in the Netherlands Indies (*Koninklijk Nederlands Indische Leger*, KNIL).[110] As late as 1949, Dutch MPs had considered Moluccans "much closer to the Dutch citizen than many other peoples of Indonesia."[111] Their construction as culturally proximate served those who wanted to justify their involvement in Dutch military efforts. However, when political circumstances changed, so did their cultural proximity. In July 1950, after Indonesian independence, KNIL was disbanded. Only totok soldiers were transferred to the Royal Netherlands Army.[112] 'Indigenous' soldiers like Moluccans were asked to serve in the Indonesian army (their former enemy) or demobilise on enemy-controlled territory. They understandably refused.

Dutch officials had granted entry rights only with considerable reluctance, offering temporary relocation after a court ruled against their forced demobilisation.[113] In 1951, 4,000 Moluccan colonial soldiers and 8,000 of their spouses and family members made the trek. Top-level officials like Minister van Thiel, the first Minister of Social Work, suggested deporting them and framed this as repatriation,[114] betraying attempts by powerful actors to exclude them not only from the 'repatriate' identity but also from belonging in the Dutch nation. The Minister of Union Affairs and Overseas Territory saw their arrival in the Netherlands as the "worst imaginable solution," and showcased the importance of racialisation in justifying these sentiments by lamenting that Moluccans' inassimilability stemmed from their "physical condition," "fitness for work," and "habits of life and social views."[115] A separate official concurred that these traits, alongside "the Dutch climate" rendered them "ill-disposed for permanent residence."[116] Similarly in 1959, Minister Klompé justified their treatment with the need to account for the "strength" of their "collective mentality."[117]

Citizenship rights were squarely off the table, even when the alternative was statelessness. The 1949 Citizenship Agreement held that Indonesian nationality would expire if an individual was outside of Indonesia for five years without filing for extension. On principle, most Moluccans did not do this. Consequently, over three quarters were stateless by the early 1970s.[118] Meanwhile, juridical ambiguity prevailed. In 1968, a local police agent queried the chief of police regarding a man listed in one register as Indonesian and in another together

109 Inventory of the archives of the *Commissariaat van Ambonezenzorg*, (1949) 1952-1970, 2.27.148, Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, 1985.
110 Hans van Amersfoort, "The Waxing and Waning of a Diaspora: Moluccans in the Netherlands, 1950-2002," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 30, no 1 (2004): 154.
111 Jones, "Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten En Nederlanders: Nederlandse Politici over Burgers Uit Oost En West En Nederland, 1945-2005," 97.
112 Willems, *De Uittocht Uit Indië, 1945-1995*.
113 van Amersfoort, "The Waxing and Waning of a Diaspora: Moluccans in the Netherlands, 1950-2002," 154.
114 van Amersfoort, 154.
115 Laarman, *Oude Onbekenden: Het Politieke En Publieke Debat over Postkoloniale Migranten, 1945-2005*.
116 Jones, "Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten En Nederlanders: Nederlandse Politici over Burgers Uit Oost En West En Nederland, 1945-2005," 112.
117 Jones, 150.
118 Jones, 129.

with his children as stateless.[119] The agent pleaded urgently for clearer guidelines, suggesting an entanglement between Moluccans and law enforcement: "I have to work on [cases like] this daily."[120]

5.3. Algerians, pieds-noirs, harkis

5.3.1. Overview

Unlike in the Netherlands, considerable migration between colony and metropole predated the Algerian war of independence. For several decades prior to the Second World War, metropolitan employers had recruited Algerians to work in the industrial sector. After legislators formally equalised their status with that of French citizens in a 1947 statute, this migration only increased, since employers could avoid the new, heavy-handed recruitment procedure required for foreign labour. However, similar to the colonial code of the Netherlands Indies, various nationality laws of Algeria consistently retained two distinct categories of French nationals: 'Muslim' subjects and 'European' citizens. Each was imbued with racial meaning and proved durable despite unsuccessful attempts to stabilise colonial rule by eliminating them. In fact, the categories were more durable than the phenomena they were invoked to describe. Prior to Algerian independence, when French policymakers referred to "Muslim French" citizens, they meant Algerian labour migrants; afterward, they meant *harkis* who had supported French military efforts in the war.

5.3.2. French empire

The French colonial project cannot be understood in isolation from transformations on the metropole. For one, the colonisation of overseas territories paralleled the expansion and consolidation of French national territory on the European continent. Although historians sometimes accept the Capetian dynasty in the late first century AD as the starting point of France - because it established "important continuity in French history"[121] - the French nation would take many centuries to assume any kind of coherence. Five languages were spoken in medieval France.[122] In the seventeenth century, France established its first colonial settlements in North America (present-day Canada), and in the West Indies (e.g. present-day French Guiana, Saint Kitts), all whilst expanding its European territory, after the Treaty of Westphalia, to include Alsace, Flanders, and French Comté.[123] Meanwhile, when the 1789 French Revolution swapped the king, aristocracy and church for the nation as the centre of authority in metropolitan France,[124] colonial subjects seized an opportunity to challenge

119 NL-HaNA-2.09.52-264-Letter, Jacob de Ruiter, 26 August 1968.
120 NL-HaNA-2.09.52-264-Letter, Jacob de Ruiter, 26 August 1968.
121 Douglas Johnson, "The Making of the French Nation," in *The National Question in Europe in Historical Context*, ed Mikulas Teich and Roy Porter, 1st ed (Cambridge University Press, 1993), 36, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511622298.003.
122 Johnson, 41.
123 Johnson, 47.
124 Johnson, 48.

French authority altogether. In 1791, more than 500,000 slaves revolted in Saint-Domingue (present-day Haiti), which was considered the "pearl" of French colonies for its sugar and coffee production.[125] Under the leadership of the Haitian general Toussaint Louverture, the insurgents borrowed from the newborn currents of liberty, fraternity, and equality to fight and eventually successfully defeat their colonial oppressor in 1804.[126]

Whilst metropolitan France expanded on the European continent throughout the nineteenth century, overseas colonisation continued. In 1804, the same year that Haiti formally won its independence, Napoleon Bonaparte declared himself emperor and expanded his reign over almost all of Europe (present-day Netherlands included). In 1830, French troops invaded Algiers. By 1848, present-day Algeria was declared French national territory and divided into three metropolitan-style administrative departments: Algiers, Oran, and Constantine.[127] The same year, Louis-Napoléon was elected President of the Second Republic, a post that he would unilaterally turn into an imperial title a few years later. Governance was subsequently transferred from Algiers to Paris, and the ties between metropole and colony multiplied, including in infrastructural terms: by the 1860s, the journey from Paris to Algiers took only four days.[128] An Algerian Governor General represented the Republic to ensure the continuity of French institutions overseas.[129] While Jules Ferry was instituting a role for the state in the "moral education" of French children, he was using a similar language to justify the "civilising mission" of colonising "inferior races."[130] French colonisation continued with the conquest of Tunisia and Morocco in 1881 and 1912 respectively, which became protectorates rather than integral parts of French territory like Algeria. By the early 20th century, the French empire was 18 times the size of metropolitan France.[131]

5.3.3. (Algerian) French

For almost all of French colonial history, imperial residents did not enjoy equal French citizenship. Just like in the Netherlands, the persistence of slavery stands as a stark reminder. The first attempt to abolish slavery took place in 1794, as a decree formalised what Haitian revolutionaries had accomplished by force.[132] Napoleon, however, reestablished it in 1804. In 1848, a committee preparing the second attempt at the abolition of slavery proclaimed that France "no longer intends to make any distinction in the human family."[133] However, that

125 Olivier Pluen, "1315-1946: Le Mythe d'un 'Empire' Français sans Esclavage," *Histoire de La Justice*, Association française pour l'histoire de la justice, N°31 (January 2021): 19–43.

126 Stoler and Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda."

127 Jennifer E Sessions, "Colonizing Revolutionary Politics: Algeria and the French Revolution of 1848," *French Politics, Culture & Society*, SPECIAL ISSUE The Politics of Empire in Post-Revolutionary France, 33, no 1 (2015): 76.

128 Jack Harrington, "The Imperial Citizen: British India and French Algeria," in *Citizenship after Orientalism*, ed Engin Isin, Palgrave Studies in Citizenship Transitions (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 57.

129 Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir Métropolitain: Politique d'intégration et Parcours de Rapatriés d'Algérie En Métropole (1954-2005)*, 33.

130 Lyons, *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: The French Welfare State during Decolonization*, 19.

131 Colley, "'This Small Island': Britain, Size and Empire," 174.

132 Nelly Schmidt, "Abolition de l'esclavage: Entre Mythes et Réalités," *Africultures* N°67 (February 2006): 18–24.

133 Emmanuelle Saada, "Citoyens et Sujets de l'Empire Français: Les Usages Du Droit En Situation Coloniale.," *Genèses* 53, no 4 (2003): 15.

same committee agreed that the status of "indigenous" populations in Algeria would remain unchanged on the grounds that they had not yet acquired the civilising customs proper to a citizen.[134] Without more detail, colonial administrators were left in the dark about what exactly this status entailed. An 1862 court ruling determined that Algerians were granted a peculiar legal status; that of French national (*ressortissant*) but not of citizen *(citoyen*).[135] According to one estimate, 1911 Algeria was home to around 500,000 citizens and five million non-citizens.[136]

Algerian residents retained distinct forms of political membership throughout time. An 1865 law developed during the Second Empire (1858-1870) elaborated on the court's ruling by assigning "indigenous" Algerians a local, rather than common, civil status (*statut de droit local*, as opposed to *statut de droit commun*).[137] On the one hand, this meant formally recognising traditional legal systems and customs, but on the other, it meant exonerating colonial officials from the standards of prevalent European legal norms.[138] The result of this law and subsequent legislation passed during the Third Republic (1870-1940) was a system of a 'universal' and invisible French nationality within which two different legal categories fell: that of citizen with a status under the common civil code and that of subject with a status under local, customary law.[139] This distinction broke with a basic tenet of republicanism and formal professions of universalism, brotherhood and tolerance with which French colonial history is replete.[140] Subjects could not vote or represent themselves in administrative bodies.[141] They found themselves both required to submit to French sovereignty and unable to participate in its decision-making.[142] Ironically, administrators justified this second-class legal status with reference to the subjects' adherence to customary civil codes. Although this was mandatorily assigned, it was portrayed as antithetical to the responsible exercise of civic duties.[143]

The uneven character of membership in French Algeria fed into the racialisation of French citizens and subjects.[144] In Algeria, most citizens were white colonists who emigrated from metropolitan France or other parts of Europe. Many emigrants came from Spain, Italy, Germany, Malta, and Switzerland.[145] Under an 1889 law, all of the above were automatically naturalised as French citizens if they were born in Algeria.[146] One explanation for this move

134 Saada, "Citoyens et Sujets de l'Empire Français: Les Usages Du Droit En Situation Coloniale."
135 Saada.
136 Paul Meuriot, "Population et populations de l'Algérie," *Journal de la société statistique de Paris*, 55, http://www.numdam.org/item/JSFS_1914_55_239_0.pdf, 1914.
137 Lyons, *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: The French Welfare State during Decolonization*, 27.
138 Saada, "Citoyens et Sujets de l'Empire Français: Les Usages Du Droit En Situation Coloniale.," 13.
139 James E Genova, "Constructing Identity in Post-War France: Citizenship, Nationality, and the Lamine Guèye Law, 1946–1953," *The International History Review* 26, no 1 (March 2004): 62, https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2004.9641024.
140 Laurent Dubois, "La République Métissée: Citizenship, Colonialism, and the Borders of French History," *Cultural Studies* 14, no 1 (January 2000): 20, https://doi.org/10.1080/095023800334968.
141 S A Bezabeh, "Citizenship and the Logic of Sovereignty in Djibouti," *African Affairs* 110, no 441 (October 1, 2011): 593, https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adr045.
142 Saada, "Citoyens et Sujets de l'Empire Français: Les Usages Du Droit En Situation Coloniale.," 17.
143 Saada, 18.
144 Saada, 19.
145 Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France*, 12.
146 Abderahmen Moumen, "De l'Algérie à La France Les Conditions de Départ et d'accueil Des Rapatriés, Pieds-Noirs et Harkis En 1962," *Matériaux Pour l'histoire de Notre Temps* 3, no 99 (2010): 61.

was that it would furnish new white voters in support of the existing political regime.[147] The status of Jewish people was ambiguous until the 1870 Crémieux declaration naturalised them en masse.[148] The subject category meanwhile was occupied by Arabs, Berbers and other "indigenous" Algerians. After the First World War, the term "indigenous" was gradually replaced with the term "Muslim."[149] The term *Muslim* (*musulman*) was used to denote all individuals from the Maghreb, regardless of their devotion to Islam. In a society hesitant to openly name race, religion performed a "camouflaging operation,"[150] although an awkward one in the French context given that successive leaders have historically resisted the influence of religion over state affairs, with secularism (*laïcité*) enshrined in French law since 1905.[151]

5.3.4. The French Union: an instrument of stability?

After the Second World War, the hard *legal* border distinguishing subject and citizen started to break down, if only slightly. The war made it much more difficult to exclude overseas French nationals from full political membership. No other European country had relied on colonial soldiers as extensively as France, where African soldiers represented about 20 per cent of the total forces deployed if Vichy and Free French troops are considered together.[152] Their conscription and the universalistic rhetoric with which it was justified[153] upset the delicate balance upon which colonial order rested between the promise of citizenship and its perpetual denial.[154] Moreover, there was a widespread perception that the conduct of the Vichy regime had ruined France's prestige among the "native populations."[155] Whether the colonies had ever viewed France with much prestige is subject to debate, but certainly the 1940s saw a plethora of uprisings against French rule, in French Indochina, Madagascar, and French West Africa.[156]

In this context of military vulnerability, the provisional government convened a conference in Brazzaville, the capital of French Equatorial Africa (*Afrique equatorial française,* AEF). Its aim was to reconsider the relationship between metropole and colony, just as the RTC had done for Dutch empire some ten years later. One critical issue was how to represent colonial subjects in the French parliament.[157] The Gaullist governor-general of AEF, Félix Éboué,

147 Lyons, *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: The French Welfare State during Decolonization*, 23.
148 Lyons, 22.
149 Jordi and Hamoumou, *Les Harkis, Une Mémoire Enfouie*, 19.
150 Étienne Balibar, "Is There a Neo-Racism?," in *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, by Immanuel Wallerstein and Etienne Balibar (London, New York: Verso Books, 1991), 20.
151 Christopher Lizotte, "Laïcité as Assimilation, Laïcité as Negotiation: Political Geographies of Secularism in the French Public School," *Political Geography* 77 (March 1, 2020): 102121, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.102121.
152 Carina Schmitt, "The Warfare – Welfare Nexus in French African Colonies in the Course of the First and Second World War," *Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung*, Special Issue: Conscription, Military Interests, and Western Welfare States in the Age of Industrialized Mass Warfare, 45, no 2 (2020): 228–29.
153 Genova, "Constructing Identity in Post-War France," 66.
154 Dubois, "La République Métissée," 27; Sukanya Banerjee, *Becoming Imperial Citizens: Indians in the Late-Victorian Empire* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010), 7; Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (University of California Press, 2005), 154.
155 Genova, "Constructing Identity in Post-War France," 57.
156 Genova, 57.
157 James I Lewis, "The French Colonial Service and the Issues of Reform, 1944-8," *Contemporary European History* 4, no 2 (1995): 158.

promoted the establishment of an intermediate category between citizen and subject that he would call *Notables* Évolués.[158] The proposal exposed the relevance of cultural practice for citizenship and social status, as the category was designed for those indigenous elites who had acquired some degree of "French" culture and education.[159] The recommendations from the conference garnered "virtually unanimous support" among participants.[160] Subsequently, a decree modelled after Éboué's suggestion was applied throughout the empire.[161] A March 1944 ordinance asserted the equality, in theory, of customary "local" legal codes in questions of civil status. Additionally, the colonies were permitted to elect deputies to deliberate on the constitution. However, only French citizens (not subjects) could so; these included, for example, residents of the four communes in Senegal (then part of French West Africa),[162] but excluded Algerians assigned local civil status. Still, when the Constituent Assembly convened in November 1945, 33 deputies from Overseas France and 26 deputies from "Muslim and non-Muslim French" from Algeria were represented.[163]

Reflecting the solidaristic ideals of the left-wing parties who enjoyed a sweeping victory in these constituent elections,[164] the draft constitution established a new federal structure called the French Union (*l'Union française*). The French Union included an assembly to which both metropole and overseas territories could send representatives as separate legal entities within a single framework.[165] Article 80 of the new constitution stipulated equal citizenship rights to French nationals whether they lived overseas or in the metropole. Article 82 reaffirmed that personal civil status could no longer be grounds for denying political rights.[166] When the first draft constitution was rejected by metropolitan voters in a May 1946 referendum, Lamine Guèye, a deputy in the National Assembly from Senegal sponsored a law that would safeguard the rights embedded in those rejected constitutional provisions, not least to ensure that colonial subjects could participate in the re-election of the next constituent assembly.[167] The law provoked discussions that reflected and reinforced racial ontologies: opponents of the Lamine Guèye Law "went to great pains to explain that Africans and Europeans were fundamentally and immutably different."[168] Still, it passed and entered into force on June 1 1946.[169] However, the law did not "expressly say that the new citizens are French citizens" but

158 Genova, "Constructing Identity in Post-War France," 57.
159 Genova, 57.
160 Lewis, "The French Colonial Service and the Issues of Reform, 1944-8," 160.
161 Emmanuelle Saada, "The Empire of Law: Dignity, Prestige, and Domination in the 'Colonial Situation,'" *French Politics, Culture & Society* 20, no 2 (2002): 98–120.
162 Paul Isoart, "L'élaboration de la Constitution de l'Union française : les Assemblées constituantes et le problème colonial," in *Les chemins de la décolonisation de l'empire colonial français, 1936-1956 : Colloque organisé par l'IHTP les 4 et 5 octobre 1984*, ed Charles-Robert Ageron, Hors collection (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2013), 15, https://doi.org/10.4000/books.editionscnrs.445.
163 Isoart, 15.
164 Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France*, 69.
165 Raymond F Betts, *France and Decolonisation, 1900-1960* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1991), 70.
166 Vincent Depaigne, *Legitimacy Gap: Secularism, Religion, and Culture in Comparative Constitutional Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 110.
167 Genova, "Constructing Identity in Post-War France," 58.
168 Genova, 75.
169 Félix Gouin, "La Loi N°43-940 Du 7 Mai 1946 Tendant à Proclamer Citoyens Tous Les Ressortissants Des Territoires d'outre-Mer," N°107 § (1946). https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000000315563.

instead offered them "the same title as a French citizen, which is to say that they exercise the same rights as a French citizen."[170] The dispute over the citizenship status of former subjects took years to resolve. In 1953, the assembly of the French Union passed a resolution effectively inverting the relationship between citizenship and nationality. (French Union) citizenship became universal and available, even for Algerians with local civil status, while nationality was particularistic and the source for rights and status.[171]

In Algeria, the main outcome of this conciliatory moment in colonial history came on 20 September 1947, when a new statute entered into force formally granting all French nationals in Algeria citizenship status and declaring, in its second article, the equality of all French citizens.[172] Substantive rights did not follow. The statute had introduced an Algerian Assembly, composed of 120 members elected by universal suffrage and in force until 1956. However, the Assembly was elected by dual college, meaning the European minority (despite representing less than one-tenth of the population) elected half the assembly, and "Muslim French" the other half. Additionally, several provisions of the statute, including the vote for "Muslim French" residents whose citizenship was supposedly now equal, or the implementation of Arabic-language education were either not respected or not completely inaugurated.[173] Seven years later, when the Algerian war of independence started, the government was still proposing the "progressive application" of the statute.[174] Finally, despite ostensibly equal citizenship, the practice of referring to French citizens of Arabic or Berber origin as "Muslims," even if they converted to Catholicism,[175] continued. A 1956 memo distinguished "Muslim French from Algeria" (FMA, *Français musulman d'Algérie*).[176] In early 1958, the French armed forces replaced this with "French of North African origin" (FSNA, *Français de souche nord-africaine*). As late as 1962, government officials were publishing reports describing French citizens as being "of European origin" and of "Muslim" origin.[177] In short, the line between European and "Muslim" Algerians remained a stubbornly persistent fixture of post-war life.

5.3.5. A domestic workforce in high demand

The 1947 statute for Algeria not only gave Algerians formal citizenship rights, but also formally conferred the right to free movement between Algeria and the metropole.[178] *De facto*, this right predated the statute. In general, French immigration policy was relatively liberal, with policymakers having eliminated barriers to free movement by abolishing a passport and

170 Genova, "Constructing Identity in Post-War France," 71.
171 Genova, 77.
172 Le Monde, "L'organisation Politique et Administrative de l'Algérie de 1830 à 1959," September 16, 1959, https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1959/09/16/l-organisation-politique-et-administrative-de-l-algerie-de-1830-a-1959_2144449_1819218.html.
173 Le Monde.
174 Le Monde.
175 Jordi and Hamoumou, *Les Harkis, Une Mémoire Enfouie*, 20.
176 Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France*, 49.
177 Shepard, 231.
178 Muriel Cohen, "Les Circulations Entre France et Algérie: Un Nouveau Regard Sur Les Migrants (Post) Coloniaux (1945–1985)," *French Politics, Culture & Society* 34, no 2 (January 1, 2016), https://doi.org/10.3167/fpcs.2016.340205.

visa system in 1861,[179] until legislation of 1888 and 1893 made permanent residence for foreigners more difficult.[180] Still, employers had readily turned to the Algerian workforce to meet their needs.[181] In the early 20th century metropolitan France was home to some 4,000 to 5,000 Algerians. They largely hailed from Kabylia, a mountainous coastal region in the north of Algeria.[182] With the First World War, a law of July 14, 1914 liberalised movement for 'indigenous' Algerian residents between the metropole and Algerian departments.[183] This prompted a more than tenfold increase in the number of Algerians in the metropole as employers scrambled to replace conscripted metropolitan workers and meet national defence needs.[184] Census data suggests that there were 60,000 Algerians living in the metropole in 1923.[185] Henneresse estimates that one year later this figure was even higher (100,000).[186]

This was a modest figure compared to overall immigration levels in France. Employer-led recruitment had begun in earnest in 1910, especially in steel and agricultural industries, and had predominantly involved Italian, Polish, and Yugoslavian workers.[187] In 1924, different employer-led services merged to form an organisation devoted to assisting them in their foreign recruitment efforts: General Society of Agricultural and Industrial Immigration (SGI, *Société g*énérale d'*immigration agricole et industriel*). From its establishment up until 1931, the SGI brought in around 500,000 foreign workers[188] to an overall foreign population of some 2.7 million.[189] These figures were clearly socially significant as the French public had met early 20th century migrants with disdain and xenophobia.[190] Still, Algerian labour attracted interest in academic and policy circles. A 1938 report by Laroque and a colleague at the Council of State elaborated on the role of "North African" labour - encompassing Algerians, Tunisians, and Moroccans - to the metropolitan economy.[191] They state that almost all were in employed in industrial and/or manufacturing jobs, the largest numbers being in construction and public works, followed by chemical factories and refineries, mining and metal processing industries. In Paris, car manufacturing was paramount.[192] The authors betray racialised undertones by

179 Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, "Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences," *Global Networks* 2, no 4 (2002): 301–34.

180 M F P Herchenroder, "The Aliens Regulations in France," *Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law* 21, no 4 (1939): 221.

181 The exception is during the First World War, during which time the state briefly assumed control over immigration. From 1924, the General Company of Agricultural and Industrial Immigration (SGI, from *Société Générale d'Immigration agricole et industriel*) organised their efforts. Henneresse, "Le Patronat et La Politique Française d'Immigration, 1945-1975," 50.

182 Henneresse, 100.

183 Muriel Cohen, "L'immigration Algérienne Post-Indépendance: L'enracinement à l'épreuve de l'exclusion," *Le Mouvement Social* 258 (2017): 32.

184 Henneresse, "Le Patronat et La Politique Française d'Immigration, 1945-1975," 100.

185 Lyons, *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: The French Welfare State during Decolonization*.

186 Henneresse, "Le Patronat et La Politique Française d'Immigration, 1945-1975," 100.

187 Henneresse, 60.

188 Henneresse, 61.

189 Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, "Immigrés et Descendants d'immigrés En France," Insee Références, Fiches Thématiques, 2012, 99, https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/1374013?sommaire=1374025.

190 Laurent Dornel, *La France Hostile: Socio-Histoire de La Xénophobie (1870-1914)* (Paris: Fayard, 2014).

191 Laroque and Français, "Les Nord-Africains En France."

192 Laroque and Français, 30.

suggesting that Algerian productivity was lower than the European average due to "genetic nonchalance."[193]

In the 1940s, Vichy France suspended the right to free movement between Algeria and the metropole. During this stage, Algerians only arrived in the metropole by organised convoys, explaining a further decline in numbers.[194] The restoration of the free right to movement in 1946[195] and subsequently in the statute, as mentioned, served the French economy well. Like the Netherlands, France emerged from the Second World War with acute labour shortages in key industries. All told, the country had suffered some 600,000 casualties in the war, of which more than half (350,000) were civilians.[196] Construction, (coal) mining, and metal processing sectors in particular struggled to meet their labour needs.[197] In response, the GPRF installed a committee headed by a demographer named Georges Mauco to advise on a new strategy for immigration.[198] Key among Mauco's recommendations was for the state to assume greater control over immigration flows. An ordinance of November 1945 dissolved the SGI and created the National Office of Immigration (*Office national d'immigration,* ONI).[199] From then on, firms interested in hiring foreign labour needed to submit a job contract to the administration, where, if approved, it would be transmitted to the ONI, who would recruit on their behalf.

Employers' recourse to Algerian workers, however, undermined this nascent system of state-led foreign labour recruitment. As citizens and part of the domestic workforce since 1947, Algerians fell outside the remit of the ONI. This meant that firms could recruit them independently, without first needing to submit the job vacancy to the ONI. In addition, many arrived in the metropole on their own accord, exercising the entry rights of citizens and seeking improved economic chances or an escape from colonial oppression. For firms, this meant that recruitment could happen on metropolitan soil rather than abroad.[200] In fact, many job-seeking Algerians would show up at their door, making the hiring process far more straightforward than the lengthy bureaucratic procedure of job contract submission required by the ONI.[201] Simultaneously, public authorities promoted the recruitment of Algerian labour, perceiving an opportunity both to "improve" the demographic situation of Algeria, where they viewed population growth as excessive, and to smooth over relations with overseas departments.[202] The latter had worsened following violent repressions of protests and widespread disillusionment

193 Laroque and Français, 33.
194 Henneresse, "Le Patronat et La Politique Française d'Immigration, 1945-1975," 100.
195 Henneresse, 100.
196 Michel Hubert, "Convergences et Divergences Démographiques Depuis 1870," in *Le Couple Franco-Allemand En Europe*, by Henri Ménudier (Paris: Presses Sorbonne Nouvelle, 1993), 152, http://books.openedition.org/psn/5720.
197 Henneresse, "Le Patronat et La Politique Française d'Immigration, 1945-1975," 103.
198 See Greg Burgess, "The Demographers' Moment : Georges Mauco, Immigration and Racial Selection in Liberation France, 1945-46," *French History and Civilization* 4 (2011): 168 for a treatment of the anti-Semitic and collaborationist leanings of this same demographer.
199 Henneresse, "Le Patronat et La Politique Française d'Immigration, 1945-1975," 73.
200 Pitti, "La Main d'oeuvre Algérienne Dans l'industrie Automobile (1945-1962), Ou Les Oubliés de l'histoire," 51.
201 Henneresse, "Le Patronat et La Politique Française d'Immigration, 1945-1975," 73.
202 Henneresse, 101–2.

with the status and treatment of the local 'Muslim' population.[203] To this end, a February 14, 1947 circular established minimum quotas of Algerian workers, ranging from 20-75 per cent of the total workforce depending on the industry. An executive order of July 26, 1949, prevented firms from hiring foreigners unless domestic (including Algerian) labour could not meet their needs.[204] Additionally, starting in 1947, public officials set out diffusing information among employers about the recruitment of Algerians.[205]

When all was said and done, in the first post-war years more Algerian workers arrived in metropolitan France than did ONI recruits. From 1946 to 1949, 255,000 Algerians arrived in France compared to 214,000 ONI recruits of mostly Italian nationality.[206] A further 868,000 Algerian workers arrived on metropolitan soil between 1950 and 1955, compared to 111,000 foreign workers hired by the ONI.[207] Although the policy to promote Algerian labour was, in numerical terms, successful, the enthusiasm of employers for the Algerian workforce cooled in the mid-1950s. In 1953, the newly formed National Council of French Employers (*Conseil national du patronat français,* CNPF, est. 1945) lamented that metropolitan industry was not in state to "absorb all of the Algerian labour surplus."[208] Some factories in the Moselle steel industry offered family housing to European foreign workers but "systematically refused" the same offer to Algerian workers.[209] Additionally, as family resettlement rather than labour migration accounted for an ever larger proportion of migration,[210] onlookers challenged the deservingness of the newcomers. One civil servant considered that women and children arrived "without any real aptitude for adaptation," and that over time, labour migrants had become "very primitive," lacking knowledge of France, French or factories.[211] He wondered out loud whether this was due to a "determined desire" of Algerian authorities to retain the "most competent individuals in Algeria" and to send the "least refined elements" (*les éléments les plus frustes*) to France.[212]

5.3.6. Algerian independence

Employers' fading enthusiasm for the Algerian workforce took place as the war for Algerian independence reached the metropole. Inspired by French defeat in Indochina, independence-seeking Algerians formed the National Liberation Front (*Front de libération nationale,* FLN) in 1954 and organised bomb blasts targeting French institutions in Algeria and later also

203 Pitti, "La Main d'oeuvre Algérienne Dans l'industrie Automobile (1945-1962), Ou Les Oubliés de l'histoire," 55.
204 Henneresse, "Le Patronat et La Politique Française d'Immigration, 1945-1975," 103.
205 Henneresse, 105.
206 Henneresse, 73.
207 See Henneresse, 73 , but note that there were also departures during this same time period.
208 Henneresse, 110.
209 Henneresse, 106.
210 FR-PaAN-19770391/9, Report by Michel Massenet, "L'Évolution de la migration algérienne en France." Undated, but probably written halfway through 1963.
211 FR-PaAN-19770391/9, Report by Michel Massenet, "L'Évolution de la migration algérienne en France." Undated, but probably written halfway through 1963.
212 FR-PaAN-19770391/9, Report by Michel Massenet, "L'Évolution de la migration algérienne en France." Undated, but probably written halfway through 1963.

in the metropole.[213] The French government in Algiers responded with repression, and, as President Macron would only recently admit, the systematic use of torture.[214] Even as Tunisia and Morocco, its neighbours in the Maghreb,[215] gained independence in 1956, Algeria's fate hung in the balance. Employers increasingly expressed the view that Algerian employees were "unstable" (despite absentee rates no higher than metropolitan or foreign workers, and their growing tendency to remain in the metropole), politicised, difficult to integrate and of "poor temperament."[216] An atmosphere of suspicion reigned. Algerians who were suspected of association with the FLN were interned in camps.[217] By 1956, employers had successfully lobbied for the ease of restrictions on hiring foreign workers.[218] It would take until around 1968 for recruitment of Algerians to pick up again.

1958 marked a turning point in the war and in its repercussions for French political life. In March, a hawkish hardliner and former Vichy official called Maurice Papon assumed leadership over the Paris police department. He would later stand trial for crimes against humanity during his tenure.[219] In May, the French National Assembly approved the nomination to prime minister of the Christian Democrat Pierre Pflimlin, who supported negotiating with the FLN. The same day as his nomination, three French soldiers were executed in Algeria.[220] Angered, the French military stationed in Algiers planned a coup against the new government. As Algerian French paratroopers descended on the metropole, Pflimlin resigned, and the Fourth Republic collapsed.[221] In the chaos, the revered general Charles de Gaulle returned from retirement to lead the country. Among the innovations of the new constitution was the significant powers it granted the president, who would serve in seven-year terms. Within days of assuming power, De Gaulle was in Algiers famously reassuring a crowd of settlers that he had heard them (*"je vous ai compris"*).[222] And yet, if he had heard the supporters of the coup, De Gaulle did not answer their prayers. By 1959 he had warmed to the idea of Algerian independence, dismissed by almost every French politician before him.[223] On March 18, 1962, negotiators signed the ceasefire accords in Évian-les-Bains, just a stone's throw away from the French border with Switzerland, marking the end of nearly a decade of war. A 'transitional period' ensued which ended in July 1962 when Algerians voted in a referendum to end 132 years of French colonial

213 Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France*, 42.
214 Angelique Chrisafis, "France Admits Systematic Torture during Algeria War for First Time," *The Guardian*, September 13, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/13/france-state-responsible-for-1957-death-of-dissident-maurice-audin-in-algeria-says-macron.
215 Maghreb is a term derived from the Arabic word for 'sunset,' designating the 'western' part of the Arabic world.
216 Henneresse, "Le Patronat et La Politique Française d'Immigration, 1945-1975," 108.
217 Arthur Grosjean, "L'action des conseillers techniques aux Affaires musulmanes. L'exemple du camp de Thol," *Matériaux pour l'histoire de notre temps* 92, no 4 (2008): 15–23, https://doi.org/10.3917/mate.092.0003.
218 Henneresse, "Le Patronat et La Politique Française d'Immigration, 1945-1975," 159.
219 Béatrice Fleury and Jacques Walter, "The Papon Trial," *Vingtieme Siecle Revue d'histoire* 88, no 4 (2005): 63–76.
220 Geoffroy Caillet, "4 Juin 1958 : Que Cachait Le «Je Vous Ai Compris» de De Gaulle ?," *Le Figaro*, June 4, 2018, https://www.lefigaro.fr/histoire/2018/06/04/26001-20180604ARTFIG00058-4-juin-1958-que-cachait-le-je-vous-ai-compris-de-de-gaulle.php.
221 Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France*.
222 Shepard.
223 Shepard, 7.

rule of Algeria.[224] The war had cost the lives of at least 250,000 to 300,000 Algerians, and some 41,000 soldiers on the French side.[225]

At independence, around 1 million former French citizens retained French citizenship, only about 10,000 of which were "Muslim."[226] The other approximately 9 million Algerians with local civil status were assigned Algerian citizenship. The details were spelled out in a 21 July 1962 ordinance, which additionally outlined the possibility for this latter group to confirm their French nationality by paying a fee and declaring their national allegiance before a judge,[227] who could reject it.[228] A 1965 report referred to the process outlined in this ordinance as an "exceptionally speedy" procedure.[229] Those that did not hand in this declaration by January 1, 1963, became foreigners.[230] Many perceived this declaration as a humiliation.

> When I was told that you had to go before a judge to become French, I was a furious… De Gaulle had said that we were all French, the same, from Dunkirk to Tamanrasset. Mitterrand also said 'Algeria is France.' When we were told to fight for French liberation, I was French. But when it was time to take refuge in France, we are no longer French. You have to go ask the judge for your nationality. It's a disgrace.[231]

5.3.7. Pieds-noirs and harkis

By the time of Algerian independence, French officials were already familiar with the notion of "repatriate," a juridical category which referred to an overseas French citizen deemed needy by the consular services of the person's territory of origin. Among the first to acquire its status were French citizens from Morocco and Tunisia, after each gained independence in 1956.[232] However, repatriation only truly took off with the Algerian war[233] during which almost all white settlers with French citizenship fled the country.[234] In 1962, 679,000 of them - or over four times the amount of Algerians who lived in the metropole prior to that date - would arrive in the metropole.[235] In fact, the late spring/early summer months of 1962 accounted

224 Moumen, "De l'Algérie à La France Les Conditions de Départ et d'accueil Des Rapatriés, Pieds-Noirs et Harkis En 1962."

225 Claire Eldridge, *From Empire to Exile: History and Memory within the Pied-Noir and Harki Communities, 1962-2012* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), 5.

226 Patrick Weil, "Le statut des musulmans en Algérie coloniale: Une nationalité française dénaturée," *Histoire de la justice* 16, no 1 (2005): 108, https://doi.org/10.3917/rhj.016.0093.

227 Moumen, "De l'Algérie à La France Les Conditions de Départ et d'accueil Des Rapatriés, Pieds-Noirs et Harkis En 1962."

228 Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France*, 241.

229 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 101

230 FR-PaAN-19920149/1-Meetings at the State Secretary for Repatriates, July 1962-May 1964, Summary of meeting on 21 January 1963

231 Jordi and Hamoumou, *Les Harkis, Une Mémoire Enfouie*, 21.

232 Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir Métropolitain: Politique d'intégration et Parcours de Rapatriés d'Algérie En Métropole (1954-2005)*, 94.

233 French of Indochina would receive 'repatriate' status in 1959, long after they arrived French from Madagascar, Guinea and the states of "Afrique noire" would receive this status from April 1960.

234 Moumen, "De l'Algérie à La France Les Conditions de Départ et d'accueil Des Rapatriés, Pieds-Noirs et Harkis En 1962," 61.

235 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 2.

for over half of total registered returns between 1954 and 1964.[236] The total figure was about double what the French government had expected in that year.[237] By the time independence was formalised on July 5 1962, 85 per cent had left.[238] Once in metropolitan France, a new group identity emerged as white Algerians reappropriated the formerly derogatory term *pieds-noirs* ("black feet"), perhaps derivative of the black boots worn by soldiers or the shoes worn by Europeans that set them apart from "indigenous" society.[239] As Jordi clarifies, "it was not in Algeria but in France, and not until May 1962, that the 'pied-noir' was born."[240] By 1974, the Ministry of the Interior would put the total number of repatriates from Algeria at over one million.[241]

Alongside the pieds-noirs who arrived in 1962 were about 16,000 "Algerians with civil status" and 12,000 *harkis* and their families.[242] The term harkis describes Algerians who had (voluntarily or otherwise) supported the French during the Algerian War. Recruitment of local labour was a central component of French military strategy for the colonial army until 1912, when the implementation of mandatory military service increased the importance of the regular military corps of career soldiers.[243] During the Algerian War, however, this trend reversed. French military leadership turned increasingly to various categories of auxiliary civilian units to assist in its "pacification" efforts.[244] Two types of civilian units were of particular importance. The first were the *moghaznis*, who were deployed to protect the 640 military-staffed institutions known as Specialised Administrative Sections (*Sections administratives spécialisées,* SAS). Created by the Governor-General of colonial Algeria in 1955, SAS aimed to "establish or re-establish contact with the Muslim population."[245] From 1960 to 1962, there were around 20,000 moghaznis.[246] A second type of auxiliary unit, the *harka* (after the Arabic word for 'movement'), staffed by harkis, was established in 1955. With 40,000 harkis in 1959,[247] this unit was numerically most significant. Harkis and moghaznis were civilian, and not military, employees, with unusually precarious employment status. Harkis were initially hired on a daily basis, and subsequently on 1-month renewable contracts without any long-term guarantees

236 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965.
237 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Speech, Mr Mellac, for members of la Commission de la Population du Conseil de l'Europe, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 October 1964.
238 Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir Métropolitain: Politique d'intégration et Parcours de Rapatriés d'Algérie En Métropole (1954-2005)*, 15.
239 Buettner, *Europe after Empire*, 238.
240 Buettner, 238.
241 Pierre Baillet, "L'intégration des rapatriés d'Algérie en France," *Population* 30, no 2 (1975): 303–14, https://doi.org/10.2307/1530668.
242 Jordi, cited in Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir Métropolitain: Politique d'intégration et Parcours de Rapatriés d'Algérie En Métropole (1954-2005)*, 15.
243 Charles-Robert Ageron, "Les supplétifs Algériens dans l'armée française pendant la guerre d'Algérie," *Vingtième Siècle, revue d'histoire* 48, no 1 (1995): 5, https://doi.org/10.3406/xxs.1995.4419.
244 Pacification had long been used as a euphemism by colonial administrators and military officials. In this case it consisted of the capture, torture and murder of suspected rebels, the displacement of millions of families, and increased surveillance.
245 General Partiot, cited in Jacques Frémeaux, "Les SAS (sections administratives spécialisées)," *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains* 208, no 4 (2002): 57, https://doi.org/10.3917/gmcc.208.0055.
246 Chabi Hafida, "La Situation Sociale Des Enfants Des Harkis" (Conseil Economique et Social, 2007), 9.
247 Hafida, 7.

of employment.[248] The total number of "Muslim" military staff may have numbered around 89,000.[249] The FLN considered these groups to be "pro-French" sympathisers, alongside local civil servants and elites representing the French government known as *caïds* and *bachagas*.[250]

This entire group is often referred to collectively as harkis. It has since become widely perceived as a racial designation, with one respondent from Jordi and Hamoumou's study explaining, "We hear people talk about 'harkis' or worse, 'children of harkis,' as if being harki was like being Black or Asian."[251] Alternative designations often miss the mark as well. To discuss "pro-French sympathisers" is misleading since it implies patriotism when most auxiliaries were recruited among poor people without work or resources.[252] Still all of these individuals faced a dangerous future in revolutionary Algeria. Although the Evian Accords had contained guarantees against persecution for acts committed during the war, they were not upheld.[253] Despite this, state officials attempted to block their arrival in France. They did so by forbidding all individual initiatives by "Muslim French" to settle in the metropole - a policy of which the High Commissioner in Algeria was reminded via a confidential telegram from the Minister of Algerian Affairs, Louis Joxe, in May 1962. A separate memo directed that "Muslims" who were "too old, physically handicapped, or too young," and single women should not be transported since they were "destined effectively either to live off public charity or, with the young women, to turn to prostitution."[254] Transfers of harkis would need to receive the approval of the State Secretary of Repatriates (a position held by Robert Boulin), and prefects were ordered not to welcome harkis outside of those formally transferred.[255] Joxe explained his reticence in the following terms: "We must fight an infiltration which, under the pretext of benevolence, would … [make] us welcome undesirable elements."[256] It seemed unnecessary for Joxe to elaborate to his interlocutors what exactly made this migration undesirable. For harkis, this restrictiveness was deadly. Thousands waited around French military camps with little to eat, facing the risk of execution by the FLN if they strayed too far from the camp.[257]

With the formal transfer of sovereignty in sight, the French government revisited their entry rights. On February 21, 1962, prime minister Michel Debré commissioned an interministerial committee "for the possible repatriation of staff under the supervision of military authority" - i.e. harkis.[258] The committee's task was to prepare for the resettlement of these units in the metropole. Councillor of State Michel Massenet presided over the

248 Hafida, 8.
249 FR-PaAN-20120054, Meeting minutes of meeting held 10 April 1962, "concernant le rapatriement éventuel de personnels musulmans placés sous le contrôle des autorités militaires"
250 Yves Zehr, "Les Politiques Financières Conduites En Faveur Des Français Rapatriés" (Conseil Economique et Social, 2007).
251 Jordi and Hamoumou, *Les Harkis, Une Mémoire Enfouie*, 28.
252 Ageron, "Les supplétifs Algériens dans l'armée française pendant la guerre d'Algérie," 12.
253 One explanation for this is that the accords were negotiated by a provisional government, which was replaced at independence; but see Hafida, "La Situation Sociale Des Enfants Des Harkis," 19 for details.
254 Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France*, 231.
255 Jordi and Hamoumou, *Les Harkis, Une Mémoire Enfouie*, 38.
256 Jordi and Hamoumou, 39.
257 Jordi and Hamoumou, 39.
258 Hafida, "La Situation Sociale Des Enfants Des Harkis," 22.

committee.[259] The committee's report, issued some ninety days before the official transfer of sovereignty, concluded in no uncertain terms the gravity of the situation: "several thousand men face a life-or-death situation. We have very little time to find a solution."[260] The report deemed existing resources for their reception and care to be inadequate. The Ministry of Armies was said to lack sufficient numbers of competent staff members to arrange for the care of these "Muslim repatriates."[261] Betraying an anxiety about their arrival, the report concluded that "it would take a miracle for the State Secretary for Repatriates to take over the organisation and financing of the resettlement of Muslim refugees in France if we only have two months before the fateful date of self-determination."[262]

Despite this, two months later, Boulin confirmed by circular that his department would, indeed, assume responsibility over the transport, housing, and professional reclassification of harkis. The French army initiated the first formal repatriation of harkis, and between 23 June and 28 September 1962, almost 50,000 arrived in Marseille.[263] From there, they were transferred on to guarded military camps. Run by the army, the camps were funded almost entirely by the Ministry of Repatriates (est. 1962) to the tune of some 23.5 billion fr between 1962 and 1964.[264] They were located in Rivesaltes, Saint-Maurice l'Ardoise, Bourg-Lastic and Larzac.[265] The latter two were emergency shelters or military bases, while the former two were intended as more permanent accommodation when the former were overrun.[266] Specialist centres were created for harkis judged in need of specialist care, for example because they were (physically or mentally) sick or disabled,[267] elderly, or otherwise unable to work.[268] Saint-Maurice l'Ardoise closed briefly only to reopen at the end of 1964 for such cases.[269]

Other harkis managed to arrange their own transport to the metropole, in defiance of Joxe's May 1962 telegram forbidding the same and of some Algerian officials' refusal to issue the police authorisations necessary for an individual to make the voyage.[270] Upon arrival in the metropole, some prefects refused to endorse Algerians' employment and lodging certificates, which, according to one civil servant, should anyways only have been required for "ordinary" migrants, not Algerians, given the freedom of movement established in the Evian Accords.[271]

259 FR-PaAN-20120054 Procès-verbal de la réunion tenue le mardi 10 avril 1962 et concernant le rapatriement éventuel de personnels musulmans placés sous le contrôle des autorités militaires.

260 FR-PaAN-20120054 Procès-verbal de la réunion tenue le mardi 10 avril 1962 et concernant le rapatriement éventuel de personnels musulmans placés sous le contrôle des autorités militaires, p 9.

261 FR-PaAN-20120054 Procès-verbal de la réunion tenue le mardi 10 avril 1962 et concernant le rapatriement éventuel de personnels musulmans placés sous le contrôle des autorités militaires, p 10

262 FR-PaAN-20120054-Procès-verbal de la réunion tenue le mardi 10 avril 1962 et concernant le rapatriement éventuel de personnels musulmans placés sous le contrôle des autorités militaires, p 10

263 Jordi and Hamoumou, *Les Harkis, Une Mémoire Enfouie*, 43.

264 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965.

265 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857- Report, "sur l'application de la loi de 26 décembre 1961," p 104.

266 Jeannette E Miller, "A Camp for Foreigners and 'Aliens': The Harkis' Exile at the Rivesaltes Camp (1962-1964)," *French Politics, Culture & Society*, Special Issue: Algerian legacies in metropolitan France, 31, no 3 (Winter 2013): 26.

267 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Note, "Concernant le service des Français musulmans," 6 May 1968.

268 Tom Charbit, "Un Petit Monde Colonial En Métropole: Le Camp de Harkis de Saint-Maurice-L'Ardoise (1962-1976)," *Politix* 4, no 76 (2006): 35.

269 Charbit, 33.

270 FR-PaAN-20120054, Report by Michel Massenet, 4 April 1962.

271 FR-PaAN-20120054, Report by Michel Massenet, 4 April 1962.

In addition, they were subject to health checks to detect contagious diseases. Those who did not pass would be sent back.[272] Drawing attention to the extortionate travel fees associated with transport the metropole, "we are forced to admit," lamented one top civil servant in 1962, "that freedom of movement… is non-existent."[273] Ultimately, by 1965 the number of "Muslim repatriates" totalled anywhere from 50,000 to 60,000.[274] By a 1965 estimate, about four-fifths of this figure passed through camps, and one-fifth arrived on their own.[275] This had consequences on their citizenship rights. Apparently, judges were not very favourable to the requests for nationality by harkis who did not pass through the camps.[276]

5.4. Caribbean citizens and the Windrush generation

5.4.1. Overview

Like France after 1946, the UK historically granted one common, 'indivisible' status to all those born within its empire. Rather than nationality, however, the relevant status was British subjecthood. It conferred few rights and was rather a symbol of conquest. British legislators reinvigorated the imperial doctrine of indivisibility[277] with a 1948 act that created several different forms of citizenship, including the Citizenship of the UK and Colonies (CUKC). Equipped with formal equality of citizenship, over 150,000 Caribbeans migrated to the British Isles from 1955 to 1960. Over 75 per cent were Jamaican.[278] Later, arrivals from India and Pakistan reached similar numbers. Despite gaping labour shortages that had prompted the recruitment of over 180,000 white prisoners-of-war and other displaced persons from European refugee camps, the British public received UK citizens of the colonies with disdain. Gradually, British immigration policy walked back entry rights of this group using thinly veiled racial exclusions in the 1962, 1968 and 1971 Immigration Acts.

5.4.2. British empire

Beveridge's proposals were famously 'universal' in scope. But what did universalism mean in an empire like Britain? Even before decolonisation profoundly changed the character of the British political community, its boundaries had never neatly and cohesively contained a national population. This was true on two levels. First, Great Britain has always been "multinational."

272 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-L'avenir des structures administratives chargés de la migration algérienne-Massent, "La migration algérienne et l'administration français."
273 FR-PaAN-20120054, Report by Michel Massenet, 4 April 1962.
274 FR-PaAN-20120054/1, Note, 24 June 1965 puts this number at 50,000. FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p. 104. A year later, FR-PaAN-20120054/67, exposé du Colonel Schoen, 1 April 1966 counts 60,000 such arrivals. Meanwhile, Hafida, "La Situation Sociale Des Enfants Des Harkis," 25, cites 66,000.
275 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p. 104. Another report, however, puts the number of "Muslim" repatriates slightly higher, at 25,000, which would constitute just over one third of the total.
276 FR-PaAN-20120054/10-Letter on the occasion of the visit of M Lahkdhari, 25 March 1963.
277 Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation*, 44.
278 Grant, *Homecoming: Voices of the Windrush Generation*, 42.

From 1536 to 1707, the Kingdom of England included Wales. From the 1707 Act of Union onwards, the kingdom united with the Kingdom of Scotland to form the Kingdom of Great Britain.[279] Second and more pertinently for the purposes of this project, Britain has a long history of colonisation and imperial expansion.

As Bhambra convincingly argues, the character of the British community has always been *imperial* rather than national.[280] North America and the Caribbean were a central focus during early British colonisation efforts. By the 17th century, most indigenous inhabitants of the Caribbean islands had been massacred by pandemics brought by Spanish and Portuguese colonisers.[281] In 1627, English colonists settled Barbados, and in 1655, a British expedition captured Jamaica. Most other islands passed through periods of settlement by different European powers before coming under British control.[282] In these territories, slavery was instituted to cultivate tobacco, rice and sugarcane. After the American War of Independence in the late eighteenth century, Britain invaded new territories and founded new colonies, including in East Africa, Southeast Asia and Australia. By the eve of the Second World War the British empire encompassed approximately one quarter of the earth's population.[283] Different colonial territories were governed according to different principles. In some places, white settlers ruled without much or any input from London after having displaced, dispossessed and/or killed local communities. Examples in the twentieth century included Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe), and Canada. In others, the London-based British government - known colloquially as Whitehall - had more authority.[284] For Brubaker, "ties of allegiance knit together the British empire, not the British nation."[285]

In the 19th century, Shilliam argues, several events laid to rest any pretences the British had about the unity of their empire.[286] Debates about abolition revealed the pervasive sentiment that Black subjects were not prepared for self-governance; upon abolition in 1834, the enslaved were not rendered free but transformed into apprentices.[287] In 1865, the British colonial governor of Jamaica violently crushed an uprising in Morant Bay, Jamaica, producing a major "crisis of conscience" in Britain.[288] Hundreds were indiscriminately slaughtered and those thought responsible for the riot were arrested and executed without trial. Parliamentary debates in the aftermath of the uprising implied that freedmen were too anarchic to be entrusted with self-governance.[289] In concert, white settler colonies gradually obtained more political rights. By the turn of the twentieth century, many colonies had won some degree of independence,

279 Goodman, *Immigration and Membership Politics in Western Europe*, 141. See also Ron Ramdin, *Reimaging Britain: 500 Years of Black and Asian History* (London: Pluto Press, 1999), 38.
280 Bhambra, "Relations of Extraction, Relations of Redistribution."
281 Mike Phillips and Trevor Phillips, *Windrush: The Irresistable Rise of Multi-Racial Britain* (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1998), 10.
282 Phillips and Phillips, 10.
283 Ramdin, *Reimaging Britain: 500 Years of Black and Asian History*, 112.
284 Ashley Jackson, *The British Empire: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford University Press, 2013), 10, https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780199605415.001.0001.
285 Brubaker in Goodman, *Immigration and Membership Politics in Western Europe*, 142.
286 Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor: From Abolition to Brexit*, 43.
287 Shilliam, 36.
288 Shilliam, 38.
289 Shilliam, 41.

typically becoming Dominions first. For example, Canada achieved independent status in the 1870s and Australia became an independent Federation in 1900.[290]

5.4.3. Citizenship in empire

Most attempts to legally pin down the meaning of membership in British empire elaborate on a concept of *subjecthood* rather than national citizenship. The emphasis was on conferring a common, unified status of British subjecthood to all those born within its empire.[291] Specifically, as of 1608, when English courts ruled that a Scottish child was an English subject, all residents of empire were to "enjoy precisely the same relationship with the monarch" – that of an allegiant subject.[292] The implication was of a direct bond between King and subject, no matter where in the empire they lived. Rather than indicating generosity, it was a "symbol of British power and ownership," as award of citizenship was part of a broader process of conquest.[293] Subjecthood did not guarantee freedom of movement within the empire.[294]

By the late 19th and early 20th century, individual Dominions within the Empire had begun to develop their own naturalisation laws in order to have more control over immigration. Some conflicted with one another. This prompted the 1914 British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, which was primarily aimed at ensuring that a "British subject anywhere [in any Dominion or colony] is a British subject everywhere."[295] The 1914 law enacted uniform naturalisation procedures, and established British nationality as a status acquired by being born or naturalised within His Majesty's dominions (for men) and additionally by marriage (for married women, whose subjecthood was determined by that of her husband).[296] Because of its historic reliance on *jus soli* principles (according to which citizenship is conferred by birth on national soil), rather than *jus sanguinis* (where citizenship follows from birth to citizen parents), Goodman sees UK "citizenship" policy up until 1981 as quite liberal, although its inclusive bent stood in sharp contrast to the flimsy, inchoate, and "ill-defined" nature of the membership it represented.[297]

The doctrine of universal subjecthood came under attack the same year that the National Insurance Act was passed. In 1946, the Canadian prime minister announced a law defining Canadian citizenship as a primary legal status, separate from and legally superior to British subjecthood. Henceforth, British subjecthood would flow from the former, rather than vice

290 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffins, and Helen Tiffin, *Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts*, 2nd ed (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 42.

291 E.J.B Rose, *Colour and Citizenship: A Report on British Race Relations*, Oxford University Press (London, New York, Toronto, 1969).

292 Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation*, 39.

293 Phillips and Phillips, *Windrush: The Irresistable Rise of Multi-Racial Britain*, 74.

294 Daniel C Turack, "Freedom of Movement Within the British Commonwealth," *The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa* 1, no 3 (1968): 478.

295 M Page Baldwin, "Subject to Empire: Married Women and the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act," *Journal of British Studies* 40, no 4 (October 2001): 527.

296 Baldwin, "Subject to Empire: Married Women and the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act."

297 Goodman, *Immigration and Membership Politics in Western Europe*, 139; she also cites the relatively short duration of required residence in the territory (5 years, or 3 years for spouses) and the allowance of dual citizenship.

versa. The British government worried that this undermined the common status of British subjecthood and, if it set a precedent, could lead to the dissolution of the Commonwealth.[298] The prime minister Clement Attlee and his cabinet convened experts from the Commonwealth countries to devise recommendations on how to respond. The committee's recommendations formed the basis of the British Nationality Act, which eventually passed in 1948, the same year as the National Assistance Act.

The British Nationality Act established six categories of citizenship. Most British subjects fell under one of the first two: Citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies (CUKC) and Citizenship of Independent Commonwealth Countries (CICC). At the time the bill was drafted, CICC included only Canada, but eventually applied to New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, Newfoundland, India, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia and Ceylon. The Act allowed CICC countries to extend citizenship under any conditions they wanted, but once it was granted, their citizens would become British subjects automatically.[299] The 1948 Act also established free entry into the United Kingdom for all parts of British empire.[300] Besides the desire to protect the political integrity of empire, officials were worried what the dissolution of Commonwealth ties might mean for the British economy. Although trade with Europe grew faster than trade with the Commonwealth, the latter imported almost three times as many British exports as Europe's six core economies.[301] Following this 1948 Act, the citizenship and entry rights of someone born and raised in Kingston, Jamaica or Kingston-upon-Thames, England, were, on paper, unequivocally identical. In this sense, the British modelled their work after the 1946 constitution of the Fourth Republic and the creation of French Union citizenship. For Shepard, both French and British reforms emerged must be understood in light of the post-war context in which democracy had emerged victorious over fascism, *and* elites wanted to keep control of their empires.[302]

Many commentators have underscored the veritable *Britishness* of colonial migrants in the post-war period to buttress arguments against their (subsequently) unjust treatment. This is particularly common in discussions of the Windrush generation. Named after the HMT Empire Windrush, one of the earliest ships to carry fee-paying migrants from Jamaica to the British Isles, the Windrush generation refers to the thousands of Caribbean-born individuals who arrived in the UK from 1948 to 1962. When their territories of origin gained independence, their rights of stay were subject to renegotiation. Many did not acquire residence permits. In late 2017, reporting by the Guardian revealed that they were being threatened with detention and deportation even though many of the affected were of retirement age and had lived in the UK for over half a century. As public outrage mounted, the Home Office apologised for what would become known as the 'Windrush scandal.' Labour MP David Lammy has emphasised that "the Windrush generation are the British people – their citizenship is, and

298 Kathleen Paul, *Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Post-war Era* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997), 16.

299 The other citizenship categories included Irish British subjects, British subjects without citizenship, British Protected Persons, and aliens.

300 Turack, "Freedom of Movement Within the British Commonwealth," 478.

301 Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor: From Abolition to Brexit*, 93.

302 Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France*, 40.

always has been, theirs by right."[303] El-Enany takes issue with this interpretation. She argues that "citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies" was meaningfully distinct from British citizenship and operated as little more than a "euphemism for British subjecthood."[304] Nonetheless, as distinct as the status may have been from future iterations, it did grant its holders a British passport and entry rights. The formal citizenship regime remained intact until the British Nationality Act of 1981, which established a *British* citizenship, revoked *jus soli* principles, and overall marked a crucial departure from Britain's "imperial past."[305]

5.4.4. Black in the Union Jack

Gilroy, in his eponymous novel, subverts the assumption that *There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack* by arguing that a "black presence" is conceptually and historically integral to the UK.[306] This is in tension with the standpoint of scholars like Hansen, who view racial heterogeneity as novel.[307] As Fryer shows, the first recorded presence of Africans in Britain dates back to the third century AD, when a "division of Moors"[308] was deployed to defend Hadrian's wall, the northeastern frontier of the Roman Empire in what is now southern England.[309] From the 1570s onward, the presence of Black Africans in the UK was unmistakeable, although by that time, their migration was mostly forced: many were enslaved as domestic servants.[310] Still, their presence was large enough to attract the skepticism and disapproval of Queen Elizabeth, who tried, in vain, to limit their arrival.[311] In the nineteenth century West African, Asian (or *lascar*), and Caribbean sailors who were hired in engine rooms on British steam ships settled in British port towns like Cardiff, Bristol and Liverpool.[312] Additionally, a growing number of British families returned to the UK from India with Indian servants.[313]

These facts notwithstanding, in numbers alone, for much of British history "emigration" took precedence over immigration. Emigration is sometimes a euphemism for colonisation, as white settlers displaced, dispossessed, or killed local populations, established plantation economies, and introduced enslaved or otherwise unfree labour regimes.[314] Usually this was done to exploit natural resources and serve a domestic market for sugar, coffee, tea, tobacco

303 cited in El-Enany, *Bordering Britain*, 32.
304 El-Enany, 88–89.
305 Zig Layton-Henry et al., "Britain: The Would-Be-Zero-Immigration Country," in *Controlling Immigration* (Stanford University Press, 2004), 306.
306 Paul Gilroy, *"There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack": The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation* (London: Hutchinson, 1987), 14.
307 Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation*, 3. Hansen technically is concerned with the "UK's transformation from a largely homogeneous society into a multicultural society," but by "multicultural" he means "multiracial," as he specifies that he chooses the former term because it is "less offensive" than the latter.
308 "Moor" was an ambiguous designation by Romans and subsequently Christians to refer to Muslims, Arabs, Berbers or dark-skinned people living in Europe or North Africa. The term was an exonym, meaning the people to whom it referred did not refer to themselves as such.
309 Peter Fryer, *Staying Power: The History of Black People in Britain* (1984; repr., London: Pluto Press, 2010), 1.
310 Fryer, 14.
311 Fryer, 14.
312 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878-Editorial by R.H Woodcock, "Of course, I've no objection myself, but...", May 1959, p 7
313 Ramdin, *Reimaging Britain: 500 Years of Black and Asian History*, 60.
314 Ashcroft, Griffins, and Tiffin, *Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts*, 61.

and other commodities in Britain. The printing press and the transmission of knowledge by travellers and authors facilitated emigration by informing a wider public about the "idea of empire."[315] Accordingly, at certain points in history, emigration was viewed in a positive light by the British public, as a way of improving one's lot.[316] At other times and for other people, emigration was involuntary. Williams, who would later become the first prime minister of Trinidad, chronicles how transportation (in essence, deportation) to the colonies was a common punishment under the harsh laws of feudal England for crimes as varied as burning stacks of corn, stealing cloth, or maiming cattle.[317] Upon arrival, the deported emigrant was bound to servitude. In every decade from 1870s onwards, there was a pressure group trying to collectivise existing efforts to move the poor to the settler colonies.[318] In this or another way, in last half of the nineteenth century, an estimated 7.5 million Britons went to Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa.[319] From every decade from 1850 to 1980 (except in the 1930s), the UK experienced net emigration year on year.[320] A further migration flow, only partly voluntary, came after the abolition of slavery, when Britain sanctioned inter-imperial migration as a way of encouraging the replacement of the formerly enslaved labour force. Between 1838 and 1917, 500,000 indentured labourers moved from India to the Caribbean as part of this process.[321]

In light of the above, Foks argues that we ought to consider migration from the colonies as "migration in the opposite 'direction'... [of] a long-running circuit of outward migration."[322] Nonetheless, by the late 1800s, the number of students from overseas began to pick up, especially in London. During the First World War, these numbers increased even more as the empire was called upon to supply labour for British military efforts.[323] In 1914, Britain's largest trained military force was the Indian army, which had over 150,000 men.[324] They fought in Europe, as well as the Middle East and in Africa. Most colonial soldiers fought in segregated regiments led by white officers until December 1915 when segregation of troops was stopped. Consequently, colonial soldiers had the opportunity to speak to other citizens of empire to discuss their rights and demands.[325] Like its European neighbours, the UK turned again to its colonies during the Second World War. At first, the Colonial Office was reluctant to fill vacancies with Caribbeans due to fears of "racial conflicts."[326] Eventually, explicit racial discrimination relaxed as England started losing aircrew.[327] The UK military recruited some

315 Ramdin, *Reimaging Britain: 500 Years of Black and Asian History*, 4.
316 Foks, "Emigration State," 174.
317 Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 11.
318 Foks, "Emigration State," 176.
319 Ramdin, *Reimaging Britain: 500 Years of Black and Asian History*, 41.
320 Foks, "Emigration State," 170.
321 Lomarsh Roopnarine, "Indian Indentured Servitude in the Atlantic World" (Oxford University Press, March 30, 2017), https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199730414-0210.
322 Foks, "Emigration State," 171.
323 Lucassen, *The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe since 1850*, 113.
324 *Combat and the Colonies: The Role of Race in World War I*, 2022, https://www.facinghistory.org/resource-library/combat-colonies-role-race-world-war-i.
325 *Combat and the Colonies: The Role of Race in World War I*.
326 Lucassen, *The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe since 1850*, 118.
327 Phillips and Phillips, *Windrush: The Irresistable Rise of Multi-Racial Britain*, 30.

8,000 mainly Jamaican men as pilots or ground crew (like gunners) in the Royal Air Force (RAF), plus some as machine workers in ammunition factories in the Northwest and some in the forestry service in Scotland.[328] These recruits were volunteers who were motivated only partly by the desire to come to the aid of the 'mother country.' One recruit explained their reasons for enrolling as follows.

> England was being pulverised in the first stage of the war. If you stayed here, and heard about Coventry being bombed, you felt like you had a duty, for one. Plus, one day at a dentist's chair, I picked up a copy of *Mein Kampf*... I came across a passage where Hitler described black people and Jews as semi-developed, anthropoid, that sort of thing. Very derogatory terms. And, as a young man, I said, To hell with you.[329]

5.4.5. Will the last one out turn off the lights?

In the late 1940s, British subjects of colour in the UK likely numbered just shy of 30,000.[330] Following the 1948 British Nationality Act, this figure increased. Although the Act was not particularly innovative, mostly reaffirming the status quo as it had existed for decades, it was still important, since after it was passed, migration to the UK was sanctioned by legal statute and not just by informal convention.[331] With this in mind, some have classified British migration policy in the immediate decades after the Second World War as a "very liberal regime," given that it allowed unrestricted immigration from the colonies and the Commonwealth.[332] Others have pointed out the informal administrative measures to discourage and restrict entry, casting aspersions on the liberal character of British immigration regime.[333] For example, the British government informally cooperated with the "Asian Dominions" to limit travel to the UK, predominantly by encouraging/pressuring newly independent Indian and Pakistani governments to withhold passports or make their issuance more conditional. Consequently the Indian government introduced the requirements of a literacy test, a health certificate and a financial guarantee (of 1,500 rupees or roughly £112) for the acquisition of regular passports.[334] According to the Chancellor Iain Macleod, "West Indian governments" equally showed an "understanding of the problems involved in migration to this country and a readiness to cooperate."[335]

Despite the government's efforts at dissuasion, migration from the colonies continued unabated. In the immediate post-war period up until the early 1960s, most colonial migrants came from the West Indies. The second largest numbers came from the Indian subcontinent,

328 Lucassen, *The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe since 1850*, 118.
329 Phillips and Phillips, *Windrush: The Irresistable Rise of Multi-Racial Britain*, 20.
330 El-Enany, *Bordering Britain*, 81.
331 Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation*, 35.
332 Layton-Henry et al., "Britain: The Would-Be-Zero-Immigration Country," 301.
333 Ian R.G Spencer, *British Immigration Policy since 1939 : The Making of Multi-Racial Britain* (London: Routledge, 1997).
334 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878-Hansard, "Immigration from the Commonwealth," 17 November 1959.
335 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878-Hansard, "West Indies, Migrants to the United Kingdom," 1 December 1960.

pushed in no small part due to the establishment of two independent states of India and Pakistan in 1947 which led to horrific communal violence and the dislocation of 15 million people.[336] As Phillips and Phillips explain, because so many had joined in British war efforts, they also "knew what it felt like to live in London and Leicester and Lancashire. They had seen new and surprising possibilities," and consequently, it became "impossible to control their aspirations in a Caribbean colony."[337] In 1948, 492 Caribbeans arrived on the *HMT Empire Windrush.*[338] Originally, the ship was sent to Jamaica to collect West Indian RAF staff who were on leave - these made up about 200-300 of the total number of passengers. The ship had extra capacity and offered those places to fee-paying passengers who wanted to come to England.[339] The arrival of the ship attracted public attention.[340] Prime Minister Attlee openly worried that their arrival would impair the "harmony, strength and cohesion" of British public life.[341]

It would be several years until immigration reached the numbers implied by concerns of this nature. The "great bulk" of Caribbean immigration to Britain began and ended in less than ten years between 1955 and 1962.[342] In 1952, the US had limited the number of migrants who could enter the US from the Caribbean, making Britain an even more attractive destination for potential migrants.[343] Subsequently, from 1955-1960, the Home Office estimated 161,450 arrivals from the West Indies compared to 33,070 arrivals from India and 17,120 from Pakistan.[344] Estimates from an Under-Secretary of State of the total population in 1959 are similar: 125,000 Caribbeans compared to 40,000 Indians and 20,000 Pakistanis.[345] Indeed, so many people migrated that Caribbeans themselves joked, "will the last person out please turn off all the lights?"[346] Initially, migrants were mostly single men who planned to save and return home: the average age of a passenger on the HMT Empire Windrush was 24.[347] In 1960, the relative numbers of Caribbeans in the UK started to decline as Asian immigration rose sharply to reach Caribbean levels.[348] From 1960-1962, reports indicate there were around 98,090 Caribbean arrivals compared to 42,000 and 50,170 arrivals from India and Pakistan respectively.[349]

Lucassen argues that annual immigration patterns were closely linked to the rhythm of employment and unemployment on British Isles.[350] Labour shortages in post-war Britain were as real as in its continental European counterparts. Shortages were exacerbated by extensive

336 Ramdin, *Reimaging Britain: 500 Years of Black and Asian History*, 165.
337 Phillips and Phillips, *Windrush: The Irresistable Rise of Multi-Racial Britain*, 45.
338 El-Enany, *Bordering Britain*, 81.
339 Phillips and Phillips, *Windrush: The Irresistable Rise of Multi-Racial Britain*, 48.
340 Phillips and Phillips, 69.
341 Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor: From Abolition to Brexit*, 86.
342 Phillips and Phillips, *Windrush: The Irresistable Rise of Multi-Racial Britain*, 120.
343 Phillips and Phillips, 120.
344 El-Enany, *Bordering Britain*, 102.
345 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878-Hansard, 17 November 1958.
346 Grant, *Homecoming: Voices of the Windrush Generation*, 43.
347 Grant, 43.
348 Ramdin, *Reimaging Britain: 500 Years of Black and Asian History*, 167.
349 El-Enany, *Bordering Britain*, 102.
350 Lucassen, *The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe since 1850*.

emigration, despite the British government's best efforts to encourage Brits to stay put: in 1947, Churchill implored "lively and active citizens in the prime of life" who had applied to emigrate to white Commonwealth countries not to desert Britain.[351] Nonetheless, from 1951 to 1998, around 7.3 million UK citizens left for non-European destinations like Australia, Canada, the US, and New Zealand.[352] Despite these circumstances, state-sponsored recruitment in British colonies was minimal, with the exception of a small number of work schemes. For example, the British Transport Commission sent a recruiting team to Barbados and ultimately employed about 4,000 Caribbeans.[353] In contrast, the UK government did recruit white workers from Eastern Europe. In 1946, under Operation Westward Ho! the Ministry of Labour recruited 180,000 foreigners from the Balkans, Italy, and Yugoslavia from DP and refugee camps to work in jobs in agriculture and mining (for the men) or textile, healthcare and education (for the women).[354] Known as European Volunteer Workers (EVWs), many were former prisoners of war, and some were accused of war crimes.[355] To recruit them additionally required modifying immigration laws, with the Polish Resettlement Act passed in 1946 to clear the way for their arrival.[356] As Olusoga remarks, "at its most extreme, it was government policy to give preference to men who had fought against Britain over men who were veterans of British forces."[357]

5.4.6. Racial exclusions

Starting in the 1960s, policymakers slowly but surely revoked the entry rights of non-white colonial citizens through nefarious legal means that severed the link between citizenship and entry rights. The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, introduced by the Conservative government under Harold Macmillan, decisively ended any legal liberalism there was to be found in the regime. The Act made CUKC citizens subject to entry restrictions, i.e. reliant on an entry voucher issued by the Ministry of Labour, unless they were born in the UK, held a passport issued under the authority of the UK government (rather than a colonial government), or were included in such a passport as a family member.[358] If the applicants in question had a job offer or skills required in the British workforce, there were no limits on how many entry vouchers could be issued. If not, they were subject to a quota system, the levels of which would be determined by government.[359] In 1965, a quota was introduced limiting the number of labour migrants from the 'New Commonwealth' countries to 8,500, 1,000 of which were reserved for migrants from Malta.

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351 Grant, *Homecoming: Voices of the Windrush Generation*, 41.
352 Timothy J Hatton, "Emigration from the UK, 1870-1913 and 1950-1998," *European Review of Economic History* 8 (2004): 153.
353 Lucassen, *The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe since 1850*, 174.
354 Schuster, *Poortwachters over Immigranten: Het Debat over Immigratie in Het Naoorlogse Groot-Britannië En Nederland*, 27.
355 *The Unwanted: The Secret Windrush Files* (BBC, 2019), https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/m00068sk.
356 Phillips and Phillips, *Windrush: The Irresistable Rise of Multi-Racial Britain*, 79.
357 *The Unwanted: The Secret Windrush Files*.
358 Layton-Henry et al., "Britain: The Would-Be-Zero-Immigration Country," 301.
359 James McKay, "The Passage of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, a Case-Study of Backbench Power," *Observatoire de La Société Britannique*, no 6 (June 1, 2008), https://doi.org/10.4000/osb.433.

In the late 1960s, policymakers drafted new legislation in response to a new wave of immigration. A large community of around 200,000 Asians living in Kenya opted to retain British citizenship at Kenyan independence in 1963. Following 'Africanisation' policies by President Jomo Kenyatta, their future in the newly independent country was uncertain. Because their passports had been issued by the colonial governor, who subsequently became high commissioner on independence, their British passports were issued under the authority of the British government. As a result, their entry rights were secure even after the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act. To this end, in 1967, 13,600 Kenyan Asians arrived in the UK.[360] The migration immediately attracted the attention of the media, who exaggerated their figures.[361] As the opposition threatened strict measures to prevent their arrival, the MP Duncan Sandy submitted a bill in which he called for a stop to this immigration. Its proponents agreed that the bill needed to be passed in the shortest possible time to prevent an additional influx of migrants. The bill was accepted only a week after it was submitted.[362] This 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act further restricted the rights of colonial citizens. Specifically, it relied on the new concept of patriality. *Patrials* were those British subjects who were born, adopted or naturalised in Britain, or whose parents or grandparents were born, adopted or naturalised in Britain. Following this Act, only patrials would have free entry into the UK, and non-patrials could only come if they got one of the 1,500 visas made available by the British government every year.[363] A 1971 Immigration Act further enshrined this practice. Consequently, CUKC citizens could be treated like aliens.

Among scholars there is little debate that the 1962 Act, and its 1968 and 1971 successors were explicitly designed to keep out migrants of colour.[364] For Shilliam, the 1962 Act "entrenched Britain's racialised division of labour" by restricting the amount of Black and Asian labour that could 'threaten' the benefits gained by white labour.[365] Part of the reason for this lack of controversy is the overt racism animating British public life at the time. Almost immediately upon arrival, Caribbeans experienced racial discrimination in housing, employment, and policing. Many reported, for instance, that a landlord who had advertised a room and confirmed its availability would suddenly change their mind, often to admit that they "don't want black people."[366] When they did get a room in an overcrowded flat, sometimes without easy access to running water or a stove, they reported being charged over twice as much as a white person might be charged for an entire flat.[367] Employment discrimination directed Black and Asian arrivals to the lowest rungs of the market for manual labour.[368] They also

360 Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation*, 160.
361 Schuster, *Poortwachters over Immigranten: Het Debat over Immigratie in Het Naoorlogse Groot-Britannië En Nederland*, 67.
362 Schuster, 69.
363 Schuster, 69.
364 El-Enany, *Bordering Britain*; Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation*.
365 Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor: From Abolition to Brexit*, 94.
366 Phillips and Phillips, *Windrush: The Irresistable Rise of Multi-Racial Britain*, 90.
367 Phillips and Phillips, 135.
368 Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor: From Abolition to Brexit*, 82.

reported being disproportionately targeted for 'sus' or 'suspected person' charges under the Vagrancy Act of 1824, which gave the police leeway to arrest people on very little grounds.[369]

This was the context in which racial and racist tensions erupted onto the political scene. In 1958, a group of white youths that identified as part of a counter-culture known as the Teddy Boys began to provoke, threaten and attack Black men.[370] The "race riots," as they would be known, began in Nottingham and subsequently took hold in London, which saw multi-day rioting. Public opinion latched on to the idea that the riots were a result of immigration increases, rather than of racism and the Teddy Boys' political aims. Among Black communities, in the aftermath of this violence the Black Power movement that had begun to reach new heights in the US began to gain traction as it was "woven into existing traditions of struggle transmitted from Caribbean and South Asian heritages."[371] Around the same time, the UK witnessed a virulently racist election campaign. In 1964, a seat that had been occupied for almost two decades by Labour flipped to a Conservative who campaigned on the slogan, "if you want a n***** for a neighbour vote Labour."[372] His opponent had spoken out against the new Immigration Act.[373] This election paved the way for the infamous 'Rivers of Blood' speech in 1968 by the Conservative Enoch Powell, in which Powell blended invasion and war metaphors with accusations that racialised people were stealing hospital beds, school places, and homes.[374] Although the opposition leader Edward Heath sacked Powell from the Shadow Cabinet, Powell had irreversibly made racial exclusions more palatable to the British public. By 1969 Heath had begun urging government to halt all immigration.[375]

369 Phillips and Phillips, *Windrush: The Irresistable Rise of Multi-Racial Britain*, 357.
370 Phillips and Phillips, 177.
371 Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor: From Abolition to Brexit*, 5.
372 Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation*, 15.
373 Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor: From Abolition to Brexit*, 95.
374 Shilliam, 100.
375 Phillips and Phillips, *Windrush: The Irresistable Rise of Multi-Racial Britain*, 245.

6. The struggle over Westernness: (post)colonial migrants in the Dutch welfare state

[Our] task involved - and still involves - the integration of an important number of citizens, who were attuned to the way of life in Indonesia, into the cultural and social system here. This integration entails the *transformation of the entire relocated person,* not only in a material, social and cultural sense, but also in a spiritual sense.

Report by Protestant Churches of the Netherlands, 1950[1]

6.1. Introduction

This chapter is devoted to the provisions made available to migrants from present-day Indonesia in the Netherlands. The analysis is divided by attention to social assistance (6.2) and old-age pensions (6.3), which was the first national (rather than employee) insurance scheme in the Netherlands. I find that exclusion from the distributive community was mostly accomplished through citizenship and immigration law, while social legislation was relatively inclusive: all migrants from Indonesia could request social assistance under the municipal system of poor relief (although assistance was granted at the discretion of local officials until 1965), and all residents of the Netherlands were mandatorily included in the General Old Age Act (AOW).

However, the texture of inclusion varied across differently racialised groups of migrants. A relatively generous regime including income transfers under national group schemes for war victims and repatriates, the 1965 General Assistance Act and entitlement under the transitional rules of the AOW awaited those whom the colonial state had recognised as Dutch citizens, whom the postcolonial state recognised as repatriates. However, those who were racialised as culturally distant "Eastern" citizens experienced paternalistic forms of welfare that involved elaborate efforts to stamp out culturally deviant traits. Regrettants, despite mostly lacking citizenship upon arrival, ultimately joined repatriates in a regime of hyper-assimilation as, driven by an ideological contest over their cultural proximity, their exclusion from the AOW transitional rules was reversed in 1961. Moluccans benefited from these lobbying efforts as policymakers could see no valid reason to exclude them from the transitional rules once regrettants had access. However, their experience of the post-war Dutch welfare state still most closely resembles ghettoisation.

6.2. Targeted, in-kind social assistance

6.2.1. Formal entitlements

In the immediate post-war period, the administration of social assistance in the Netherlands was largely in the hands of municipal social services departments that had emerged out of

1 NL-UtA-1405-391-"Rapport inzake de geestelijke verzorging der gerepatrieerden namens de Protestantse Kerken in Nederland (ZD)."

civic poor boards and poor councils prior to the Second World War (see 4.2.5). These services were responsible for offering financial assistance and for coordinating the efforts of charitable organisations and churches who were interested in staying involved in helping the needy but lacked sufficient resources of their own.

The entitlement of (post)colonial migrants under this system was not guaranteed, but neither was the entitlement of *anyone*. During the discussions of the "new" 1912 Poor Law, a socialist MP proposed such an entitlement, and it was explicitly rejected.[2] Until 1965, assistance was granted on a case-by-case basis, rather than as a right. In practice, local institutions (charitable, private, or civic) did assist needy foreigners, suggesting that nationality was not a criterion of entitlement.[3] Oostindie has argued that "there were few political debates about limiting access to [this] social assistance [for Indonesian migrants]. At the time of the mass migration from Indonesia, the overall level of such assistance was very modest anyway."[4] Ellemers and Vaillant confirm that in emergency situations, repatriates could claim municipal assistance.[5] Indeed, the CCKP, an umbrella organisation for the private care of repatriates from Indonesia (see 6.2.3), admitted that financial assistance, or "material care," required the involvement of municipal services. "Appeals to municipal social services will be necessary on several occasions," a CCKP official admitted, and strongly recommended that local committees of their organisation include a representative of municipal services for this reason.[6]

When in 1963 the General Assistance Act was introduced, it explicitly renounced government obligations toward non-citizens.[7] The first article of the law reads that municipal assistance will be granted to "every Dutch citizen who finds himself [*sic*] or threatens to find himself in such circumstances that he lacks the means to provide for the necessary costs of existence."[8] Practically speaking this meant that regrettants would be excluded unless and until they could naturalise as Dutch citizens, which frequently took place years and sometimes decades after their arrival in the Netherlands.[9] Equally, Moluccans, most of whom were stateless, lacked entitlements under the General Assistance Act. For both these groups, a targeted scheme was in place instead, as described in sections 6.2.4 and 6.2.5.

6.2.2. Evacués

If repatriates formally had access to social assistance until 1965, the inclusion of repatriates was primarily assured through targeted assistance schemes. The first such scheme fell under general provisions for emergency evacuation. Back in the Netherlands Indies, liberating British forces

2 van Leeuwen, "Armenzorg 1912-1965: Van Centrum Naar Periferie," 522.
3 Inventory of the archives of the *Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken: Afdeling Volksgezondheid En Armwezen, (1892) 1910-1918*, 2.04.54, Nationaal Archief, Den Haag. 2021, 10.
4 Oostindie, "Postcolonial Migrants in the Netherlands: Identity Politics versus the Fragmentation of Community," 112.
5 Ellemers and Vaillant, *Indische Nederlanders En Gerepatrieerden*, 49.
6 NL-StRo-1402-614-"Leidraad," August 1950, p 6.
7 "Memorie van Toelichting - Wijziging van de Algemene Bijstandswet, Inzake de Bijstandsverlening Aan Vreemdelingen," Pub L No 20459, KST20459N3K2 (1988), https://www.socialezekerheidsstelsel.nl/id/vk11nknnpqz9/memorie_van_toelichting_wijziging_van_de.
8 Wet van 13 juni 1963, houdende nieuwe regelen betreffende de verlening van bijstand door de overheid (Algemene Bijstandswet), Stb. 284
9 Laarman, *Oude Onbekenden: Het Politieke En Publieke Debat over Postkoloniale Migranten, 1945-2005*, 69–70.

set up an emergency military apparatus called the Recovery of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees (RAPWI). RAPWI offered war victims medical assistance and, where necessary, evacuation to the Netherlands.[10] Upon arrival, in keeping with the Dutch dualistic welfare tradition, non-governmental organisations and religious institutions played the main part in repatriates' reception, and the central government a supportive, but substantial, role. In an initial phase, the Dutch Red Cross supplied medical assistance aboard repatriating ships and, together with local NGOs, packages of foodstuffs, blankets, bed linens, and toiletries for reception centres.[11] A non-governmental fundraising campaign under the name *Nederland Helpt Indië* rallied to assist those suffering in "our Kingdom territory."[12] Another organisation, called *Stichting Pelita* after the Indonesian word for an oil lamp which symbolised a beacon of light, was established in 1947 to offer social and financial assistance to those suffering in the East Indies after the war with Japan.[13]

Central government, although generally reluctant to assume responsibility for its citizens' welfare at this time, also participated in repatriates' emergency reception. Upon their arrival in the Dutch metropole, many were shocked to find that war victims from the Dutch marines were getting full payment of lost income and material war damage.[14] The Central Bureau for the Care of War Victims (*Centraal Bureau Verzorging Oorlogsslachtoffers,* CBVO)[15] at the Interior Ministry responded to this consternation by coordinating public assistance for évacués from 1945 to 1948, together with its regional and local affiliates. This assistance was the product of negotiations between a representative of the Netherlands Indies government, an interest group established in 1945 under the name Dutch-Indisch Alliance for Ex-Prisoners of War and Internees (*Nederlands-Indische Bond van Ex-krijgsgevangenen en Geïnterneerden*, NIBEG), a federation of Indische trade unions, and a Dutch-Indisch employers' association.

In-kind assistance was paramount at this stage. After the war, the Netherlands operated a food and firewood rationing system as import infrastructure gradually recovered from its wartime interruptions.[16] The CBVO offered repatriate evacuees *extra* coupons for rationed food and firewood.[17] This was the subject of some controversy and resentment for those metropolitan Dutch who had lived through the *hongerwinter*, a severe famine in the winter of 1944-45 caused by a Nazi food embargo. The repatriates acquired derogatory nicknames like '*bonnenvreters*' ("coupon eaters") for their double rationing.[18] Besides this, the costs of transport to the Netherlands were covered with an advance payment known as a *rijksvoorschot* charged to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[19] In one quarter of 1963, this cost the Ministry

10 C Schouten, *RAPWI: Geschiedkundig Overzicht*, 1947.
11 Willems, *De Uittocht Uit Indië, 1945-1995*, 31–36.
12 Willems, 31.
13 Griselda Molemans, *Opgevangen in Andijvielucht: De Opvang van Ontheemden Uit Indonesië in Kampen En Contractpensions En de Financiële Claims Op Basis van Uitgebleven Rechtsherstel* (Amsterdam: Quasar Books, 2014), 30.
14 NL-UtA-1405-81-Memo, "het Indische Oorlogsslachtoffers-probleem en wat daarmede samenhangt."
15 Inventory of the archives of *Het Centraal Bureau Verzorging Oorlogsslachtoffers En de Rijksdienst Voor Maatschappelijke Zorg, 1945-1949*, 2.04.48.14, Nationaal Archief, Den Haag. 1986.
16 Johan van Merriënboer, *Mansholt: Een Biografie* (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Boom, 2006), 118.
17 Willems, *De Uittocht Uit Indië, 1945-1995*, 68.
18 Willems, 53.
19 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-1010-"Verslag 4e Kwartaal 1963: Verzorging Gerepatrieerden" 1964.

around 145,768 guilders.[20] This would have been a fraction of their overall expenditure for 1963, which was about a quarter of a billion guilders.[21]

As Dutch authority in the East Indies waned and it became increasingly clear that repatriates were in the Netherlands permanently, their reception entered a new phase. In particular, public efforts were substantially reorganised. In 1948, formal responsibility for repatriates shifted to the newly founded department of Social Care (*Dienst Maatschappelijke Zorg*; DMZ) in the Ministry of the Interior. In 1949, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs set up a Council for Indonesian Matters (*Raad voor Aangelegenheden met Indonesie;* RAVI) charged with deciding repatriate policy. RAVI was a sub council to the Council of Ministers; i.e. a place for ministers to discuss complicated or technical subjects prior to placing the subject on the agenda of the Council of Ministers. Its importance was signalled by the fact that prime minister Drees himself chaired the commission. The council was supported in administrative matters by the Commission for Indonesian Affairs (*Commissie voor Aangelegenheden van Indonesië,* CAVI).

After Indonesian independence and as the numbers of migrants picked up, the perceived magnitude of the task at hand grew. On the advice of the Ministry of Union Affairs and Overseas Territory, the interministerial Commission for the Coordination of Repatriates (*Coördinatie-Commissie Gerepatrieerden,* CCG) was founded in April 1950 and entrusted with offering policy advice and coordinating efforts across the eight ministries it convened.[22] The Chair of CCG was Hr. J.M. Kiveron, who was the Secretary-General (i.e. highest ranking civil servant) of the Ministry of Union Affairs and Overseas Kingdom Territories.[23] The jurist Philip Werner chaired a subcommittee on labour market activation and would in 1958 become its Chair. The subcommittee for social assistance was chaired by Dr. J.Th.A.H. van der Putten, who was the Director of the DMZ at the Ministry of the Interior.

Even then, government capacity was deemed insufficient without the help of private organisations.[24] In 1950, the same year that CCG was founded, Prince Bernhard penned a letter to Drees requesting that a "Repatriation Council" be established by churches and civil society.[25] Bernhard explained that repatriates "generally find themselves in very difficult circumstances," and that it was the joint responsibility of the Dutch government and the

20 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-1010-"Verslag 4e Kwartaal 1963: Verzorging Gerepatrieerden" 1964.

21 Statistiek der Rijksfinancien, "Herleiding van de Uitgaven En Inkomsten van de Hoofdstukken Der Rijksrekeningen En Der Ingewerkte Fondsen Enerzijds Tot de Volgens de Codering Verkregen Uitgaven En Inkomsten Anderzijds" (1963), Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, https://historisch.cbs.nl/STATISTIEK%20DER%20RIJKSFINANCIEN/34?nav_id=0-1&id=559230424&index=62.

22 J Van Winkel, inventory of the archives of the *Centraal Comité van Kerkelijk En Particulier Initiatief Voor de Sociale Zorg Ten Behoeve van Gerepatrieerden (CCKP) van de Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk (1948) 1950-1968 (1969)*, 2.8.4.1 Bestuursinstellingen: Landelijk, Het Utrechts Archief, Utrecht. 2006.

23 NL-StRo-1402-614-"Leidraad," August 1950.

24 Van Winkel, inventory of the archives of the *Centraal Comité van Kerkelijk En Particulier Initiatief Voor de Sociale Zorg Ten Behoeve van Gerepatrieerden (CCKP) van de Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk (1948) 1950-1968 (1969)*, 2.8.4.1 Bestuursinstellingen: Landelijk, Het Utrechts Archief, Utrecht. https://hetutrechtsarchief.nl/onderzoek/resultaten/archieven?mivast=39&mizig=210&miadt=39&miaet=1&micode=1405&minr=2454488&miview=inv2inv3t0. 2006.

25 NL-HaNA-2.04.48.16-11-"Letter," Prins Bernhard, 1950.

Dutch people to do something about it.[26] The government, for its part, passed this request on to churches and other organisations active in the domain of social work.[27] This was consistent with a longer Dutch tradition of functional cooperation among welfare providers: because so many different charities were operative in different domains, the need for cross-organisational subcommittees that dealt with specific policy areas or target groups had become increasingly acute. For example, the Federation of Institutions for Child Protection was founded in 1924.[28] In this case, the response to the Prince's appeal came under the particularly unwieldy name of the "Central Committee of Clerical and Secular Initiatives for Social Care of Repatriates" (*Centraal Comité voor Kerkelijke en Particulier initiatief voor sociale zorg ten behoeve van gerepatrieerden,* CCKP).

6.2.3. A "Repatriation Council" and cultural conversion

The CCKP became the cornerstone of in-kind social assistance for repatriates. It united around twenty private and religious organisations, including the Roman Catholic Church, a union of Protestant churches, a humanist representative ('Humanitas'), the Dutch Red Cross, federations of trade unions, and organisations specifically devoted to the cause of repatriates, like *Nederland Helpt Indië* and NIBEG.[29] Its most important source of financing was a "modest" subsidy from the Ministry of Internal Affairs.[30] It was designed to cooperate with government on reception, housing, and education, but also to act independently in policy areas seen as more appropriate at their level, such as spiritual care and the recruitment and management of social workers.[31] The latter role would be the prerogative of churches represented in CCKP exclusively.[32]

The remit of CCKP's activities was vast. Its chair, J. Moora, is reported as saying that every repatriate had a right to a vase with a flower on their table.[33] It saw its mandate as "look[ing] after everything that benefits the mental and physical well-being of the repatriates."[34] It set out to accomplish those tasks by promoting the work of its constituent organisations. Each local committee needed to have a representative of both the Catholic Church, the Protestant churches, and, ideally, the municipal service of social affairs.[35] Depending on the organisation, these, in turn, offered informal education in the realm of "family and household" spheres (*Gezins- en Huishoudelijke Voorlichting*), provided "relaxation and distraction" by organising leisure activities or distributing literature, and recruited social workers.[36]

26 NL-HaNA-2.04.48.16-11-"Letter," Prins Bernhard, 1950.
27 NL-StRo-1402-614-"Leidraad," August 1950.
28 van Leeuwen, "Armenzorg 1912-1965: Van Centrum Naar Periferie," 525.
29 Van Winkel, inventory of the archives of the *Centraal Comité van Kerkelijk En Particulier Initiatief Voor de Sociale Zorg Ten Behoeve van Gerepatrieerden (CCKP) van de Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk (1948) 1950-1968 (1969)*, 2.8.4.1 Bestuursinstellingen: Landelijk, Het Utrechts Archief, Utrecht. 2006.
30 Willems, *De Uittocht Uit Indië, 1945-1995*, 185. Ellemers and Vaillant, *Indische Nederlanders En Gerepatrieerden*, 51.
31 NL-HaNA-2.20.48.16-11-Task description CCKP.
32 NL-StRo-1402-614-"Leidraad," August 1950, p 6.
33 Laarman, *Oude Onbekenden: Het Politieke En Publieke Debat over Postkoloniale Migranten, 1945-2005*, 81.
34 NL-StRo-1402-614-"Leidraad," August 1950, p 6.
35 NL-HaNA-2.20.48.16-11-Task description CCKP.
36 NL-StRo-1402-614-"Leidraad," August 1950, p 6.

CCKP operated through a series of local committees (*Plaatselijke Comités*), which acted, in their own words, as a "local reflection and representation of the CCKP.[37] Illustrative of the lengths to which the CCKP went to assure a warm welcome for repatriates are its efforts in the domain of labour market policy. Not only did it coordinate counselling on labour market opportunities to repatriates, but it cooperated with the official Labour Bureau to instruct Dutch employers about the repatriates "with an eye to removing prejudices that [they] might have toward the labour force from Indonesia."[38]

With the generosity of private and religious solutions came the caveat of rather extensive involvement in the private lives of beneficiaries. In keeping with the Dutch history of linking poor relief with moral education, CCKP was deeply involved in the "personal and spiritual functioning" of repatriates. One pamphlet by a local Protestant church advertised household courses on interior design, washing clothes, nutrition, sewing, budgeting, heating a home, knitting, acquiring household items, and treating modern textiles, all for the price of 45 cents per person per lesson with the "number of ladies" varying from 8 to 10.[39]

One of the main policy areas in which the central government was active was housing. In 1950 the use of guesthouse contracts (*contractpensions*) took off. This was made possible by the Housing Law for Repatriates (*Wet Huisvesting Gerepatrieerden*) passed on 8 December 1950 (SK 555). Guesthouse contracts were agreements between municipalities and hundreds of hotel owners around the country, whereby the latter would provide room and board to repatriates in exchange for a per-person allowance from the former.[40] They fell under the DMZ, still part of the Ministry of the Interior. Experiences in these guesthouses varied; some repatriates reported that the owner of the pension stole their food coupons.[41] Schrover notes that guesthouse owners in Utrecht took advantage of their position in a tight housing market by increasing the prices of a bed.[42] Other reports suggest that those living in guesthouses were so content that they were fearful of moving out.[43] Residence included added bonuses; for example, by 1952, the government would cover the cost of sending children in contractpensions, whose parents lacked sufficient means, to summer camp or on hikes for holiday.[44] Symbolising the state's continued sense of duty toward offering shelter, Princess Wilhelmina offered spots at the summer residence of the royal family, Palace het Loo, for 84 repatriates over the course of a year.[45] To phase out guesthouse contracts, the government would eventually subsidise and reserve around

37 NL-StRo-1402-614-"Leidraad," August 1950.
38 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-1037-Brochure 'Voor Het Eerst Naar Nederland.'"
39 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-49-"Folder van de Protestantse Zorg t.b.v Hen Die Uit Nieuw Guinea Gekomen Zijn, Uitgaande van de Hervormde Stichting voor Kerkelijk Sociale Arbeid."
40 Molemans, *Opgevangen in Andijvielucht: De Opvang van Ontheemden Uit Indonesië in Kampen En Contractpensions En de Financiële Claims Op Basis van Uitgebleven Rechtsherstel*, 44.
41 Molemans, 25.
42 Marlou Schrover, "Rats, rooms and riots: usage of space by immigrants in the Dutch town Utrecht 1945-1970," *Journal of Migration History*, 7 (2021): 244-271. https://doi.org/10.1163/23519924-00703003, 252.
43 NL-HaNA-2.04.48.16-11-Memo, 8 November 1950.
44 NL-UtA-1405-391-"Derde rapport inzake de sociale verzorging der gerepatrieerden namens de Protestantse Kerken in Nederland." Juli 1952-Juni 1954 Contact in Overheidszaken.
45 Molemans, *Opgevangen in Andijvielucht: De Opvang van Ontheemden Uit Indonesië in Kampen En Contractpensions En de Financiële Claims Op Basis van Uitgebleven Rechtsherstel*, 20.

5 per cent of houses built for the 1962 Housing Act (*Woningwet*), a law governing construction of public housing, for repatriates.[46] The last contractpension was eventually dissolved in 1969.

6.2.5. "No worse than refugees"

As mentioned in Section 5.2.6, about 12,000 of the migrants coming from present-day Indonesia came from the Moluccan islands. Assigned the nationality of their former enemy, most were stateless by the early 1970s. This meant that they could not access assistance under the targeted schemes for repatriates outlined in 6.2.4.

They were also excluded from the activities of non-governmental organisations. CCKP, in its communications, made clear that, like Minister van Thiel who had proposed deporting them, it saw "Moluccan" as incompatible with repatriate status. In 1951, the Chair of CCKP reported that cooperation with Moluccan organisations had failed, because the latter had insisted on introducing 'politics' into the domain of social work.[47] That same year, headquarters wrote to local CCKP committees informing them of the option to keep Moluccan communities out of their work. They announced the creation of a separate committee for Moluccans, which would not host any representative from CCKP (unlike CCG), and explained, "CCKP must stick to its original task, that is, the assimilation of *repatriates.* As such, CCKP has nothing to do with the Ambonese, who will not be assimilated but only sheltered here temporarily... in connection with all kinds of complications that arise around the issue of the Ambonese, the CCKP deems it appropriate to remain far removed from Ambonese affairs."[48]

One month later, during a meeting of the local Rotterdam branch of the CCKP, a question about the inclusion of Moluccans was answered in the negative: "Ambonese soldiers ... must be regarded as guests of the Dutch government. Aid to this group is not within the Committee's domain."[49] Two years later, CCKP wrote to the Ministry of Social Work complaining that an office for Moluccans had been established in collective repatriate housing centres.[50] They argued that such an office would have "far-reaching psychological consequences" for other residents and lamented that the Dutch public already could not distinguish between the repatriates and Moluccans.[51]

To some extent, public social assistance stepped in where private assistance balked. Initially, the Dutch government paid Moluccans' housing, clothes, food, and an allowance.[52] This was a joint responsibility of the Ministry of Union and Overseas Relations, the Ministry of Foreign

46 Ellemers and Vaillant, *Indische Nederlanders En Gerepatrieerden*, 47; Laarman, *Oude Onbekenden: Het Politieke En Publieke Debat over Postkoloniale Migranten, 1945-2005*.

47 By politics was meant their advocacy for the right to self-determination on the Moluccan islands. NL-UtA-1405-34-Meeting minutes of CIO social care, 3 April 1951.

48 NL-UtA-1405-10- Letter from CCKP to Provincial, regional, local committees of CCKP, 16 April, 1951.

49 NL-StRo-1402-Meeting minutes, Sub-Comité Rotterdam van het CCKP, 9 May 1951.

50 NL-UtA-1405-11-Letter to Hoofd Bijzondere Maatschappelijke Zorg, Ministerie van Maatschappelijk Werk, 29 January 1953.

51 NL-UtA-1405-11-Letter to Hoofd Bijzondere Maatschappelijke Zorg, Ministerie van Maatschappelijk Werk, 29 January 1953.

52 Jones, "Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten En Nederlanders: Nederlandse Politici over Burgers Uit Oost En West En Nederland, 1945-2005," 120.

Affairs and the Ministry of Recovery and Public Housing.[53] From 1952 a separate division was created at the Ministry of Social Work to coordinate this: the Commission of Ambonese Assistance (*Commissariaat Ambonezenzorg*; CAZ). The head of CAZ (the commissioner) regularly met with the Minister of Social Work.[54] One of its central tasks was organising accommodation. Quite distinct from the contractpensions available to other repatriates, much of the housing provided by the CAZ consisted of wooden barracks in isolated camps (*woonoorden*). The two largest camps had been Nazi concentration camps during the Second World War: *Lunetten* (formerly Kamp Vught) and *Schattenberg* (formerly Kamp Westerbork), with almost 3,000 residents each as of October 1, 1953.[55] Indische Nederlanders had also been housed in Schattenberg, but for less than a year, from July 1 1950 until March 1951.[56] In contrast, the residence of Moluccans - the longest group to reside in the camps - was to last over two decades. Officials justified the camps as a "choice born purely out of necessity, in terms of both time and space," and with reference to their supposedly temporary character of their stay.[57]

Moluccans mostly found basic material needs met. There was a central kitchen, food coupons and a weekly allowance. However, camp life was without much privacy or autonomy. Social workers intervened in family life. Residents were not allowed to work, and had to report to the camp administration if they wanted to visit relatives.[58] The conditions were harsh enough that by late 1959 CAZ officials were suggesting shutting them down.[59] However, residents reportedly resisted moving out for fear of falling "under the surveillance of the alien police," so to facilitate their transition, a CAZ official requested leniency from the Head of Police.[60] The latter forwarded the request to his superior at the Ministry of Justice, scribbling in the margins: "I find the feelings expressed by the Ambonese concerned grossly exaggerated."[61] Yet he ultimately acquiesced because, "if the proposal [to acquire travel documents] would run into unwillingness on the part of the Ambonese, we would have no stick; at least no stick that we want to use (internment). I am thinking here of the difficulties that we have already had in the past in this respect with these *difficult* people."[62] The Head of Police's sentiment reflects not only a dismissal of their emotional and psychological reality but a tendency to assign traits to the entire group.

53 Inventory of the archives of the Commissariaat van Ambonezenzorg, (1949) 1952-1970, 2.27.148, Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, 1985, 3.

54 Centrale Archief Selectiedienst, 8.

55 Laarman, *Oude Onbekenden: Het Politieke En Publieke Debat over Postkoloniale Migranten, 1945-2005*, 104.

56 Roy van Gool, "70 Jaar Geleden Kwamen Indische Nederlanders Aan in De Schattenberg," July 4, 2020, https://www.rtvdrenthe.nl/nieuws/161311/70-jaar-geleden-kwamen-indische-nederlanders-aan-in-de-schattenberg.

57 H. Akihary, "Van Almere tot de Zwaluwenberg: Molukse woonoorden in Nederland," in *Tijdelijk Verblijf: De opvang van Molukkers in Nederland, 1951,* ed. Wim Manuhutu and Henk Smeets (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1991), 66.

58 Fridus Steijlen, "In and out of Uniform: Moluccan Soldiers in the Dutch Army," in *Colonial Soldiers in Europe, 1914-1945: "Aliens in Uniform" in Wartime Societies*, ed Eric Storm and Ali Al Tuma (New York: Routledge, 2017), 240.

59 NL-HaNA-2.09.52-264-Letter from A.J van Raalte, 19 November 1959.

60 NL-HaNA-2.09.52-264-Letter from A.J van Raalte, 19 November 1959.

61 NL-HaNA-2.09.52-264-Letter forwarded by Head of Police, 14 December 1959.

62 Emphasis added; NL-HaNA-2.09.52-264-Letter forwarded by Head of Police, 14 December 1959.

Such internment was not completely foreign to the Dutch welfare apparatus, although the setting of former Nazi transit camps added some alarm. As described in 4.2.3, re-education villages and internal colonies intended to promote "moral elevation" dated back to the late nineteenth century and picked up steam in the antebellum period. These initiatives were reserved for families deemed maladapted or anti-social. In general, this betrays the context, not of recognition as a moral equal, to borrow Somers' definition[63] and in direct contrast to the Dutchness of regrettants, but of mutual resentment. Tellingly, in 1960, the Foreign Minister, Joseph Luns of the KVP promised Parliament that Moluccans be treated in the domain of social policy *no worse than refugees*.[64] Obviously distinct from equal treatment with Dutch citizens, this minimal promise formed the cornerstone of subsequent claims to social rights.[65]

In addition, as non-citizens, Moluccans were not eligible for National Group Schemes for Repatriates. However, in 1956 a separate legislative framework was drawn up. The Ambonese Benefit Scheme (*Uitkeringsregeling Ambonezen*) was introduced on May 14, 1956. Rather than signal an era of generosity, however, it marked the withdrawal of the government from the provision of their food (through central kitchens of the camps), clothing, and cash allowances. The Scheme required Moluccans to register with a labour agency and stipulated the conditions under which they might still be eligible for benefits. In early 1962, it was replaced by a National Group Scheme for Ambonese (*Rijksgroepsregeling Ambonezen*).[66] As the Group Scheme for Repatriates, adjustments were made to accord with the provisions of the general welfare schemes such that the provisions of the AOW would become applicable to Moluccans.

The specific bundle of welfare available to Moluccans is not easily explained without considering their racialisation as an inherently separate and biologically fixed group. In 1959, Minister Klompé justified their treatment with the need to take into account the "strength" of their "collective mentality."[67] The observations of social workers visiting houses with mixed marriages is illustrative. One reports a white Dutch woman adapting to the Moluccan "lifestyle" through cooking and language. In the margins of her report, an official writes: "A bit fanatic, no? I think it's a little creepy." Two years later, when the social worker describes the woman adopting "Dutch" traits, the official scribbles in the margins again: "thank goodness. Blew over. It just goes to show: nature is always stronger than nurture!"[68]

By 1968, public officials planned to liquidate all camps by January 1, 1970, the date at which CAZ itself would close its doors.[69] The goal was to transfer Moluccans out of wooden barracks and into neighbourhoods (*woonwijken*) with stone houses which would be

63 Somers, *Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness and the Right to Have Rights*, 6.
64 NL-HaNA-2.15.5142-356- Letter, from Gevolmachtigd minister van de Republik Malutu Selatan, 26 September 1960.
65 NL-HaNA-2.15.5142-356- Letter, from Gevolmachtigd minister van de Republik Malutu Selatan, 26 September 1960.
66 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-1008-"Toelichting behorende bij het ontwerp Rijksgroepregeling Gerepatrieerden."
67 Jones, "Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten En Nederlanders: Nederlandse Politici over Burgers Uit Oost En West En Nederland, 1945-2005," 150.
68 Laarman, *Oude Onbekenden: Het Politieke En Publieke Debat over Postkoloniale Migranten, 1945-2005*, 115.
69 NL-HaNA-2.09.52-264-Letter from Th H.A Booms to dhr Hoofd van de Afdeling Toezicht Vreemdelingen en Grensbewaking, 4 June 1968.

incorporated into local municipalities.[70] There is evidence that this process took longer than planned, with the last residents leaving the camp of Schattenberg (former Camp Westerbork) in 1971.[71] Once they left the camps, surveillance was made more difficult. In fact, officials at the Ministry of Justice expressed their trepidations about the transfer exactly for this reason: the CAZ had been supplying the Ministry with up-to-date personal information about the Moluccans, and lacking this data made oversight of the group "very difficult," according to the head of the department of Immigration Affairs and Border Control at the Ministry of Justice.[72] At the same time, those same officials wondered whether targeted attention was justified any longer. "After a stay of around 17 years in The Netherlands," one official wrote, "one is inclined to ask whether the Moluccans ought still to assume an exceptional position and if they should not be treated just like *any other foreigner.* This would be the easiest, at least for the Ministry of Justice. Given the misery which we have had with this rather easily irritated group [however], I expect that such equalisation would provoke resistance."[73] The fact that a 17-year-stay was interpreted as a call to treat Moluccans like foreigners rather than as insiders speaks to the extent to which officials doubted their assimilability. Furthermore, officials continued to dismiss their emotional experience, portraying their irritation as an unjustified nuisance rather than as something to be taken seriously.

Either way, even after they moved out, Moluccans did not entirely escape state surveillance. One former soldier in Roermond writes to the public prosecutor in 1969, complaining that "policemen have repeatedly visited my house in all kinds of ways."[74]

6.2.6. National group schemes

Previous sections discussed targeted in-kind assistance, which was provided by a consortium of actors devoted to the repatriate cause. Repatriates also had access to targeted cash assistance. In Dutch law, schemes devoted to a target group are known as (national) group schemes (*groepsregelingen* or *rijksgroepregelingen*). These would later include target populations as diverse as artists, the blind and the partially disabled.[75] Repatriate care fell under the remit of several different group schemes, depending on the time period.[76] The first set of schemes offered material aid to war victims, former resistance members and demilitarised soldiers. Repatriates fell within its remit. In 1950, these schemes were transferred to the Assistance Scheme for War Victims 1940-1945 (*Regeling Hulpverlening Oorlogsslachtoffers, 1940-1945*). Making claims under the scheme meant access to financial assistance and housing, funded by the CBVO.[77]

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70 NL-HaNA-2.09.52-264-Letter from A.J van Raalte (Commissary's van Ambonezenzorg) to the Director-General of the Police, November 19, 1959.

71 Herinneringscentrum Kamp Westerbork, "Schattenberg 1950-1971," n.d., https://kampwesterbork.nl/plan-je-bezoek/40-schattenberg-1950-1971.

72 NL-HaNA-2.09.52-264-Letter from Head of Department of Immigration and Border Control, Ministry of Justice, to Director of Police, 28 May 1969.

73 NL-HaNA-2.09.52-264-Letter from Th H.A Booms to dhr Hoofd van de Afdeling Toezicht Vreemdelingen en Grensbewaking, 4 June 1968.

74 NL-HaNA-2.09.52-264-Letter from l Amanupunnio to Officer van Justitie, 30 January 1969.

75 Oude Nijhuis, *Religion, Class and the Post-war Development of the Dutch Welfare State*, 110–11.

76 Ellemers and Vaillant, *Indische Nederlanders En Gerepatrieerden*, 49.

77 Molemans, *Opgevangen in Andijvielucht: De Opvang van Ontheemden Uit Indonesië in Kampen En Contractpensions En de Financiële Claims Op Basis van Uitgebleven Rechtsherstel*.

Repatriates who were former bureaucrats, military personnel, resistance fighters and forced labourers in the East Indies were eligible.[78]

However, the scheme was not considered sufficient for the circumstances of repatriates. As one official from the Ministry of Union Affairs and Overseas Kingdom (*Ministerie van Uniezaken en Overzeeserijksdelen,* MINUOR) stated in a memo, repatriates faced specific difficulties that others not coming from the "tropics" might not have faced, such as acquiring appropriate clothes.[79] Additionally, officials were concerned about the diversity of circumstances in which repatriates found themselves, given, for example, that some had been assigned places in guesthouses, and others had not. Therefore, a new group scheme was drafted, which had repatriates from the Netherlands Indies, specifically, as its specific target group.

The goal of drafting targeted legislation, the MINUOR official clarified, was to "integrate [repatriates] into normal Dutch affairs."[80] The Minister of Foreign Affairs had clarified that the government viewed as its responsibility the task of offering "sufficient support that the repatriates are able to reach an adequate standard of living in our society."[81] The result was the Assistance Scheme for Repatriates (*Regeling Hulpverlening Gerepatrieerden*), which entered into force in 1956. In practice, this represented rather an update of existing guidelines, and assistance was still mostly granted under the legal provisions of the previous scheme for war victims.[82] When the Ministry of Social Work changed the requirements for war victims, the scheme in place for repatriates was revisited.[83] Consequently on 1 January 1961, the new National Group Scheme for Repatriates (*Rijksgroepsregeling Gerepatrieerden*) came into force.[84] The new scheme was still very similar to the Assistance Scheme for War Victims, which still applied to the repatriates who qualified as war victims and had arrived in the Netherlands prior to 1950.[85]

The National Group Scheme for Repatriates offered those who qualified as repatriates two different types of cash transfers. The first were regular allowances (*periodieke uitkeringen*) at fixed benefit levels for heads of family, single persons, or jobseekers, as well as one-off loans for housing or furniture, with repayment plans determined by the municipal council.[86] One brochure designed for repatriates reassured readers that "when the debt is collected, account will be taken of the financial security of repatriates," suggesting that repayment was flexible.[87] Indeed, from 1957-59, the Ministry of Social Work spent around f. 45 million on furniture loans, less than half of which was paid back.[88] Nonetheless, repatriates interviewed by

78 Dineke de Visser, "Ontwikkeling van Het Denken over Materiële Vergoeding" (Onderzoeksgids Oorlogsgetroffenen WO2, n.d.), https://www.oorlogsgetroffenen.nl/thema/wetgeving/01_01_Ontwikkeling_van_het_denken_over_materiele_vergoeding.

79 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-Nota, MINUOR, 8 November 1950.

80 "Het inpassen van de gerepatriëerden in de normale Nederlandse verhoudingen," NL-HaNA-2.27.02-Nota, MINUOR, 8 November 1950.

81 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-Memo containing proposals formulated after CCKP's meeting of November 9, 1950

82 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-1008-"Toelichting behorende het ontwerp Rijksgroepregeling Gerepatrieerden."

83 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-1008-"Rijksgroepregeling Gerepatrieerden," 20 January 1961.

84 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-1008-"Toelichting behorende bij het ontwerp Rijksgroepregeling Gerepatrieerden." Published in Staatscourant 1960, nr 237.

85 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-1008-"Toelichting behorende bij het ontwerp Rijksgroepregeling Gerepatrieerden."

86 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-1008-"Rijksgroepregeling Gerepatrieerden," 20 January 1961.

87 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-1037-Brochure 'Voor Het Eerst Naar Nederland.'"

88 Ellemers and Vaillant, *Indische Nederlanders En Gerepatrieerden*, 47.

Molemans did describe the debt as particularly burdensome. As soon as they could pay their own rent, they were expected to start paying back the cost of the guesthouse as well as the aforementioned clothing and furniture loans.[89] One respondent described deductions being levied on her husband's salary over the course of about ten years.[90]

The eligibility criteria for the National Group Scheme for Repatriates were specified in Article 3 as follows.[91] To qualify as a repatriate, the individual must have Dutch citizenship, have arrived from Indonesia after 27 December 1949, and have done so either "as a consequence of events in Indonesia" after or around January 1 1958, or beforehand with an eye to the "expected deterioration of relations between the Netherlands and the Netherlands." The definition was thus fixed by their citizenship, the date of their migration, and their motivation for leaving Indonesia. Moreover, the beneficiary's need had to be directly related to their arrival in the Netherlands.[92] As officials at the Ministry of Social Work would later clarify, betraying their specific interpretation of what an undeserving repatriate would look like, this meant that if someone found themselves in a difficult situation because they were "divorced in the Netherlands" or were "pregnant and unmarried," they would not qualify for assistance under the act.[93] Additionally, for regular allowances, the repatriate needed to be registered as job seeker at the regional employer exchange, and be willing to undergo further education unless they were a woman, for whom "on social grounds" it was "not desirable" for her to fulfil these conditions.[94] One-off special transfers were reserved for former KNIL members, or those who were sick, injured or otherwise incapacitated.[95]

Group schemes were implemented by municipalities, usually within the framework of their municipal services for social affairs, who received compensation from the Ministry of the Interior for associated expenditure.[96] The municipality of The Hague, exceptionally, initially had a separate department devoted to the care of war victims and évacués, for which they received a special subsidy for several years.[97] Protesting the planned reduction in this subsidy, the Director of the Municipal Service of Social Affairs wrote to the Minister of Interior in 1951 stressing the value of their work by referencing the elites they had managed to help: "we received many (immaterial) tokens of appreciation from numerous persons from higher circles, such as chief officers, university educated, etc., who held prominent positions in the Netherlands Indies."[98]

89 Molemans, *Opgevangen in Andijvielucht: De Opvang van Ontheemden Uit Indonesië in Kampen En Contractpensions En de Financiële Claims Op Basis van Uitgebleven Rechtsherstel*, 219.
90 Molemans, 220.
91 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-Rijksgroepregeling Gerepatrieerden, sent 20 January 1961 Nr U 36000.
92 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-1008-"Toelichting behorende bij het ontwerp Rijksgroepregeling Gerepatrieerden."
93 NL-Ha-NA-2.27.02-1008-Verslag van de op vrijdag 15 oktober 1965 op het Districtskantoor te Arnhem gehouden bespreking omtrent vraagstukken betreffende de Rijksgroepsregeling Gerepatrieerden.
94 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-1008-"Rijksgroepregeling Gerepatrieerden," 20 January 1961.
95 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-1008-"Rijksgroepregeling Gerepatrieerden," 20 January 1961.
96 NL-HaHG-0502-01-Afschrift, Minister of Interior, to College van Burgemeester en Wethouders van 's Gravenhage, 15 December 1948
97 NL-HaHG-0502-01-Afschrift, Minister of Interior, to College van Burgemeester en Wethouders van 's Gravenhage, 15 December 1948
98 NL-HaHG-0502-01-Letter, Director of Gemeentelijke Dienst van Sociale Belangen, Den Haag, to the Minister of Interior, 20 January 1951.

CCKP organised educational evenings all around the country to inform repatriates of their social rights.[99] If ineligible for these schemes, repatriates could make recourse to poor relief, which, as mentioned in 6.2.1, would be granted at the discretion of municipal authorities. Central government, however, would subsidise the costs that municipalities would incur.[100] This was somewhat exceptional but not completely unheard of.[101]

When it entered into force, the General Assistance Act (1965) did not replace existing group schemes. Many of them remained intact and were significantly improved in subsequent years.[102] Article 11 of the General Assistance Act had stipulated that "further rules may be laid down by executive order with regards to persons belonging to a specific group."[103] On December 15, 1964, modifications to the National Group Scheme for Repatriates were made to accord with the General Assistance Act and the Act.[104] It adjusted the benefit levels of the periodical transfers in accordance with other transfers to which a claimant might be eligible. Notably, the eligibility criteria of the modified National Group Scheme contained an exception for non-Dutch nationals that specifically included regrettants who would have otherwise been excluded from the General Assistance Act. Namely, in Article 3, the text specified that the Minister of Social Work could equalise a non-Dutch citizen who, prior to April 1, 1964 - the date at which the special admissions scheme for regrettants ended[105] - had handed in a request to reside in the Netherlands and whose request had been successful.[106]

By 1960, there was increasing talk of transitioning out of targeted assistance and toward reliance on general social policy institutions.[107] This took time. The 1965 Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work (*Ministerie van Cultuur, Recreatie en Maatschappelijk Werk,* CRM) still contained a separate office for repatriates.[108] However, by 1970, "repatriate care" had disappeared from the government's accounting.[109] By the 1980s, CRM no longer listed Indische Nederlanders as foreigners or minorities.[110] At the same time, repatriates reported feeling that they were treated as so unequivocally Dutch that their unique group identity was being erased.[111] Hence, in 1963 a foundation was established to preserve the cultural values of the Indische Nederlands community in Dutch society and abroad.[112]

99 NL-UtA-1405-81-Letter from a social worker named A Chr Baëhr to Mv Wetn van de Vring, 27 July 1954.
100 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-1008-"Rijksgroepregeling Gerepatrieerden," 20 January 1961.
101 Algemene Bijstandswet, 1963, Articles 48 and 49.
102 Oude Nijhuis, *Religion, Class and the Post-war Development of the Dutch Welfare State*, 135.
103 Algemene Bijstandswet, 1963.
104 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-1008-"Toelichting behorende bij het ontwerp Rijksgroepregeling Gerepatrieerden."
105 Laarman, *Oude Onbekenden: Het Politieke En Publieke Debat over Postkoloniale Migranten, 1945-2005*, 72.
106 Besluit van 15 december 1964, houdende nadere regelen als bedoeld in artikel 11 van de Algemene Bijstandswet ten aanzien van gerepatrieerden (Rijksgroepsregeling Gerepatrieerden), Stb. 550 (1964).
107 NL-HaNA-2.20.27-24, Periodical SIWO, November 1960.
108 Ellemers and Vaillant, *Indische Nederlanders En Gerepatrieerden*, 51.
109 Ellemers and Vaillant, 51.
110 Jones, "Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten En Nederlanders: Nederlandse Politici over Burgers Uit Oost En West En Nederland, 1945-2005," 178.
111 Willems, *De Uittocht Uit Indië, 1945-1995*.
112 NL-HaNA-2.20.27-50-"Statuten en Huishoudelijk Reglement van de Vereniging Indische Culturele Kring 'Tong-Tong'" 1962.

6.3. Constructing and discouraging 'Eastern' citizens

6.3.1. The Werner report

In this section I document how repatriates were classified according to geographical and cultural 'rootedness,' a racialised variable which cut across formal citizenship. This distinction had its roots in the colonial-era nationality code, but the evacuation guidelines issued immediately after the Second World War refashioned it. These guidelines stipulated that potential évacués were to be differentiated according to whether the Netherlands was their "mother country."[113] In 1948, Minister without portfolio Lubbertus Götzen openly worried that a larger number of individuals "rooted in the Indies" had arrived in the Netherlands than what we thought desirable."[114]

The meaning of "rootedness" came into focus in 1952, when CAVI commissioned the jurist Philip Werner and a team from the Ministry of Union Affairs and Overseas Territories to travel to Indonesia to investigate the conditions of Indische Nederlanders there. The committee "seriously considered… where the most and greatest opportunities for [their] current and future happiness" lay, by which they largely meant whether they should be transferred to the Netherlands.[115] Werner concluded that a "correct and useful criterion" for making this decision was the "distinction, which already exists in practice" between two types of people: "Western" or "Western-oriented" and "Eastern" or "Eastern-oriented" Dutch citizens. He described the latter as "physically, psychologically, socio-economically and culturally attuned to Indonesia by origin, nature, aptitude and environment."[116] The committee recommended they stay in Indonesia, not least because their children were "in more urgent need of being raised at home in the tropics" and because, due to their "inherently slow pace of work and other specific Eastern characteristics and behavioural traits," they would not find a place in the Dutch labour market[117] and their chances of assimilation would be "extremely small, if not non-existent."[118] Notably, this conclusion blatantly and deliberately contradicted the preferences of members of the Indische Nederlanders themselves, many of whom saw their interests "exclusively in terms of … a new future for themselves and their children in the Netherlands or in other parts of the Dutch empire… in any case outside of Indonesia."[119] This, Werner and colleagues concluded, was due to "completely erroneous and fantastical insights and ideas,"[120] and, as a result, argued

113 Jones, "Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten En Nederlanders: Nederlandse Politici over Burgers Uit Oost En West En Nederland, 1945-2005."

114 Schuster, *Poortwachters over Immigranten: Het Debat over Immigratie in Het Naoorlogse Groot-Britannië En Nederland*, 86.

115 NL-HaNA-2.27.01.01-128-Werner, "Verslag van de Commissie Ter Bestudering van het Indo-Europese Vraagstuk in Indonesië," 32.

116 NL-HaNA-2.27.01.01-128-Werner, "Verslag van de Commissie Ter Bestudering van het Indo-Europese Vraagstuk in Indonesië," 32.

117 Translation by Schuster, 101.

118 NL-HaNA-2.27.01.01-128-Werner, "Verslag van de Commissie Ter Bestudering van het Indo-Europese Vraagstuk in Indonesië," 32.

119 NL-HaNA-2.27.01.01-128-Werner, "Verslag van de Commissie Ter Bestudering van het Indo-Europese Vraagstuk in Indonesië," 27.

120 NL-HaNA-2.27.01.01-128-Werner, "Verslag van de Commissie Ter Bestudering van het Indo-Europese Vraagstuk in Indonesië," 27.

that the decision of where it would be in someone's interest to live "cannot and should not be left to the individuals themselves," and that the "government had a responsibility to protect the concerned against themselves."[121]

The report was handled secretly and never published, under the suspicion that it would harm relations with Indonesia.[122] However, CAVI incorporated Werner's recommendations in their advice to RAVI, suggesting that the future of "Eastern" Dutch citizens was in Indonesia.[123] In 1958, Werner would assume the chairmanship of the CCG. Accordingly, the government made informal attempts to shape immigration flows in line with the 'rootedness' criterion. Discouragement policy (*ontmoedigingsbeleid*) centred on keeping 'Eastern-oriented' Dutch citizens in Indonesia. The Werner committee had concluded that it was "absolutely necessary" to "regulate departure to the Netherlands and find some method to prevent it."[124] However, it was technically illegal to forbid the entry of citizens. Therefore, strict conditions were attached onto the advance transport payments and 'contact officials' (*contactambtenaren*) boarded repatriating ships to report on passengers' 'orientation' to the DMZ.[125] One contact official reported that when their ship docked in Ijmuiden on 30 December 1959, Minister Beerman of Justice boarded to ask her about the passengers' integration prospects.[126] The contact official reassured him that "this group of repatriates is very certainly not more Eastern oriented than the group that is already staying in [the Netherlands]," adding that at the captains' dinner, they took their place at the table in "full regalia."[127]

The so-called "orientation" of Dutch citizens was not only used to shape entry rights, but also had a bearing on social rights. Social workers paying home visits could deny a repatriate permanent housing if they failed to pass as Western-oriented, due, for instance, to eating rice rather than potatoes, furnishing their house in an "Indisch style" (this was not further elaborated), or walking around in a sarong instead of European clothes.[128] A 1954 brochure of Pro Patria, an organization representing the interests of Indische Nederlanders, protested that families deemed 'Western' received two times as much in financial support as those deemed Eastern.[129]

6.3.2. The distinction takes hold

Meanwhile, the Western-Eastern distinction became a central aspect of a broader project of categorising newcomers from the Netherlands Indies. A social Catholic magazine dated

121 NL-HaNA-2.27.01.01-128-Werner, "Verslag van de Commissie Ter Bestudering van het Indo-Europese Vraagstuk in Indonesië," 28.
122 Willems, *De Uittocht Uit Indië, 1945-1995*, 127.
123 Willems, 127.
124 NL-HaNA-2.27.01.01-128-Werner, "Verslag van de Commissie Ter Bestudering van het Indo-Europese Vraagstuk in Indonesië," 29.
125 Jones, "Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten En Nederlanders: Nederlandse Politici over Burgers Uit Oost En West En Nederland, 1945-2005," 160.
126 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-1018-"Verslag van de reis met het s.s Zuiderkruis," February 1960
127 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-1018-"Verslag van de reis met het s.s Zuiderkruis," February 1960
128 Jones, "Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten En Nederlanders: Nederlandse Politici over Burgers Uit Oost En West En Nederland, 1945-2005," 175; Willems, *De Uittocht Uit Indië, 1945-1995*, 189.
129 Schuster, *Poortwachters over Immigranten: Het Debat over Immigratie in Het Naoorlogse Groot-Britannië En Nederland*, 108.

December 1951 contains several pieces that shed light on how the Catholics - coalition partners in government - thought about the distinction. In an introduction penned by J. Moora, chair of the CCKP, Moora explains to readers that "besides your own family members and friends who returned from Indonesia, and the many other Dutch citizens who are also *repatriates* in the real sense of the word, there is also a large group of Indische Nederlanders of whom a significant number are physically and psychically, in terms of culture and development, partly focused on the East (Indonesia) rather than on the West (the Netherlands)."[130] Moora explained that this was a function of both "race and environment," and, although he technically places more emphasis on the "environment" part, goes on to list a series of group-specific physical attributes, encouraging the reader to "think about their dexterity and agility, of their diligence, and of their athletic and artistic achievements."[131]

In this way, the CCKP engaged openly in the racialisation of Dutch citizens. Later in the edition, a member of Parliament for the KVP betrays a comparable commitment to understanding Dutch citizens in racial terms. Theo De Graaf explains that many newcomers belong to a group of "small Indo-Europeans with little education, a typical Eastern lifestyle, often *lethargic and apathetic in nature* when faced with difficulties. *They are Dutch* and they feel 100 per cent Dutch. *But they are different people; they almost belong to a different race*."[132] He suggests that their only chance at succeeding in the Dutch economy is to learn manual labour in the countryside or in industry, and cautions that they should not be entrusted with financial resources or in-kind benefits, which are "conducive to the cultivation of a resignation to poverty [and] to the cultivation of a spiritual pauperism."[133]

At the end of 1952, the Werner report was leaked and a summary published in a national newspaper.[134] The newspaper was incensed at the implication that some Dutch citizens were assimilable while others were not, and that Indische Nederlanders were not expected to be able to reason for themselves what was in their own interest. Parliament was quick to pile on the criticism. Jan van Baal, MP for the Protestant ARP (who would later be governor of Netherlands New Guinea), accused the Eastern distinction of being stigmatising, and argued that the Werner committee "proceeds from a racial doctrine which does not differ much from that of Hitler and Alfred Rosenberg."[135] To clarify what he meant by racial doctrine, he pointed out that the suggestion that "Eastern" Dutch will have greater difficulty establishing themselves in the Netherlands, even once they have been educated in Europe, relies on a belief in "inheritance factors of an unfavourable nature which stem from Indonesian ancestry."[136] Despite the upheaval, discouragement policy remained intact until 1956, when strict eligibility criteria for advance transport costs were ended by the first female minister, Minister Marga Klompé of Social Work. "In my opinion," Klompé said, "a simple investigation of whether the

130 NL-UtA-1405-391-Katholiek Sociaal Tijdschrift, Vierde Jaargang, Nr 4, December 1951.
131 NL-UtA-1405-391-Katholiek Sociaal Tijdschrift, Vierde Jaargang, Nr 4, December 1951, p 76.
132 Emphasis added; NL-UtA-1405-391-Katholiek Sociaal Tijdschrift, Vierde Jaargang, Nr 4, December 1951, p 94.
133 NL-UtA-1405-391-Katholiek Sociaal Tijdschrift, Vierde Jaargang, Nr 4, December 1951, p 94.
134 Laarman, *Oude Onbekenden: Het Politieke En Publieke Debat over Postkoloniale Migranten, 1945-2005*, 61.
135 Willems, *De Uittocht Uit Indië, 1945-1995*, 128.
136 Willems, 128.

concerned party is able to make the transport on their own costs - or by making recourse to a third party - should be sufficient to ascertain whether a Dutch citizen should get an advance payment to come to the Netherlands."[137]

That said, I found evidence that the Western-Eastern distinction remained in use by social workers far later than that date. In November 1963, a local diaconal committee devoted to repatriate affairs in Breda was evaluating repatriate assistance on the occasion of its transition out of the targeted domain in which religious actors played a major role, and towards a regime of general assistance.[138] For the purposes of their inquiry, the committee had distributed a survey to local social workers that included the question of whether the family's "mentality" was "predominantly Western or Eastern," alongside questions about the appearance of the women and children, the relationship between the husband and the wife, the cleanliness of the household and how well the children were being raised.[139] That said, the committee admitted that the question about Westernness "sometimes gave rise to different interpretations."[140]

6.4. Securing old-age pensions for all

6.4.1. Formal entitlements

Since its introduction, national insurance in the Netherlands has not been conditioned on nationality. It is intended for all residents, plus non-residents whose income is taxed in the Netherlands because they have a job in the Netherlands.[141] The General Old Age Act (AOW) was no different. In the bill presented to the Second Chamber, Article 6 specified the "circle of insured"[142] as follows. Everyone who was between 15 and 65 years old was mandatorily insured if that person was either a) a resident, b) subject to payroll tax due to having worked in the Dutch kingdom, or c) a Dutch citizen who received wages or performed work for the kingdom elsewhere. Article 2 specified that a "resident" in the context of this law meant "someone who lives within the Kingdom."[143]

Because Indonesia was almost a decade into independence by the time the legal gazette (*Staatsblad*) published the AOW, there could be no confusion about whether Indonesia constituted part of the Kingdom. Therefore, in the first instance the eligibility of repatriates under this Act was relatively straightforward: if they made it to the Netherlands, they were required to contribute to national insurance and they would build up rights to an old-age pension. As I documented in previous sections, residence was not always an easy condition to fulfil, even if a repatriate had Dutch citizenship, as the discouragement policy for "Eastern-oriented" Dutch citizens suggested.

137 Molemans, *Opgevangen in Andijvielucht: De Opvang van Ontheemden Uit Indonesië in Kampen En Contractpensions En de Financiële Claims Op Basis van Uitgebleven Rechtsherstel*, 202.
138 Nl-UtA-1405-392-"Onderzoek aanpassingsmoeilijkheden Gerepatrieerden," November 1963.
139 Nl-UtA-1405-392-"Onderzoek aanpassingsmoeilijkheden Gerepatrieerden," November 1963.
140 Nl-UtA-1405-392-"Onderzoek aanpassingsmoeilijkheden Gerepatrieerden," November 1963.
141 Goudswaard, de Kam, and Sterks, *Sociale Zekerheid Op Het Breukvlak van Twee Eeuwen*.
142 Wet van 31 mei 1956, inzake een algemene ouderdomsverzekering (Algemene Ouderdomswet), Stb. 281 (1956)
143 Algemene Ouderdomswet, 1956.

6.4.2. Transitional rules in the Kingdom

Transitional arrangements (*overgangsbepalingen*) under the AOW, however, came with separate entitlement conditions. When new insurance legislation is introduced, there is a need to consider how to handle the cases of individuals who qualify for a benefit in some respects, but did not pay premiums.[144] The full AOW pension was only possible for those who had worked and paid contributions for the full 50 years. Someone who worked for fewer years would receive a reduction of two per cent in their total benefit per year that they were not insured.[145] Therefore, legislators deemed transitional rules necessary to cover those individuals who, because of their age when the law entered into force, could never contribute enough years to qualify for the benefit to which they are entitled. This would ensure that no retiree was left worse off compared to past retirees (who likely benefited from Drees' 1947 means-tested emergency provision) and future retirees (who could build up larger pensions).

The transitional rules were laid out in Articles 43 and 46. Taken together, Articles 43 and 46 stipulated that those who were over the age of 15, but had not yet turned 65, *and* had lived for six years (interrupted or not) in the Kingdom, Netherlands New Guinea, Suriname, or the Netherlands Antilles, would be considered to have been insured for the time period stretching from when they reached age 15 and when the AOW entered into force. The six-year requirement was taken from Drees' emergency law on old-age pensions.[146] Those who qualified under these rules would be eligible for a transfer funded by contributions, but not their own. Thus, the transitional arrangements represented a severance with contribution-based financing, as officials themselves in the Department of Social Insurance recognised in a discussion of whether foreigners and refugees ought to have access under the arrangements.

> In view of the rather special nature of the transitional arrangement - the pension to which it confers a right being a cash transfer based on contributions but not on the contribution of the pensioner themselves - even though the AOW establishes a close link between benefits and contributions - the Dutch government has decided to consider the transitional pension as a benefit which is *not* based on contributions.[147]

Tellingly, eligibility under these arrangements constituted the only part of the AOW legislation which was conditioned on citizenship. According to Articles 44 and 47, beneficiaries under the transitional arrangements must also be Dutch citizens.[148] Those articles also specified that the benefits contained in Articles 43 and 46 were reserved for residents of "the Kingdom." Even for contemporaries, the territories to which this referred was unclear. On the one hand, in Articles 43 and 46, Netherlands New Guinea, Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles had

144 NL-HaNA-2.15.5142-356, Second reading of "Besluit tot vaststelling van een algemene maatregel van bestuur, als bedoeld in artikelen 45 en 48 der Wet op de algemene ouderdomsverzekering," 3 December 1955.

145 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-Letter from Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Volksgezondheid, Afd Sociale Verzekering II, 18 April 1958.

146 NL-HaNA-2.15.5142-356, Second reading of "Besluit tot vaststelling van een algemene maatregel van bestuur, als bedoeld in artikelen 45 en 48 der Wet op de algemene ouderdomsverzekering," 3 December 1955.

147 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-Letter from Afdeling Sociale Verzekering II, "Betreft: bijzondere regeling voor vluchtelingen en staatlozen in het kader van de overgangsbepalingen der AOW." 4 August 1956.

148 Algemene Ouderdomswet, 1956.

been listed alongside one another, signifying that rights under the transitional rules could be built up on the basis of six uninterrupted years of residence in any of those territories. Pursuant to this, the logically consistent next step would be to pay out benefits on the basis of residence in any of those same territories. In addition, the 1954 Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands had, two years prior, made crystal-clear that the Kingdom of the Netherlands contained the 'equal' and 'autonomous' countries of the Netherlands, Suriname, and the Netherlands Antilles.[149] On the other hand, just as explicitly as Articles 43 and 46 had listed Netherlands New Guinea, Suriname, and the Netherlands Antilles, Articles 44 and 47 had omitted them. This suggested that, although residence in those territories would count toward their contribution record, they could not access rights to an old-age pension under the AOW as long as they lived in those territories.

The Social Insurance Bank, the implementing agency of national insurance schemes,[150] adopted the latter view. In January 1966, Renardel de Lavalette, director of the Governor's cabinet in Suriname wrote from Paramaribo to the Social Insurance Bank asking for clarification.[151] Lavalette explained that an elderly man by the name of Dupont, who had already reached the age of 65 by the entry into force of the AOW, had approached the cabinet to ask whether he could receive his old-age pension in Paramaribo, Suriname's capital. Lavalette explained that Dupont, who was a Dutch citizen (as this preceded Surinamese independence), had cited Article 46, in which residence in the Netherlands was equalised with residence in Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles. "In that case," Lavalette pondered, "Mr Dupont, who lived for more than six years uninterrupted in Suriname, would qualify for the award and payment of an old-age pension in Suriname."[152] The answer from the Social Insurance Bank, however, came two months later in the negative: "The Kingdom means the Kingdom in Europe."[153] As Westra and Van Hooren have shown, this accords with the interpretation of both the 1848 and 1919 Dutch constitutions.[154] This principle, which directly contradicts the spirit and text of the 1954 Charter, is the reason for the "AOW hole" that has affected some thirty thousand elderly Dutch citizens who came from Suriname after 1975 (see Conclusion).

6.4.3. Relaxing requirements through Royal Decree

Interest groups dedicated to the plight of Indische Nederlanders received the eligibility criteria for transitional arrangements with concern. In October 1955, about eight months before the publication of the AOW in the Staatsblad, several groups representing their interests drafted a

149 Jones, "Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten En Nederlanders: Nederlandse Politici over Burgers Uit Oost En West En Nederland, 1945-2005," 187.

150 In the implementation of the AOW, the Labour Councils (*Raden van Arbeid*) also played a role. They had been responsible for overseeing and calculating premium and pension payments in employee insurances.

151 NL-HaNA-2.10.26–148-Letter to the Sociale Verzekeringsbank from Mr W.A Renardel de Lavalette, 22 January 1966.

152 NL-HaNA-2.10.26–148-Letter to the Sociale Verzekeringsbank from Mr W.A Renardel de Lavalette, 22 January 1966.

153 NL-HaNA-2.10.26–148-Letter to Mr W.A Renardel de Lavalette from the Social Insurance Bank, 9 March 1966.

154 Eline Westra and Franca van Hooren, "Social rights in a post-colonial welfare state: revisiting 'universality' and 'inclusivity.'" (Unpublished manuscript, 2024)

memo to consolidate their position on the draft legislation. Represented groups included: the Catholic Civil Servants and Private Employees from former Netherlands Indies (*Katholieke Ambtenaren en Particuliere Werknemers uit het Voormalige Nederlands-Indië*, KNAF), *Indische Pensioenbond*, and NIBEG.[155] The memo read that, despite their "great respect for this undeniably important draft," they requested the serious consideration of the residence requirement of the transitional rules.

Their logic was as follows. Under pressure by the Dutch government, many former Dutch citizens and subjects had continued to work in Indonesia after its independence. Because this formally constituted residence in a foreign country, any repatriate in the Netherlands after the 1950s would not have had time to build up six years in the Netherlands to qualify for an old-age pension under the transitional rules. The authors of the memo explained that those individuals who remained did so under "the pressure that the Dutch government applied to those working in Indonesia to continue working there in the interests of the Netherlands and the Dutch economy" (see Lamping's speech in 5.2.5) and that therefore "it would be wrong and unjust to withhold rights from those who followed those instructions compared to those who did not."[156] The groups stated their goal, which was to obtain commitment from the Dutch government that residence in the Indonesian republic after independence could be equalised with residence in the Kingdom.

The lobbying efforts of these interest groups appears to have been successful. The discussion made it to the Ministerial Council of 30 January 1956.[157] The ministers agreed that it would be "reasonable to assume" that Dutch people who lived in the former Netherlands Indies met the residence requirement of if they repatriated within ten years of the sovereignty transfer. Their request would be met on 20 December 1956 with a Royal Decree (Stb. 628b). The Royal Decree stipulates that for Articles 43 and 46, in which transitional rules are laid out, "living in the Kingdom" would be equalised with: "a) living in former Netherlands Indies, b) living in Indonesia to the extent that this took place *after* 27 December 1949 and the leaving of that country took place before December 28, 1964."[158] With this adjustment, repatriates who moved from Indonesia after independence *with Dutch citizenship* would be equalised with those Dutch citizens who had built up six years in the Netherlands.

Any migrants from the former Netherlands Indies without Dutch citizenship - like Moluccans and (most) regrettants - would still be excluded from the aforementioned Royal Decree. Two days prior to the decree that equalised residence in Indonesia with residence in the Kingdom, a Royal Decree of 18 December 1956[159] equalised *refugees* living in the Kingdom with Dutch citizens. This had itself been the subject of some debate. In 1955 the justice minister had worried that it would encourage refugees to come to the Netherlands. The head of Immigration Affairs at the Ministry of Justice explained: "We have too many people and too few houses; we spend a lot of money for Dutch people to emigrate; our country is not

155 NL-UtA-1405-80-Memorandum re: het Wetsontwerp Algemene Ouderdomsvoorziening, 20 October 1955.
156 NL-UtA-1405-80-Memorandum re: het Wetsontwerp Algemene Ouderdomsvoorziening, 20 October 1955.
157 NL-HaNA-2.15.5142-356-Letter, to Minister without Portfolio, "Uit Indonesië gerepatrieerde Nederlanders en de AOW," 6 July 1956.
158 NL-HaNA-2.20.27-24-SIWO no 57, "De AOW ook voor 'spijtoptanten,'" November 1960.
159 Published in Stb 627

suitable for taking in refugees on a large scale."[160] In another note, he specified that, "if we include refugees in the AOW, that is charity. We ought to consider whether we are not already going far enough by letting refugees into our overpopulated country, and if it is therefore not fairer simply to leave their social care to private initiative."[161] However, two years prior, the Dutch government had ratified the Geneva Convention, some five years after its signature thereof. Under the Convention, as the Dutch representative of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reminded the Minister of Social Affairs and Public Health (then Jacobus Suurhoff of the Labour Party) in 1955, those with refugee status must receive preferable treatment to foreigners in general.[162] Specifically, according to Article 24 of the Geneva Convention, refugees must be equalised with citizens for the purpose of contributory social security systems. The Royal Decree of 18 December 1956 was the result.

On paper, regrettants could not make use of this provision. Requests for pension payments were handled by the Labour Councils (*Raden van Arbeid*). Democratically elected tripartite institutions (representing employers, labour, and the state), Labour Councils historically administered premiums and payments for employee insurance schemes, and shared responsibility for the implementation of the AOW with the Social Insurance Bank. Appeals could be made to local Boards of Appeal, who largely ruled in favour of regrettants when their request for AOW pensions was rejected by the Labour Council.[163] However, the Central Board of Appeal annulled the decisions to grant regrettants pensions on the grounds that they could not be considered refugees. The Central Board of Appeal argued that at the time the Refugee Convention was signed in July 1951, conditions in Indonesia did not conform to the conditions of persecution as referred to in that treaty (on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, political beliefs, or belonging to a specific group).[164] Therefore, the Central Board of Appeal ruled, it could not be assumed that the Refugee Convention would apply to regrettants. The Board admitted that this put them in a "less favourable position" than refugees, which raised the question of whether this was in accordance with the commitment expressed by the Dutch government in 1955 not to treat Indonesians worse than refugees.[165] However, the Board considered its hands tied, suggesting that this was the only ruling possible given the existing text of the Royal Decree.

Moluccans were equally excluded from the provisions of this Royal Decree. In April 1957, Marga Klompé, as Minister of Social Work, wrote to Suurhoff concerning the case of the Moluccans.[166] She explained that the question has been raised in the Moluccan community about whether those who had already reached the age of 65 could also access old-age pensions. She reminded Suurhoff about Luns' promise (see 6.2.5), according to which Moluccans were not to find themselves in a worse position than refugees according to the Geneva Convention.

160 NL-HaNA-2.15.5142-356-Letter, "Bijzondere regeling voor vluchtelingen en staatlozen in het kader van de overgangsbepalingen der AOW," 4 August 1956.
161 NL-HaNA-2.15.5142-356-Interim toelichting bij ontwerp-besluit en artikelen 45A en 48A AOW.
162 NL-HaNA-2.15.5142-356-Letter to the Minister of Social Affairs from C Brouwer, 21 July 1955
163 NL-HaNA-2.20.27-24-SIWO no 57, "De AOW ook voor 'spijtoptanten,'" November 1960.
164 NL-HaNA-2.20.27-24-SIWO no 57, "De AOW ook voor 'spijtoptanten,'" November 1960.
165 NL-HaNA-2.20.27-24-SIWO no 57, "De AOW ook voor 'spijtoptanten,'" November 1960, p 8.
166 NL-HaNA-2.15.5142-356-Letter from Minister of Social Work to Minister of Social Affairs and Public Health, "Ouderdomspensioen voor Ambonezen." 3 April 1957.

A month later, an official from Suurhoff's ministry responded. The official explains that, "under current legislation, Ambonese residents in the Netherlands will generally not be able to claim the benefits arising from the transitional provisions regarding the general old-age pension included in Articles 43 and 46 of the AOW."[167] The official explained that although their residence in Indonesia after 1949 would be equalised with residence in the Dutch kingdom, as per the Royal Decree of 20 December 1956, they still did not have Dutch citizenship, nor could they claim access under the Royal Decree of 18 December 1956 since they did not have refugee status. A representative from the Ministry of Social Affairs would later comment that the discussion at this stage - 1957 and early 1958 - led to a dead-end, as concerns like those raised by Klompé were set against a backdrop of public opinion that viewed equalising Moluccans as "undesirable."[168]

The discussion was revived shortly later, as the camps in which Moluccans were housed were being shut down. In December 1959, A.J. Raalte, a director of the CAZ, took up correspondence with the Ministry directly.[169] Raalte stressed that Moluccans had not have the possibility to opt for Dutch nationality, and that it was increasingly clear that their stay in the Netherlands would be long-term. He requested a modification of the Royal Decree of 18 December 1956 to include Moluccans above the age of 65, and added that "the financial consequences" of this proposal were "minor" given that "the elderly Moluccans staying in our country are few in number."[170]

6.4.4. Moluccans and regrettants

By 1960, the Ministry of Social Affairs, then under Catholic leadership, was more favourable to the idea. This coincided with the formation of the National Action Supporting Regrettants From Indonesia (Stichting *Comité Nationale Actie Steunt Spijtoptanten Indonesië*, or NASSI). NASSI became an official foundation on April 5, 1960, aiming to "give expression to the belief of the Dutch people that our fellow 'tribespeople' … should be helped, which mostly means that those who are forced to seek refuge in the Netherlands by applying for a visa can come here as soon as possible" and to "ensure that help is actually given."[171] NASSI involved parliamentarians and public figures to plead the cabinet for leniency vis-à-vis regrettants. Key to NASSI lobbyists' strategy had been racialising these non-citizens as insiders, to which 1960 radio speeches testify. A Liberal MP based her assertion of the Netherlands' "moral obligation" toward repatriates on it being "inhumane to let so many *Dutch* men, women and children

167 NL-HaNA-2.15.5142-356-Letter from Head of Department of Social Insurance at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Public Health, to the Minister of Social Work, 16 May 1957.

168 NL-HaNA-2.15.5142-356-Letter from Ministry of Social Affairs and Public Health to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 19 July 1960.

169 NL-HaNA-2.15.5142-356-Letter from Mr Raalte of CAZ (Social Work) to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Public Health, "Toepassing overgangsbepalingen Algemene Ouderdomswet op Ambonezen," 21 December 1959.

170 NL-HaNA-2.15.5142-356-Letter from Mr Raalte of CAZ (Social Work) to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Public Health, "Toepassing overgangsbepalingen Algemene Ouderdomswet op Ambonezen," 21 December 1959.

171 Inventory of the archives of the *Stichting Comité Nationale Actie Steunt Spijtoptanten Indonesië (NASSI), 1960-1969*, 2.20.27, Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, 2019.

perish."[172] The actress Nel Oosthout invoked the hardship of those "born and raised under the tropical sun; of 'mixed blood' if you will and slightly darker skinned than you and I, but who have Dutch names."[173] This last subclause was crossed out and replaced with "but who are Dutch, regardless of their origin, like you and I," suggesting that the qualities that determined Dutchness remained under negotiation. The fact that, with the stroke of a pen, a group could be moved from merely "hav[ing] Dutch names" to "[being] Dutch, regardless of their origin," bespeaks not only the discretion of local actors in shaping national belonging at the time, but the frail, unfinished fabric out of which this belonging was fashioned. The salience and sensitivity of race in this process is reflected in Oosthout's decision not to mention regrettants' "mixed blood," and later to emphasise that they had "remained Dutch in their *appearance*, in their ways of life, in their views."[174] "In their clothing" was also struck through; fashion, as ephemeral as it is, presumably too weak a drywall on which to hang national identity. The importance of clothing, like all other traits, was subject to popular debate, however, since in the same year as Oosthout's speech, a contact official on board an arriving ship had used the fact that Indische Nederlanders had worn "full regalia" at a captains' dinner to reassure the Justice Minister of their "Westernness."[175]

NASSI's efforts were central in heightening the quota of regrettants who could enter The Netherlands under the special admissions scheme. By February 1960, their treatment raised eyebrows at the Council of Ministers. A minister (whose anonymity the archival record preserved) asked whether regrettants "were not too well-cared for?"[176] Another responded, "as a rule, the standard is indeed higher than that of the Poor Law," and went on to justify this outcome: "the repatriates require a higher standard than the Poor Law because they find themselves under difficult circumstances, coming from another country."

Arguably one of the NASSI's major successes was the reversal of their exclusion from AOW transitional rules. On 21 September 1960 Senator de Vos van Steenwijk asked the Minister of Social Affairs about the ineligibility of Indonesian citizens (regrettants) for the AOW transitional rules, asking whether this "injustice [ought not] be removed."[177] Nine days later, the answer came in the affirmative: the Royal Decree would be modified at the shortest delay to accommodate regrettants. By 1960, representatives of the Moluccan community had also mobilised, specifying that "since 1957, refugees falling under the [Geneva] Convention have enjoyed an AOW old-age pension, but despite all the efforts made by … the representation of South Moluccans in the Netherlands, up until now, a similar pension is not being granted to South Moluccans."[178] By 1960, the Ministry was favourably disposed. Their only concern was that it might create a welfare magnet for other Moluccans or "other groups of people who are coming from Indonesia," and therefore turned to Luns, who was still Minister of Foreign

172 Emphasis added, NL-HaNA-2.20.27-24-"Onze Indische Nederlanders," 1960.
173 Emphasis added, NL-HaNA-2.20.27-24-Radio speech, Oosthout, 1960.
174 Emphasis added, NL-HaNA-2.20.27-24-Radio speech, Oosthout, 1960.
175 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-1018-"Verslag van de reis met het s.s Zuiderkruis," February 1960.
176 NL-HaNa-2.27.02-1013-Minutes of Ministerial Council, 4 February 1960.
177 NL-HaNA-2.20.27-24, Periodical SIWO, November 1960.
178 NL-HaNA-2.15.5142-356-Letter from the Plenipotentiary Minister of the Republik Maluku Selatan to Minister van Rooy of Social Affairs and Public Health, 26 September 1960.

Affairs.[179] Luns did not seem as concerned with the possibility of a welfare magnet, and in fact stressed the importance of offering this equalisation to other non-citizen repatriates who had also not received refugee status.[180] He agreed to the equalisation of Moluccans "gladly" and added that such an equalisation also apply "to other non-Dutch citizens from Indonesia who have obtained permission for permanent residence in the Netherlands (in particular the so-called 'regrettants' and other groups)."

By 1961, preparations for a provision providing access for non-citizen repatriates to the transitional rules of the AOW were in full swing. It was ultimately achieved on 26 January 1961 by modifying the Royal Decree of 18 December 1956 to include a third article.[181] This article stipulated that, "for the application of Articles 44 and 47 of the General Old Age Pensions Act, as long as they live within the Kingdom, non-Dutch nationals, originating from Indonesia, who have settled in the Netherlands with the permission of the Dutch government and who were 50 years or older at the time of their establishment in the Netherlands." Officials at the Ministry of Social Affairs explained that "insistence from multiple sides" prompted this modification.[182] Later, Luns' colleague in the Catholic-conservative coalition cabinet of the late 1960s would express that he was less glad about the equalisation of Moluccans. Polak, a Catholic, wrote to an interlocutor at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Public Health, stating that the modification to the Royal Decree was "actually intended" for regrettants and the "social Dutch" (*maatschappelijke Nederlanders*).[183]

As the special admissions scheme for regrettants drew to a close in April 1964, members of parliament continued to draw attention to their plight. Christian symbolism and appeals to morality featured prominently, even by members of secular parties. The Labour MP Johan Scheps likened admitting regrettants to admitting Jews during the Second World War, before referring ominously to a biblical symbol for the Anti-Christ by noting that on 1 Jan 1964 there were 666 requests for admission and that "the number is of great significance."[184] Unsurprisingly, Jan Meulink of the prominent Protestant party at the time (ARP) retained a focus on moral duty, arguing that benevolent immigration policy is "above all a demand of Christian morality."[185]

179 NL-HaNA-2.15.5142-356-Letter from Department of Social Insurance to Minister of Social Affairs, "Gelijkstelling van Ambonezen met Nederlanders voor de toepassing van de overgangsbepalingen der AOW," 14 January 1960

180 NL-HaNA-2.15.5142-356-Letter from Minister of Foreign Affairs to Minister of Social Affairs and Public Health, 28 April 1960.

181 NL-HaNA-2.15.5142-356-"Besluit van houdende wijziging van het Koninklijk Besluit van 18 december 1956"

182 NL-HaNA-2.15.5142-356-Letter from the department of Social Insurance at the Ministry of Social Affairs to Minister/State Secretary "Ontwerp-besluit tot wijziging K.b van 18 december 1956 (Stb 627)(gelijkstelling niet-Nederlanders met Nederlanders) en ontwerp-besluit ex art 60, onder a van de Algemene Weduwen en Wezenwet (Gelijkstelling niet-Nederlanders met Nederlanders)," 13 November 1960.

183 NL-HaNA-2.15.5142 -356-Letter from Minister of Justice to Ministry of Social Affairs, 12 November 1968,

184 NL-HaNA-2.27.19-18503-Parliamentary discussion, "Ontwerp Vreemdelingenwet 1965 en Vreemdelingenbesluit," 23 June 1964.

185 NL-HaNA-2.27.19-18503-Parliamentary discussion, "Ontwerp Vreemdelingenwet 1965 en Vreemdelingenbesluit," 23 June 1964.

6.5. Analysis

As I have shown, the public and private provisions available to repatriates with citizenship were considerable. At the level of proximate causes, this is largely attributable to the fact that the Dutch government viewed itself as responsible for providing enough support that repatriates could reach an "adequate standard of living," to which its foreign minister admitted in 1950.[186] But why did it assume responsibility over this population? Until 1965, not even the standard of living of needy *metropolitan* Dutch citizens was considered a government responsibility. By 1960, when an anonymous minister responded behind closed doors that the "standard [for regrettants] is indeed higher than that of the Poor Law," it was clear that the goal of providing welfare to repatriates was distinct from that of metropolitan Dutch citizens.

The stated justification for discrepancy was simply of need. Prince Bernhard had invoked the neediness of repatriates when he wrote to prime minister Drees,[187] and ten years later, the minister had justified generous policy toward regrettants – indeed of a "higher standard than the Poor Law" – on the grounds that repatriates "find themselves in difficult circumstances, coming from another country."[188] Granted, need is one of many criteria flagged by existing literature as an important determinant of potential welfare claimant's deservingness.[189] However, in this context it is a red herring, as access to welfare was not fragmented along lines of need. Moluccans were not excluded from the CCKP's remit and placed under constant surveillance in military camps because they had different needs than Indische Nederlanders. Nor were regrettants excluded from the transitional rules of the AOW - notably the only part of the legislation that entailed noncontributory rather than contributory benefits - because they fared better than their Dutch citizen counterparts.

Rather, fragmented patterns of inclusion reflect contestation over cultural proximity, and ultimately mirrored the messy racial classifications that this contestation produced. In a war-torn economy about to lose its crown imperial jewel, Dutch policymakers faced cross-pressures as they fumbled for national identity. On the one hand, they had inherited ready-to-use racial ideology from their colonial past. Europeanness and so-called "civilisation(al attainment)" had been deployed to make sense of difference in The Netherlands Indies, and "indigenous" and "Foreign Oriental" subjects had been denied political rights on this basis since 1892. This provided an attractive template for group constitution after Indonesian independence. At the same time, explicitly racial language had been expunged from the public sphere after the Holocaust. Just two years before the Werner Report was leaked, UNESCO had published a report condemning race on moral and analytic grounds and undertaken a broad campaign to disseminate its findings.[190]

The Western-Eastern or *rootedness* distinction, popularised by the 1952 Werner report appeared to offer government officials an appealing way out. The distinction made no formal reference to skin colour, but its racial meaning was clear, as it assigned immovable, fixed

186 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-Memo containing proposals formulated after CCKP's meeting of November 9, 1950
187 NL-HaNA-2.04.48.16-11-"Letter," Prins Bernhard, 1950.
188 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-Memo containing proposals formulated after CCKP's meeting of November 9, 1950
189 van Oorschot, "Who Should Get What, and Why?"
190 *The Race Question* (Paris: UNESCO, 1950), https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000128291.

attributes to complex individuals on the basis of ancestry and geography, leaving discrete, self-contained categories amenable to public policy in its wake. In the same way that Hall argued that the crisis of social authority in 1980s Britain was thematised through race, anxieties about national identity were thematised through Westernness. The distinction supplied the basis, as I have shown, for the distribution of citizenship and entry rights among Dutch citizens in Indonesia, and continued wielding power over repatriates upon their arrival in The Netherlands since the "Eastern" label could purportedly lead to reduced cash assistance[191] or denial of permanent housing.

The placement of (post)colonial migrants along this dimension, however, was not obvious nor fixed. Moluccans, for example, had historically been regarded as culturally and religiously proximate, but ultimately fell in no uncertain terms on the outside of the boundaries of the sphere of justice, as the first Minister of Social Work (van Thiel) proposed their "repatriation" to Asia,[192] signalling their status as symbolic foreigner to the Dutch *patria,* and the second Minister of Social Work (Klompé) justified their treatment with reference to a nebulous and indubitably racialised cultural essence. In keeping with the social interpretation of welfare expansion, this may have been because they had less powerful advocates in their corner compared, for instance, to regrettants. A cross-party coalition joined by prominent public figures contested the state's placement of regrettants as outsiders, and successfully appealed for their entry rights and entitlement under the transitional rules of the AOW.

Importantly, these lobbying efforts both pulled regrettants across the boundaries of the welfare state, *and* revised or reverse-engineered the dimensions with which boundaries were being made. When the actress Nel Oosthout highlighted that regrettants "remained Dutch in their appearance, in their ways of life, in their views," and reduced emphasis on whether they "had Dutch names" or wore Dutch clothing by crossing out these attributes, she was both portraying regrettants as Western *and* curating which features mattered for Westernness.[193] Meanwhile, one month prior, the contact official on board the SS Zuiderkruis *had* felt that the choice and ability of the repatriates on board her ship to dine in "full regalia" was an important way to reassure the Minister of Justice of their Western orientation.[194] If access to welfare changed over time for regrettants, it is because racial classifications are a notoriously fragile basis for establishing the imagined community.

The reversal of the regrettants' exclusion from the AOW not only coincided with the amplified lobbying efforts of the NASSI coalition, with its advocates in high places, both academically and politically. It also happened against the backdrop of a changing political landscape in which Christian social doctrine began to play a more important role. In 1958, a thirteen-year period of "Roman-red" coalitions, i.e. of cooperation between Labour and confessional or Christian Democratic parties, came to an end, and the Catholic Peoples' Party assumed the next three premierships. Oude Nijhuis argues that this created more room for

191 Schuster, *Poortwachters over Immigranten: Het Debat over Immigratie in Het Naoorlogse Groot-Britannië En Nederland*, 108.

192 Jones, "Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten En Nederlanders: Nederlandse Politici over Burgers Uit Oost En West En Nederland, 1945-2005", p. 104.

193 NL-HaNA-2.20.27-24-Radio speech, Oosthout, 1960.

194 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-1018-"Verslag van de reis met het s.s Zuiderkruis," February 1960.

the "Christian-democratic emphasis on social justice and solidarity," as opposed to the social democratic emphasis on formal equality.[195] This created a favourable context for "demand[s] of Christian morality" like those made by regrettants in the Second Chamber.[196] The effect was no doubt particularly pronounced when peppered with references to Hitler and Rosenberg, in a country that had sought to create distance from Nazi rule through the large-scale "purification" (*zuivering*) of collaborators from public office.

195 Oude Nijhuis, *Religion, Class and the Post-war Development of the Dutch Welfare State*.

196 NL-HaNA-2.27.19-18503-Parliamentary discussion, "Ontwerp Vreemdelingenwet 1965 en Vreemdelingenbesluit," 23 June 1964.

7. Securing the republic: (post)colonial migrants in the French welfare state

We have to teach the women everything... [this is] essential, nonstop work, since the aim is to transform, as much as possible, these Muslims into Europeans.

Interview with a social worker at a forest hamlet in Lozère, July 1963.[1]

7.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I analyse the inclusion of Algerians in the French welfare state in order to estimate the boundaries of the French sphere of justice. I explore the rights of French citizens and subjects in Algeria (7.2), Algerian labour migrants who arrived in the metropole prior to Algerian independence (7.3), and subsequently pieds-noirs (7.4) and harkis (7.5) who fled Algeria after Algerian independence. Like in the Dutch case, I find evidence not necessarily of racial exclusions (although there were some), but mainly of internal structuration along racial lines. The French welfare state splintered into different tiers to accommodate different (post) colonial migrants, even if this meant departing from some of its key tenets.

The system included white European Algerians on generous and dignified terms, whether they lived in Algeria or in the metropole. In the metropole, Algerian labour migrants - known as "Muslim French" - were granted roughly the same *amount* of welfare as their white compatriots up until Algerian independence. However, its character was distinctly paternalistic. Most notably, from 1958 to 1962, contributions on their behalf to the family allowance fund were diverted to a Social Assistance Fund for Muslim Workers and Their Families (FAS) which delivered in-kind social assistance. This was in keeping with a broader tradition of what Amelia Lyons calls the "Algerian services network" - a proliferation of institutions devoted to educating, housing and closely supervising Algerian labour migrants.[2] At Algerian independence, many private and public institutions of this network switched their attention to harkis, who became known as "Muslim French" refugees. Compared to Algerian labour migrants, their reception scored far lower on the Marshall dimension (as most were housed in military barracks) and particularly low on the Somers dimension, with Alexandre Parodi - one of the founding fathers of French social security - presiding over a committee responsible for their "tutelage."

7.2. Social security in Algeria

7.2.1. The Algerian Assembly and its social security provisions

Although the view that Algeria was an obvious extension of metropolitan France was widely held in the post-war period, the October 1945 ordinances did not apply on Algerian territory.

1 FR-PaAN-19920149-"Les harkis, à la recherche d'une patrie," Christian Rudel, 17 July 1963.

2 Amelia H Lyons, "Social Welfare, French Muslims and Decolonization in France: The Case of the Fonds d'action Sociale," *Patterns of Prejudice* 43, no 1 (February 2009): 79, https://doi.org/10.1080/00313220802636072.

Instead, the French overseas departments of Algeria established a social security regime that with time came "closer and closer" to that of metropolitan France.[3] According to officials, its development was slow due to circumstances "specific to Algeria."[4] The circumstances in question are elucidated by an undated report which mentions not only the territory's more limited economic capacity but also the presence of "people still in evolution."[5] Later drafts of the same document dropped this reference to evolution. Still, a series of decisions voted on by the Algerian Assembly in 1949 instituted a social insurance system "almost identical" to that of salaried workers in the metropole, both in underlying principles and in scope.[6] In 1953, a centralised old-age insurance scheme, modelled after its metropolitan counterpart, was adopted, with a Central Fund for Algerian Old-Age Insurance at its heart (*Caisse Centrale Algérienne d'Assurance Viellesse*).[7] A system of family allowances preceded this regime by eight years.[8]

In some ways, the Algerian regime was more generous than its metropolitan counterpart. One report notes that "the Algerian Assembly went further than the metropolitan position," granting salaried workers the right to a full pension at 60 years (instead of 65).[9] Moreover, the ceiling on pensions was fixed at 60 per cent of the capped salary,[10] compared to 40 per cent in the metropole.[11] As a transitory rule, retirees who could provide evidence of their salaried work in the fifteen years preceding the scheme's entry into force (1938-1953) could receive benefits as if they contributed during that period. The generosity of the Algerian Assembly raised the eyebrows of Roger Léonard, governor-general of French Algeria (representative of the Republic) who deemed it financially unsustainable.[12] The justification for the elaborate system was its ability to tighten up a "slack" labour market by pulling the elderly out of the workforce.[13]

In other ways, the regime was less generous. For example, its family allowance system excluded agricultural workers, domestic workers, and the self-employed, and provided allowances at a lower rate than in France. Moreover, however, its scope of application was more restricted.[14] The Algerian social security system was targeted at (urban) industrial workers: agricultural workers had a less advantageous scheme and did not benefit from family

3 FR-AixAN-81F 1496-Note, "Le Régime Algérien de La Sécurité Sociale: Situation Comparée Avec Le Régime Métropolitain," 17 April 1961.
4 FR-AixAN-81F 1496-Note, "Le Régime Algérien de La Sécurité Sociale: Situation Comparée Avec Le Régime Métropolitain," 17 April 1961.
5 FR-AixAN-81F 1496-Note, "Application Des Lois Sociales En Algérie," most likely from 1957 or 1958.
6 FR-AixAN-81F 1496-Note, "Le Régime Algérien de La Sécurité Sociale: Situation Comparée Avec Le Régime Métropolitain," 17 April 1961, p 3.
7 FR-AixAN-81F 1510-Letter from Roger Léonard, Governor General of Algeria, 11 February 1953.
8 "La Politique de Securite Sociale En Algerie," *Population (French Edition)* 7, no 1 (January 1952): 18, https://doi.org/10.2307/1523518.
9 FR-AixAN-81F 1496-Note, "Le régime de sécurité sociale en Algérie," 7 August 1957.
10 The capped salary, or *salaire plafonné,* represented the maximum salary taken into consideration for the calculation of contributions to social security.
11 FR-AixAN-81F 1510-Letter from Roger Léonard, Governor General of Algeria, 11 February 1953.
12 FR-AixAN-81F 1510-Letter from Roger Léonard, Governor General of Algeria, 11 February 1953.
13 FR-AixAN-81F 1496-Note, "Le régime de sécurité sociale en Algérie," 7 August 1957.
14 Rager, *Les Musulmans Algériens En France et Dans Les Pays Islamiques*, 234.

allowances.[15] As a result, the system directly insured only about 500,000 salaried workers.[16] Additionally, although there were no racially discriminatory clauses on paper, in practice the "indigenous peasantry" were excluded on the grounds that they relied on non-salaried contracts which "[could] not be assimilated" into the social insurance scheme.[17] Even *salaried* "Muslim" workers appear to have been excluded from the provisions of old-age pensions.

In 1955 Trois-gros, a Gaullist representative in the Assembly of the French Union, proposed extending the provisions of *metropolitan* old-age insurance for self-employed and agricultural workers to "Muslim" retirees from the salaried workforce who were above the age of 65.[18] Fellow parliamentarians, before ultimately rejecting the proposal on March 6, 1956, argued that, in applying only to French "Muslims," his proposal would amount to discrimination under the 1947 statute according to which all French nationals of Algeria were equal by law. They additionally argued that inclusion would be too costly since, for every 1000 "Muslim" Algerians, only 420 were active workers, and those 420 would need to "come to the rescue" of 55 elderly people.[19] This was unconvincing given that the ratio was even smaller for European Algerians, of which 534 active workers out of a total of 1000 needed to cover the benefits of 116 elderly. A final argument as opponents scrambled to justify their dissent related to the administrative culture of "Muslims." It stated that "Muslim rule of law is only just starting to establish itself, and many … are not capable of saying their age."[20] Despite this blatantly racial logic, the session was closed to applause with the expression of confidence in the government, which would "do all in its power for the elderly of Algeria, Muslims and non-Muslims, because they are all French."[21]

Trois-gros' proposal and the accompanying debates laid bare the exclusion of "Muslim" salaried workers from the ostensibly generous old-age regime in Algeria, the unwillingness of legislators to rectify this, the less-than-convincing cost-benefit calculations used to uphold their position and its awkward pairing with their nonetheless adamant proclamations of national fraternity. Useful in understanding this paradox is a reminder of the composition of the Algerian Assembly. As mentioned (5.3.4), a white minority elected half of its 120 seats despite representing less than one-tenth of the population.[22]

Additionally, the Algerian war of independence had been underway since 1954, when Algerian nationalists had begun taking up arms against colonial rule.[23] There is some evidence that during the Algerian war, the old age system was used to instil discipline among rebels. The Algerian Assembly's anxieties in the face of rising tensions meant that the social security regime doubled as a tool for achieving desired social outcomes. Selective exclusion served that role. In 1958, the Assembly proposed denying the pension pay-outs of dependents whose caretakers

15 "La Politique de Securite Sociale En Algerie."
16 FR-AixAN-81F 1496-Report, "Les Réalisations Du Secteur Sociale En Algérie En 1960," 8 November 1960.
17 "La Politique de Securite Sociale En Algerie," 19.
18 FR-AixAN-81F 1510- Letter from E Simoneau, to Mr Pierre Cornet, 28 February 1956.
19 FR-AixAN-81F 1510-Meeting minutes, session of l'Assemblée de l'Union Française, 6 March 1956, p 3.
20 FR-AixAN-81F 1510-Meeting minutes, session of l'Assemblée de l'Union Française, 6 March 1956, p 7.
21 FR-AixAN-81F 1510-Meeting minutes, session of l'Assemblée de l'Union Française, 6 March 1956, p 7.
22 Donald J Harvey, "Algeria: Tiger by the Tail," *Current History* 41, no 242 (October 1, 1961): 211.
23 Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France*, 42.

had died during "rebellion,"[24] thereby using insurance as an instrument for punishing dissent. In fact, metropolitan legislators reacted disapprovingly to this proposal. Nafissa Sid Cara, the Secretary of State in charge of social affairs in Algeria (who was the first ever minister of "Muslim" origin and the first female minister) deemed the proposal "excessive," and appealed for an attenuated draft in which families would be presumed innocent, rather than the opposite.[25]

7.3. Algerian labour migrants

7.3.1. The Algerian services network

As mentioned in 5.3.5, in the first few years after the Second World War, a quarter of a million of Algerians arrived in France: more than double the number that had arrived during and immediately after the First World War.[26] Religious institutions played an important part in welcoming migrants, but those of Catholic denomination concentrated on Italians and Polish ONI recruits and devoted less attention to Algerians.[27] The lacuna was filled by an elaborate set of public and private programmes devoted to Algerian affairs. Amelia Lyons calls this the "Algerian services network."[28] The network came of age during the Fourth Republic (1946-1958) and was intimately intertwined with efforts to retain French authority over Algeria.

According to one memo from 1959, no fewer than 135 private organisations were involved in social assistance for "Muslim French," as Algerian labour migrants were known.[29] Many received state subsidies for their efforts in this domain.[30] Prominent organisations receiving subsidies for their work included the North African Family Social Service (*Service social familial nord-africain*, SSFNA) and Moral Assistance and Aid to North Africans (*Assistance morale et aide aux nord-africains*, AMANA). SSFNA was a social Catholic organisation aiming at "progressively ensuring the adaptation of Muslim women to European life, and the integration of these families in… metropolitan services."[31] Examples of its activities included running cleaning courses (exclusively for women) or French lessons.[32] AMANA, in turn, was founded in 1947 by a white French repatriate from Tunisia. Its primary aim was to improve

24 FR-AixAN-81F 1496-Modifying decree, "Relatif Aux Mesures Exceptionnelles Tendant Au Rétablissemnet de l'ordre, à La Protection Des Personnes et Des Biens et à La Sauvegarde de Territoire de l'Algérie," 23 January 1958.
25 FR-AixAN-81F 1496-Response by Sid Cara, 1958.
26 Henneresse, "Le Patronat et La Politique Française d'Immigration, 1945-1975," 73.
27 Philippe Dewitte, "Historique," *Hommes et Migrations*, accessed April 18, 2022, https://journals.openedition.org/hommesmigrations/1768.
28 Lyons, "Social Welfare, French Muslims and Decolonization in France," 79.
29 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Services-Organisation générale, "Notes sur l'action sociale en faveur des travailleurs algériens en métropole," 1959.
30 Inventory of the archives of the *Fonds d'action Sociale Pour Les Travailleurs Migrants (1953-1998)*, 19990118/1-19990118/39, Archives Nationales.
31 FR-PaAN-19770391/9, Note for Mr Director-General, March 6 1959.
32 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Note, "Comité restreint sur l'action sociale en faveur des migrants algériens dans la métropole," 6 March 1959.

the literacy of Algerian workers and to act as an intermediary with French society.[33] AMANA also hosted French courses, helped match individuals with accommodation, provided "leisure" opportunities and educated on "preparation for metropolitan life."[34] Additionally, in the same year, a Sanitary and Social Assistance Fund was founded to promote the construction of accommodation for Algerian workers and to facilitate their access to existing accommodation by means of individual loans.[35] Private associations like these aimed to provide services that complemented, rather than substituted, general social services.

By 1950, miscellaneous activities concerning "Muslim French" fell under the remit of three different ministries: the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Public Health and Population, and the Ministry of the Interior, with the latter playing a coordinating role.[36] In theory, each had a different mandate, but in practice, according to an official from the Ministry of Public Health in 1959, "from the start, a certain ambiguity surrounded the division of tasks between the three Departments."[37] The Ministry of the Interior made political decisions regarding assistance, maintained a general overview of subsidies and was also interested in questions relating to the public order, including temporary housing and assimilation. To this end, it oversaw Social Intervention Offices (*Bureaux d'interventions sociales,* BIS) which helped families compile dossiers for family benefits, social security, or requests for civil status.[38] Indeed, the latter made up the largest proportion of activity at the BIS.[39] At least until 1957, temporary housing also concerned the Ministry of Labour, who simultaneously coordinated professional resettlement and vocational training. Finally, the Ministry of Public Health and Population shared an interest with the Ministry of the Interior in social adaptation. In practice, a representative of the Ministry of Public Health and Population lamented that the Ministry of Interior exercised a "leadership role in social policy" due to the inequality of budgetary credits.[40] In 1958, the Ministry of the Interior received 320 billion fr compared to the Ministry of Public Health and Population's 42 million fr. "Thus," complained the author, "the Ministry mandated with public order and policing assumed at the same time the social protection of the same populations."[41] By 1959, there there were at least nine public services tasked with helping Algerians.

The French government's interest in social assistance for Algerian labour migrants was closely linked to its interest in preserving French colonial empire. Nowhere is this clearer than in the appointment of Technical Consultants for Muslim Affairs (CTAM, *Conseillers techniques pour les affaires musulmanes*) with the joint mandate of promoting welfare and monitoring radicalisation. These technical consultants fall into a specific French tradition of administrative centralisation, where decisions are taken in Paris and implemented by state-

33 Dewitte, "Historique."
34 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Note, "Comité restreint sur l'action sociale en faveur des migrants algériens dans la métropole," 6 March 1959.
35 Archives Nationales, "Santé; Fonds d'action Sociale Pour Les Travailleurs Migrants (1953-1998)."
36 FR-PaAN-19770391/9, Note for Mr Director-General, March 6 1959.
37 FR-PaAN-19770391/9, Note for Mr Director-General, March 6 1959.
38 FR-PaAN-20120054/1, Letter from Minister of Repatriates to Minister of the Interior, November 29, 1963
39 FR-PaAN-20120054/1, Letter from Minister of Repatriates to Minister of the Interior, November 29, 1963
40 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Note for Mr Director-General, March 6 1959.
41 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Note for Mr Director-General, March 6 1959.

appointed representatives, like prefects.[42] In 1948, in the aftermath of strikes that produced widespread disorder, the Interior Ministry assigned General Administrative Inspectors on Special Assignment (*Inspectors généraux de l'administration en mission extraordinaire*, IGAME) to preexisting military districts.[43] An IGAME was expected to act as an agent of control and supervision, charged with restoring public order[44] and expected to extend ministerial, regional and local governmental reach.[45] In the 1950s, they were sent to Algeria to help quell the rebellion, and those in the metropole were tasked with helping prefectures organise "moral, material, and social assistance for the Muslim population."[46] In 1952, the governor-general of Algeria appointed the aforementioned technical consultants to assist with this duty. The technical consultants were civil servants with experience as administrators in colonial Algeria.[47] Between 1952 and 1962, they increased in number from four to 34.[48]

The multiplication of duties associated with the technical consultant was intricately linked with the French war effort as public officials sought to turn Algerians away from the FLN through social assistance.[49] A series of reports produced by the Marseilles-based technical consultant for their prefect between 1958 and 1959 are indicative.[50] Almost every introduction begins with an update on the progress of the war in the metropole, listing, for example, estimates of the number of FLN supporters among Algerian workers, recent arrests of rebel leaders, and interpretations of FLN propaganda. At the end of 1958, the technical consultant argued that inequality was making FLN more popular, and that therefore "psychological action" was necessary to reduce the distance between metropolitan and Algerian French workers, and that social and educational assistance must be geared toward making Algerian migrants feel "every day more and more equal to their metropolitan comrades."[51] Similarly, a 1959 note from officials at the Ministry of Public Health explained the importance of fostering sympathies across metropolitan and Algerian populations.[52] That same year, a communiqué from the Ministry of Interior worried that, "nationalist and anti-French sentiments are gaining ground in this population [of Algerian workers] as they experience feelings of isolation, maladjustment and inferiority in the metropole" and that social measures were implemented to "combat the consequences of this state of mind."[53] Obviously, this motive was kept under wraps. Officials from the Ministry of Public Health and Population described their work as "speak[ing] to [Algerians] in the language their hearts understand."[54]

42 After the Revolution, France was divided up into departments, each run by an elected deliberative assembly and a prefect, who has executive functions. Since 1800, the prefect stands in as representative of central government.
43 Jeanne Lemasurier, "Les Inspecteurs Généraux de l'Administration En Mission Extraordinaire," *La Revue Administrative* 7, no 40 (1954): 378.
44 Lemasurier, 378.
45 Lyons, *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: The French Welfare State during Decolonization*, 62.
46 Lyons, 62.
47 Grosjean, "L'action des conseillers techniques aux Affaires musulmanes L'exemple du camp de Thol."
48 Grosjean, 6.
49 Grosjean, 6.
50 FR-MaAD-138W-16
51 FR-MaAD-138W-16-Report, third trimester 1958.
52 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Note, "Sur l'action sociale en faveur des travailleurs algériens en métropole," 1959, p 8.
53 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Communiqué, "Création d'un climat favorable par l'action sociale," 19 February 1959.
54 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Note, "Sur l'action sociale en faveur des travailleurs algériens en métropole," 1959.

It is not obvious, however, that the hearts of Algerians understood or appreciated this language. Evidence that they resisted or mistrusted social initiatives is plentiful. In September 1958, the technical consultant in the department of Bouches-du-Rhône reported that private associations were having difficulty recruiting staff after the "attacks of which several social services agents were recently victim."[55] The undated minutes of a meeting of technical consultants from different areas in southern France contains the advice to social workers that, when conducting home visits, they avoid being alone, "if necessary even by being accompanied by a well-trained dog," that their reception offices "make surprises difficult (for example hav[ing] just one door for entrances and exits)," and that they "tighten their ties with the police."[56] After the war was over, suspicion between the communities and/or resistance to the efforts of welfare providers appears to have continued in the metropole. As late as 1964, the SSFNA reported difficulties recruiting staff, such as teachers for their cleaning courses, not only due to the low salaries compared to the cost of their studies, but also due to the nature of their profession as "thankless."[57] In general, Algerians appeared to view much of the "Algerian services network" with suspicion and as colonial agents whose intention was to infiltrate social services so as to better monitor them.[58]

7.3.2. Social security without family allowances

Besides targeted assistance schemes, Algerian labour migrants were formally included under the general social security scheme. As Laroque explains, "it could hardly be otherwise since these laws are also applicable to foreigners."[59] A 1953 decree established that Algerians arriving in the metropole after that date had immediate access to rights under the metropolitan social security scheme on the condition that they had been insured in Algeria.[60] A report from later that year submitted to the Algerian Assembly explained that these texts "ensure[d] the continuity of rights to benefits for workers who move from Algeria to metropolitan France or vice versa. Thus, insured Algerians who worked in the metropole could benefit from the services of the metropolitan regime, considering the periods of contribution carried out in Algeria."[61] Additional clauses included the right to sickness or disability benefits *in* Algeria, paid for by metropolitan funds, if their rights to these benefits had been established while they were in the metropole.[62] These provisions, according to Laroque, were "more favourable" than those provided to foreign workers with whom France had concluded a bilateral agreement.[63] As of

55 FR-MaAD-138W-16-Report, 4 September 1958, p 2
56 FR-MaAD-138W-16-Meeting Minutes, "Coordination régional des affaires sociales musulmanes."
57 FR-PaAN-19850021/24-Report, 1963-1964 SSFNA.
58 Lyons, *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: The French Welfare State during Decolonization*, 64.
59 Laroque and Français, "Les Nord-Africains En France," 171.
60 Decree of 25 February 1953 (n°53.167), establishing principles for coordination across metropolitan and Algerian social security regimes FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965.
61 FR-PaAN-81F 1496-Meeting Minutes of Assemblée Algérienne, "Session Ordinaire de Novembre-Décembre 1953," p 16.
62 FR-PaAN-81F 1496-Meeting Minutes of Assemblée Algérienne, "Session Ordinaire de Novembre-Décembre 1953," p 17.
63 Pierre Laroque, "Préface," in *Les Travailleurs Algériens En France*, by Andrée Michel (Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1956), 3.

an interministerial circular dated 15 February 1938, Algerians also had access to rights under prevalent assistance legislation.[64]

Nonetheless, Algerian workers were excluded from family allowances if their family remained in Algeria. In 1932, they received no allowances at all, and by 1952, they had access to allowances but under Algerian rather than metropolitan legislation. This meant that Algerian families in Algeria received between one third and two thirds less than those living in the metropole, despite (the employers of) their heads of family having contributed the exact same amount as their metropolitan colleagues.[65] It also meant that families had to wait longer before they could access allowances, that allowances would arrive quarterly rather than monthly, and that only biological children, rather than all dependent children, would qualify.[66] Additionally, Algerian families faced informal barriers to accessing family allowances, since local officials in Algeria often refused to provide birth certificates, to register children, demanded bribes or withheld payments entirely.[67]

Laroque was adamant that this outcome resulted from "only the application of the general principle of territoriality," according to which metropolitan legislation applied to all families residing on metropolitan soil.[68] In a more elaborate justification he explained as follows.

> If, at first glance, it may be shocking that two workers from the same company do not receive the same family benefits because of the different residences of their families, would it not be as shocking and even perhaps more shocking that two families from the same Kabyle *douar*[69] could receive different benefits depending on whether the head of the family works in Algiers or Marseilles? Legislation in this area necessarily depends on the economic and social environment in which the family lives, much more than on the working environment. If the Algerian legislation may appear imperfect, there is no question of 'discrimination' in the application of this legislation.

While Laroque's logic may seem straightforward, contemporaries took issue with it for several reasons. First, the territoriality principle was not applied as strictly as Laroque implied. As a measure of benevolence, the families of Italian labour migrants, even if they stayed in Italy, would receive family allowance at metropolitan French rather than local rates, making Italians - who were foreigners - better off than Algerians - who were not.[70] Second, for many observers, this represented a "shocking contradiction" with the contributory logic of family allowances, according to which the right to benefits was determined by contributions from the employer of salaried workers.[71] The rupture with this principle was not just objectionable

64 Laroque and Français, "Les Nord-Africains En France," 168.
65 Lyons, *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: The French Welfare State during Decolonization*, 96.
66 Lyons, 96.
67 Lyons, 97.
68 Laroque, "Préface," 1956.
69 *Douar* is an Arabic term signifying a small, rural village, and Kabylia is a mountainous region in Algeria from which many migrants hailed.
70 Rager, *Les Musulmans Algériens En France et Dans Les Pays Islamiques*, 234.
71 Antoine Math, "Les Allocations Familiales et l'Algérie Coloniale," *La Revue de La CNAF Recherches et Prévisions*, no 53 (September 1998).

on theoretical grounds, but led to the bizarre predicament that French family allowance funds (*Caisses d'allocation familiale*) in France would actually realise economies by discriminating against Algerian families due to the difference in dues paid by employers (which were set at the metropolitan rate), and the actual family benefits to which Algerians had access (which were set at an inferior rate). Rager estimates that the families of Algerian workers would have received almost twice what they received in Algeria if they had moved to the metropole with the head of family (2 billion fr compared to the 1.2 billion fr they received in 1948).[72] Lyons estimates that the family allowance fund accumulated a surplus of over 600,000 fr between 1946 and 1956.[73]

This inequality became the subject of heated protest in the 1950s as Algerians accused metropolitan funds of "theft" as the surplus generated by the inequality was redirected away from their families and toward the population at large.[74]

7.3.3. A Fund for "Muslim Workers"

The response of French policymakers to protests regarding the inequality of access to family allowances was peculiar. Notably, rather than match the allowances of Algerian and metropolitan workers to rectify the imbalance, they continued to renounce basic contributory logic and created a new system more closely resembling the targeted social assistance schemes of the Algerian services network (7.3.1) than the general social security regime. Specifically, they charged a levy on employer contributions for family allowances and redirected it towards a new fund which financed services rather than direct payments.[75] The levy was based on family allowance rates in Algeria.[76]

On December 29, 1958, ordinance n°58-1381 established the Social Assistance Fund for Muslim Workers and Their Families (*Fonds d'action sociale pour les travailleurs musulmans et leurs familles,* FAS).[77] As the Minister of Algerian Affairs, Louis Joxe, would put it in a letter dated 9 November 1962, the FAS was designed "not to replace the intervention of ordinary social organisations, but to develop marginal operations intended to put Algerian migrants in a position to benefit from the activities of these organisations."[78] The Fund would be responsible for financing in-kind benefits. Thus, though financed by contributions, there was no link between contributions and benefits. Its activities started in October 1959.[79] Additionally, unlike social security and family allowance funds, the FAS was not self-administered. Instead, its board of directors included representatives of the prime minister, of colonial government,

72 Rager, *Les Musulmans Algériens En France et Dans Les Pays Islamiques*, 235.
73 Lyons, "Social Welfare, French Muslims and Decolonization in France," 70.
74 Rager, *Les Musulmans Algériens En France et Dans Les Pays Islamiques*, 236.
75 Lyons, *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: The French Welfare State during Decolonization*, 83.
76 FR-PaAN-19760140/6-"Projet de réalisations sociales au profit des migrants algériens travaillant en France - exposé de motifs."
77 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Note, "Le Fonds d'Action Sociale pour les migrants algériens en France et pour leurs familles," 13 February 1963 See also: FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Note, "L'action sociale en faveur des travailleurs algériens en métropole," 1959, p 4.
78 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Letter from Minister of Algerian Affairs to Minister of Work, 9 November 1962, p 3.
79 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Note from Michel Massenet, "Rapport d'activité du Délégué aux Affaires sociales," 28 May 1960.

key ministries like Labour, Finance, Public Health and Population.[80] The Fund reported to the Prime Minister through the Office of Algerian Affairs.

The government's responsiveness to Algerian protest, and the creation of the FAS need to be understood in the context of developments in the Algerian war of independence. Earlier that year, the Fourth Republic had collapsed under the weight of the crisis and De Gaulle had returned to power in an entirely new constitutional framework of the Fifth Republic (see 5.3.6). In October 1958, De Gaulle travelled to the Algerian city of Constantine - his second visit to Algeria within the course of a few months - and declared that "all of Algeria must have her share in what modern civilisation can and must bring to men."[81] The Constantine Plan was an ambitious development plan which aimed to raise national revenue of Algeria by seven and a half percent, educate one and a half million children, and lodge a million inhabitants, all in the hopes of convincing nationalists that prosperity was more likely under French rule than under conditions of independence.[82] For Lyons, the FAS acted as the "metropolitan arm" of the Constantine Plan[83] - a means of neutralising the nationalist threat and countering FLN propaganda. At the same time, its stated aim was to offer social protection in line with the "importance of the industrial Muslim workforce in certain sectors."[84]

Between 1958 and 1963, the Fund received a total of around 40 million nouveaux francs.[85] It spent this on over one hundred private associations, on local government initiatives, and on social workers (or "counsellors") who worked directly with various service providers.[86] The SSFNA and a public-private organisation charged with constructing houses for Algerian labour migrants (SONACOTRAL) were among the recipients of the Fund's subsidies. In 1963, about 70 per cent of these subsidies had been spent on housing, 20 per cent on general and professional education and 10 per cent on social interventions in the family.[87] By the end of 1959, it had financed cleaning courses for Algerian women and girls, trained social workers, supported "observation centres" (*centres d'observation*) for certain children, financed medical-pedagogical institutions devoted to "sanitary education" and, in general, devoted itself to solving the "problem of Muslim families" and the "problem of young Muslims," who apparently were struggling to adapt to "metropolitan life."[88] In May 1960, the fund reported

80 Lyons, *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: The French Welfare State during Decolonization*, 148.
81 Muriam Haleh Davis, "Restaging Mise En Valeur: 'Post-war Imperialism' and The Plan de Constantine," *Review of Middle East Studies* 44, no 2 (January 2010): 176, https://doi.org/10.1017/S215134810000149X.
82 Davis, 176.
83 Lyons, "Social Welfare, French Muslims and Decolonization in France," 70.
84 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Note from Minister of Public Health and Population, "Sur l'Action Sociale du Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population susceptible de recevoir un financement complémentaire du Fonds d'action Sociale," 31 December 1959.
85 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Note, "Le Fonds d'Action Sociale pour les migrants algériens en France et pour leurs familles," 13 February 1963.
86 Lyons, *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: The French Welfare State during Decolonization*, 149.
87 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Note, "Le Fonds d'Action Sociale pour les migrants algériens en France et pour leurs familles," 13 February 1963.
88 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Note from Minister of Public Health and Population, "Sur l'Action Sociale du Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population susceptible de recevoir un financement complémentaire du Fonds d'action Sociale," 31 December 1959.

having financed the construction of accommodation in Nanterre and in Lyon, as well as beds in youth centres, and 700 internships to prepare workers for entry into vocational education.[89]

After Algerian independence, the organisation underwent a crisis of purpose and of finances. As the majority of Algerians would lose their French nationality, it was not clear whether a Fund for members of one specific nationality was appropriate. Roger Frey, Minister of the Interior, requested that associations devoted to helping Algerian workers reduce their activities in favour of the latter, who, upon independence, should fall instead under the purview of Algerian consular services.[90] Additionally, Algerian independence also meant the detachment of the Algerian regime of social security from the French regime.[91] Therefore, new contributions dried up, and the Fund lived on its reserves alone. However, many argued that the Algerian services network needed to remain intact; among them, Michel Massenet. Massenet was a former IGAME who became "arguably, the most influential voice in the Algerian welfare network in the early Fifth Republic," reporting directly to the Prime Minister Debré.[92] The independence of Algeria, Massenet admitted in 1963, changed "to a great extent the perspective with which these problems must be approached."[93] However, Massenet insisted that there were several reasons to continue to treat Algerian workers as distinct, chief among which was the centrality of Algerian labour to the French economy.

> No one is more convinced than me of the usefulness of labour of Algerian ["Muslim"] origin for the French economy... In fact, the new arrivals take positions that facilitate the social elevation of French workers, take on tasks that the latter increasingly abandon, constitute a mobile workforce while French labour moves very little, and finally, while the analogous labour pool in Europe is in the process of drying up, the Algerian ["Muslim"] labour reserve is the only one on which we can count...[94]

Part of the reason that European labour was drying up is that the attractiveness of other destinations was growing. Germany entered a period of active labour recruitment, signing bilateral agreements with the governments of Italy and Spain in 1955 and 1960 respectively as its economy began to grow.[95] Meanwhile Switzerland had begun to make a "bigger and bigger effort to retain" foreign workers.[96] In this context of competition, Massenet stressed that social assistance would keep France as attractive as possible for Algerians, and also avoid a situation of segregation for those who did come so as to win the public's favour. Specifically,

89 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Note from Michel Massenet, "Rapport d'activité du Délégué aux Affaires sociales," 28 May 1960.
90 FR-PaAN-20120054/1, Letter from Minister of Repatriates to Minister of the Interior, November 29, 1963
91 FR-PaAN-19760140/6-"Programme complémentaire du Fonds d'action sociale Année 1964."
92 Lyons, *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: The French Welfare State during Decolonization*, 62.
93 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-"L'avenir des structures administratives chargés de la migration algérienne"
94 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-"L'evolution de la migration algérienne en France," Massenet, most likely written half way through 1963.
95 Hedwig Rudolph, "The New Gastarbeiter System in Germany," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, New Migration in Europe: Dilemmas of Mobility and Control, 22, no 2 (1996): 287–300.
96 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-"L'avenir des structures administratives chargés de la migration algérienne"

continued social assistance could reduce "inconvenience that closed-off enclaves … cause the French community in terms of demographics, public health, urbanisation and public order."[97]

Although others appear to have agreed with Massenet regarding the need for manual labour reserves, they did not necessarily concur that Algerians needed to be the ones to meet the lacuna. Indeed, Lyons suggests that one of the reasons for Massenet's enthusiasm about keeping the *Algerian* network intact was that it afforded him continued direct access to the prime minister.[98] If so, it worked; but only partly. In February 1963, the Prime Minister decided to renew the Fund's mission for at least three years.[99] However, there was a perceived need to improve the "reception and social status" of foreign labour given "the difficulties that France [was] encountering in recruiting" it.[100] In April 24 1964, a decree extended the attribution of the fund to all foreign workers of any nationality, becoming Fastif (*Fonds d'action sociale pour les travailleurs immigrés et leurs familles).*[101]

7.3.4. Cleaning courses and child-rearing advice

The FAS was not the only fund, financed by social security contributions, involved in offering social assistance to Algerian labour migrants. The October 4 ordinance creating the general social security regime also created a "technical committee for medical and social assistance," the latter assumed to be aligned with the regime's overall aim to "guarantee, as far as possible, the preservation or recovery of [recipients'] capacity for work."[102] After the committee produced its guidelines in November 1946, the National Social Security Fund (CNSS) was tasked with managing a "Fund of Medical and Social Assistance" (*Fonds d'action sanitaire et sociale*). Like the FAS, deductions on social security contributions constituted the Fund's main source of income. In 1954, the levies amounted to 0,85 per cent of social security contributions, 3 per cent of workplace accident insurance contributions, 4 per cent on family allowance contributions for salaried workers, 2.1 per cent on family allowance contributions for employers and the self-employed, and 100 per cent on fines for late payment.[103]

Again like the FAS, the types of assistance that the Fund was responsible for financially supporting promoted the social integration of specific target groups seen as problematic, frequently at the expense of their own agency and privacy. For example, medical assistance included domestic visits to new mothers whose "sanitary state" required "specific protection," including, apparently, "advice … on child rearing and nutrition."[104] As of 1955, Family Allowance Funds oversaw a network of around 2,000 social workers, with most Funds having

97 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-L'avenir des structures administratives chargés de la migration algérienne-Massent, "La migration algérienne et l'administration français," p 2.

98 Lyons, *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: The French Welfare State during Decolonization*, 81.

99 FR-PaAN-19760140/6-"Projet de réalisations sociales au profit des migrants algériens travaillant en France - exposé de motifs."

100 FR-PaAN-19760140/6-"Programme France 1964."

101 Archives Nationales, "Santé; Fonds d'action Sociale Pour Les Travailleurs Migrants (1953-1998)."

102 FR-PaAN-19830235/28-"Etude sur l'action sanitaire et sociale des organismes de Sécurité Sociale et d'Allocations Familiales," 19 December 1955.

103 FR-PaAN-19830235/28-"Etude sur l'action sanitaire et sociale des organismes de Sécurité Sociale et d'Allocations Familiales," 19 December 1955.

104 FR-PaAN-19830235/28-"Etude sur l'action sanitaire et sociale des organismes de Sécurité Sociale et d'Allocations Familiales," 19 December 1955, p 23.

trained at least one in "assisting Muslim families."[105] They had also established around 45 social centres. Cleaning and child rearing courses, domestic visits, temporary childcare, and youth groups were among the services offered by these centres.[106] Courses devoted to labour market integration were less important. "The North African as a migrant generally," read one report, "is relatively unconcerned with social mobility."[107]

7.4. Benefits of Returning (for Pieds-Noirs)

7.4.1. Resettling displaced citizens

In the early 1960s, with the signature of the Évian Accords looming, a new wave of immigration from Algeria picked up as nearly one million pieds-noirs made their way to the metropole. The provisions designed to facilitate their arrival and integration have a different lineage to the provisions that were available to the labour migrants who came before them. Targeted social assistance for pieds-noirs traces its roots to efforts to relocate displaced French citizens after the Second World War. This, in turn, involved a system of state-sponsored (and thus non-contributory) cash transfers and loans.

A committee founded in 1939 concerned itself primarily with receiving French DPs.[108] It also provided a modest allowance. The committee continued to assist French citizens coming from abroad, such as the 12,000 who arrived from newly independent French Indochina in 1954.[109] However, when Morocco and Tunisia gained independence in 1956, the needs of the 324,000 new arrivals outstripped its capacity.[110] The "Orientation Centre for French Repatriates" was founded (*Centre d'orientation pour les Français rapatriés*; hereafter: the Orientation Centre) in response. It predominantly distributed emergency relief to repatriates in dire circumstances in accordance with a 1957 circular stipulating the nature and amount of benefits to which repatriates had right.[111] It included provisions like an initial allowance, a travel voucher from port of departure to port of arrival in France, and lodging allowance for a maximum of 30 days for adults and children.[112] The mandate of the Orientation Centre expanded with time. By decree of 13 March 1958, the centre was attached to the Ministry of Interior, signifying that this had become a "national concern," and by October of that year its commissioner reported directly to the Prime Minister.[113] In June 1959, the committee was replaced by a commissioner for the assistance and orientation of repatriated

105 FR-PaAN-19830235/28-"Etude sur l'action sanitaire et sociale des organismes de Sécurité Sociale et d'Allocations Familiales," 19 December 1955, p 23.
106 FR-PaAN-19830235/28-"Etude sur l'action sanitaire et sociale des organismes de Sécurité Sociale et d'Allocations Familiales," 19 December 1955, p 23.
107 FR-PaAN-19830235/28-Report, "Les travailleurs nord-africains et la sécurité sociale."
108 Le Comité d'entraide aux rapatriés. Scioldo-Zürcher, "Faire des Français d'Algérie des métropolitains."
109 Scioldo-Zürcher, 17.
110 Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir Métropolitain: Politique d'intégration et Parcours de Rapatriés d'Algérie En Métropole (1954-2005)*, 93.
111 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 18.
112 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 18.
113 Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir Métropolitain: Politique d'intégration et Parcours de Rapatriés d'Algérie En Métropole (1954-2005)*, 93.

French (*Commissariat à l'aide et à l'orientation des Français Rapatriés*; hereafter: assistance commissioner), still falling under the Ministry of the Interior.[114] Although there was no overarching legal framework to organise repatriate reception,[115] the assistance commissioner used the means of common law at his disposal together with diplomatic authorities like embassies and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These included an authorisation by the Ministry of Finance to issue zero-interest loans financed by budgetary credit or by semi-public lending institutions like the *Crédit Foncier de France*.[116] "Repatriation, considered at the time both as a minor occurrence and as the inevitable counterpart to decolonization policy, was not the subject of much debate," a civil servant tasked with managing repatriation explained in a speech to the Council of Europe in 1964. "The repatriates were helped in an atmosphere of semi-secrecy."[117]

When arrivals from Algeria started to increase in number, and against the backdrop of growing anti-French activity in Tunisia, legislators returned to the institutional apparatus for repatriates. In June 1961, President De Gaulle announced to deputies that a new repatriate and resettlement policy was underway. A State Secretary for Repatriates was created in August 1961, with the Gaullist Robert Boulin nominated to the role.[118] The Council of Ministers appointed Raymond Morice, previously sub prefect in the city of Reims, to director of administration, and Christian Mellac, previously civil servant at the Ministry of Finance, to director of economic and social affairs.[119] A circular dating to 14 September 1961 admitted Algerian repatriates to benefits listed under the 1957 circular. Eventually, benefits were limited to those who arrived after October 1961.[120] In September, Boulin co-presented a bill to the Senate that would lay out the contours of assistance to newly arriving pieds-noirs.[121]

7.4.2. Defining the repatriate

Legislators were broadly sympathetic to the idea of expanding welfare provisions to repatriates.[122] A 1965 report from the Ministry of the Interior to De Gaulle explained the predicament of the French state at the end of 1961, couching the decisions to upgrade the system of repatriate reception in terms of necessity.

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114 Scioldo-Zürcher, "Faire des Français d'Algérie des métropolitains," 17.

115 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857- Speech for the Commission de la Population du Conseil de l'Europe, M Christian Mellac, 5 October 1964.

116 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857- Speech for the Commission de la Population du Conseil de l'Europe, M Christian Mellac, 5 October 1964.

117 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857- Speech for the Commission de la Population du Conseil de l'Europe, M Christian Mellac, 5 October 1964.

118 Colette Zytnicki, "L'administration Face à l'arrivée Des Rapatriés d'Algérie: L'exemple de La Région Midi-Pyrénées (1962-1964)," *Annales Du Midi : Revue Archéologique, Historique et Philologique de La France Méridionale* 110, no 224 (1998): 505.

119 Le Monde, "Au secrétariat d'Etat aux rapatriés," *Le Monde.fr*, January 19, 1962, https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1962/01/19/au-secretariat-d-etat-aux-rapatries_2352518_1819218.html.

120 "Rapatriés d'Algérie, Du Maroc et de Tunisie 1" (Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, July 26, 1965), 19, Archives de Charles de Gaulle, président de la République (1959-1969), Les Archives Nationales.

121 Scioldo-Zürcher, "Faire des Français d'Algérie des métropolitains," 4.

122 Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir Métropolitain: Politique d'intégration et Parcours de Rapatriés d'Algérie En Métropole (1954-2005)*, 21.

The magnitude and urgency of the problem to be solved dictated the policy to be chosen… The Government and Parliament *had no choice*. It was *necessary* to welcome, house, reclassify, protect, in order to then be able to integrate. It was therefore *necessary* to build a vast legal and financial system particularly protective of all repatriates, while aiming, as a final objective, to integrate returnees into the legal procedures and financial mechanisms of common law.[123]

When it came to what kind of assistance repatriates needed, State Secretary for Repatriates Boulin echoed the report's emphasis on policymakers' lack of choice: it "appeared necessary that for a fairly long period of time, the repatriate be assured of a daily allowance … which will allow him in all serenity to look for a job that matches his training or toward which we will have personally directed him."[124] The discursive appeal of invoking need is that it invites no further queries as to the advantages and disadvantages of a given regime. Nonetheless, Mellac's speech to the Council of Europe offers clues that failing to adequately provide for newcomers might have come at a high political cost. Mellac mentions that the "humanitarian efforts… succeeded in winning the confidence and affection of the Pieds noirs, which allowed us to *surpass the atmosphere of defiance and hostility* that characterised the first repatriations.[125] As Jordi describes, from 1954 to 1961, the public opinion of the metropolitan French had gone from unconditionally supporting the pieds-noirs to an "almost systematic rejection" of this population.[126] One pieds-noir explained, "in Marseille, [the metropolitan French] mistook us for rich settlers, and told us that we were taking their apartments, and their jobs."[127]

Ultimately, Boulin's law passed on December 26, 1961, becoming the "Law n°61-1439… relating to the reception and resettlement of French people from overseas" - hereafter the 26 December Law. An implementing decree of 10 March 1962 ("Charter") and decrees of the same date stipulated specific conditions and amounts of benefits that repatriates could access.[128] The cornerstone of eligibility for the law's provisions was the possession of formal repatriate status, which was defined in such a way that most pieds-noirs from Algeria and other white repatriates from Tunisia and Morocco would be included, but Algerian labour migrants would not.

The first criterion for acquiring repatriate status was that the person have been settled in a territory that got independence from France after having been under its "sovereignty, protectorate or tutelage." The inclusion of the latter two options made room for migrants from Tunisia and Morocco which, unlike Algeria, had been French protectorates rather than integral parts of the French national territory.[129] This meant that they preserved some degree of local government and had been conquered by treaties.[130]

123 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 280 In this case, I am translating both the French verb *devoir* and *falloir* as versions of necessary.

124 Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir Métropolitain: Politique d'intégration et Parcours de Rapatriés d'Algérie En Métropole (1954-2005)*, 21.

125 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857- Speech for the Commission de la Population du Conseil de l'Europe, M Christian Mellac, 5 October 1964.

126 Jordi, *1962: L'arrivée Des Pieds-Noirs*, 37.

127 Jordi, 48.

128 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857- Speech for the Commission de la Population du Conseil de l'Europe, M Christian Mellac, 5 October 1964.

129 Herbert J Liebesny, "Chapter II Morocco and Tunisia," in *The Government of French North Africa* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1943), 25, https://doi.org/10.9783/9781512817669-005.

130 Liebesny, 25.

The second component of the definition of 'repatriate' related to their motives for leaving. To qualify as a repatriate, a person needed to have left due to "political events." This effectively excluded labour migrants, as political events were understood by officials as "serious disturbances having compromised the safety of our compatriots, discriminatory measures against French people as such, or even a political, economic and social situation making it impossible to stay or keep exercising a given profession."[131] Usually, events that took place in tandem with, immediately preceding or following the territory's independence met this criterion. To ease the administrative burden of assessing eligibility, in March 1962, an interministerial assembly listed territories from which it could be reasonably assumed that *every* departure was due to such political events. By the end of the following month, the Évian Accords and been signed and Algeria was added to this list. If a country was not on the list, a committee housed at the Interior Ministry would assess the case. The committee was inclined to issue a favourable opinion in cases of political expulsions, physical danger, or the "Africanization" of the public sector, i.e. the promotion of "indigenous" people to specific posts.[132] It would also consider any particular vulnerabilities of the individual (such as old age) and was particularly sensitive for Algerian repatriates for whom the registration deadline may have presented "special difficulties."[133]

Finally, there was a nationality criterion. Specifically, it was stipulated that the person must have had French nationality at independence, or when the political event which caused their departure occurred. Conform with a long tradition of allowing men to confer nationality and not women, foreign women married to a French man were considered French, while foreign men married to French women were not.[134] Again, this excluded Algerian labour migrants since, as mentioned, since Algerians classed as "Muslims" were assigned Algerian nationality at independence. Under certain conditions, foreigners could also benefit from the law. A September 4 1962 decree stipulated that foreigners could be equalised with French nationals for the purpose of the law based on their "devotion" (*dévouement*) to France. Acceptable expressions of this devotion were grouped into five categories.[135] The foreigner must have either (1) served in the French army as a military conscript, (2) served in the French army for five years, or have voluntarily engaged in the French or allied military effort, (3) served in the French army as a combatant during a war, (4) have lost a family member (ancestor, descendent or spouse) for the French cause (*mort pour la France*), or (5) have proven loyalty to France or given it exceptional services.

One additional criterion related to the time which was allowed to pass between a repatriate's arrival and their registration at a prefecture. This criterion was a moving target, however, and constantly readjusted to accommodate circumstance. Originally, the deadline for registration was fixed at four months from 10 March 1962. It was then extended to six months and finally to 31 December 1962, "for the sake of liberalism."[136] According to the

131 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 9.
132 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 11.
133 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 14.
134 Emphasis added; FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 7.
135 FR-PaAN-19920149/1-Brochure, "Aide Aux Rapatriés," p 5.
136 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 13.

1965 report, even this restriction was interpreted "extremely liberally," such that, for instance, if half of a family came before the deadline and the other half after, the entire family would be considered to have arrived prior to the deadline, and that any attempts to "approach a metropolitan service of repatriates" before the deadline would be considered a registration.[137] Similarly, certain benefits were technically limited to those who had assembled a file prior to leaving the territory in question, but this too was interpreted liberally, with exceptions made, for example, for those leaving due to political expulsions.[138]

With this in mind, the law did not adhere to the principle of compensation in that it introduced the *possibility,* but not the right, to assistance. This meant that an individual could meet all three criteria and still be denied assistance. Mellac insisted to colleagues at the the Council of Europe, an international organisation established in 1949 to promote human rights and democracy that "this juridical component of repatriation law" - meaning the room it left for administrative discretion - was "very important."[139] Administrators were expected to take into account the "financial situation of the concerned parties," with "the competent authorities retain[ing] full discretion to grant all or part of the return benefits, or to refuse the subsistence allowance of those who have sufficient resources to wait for a job or a professional installation."[140]

Several institutions were competent authorities for exercising this discretion. Consular or diplomatic authorities at the place of origin were charged with assessing the financial resources of the repatriate.[141] If the applicant was already in France, requests would be handled by the prefecture of their place of residence. In five major cities (Paris, Marseille, Lyon, Bordeaux and Toulouse), regional delegations, which would replace existing Orientation Centres, would cooperate with the prefect to examine requests for assistance.[142] The decision could be appealed at a central committee of the Ministry of Repatriates, which would be staffed by several people with "in-depth knowledge of Algerian problems."[143]

7.4.3. The 26 December Law

Assistance under the 26 December Law fell into three main pillars: reception benefits (*les prestations d'accueil*), exceptional relief (*secours exceptionnels*), and benefits-in-kind. Reception benefits included two types of cash transfers: those designed to facilitate physical relocation from colony to metropole, and those designed as subsistence after resettlement. The former (*prestations de retour*) included the right to free transport to the metropole, which was to be arranged by representatives of the French government in the territory of departure or, in the case of Algerian repatriates who had to pay upfront, reimbursed upon arrival. The transport included travel to the port of departure in the territory of origin, and to the final destination in metropolitan France. It was complemented with supplementary cash transfers, including

137 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 14.
138 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 12.
139 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857- Speech for the Commission de la Population du Conseil de l'Europe, M Christian Mellac, 5 October 1964.
140 FR-PaAN-19920149/1-Aide Aux Rapatriés, p 7.
141 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 12.
142 FR-PaAN-19920149/1-Decret N°62-565, 15 May 1962.
143 FR-PaAN-19920149/1-Réunions au Secrétariat d'Etat aux Rapatriés, Meeting minutes, 21 January 1963.

a lump sum compensation for the move. A family from North Africa could hope for 4000 fr.[144] There were also per-person departure allowances, for which a head of family could expect 500 fr. For comparison, the minimum monthly wage for a Parisian working 40 hours a week in December 1961 was 292,33 fr.[145] Besides transfers designed to ease relocation costs, under the new law repatriates had a right to subsistence allowance (*allocations de subsistance*). These were monthly transfers whose level varied according to age, family and professional situation. The transfers were intended to smooth out income levels until a repatriate got a new job or after twelve months, whichever came first. A jobseeker could expect just over the monthly minimum wage per month (350 fr), the elderly just under (250 fr). The previously self-employed could also count on a bonus if they transitioned to salaried work.[146] Reception benefits were tax-financed assistance for the needy, with no contributory history required for eligibility. Instead authorities withheld 20 fr from the first subsistence allowance payment as a social security contribution.[147] This constituted less than 1 per cent of the total allowance if the latter was paid out in full.

The second pillar of social assistance was its provisions for exceptional relief, which, unlike reception benefits, did not represent a radical departure from existing policy. Designated for cases of a "particularly severe or urgent" character,[148] these included modest transfers, allocated by prefects under the same conditions as they would normally allocate relief to other needy citizens of their department. The only difference was that the procedure was accelerated compared to other French citizens. If the situation was of "extreme urgency," the relief was given without a time limit, or as a form of waiting relief (*le secours d'attente*) to tie over heads of households or individuals whose applications for social assistance, old-age or unemployment insurance were still being processed. In the latter case, each head of family could receive a maximum of 235 fr, just under the minimum wage, renewable monthly for a maximum of six months. The judgment of a case as severe or urgent was left to the discretion of prefects, but they were advised to grant assistance "… under the same conditions as those which they deliver to the needy in their departments."[149] The state would then reimburse departments for these expenses.

The final pillar of the law were benefits in-kind. Of the needs repatriates had upon arrival, housing was "without a doubt" the most difficult to meet.[150] The government opted to assist in reserving, renovating or converting pre-existing housing on a large scale. 100,000 spots were freed in boarding schools, and spaces as diverse as hotels, chateaus, old factories, convents, banks, and event venues were reappropriated to accommodate 45,000 repatriates. The government also commissioned the construction of new real estate with a special focus on pre-fabricated housing units.[151] Furthermore, a March 1962 decree ordered that 10 per cent of social housing (*habitation à loyer modéré*, HLM) be reserved for repatriates between January 1,

144 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 25.
145 P Fournier, "Les Salaires," *Révue d'économie Politique*, La France économique en 1961, 72, no 4/5 (1962): 741.
146 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 28.
147 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 25.
148 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, chapter 2.
149 FR-PaAN-19920149/1-Brochure, "Aide aux Rapatriés," p 10.
150 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 41.
151 These were units whose components were manufactured elsewhere and assembled on-site FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 46.

1962 and December 31, 1966. This was hiked up to 30 per cent a few months later.[152] In-kind benefits were, on paper, not free. They were subsidised from the aforementioned deduction (if the housed person received this benefit) or else by the payment of a daily fee. However, those repatriates whose condition prevented them from being active on the labour market were "completely at the charge of the state budget."[153] Within the state apparatus, principal creditors were the assistance commissioner (1958-1961), the Secretary of State of the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Construction, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (for repatriates from Egypt only). There is a rough estimate of government spending from 1958 to mid-1965 in Ch. XIV of the 1965 report (see Table 9). The figure given is over ten billion francs, about a third of which were loans financed by the *Caisse des Dépôts* (see Table 9).

Table 9: Total yearly expenditure on repatriate-related costs.[154]

Year	Expenditure (in millions of francs)
1956	1
1957	5
1958	72
1959	123
1960	260
1961	425
1962	1,289
1963	4,160
1964	3,260
1965 (first half)	744
Total	10,433

Officials admitted that their expenditure had far exceeded that for which they had budgeted, and that they were mostly in the dark about total costs. On July 30, 1965, the Interior Minister wrote to De Gaulle admitting that, "neither the Ministry of Finances nor the Ministry of the Interior has enough information to give a valid estimate of the indirect costs of repatriation."[155] The authors of the 1965 report explained that any estimate of their total expenditure would be less than the overall "financial effort supported by the Nation in favour of repatriates."[156] In drafting the report, their intention was no doubt to emphasise the generosity of the French state and of French taxpayers. However, cost concerns seem to have been regularly sidelined in the name of "liberalism." For example, at some point before 1965 the requirements for eligibility

152 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 41.
153 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, ch 2, subchapter 4.
154 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la lei du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 275.
155 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Letter, N° 281/CAB XII, from Minister of the Interior to the General Secretary of the President, 30 July 1965.
156 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 271

under the law of 26 December 1961 were loosened to eliminate the burden of proof to receive an allowance for the transport of furniture.[157] This move, which for the authors of the report was "inspired by a concern for liberalism with regards to repatriates," came at substantial administrative cost, since files that were considered closed needed to be reopened.[158]

7.4.4. Expedited access to social security

As of April 1965, 317,516 heads of household had accessed allowance, covering over 700,000 people.[159] However, in 1962 officials judged existing social assistance to be inadequate for the needs of the newcomers, particularly the roughly 18 per cent of whom were over 60 and were "deprived of all social protection systems attached to the general social security regime."[160]

An early response to this perceived deprivation was to double down on efforts to coordinate across the Algerian and metropolitan social security regime. Three decrees (March 17, May 26, June 30) formalised a procedure through which French and Algerian funds could swap debt under general or complementary retirement regimes. These agreements needed to be approved by executive order.[161] However, the capacity of French funds to absorb the newcomers' claims dried up, and many had to reduce their pay-outs or stop them altogether.[162] On the other hand, eligibility criteria for metropolitan schemes presented obstacles. Benefits were typically contingent on the duration of residence in France – to which, after 1962, Algeria no longer belonged – and on the exercise of professional activity. Often, repatriates struggled to furnish administrative proof of the latter, given that many had fled their homes "in dramatic conditions" and that attacks on public buildings had destroyed many files kept by the Algerian funds to which they may have been affiliated.[163] As a result, officials judged a new plan of action necessary, which they explained in the 1965 report.

> It therefore became necessary both to create very simple social legislation of a temporary nature adapted to the diverse situations [faced by repatriates] and to make maximum use of existing social protection systems… It was necessary to protect the repatriates quickly, without lengthy administrative formalities, against the financial burdens of illness, maternity, and resettlement. It was also necessary to maximally help the elderly, for whom the move posed more painful challenges… Therefore it was necessary to create, on the one hand, for all repatriated persons an original and simple system of family allowances and social security, and on the other hand, for the elderly, a system of social protection…[164]

157 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 20.
158 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 20.
159 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 28.
160 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 4, p 76.
161 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 85.
162 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 85.
163 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 72.
164 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 72.

The new approach thus had two parts; the removal of any (informal) obstructions to accessing the social security regime, and the creation of a comprehensive system of social protection for elderly newcomers. Here I focus on the first. Two different ordinances on February 14, 1962, inaugurated a temporary social security regime for repatriates.[165] These relaxed the long-standing employment conditions for accessing social security by stipulating that upon arrival, repatriates could access in-kind sickness and maternity benefits, as well as family benefits in cash, for the period of one year. Unlike virtually all other regimes in the French system, eligibility relied only on formal "repatriate" status as defined by the 26 December Law. Administratively, the only proof needed was a temporary social security card issued to repatriates upon their registration at a prefecture (for sickness and maternity benefits) or a special card delivered to heads of household at the same time (for family benefits).[166] Local level funds of the general social security regime – the primary fund (*Caisse primaire*), and the fund for family allowances (*Caisse d'Allocations Familiales)* – were responsible for issuing benefits. At the end of the year, repatriates could trade in their temporary card for a permanent card and join the system of social insurance corresponding with their professional activity.[167] The regime was financed by a surcharge of 20 fr on the first subsistence allowance payment that repatriates received, by contributions to the regime they ended up joining, and, for those not registered with one of these regimes by the end of the year, by the state.[168] On December 31, 1964, 362.602 temporary cards had been distributed.[169]

In essence, this group could access a contributory regime on a *non-contributory basis* for a year. However, their coverage would expire once that year had elapsed unless they became affiliated with a particular regime on the basis of their occupation - the foundations of eligibility for all the other insured persons. Because affiliation was organised by occupation, a repatriate's permanent access to social security was contingent on their successful transition into the workforce. The government therefore took an active role in occupational reclassification.

7.4.5. Professional resettlement

A particularly elaborate system accompanied the professional resettlement of the self-employed repatriate, who could access capital to buy an existing business or (re-)establish a new one. By 1965, almost 936 million fr and 100 million fr had been granted for loans and subsidies, respectively.[170] High-skilled professionals were also helped into an appropriate role through unconventional means. Seats were reserved on the doctors' councils of the agricultural mutual aid fund for repatriate doctors, while Ministerial Circulars invited construction on public works to hire repatriate architects.[171] To be sure, professional reclassification responded not only to repatriate qualifications, but to the perceived needs of the French economy. A circular

165 "Journal Officiel de La République Française" (February 15, 1962), https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000000703882.
166 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 76.
167 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 76.
168 "Journal Officiel de La République Française."
169 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 76.
170 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 194.
171 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 204.

from Boulin's office explained that social assistance must be accompanied by "geographical and professional direction aiming… to organise repatriation in harmony with economic and social development plans of the nation."[172] An "essential instrument" in this policy of direction were professional lists.[173] Introduced by decree on 10 March 1962, professional lists supplied the administrative means for splitting up the self-employed repatriates into occupational categories: industrial, commercial/artisanal, liberal, and agricultural. Registration on a list was necessary for access to any reclassification benefit, which in turn could only be used to pursue work in the sector corresponding with the list. Registration, rather than being voluntary or determined by a fixed legal framework, was managed, and updated by regional delegates.[174]

Regional delegates enjoyed complete discretion. Nonetheless, they were instructed by Circular to consider a repatriate's professional background, asset ownership, criminal record and (lastly, on a list of seven items), the desires of the repatriate themselves.[175] They were also instructed to be "informed by local circumstances," and highly selective when registering repatriates onto lists corresponding with "overcrowded and undesirable occupations."[176] Simultaneously, to avoid any suspicion that national interest was outweighing the repatriate's own, regional delegates were requested to convince the repatriate of the advantages of converting to the salaried workforce, and that their professional and geographical placement was "aimed, above all, at ensuring their best possible chances of success."[177] The repatriate should also be reminded of their liberties, notably that "he *[sic]* is *entirely free* to resettle as he sees fit, but that state assistance will be made more readily and generously available to the extent that he follows the advice he is given."[178] Boulin also instructed the Regional Economic Committees to be "more or less generous" in the loan they would award according to the location and economic activity of the business in question: committees were expected to be "more generous when the question is setting up a clinic and less when it is about buying a bar" and to "encourage movement in the southern and western regions of the country [but] apply the brakes in urban agglomerations of Paris and Marseille."[179]

Outside of the self-employed, salaried repatriates also received a helping hand into the French workforce. In fact, former employees of social security institutions in Algeria were the beneficiaries of significant efforts to reintegrate them in accordance with their qualifications. The departmental archives of Bouches-du-Rhône are replete with correspondence between repatriates who had previously exercised a function within Algerian social security institutions expressing dissatisfaction with their job placement and the regional director of social security

172 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Circular, Robert Boulin, "Définition Du Rôle Des Délégués Régionaux," 22 May 1962.
173 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Circular, Robert Boulin, "Définition Du Rôle Des Délégués Régionaux," 22 May 1962.
174 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-N°1207, by Alexandre Roche, 13 May 1968.
175 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Circular, Robert Boulin, "Définition Du Rôle Des Délégués Régionaux," 22 May 1962.
176 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Circular, Robert Boulin, "Définition Du Rôle Des Délégués Régionaux," 22 May 1962, p 8.
177 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Circular, Robert Boulin, "Définition Du Rôle Des Délégués Régionaux," 22 May 1962, p 3.
178 Emphasis added; FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Circular, Robert Boulin, "Définition Du Rôle Des Délégués Régionaux," 22 May 1962, p 4, emphasis added.
179 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Circular, Robert Boulin, "Les Prêts et des Subventions de Réinstallation," 22 May 1962, p 10.

in Marseille attempting to accommodate their wishes. One repatriate writes to the regional director asking if the latter could allow his son to take a law exam in Montpellier rather than in Marseille, and if not, if the interlocutor could ask the National Commission on his family's behalf.[180] He then asks if he can have a job in Nice, even though he had already been assigned a job at a Family Allowances Fund in Aveyron. The regional director responded by signifying his personal commitment to investigating the repatriate's situation: "I plan to be in Nice very soon, and if I collect any information that might interest you I will not hesitate to let you know immediately."[181] The repatriate writes again the following year, signaling the imminent retirement of an accountant at another organisation and asking to be posted at another Fund.[182] He later added that his family is "struggling with the climate," mentioning that his wife is "often sick, physically and morally, since she arrived in Aveyron."[183] The archival record does not reveal whether or not this individual was ultimately transferred but does confirm that he received monthly compensation for the fact that he earned less than the job "to which [he had] a right" - a compensation worth the difference between his posting and the job to which his qualifications lent him a "right."[184] Another repatriate, who was assigned a job inferior to his qualifications, issued a complaint to the committee of reclassification located at a different Family Allowance Fund in Spinal, on the grounds that he deserved a better position.[185] His request was successful, and the Director-General of Social Security at the Ministry of Labour in Paris confirmed his right to reimbursement for the costs of the trouble of having to move twice.[186]

7.5. Harkis

7.5.1. Refugees and reception benefits

So far, I have made a firm distinction between the provisions available to Algerians who came to the metropole for work in the 1940s and 1950s, and provisions available to the pieds-noirs who arrived in the run-up to Algerian independence. However, these were not the only migrants from Algeria. As mentioned in 5.3.7, by 1965, up to 60,000 harkis had made their way or been transferred to the metropole. These were not whom legislators had in mind when repatriate legislation was written.

De Gaulle himself declared on July 25, 1962: "the term 'repatriates' obviously does not apply to the Muslims. In their case, we are dealing only with refugees."[187] The Interior Ministry appears to have felt similarly, as in its report on the 26 December Law it contains a separate section for "Muslims," and in the conclusion, the authors, who have thus far only referred

180 FR-MaAD-172 W 2-Letter, 4 July 1963.
181 FR-MaAD-172 W 2-Letter, 12 September 1964.
182 FR-MaAD-172 W 2-Letter, 3 April 1964.
183 FR-MaAD-172 W 2-Letter, 18 September 1964.
184 FR-MaAD-172 W 2-Letter, 28 November 1963.
185 FR-MaAD-172 W 2-Letter, Regional Director of Social Security to Labour Minister, 14 April 1964.
186 FR-MaAD-172 W 2-Letter, 25 May 1964, Director-General of Social Security to Regional Director of Social Security in Marseille.
187 cited in Eldridge, *From Empire to Exile: History and Memory within the Pied-Noir and Harki Communities, 1962-2012*, 71.

to repatriates, commend "the *Pieds Noirs*" for having "excellently demonstrated tenacity, dynamism, and courage, [traits] which are traditionally recognized in them."[188] Eventually, the state would settle on the designation of "repatriates of North African origin," which Jordi and Hamoumou argued represented yet another effort of the French state to "differentiate so as to treat differently."[189] More importantly, perhaps, harkis themselves dispute the applicability of the designation of repatriate. One bachagha (a former civil servant in colonial Algeria) agreed that the word repatriate had little meaning for him: "how can you feel like a *repatriate* when the *patria* that welcomes you treats you like a foreigner?"[190]

Although the Ministry of the Interior might have primarily associated *repatriate* with pieds-noirs, there were no legal grounds for racial distinction in the 26 December Law. Technically, those Algerians who retained French nationality could access the provisions of the law. A letter from the Ministry of Armies suggested the same: "When [harkis] came to France, the persons concerned benefited from the provisions applicable to repatriates."[191] Indeed, although the 26 December Law was conditioned on nationality, the "vast majority" who arrived managed to become French nationals under the procedure stipulated by the July 21, 1962 ordinance.[192] The evidence suggests that at least some harkis did manage to access these benefits. One writes to the Minister of Repatriates in February 1963 asking for job-seeking help.[193] Having arrived in June 1962 from Oran, the individual describes having been received "very well" by the municipality and from a social worker. After losing his job as a bus driver, he describes receiving subsistence allowance, family allowances and housing benefits, and is writing for help finding a new job as he did "not want to be the responsibility of the French government."[194] Indeed, in a 1963 letter that Alexandre Parodi - whose role in the assistance to harkis will be further elaborated in 7.5.3 - wrote to the Minister of Repatriates, Parodi explains that some harkis indeed "managed to open a repatriate file and regularly receive their monthly subsistence allowance."[195]

However, a 2007 report by the Economic and Social Council[196] would later conclude that "the 1961 provisions of assistance barely benefited harkis... they were effectively excluded."[197] In Parodi's letter, he states the same: many harkis did not receive that allowance, and he was writing to inquire about the possibilities for assisting them. There were several reasons for this.

188 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 12.

189 Jordi and Hamoumou, *Les Harkis, Une Mémoire Enfouie*, 20.

190 Jordi and Hamoumou, 21.

191 FR-PaAN-20120054/64, Letter from Ministry of Armies to Colonel Schoen, Secretary General of Comité National Pour les Musulmans Français, 22 August 1967.

192 "La Réintégration des harkis dans la nationalité française," *Le Monde*, December 27, 1974, https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1974/12/27/la-reintegration-des-harkis-dans-la-nationalite-francaise_2537381_1819218.html.

193 FR-PaAN-19920149/2-"États statistiques des harkis demandeurs d'emploi et de reclassements professionnels, mars 1963-décembre 1964."

194 FR-PaAN-19920149/2-"États statistiques des harkis demandeurs d'emploi et de reclassements professionnels, mars 1963-décembre 1964."

195 FR-PaAN-20120054-20110111-Letter from Alexandre Parodi to the Minister of Repatriates, François Missoffe, 29 January 1963.

196 Now known as the Economic, Social and Environmental Council (*Conseil économique, social et environnemental*) is a consultative assembly which advises the government.

197 Emphasis added Hafida, "La Situation Sociale Des Enfants Des Harkis," 44.

First, only harkis who were not repatriated by the army into camps (an estimated one fifths of the total) could be considered for assistance. Camp residents were considered a special case for social assistance purposes.[198] While resident there, the State Secretary of Repatriates would pay neither departure nor subsistence allowance.[199] Harkis would only enter the general system of social assistance for repatriates once they left this centre.[200] Once they did, social workers were to supervise their use of the allowances they received.[201] Second, when they left the centre, many were "ignorant" of their rights.[202] This lack of knowledge was no doubt facilitated by their isolation en masse in guarded facilities. Third, Parodi adds, once they left the camps, they often passed through multiple different locations as they had difficulty finding a job. If they managed to open one, their repatriate file "did not follow them."[203]

Fourth, those who had arrived on their own faced additional obstacles and many did not manage to open a repatriation file. In January 1963, several prefects asked the Minister of Repatriates about the conditions under which the status of 'repatriate' could be offered to "Muslims."[204] Officials responded that in no case should repatriate status be attributed to "Muslims," even if they were French nationals, who had "settled in France for a certain time and in any case before July 1 1962."[205] Since that was when army-sponsored transfers had begun, this restriction applied only to harkis who had made their own way over to the metropole. The committee added that this group of harkis would need to "prove that they had to return for political or security reasons" - proof which would be examined by a regional committee affiliated with the Ministry of Repatriates. This was especially difficult, Parodi added, because "their documents are rarely complete," and because officials are inherently suspicious about the likelihood that, alongside "genuine refugees" are "simple [labour] 'migrants'" who are not French citizens and trying to take advantage of these provisions.[206]

Finally, prefects were instructed that a "very clear distinction should be made between those who ... [confirmed] their French nationality and those who did not."[207] There should be "no difficulties rejecting the requests of Algerians who expressed their desire to remain Algerian, notably by keeping a passport or identity card delivered by the Algerian consular authorities in France."[208] There were several reasons why a harki might have done so, including protecting their family members remaining in Algeria or hoping at some point to return. Nonetheless, the concerned party's request would be considered under the September 4, 1962 decree according to which foreigners needed to have expressed their "devotion" to France in

198 PaAN-19920149/1-Brochure, "Aide aux Rapatriés," p 26.
199 FR-PaAN-19920149/1-Circulaires, instructions et notes générales du Service et du Ministre des Rapatriés, January 1962-May 1964.
200 PaAN-19920149/1-Brochure, "Aide aux Rapatriés," p 27.
201 PaAN-19920149/1-Procès-verbale de la réunion du 21 août 1962, Secrétariat d'Etat aux Rapatriés.
202 Hafida, "La Situation Sociale Des Enfants Des Harkis," 44.
203 FR-PaAN-20120054-20110111-Letter from Alexandre Parodi to the Minister of Repatriates, François Missoffe, 29 January 1963.
204 PaAN-19920149/1-Compte-rendu de la réunion du 21 janvier 1963, Ministère des Rapatriés.
205 PaAN-19920149/1-Compte-rendu de la réunion du 21 janvier 1963, Ministère des Rapatriés.
206 FR-PaAN-20120054-20110111-Letter from Alexandre Parodi to the Minister of Repatriates, François Missoffe, 29 January 1963.
207 PaAN-19920149/1-Compte-rendu de la réunion du 21 janvier 1963, Ministère des Rapatriés.
208 PaAN-19920149/1-Compte-rendu de la réunion du 21 janvier 1963, Ministère des Rapatriés.

order to qualify for the 26 December Law. Harkis would generally fall into the last category: those who had proven loyalty to France or given it exceptional service.[209] Those in this category would be considered eligible only if an interministerial committee convened by the Secretary of State (and later Ministry) of Repatriates ruled in their favour. As of April 1, 1965, only 15 per cent of files submitted to the committee for this purpose were admitted.[210]

In short, even if there was no formal exclusion of harkis, several implementation choices (for example, to avoid issuing benefits in the camps) and administrative committees help explain their "effective exclusion" in the eyes of the Social and Economic Council. Arguably, however, the most telltale sign of their exclusion was the existence of parallel systems devoted to their care.

7.5.2. "Adapted to Muslims"

"Muslim French" existed as a separate item in virtually every institution concerned with repatriate care. In 1960, Bernard Chenot, then-Minister of Public Health, even boasted the same: "... in the framework of social assistance pursued by my department, the Muslim population coming from Algeria has received special attention. They not only benefit, to the same extent as the metropolitan population, from metropolitan social services and provisions, but my department has also committed to promoting social and educational assistance adapted to the particular needs of Muslims in its work relating to settlement and reception of migrants."[211] Later in the same letter he refers to this as "social assistance adapted to Muslims," in contrast to "traditional social assistance."

The need for this adaptation was justified in terms of cultural inassimilability. In a brochure, officials at the Ministry of Repatriates state, without feeling the need to elaborate, that harkis are particularly unequipped to overcome the challenges they encounter in France. "Certain categories of repatriates are not in a position to cope with the problems they face on arrival," the brochure reads, which is what "justifies different types of aid."[212] The 1965 report on the 26 December Law emphasised specific cultural qualities of the community: "the majority ... express themselves only with great difficulty in our language and have only a very superficial knowledge of our customs and traditions."[213] As Massenet would later concur, the "cultural differences" between harkis and the metropole created an "obvious risk of maladjustment and isolation."[214]

How public officials interpreted the meaning of "adapting to Muslims" becomes clear when the institutions specifically devoted to their needs are examined. In particular, these

209 Sung Choi, "The Muslim Veteran in Postcolonial France: The Politics of Integration of Harkis after 1962," *French Politics, Culture & Society* 29, no 1 (Spring 2011): 28.

210 403 out of 2,680 files submitted FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la lei du 26 décembre 1961," p 17.

211 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Letter, "Intervention du Fonds d'Action Sociale Nord-Africain dans la politique d'action sociale menée par le Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population," from the Minister of Public Health and Population to the Prime Minister, 15 January 1960, p 2.

212 FR-PaAN-19920149/1-Aide Aux Rapatriés, p 8.

213 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 104.

214 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-L'avenir des structures administratives chargés de la migration algérienne-Massent, "La migration algérienne et l'administration français."

institutions took on a disciplinary and intrusive character, where "tutelage" and monitoring were justified as means of promoting their integration. To some extent, all repatriates were subject to disciplinary power. For instance, a decree laying out the temporal scope of application of the 26 December Law clarified that access to benefits was contingent on administrative registration, at which point prefects would open an investigation into individual dossiers and personal justifications for leaving Algeria to assess eligibility.[215] Similarly, from September 1961 to February 1962, all repatriates could make recourse to temporary benefits only after passing a "double investigation," once in France and once in Algeria, on the motives of their return and their social situation.[216] However, in general, this interest in mapping and disciplining the population mattered less for the autonomy of pieds-noirs than it did for "Muslim" repatriates. In fact, attempts to shape behavior of the former often relied on market mechanisms or incentive structures that preserved at least some degree of individual autonomy; for example, loans to acquire housing were adjusted with a geographical supplement which changed the amount of the loan according to the availability of employment of a given locale.[217]

In contrast, the monitoring to which 'Muslim' repatriates were subject was far more intrusive and more closely resembled surveillance. The first institution to consider is the camp itself. As mentioned (5.3.7), the reception of those who were transferred by the French army was characterised by placement in guarded camps under strict military surveillance.[218] The experience of the camps is in keeping with their bleak history. Rivesaltes, which was the "epicentre of the special accommodation structures" for harkis,[219] also had a history as "the most active" Nazi transit camp, serving as a temporary way station for persecuted Jews and political opponents on their way to Auschwitz.[220] That said, harkis were not the only ones to suffer internment: FLN nationalists were housed in Rivesaltes for a year in 1962 and Saint-Maurice l'Ardoise from 1958 to 1961.[221] Saint-Maurice L'Ardoise then subsequently housed former officers of the Secret Army Organisation (*Organisation armée secrète*, OAS), a paramilitary terrorist organisation of white Algerians determined to preserve colonial rule, from January to September 1962. However, the latter were housed under different conditions than harkis. In fact, Lavrut judges that, at least at first, "the balance of power [was] in favour of the [OAS] internees" compared to the camp staff, whose surveillance Lavrut describes as "lax."[222] He draws evidence from two separate escapes that took place during the period in question. The first, in January 1962, involved two internees simply walking out the front door of the administrative buildings. A guard who spotted them let them pass and, when reprimanded, later explained that there is a "shortage of supervisors specialised in the surveillance of European internees,

215 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 12.
216 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 20.
217 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 45.
218 Choi, "The Muslim Veteran in Postcolonial France: The Politics of Integration of Harkis after 1962," 28.
219 Abderahmen Moumen, "Le Logement Des Harkis: Une Ségrégation Au Long Cours," *Métropolitiques*, March 19, 2012, https://metropolitiques.eu/Le-logement-des-harkis-une.html.
220 Jacqueline Trescott, "France to Shine a Light on Its Notorious Camp," *Washington Post*, May 2, 2006, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/01/AR2006050101735.html.
221 Didier Lavrut, "S'évader de Saint-Maurice l'Ardoise," *Matériaux Pour l'histoire de Notre Temps* N° 92, no 4 (2008): 2.
222 Lavrut, 17.

who are difficult to recognise."[223] The second escape, which took place in February 1962, lasted for more than three hours and made use of a tunnel which had itself taken considerable time judging from the rubble that accumulated in adjacent rooms.[224] Lavrut adds that a resident was also allowed to get married within the camp, hosting the bride's family, wives, a banquet and a "not particularly prison-like" meal.[225]

The fact that harkis were housed in the same camp as dangerous enemies to the French state and, at least according to Lavrut's account, under worse conditions, speaks to what contemporaries understood as a reception "adapted to Muslims" and one which was appropriate to "European" rebels sentenced to internment. For harkis, Charbit argues, the camps were "a little colonial world in the metropole."[226] They were designed to provide a "regime of complete tutelage."[227] Residents were usually at the whims of individual camp directors. In Saint-Maurice-l'Ardoise, an administration operating without regard to any codified rules or regulations exercised control over multiple fields of daily life, including health, education, vocational training, and leisure.[228] Much of the activity in the camps fell under the banner of "sanitation and development."[229] The leadership of camp Bias imposed a 22:00 curfew, charged for weekly showers, and inspected incoming mail.[230] Sometimes camp workers went so far as to assign (French-sounding) baby names to newborns in the camp.[231] This tutelage was framed as a means of "more easily ensuring their reception and care"[232] and of "prepar[ing] their relocation meticulously" prior to "incorporating them in the metropolitan collectivity, to prepare their relocation meticulously."[233] One former resident describes to Jordi and Hamoumou the psychological harm that camp residence caused in the following terms: "the most difficult memory is that of my grandma, shivering of cold under the blankets, without any medical assistance, without anything. It haunts me still."[234] The respondent's grandma was not alone in experiencing the cold - several thousand harki families from the Algerian countryside arrived in the frigid winter of 1962 only to be housed in tents.[235] The potential neglect of the material needs of vulnerable populations sits heavy alongside the psychological distress of their loved ones witnessing it.

223 Lavrut, 17.
224 Lavrut, 11.
225 Lavrut, 16.
226 Charbit, "Un Petit Monde Colonial En Métropole: Le Camp de Harkis de Saint-Maurice-L'Ardoise (1962-1976)."
227 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 122.
228 Charbit, "Un Petit Monde Colonial En Métropole: Le Camp de Harkis de Saint-Maurice-L'Ardoise (1962-1976)," 37.
229 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 106.
230 Hafida, "La Situation Sociale Des Enfants Des Harkis," 35.
231 Hafida, 39.
232 FR-PaAN-19920149/1-Circulaires, instructions et notes générales du Service et du Ministre des Rapatriés- Note, "Recasement des supplétifs musulmans," 20 September 1962.
233 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857- Report, "sur l'application de la loi de 26 décembre 1961," p 104.
234 Jordi and Hamoumou, *Les Harkis, Une Mémoire Enfouie*, 52.
235 Charbit, "Un Petit Monde Colonial En Métropole: Le Camp de Harkis de Saint-Maurice-L'Ardoise (1962-1976)," 32.

In general, this "assistance" had less to do with improving living standards as it did with facilitating the "sufficient *evolution"* of residents "so as to integrate into metropolitan life."[236] Welfare was a means to cultural, not material, ends. Hence, camp staff were recruited on the basis of their "familiar with the Muslim mentality."[237] One candidate enclosed a letter to her job application in which she demonstrated her "familiarity with the Muslim temperament, which she had studied for a long time."[238] She explained in terms that are worth citing at length.

> It's hard to know exactly what a Muslim is thinking. The women are sometimes easier to understand. It is necessary to be very realistic, and to deal with them according to their character. They are very childish at times and other times very bitter. They like to put on a show in front of their comrades and find any excuse to talk for hours. Despite our desire to make them understand our customs and (for women) our clothing, it will be necessary to be patient and to proceed with a great deal of psychology... overall, I have observed that, when supervised, women and men often display goodwill. They learn quickly, but their natural indolence too often prevents them from remedying a state of untidiness by which they are so often characterised.[239]

Noteworthy is the applicant's commitment to describing "a Muslim" in singular terms - a practice that involves imbuing a constructed identity with racialised meaning, as well as to the overarching goal of the organisation - to force "the Muslim" to "understand our customs."

7.5.3. Parodi Committee

Outside of the camps, harkis hardly escaped the "tutelage" to which camp residents were subject. The Parodi Committee is illustrative. The committee traces its roots to the discussion of what to do with the FAS once Algerians lost French nationality.

In a November 1963 letter, the Minister of Repatriates, François Missoffe, requested that the Minister of Interior Roger Frey assist organisations that had worked with Algerian labour migrants to redirect their resources toward harkis: "I would be happy if you could invite the leaders of these associations to continue, but for *Muslim refugees,* the direct assistance they used to offer Algerian workers."[240] Missoffe explained that the goal was to prevent harkis "from perceiving that they are worse off not only compared to the metropolitan population, but also and especially compared to Algerian workers who have, for a number of years, seen various social services... establish numerous facilities for them."[241] Of course, the FAS did not

236 Emphasis added; FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 122.

237 Charbit, "Un Petit Monde Colonial En Métropole: Le Camp de Harkis de Saint-Maurice-L'Ardoise (1962-1976)."

238 FR-PaAN-F/1A/5137-Letter from Mme Etourneu-Copin to Mr Lienart, Service des Rapatriés d'AFN, 14 May 1963.

239 FR-PaAN-F/1A/5137-Letter from Mme Etourneu-Copin to Mr Lienart, Service des Rapatriés d'AFN, 14 May 1963.

240 Emphasis added; FR-PaAN-20120054/1, Letter from Minister of Repatriates to Minister of the Interior, November 29, 1963

241 FR-PaAN-20120054/1, Letter from Minister of Repatriates to Minister of the Interior, November 29, 1963

ultimately devote its resources to harkis, but focused instead on beneficiaries who might be able to provide valuable labour for France. Indeed, FAS rejected a request for funding from an organisation in September 1963 because their target beneficiary was "Muslims who have acquired French nationality." This, Michel Massenet regretted to inform the inquirer, was not the target beneficiary of the Fund. Instead, this group was "entrusted to the supervision… of the Ministry of Repatriates."[242]

If Missoffe could not repurpose existing institutions for harkis, he would instead spearhead the creation of new ones. Missoffe's vision was of a nation-wide organisation of *social tutelage* for harkis who resided on their own (rather than in camps) around the country. By 1965, this represented about half of the total of around 50,000 harkis in the metropole.[243] He suggested that this "tutelage" take place at a prefectoral level and by individuals with a "profound knowledge of Muslim environments."[244] In light of these considerations, Missoffe called for the establishment of the National Committee for Muslim French (*Comité National pour les Français Musulmans*) in 1962. The committee is now often (and hereto) referred by the name of its chair: Alexandre Parodi. This was the same Parodi who had been Labour Minister under the GPRF, who had appointed Laroque director of social insurance, and who had overseen the creation of the general social security regime. Parodi reported initially declining the offer to chair the committee, but eventually agreed after a military general declined.[245] He did so on the condition that a sustainable source of income could be guaranteed, including if the Ministry of Repatriates would be dissolved. Missoffe agreed to do everything in his power to secure the committee's financing in this event, and ultimately seems to have made good on his promise. The Parodi Committee received subsidies of up to 600,000 fr, first from the Ministry of Repatriates, then from the Ministry of Interior and subsequently from the Ministry of Labour.[246]

Formally, the Parodi Committee's aim was to defend the "moral and material interests" of harkis, who were from then on known as "Muslim French"[247] now that Algerians had become foreigners. The committee decided that activities designed to achieve this aim would fall into two categories: "administrative tutelage" and "social tutelage." Administrative tutelage included solving problems of employment, housing and education, which usually fell to the prefects, as assisted by CTAM and specially hired inspectors. Social tutelage, in contrast, would mean "promoting education in families," a task previously befallen to social workers[248]

242 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Letter from Michel Massenet to the President of the National Union of Soldiers, 16 September 1963.

243 FR-PaAN-20120054-Note, 24 June 1965.

244 FR-PaAN-20120054/1, Letter from Minister of Repatriates to Minister of the Interior, November 29, 1963

245 FR-PaAN-20120054/1, Meeting minutes on 10 February 1964.

246 The committee would remain in tact for decades. Its new chair would announce in an article in September 1990 that it was time to close its doors, and it was ultimately closed in 2007. André Wormser, "L'action Du Comité National Pour Les Musulmans Français," *Hommes et Migrations* 1135 (September 1990): 53–58 Archives Nationales, "Fonds Du Comité National Pour Les Musulmans Français (CNMF) Dit Comité Parodi (1955-2006)," 2007, https://www.siv.archives-nationales.culture.gouv.fr/siv/rechercheconsultation/consultation/ir/consultationIR.action?irId=FRAN_IR_050540.

247 FR-PaAN-20120054/1, Fact sheet in folder called Période d'élaboration, October 1963 to March 1964.

248 FR-PaAN-20120054/1, Note to Minister Besson.

who were, in the words of reformers, "pushed into families."[249] The committee was to pursue its mission either directly, by assisting public authorities in receiving, resettling, integrating and employing harkis in the metropole, or by subsidising intermediary private associations with similar goals.[250] Associations would use these subsidies principally to remunerate social workers.

In 1964, a member of the Committee argued that the use of "tutelage" was inappropriate because it was being used to refer to "French citizens."[251] The implication is that the word tutelage contained a condescension that was no longer appropriate in a post-independence context. The committee evidently found this argumentation convincing and substituted the term with the word *assistance* (*"l'aide administrative et sociale"*). Even with a new name, however, the assistance offered to harkis differed starkly from the assistance by the same name as codified in the law on social assistance of 29 November, 1953. Notably, it did not involve any cash payments. Indeed, when Parodi requested extra financing for the committee, Missoffe responded with reluctance given that "under no circumstances" did he envision the payment of "cash assistance" to target families.[252] Instead, Missoffe explained to Parodi, the committee was supposed to "help [harkis] to assimilate and integrate through appropriate supervision."[253] Accordingly, in 1965, most (64 per cent) of of its funding went to paying the salaries, social security contributions and transport cost of its social workers.[254] This was sometimes by means of intermediary organisations.[255]

Social workers were tasked with a vast array of responsibilities. One interviewed in the media explained, "We have to teach the women everything. My work starts in the morning: I move from accommodation to accommodation, checking if the beds have been made; then, it's a cooking tip here, one on childcare over there. Elsewhere, I show someone how to knit a pair of socks, and then, there is a medical visit for their children."[256] The social worker's busy schedule indicates the intensive supervision to which Algerian women were subject in the intimate confines of their own homes.

By 1966, the committee operated in 17 departments (of which three were in the Parisian region) and worked with 25,000-30,000 people, or roughly half of the total number of harkis in France.[257] According to archivists at the National Archives, the committee also became involved in policy work, overseeing the development and modification of laws that concerned harkis, such as the nationality option decree.[258] Parodi and the committee would navigate their roles as campaigning for the harki cause by spinning a narrative emphasising the loyalty and national devotion that their target beneficiaries exhibited.

249 FR-PaAN-20120054/1, Note to Minister Besson.
250 FR-PaAN-20120054/1-Letter, 6 October 1965 from Alexandre Parodi to Minister of Interior.
251 FR-PaAN-20120054/1, Meeting minutes, 10 February 1964.
252 FR-PaAN-20120054/1, Letter from Missoffe to Parodi, 17 February 1963
253 FR-PaAN-20120054/1, Letter from Missoffe to Parodi, 17 February 1963
254 FR-PaAN-20120054/1, Note, 24 June 1965
255 FR-PaAN-20120054/1-Letter, Alexandre Parodi to Minister of Interior, 6 October 1965.
256 Fr-PaAN-19920149-"Les harkis, à la recherche d'une patrie," Christian Rudel, 17 July 1963.
257 FR-PaAN-20120054/67, exposé of Colonel Schoen, April 1, 1966.
258 Archives Nationales, "Fonds Du Comité National Pour Les Musulmans Français (CNMF) Dit Comité Parodi (1955-2006)."

> Millions of Muslims who mobilised and fought by our sides have returned from Algeria, seeking asylum in our country. The Government is working to ensure that their material needs are met. It is up to us to make them our brothers. Loyal friends, they have chosen to remain French all while losing their native land. May they and their families find a warm welcome, peaceful employment and a life that respects their traditions on our soil. These are the goals that the National Committee for Muslim French has set itself.[259]

Missoffe had used similar language in his initial appeal to Frey to support his efforts, even deliberately classifying harkis as repatriates and highlighting their particular need. "It is only to be expected," Missoffe had written, "that the effort that has been made historically for migrants, who have now become foreigners, should today be directed towards those who have voluntarily become our *compatriots* and who are among the most deprived and helpless of Algerian repatriates."[260]

7.5.4. Into the woods?

Another important example of the parallel institutions for harkis is the professional reclassification efforts performed in their name. The State Secretary for Repatriates viewed it as his "essential mission" to reclassify harkis "as fast as possible, but also in a rational and humane way."[261] An apparatus for this purpose emerged in July 1962 when the Reception and Reclassification Service for French people from Indochina and Muslim French (*Le Service d'Accueil et de Reclassement des Français d'Indochine et des Français Musulmans*, SFIM) was founded and placed under the leadership of a prefect Yves Pérony. The SFIM was a specialised service at the Ministry of Repatriates with the mandate of not only managing camps for harkis but also helping them procure jobs and resettle into permanent housing.[262]

Officials at SFIM reported that the resettlement of harkis ran into "immediate obstacles."[263] Whether it concerned jobs or housing, the main obstacles were described as stemming from harkis' "failure to adapt to the metropolitan way of life."[264] For example, officials described a lack of housing stock "matching their attributes."[265] These attributes remained relatively underspecified, apart from a vague reference to their "need to live in a group, and to feel morally supported."[266] In fact, the causes of difficulty were just as likely to be structural. Many prefects

259 FR-PaAN-20120054, Parodi, undated.
260 FR-PaAN-20120054/1, Letter from Minister of Repatriates to Minister of the Interior, November 29, 1963
261 FR-PaAN-19920149/1-Circulaires, instructions et notes générales du Service et du Ministre des Rapatriés, janvier 1962-mai 1964- Note, "on harkis and moghaznis."
262 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)-Note, "concernant le service des Français musulmans," 6 May 1968.
263 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 110.
264 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 110.
265 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 110.
266 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 110

opposed harkis coming to their communities,[267] and economic expansion (and therefore construction activity) had slowed down in 1964 and 1965.[268]

Similarly, officials blamed the "growing reluctance" of employers to hire "Muslims, and in particular Muslim French"[269] on the fact that harkis were "maladjusted, and often devoid of any professional qualification and almost always burdened with family obligations."[270] Additionally, the officials cited the "tense climate" between "Muslim migrants and harkis" as an object of concern.[271] In many departments, there was said to be a "significant establishment of a Muslim workforce subservient to the FLN."[272] Many Algerian labour migrants had supplied a key source of financing for the organisation, often by contributing 5 per cent of their monthly salary.[273] By 1962, it was true that, in certain departments, this meant that the safety of harkis, whom the FLN perceived as traitors to the Algerian cause, could not be guaranteed. The administrative director of the National Council of French Employers (*Conseil National du Patronat Français,* CNPF) argued that it was "undeniable" that the FLN posed a significant obstacle to the "massive resettlement of harkis in the industrial sector."[274] However, some officials associated with SFIM judged this to no longer be the case in over fifty departments.[275]

Even if they mostly located the causes of these difficulties with harkis themselves, SFIM officials embarked on at least two parallel strategies to overcome these challenges. One was to educate employers about the utility of the Algerian workforce. In 1962, a note by SFIM requested that employers' associations "urgently ask [their] members what need they might possibly have for a Muslim workforce."[276] The Minister of Labour issued a similar circular on 22 March 1963 to the divisional labour inspectors and to the departmental directors of labour, asking them to get in touch with employers, inform them of the possibilities offered by this labour force, and ask for their help in reclassifying harkis.[277]

The second strategy, which commanded far more resources, was the creation or promotion of jobs in the agricultural sector. Officials viewed this sector as particularly suitable for Algerians, ostensibly accounting for their "lack of professional training" and providing work in a "region where their assimilation would be easier."[278] The argument regarding their lack

267 FR-PaAN-19920149/1/Circulaires, instructions et notes générales du Service et du Ministre des Rapatriés, janvier 1962-mai 1964, note for M Linear, SFIM, undated.

268 FR-PaAN-20120054/67-Annex I, "Emploi de la main d'oeuvre africaine et de la main d'oeuvre étrangère en 1966."

269 FR-PaAN-20120054-Letter, from Pérony to Mr Pottier of the Direction des Eaux et Forêts, 18 August 1965.

270 FR-PaAN-19920149/1/Circulaires, instructions et notes générales du Service et du Ministre des Rapatriés, janvier 1962-mai 1964, note from SFIM, undated but probably sometime in 1963.

271 FR-PaAN-19920149/1/Circulaires, instructions et notes générales du Service et du Ministre des Rapatriés, janvier 1962-mai 1964, note from SFIM, undated but probably sometime in 1963.

272 FR-PaAN-19920149/1/Circulaires, instructions et notes générales du Service et du Ministre des Rapatriés, janvier 1962-mai 1964, note, "Sur les harkis et moghaznis."

273 Lyons, *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: The French Welfare State during Decolonization*, 144.

274 FR-PaAN-19920149/1-Réunions au Secrétariat d'Etat aux Rapatriés, juillet 1962-mai 1964; Interview with Mr Ceyrac, Administrative Director of the *Conseil National du Patronat Français.*

275 FR-PaAN-19920149-Note, from SFIM to Boulin, 31 August 1962.

276 FR-PaAN-19920149/2-Circulaires, instructions et notes générales du Service et du Ministre des Rapatriés, janvier 1962-mai 1964, note, "Recasement des supplétifs musulmans," 20 September 1962.

277 FR-PaAN-19920149/2-Circulaires concernant le reclassement professionnel des harkis, septembre 1962-mars 1963.

278 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 111

of training is puzzling, as in the fall of 1962, almost as many harkis had industrial training as a background in any other activity (323 in industry compared to 348 in agriculture, 460 in construction, 61 in transport and 233 in a miscellaneous category).[279] Additionally, Algerian labour migrants had been highly sought-after in the industrial sector for several decades. In 1963, a journalist proposed a tangential but similar explanation in response to the question of "why we [metropolitan French] put them [harkis] here [in the forest]" - "because, quite simply, it was in the forest that we could easily create jobs."[280] Either way, the administration tried to steer as many young people as possible toward agricultural summer schools, although upon finishing their internship only a few accepted a salaried job on a farm.[281]

Efforts to reclassify harkis in the agricultural sector reached new heights in September 1962 when the Ministries of Agriculture, Finance, and Repatriates launched a joint project. Some 2,000 harki heads of household were sent to remote forest hamlets where they worked as rangers and firefighters for the French state. They were offered a modest income paid for by the Ministry of Repatriates.[282] Initially only 40 forest hamlets were designed, each containing 25-28 prefabricated houses.[283] However, by 1965, a total of 75 forest hamlets and 2,043 accommodations had been constructed to this end.[284] Life in the hamlets was tough. Newly installed harkis experienced difficulties of "subsistence."[285] One issue seemed to be that the work was weather-dependent, and that harkis could not work every day. Officials therefore agreed to pay out their salaries in full on days when their work was interrupted by weather, and to pay a half-day's work every time a day was completely lost due to bad weather. In general even officials admitted that the placements "incited very little interest among the lodged workers."[286] The cost for the state was over 23 million francs. By 1963, officials began pursuing another solution, which was considered "very likely" to provide new employment opportunities.[287] Specifically, harkis were given the means to buy herds of sheep so as to enable their transition into a job of "collective sheep herding."[288]

Although the forest hamlet solution was justified as providing a gradual initiation to "metropolitan life,"[289] several remarks suggest an alternative rationale that had more to do with

279 FR-PaAN-19920149/2-Circulaires, instructions et notes générales du Service et du Ministre des Rapatriés, janvier 1962-mai 1964, note from State Secretary of Repatriates to the prefect, "Reclassement des supplétifs musulmans dans le secteur industriel," 13 September 1962.

280 FR-PaAN-19920149-

281 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 114.

282 Choi, "The Muslim Veteran in Postcolonial France: The Politics of Integration of Harkis after 1962," 28.

283 Prefabrication is a type of building construction which involves manufacturing various individual elements of a building off-site in a factory and subsequently assembling it on-site. Prefabrication essentially introduced industrial practices into housing construction, and helped solve housing shortages throughout the twentieth century by dramatically reducing the time and money needed to erect a new accommodation.

284 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 112

285 FR-PaAN-19920149/1-Réunions au Secrétariat d'Etat aux Rapatriés, juillet 1962-mai 1964-Meeting minutes,15 January 1963.

286 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 113.

287 FR-PaAN-19920149/1-Réunions au Secrétariat d'Etat aux Rapatriés, juillet 1962-mai 1964-Meeting minutes,15 January 1963, p 4

288 FR-PaAN-19920149/1-Réunions au Secrétariat d'Etat aux Rapatriés, juillet 1962-mai 1964-Meeting minutes,15 January 1963, p 4

289 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 112

social discipline than with care. Just over one year earlier, Pérony described the "relatively tight control" over harkis that forest hamlets offered.[290] Pérony said this in order to recommend that the Parodi Committee focus its efforts on other departments, where harkis were not as "well supported by the administration."[291] The conceptual slippage between "control" and "support" is worth noting. When in the mid-1960s, the future of the forest hamlets was up for discussion, the prefect Yves Pérony expressed trepidation about closing them down. Referring to the 1,500 thousand families who had not yet found their way into the city, Pérony suggested that it would be "deplorable" to, after having undertaken the work of professional resettlement of "this rough [*fruste*] population toward which we are bound by a certain moral obligation," to leave them to their own devices. In particular, he drew attention to the 6,000 minors associated with these families, to whom he argued the French administration has "the obligation to make them good, young French people."[292]

Apparently, there was some criticism about the administration's decision to redirect harkis to rural areas. However, Pérony defended the scheme, arguing that, "it is inaccurate to claim that we do not want to incorporate these auxiliaries into the French Community, and that we hide them in poor areas of population density."[293] Instead, Pérony repeated the line that this was a suitable placement for this group: "the sites correspond to the aptitudes and possibilities of a large part of these harkis with a pastoral background."[294]

The SFIM ended its work in 1966, transferring its responsibilities to the Direction of Population and Migration at the Ministry of Social Affairs. Some camps remained until well into the 1970s, however. For example, although the Rivesaltes camp closed in 1964, Saint-Maurice L'Ardoise closed as late as 1976, after young harkis that had grown up in the camp staged a revolt, took control of the camp, and occupied the administrative offices the summer before.[295]

7.6. Analysis

The paternalistic welfare awaiting Algerian labour migrants prior to independence and the hyper-assimilation awaiting pieds-noirs afterward are best understood as efforts to secure consent in the context of a ravaging colonial war and its aftermath. Algerian labour migrants were firmly included in schemes falling under the banner of "social assistance for Muslim French." This world was characterised by some generosity, but a distinct form of welfare in which privacy and participation were minimal. Even when they earned formal entitlements to family allowances through contributions, they did not receive cash benefits like their metropolitan colleagues, but in-kind assistance that consistently intervened into their family's

290 FR-PaAN-20120054-Note for Mr Besson, 28 February 1964.
291 FR-PaAN-20120054-Note for Mr Besson, 28 February 1964.
292 FR-PaAN-20120054-Letter, from Pérony to Mr Pottier of the Direction des Eaux et Forêts, 18 August 1965.
293 FR-PaAN-19920149/1/Circulaires, instructions, et notes générales du Service et du Ministre des Rapatriés, janvier 1962-mai 1964, note by Y Pérony for M Lineard, August 1962.
294 FR-PaAN-19920149/1/Circulaires, instructions, et notes générales du Service et du Ministre des Rapatriés, janvier 1962-mai 1964, note by Y Pérony for M Lineard, August 1962.
295 Charbit, "Un Petit Monde Colonial En Métropole: Le Camp de Harkis de Saint-Maurice-L'Ardoise (1962-1976)," 33.

lives in the name of sanitation or cultural integration. Ostensibly, the generosity of this assistance could advertise the benefits of belonging to the French empire, whilst its character would grant the colonial state the ability to exercise surveillance over (increasingly dissatisfied) colonial subjects. Indeed, when the Fourth Republic collapsed in 1958, the Constantine Plan *and* the FAS were both borne out of the conviction that an expanded welfare network was part of the solution to the "Algerian problem."[296] The mistrust that existed between the migrants and welfare officials, however, as evidenced by the recommendation that social workers seek out a "well-trained dog" to accompany them on their domestic visits and "tighten their ties with police,"[297] suggests little success in winning the hearts and minds of the colonised.

Just like for repatriates in the Netherlands, provisions to insure white/European Algerian French citizens routinely went above and beyond provisions for metropolitan French citizens. The history of this favourable treatment harks back to colonial Algeria, where, between 1948 and 1953, a European-dominated Algerian Assembly passed a series of decisions instituting a social security regime that closely resembled the French system but exceeded it in generosity. The fact that French citizens in Algeria faced a lower retirement age and were offered higher pay-outs upon retirement led to accusations of financial foolhardiness by representatives of the Republic; yet before long the Republic itself would be offering old-age provisions to pieds-noirs that were strikingly similar in generosity to the colonial Algerian context. In addition, veritable efforts were made to move any informal barriers that pieds-noirs might experience. To a domestic audience, officials framed these provisions as technical, necessary solutions to elderly deprivation. To Europeans, Mellac, the Director of Repatriates explained these efforts instead as a show of national solidarity, alluding also to the need to quell "defiance and hostility" among newcomers.[298] He also momentarily broke character to describe repatriates in race-laden terms, focusing on winning the "confidence and affection of the *pieds-noirs*."[299] A world of hyper-assimilation was particularly expedient given that the dissent of the white Algerian community had been largely responsible for the fall of the Fourth Republic in 1958.

The fact that there was continuity between the disciplinary power exerted over Algerian labour migrants and that of harkis suggests that an ideological preoccupation with cultural security also drove patterns of inclusion. By logical necessity, harki refugees arrived only after France had lost the Algerian war of independence and given up on at least some of its imperial fantasies. Nonetheless, as the label of "Muslim French" relocated onto harkis' bodies, so too did the watchful eyes of the colonial state. The conceptual slippage between "tutelage" and "support" evident by the Parodi Committee and by Yves Pérony is illustrative. While thousands of men were directed against their will to isolated forest hamlets, women were sent to cleaning and weaving schools. Such a sizeable portion of these efforts were funded by the National Fund for Social Security (*Caisse nationale de sécurité sociale*, CNSS), arguably the cornerstone of the French welfare state at the time, that the fund complained of being financially overburdened. Just as the exclusion of "Muslims" in colonial Algeria was justified based on their cultural-

296 Lyons, *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: The French Welfare State during Decolonization*, 14.
297 FR-MaAD-138 W-16-Meeting minutes, "Coordination régional des affaires sociales musulmanes."
298 Mellac, "Généralités, Situation, Requêtes."
299 Mellac.

administrative habits and whether they were "capable of saying their age,"[300] metropolitan officials reached easily for stereotypes regarding the culturally inassimilable nature of "Muslims" as a justification for the efforts that were made in their name. Equally, officials were quick to explain any outcomes that emerged because of their policy with reference to the migrants' own preferences. The welfare that harkis accessed scored lower on the Marshall dimension than their forebears. Harkis were overwhelmingly directed to the agricultural sector which was of far less importance to the French economy at that time than the industrial sector, and various informal barriers prevented them from accessing their full entitlements. For example, most were directed into military camps, where social security benefits would not be paid, and the Minister of Repatriates instructed prefects to place the burden of proof of their own need on "Muslim" applicants and to make positive judgments only sparingly.[301] The combination of low levels of welfare, which takes on a particularly disciplinary form, is congruent with the ghettoisation ideal-type that I introduced in 2.4.4. It points to the use of welfare as an instrument for containing a perceived cultural threat.

This is not to imply that the integration of pieds-noirs into the existing social security regime always involved empowerment, moral equality and mutual regard. Nowhere is this nuance more obvious than in the professional reclassification benefits for self-employed repatriates. The advantages, which included easier entry into the occupational funds of the social security system, came at the price of individual autonomy over job placement as regional delegates decided where the self-employed would work. Delegates justified this as being in the best interest of repatriates, but, as I have shown through ministerial circulars, national interests were very clearly at stake. These national interests were conceptualised broadly, not just with an eye to labour market needs but also to social aims as committees were advised to grant more generous loans for opening a clinic than for opening a bar.[302] However, in these cases the disciplinary instrument was a blunt one, that relied on the voluntary action and deliberation of the recipients. Rather than forbidding employment, the state structured incentives that promoted specific choices and dissuaded others - like Adam Smith's invisible hand, which, although interfering in individual choice, ultimately preserves individual liberty. In addition, the evidence I marshalled of successful attempts by repatriated former employees of Algerian social security funds shows that repatriates could defeat the forces of the invisible hand. Many successfully appealed to the psychological needs of themselves and their families, with one repatriate asking for a different job since his wife was "often sick, physically and morally," since his placement in Aveyron.[303] Camp Larzac, for harkis, was incidentally also located in Aveyron. Any "physical and moral sickness" that harkis might have incurred by their placement there did not serve as grounds for their relocation.

300 "Procès-Verbal, l'Assemblée de l'Union Française," p 7.
301 PaAN-19920149/1-Compte-rendu de la réunion du 21 janvier 1963, Ministère des Rapatriés.
302 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Circular from Secretary of State of Repatriates (Robert Boulin) to Regional Delegates, IGAME, and Prefects, 22 May 1962, p 10.
303 FR-MaAD-172 W 2-Letter, 18 September 1964.

8. Deservingness debates: (post)colonial migrants in the British welfare state

"Does my right hon. Friend realise that our old-age pensioners feel a real sense of grievance when they are told that their pensions cannot be raised, while at the same time they see people coming here from other Commonwealth countries and getting National Assistance as soon as they arrive?"

Conservative member of Parliament to Home Secretary Rab Butler, 7 July 1960[1]

"How can I be an illegal immigrant if I've worked for 30 odd years? I've paid my tax, I've paid my National Insurance. Then I was British, wasn't I? You were taking my tax. You were taking my National Insurance."

Sarah O'Connor, interview, 2019[2]

8.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I gauge the boundaries of the British welfare state by assessing the access of migrants from the Caribbean to the landmark legislative acts of the Beveridgean regime: National Assistance (tax-funded, means-tested social assistance) and National Insurance (8.2 and 8.3 respectively). In contrast to the Dutch and French cases, the UK welfare state did not fragment into different welfare regimes devoted to different groups. There was little attention to psychological needs, social integration, or human learning and development across the board, but there was, thanks to Beveridge's commitment to universalism, formal equality of welfare entitlements to all UK residents. National Assistance explicitly made no distinction on the basis of nationality or residence duration. Additionally, all residents of Great Britain (the metropole) above school leaving age were required to pay contributions into National Insurance, although they could only withdraw benefits once they had made a specific number of weekly contributions, meaning that, in practice, recent migrants from the Caribbean who fell on hard times were more likely to rely on National Assistance than National Insurance.

However, substantive rights differed meaningfully from formal entitlements when it came to National Assistance, where I document local-level discrimination. Additionally, heated ideological contestation over the deservingness of Caribbean recipients (but not necessarily their cultural proximity) persisted over time. When racist public anxieties about the welfare use of Caribbeans ultimately won out over the protests of the National Assistance Board, immigration law became the main site of exclusion from the distributive community and the Commonwealth Immigrants Act was passed. After persistent back-and-forth, the Home Office and police ultimately used the welfare state apparatus to enforce immigration control, testifying to the interplay between agents of internal and external boundaries.

1 UK-LoNA-AST 7-Hansard, "West Indian Immigrants," 7 July 1960.
2 *The Unwanted: The Secret Windrush Files*.

8.2. The National Assistance Board

8.2.1. Formal entitlements

Since the British Nationality Act of 1948, Caribbeans had Citizenship of the UK and Colonies (CUKC) and would therefore pass any nationality conditions. In any case, there were not many such criteria, given that the Beveridgean vision was one of universal welfare. Among National Insurance, National Assistance, family allowances, and the NHS, none required a nationality test.[3] Section 4 of the National Assistance Act of 1948 stated, "It shall be the duty of the [National Assistance] Board ... to assist persons in Great Britain who are without resources to meet their requirements, or whose resources (including benefits receivable under the National Insurance Acts, 1946) must be supplemented in order to meet their requirements."[4] In a Draft Annual Report of 1961, the Board confirmed that the National Assistance Act "imposes a duty on the Board to meet need: it draws no distinctions of nationality or colour."[5] Thus, Caribbeans were formally entitled - in full - to the benefits associated with the National Assistance Act of 1948. Similarly, Section 1 of the National Insurance Act stipulated that "all persons employed in insurable employment shall be insured in manner provided by this Act."[6] The only scheme conditioned on nationality was the non-contributory old-age pension scheme introduced by Lloyd George in 1908, the remnants of which were administered by the National Assistance Board.[7] Even then, it was the relatively more liberal subjecthood rather than the relatively more restrictive citizenship which dictated inclusion, as pensions were only payable to "British "subjects."[8]

In any case, in principle, the only risk to new arrivals from the Caribbean would have been any residence criteria. For example, receipt of non-contributory old-age pensions introduced by Lloyd George was conditioned on a residence test; one that, in fact, distinguished between "natural-born" and naturalised subjects. British subjects by birth needed to have resided in Great Britain for 12 years since age 50. Naturalised British subjects, in contrast, were required to have lived in Great Britain for 20 years in the aggregate.[9] This would prevent anyone from naturalising or moving to the UK with the exclusive intent of accessing pensions. Family Allowances were similar. One of the parents must have lived in the UK for 26 weeks in the previous 12 months, and if the parent was born elsewhere, they must have lived in Great Britain for at least a year over the last two years (if a British subject), or for two years out of the last four years (if a foreigner).[10] National Assistance, however was payable regardless of how long someone had lived in Great Britain.[11]

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3 UK-LoNA-PIN 95/4-Section II, Annex I "Persons eligible to claim - existing schemes."
4 National Assistance Act 1948.
5 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878-"Draft Annual Report," 1961.
6 "National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act, 1946," Pub L No 62 (n.d.), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1946/62/pdfs/ukpga_19460062_en.pdf.
7 Phyllis Osborn, "Selected Observations on the National Assistance Program of Great Britain," *Social Service Review* 32, no 3 (1958): 265.
8 UK-LoNA-PIN 95/4-Section II, Annex I "Persons eligible to claim - existing schemes."
9 UK-LoNA-PIN 95/4-Section II, Annex I "Persons eligible to claim - existing schemes."
10 UK-LoNA-PIN 57/10-Report from Commonwealth Conference on National Insurance, May 1947.
11 UK-LoNA-PIN 95/4-"Outline of an Income Guarantee, Section II"

8.2.2. "Neither discrimination, nor special treatment"?

Despite this indisputable right to assistance, Caribbeans did not always receive benefits proportionate to their formal entitlements. Evidence from London and Birmingham points to the existence of street-level racial discrimination against Caribbeans in the late 1950s.

As mentioned, officers of the National Assistance Board, which enjoyed a quasi-independent status within the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance, had a substantial amount of discretion in the administration of National Assistance (see 4.4.5). One inquiry by Phyllis Osborn in 1958 offers details. The first layer of their autonomy had to do with the Board's autonomy relative to the Minister of National Insurance and to Parliament. The Board would propose "scale rates" that the Minister of National Insurance would take into consideration for parliamentary approval; the latter would "usually" present the exact proposal of the Board to parliament.[12] As one observer noted, "top staff [of the Board] apparently do their best to convince the Minister to follow practices which they, from their experience and knowledge, believe to be sound."[13] Subsequently, the Board could instruct its staff on the administration of the programme without consulting or informing Parliament or even the Appeal Tribunals that reviews the cases of aggrieved applicants.[14] The Board's officers were also tasked with means-testing, i.e. investigating the circumstances of applicants, not just for National Assistance but for a variety of other schemes, such as servicemen's allowance and free meals.[15] 10,000 staff members carried out the Board's mission, about 500 of which were at headquarters, with the remainder spread out in local offices. The chairman was the head of the organisation, and the only full-time member of the organisation.[16] From 1954 to 1964, the chair was Geoffrey Hutchinson, who had previously represented Ilford for the Conservative Party in the House of Commons. The Board had ten regional offices in England, which liaised between the headquarters office and the area offices. Each regional office was led by a regional controller, who was supported by at least one deputy and several assistant controllers.[17] Area offices, of which there were around 400, functioned "to a considerable degree" autonomously.[18] They were run by area officers, who were responsible for staff training and quality of performance, while the officers who serve under the area officers were responsible for handling applications and deciding payments.[19]

In the spring of 1958, G.F. Sinclair, the regional controller of Birmingham, tasked his assistant controllers with investigating how much National Assistance "immigrants" were receiving, presumably in the area offices under his jurisdiction.[20] In Birmingham, the group in question was made up of "West Indians and Pakistanis."[21] As a reminder, the latter were citizens of the Commonwealth after India and Pakistan won independence in 1947, while

12 Osborn, "Selected Observations on the National Assistance Program of Great Britain," 264.
13 Osborn, 265.
14 Osborn, 265.
15 Osborn, 266.
16 Osborn, 266.
17 Osborn, 267.
18 Osborn, 267.
19 Osborn, 268.
20 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878-Letter from Birmingham Regional Office to Higginson, 31 August 1958.
21 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878-Letter from Birmingham Regional Office to Higginson, 31 August 1958.

the former were Citizens of the UK and Colonies. In later correspondence, the Birmingham office would effortlessly swap the word "immigrant" for the word "coloured applicant," revealing a conceptual slippage between national and racial boundaries. On May 21, 1958, Sinclair issued a circular to his staff with the results of the investigation, expressing that he found them "disturbing."[22] He explained that, in the case of "immigrants," means tests were performed hastily and inattentively. Specifically, he noted that many officers inquired in an only "perfunctory" manner into an individual's circumstance before making their decision. Sharing his suspicion of racist discrimination, Sinclair continued that, "it should be unnecessary to remind officers that the Act and Regulations do not distinguish between applicants of different nationality, language, creed or colour."[23] Unforgiving public attitudes toward racism seemed to make this issue particularly salient, as Sinclair continued: "there must be no appearance of discrimination, particularly against coloured immigrants."[24]

Discrimination in the private sector exacerbated opportunities for discrimination by area officers. This was most noteworthy in the housing sector. Landlords were known to exploit the "housing needs of coloured people" by splitting up an entire house into multiple, minimally furnished rental units and charging excessively.[25] The conditions were crowded, as entire families would be forced to share (eat, sleep and live) in a single room. Often, they would have to share one downstairs kitchen with two gas stoves in it.[26] In addition to charging excessively, or perhaps because of it, landlords would often avoid issuing a rent-book. In general, since rent allowances were supposed to cover an applicant's net rent, both practices "present[ed] a difficult problem for the Board's local officers."[27] On the one hand, without a rent-book, there was no proof of the rent charged.[28] Even if a rent-book was supplied, area officers argued that it might be untrustworthy on the grounds of potential "collusion" between landlord and tenant.[29] Secondly, the excessive charges would lead local officers to refrain from covering the declared rent in full.[30] One London-based officer justified withholding rent by referring to his perception that the communities in question operated on communal, solidaristic lines. This ensured, in his view, that the applicant "did not suffer any hardship" if their full rent was not covered, since others in the community would pick up slack by "contribut[ing] from their relatively high wages to the 'common pot.'"[31]

Later that summer, the Birmingham office reached out to headquarters, acknowledging that the Regional Offices of London (there were two - London North and London South) had dealt with similar issues. The London offices had responded by issuing strict instructions to

22 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878-"Circular Minute 13/58," signed by G.F Sinclair, 21 May 1958.
23 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878-"Circular Minute 13/58," signed by G.F Sinclair, 21 May 1958.
24 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878-"Circular Minute 13/58," signed by G.F Sinclair, 21 May 1958.
25 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878-Draft circular by W.L Lidbury, July 1959, sent to Miss J Hope-Wallace on 14 July 1959.
26 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878-Report to the Pilgrim Trust by the Nottingham Consultative Committee for the Welfare of Coloured People, summer 1959.
27 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878-Debate on Amendment Regulations, National Assistance Board, 24 June 1959.
28 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878-Meeting minutes, 11 June 1959.
29 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878-Meeting minutes, "Group Conference to discuss the problems of coloured applicants," 30 May 1960.
30 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878-Memo by GW Cole, 4 June 1959.
31 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878-Memo by GW Cole, 4 June 1959.

area officers as to how to conduct the initial visit and how to determine the rent allowance. In the event of applicants being charged exorbitant rents by exploitative landlords, the guidelines instructed area officers to meet their rental allowance up to 15s for an applicant sharing a room and £1 for an applicant with a single room. Additionally, the guidelines instructed local officers to inform applicants of their right of appeal in the event of high rents to the Rent Tribunal.[32] Birmingham Regional Office opted against issuing a circular as London regions had done, citing the likelihood that it would be viewed as permitting discrimination where it did not already exist. "There are undoubtedly still some officers," a representative explains to national headquarters, "whom it hurts to give coloured applicants anything that can be withheld with some vestige of covering authority from above."[33] Nonetheless, in their communications, London Regional Offices did not condone discrimination. In their circular, they stressed that "a genuine coloured applicant should not be left in straitened circumstances because of a decision not to give assistance," citing the fact that "he may be friendless in this country and have no home roots."[34]

By the mid-1950s, the Board's headquarters were well aware of local-level discrimination against "applicants of colour." Attention to the problem appears not to have solved it, however. In May 1960, the Board's London (North) Regional Office convened a conference on the matter, citing the "difficulties [that] were still being encountered in dealing with coloured immigrants."[35] Officials from the Board's headquarters were invited. During this conference, Mr W.L. Lidbury, Regional Controller of London (North), reiterated the position of his office that if rent was excessive, it should not be met in full. Lidbury considered this position an expression of the general principle that, when it came to "coloured immigrants," there should be "neither discrimination against them, nor special treatment."[36]

8.2.3. Two committees, one conclusion

In assuring conference attendees of the undesirability of "special treatment" for Caribbean migrants, Lidbury was simultaneously responding to a spiralling national concern with the potential for welfare abuse by CUKC citizens from the colonies. This concern fuelled the flames of discussions around immigration restriction. It also meant that recourse to national assistance bore disproportionate political weight for Caribbean migrants and other applicants of colour. It features prominently in the archival record in official correspondence and documentation associated with two separate committees, both tasked with investigating the restriction of entry to CUKC citizens: one appointed by Attlee's Labour Cabinet in 1950 and the other by Churchill's Conservative Cabinet in 1953.

32 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878-Draft circular by W.L Lidbury, July 1959, sent to Miss J Hope-Wallace on 14 July 1959, p 14.

33 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878-Letter, Birmingham Regional Office to Higginson 31 August 1958.

34 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878, Draft circular by W.L Lidbury, July 1959, sent to Miss J Hope-Wallace on 14 July 1959.

35 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878-Meeting minutes, "Group Conference to discuss the problems of coloured applicants," 30 May 1960.

36 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878-Meeting minutes, "Group Conference to discuss the problems of coloured applicants," 30 May 1960.

On 19 June 1950, Attlee's Cabinet invited him to review the "further means which might be adopted to check the immigration into this country of coloured people from British Colonial territories."[37] The appointed committee included the Home Secretary (James Chuter Ede at the time), Minister of Labour, Minister of Health, Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. Despite this not featuring in their mandate, the committee first concerned itself with the extent of the *problem* caused by "immigration into this country of coloured people from British territories."[38] The people in question included CUKC citizens: Caribbean migrants ("of West Indian extraction"), West Africans, and "Moslem people, mainly from Aden and Somaliland."[39] Key to the committee's investigation was the extent to which these individuals posed a fiscal burden on the public purse. A sample check during one week of August 1950 showed that 572 "coloured Colonials" had applied for national assistance, which was sufficiently few for the committee to conclude that "unemployment and destitution among these coloured people of all types is not so widespread as to have any noticeable effect on [the British] economy."[40] The committee did not allow itself to be reassured by this finding. In the end, it recommended against restricting entry, but mostly because "for citizenship purposes, the United Kingdom together with the Colonies form[ed] one unit, and it would be contrary to the scheme to sub-divide that unit."[41] The formal citizenship rights of colonial migrants acted to buffer exclusionary impulses. Moreover, making clear that anxieties around welfare abuse were racialised, the committee also ruled out a "colour test," implying that though it would be desirable, it would be politically infeasible, i.e. "so invidious as to make it impossible of adoption."[42] Without evidence, however, the committee cautioned that "social services in the United Kingdom, particularly the *rights under which any destitute person can avail himself under the National Assistance Act,* must inevitably act as a considerable attraction."[43] The implication was that access to British welfare operated as a magnet for migrants of colour.

Shortly thereafter, a different committee would ask the same question and come to the same conclusion despite similarly meagre evidence. In autumn of 1951, Winston Churchill led the Conservatives back into power. Churchill shared the interest of his predecessor in how migrants of colour were settling in the UK. Later that year, he asked the Postmaster General[44]

37 UK-LoNA-Co 1028/22-Draft report, "Immigration of British subjects into the United Kingdom," Committee of Ministers, 24 January 1951.

38 UK-LoNA-CO 1028/22-Draft report, "Immigration of British subjects into the United Kingdom," Committee of Ministers, 24 January 1951.

39 UK-LoNA-CO 1028/22-Draft report, "Immigration of British subjects into the United Kingdom," Committee of Ministers, 24 January 1951, 1.

40 UK-LoNA-CO 1028/22-Draft report, "Immigration of British subjects into the United Kingdom," Committee of Ministers, 24 January 1951, 1.

41 UK-LoNA-CO 1028/22-Draft report, "Immigration of British subjects into the United Kingdom," Committee of Ministers, 24 January 1951, 7

42 UK-LoNA-CO 1028/22-Draft report, "Immigration of British subjects into the United Kingdom," Committee of Ministers, 24 January 1951, 8.

43 Emphasis added; UK-LoNA-CO 1028/22-Draft report, "Immigration of British subjects into the United Kingdom," Committee of Ministers, 24 January 1951, 9

44 At the time, this was a Cabinet-level ministerial position involved in maintaining the postal system and national communications

about the employment of "coloured workers" in the postal service. The Postmaster General responded that there were 500 to 600 gainfully employed, and on 16 December 1951 explained that the Post Office "could not discriminate against coloured British subjects once they are here" and therefore, if there was a concern with "coloured British subjects," it was "not purely a Post Office question at all" and should be taken up elsewhere.[45] In response, two days later, Churchill's cabinet invited the Home Secretary – now David Maxwell Fyfe – to convene a committee bearing much similarity to the one that Attlee's cabinet had convened. To this end, the "Working Party on Coloured People Seeking Employment in the UK" (henceforth the "Working Party") was formed. As its predecessor had, the Working Party recognised that its terms of reference explicitly did not require them to consider the "*desirability* of preventing any increase in the number of coloured people seeking employment…" - and, again as its predecessor had, nevertheless undertook to explore the "true extent of the problem raised by coloured immigration" before proceeding.[46] To this end, the Chairman of the Working Party requested that chief constables of police districts with "large coloured communities," regional welfare officers of the Colonial Office, the Ministry of Labour, and the National Assistance Board submit notes on the extent to which, broadly, "coloured people … make calls upon public assistance."[47]

These various submissions mostly offer vague impressions of the "problem" to which the committee was called to respond. The inputs of regional welfare officers of the Colonial Office are summarised in a note dated 12 March 1953. It mainly includes estimations of the size of the population of "coloured workers," although, without going into further detail, an "experienced social worker" in Liverpool suggests that "the Africans and the West Indians present the only real problems."[48] The reports compiled by police commissioners and constables are summarised in a note by the Home Office. A scattering of minimally substantiated observations suffice as evidence for their claims. For example, the Home Office concludes that, "although the size and make-up of the coloured communities varies considerably from one to another of these districts, members of the same race behave in much the same way in all areas."[49] Several districts suggest that although the population lives in "poor and dirty conditions," it is from "choice rather than necessity" (though Leeds and Birmingham disagree).[50] A number of districts in London express "the impression that on the whole coloured people are work-shy and content to live on national assistance," echoing the view of police in Cardiff and Middlesbrough, although Liverpool, standing alone, claimed that "there is no evidence to support the view that any or all sections of the coloured community are generally idle or poor workers."[51]

In their submissions to the Working Party, the Ministry of Labour and the National Assistance Board struck a different tone. The Ministry of Labour suggested that if what was

45 *The Unwanted: The Secret Windrush Files*.
46 UK-LONA-CO 1028/22-Confidential note, Chairman of Working Party, 26 January 1953.
47 UK-LoNA-CO 1028/22-Note by the Chairman, 11 July 1953.
48 UK-LoNA-CO 1028/22-Note, Colonial Office, 12 March 1953.
49 UK-LoNA-CO 1028/22-"Information obtained from the police about coloured communities in the United Kingdom," Home Office, 11 July 1953.
50 *Ibid*.
51 *Ibid*.

at stake in the conversation was a departure from the principle of non-discrimination when matching jobseekers with prospective employers, they saw "the strongest possible objection" to the proposal.[52] The Board, for its part, started off by qualifying that they were not "in a good position to express a general opinion on coloured people as a whole, because [they had] business with them only when something goes wrong."[53] Still, they surveyed all the "able-bodied coloured people" who received assistance during a given week in June.[54] The total number was 1,870, of which 686 were West African and 431 were Caribbean. The amounts paid indicated that the costs for this assistance would amount to around £150,000 and £200,000 a year, compared to a total bill for state-funded cash assistance of £100 million a year.[55] The Board took these statistics to mean that "most of [the applicants of colour] must be leading the same lives of steady solid industry as the ordinary British working man."[56] The only problem they identified was, indeed, negative attitudes from the public at large: "their presence in the Board's offices leads to complaints about wasting the taxpayer's money which would not be made if their colour did not attract attention."[57] In short, the main issue was the racism of taxpayers, not the welfare use of the individuals in question. The Board's note was submitted on October 5.

On November 12, the Working Party assembled to discuss the "apparently high proportion of coloured people who were unemployed or drawing National Assistance," skipping over most of the qualifications the Board had made. The Board representative in attendance, Jacqueline Hope-Wallace, who was head of the Division of Assistance,[58] took the opportunity to again attenuate the perception of the problem, stressing that many migrants of colour were recent arrivals who did not yet qualify for National Insurance benefits, which could explain any reliance on National Assistance.[59] Hope-Wallace requested therefore that if mention was made of National Assistance during the draft report, this point also be included. The representative from the Ministry of Labour, Mr. Toogood, then cast aspersions on any calculations on a percentage basis (i.e. rates of public assistance in a given population), since these assumed that the size of the total population of colonial migrants of colour was known, which it was not.

Despite the further qualifications made by representatives of both the National Assistance Board and the Ministry of Labour, the Working Party agreed that "the rate of unemployment amongst coloured people must *on any calculation* be remarkably high."[60] When the Working Party finished its deliberations at the end of 1953, its final report made no mention of Hope-Wallace's request. Instead it echoed the report of the committee convened by Attlee's cabinet, that welfare must be acting as a significant 'pull' for immigrants. As per the report, "so long as people have only to land in the United Kingdom to be eligible for national assistance, which may even exceed the amount what they were drawing in wages before they left their own country... it is not to be expected that administrative measures alone will do much to prevent

52 UK-LoNA-CO 1028/22-Note, Ministry of Labour, 27 March 1953.
53 *Ibid*.
54 This was the week beginning 15 June 1953.
55 UK-LoNA-CO 1028/22-Note by National Assistance Board, 5 October 1953.
56 *Ibid*.
57 *Ibid*.
58 Osborn, "Selected Observations on the National Assistance Program of Great Britain," 258.
59 UK-LoNA-CO 1028-Meeting minutes of 4th meeting, 12 November 1953.
60 UK-LoNA-CO 1028/22-Meeting minutes, 12 November 1953.

an influx to this country…"[61] The Working Party closed by recommending, among other forms of immigration restriction, that the Secretary of State be given the power to deport British subjects who were "deliberately living in idleness on public funds."[62] The considerations from the National Assistance Board, according to which most colonial migrants were probably living lives of "steady solid industry," were relegated to the appendix.

In short, the inquiries led by two committees, one convened by Labour and one by the Conservatives, display remarkable similarities. Both reveal a blistering preoccupation with the extent of CUKC citizens' reliance on the national assistance to which they were entitled, and both portray their access to welfare as an immigration 'pull' and a justification for considering restricting this immigration. In short, both conclude that the access to welfare of colonial migrants was a problem that needed fixing, despite evidence to the contrary.

8.2.4. Welfare chauvinism

Although these conversations happened behind closed doors, anxiety around the welfare use of colonial migrants quickly spread into the public light, where members of parliament and of the public sparred mostly with members of the National Assistance Board. In the late 1950s, Conservative MPs Cyril Osborne and Norman Pannell both campaigned against non-white immigration from the colonies and did so with reference to welfare use. In 1959, Pannell began a parliamentary tirade about citizens of the Colonies and Commonwealth by reminding his audience that such citizens could "seek, and obtain, National Assistance for an indefinite period" and that they could not be deported. He went on to suggest that they were liable to "transgress [British] laws or abuse [British] hospitality," and then to maintain that, although "most have been coloured" he did not mean to suggest that this constitutes "any drawback."[63] According to Hansen, the "Osborne/Pannell position" was viewed with disdain by their colleagues in Parliament and in Whitehall, who in correspondence dismissed them as "lunatic" racists.[64] However, we have already seen how civil servants of the aforementioned committees shared at least some of the perspective of these "lunatics." Moreover, by 1960, other MPs jumped in to lambast colonial migrants' rights to national assistance, although usually doing so under the veneer of expressing their constituents' opinions.

Parliamentary questions are illustrative. In July 1960, a Conservative MP Cordeaux asked then-Home Secretary Rab Butler whether he realised the "real sense of grievance" felt by British retirees who witnessed Caribbean and other migrants from the colonies exercising their formal rights to National Assistance.[65] Cordeaux was implying that the right of CUKC and Commonwealth citizens of colour to social assistance should be conditional on the possibility to grant white pensioners a benefit increase. Cordeaux suggested consulting with the Minister of Pensions and National Insurance to require "such immigrants" to pay back their benefits

61 UK-LoNA-CO 1028/22-Draft report, "Working Party on Coloured People Seeking Employment in the United Kingdom," 28 October 1953.
62 *Ibid*: 9.
63 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878-Hansard, "Immigration from the Commonwealth," 17 November 1959.
64 Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation*, 83.
65 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878-Hansard, "West Indian Immigrants," 7 July 1960.

at a "suitable weekly rate." Butler deferred the matter to the Colonial Secretary. A year later, in April 1961, Conservative MP Sir W. Bromley-Davenport brought a similar question to the attention of David Renton, Joint Under-Secretary of State[66] for the Home Department. Bromley-Davenport asked Renton whether he was "aware that there is increasing resentment over this type of immigrant, who come over to this country and live off the Welfare State [*sic*]..."[67] Bromley-Davenport then blurred the distinction between welfare access, labour market competition and criminal activity by continuing that these immigrants "occupy the homes our people so badly need and celebrate the occasion by occupying our gaols as well?", implying their criminality with reference to an old word for *jail*. Renton replied by pushing back against some of the assumptions upon which Bromley-Davenport's question relied, arguing that crime rates between "Commonwealth immigrants" and others were comparable.

Ministers were not the only ones who found themselves fielding questions of this nature. The Board, as an implementing agency of the 1948 Act, received several requests to speak on the topic, and each time displayed a striking political bent by defending the social rights of CUKC and Commonwealth citizens of colour. In August 1960, Labour MP Alan Thompson wrote to Hutchinson, the chair of the Board, explaining that he had received a letter from an agitated constituent. This constituent had read a news article in which a train passenger had described striking up conversation with a Jamaican, who had in turn explained that he was leaving the UK after two years, "during which time he had not worked at all but lived on National Assistance and was able to have a 'wonderful time.'"[68] Neglecting the formal citizenship of Caribbean migrants and professing to transmit public anxieties, Thompson reported "considerable concern about the ease with which foreigners appear to be able to settle down on national assistance when they come here" and asked for Hutchinson's reassurance.[69]

Hutchinson's response, succinct and decisive, is worth citing at length.

> I really cannot comment very effectively upon the two letters in the newspapers which your constituent has read, or upon the conversation in the train, in the absence of any means of identifying the cases and ascertaining the real facts.
>
> I really do not think that any man, Jamaican or otherwise, could have remained on national assistance for two years without working, unless he was sick or for some reason no work was available for him. The writer of the letter may have been mistaken; or the man himself may have been merely boasting, as they sometimes do.
>
> It has not been our experience that the Jamaicans are more ready to come on to national assistance than British work-people. In the Spring of this year out of about 130,000 unemployed persons receiving assistance, only 3,700 were coloured immigrants. There are no official statistics of coloured persons in this country, but

66 There are three tiers of government minister in the UK; in order of rank, Secretary of State, Minister of State, and Under Secretary of State.

67 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878, Hansard, 13 April 1961.

68 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878, Letter from Thompson to Hutchinson, Chair of National Assistance Board, 3 August 1960.

69 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878, Letter from Thompson to Hutchinson, Chair of National Assistance Board, 3 August 1960.

> the British Caribbean Welfare Society estimate that there are roughly 150,000 West Indian workers alone over here. These figures show that the proportion of coloured persons who come on to assistance is very small. I must say that in general our experience of Jamaicans has been that they are very ready to work, and anxious to earn the good wages available in this country.
>
> I hope that you will assure your constituent that the Board are very much alive to the problem of persons, coloured or otherwise, who are unwilling to work... We have powers of prosecution and there are other steps which we do not hesitate to take in appropriate cases...
>
> The Jamaicans are, of course, British subjects, and as such are in an essentially different position from foreigners.[70]

In short, Hutchinson expressed doubt in the veracity of the story as told by the newspaper reporter, given that assistance was conditional on jobseeking. He marshalled evidence to suggest that the proportion of Caribbean migrants receiving National Assistance was proportionate to their size in the population, and offered his positive impressions of the community, expressing, in no uncertain terms, solidarity with Caribbean migrants. He also reaffirmed their status as British subjects, and reassured Thompson that the Board would pursue cases of fraud wherever it would find them. Circulating his response to Thompson among his colleagues, Hutchinson scribbled in the margins an instruction that this letter be used as model for future responses on the same subject. Somewhat surprisingly, at least one official from the Home Office seem to have borrowed his words, responding to the accusation made by Conservative MP Martin McLaren that colonial migrants arrive and immediately seek out assistance by saying that "this has no factual foundation," and echoing Hutchinson's conviction that "there is nothing whatever to indicate that large numbers [of Commonwealth immigrants] seek assistance."[71] This official then proffered that despite the presence of "a minority of idlers in the community at large" there was "no reason to suppose that the proportion of such people among coloured immigrants is any greater than in the white population."[72] David Renton, who later would stress comparable crime rates across different communities, wrote to Conservative MP Beresford Craddock in January 1961, echoing these sentiments: "there is no evidence that in general immigrants come here in order to take advantage of our welfare services; they come in order to find employment, and the vast majority are in fact usefully employed, and contribute to our welfare services through taxation and national insurance. They certainly do not get preferential treatment."[73]

These attempts to assuage welfare chauvinist anxieties were ultimately in vain. In 1960, Conservative MPs Norman Pannell asked Iain Macleod about dissuading emigration from the Caribbean, and his colleague in Parliament, Sir J Duncan, cautioned Macleod that "There are far more hon. Members worried about this matter than would appear from Questions on

70 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878, Letter from Chair of National Assistance Board to Thompson, 26 August 1960.
71 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878, Letter from BR Williams to Private Secretary of Martin McLaren, 22 December 1960.
72 *Ibid*.
73 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878, Letter from David Renton to MP Beresford Craddock, 10 January 1961.

the Order Paper."[74] Tellingly, Macleod responded: "I know that … Her Majesty's Government are worried about it, too."[75] In 1961, Home Secretary Rab Butler, who had one year earlier responded to a dismayed Cordeaux about the pension rights of elder Britons being eroded by the assistance rights of CUKC citizens, spoke to the House of Commons about his own fear of "virtually limitless immigration."[76] By April of the following year, the Commonwealth Immigrants Act passed, severing the link between British subjecthood and right of entry to the United Kingdom.

8.3. National Insurance

8.3.1. Formal entitlements

Practically speaking, entitlement to National Insurance was closely linked to residence. As alluded to in the previous section, all residents over school leaving age were to be insured under the National Insurance Act of 1946. "Nationality makes no difference," emphasised a leaflet distributed to employers by Crown Agents for Overseas Governments and Administrations when the Act entered into force: "contributions must be paid whether the worker is a British subject or not."[77] There was no specific residence test, but benefits were only payable after a specific number of contributions had been made.[78] For example, someone did not qualify for unemployment insurance benefits until they had made 50 weekly contributions (amounting to around a year's residence).[79] Additionally, these contributions needed to accord with "the appropriate class." Hence, eligibility for unemployment benefits depended on contributions as an employed person, while sickness benefit and maternity allowance required contributions as an employed or self-employed person.[80] In practice, this meant that many migrants could not access National Insurance benefits immediately upon arrival, as they had not built up enough contributions, as Hope-Wallace from the National Assistance Board had testified to the Working Party in 1953.[81]

8.3.2. Imperial social insurance

Whether residence in the colonies counted as residence was subject to discussion. Ultimately, residence in Great Britain was taken to mean residence in England, Wales, Scotland or the Isle of Man.[82] One reason for this was the impression of colonial officers that the needs "in an African village" are different than in the British Isles.[83] Specifically they argued that "the tribe

74 This is the agenda for each sitting day of the House of Commons, and includes questions, motions, updates from committees, etc.
75 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878, Hansard, "West Indies, Migrants to the United Kingdom," 1 December 1960.
76 El-Enany, *Bordering Britain*, 98.
77 UK-LoNA-CAOG 15/168-Leaflet N.I 20, "Employer's guide to National Insurance," April 1948: 5.
78 W.A Robson, "The National Insurance Act, 1946," *The Modern Law Review* 10, no 2 (April 1947): 172.
79 UK-LoNA-CO 1028/22-Meeting minutes of 4th meeting, 12 November 1953.
80 Robson, "The National Insurance Act, 1946," 172.
81 UK-LoNA-CO 1028-Meeting minutes of 4th meeting, 12 November 1953
82 Robson, "The National Insurance Act, 1946."
83 UK-LoNA-CO 859/124/2-Memo, C.M No 5, "Social Security in the Colonial Territories." June 1944.

or family still helps substantially to provide against old age, indigence, and, to a more limited extent, sickness."[84] Additionally, each territory contained, apparently, "several communities at different stages of development," which was coined "the problem of plural communities" after the Dutch had apparently used that term.[85] Therefore, officers judged, the priority of British colonial governments should be to "support… the existing social structure" rather than introduce any new legislation.[86] Colonial governments could access assistance for this purpose under the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act.[87] The Act was the British government's response to labour protests in the late colonial period.[88] It involved lending or granting around £40 million to the colonies from 1946 to 1951.[89] According to Cooper, officials had long worried that the Act would become a "colonial 'dole,'" suggesting the political cross-pressures from which it emerged: to keep the colonies part of the British empire, but to limit the costs of doing so.[90]

Either way, this decision to limit National Insurance to the British Isles meant that while on duty, colonial officers did not fall under the description of insured persons.[91] They did have access to colonial superannuation benefits, provident funds, widows and orphans' reunions schemes.[92] However, as one note makes clear, this was considered inadequate social provision. Therefore, the Colonial Office pushed for the inclusion of colonial officers, invoking fairness as the justification for these efforts: "it would seem to me that in fairness to persons who became compulsorily insured as from July 5 1948 [the date at which the National Insurance Act entered into force], and subsequently go to a Colony on contract - such as to the Ground Nut Scheme in Tanganyika… should have the option… of keeping up contributions."[93] The reference to the Ground Nut Scheme is a reference to an expensive scheme pursued under the premiership of Attlee in which land in present-day Tanzania was diverted toward the cultivation of peanuts in order to alleviate margarine shortages in Britain.

In response, provisions were drawn up according to which exceptions to the residence rule could be made for people who were temporarily either visiting or leaving the UK.[94] The result was that, although they were not covered under the scheme by default, colonial civil servants were able to voluntarily insure themselves by paying the contributions that they would have paid while they were abroad.[95] The regulations for this were spelled out in a leaflet labelled 38,

84 UK-LoNA-CO 859/124/2-Memo, C.M No 5, "Social Security in the Colonial Territories." June 1944: 3.
85 UK-LoNA-CO 859/124/2-Memo, C.M No 5, "Social Security in the Colonial Territories." June 1944: 6.
86 UK-LoNA-CO 859/124/2-Memo, C.M No 5, "Social Security in the Colonial Territories." June 1944: 3.
87 UK-LoNA-CO 859/124/2-Memo, C.M No 5, "Social Security in the Colonial Territories." June 1944.
88 Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa*, 168.
89 Bhambra reminds us that this paled in comparison to the amounts that colonies were required to redirect toward the metropole by tributes or dollar deposits. Bhambra, "Relations of Extraction, Relations of Redistribution."
90 Frederick Cooper, "Decolonization and Citizenship: Africa between Empires and a World of Nations," in *Beyond Empire and Nation: Decolonizing Societies in Africa and Asia, 1930s-1970s*, ed Els Bogaerts and Remco Raben, Verhandelingen van Het Koninklijk Instituut Voor Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 55.
91 UK-LoNA-CO 859/124/2-Note, 15 January 1946.
92 UK-LoNA-CO 859/124/2-Note, 15 January 1946.
93 UK-LoNA- CO 859127/5- Note, K Storrie, 2 March 1949.
94 UK-LoNA-CAOG 15/168-Leaflet N.I 38, "Persons entering or leaving Great Britain," October 1948.
95 UK-LoNA-CAOG 15/168-Notice, National Insurance Scheme, from Appointments and Passages Department of Crown Agents from the Colonies.

and circulated by National Insurance (N.I.38). They were not eligible for Class 1 (designated for employees) contributions and benefits, but rather could only pay Class 3 (non-employed) contributions, and in some cases Class 2 (self-employed).[96] Additionally, in order to make use of these exceptions, the person in question would need to apply by mail within 26 weeks of the beginning of their time abroad, or of their return to the UK. As of 11 December 1950, these requirements changed slightly, such that the time restriction became dependent on the length of time spent abroad since July 5, 1948.[97] The person in question still had to notify the Ministry of their desire to voluntarily insure themselves, but they could do so at any time. The limits on who could benefit from these provisions appear to have remain relatively strict. Conditions included that the person have been compulsorily insured in an Army Council or another government department, contributed voluntarily to another insurance, or were classified as being in a war occupation.[98] In short, the rule that residence determined entitlement was relaxed, but only enough to accommodate colonial officers.

Insurance available to those British subjects who were not colonial officers was the subject of a separate discussion. Before the end of the Second World War, the Colonial Office had begun transmitting information about Beveridge's reforms to colonial governments. It circulated a memorandum discussing, in general terms, the link between social security needs and economic development for any government that was considering taking similar steps.[99] Indeed, the possibility of transforming the social legislation of the immediate post-war period to meet "colonial conditions" garnered a fair amount of attention, though it is unclear how much escaped confidential memos.[100] Following these efforts, several colonial governments began to take steps toward setting up their own social security systems, with special emphasis on pensions. The Colonial Office summarised their efforts and their reflections on what type of reforms would be possible.[101] Barbados, Jamaica, Ceylon and other territories appointed a committee to consider social security "on the lines of the Beveridge Plan."[102] In Mauritius, legal provision was made for the establishment of old-age pensions for workers in the sugar industry (though it was not implemented), while Barbados established non-contributory old age pensions for those who reached 68 years old. On the other hand, in the Bahamas, for example, the Governor "expressed the opinion that there is very little hope of the introduction of a contributory scheme of social insurance."[103]

Those colonies that did set up their own scheme would be able to reward any of their residents who migrated to the British Isles with privileged access to the National Insurance Act. This is because, similar to the attempts to coordinate between metropolitan and Algerian

96 UK-LoNA-CAOG 15/168-Letter from CJ Bromhead at Colonial Office to Ministry of National Insurance, Overseas Group, 11 April 1951.
97 UK-LoNA-CAOG 15/168-Letter from CJ Bromhead at Colonial Office to Ministry of National Insurance, Overseas Group, 11 April 1951.
98 UK-LoNA-CAOG 859/124/2-Leaflet N.I 38A, "Persons Abroad on 5th July, 1948," Ministry of National Insurance, June 1948.
99 UK-LoNA-CAOG 15/168-Confidential memo, "Social Security in the Colonies," 13 February 1946.
100 UK-LoNA-Confidential memo, "Social Security in the Colonies," Colonial Office, 13 February 1946.
101 UK-LoNA-Confidential memo, "Social Security in the Colonies," Colonial Office, 13 February 1946.
102 UK-LoNA-Confidential memo, "Social Security in the Colonies," Colonial Office, 13 February 1946, p 2.
103 UK-LoNA-Confidential memo, "Social Security in the Colonies," Colonial Office, 13 February 1946.

French social security schemes, the Act eventually made provisions for the government of "any British Dominion or Colony to link by reciprocal arrangements" their two insurance schemes.[104] Motivating this decision was, as Conservative MP Christopher Hollis put it, the notion that a key tenet of "Empire policy" was the ability of social insurance to stretch across different administrative units in the territory, or "a system of Imperial social insurance, by which contributions can be made in any one country of the empire and the benefits paid in any other country where the British citizen may find himself."[105] To this end, a Commonwealth Conference on social insurance took place in May 1947 in London. Representatives of Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, Eire (Ireland), Southern Rhodesia, Burma, and Northern Ireland were invited.[106] The purpose was to "examine the principles on which reciprocal arrangements in the field of social insurance might be based." Jim Griffiths, then-Minister of National Insurance (and in 1950 to become Secretary of State for the Colonies) opened the conference by reassuring delegates that "from the start we realised the importance of reciprocal arrangements."[107] These were the first steps taken toward what Conservative MP Christopher Hollis would call a key tenet of "Empire policy."[108] This tenet marked a rupture with colonial policy, which up until then had relied on acts like the Colonial Development and Welfare Act to deliver welfare gains in the colonies, as well as a departure from the basic residence-based criterion for eligibility under National Insurance.

8.3.3. Social security and surveillance

In 8.2.3 and 8.2.4, I showed how political committees, members of Parliament and media outlets used migrants' recourse to National Assistance to fuel anxieties about immigration. This discussion ultimately led to the passing of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act in 1962 (and its 1968 and 1971 successors). In this section I show how, when executing the Commonwealth Immigrants Act proved complicated, the Home Office turned to the department in charge of administering National Insurance (whose name changed multiple times in the post-war period) for assistance. These departments however exhibited substantial resistance to allowing their records to be used "for the purposes of law enforcement and immigration control."[109]

The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act did not succeed in its policy aims of reducing the immigration from the colonies and the Commonwealth. Instead the total number of "Coloured Commonwealth Immigrants," which had reached 57,700 in 1960, averaged over 51,000 between 1963 and 1968.[110] For this reason, Carson suggests that the Act was a "futile" piece of legislation, a "weak and inapposite" instrument for controlling the entry of immigrants.[111] Implementation was made particularly difficult because Commonwealth

104 UK-LoNA-CAOG 15/168-Leaflet N.I 38, "Persons entering or leaving Great Britain," October 1948).
105 UK-LoNA-CO 859/124/2-Daily Express article, "Hear the call of Empire," 25 May 1948.
106 UK-LoNA-CO 859/124/2-Glasgow Herald article, "Reciprocal social insurance plan," 16 May 1947.
107 UK-LoNA-CO 859/124/2-Glasgow Herald article, "Reciprocal social insurance plan," 16 May 1947.
108 UK-LoNA CO
109 UK-LoNA-HO 344-Letter from GJ Otton to Mr Rawsthorne, "Immigrants and insurance cards," 1 December 1969.
110 John Carson, "A Matter of Policy: The Lessons of Recent British Race Relations Legislation," *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies* 8, no 2 (1976): 160.
111 Carson, 161.

citizens were not required to report to an immigration officer in the same way that foreigners were.[112] In this context of impotence and continued political pressure, in 1964 the Home Office turned to the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance for their assistance in tracing those "Commonwealth citizens who are in breach of the conditions on which they were admitted to this country."[113] The Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance balked at this request at every opportunity they had.

In August 1964, R.J. Whittick, Assistant Secretary of the Immigration and Nationality Department, reached out to an official by the name of G.T. Williams at the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance, requesting that they jointly conduct an experiment.[114] The terms of the experiment were that Whittick would provide Williams with a dozen missing individuals, and Williams would investigate whether his records provided helpful information about their whereabouts. Williams had expressed reluctance, but Whittick persistently urged, "I should be grateful if you would carry out the experiment."[115] Five days later, Williams writes back with bad news. After having attempted to trace the individuals using the names provided, he explained to Whittick, "as I feared, we have had little success."[116] This failure only boosts Williams' scepticism about the entire collaborative effort. "In the circumstances, we feel that this result merely endorses the doubts we have expressed previously and that leaving aside the question of principle the results likely to be obtained from such checks will be unproductive and disproportionately wasteful of staff time."[117]

Officials from the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance explained their rationale for dismissing the concerns of the Home Office in no uncertain terms. They outlined several practical concerns. First, if word got out that their department was checking for entry vouchers, migrants might seek work with "unscrupulous employers prepared to evade their national insurance obligations," which would result in a net loss of contributions to the system.[118] They also listed ethical considerations, as below:

> Many people would feel it morally indefensible for the Government to use for this purpose information supplied for a quite different purpose to a social service Department and since the start of social insurance... it has been policy... that information which anyone has been obliged to furnish under the working of the

112 UK-LoNA-HO 344-Brief, "Commonwealth Immigration, Evasion."
113 UK-LoNA-HO 344-Letter, from RJ Whittick (Home Office) to GT Williams Esq (Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance), 21 August 1964
114 UK-LoNA-HO 344-Letter, from RJ Whittick (Home Office) to GT Williams Esq (Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance), 21 August 1964
115 UK-LoNA-HO 344-Letter, from RJ Whittick (Home Office) to GT Williams Esq (Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance), 21 August 1964
116 UK-LoNA-HO 344-Letter, from GT Williams Esq (Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance) to RJ Whittick (Home Office), 22 December 1964.;
117 UK-LoNA-HO 344-Letter, from GT Williams Esq (Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance) to RJ Whittick (Home Office), 26 August 1964.
118 UK-LoNA-HO 344-Letter, from Miss GM Jones (Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance) to RJ Whittick (Home Office), 22 December 1964.

> compulsory scheme of insurance should not be made available for use, possibly to his detriment, in other connections.[119]

Finally, they stressed the potential impact of cooperation on the ability of the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance (MPNI) to carry out its own legal duties, given that a contribution card must be issued regardless of whether someone has an entry voucher or not. The successor of the Ministry of Labour, known as the Department of Employment, echoed this sentiment. Expressing "some objections of principle," they stated that they were "concerned to assist employers to fill vacancies and to help people find jobs." In any case, "if a man is here unlawfully, it is better to have him working than to have him living off supplementary benefit."[120] Additionally, officials stressed that communications between themselves and their 'clients' were confidential, and that it would "impair" their relationship with their clients if they found out that their information was being used for other purposes.[121]

Later, Conservative MP Geoffrey Lloyd asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Pensions, Norman Pentland, about whether it would be possible to require the presentation of this entry voucher. Pentland responded that "it would not be right for me as a matter of National Insurance administration to require a person properly admitted to this country to produce these documents as a condition for issuing him with a contribution card."[122] Later that year, Pentland was asked what precautions are taken to ensure that an applicant for National Insurance has a right to work in this country, to which Pentland responded, again in no uncertain terms, "none. The right or obligation of a person in this country to have a National Insurance card does not in general depend on whether he is working."[123]

The Home Office did not take no for an answer. In 1968, it resumed the discussion, pushing back against the practical arguments given by MNPI. The Home Office was under constant pressure to improve their monitoring capacity.[124] In particular, they faced criticism from the Monday Club - a political pressure group formed in 1961 by right-wing members of the Conservative Party.[125] The Home Office again approached the Ministry of Social Security, as the MNPI was known from 1966 after it merged with part of the National Assistance Board, arguing that, in any case, a person from overseas applying for a contribution card will have to authenticate his date of birth with his passport as a form of ID. In that case, Home Office officials deliberated, "it would be the work of a moment to refer to the back pages to check on what basis the applicant has been admitted to the country."[126] Even if a "systematic check of all

119 UK-LoNA-HO 344-Letter, from Miss GM Jones (Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance) to RJ Whittick (Home Office), 22 December 1964.
120 UK-LoNA-HO 344, Expiring Law Continuance Bill, Evasion - the position of the Department of Employment and Productivity and the Department of Health and Social Services.
121 UK-LoNA-HO 344, Letter, from GJ Otton to Mr Rawsthorne, "Immigrants and Insurance cards," 1 December 1969.
122 UK-LoNA-HO 344-Hansard, House of Commons, 22 March 1965.
123 UK-LoNA-HO 344-Hansard, 15 November 1965.
124 UK-LoNA-HO 344-Letter from the Home Office to Mr IG Gilbert, "Commonwealth Immigrants and Social Security Records," 31 March 1970.
125 UK-LoNA-HO 344-Letter from RVD Shuffrey to Mr Rawsthorne, 23 November 1970.
126 UK-LoNA-HO 344-Notes, "regarding Mr Gilbert from the Ministry of Social Security," 21 February 1968.

applications" was not possible, the officials continued, "if we could get the Ministry to inform us in a limited number of cases," it would be worth their efforts.[127]

By the time the new Commonwealth Immigrants Act entered into force, the Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS), as the new social security agency was known, had softened its stance. It agreed to assist the police if it came to their attention that their clients were evading immigration control, on the condition that this information be given verbally rather than in written form, and that their cooperation be kept confidential.[128] The DHSS did not wish for these arrangements to be publicised because "disclosure would be likely to reduce their effectiveness."[129] As one official summarised, the arguments of social security agencies were "wearing pretty thin by now."[130] Despite the relaxation of its stance vis-à-vis the police, it continued to mount resistance to the Home Office.

> I am sure you will appreciate that this Department's primary responsibility is to ensure that every person in employment has a national insurance contribution card, so that the provisions of the National Insurance Acts may be complied with and the contributions properly due may be paid. There can be no question of a work permit having to be produced - even if we know one should be held - before a card is issued. A card has to be issued almost immediately so that national insurance contributions may be paid and we do not of course normally know whether the person applying for the card is an illegal immigrant or not, and there is not the time nor have we staff sufficiently experienced in such work to be able to check a person's origins adequately even if we had the staff-time to do it. Furthermore, as you know, this Department is *primarily a welfare department* and it would be inconsistent with this function for it to take over immigration control duties, which are the province of the Home Office.[131]

A further concern, if the choice was to shirk the systematic application of the Home Office's request in favour of occasional checks, was the ways in which it would be decided which applications to subject to closer scrutiny. By 1970 it was obvious that the approach taken would be to revert to racial stereotypes: "by far the most stumbling block and the most difficult to resolve" was to invent a way to identify immigrants who lack an entitlement to work "which does not boil down to a check based on the colour of the applicant's skin."[132] The fact that the execution of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act would require racialised decisions at the street-level is not surprising given that the intent behind the policy was racialised.

127 UK-LoNA-HO 344-Notes, "regarding Mr Gilbert from the Ministry of Social Security," 21 February 1968.
128 UK-LoNA-HO 344-Draft instructions, DHSS, 29 October 1969.
129 UK-LoNA-HO 344-Brief no 3, "Immigrants and insurance cards."
130 UK-LoNA-HO 344-Notes, "regarding Mr Gilbert from the Ministry of Social Security," 21 February 1968.
131 UK-LoNA-HO 344-Letter from David Ennals to Frank Tomboy Esq MP, 21 April 1970.
132 UK-LoNA-HO 344, Brief no 3, "Immigrants and insurance cards."

8.4. Analysis

Unlike its French and Dutch counterparts, the UK welfare state did not splinter to accommodate (post)colonial migrants. Its universalist foundations left no room for varying gradients of inclusion. Baldwin argues that, in Britain and Scandinavia, universalism was the "quintessential characteristic of victorious wartime reform."[133] He shows how it helped to get post-war reform off the ground, because under Beveridge's plan, middle and lower classes made the exact same contributions for entitlement to the exact same levels of benefit. This unwillingness to ask the middle classes to subsidise the poor made it "pro-bourgeois"[134] and therefore was a central part of its appeal. The non-negotiable character of the *universal* aspect of British welfare is on display when Keynes, one of the most influential economists of the century, proposed abandoning universality in a 1942 policy paper, and Beveridge resolutely "resisted any budging on the principle."[135]

Therefore, from its inception, National Assistance was available for anyone who made it to UK soil, including Caribbean migrants. Its inclusive character is somewhat surprising for a non-contributory welfare scheme, since it cannot be explained with reciprocal or actuarial logic, and it stands in contrast to its immediate non-contributory predecessors (the 1908 Old Age Pensions Act, 1945 Family Allowances Act) as well as to its Dutch counterpart, the 1965 General Assistance Act. Instead it is probably best understood as the product of a specific historical moment in which maintaining imperial integrity was an important aim, just like in France. The same year as the National Assistance Act, the British Nationality Act was passed in frantic response to fears of Commonwealth dissolution, two years after Canada had moved to create a separate citizenship and a year after Indian and Pakistani independence had highlighted the vulnerability of British empire. The architects of National Assistance added similar meaning and structure to membership in the British imperial nation. After all, Beveridge himself had specific sympathies with white settlers, having been born in colonial India to white parents, and openly admitted that he saw welfare not only as a means of boosting morale and loyalty during trying times, but of securing the "British race."

That said, by spotlighting correspondence between Regional Offices of the National Assistance Board and its headquarters, I have presented evidence that formal entitlement did not necessary translate into substantive rights for Caribbeans. The discretionary tools built into National Assistance (as compared to National Insurance) made this possible. Lieberman has shown that in 1930s America, Southern Democrats only accepted the formal entitlements of Black Americans if the federal government foreswore operational control over street-level decisions about whom to grant assistance and how much. The ensuing racial discrimination in the programme's administration was "beyond question."[136] Beveridge, who toured extensively across the US after the publication of his report,[137] may have avoided a selective public assistance programme by building in substantial discretionary powers of the National Assistance Board.

133 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*, 52.
134 Baldwin, 112.
135 Harris, *William Beveridge: A Biography*, 402.
136 Lieberman, *Shifting the Color Line*, 119.
137 Harris, *William Beveridge: A Biography*.

The inclination of local-level officials in London and Birmingham to deny equal benefit levels to Caribbeans suggests that, at least in some regions, this discretion among UK street-level bureaucrats was similarly accompanied by racial discrimination.

Ideological contestation over the deservingness of Caribbean migrants abounded during this time period. Although these discussions did not influence the formal social rights they earned in 1946 and 1948, they did fuel the withdrawal of their entry rights in 1962. The silhouettes of two different ideological positions appear quite markedly. The debate over deservingness was highly racialised, as both parties attributed specific traits to a population that they designated as unified in some meaningful way, and revolved around work ethic. The first position portrayed "coloured immigrants" as undeserving antagonists, whose idleness threatened the fiscal base of the post-war British welfare state. In the early 1950s, two interministerial committees, commissioned first by a Labour and then by a Conservative government, concluded that the welfare rights of this group constituted a problem, despite both receiving only contrary evidence or vague, unfounded impressions from the experts they consulted. By the late 1950s, both Conservative and Labour MPs had caught on and were expressing similar anxieties, claiming to act on behalf of their constituents. Most could make particularly incendiary speeches because of a rhetorical trick of collapsing the distinction between poverty and criminality – a British tradition that dates to 1834 poor law reforms. Opponents of welfare rights for Caribbean and other migrants of colour also built on medieval laws of settlement and removal when they called for the deportation of British subjects who threatened to be a liability for public funds.

The second ideological position, best exemplified in Hutchinson's lengthy statement, portrayed "Jamaicans" as deserving recipients who are "very ready to work"[138] and contribute to the British economy, as set against a minority of undeserving "welfare scroungers" of all races that the Board was ready to persecute.[139] In fact, throughout this entire time period, the National Assistance Board emerged as a staunch defender of the social rights of migrants of colour, expanding its role beyond its administrative mandate. Each position views the same material facts differently. For example, from the former position, the fact of "poor and dirty" living conditions is interpreted as flowing from "choice rather than necessity" and used to propagate an image of the Caribbean migrant as culturally unsuited to British life.[140] Similarly, unemployment was read by one camp as the result of a "workshy" workforce, feeding into a doctrine of racialised personality traits, and by the other as stemming from labour market discrimination.[141]

When it came to National Insurance, the implementing agency again stood up for its citizen-clients, albeit in a different way. In this case, the Ministry of Pensions and National

138 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878, Letter from Thompson to Hutchinson, Chair of National Assistance Board, 3 August 1960.

139 For more on the 'welfare scrounger', see S Hall [1978] 2021: 64).

140 UK-LoNA-CO 1028/22-"Information obtained from the police about coloured communities in the United Kingdom," Home Office, 11 July 1953.

141 The Ministry of Labour attributes, for example, unemployment at least in part to the "reluctance of some employers … to take them on" in UK-LoNA-CO1028/22-Draft report, "Working Party on Coloured People Seeking Employment in the United Kingdom," 28 October 1953, p 9

Insurance (and its successors by different names) warded off requests by the Home Office and by the police to hand over data to identify Commonwealth and colonial migrants who had overstayed their visa. These requests were intended to meet the requirements of the new 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, which was initially highly ineffective in achieving its aims of immigration restriction. Throughout the 1960s, the Ministries responsible for administering National Insurance adamantly protested the use of their databases for the purposes of controlling immigration. Officials supported their argument with both moral and pragmatic appeals, that occasionally merged into one argument foregrounding a specific institutional mandate. The Department of Employment clarified that its main role was to "assist employers to fill vacancies."[142] It continued to mount resistance, but the arguments of the Home Office ultimately won out. By 1970, they had acquiesced and agreed to confidential cooperation with the police.

Material facts are usually necessary, but not sufficient, for an ideology to win out over another. This helps explain why members of the 1953 Working Party could meaningfully agree (and record in their meeting minutes without it attracting enough attention to be revised), that the rate of unemployment "must *on any calculation* be remarkably high"[143] after having just concluded that such a calculation was impossible. The problem of the idle "coloured immigrant" had already been established – the unemployment rate was "too high" before it could even be calculated. Notably, migrants had access both to non-contributory benefits under National Assistance and to contributory insurance under National Insurance. However, only their recourse to the former attracted public scrutiny, lending credence to the idea that deservingness is a more salient feature of debates regarding access to non-contributory benefits compared to contributory benefits.

142 UK-LoNA-HO 344, Expiring Law Continuance Bill, Evasion - the position of the Department of Employment and Productivity and the Department of Health and Social Services.

143 UK-LoNA-CO 1028/22-Meeting minutes, 12 November 1953.

9. Conclusion

9.1. Social security as cultural security

The prospect of telling welfare state scholarship the story of (post)colonial migrants was inviting. Contemporary observers acknowledged the heterogeneity they introduced,[1] but the time period in which they arrived is widely considered the Golden Age of welfare expansion.[2] This is difficult to explain with existing theory which argues that diversity undermines solidarity.[3] Equally, the literature attesting to the importance of boundaries for distributive communities is vast. Decolonisation was a protracted and political process in which Europe was forced to refashion its boundaries. If there was ever a time to suspect a bonding-through-bounding dynamic,[4] the arrival of (post)colonial migrants should have been it. Given the extensive racial exclusions documented by US-based welfare state scholars,[5] I expected the post-war 'sphere of justice'[6] to be constituted by the exclusion of racial others from the colonies, which would create the homogeneous conditions for solidarity to flourish.

Contrary to my expectations, the post-war welfare states of the Netherlands, France and the UK did not respond to (post)colonial migration from present-day Indonesia, Algeria, or the Caribbean by sealing off access to the distributive community. In part, this is because law and practice in the domains of citizenship and immigration were far more involved in drawing external boundaries than was social policy. It is also because there were no fixed, pre-existing categories of "racial others" to exclude. Among the heterogeneous millions arriving from these territories of origin, it was by no means obvious to contemporaries who belonged as cultural insiders. In all three cases, there were race-laden exclusions, usually accomplished through informal barriers rather than through legislative means. In the Netherlands and the UK, these exclusions were concentrated in the parts of the welfare state that disseminated noncontributory as opposed to contributory benefits, suggesting that these were subject to more rigorous efforts at boundary-making.

However, in general, inclusion on unequal terms was far more important than exclusion writ large. This was especially the case in Dutch and French welfare states, which fragmented to accommodate (post)colonial newcomers through hyper-assimilation (extending relatively generous, dignified provisions), paternalism (extending generous but disciplinary provisions), and ghettoisation (extending meagre, disciplinary provisions). In fact French and Dutch cases display striking commonality despite previously acknowledged institutional and programmatic differences (see 3.2.3). Meanwhile, the universalistic nature of the UK welfare state focused the debate on implementation and eventually on external boundary-making through immigration law.

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1 Smith, "Introduction," 11.
2 Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*, 77.
3 Kymlicka and Banting, *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State*, 9.
4 Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*.
5 Lieberman, *Shifting the Color Line*; Fox, *Three Worlds of Relief*.
6 Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality*.

These patterns can be explained as efforts by welfare state agents to secure the social and cultural premises of the nation at a time of profound challenge to its integrity. After suffering severe losses of life and legitimacy in the Second World War, former colonial powers needed to articulate what membership in their community entailed, not only in terms of the rights it conferred (as T.H. Marshall had highlighted), but also the people it unified. Colonial legal codes could only take them so far before they needed to find a new source of fuel, not least as colonies began to wrest free from imperial arrangements. If in the late 19th and early 20th century, liberal and individualist ideologies had "limited what ... political instincts expected of the state,"[7] collectivist ideologies of the immediate post-war period had enlarged these expectations, and welfare states bore considerable responsibility for meeting them. My findings show that the welfare state was implicated in providing for not only citizens' material needs, but also less material aspects of nation-building, like structuring social space, subduing dissent, and dispelling cultural threats. The way that it discharged its duties differed somewhat across institutional contexts, while its effects on the form of welfare offered to (post)colonial migrants depended on available modes of classifying the population, the identities that they came to assume along these dimensions, and the outcomes of ideological contestation.

Race mattered here, in the sense that the patterns of inclusion produced were racialised. However, as I hope to have made clear, to locate the *cause* of inclusion in a beneficiary's *race* is misguided since race is not an individual-level attribute but a doctrine that shifts shape across time and space, giving rise to identities that emerge in relation to one another.[8] As such, the racial identity of a person cannot exercise independent influence on their inclusion. Instead, I show in the following sections how various constructions - of deservingness, power, and assimilability - relied on the blueprints of racial ideologies inherited from colonial rule in all three cases. Thus if the welfare state's efforts at supporting nation-building meant different things for different people, it was not *because of race*, but rather because racecraft supplied a "way of economising"[9] in the face of the multifaceted and complex challenge that boundary-making presented, as well as a moral justification for the stratified society to which boundary-making gave rise that could keep intact the image of the nation as a "community of value."[10] Moreover, the precise result of translating centuries-old racial ideology into a post-war context was not possible to deduce from theoretical priors or material conditions, in the same way that the location of redistributive boundaries was not inevitable.

Finally, the encounter between (post)colonial migrants and post-war welfare states offered an opportunity for the nation to redefine itself in moral terms. Persistent references to the *patria,* after the Latin word for fatherland, provide clues. In France and The Netherlands, *repatriate* and its translations served as the single most important determinant of inclusion, since targeted assistance schemes were conditional on formal repatriate status. Discursive gatekeeping of repatriate status supplemented legal criteria, with De Gaulle commenting that

7 Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*, 102.
8 Fields and Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*, 177.
9 Hall, *The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations*, 100.
10 Anderson, *Us and Them?*

"the term 'repatriates' obviously does not apply to the Muslims,"[11] and Minister van Thiel of Social Work suggesting that Moluccans "repatriate" to Asia.[12] In the UK, where there were no targeted schemes, it is noteworthy that the first efforts at bounding the distributive community through immigration law rewarded only *patrials* - those British subjects born, adopted or naturalised in Britain, or whose parents or grandparents were born, adopted, or naturalised in Britain - with freedom of entry. Importantly, the language of the fatherland camouflaged and buttressed racial ideology. As many before me have argued, the function of patriality in British immigration law was to exclude non-white citizens without overt racial language.[13] So it was in The Netherlands and France: the repatriate was intended for white bodies, but contained no references to race. The net effect of this discursive move was to imbue the nation both with parental authority, the conditional love of the father figure, and the nurturing qualities of home for a select subset of people. This had lasting consequences. Schneider and Ingram argue that the way that policy constructs target populations influence how they view themselves and, specifically, their orientation toward government.[14] If so, then targeted policy for *repatriates* ought to thicken the ties between the migrant and the fatherland. Put differently, when High Commissioner Lamping adjudicated belonging based on who would "feel at home" in the Netherlands,[15] he made some people more likely than others to feel at home. When Van Thiel suggested deporting Moluccans on the grounds that the Netherlands was "to them foreign and unknown,"[16] he exacerbated the foreignness of the Netherlands to that group. Hence why a bachagha could say, "how can you feel like a *repatriate* when the *patria* that welcomes you treats you like a foreigner?"[17]

My account contrasts with the explanations given by public officials who consistently framed welfare choices as a technical response to need. The 1965 report by the French Ministry of Interior on repatriate assistance furnishes plenty of examples, its authors declaring that "the Government and Parliament *had no choice*. It was *necessary* to welcome, house, reclassify, protect, in order to then be able to integrate. It was therefore *necessary* to build a vast legal and financial system particularly protective of all repatriates…"[18] When questioned in 1960 about the excessive attention being paid to regrettants, the Dutch government had similarly invoked their need.[19] Context is key: in both of these cases, cabinet representatives were offering an ex-post justification for policy decisions after they had raised attention. To suggest that the decision was apolitical, because necessary, is a useful rhetorical device for shirking responsibility

11 cited in Eldridge, *From Empire to Exile: History and Memory within the Pied-Noir and Harki Communities, 1962-2012*, 71.
12 van Amersfoort, "The Waxing and Waning of a Diaspora: Moluccans in the Netherlands, 1950-2002," 104.
13 Gary Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies: The French and British Experience, 1945-1975* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 63; El-Enany, *Bordering Britain*; Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation*.
14 Schneider and Ingram, "Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy," 340.
15 NL-HaNA-2.20.27-24- Speech Lamping, December 1951.
16 Jones, "Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten En Nederlanders: Nederlandse Politici over Burgers Uit Oost En West En Nederland, 1945-2005," 112.
17 Jordi and Hamoumou, *Les Harkis, Une Mémoire Enfouie*, 21.
18 Emphasis added; FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 280 In this case, I am translating both the French verb *devoir* and *falloir* as versions of necessary.
19 NL-HaNa-2.27.02-1013-Minutes of Ministerial Council, 4 February 1960.

for its consequences. Meanwhile Laroque, an architect of the French social security regime, justified withholding family allowances from Algerians as the straightforward "application of the general principle of territoriality" upon which the welfare state was built.[20] This justification does not hold water, however, as in this case, the straightforward application of this principle required the neglect of another principle upon which the welfare state was built: the contributory logic according to which benefits are linked to contributions. Additionally, the principle of territoriality was not applied uniformly, as the families of Italian labour migrants in Italy were entitled to family allowance at metropolitan rates.[21]

The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. 9.2 deals with the form that redistributive boundaries took in my three country cases, while 9.3 is devoted to explaining the location of these boundaries. 9.4 provides an overview of my scholarly contributions and 9.5 discusses their societal relevance.

9.2. Boundaries of post-war welfare

9.2.1. Instruments of external boundaries

Social legislation is not the only site at which redistributive boundary-making takes place. Instead, the external boundaries of distributive communities are jointly worked out in the space, overlap and friction between different policy domains, on the one hand, and between policy and implementation, on the other. In my research, citizenship, immigration, and social policy appeared as three distinct levers, all of which affected inclusion or exclusion in the distributive community. Political circumstances and sociolegal constraints specific to a given time period and context shaped which lever was more attractive for a policy-maker interested in restricting or expanding access to welfare. Informal and extra-legal efforts complemented their choice. In the post-war period, citizenship rights were particularly central as declining colonial powers were forced to negotiate, with newly independent nations, the reach of national citizenship.

With this in mind, while the UK displayed one way of tightening the boundaries of the sphere of justice, France and the Netherlands pursued another. British policymakers opted for an inclusive citizenship regime. After Canada moved to establish its own citizenship in 1946, the 1948 British Nationality Act was penned as a political concession to stabilise the empire and reestablish its importance in the eyes of Commonwealth countries. The Act granted Citizenship of the UK and Colonies to all residents of colonial territories. Although El-Enany may consider it "little more than a euphemism for British subjecthood,"[22] it did have legal consequences (which Hansen is quick to problematise).[23] In the early 1950s, however, recourse by Caribbean migrants to National Assistance came under scrutiny. Despite evidence presented by the National Assistance Board and the Ministry of Labour that the use of these individuals

20 Laroque, "Préface," 1956.
21 Rager, *Les Musulmans Algériens En France et Dans Les Pays Islamiques*, 234.
22 El-Enany, *Bordering Britain*, 89.
23 Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation*.

was measured and proportionate, two different inquiries, led by Labour- and Conservative-appointed committees respectively, drew the conclusion that access to National Assistance was a welfare magnet attracting "coloured people from British Colonial territories,[24] and that this was an urgent problem.

As the public increasingly came to adopt this view and their representatives in the House of Commons amplified their voices, enthusiasm around bounding the sphere of justice more tightly grew. However, British state officials did not see withdrawing citizenship rights as a viable option. Substantially revising the nationality code several years after it had been published would be difficult to justify, and Britain was still attached to its empire and to the unified status with which it was associated. There were practical concerns as well: as Hansen shows, the type of revision for which the public was advocating would require creating a unified citizenship for the UK and Ireland since there was no interest in restricting Irish entry into the sphere of justice.[25]

In this context, British policy-makers interested in tightening the boundaries around the welfare state found immigration legislation an attractive domain in which to do so. This was true even when it meant stripping citizens of their right to enter the country of which they were a citizen: a movement in the opposite direction of the march toward social citizenship which Marshall had identified. In fact, Marshall had proclaimed that the harmonisation of rights across the British territory had "unfolded slowly and smoothly... very early in history."[26] The choice to apparently re-fold these rights is on display in the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962, and its 1968 and 1971 successors. Prior to these acts, behind closed doors, the UK government had already activated to limit immigration. For example, they sought out the cooperation of the "Asian Dominions" (newly independent India and Pakistan) and "West Indian governments" (the governors of Caribbean territories) to restrict emigration by withholding passports or making access to passports more stringent.[27] The fact that the Home Office then appealed to the departments in charge of National Insurance for their help in policing the nation's territorial boundaries by identifying (post)colonial migrants who had overstayed their visa only testifies to the interplay between immigration and welfare policy.

Dutch and French policymakers granted citizenship much more sparingly than their British counterpart. One year after the British Nationality Act created "Citizenship of the UK and the Colonies," the Dutch and Indonesians agreed to assign Dutch citizenship only to those who had been Dutch citizens rather than subjects during colonial rule. This meant that access to citizenship was distributed on racial lines, since decisions about citizenship under colonial rule had been highly racialised. Since 1892, only those recognised as European, rather than indigenous or "Foreign Oriental," had citizenship in the Netherlands Indies - several hundred thousand people out of a total population of 70 million. Moluccans who had risked their lives

24 UK-LoNA-Co 1028/22-Draft report, "Immigration of British subjects into the United Kingdom," Committee of Ministers, 24 January 1951.

25 Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation*, 104.

26 cited in Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*, 38.

27 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878-Hansard, "Immigration from the Commonwealth," 17 November 1959.

for the Dutch military during the Indonesian war of independence fell on the other side of this boundary. Instead they were assigned the nationality of Indonesia, their former enemy, and over three-quarters were stateless by the early 1970s.[28] Similarly, after the Algerian war in 1962, only about one-tenth of Algerians remained French citizens. Even though the 1947 Statute of Algeria had granted every resident of Algeria citizenship in the new French Union, citizens formerly known as "indigenous" or "Muslim" inherited a different civil status than those viewed as European, which was the basis for their exclusion from the French citizenry after Algerian independence. This meant that harkis who had devoted years fighting under the French flag were denied citizenship, but could nationalise by requesting nationality before a judge. Many harkis perceived this as humiliating,[29] which, according to existing literature on benefit take-up, is likely to have harmed the take-up of this right.[30]

If British immigration law from 1961 to 1972 can be viewed as a form of cordoning off the boundaries of the distributive community, then the conservative distribution of citizenship rights after independence by Dutch and French negotiators must equally be seen in that light. Nonetheless, both continental European governments still attempted to cordon off entry rights as well. Unlike the UK, they balked at doing this by formally decoupling the right of entry from citizenship rights - although Dutch policymakers would later consider and ultimately reject this option in the context of Suriname immigration in the late 1960s and early 1970s.[31] Instead, they informally facilitated and discouraged migration. Both French and Dutch officials offered migrants from Algeria and Indonesia, respectively, subsidies for the cost of transport to the metropole. These were called return benefits (*prestations de retour*) and Kingdom-sponsored advance payments (*rijksvoorschotten*) respectively. Transport subsidies were only made available after stringent conditions had been met, allowing them to function as instruments of boundary-making. They went hand-in-hand with informal barriers set up to dissuade harkis and "Eastern-oriented" Dutch citizens from making the journey. Confidential memos from May 1962 attributed to Louis Joxe, the Minister of Algerian Affairs under De Gaulle, forbade individual initiatives by harkis to settle in the metropole outside of military convoys, ordered prefects not to register anyone who had done so, and instructed the high commissioner in Algeria not to transport "Muslims" whose physical condition was too poor or who might "turn to prostitution."[32] Joxe perceived this parallel treatment of harkis as a means of keeping out "undesirable" migrants.[33]

Meanwhile, in The Netherlands, transport subsidies were famously been conditioned on "Westernness." Westernness was a racialised dimension that had roots in colonial law but had been formally introduced into Dutch policy circles by the jurist Philip Werner, who would in 1958 serve as chair of the public committee devoted to coordinating repatriate welfare

28 Jones, "Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten En Nederlanders: Nederlandse Politici over Burgers Uit Oost En West En Nederland, 1945-2005," 129.
29 Jordi and Hamoumou, *Les Harkis, Une Mémoire Enfouie*, 21.
30 van Oorschot, "Non-Take-up of Social Security Benefits in Europe," 20.
31 Schuster, *Poortwachters over Immigranten: Het Debat over Immigratie in Het Naoorlogse Groot-Britannië En Nederland*.
32 Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France*, 231.
33 Jordi and Hamoumou, *Les Harkis, Une Mémoire Enfouie*, 39.

(*Coördinatie-Commissie voor Gerepatrieerden*, CCG). Werner and his team had distinguished between "Western-oriented" and "Eastern-oriented" Dutch citizens, attributing to the latter a series of characteristics such as an "inherently slow pace of work."[34] The report that they published ultimately recommended that Eastern citizens remain in Indonesia, where they ostensibly would feel more "socially at home."[35] The Dutch government obliged with discouragement policy (*ontmoedigingsbeleid*), which included restricting transport subsidies of "Eastern-oriented" citizens for several years until the Minister of Social Work Marga Klompé put an end to the policy. It also included unconventional tactics, like the Dutch High Commissioner in Indonesia appealing in 1951, via radio, to the sensibilities of Dutch citizens, arguing that they ought to opt for Indonesian nationality and avoid coming to The Netherlands, a country facing, he argued, "diminishing opportunities for work and existential difficulties."[36]

9.2.2. Worlds of (post)colonial welfare

9.2.2.1. Hyper-assimilation

One way in which post-war Dutch and French welfare states interacted with (post)colonial migrants was through radical interventions to raise their standard of living. This happened through the creation of new schemes as well as through inclusion in existing programmes, even when it meant departing from key organising principles of each welfare state or going above and beyond that to which both systems had previously committed. In the Netherlands, this world of hyper-assimilation lasted from around 1946, when a "Repatriation Department" was established in the Ministry of Social Affairs, up until 1968, when the *Centraal Comité van Kerkelijk en Particulier initiatief voor de sociale zorg ten behoeve van gerepatrieerden* (CCKP) was discontinued. Regrettants were brought into this fold around 1960 after substantial lobbying efforts. In France, the dynamic emerged later and lasted shorter, stretching from the introduction of Boulin's law at the end of 1961 up until around 1966, when the decree reserving social housing for repatriates expired.

In June 1961, as migration from Algeria to the French metropole picked up and negotiations with Algerian nationalists faltered, De Gaulle created a State Secretary for Repatriates, to be filled by Robert Boulin. One of Boulin's first moves was to present a bill organising assistance for the pieds-noirs. The law of 26 December "relating to the reception and resettlement of French people from overseas" contained three pillars of material assistance. Reception benefits compensated for the cost of transport, as mentioned, but also included departure allowances, which for heads of household amounted to almost two times as much as the minimum monthly wage for a Parisian full-time worker (500 fr compared to 290 fr) and monthly subsistence allowances, which sat at just over said wage for a jobseeker.[37] The second pillar involved an expedited procedure for accessing municipal assistance, and the final pillar

34 Schuster, *Poortwachters over Immigranten: Het Debat over Immigratie in Het Naoorlogse Groot-Britannië En Nederland*, 101.
35 Schuster, 99.
36 NL-HaNA-2.20.27-24- Speech Lamping, December 1951.
37 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 25.

included housing subsidies. In 1962, the government ordered by decree that 10 per cent (and later 30 per cent) of social housing be reserved for repatriates up until December 31, 1966.[38] In effect, repatriates from Algeria would receive public assistance at a time and in a welfare system where central government had delegated this responsibility to occupation-based social security, municipalities and private charities.

Repatriates in The Netherlands would be able to make recourse to assistance under a similar regime of targeted care. In the Dutch case, private actors were particularly well-organised. The CCKP, a network whose primary source of funding came from government subsidies and which included religious and non-governmental organisations, headed up a well-oiled machine of private assistance. Public assistance also took the form of cash transfers however, the conditions of which were stipulated in national group schemes. Such schemes were not entirely unique in the Dutch context, but the extent of adjustments made for repatriates was extraordinary. Inclusion under the scheme for war victims was considered insufficient given the specific difficulties that coming from the "tropics" introduced.[39] A new scheme was drawn up to accommodate their circumstances, and regularly updated. It granted the right to an allowance similar to that which repatriates in France could expect, except that it was technically a loan. Additionally, central government would subsidise municipalities for extending poor relief to those who were ineligible for this scheme.[40] Like the French state, the Dutch state also provided in-kind benefits like temporary housing, with around 5 per cent of houses built for the 1962 Woningwet reserved for repatriates.[41]

The type of welfare to which repatriates had access scored high on the Somers dimension. In The Netherlands, attending to the psychological needs of claimants was paramount and an explicit aim of schemes in their name. The government and the CCKP agreed that the latter would be responsible for assuring the "spiritual care" of repatriates, a task it mostly delegated to the churches in its organisation,[42] but official documents confirm its interest in looking after the "*mental* and physical well-being of the repatriates."[43] Furthermore, when the CCKP argued against housing Moluccans in collective repatriate centres, it did so by invoking the "far-reaching psychological consequences" that the presence of Moluccans would have on the repatriates.[44] They thus privileged repatriates' psychological comfort over the material needs of Moluccans. Equally, the stated aim of the national group schemes was to facilitate integration as quickly as possible,[45] and the fact that the CCKP contacted employers to sensitise them to the benefits of this new labour force is indicative of their commitment to this goal.[46]

38 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 41.
39 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-Nota, MINUOR, 8 November 1950.
40 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-1008-"Rijksgroepregeling Gerepatrieerden," 20 January 1961.
41 Ellemers and Vaillant, *Indische Nederlanders En Gerepatrieerden*, 47; Laarman, *Oude Onbekenden: Het Politieke En Publieke Debat over Postkoloniale Migranten, 1945-2005*.
42 NL-StRo-1402-614-"Leidraad," August 1950, p 6.
43 NL-StRo-1402-614-"Leidraad," August 1950, p 6.
44 NL-UtA-1405-11-Letter to Hoofd Bijzondere Maatschappelijke Zorg, Ministerie van Maatschappelijk Werk, 29 January 1953.
45 HaNA-2.27.02-Nota, MINUOR, 8 November 1950.
46 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-1037-Brochure 'Voor Het Eerst Naar Nederland.'"

French national and local officials also responded to the psychological needs of repatriates and pushed toward their social integration. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the requests by former officials of social security institutions to be relocated to a new job after having already received one. The departmental archives of Bouches-du-Rhône, the department where Marseille is located, contains a folder of these requests. Many of the repatriates' requests make appeals - successfully - to their psychological, mental or social needs. Someone who had received a job at the Family Allowances Fund in Aveyron requested a transfer on the grounds that "my wife is often sick, physically and morally, since she arrived in Aveyron" on account of its climate.[47] He confirmed receipt of monthly subsistence allowance. The sensitivity of local-level officials to concerns like these is striking. The regional director of social security in Bouches-du-Rhône had previously responded to a similar request by that same individual by stating that he would personally keep an ear on the ground on this person's behalf: "I plan to be in Nice very soon and if I collect any information that might interest you I will not hesitate to let you know immediately."[48]

Besides targeted social assistance schemes, the world of hyper-assimilation also featured the relaxation of criteria for accessing general social security. The French welfare state effectively dismantled any barriers that pieds-noirs might face in accessing social security. These efforts trace their roots back to 1953, when coordination mechanisms linked French and Algerian social security regimes, but picked up dramatically after the ordinance of February 14, 1962 removed all administrative burdens associated with accessing social security. The only proof they needed was a temporary social security card that would be provided to them as soon as they registered at a prefecture, and would be traded for a regular card corresponding with their profession after one year.[49] In the Netherlands, the Royal Decree instituted in 1956 to equalise residence in the Netherlands Indies and present-day Indonesia as part of residence in the Dutch kingdom speaks to a parallel effort, as do the subsequent modifications to this decree in 1961 to include specific groups of non-citizens. The private sector also removed informal barriers to take-up as the CCKP hosted information evenings to make sure that repatriates were made aware of their rights.

The importance of French officials removing administrative barriers to accessing general social security cannot be overstated. Existing literature has repeatedly highlighted that the French welfare regime is characterised by the fragmentation of its social insurance schemes on occupational lines; in other words, on employment being the gateway to inclusion, for better or for worse.[50] As mentioned, this was a concession made to reluctant middle classes in order to bring them on board with the idea of a nation-wide social security system. But assistance to repatriates evidently bucked this trend, as their entitlement was contingent not on employment but on repatriate status alone. The loosened eligibility criteria, decoupling from occupational status, and streamlined administrative procedure of the temporary special regime

47 FR-MaAD-172 W 2-Letter, 18 September 1964.
48 FR-MaAD-172 W 2-Letter, 12 September 1963.
49 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 76.
50 Manow and Palier, "A Conservative Welfare State Regime without Christian Democracy?"; Palier, "Les Transformations Du Modèle Social Français Hérité de l'après-Guerre."

for repatriates starts to resemble very closely Laroque's vision of an integrated, rationalised, and more solidaristic system – a vision which he never succeeded in fully implementing due to push-back from the private sector and mutual aid societies.

In both countries, access to this world was tightly constrained by access to repatriate status, which in turn was imbued with racial and cultural meaning. Repatriate status was conditioned in both countries by citizenship. As I described earlier, this was a racialised inheritance and largely excluded those that the colonial state had deemed 'indigenous,' 'Oriental,' or 'Muslim.' Repatriates were also meant to be *refugees*, although it was never named in so many words. Dutch candidates for repatriate status would need to have arrived from Indonesia after 27 December 1949, the date of the formal sovereignty transfer, and done so because of political circumstances. To qualify as a repatriate in France, an individual similarly needed to prove that they had left due to "political events" in a territory that had just become independent from France.[51] The cross-case similarities may have been due to policy diffusion, as there is evidence that French observers took note of how the Dutch received repatriates, devoting an entire chapter to the Dutch experience in a policy memo focused on the future of overseas French citizens.[52] Either way, the combined criteria ensured that this world was designed for white migrants fleeing persecution, and was relatively well-guarded. In France, an additional protective layer was supplied by the discretion awarded to administrators, who retained the right to refuse to grant an allowance or to grant only part of the package of benefits specified in the law.[53]

9.2.2.2. Paternalism

A separate form of welfare operated either prior to or in parallel to the repatriate's world of hyper-assimilation in France and the Netherlands respectively. This was a world characterised by statutory inclusion, and scoring relatively high on the Marshall dimension barring the potential for discrimination. However, it was also characterised by welfare that was much less concerned with the dignity and psychological well-being of its recipients and comparatively more concerned with instilling cultural conformity and discipline. I argue that it characterises the welfare encountered by Algerian labour migrants from 1946, when free movement between Algeria and the metropole was restored, until 1962, when most Algerians lost French citizenship, and of Indische Nederlanders who were designated as "Eastern" from 1951, when the Werner report was published and as migration from the new Indonesian republic started to include fewer totoks, up until 1963, the last evidence I found of the Western-Eastern distinction being used.

Formally, both groups had full citizenship rights during the time in question: all Algerians were French citizens between 1947 until Algerian independence in 1962, while Indische Nederlanders retained Dutch citizenship at Indonesian independence in 1949. Both groups were formally entitled to social assistance, at least to the extent that all other residents were:

51 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 14.
52 Jean Vacher-Desvernais, *L'Avenir Des Français d'Outre-Mer* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962).
53 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857- Speech for the Commission de la Population du Conseil de l'Europe, M Christian Mellac, 5 October 1964.

in practice, in both countries, assistance was granted at the discretion of municipal services in at this time. They were also formally entitled to benefits under the 1956 General Old Age Act (AOW) of The Netherlands and the general social security regime of France established in 1945. The original draft of the AOW did contain some criteria for eligibility under the transitional rules (as laid out in Articles 43 and 46) that might have been hard for Indische Nederlanders to meet. Specifically, it required that claimants have built up six years of residence in the Dutch kingdom. In 1956, Indonesia had been independent for seven years, and many Indische Nederlanders had only just started to make their way to the metropole, especially because the peak of retaliation under Sukarno was yet to come (5 December 1957). This meant that many would not have built up enough years of residence. However, shortly after the bill was passed, a Royal Decree stipulated that living in former Netherlands Indies and Indonesia would be equalised with "living in the Kingdom" for the purposes of the law.[54]

The inclusion of both groups was also marred by "special" treatment in at least two respects. First, in France, there is evidence of discrimination in law and practice. Second, social workers and institutions were heavily involved in promoting cultural assimilation, in ways that infringed on the privacy and autonomy of the recipients. The French case supplies the most obvious example of discrimination, which took place in the realm of family allowances. After becoming full and equal citizens of the French Republic in 1947, Algerian labour migrants were entitled to allowances for their families but, if these families lived in Algeria, only at the rates stipulated by local Algerian legislation rather than metropolitan law. This was true even though their salary deductions were set at metropolitan levels, meaning that they contributed just as much as their metropolitan colleagues to the family allowance funds, but got much less back. This discrepancy led to the accumulation of surplus by metropolitan family allowance funds, which did not escape the attention of increasingly disgruntled Algerian workers.[55] No comparably high-profile instance of discrimination occurred in the Dutch case, but there is some evidence that families were punished financially or in material terms for displaying "Eastern" characteristics. I can only cautiously repeat the claims of Pro Patria, an interest group representing Indische Nederlanders, that argued in 1954 that families labelled "Eastern" were receiving two times less financial assistance than those labelled "Western."[56]

This is linked to the second aspect of special treatment I mentioned above: the considerable involvement of social workers in the lives of individuals and their families. To be clear, Dutch social workers inserted themselves into the private lives of *all* (post)colonial migrants, including those designated "Western." The recruitment of social workers was a central instrument through which the CCKP pursued its aims, and, as the 1963 survey sent by the Diaconal Committee for repatriate care in Breda indicated, social workers were expected to collect knowledge about various facets of intimate life, including the relationship between husband and wife, the extent to which the household was cleaned, and how the children were raised. Notably the data in which the committee is interested has everything to do with

54 NL-HaNA-2.20.27-24-SIWO no 57, "De AOW ook voor 'spijtoptanten,'" November 1960.
55 Rager, *Les Musulmans Algériens En France et Dans Les Pays Islamiques*, 235.
56 Schuster, *Poortwachters over Immigranten: Het Debat over Immigratie in Het Naoorlogse Groot-Britannië En Nederland*, 108.

measuring the degree of cultural conformity and very little to do with the beneficiary's own sense of well-being, perceived social position or happiness.[57] In this sense, all repatriates in the Netherlands had at least familiarity with a form of welfare in which psychological wellbeing was less important than whether a child was reared in conformity with local cultural standards. That said, feminist scholarship has long pointed out that the same measure or policy can have drastically different effects on "differently situated" individuals in a society.[58] In this sense, the scrutiny to which *all* repatriates in the Netherlands were subject will not have had an equal impact across the board. Here, I posit that Indische Nederlanders whom social workers designated as "Eastern" would have experienced this scrutiny with greater vigour, given the tenets of discouragement policy in place.

In the French case, meanwhile, the involvement of social workers came of age specifically for Algerian labour migrants, as Lyons argues in describing the "Algerian services network."[59] Many of the organisations in this network shared a social Catholic orientation with their Dutch counterparts. For example, the North African Family Social Service (SSFNA), one of the more prominent organisations receiving government subsidies for their work with Algerian labour migrants, was cut from this cloth. It shared many of the concerns that its Dutch brethren had, with the SSFNA hosting cleaning courses for women. These efforts arguably took on new heights in 1958, when the French government responded to protests at family allowance discrimination by establishing the "Social Assistance Fund For Muslim Workers and their Families" (*Fonds d'action sociale pour les travailleurs musulmans et leurs familles,* FAS).[60] Importantly, the Fund filled the gap in benefits and contributions that had emerged not with cash transfers, but with in-kind interventions by subsidising private organisations that offered cleaning courses to Algerian women alongside "centres of observation" for young "Muslims" who were having trouble "adapting to metropolitan life."[61] This was not novel: the Fund was part of a longer heritage of French social security funds treating Algerians differently: the peculiar involvement of the CNSS in providing housing for "Muslim" workers testifies.

Compared to receiving a cash allowance to which one has earned entitlement by financial contributions, social interventions in the family are far less inclined to protect the autonomy and self-determination of their beneficiaries. Any engagement with the way in which a family raises their child or cleans their house infringes on the capacity for "competence, control and achievement"[62] in the most intimate domains of human life. It is precisely the ability to fulfil care duties, which Chan and Bowpitt recognised as an important measure

57 NL-UtA-1405-392-Diocesane Commissie voor gerepatrieerdenzorg, "Onderzoek aanpassingsmoeilijkheden Gerepatrieerden," November 1963.

58 Ann Phillips, "Defending Equality of Outcome," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 12, no 1 (2004): 15.

59 Lyons, "Social Welfare, French Muslims and Decolonization in France," 79.

60 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Note, "Le Fonds d'Action Sociale pour les migrants algériens en France et pour leurs familles," 13 February 1963 See also: FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Note, "L'action sociale en faveur des travailleurs algériens en métropole," 1959, p 4.

61 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Note from Minister of Public Health and Population, "Sur l'Action Sociale du Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population susceptible de recevoir un financement complémentaire du Fonds d'action Sociale," 31 December 1959.

62 Granerud and Severinsson in Chan and Bowpitt, *Human Dignity and Welfare Systems*, 22.

of dignity,[63] that is at stake when a welfare state chooses to send a migrant's children to a youth centre run by a national social security fund rather than supplying their parents with an allowance. Additionally, although this world of welfare did contribute to human learning and development, the courses subsidised were devoted to activities that occupied the lowest rungs of the income ladder, like cleaning and manual labour. In this way, this particular world of social work and control promoted cultural assimilation but not socioeconomic mobility.

9.2.2.3. Ghettoisation

The final set of practices that my research lays bare are dynamics of ghettoisation. Welfare associated with ghettoisation scores low on both Marshall and Somers dimensions. There is either formal or substantive exclusion from mainstream welfare programs as individuals are redirected toward programmes characterised by surveillance, isolation and control. The physical needs of beneficiaries are met variably but their psychological needs are given little attention, there are few opportunities for learning and development that could promote social mobility, and self-determination and participation are limited. I argue that this was the form of welfare that Moluccans encountered when they arrived in the Netherlands in 1951, lasting until around 1970, when most camps were discontinued, and that a similar system welcomed harkis when they arrived in metropolitan France some ten years after Moluccans had made the trek, from July 1962 when SFIM was created until 1976 when Saint-Maurice l'Ardoise closed its doors.

Lacking Dutch citizenship, Moluccans were not eligible for the national group schemes designed for repatriates. On this basis they were also ineligible to access pensions under the transitional rules of the 1956 General Old Age Act (AOW) when it entered into force, and would fall outside the remit of the 1965 General Assistance Act. Their exclusion was ultimately reversed with a modification to a Royal Decree stipulating exceptional conditions under which a pension could be accessed under the transitional rules. In 1968 the Minister of Justice would admit that they were not the intended targets of this policy reform, but a byproduct of the Dutch government wishing to grant concessions to regrettants.[64] Additionally, the modification came in 1961, ten years after most Moluccans arrived and five years after the AOW came into force. Since the transitional rules are intended for those who are already too old to build up a sufficient contribution record, these years counted. As for the network of private assistance to which repatriates had access, the CCKP explicitly refused bringing the Moluccan community into the remit of the organisation.[65]

The exclusion of harkis from welfare provisions was substantive rather than formal. Though assigned Algerian citizenship, they could become French citizens and thereby qualify under the Law of 26 December if they declared their allegiance to France. Some accessed welfare under the Law's provisions in this way.[66] However, as we know from the literature on take-up

63 Chan and Bowpitt, *Human Dignity and Welfare Systems*.
64 NL-HaNA-2.15.5142 -356-Letter from Minister of Justice to Ministry of Social Affairs, 12 November 1968,
65 NL-UtA-1405-34-Meeting minutes of CIO social care, 3 April 1951.
66 FR-PaAN-19920149/2-"États statistiques des harkis demandeurs d'emploi et de reclassements professionnels, mars 1963-décembre 1964."

rates, the information clients have about their rights, the discretion available to local-level officials, and the administrative complexity or stigmatising nature of the claiming process can all affect the take-up of social benefits. In virtually all of these aspects, harkis' access to the Law of 26 December was substantively curtailed. First, as mentioned, many perceived the need to declare allegiance to a country they had fought for humiliating, creating a first obstacle toward accessing French nationality; the judge's discretion, which they did not hesitate to use in the instance of a harki who had relocated on their own accord, was the second. Administratively, allowances under the Law were not distributed in the camps,[67] and, if harkis knew of their rights at all, many had difficulty opening a file once they left because their documents were incomplete and they moved around frequently in search of a job.[68]

Exclusions aside, the most glaring feature of ghettoisation was the camps in which harkis and Moluccans were accommodated, some of which had a former life as Nazi transit or internment camps. These locations had housed other (post)colonial migrants as well, but either under shorter or less stringent conditions. Indische Nederlanders stayed for less than a year in Schattenberg,[69] for example, compared to Moluccans, who were housed there for twenty. OAS officers - militarised white settlers whose fight to retain French control over Algeria included staging a putsch against the French government - were also kept in the camp Saint-Maurice L'Ardoise, but for less than a year and under "lax" conditions.[70] For harkis, in contrast, the camp constituted a "little colonial world in metropolitan France."[71] The camps were an important, systematic part of their reception, and showed little mercy. Harkis were supposed to fall into a "regime of complete tutelage," of which the isolated barracks formed a central pillar.[72]

In the early days of their arrival in camps, many of which were outfitted with tents rather than barracks, harkis' material needs like warmth and shelter were barely met and psychological needs were sidelined. Social workers intervened in the nutrition, leisure, sanitation, health, and behaviour of Algerian children. Meanwhile, opportunities for human learning and development were minimal, and officials at SFIM, a public organisation devoted to reclassifying harkis, mostly concentrated on integrating them into the agricultural sector - a waning sector in post-war France. Outside the camps, this "tutelage" followed harkis under the watchful eye of the Parodi Committee, although in 1964, committee members would quickly agree to call it "assistance" rather than tutelage. Moluccans, meanwhile, initially found their basic needs for food, clothing, and housing met by various ministries and the CAZ in an initial phase from 1951 to 1956. However, this care came at the cost of personal autonomy and privacy. CAZ, who ran the camps in which they stayed from 1952, transmitted data and personal details to the Ministry of Justice, who exercised oversight. Social workers were deployed and permission was needed for everything, including receiving visitors. From 1956, government involvement was

67 FR-PaAN-19920149/1-Circulaires, instructions et notes générales du Service et du Ministre des Rapatriés, January 1962-May 1964.

68 FR-PaAN-20120054-20110111-Letter from Alexandre Parodi to the Minister of Repatriates, François Missoffe, 29 January 1963.

69 van Gool, "70 Jaar Geleden Kwamen Indische Nederlanders Aan in De Schattenberg."

70 Lavrut, "S'évader de Saint-Maurice l'Ardoise," 17.

71 Charbit, "Un Petit Monde Colonial En Métropole: Le Camp de Harkis de Saint-Maurice-L'Ardoise (1962-1976)."

72 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 122.

rolled back to make room for greater autonomy, but labour market integration was minimal. Again there was little attention to Moluccans' psychological needs, with the Head of Police dismissing their anxieties about immigration control by stating that he found the "feelings expressed … grossly exaggerated"[73] and Ministry of Justice officials complaining that they were "easily irritated."[74] In general, this combination of physical segregation and intense surveillance[75] closely resemble Goffman's notion of the *total institution,* as Charbit has noted with respect to the camps housing harkis.[76]

9.3. Serving the patria

9.3.1. Summary of explanation

I document three distinct ways in which welfare contributed to the nation-building project. On their own, they explain the nature of redistributive boundaries, but not the type of welfare that an individual might encounter. For this, the three dynamics I name need to be combined with attention to ideological work, according to which different individuals are placed in different relationship to the overarching aim. This frequently involved some degree of racialisation, which helps explain why forms of inclusion clustered along racial lines. The fact that welfare can produce different outcomes for different people should not be surprising. As Meghji notes, "all racialised people - including whites - exist in the *same* racialised social system, and consequently … there is a necessary relation that exists between their positions."[77]

First, in contexts where institutional fragmentation was conceivable, welfare helped internally structure the nation's social space by distributing resources differently across different groups of (post)colonial migrants, sorting beneficiaries into distinct strata. This was mostly accomplished in extra-legal or informal ways, and explains variation across the Marshall dimension: those who were constructed as deserving received more welfare than those constructed otherwise. Second, welfare helped neutralise resistance to the national project. It sometimes achieved this by offering entitlements to welfare that scored high on the Marshall dimension, and sometimes by offering welfare that scored low on the Somers dimension as a means of supplying monitoring and surveillance capacity to the state. What exactly this meant for which beneficiaries depended on their perceived power in the national context. Finally, welfare dispelled threats of cultural vacuity either by removing the culturally deviant to the margins of social space through ghettoisation or including them under paternalistic schemes designed to shape their conduct. Where exactly someone fell depended on the extent to which they were constructed as assimilable.

73 NL-HaNA-2.09.52-264-Letter forwarded by Head of Police, 14 December 1959.
74 NL-HaNA-2.09.52-264-Letter from Th H.A Booms to dhr Hoofd van de Afdeling Toezicht Vreemdelingen en Grensbewaking, 4 June 1968.
75 Meghji, *The Racialized Social System*, 129.
76 Charbit, "Un Petit Monde Colonial En Métropole: Le Camp de Harkis de Saint-Maurice-L'Ardoise (1962-1976)."
77 Emphasis added; Meghji, *The Racialized Social System*, 130.

The following sections consider each of the three aims. At any given time, policy could have overlapping aims; I spell out their explanatory value one by one mainly for analytic intelligibility.

9.3.2. Agent of stratification

Some redistributive decisions responded to the logic of structuring social space. In these cases, when the welfare state acted, as Esping-Andersen suggested, as an "agent of stratification,"[78] the location of redistributive boundaries corresponded with prevalent constructions of deservingness, which in turn depended on the dimensions with salience in case-specific ideologies. In the Netherlands, cultural proximity (embodied by the criteria of Westernness or Western orientation) was the key dimension informing someone's placement in social space. In the UK, reciprocity or work ethic played this role. The construction of cultural proximity in the Dutch case and reciprocity in the UK case both relied on racecraft and fed into a more general process of racialisation.

In The Netherlands, Westernness was associated with an ontology according to which Dutch citizens were divided into distinct groups, distinguished by inherited and learned tendencies. These tendencies ranged from an "inherently slow pace of work,"[79] according to Philip Werner, lethargy and apathy according to a Catholic MP, as well as a preference for rice over potatoes and sarongs over jeans. Much (though not all) of the ideological contestation over social rights that took place among local actors during this period concerned whether someone qualified as Western. The broad-based coalition in support of regrettants successfully moved them into the world of empathetic inclusion by describing them as Western; the contact official on the SS Zuiderkruis could pacify the Minister of Justice who boarded her ship by doing the same. Besides contesting the placement of a potential beneficiary along lines of Westernness, there was also confused, but constructive, disagreement over how Westernness ought to be defined. The hard copies of a series of radio speeches in 1960 trying to garner sympathy among the Dutch public for the plight of regrettants is revealing for its mark-ups, as certain features are crossed out (having Dutch names) and others are left to stand (remaining Dutch "in their appearance"). In 1963, social workers in Breda reportedly did not interpret the survey question of whether the families they worked with were "predominantly Western or Eastern" in the same way.[80] This is consistent with the generally empty and/or self-contradictory nature of racial classifications.

Either way, the question of whether Westernness was an appropriate yardstick with which to measure deservingness was subject to little to no meaningful debate. When the Werner report was leaked, the media and parliament were highly critical: one MP argued that the Werner committee proceeded from a "racial doctrine which does not differ much from that of Hitler and Alfred Rosenberg."[81] However, the following year, that same MP went on to

78 Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, 55.

79 Schuster, *Poortwachters over Immigranten: Het Debat over Immigratie in Het Naoorlogse Groot-Britannië En Nederland*, 101.

80 NL-UtA-1405-392-Diocesane Commissie voor gerepatrieerdenzorg, "Onderzoek aanpassingsmoeilijkheden Gerepatrieerden," November 1963.

81 Willems, *De Uittocht Uit Indië, 1945-1995*, 128.

govern one of the last Dutch colonies, Netherlands New Guinea, whose rule was justified to the international community on the grounds that the population belonged to a "negroid" race and was therefore far more "backwards" than the population of Indonesia.[82] More important than the hypocrisy was the fact that critical comments did not succeed in changing government policy, at least not at the local level, where, as is obvious above, social workers were still using the distinction over a decade later.

Deservingness also played a role in the distribution of welfare in the UK, but it was constructed with relation to work ethic and reciprocity. Lengthy discussions over the use of welfare by so-called "coloured Colonials," or "coloured British subjects" preceded the rollback of their entry rights. Throughout these discussions, which are captured in the archival record of the early 1950s, an ideological position emerged in which the central conflict was the "immigration into this country of coloured people from British territories."[83] Casting the newcomers as idle and undeserving welfare recipients helped underline the problem that immigration posed in terms that contributors to a brand-new universal welfare system could understand. All police districts submitting evidence to the 1953 "Working Party on Coloured People Seeking Employment in the UK" - except Liverpool - impressed upon their interlocutors that "on the whole coloured people are work-shy."[84] This, however, involved ideological work. When proponents of this ideological persuasion suggested that Caribbeans "come over to this country and live off the Welfare State..."[85] without any intention to work, the National Assistance Board protested that "our experience of Jamaicans has been that they are very ready to work..."[86] Indeed, neither committee of inquiry that investigated this question could ever provide evidence to the contrary. Nonetheless, the "work-shy" Jamaican who was nonetheless "able to have 'a wonderful time'"[87] upset the tradition of viewing people of colour as undeserving of civil and political liberties, a position that justified ongoing colonial rule and, according to Shilliam, gained ground during the the 1865 Morant Bay rebellion.[88] This helps explain why the National Assistance Board and other advocates of the newcomers' deservingness ultimately lost the ideological battle, and, in turn, why Caribbeans would ultimately find their access to the distributive community curtailed by restrictive immigration laws.

9.3.3. Hearts and minds

The second purpose that welfare served was to win over dissenting members of the population. Of all the dynamics I document, this one most closely approximates social interpretations of the function of welfare, according to which welfare is understood as compensating powerful groups

82 Kuitenbrouwer, "Beyond the 'Trauma of Decolonisation': Dutch Cultural Diplomacy during the West New Guinea Question (1950-62)," 312.

83 UK-LoNA-CO 1028/22-Draft report, "Immigration of British subjects into the United Kingdom," Committee of Ministers, 24 January 1951.

84 UK-LoNA-CO 1028-Note by the Home Office, "Information obtained from the police about coloured communities in the United Kingdom," 11 July 1953

85 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878, Hansard, 13 April 1961.

86 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878, Letter from Chair of National Assistance Board to Thompson, 26 August 1960.

87 UK-LoNA-AST 7/1878, Letter from Thompson to Hutchinson, Chair of National Assistance Board, 3 August 1960.

88 Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor: From Abolition to Brexit*, 38.

to avoid social unrest. However, rather than subdue working class resistance, my findings suggest that it was used to sedate emergent nationalist sensibilities and the risk of insurgency. It did this either by cultivating sympathy for the imperial unit (with welfare that scored high on the Marshall dimension) or by subjecting the beneficiary to intensive surveillance (with welfare that scored low on the Somers dimension). In his study of late colonial British and French Africa, Cooper observed that the "corollary to the distribution of revenue was the surveillance of the recipients."[89] The form of welfare that a given beneficiary encountered depended, under these circumstances, on how much power they had. This in turn was, at least partly, a colonial inheritance, and therefore differentiated along racial lines.

In the UK, this dynamic explains why Caribbeans had formal entitlements to social assistance and social security. The 1948 British Nationality Act, as mentioned, was passed to reinstate the primacy of British subjecthood over individual citizenship status.[90] The inclusive character of social legislation, which was introduced in the exact same window, can be seen as complementary to this project of stabilising the imperial order. In this case, the perceived power of (post)colonial migrants did not drive this outcome, however. Hansen is adamant that the target audience of these inclusive clauses were predominantly white settlers living in what were called the Dominions, but that "any tendency to differentiate between different types of British subjects" was viewed as antagonistic to the British conception of its own imperial identity at that time.[91] This explains why the main way in which exclusions were felt by Caribbean migrants was in local-level discrimination, for which imperial policymakers could not be held responsible.

In France, the impulse to pacify Algerian nationalism goes far in explaining both the hyper-assimilation of pieds-noirs and the paternalism that Algerian labour migrants encountered. Speaking to the Council of Europe, Mellac had explained the "humanitarian efforts" of the Ministry of Repatriates with reference to Boulin and his colleagues knowing "how to win the confidence and the affection of the Pieds noirs," which in turn allowed French policymakers to "surpass the atmosphere of defiance and hostility that characterised the first repatriations."[92] When the 26 December Law was passed, only three years had passed since the 1958 putsch had toppled the Fourth Republic and shown that the disaffection of former Algerian settlers could come at extraordinarily high political costs.

In previous decades, French policy-makers had used welfare to appease a different population: Algerian labour migrants. Lyons has argued that the FAS was the "metropolitan arm" of the Constantine Plan,[93] designed to win over hearts and minds of the Algerian workforce in order to quell their nationalist instincts, as the strength of the FLN grew and the Algerian war of independence reached the metropole. However, the form of welfare that emerged to meet this perceived need was distinct from that designed for pieds-noirs. Paternalism allowed for a careful balance of reward and supervision, and featured regular

89 Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa*, 319.
90 Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation*.
91 Hansen.
92 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)-Speech given by Mr Mellac, Director of Repatriates, for la commission de la Population du Conseil de l'Europe, 5 October 1964
93 Lyons, "Social Welfare, French Muslims and Decolonization in France," 70.

incursions into their private lives which ultimately ended up stirring more hostility than they quelled. The fact that the Ministry of the Interior - "the Ministry mandated with public order and policing" - had the biggest budget of all ministries for the social protection of Algerian labour migrants was illustrative.[94]

Stoler and Cooper have argued that securing the consent of subjects *in* the colonies eventually came at too high a cost for British and French elites, who shrank back from the "implications of extending the universalistic social engineering theories" that were associated with welfare expansion on the continent to the colonies.[95] In this section I have tried to argue that the opposite dynamic - in which the costs of *withholding* social rights from (post)colonial subjects who had already arrived in the metropole is too high - also has explanatory power.

9.3.4. Cultural change

Finally, I find evidence that welfare acted to dispel the threat of cultural vacuity. It did this either by promoting the adoption of specific cultural habits, or by segregating those with different cultural habits. In effect, both eliminate the possibilities for cultural deviance. I follow Charbit in viewing both segregation *and* efforts to survey and correct the conduct of beneficiaries as congruent with the legacies of colonial rule.[96] When coupled with constructions of cultural proximity, which determines what counts as cultural deviance, and with constructions of assimilability, which shape whether someone could be expected to respond well to the disciplinary interventions that a welfare state could provide, this dynamic helps explain the patterns of inclusion that a beneficiary received.

The world of paternalistic welfare to which Indische Nederlanders assigned "Eastern" identities and French citizens assigned "Muslim" identities had access can be largely explained with reference to this impulse. An official from the Ministry of Union and Overseas Affairs had clarified that the overarching policy goal of their involvement in repatriate affairs was to "integrate" repatriates into "normal Dutch affairs."[97] "Normal" in this case was a euphemism for "European," and, falling back on Durkheim's approach of defining things by virtue of what is done in their name, integration into "normal Dutch affairs" was defined as mimicking the cultural scripts of a European household. This explains the government's enthusiasm about, and willingness to subsidise, courses on interior design, washing clothes, nutrition, sewing, budgeting, heating a home, knitting, acquiring household items, and treating modern textiles, all for the price of 45 cents per person per lesson with the "number of ladies" varying from 8 to 10.[98] The same can be said of the specific courses and programmes subsidised by the FAS and other social security funds devoted to the care of Algerian labour migrants.

94 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Note for Mr Director-General, March 6 1959.
95 Stoler and Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda," 24.
96 Charbit, "Un Petit Monde Colonial En Métropole: Le Camp de Harkis de Saint-Maurice-L'Ardoise (1962-1976)."
97 "Het inpassen van de gerepatriëerden in de normale Nederlandse verhoudingen," NL-HaNA-2.27.02-Nota, MINUOR, 8 November 1950.
98 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-49-"Folder van de Protestantse Zorg t.b.v Hen Die Uit Nieuw Guinea Gekomen Zijn, Uitgaande van de Hervormde Stichting voor Kerkelijk Sociale Arbeid."

Not everyone who was constructed as "Eastern" or "Muslim" was viewed as capable of assimilation, or undergoing the kind of transformation that this cultural mission required. For some observers, this was the case for Moluccans and harkis. The official who read the reports of the social worker who had stumbled upon a white Dutch woman adopting Moluccan cultural traits had betrayed this view when they wrote "nature is always stronger than nurture!"[99] One of Jordi and Hamoumou's respondents had expressed their frustration that harkis were viewed in similarly fixed terms. "We hear people talk about 'harkis' or worse, 'children of harkis,' as if being harki was like being Black or Asian."[100] At the same time, like any identity, it was subject to contestation. The French social worker at the forest hamlet in Lozère who justified her full-time involvement in the lives of harkis by clarifying that "the aim is to transform, as much as possible, these Muslims into Europeans"[101] betrayed her clear faith in their "assimilability," as did the applicant for the position of social worker with the Parodi Committee who mused that "[although] it's hard to know exactly what a Muslim is thinking… when supervised, women and men often show a very good will."[102]

However, the ghettoisation that harkis and Moluccans faced suggests that, during an important moment in the history of their migration, the prevalent ideological consensus was that they lacked the potential to assimilate. In both cases, this consensus was built on racial stereotypes. For example, Moluccan internment was justified by officials, including Minister of Social Work Marga Klompé with reference to their "physical condition, "fitness for work," "habits of life"[103] or "collective mentality."[104] The same social worker who suggested that harkis can show "a very good will" "when supervised," added a slew of racial qualifiers to her description, including calling them "very childish," and exhibiting "natural indolence."[105] In this context, reception camps could go some way toward incentivising cultural change, as some agents of the welfare state were taught to believe was possible, thereby protecting the benevolent image of elites. However, the segregation they experienced would pose an enormous obstacle to their cultural integration, which in turn would facilitate the sustained belief in the fixity of their ways.

In fact, if Saïd is to be believed - that modern society derives its identity "negatively" - in terms of what it is not rather than what it is - and that the (national, normal) Self is defined in terms of the (foreign, abnormal) Other[106] - then their presence at the margins is actually of greater service to the cultural identity of the nation than their exclusion would be. Saïd argues that because we rarely actually *understand* the Other, we represent other cultures in a "very

99 Laarman, *Oude Onbekenden: Het Politieke En Publieke Debat over Postkoloniale Migranten, 1945-2005*, 115.
100 Jordi and Hamoumou, *Les Harkis, Une Mémoire Enfouie*, 28.
101 Fr-PaAN-19920149-"Les harkis, à la recherche d'une patrie," Christian Rudel, 17 July 1963.
102 FR-PaAN-F/1A/5137-Letter from Mme Etourneu-Copin to Mr Lienart, Service des Rapatriés d'AFN, 14 May 1963.
103 Laarman, *Oude Onbekenden: Het Politieke En Publieke Debat over Postkoloniale Migranten, 1945-2005.*
104 Jones, "Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten En Nederlanders: Nederlandse Politici over Burgers Uit Oost En West En Nederland, 1945-2005," 150.
105 FR-PaAN-F/1A/5137-Letter from Mme Etourneu-Copin to Mr Lienart, Service des Rapatriés d'AFN, 14 May 1963.
106 Said, "Imaginative Geography and Its Representations," 20.

unrigorous way,"[107] creating a "closed field, a theatrical stage affixed to Europe."[108] Arguably, reception camps embody that stage, offering a site where the *negative* meaning of Frenchness, Dutchness, Europeanness and "normal affairs" could be worked out.

9.4. Revisiting the heterogeneity-redistribution trade-off

9.4.1. Summary of contributions

Earlier, I introduced the heterogeneity-redistribution trade-off thesis,[109] according to which diversity reduces social solidarity, and by extension, public support for redistribution. Overall my findings suggest that diversity and solidarity are related, but not in the way that the thesis implies. In fact, inquiring into the effects of diversity on welfare states is misplaced for at least three reasons. First, a focus on identity and racial difference is warranted, but only if it is viewed as the product of *racecraft*[110] rather than inevitable. What existing literature has identified as the effect of *diversity* is actually the effect of racism, and it has indeterminate effects. Second, diversity does exist. However, agents of welfare states can actively shape, suppress, and eliminate it in their capacity as disciplinary agents, *homogenising* an ostensibly heterogeneous population. Because I have shown how this process contributes to cultivating consent and belonging, we can understand diversity and solidarity as co-constructed. In this sense, diversity cannot have independent effect. Finally, the heterogeneity-redistribution tradeoff relies on the assumption that public attitudes directly affect welfare policy. However, my project shows that attitudes are not decisive for a specific policy course.

9.4.2. Racecraft and racism, not diversity

As for the first, my findings indeed suggest that the identity of (post)colonial migrants mattered for their inclusion, and that their arrival prompted institutional change as French and Dutch welfare states departed from their central organising principles and created new schemes to integrate them in various ways. In the UK, I show that relaxed and inclusive redistributive boundaries towards Caribbeans were met with public resistance and then border control. However, it was not "racial heterogeneity" in the abstract which strained the solidaristic floorboards of the Beveridgean system and disfigured the Dutch and French systems. Instead it was racecraft and racism that did the work.

In this context of imprecise group definitions, welfare agents engaged in racialisation, interpreting cultural practices and collective outcomes as flowing from a group-based essence, and making racist statements to imbue these qualities with negative value. There was nothing inevitable about these characterisations, and the archival record furnishes several examples of conflicting interpretations. For example, employment and accident rates differed between Algerian French citizens and European French citizens. According to a 1952 thesis, workplace

107 Said, 21.
108 Said, 27.
109 Kymlicka and Banting, *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State*, 9.
110 Fields and Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*.

accidents among Algerian labour migrants were more serious and more frequent than among Europeans.[111] However, trade unions and labour inspectors interpreted this as a function of employers' inclination to assign North Africans "the most dangerous, the most difficult and the dirtiest" work[112] rather than of "the North African['s] temperament" as the report had.[113] In the same way, while police districts read unemployment among Caribbeans as stemming from a "work-shy" attitude, a representative of the Ministry of Labour focused on the importance of labour market discrimination.[114] This is partly what Said meant when he said that "rudimentary classification has a logic to it, but … there is always a measure of the purely arbitrary in the way the distinctions between things are seen."[115]

When racial identities meet policy, they tend to furnish further evidence of themselves, as Fields and Fields have argued.[116] Developing a "collective mentality," for example, is one way to respond to being denied access to general provisions and permanent housing. Meanwhile, if employers hear of the "natural indolence"[117] of Algerian applicants, they will be less likely to recruit them, and the ensuing unemployment will produce even more evidence of the supposed "natural indolence." As Fields and Fields describe, race "acquires perfectly adequate moving parts when a person acts upon the reality of the imagined thing; the real action creates evidence for the imagined thing."[118] The pathway to racism is cleared.

Racism itself may present challenges for solidarity. In the UK case, both the proponents and opponents of rights for Caribbean citizens could agree on this. The fact that MPs prefaced their parliamentary questions with reference to the views of their "concerned" white constituents is illustrative. As public representatives, this is perhaps unsurprising, but even civil servants linked their arguments back to the concerned public. For example, in the 1953 Working Party's final report, their concluding argument rested on the "affectionate feelings towards the mother-country" of white settlers, which they argued would be weakened by the presence of a "large coloured community as a noticeable feature of our social life" since "such a community is certainly no part of the concept of England or Britain to which people of British stock … are attached."[119] On the other end, the Board conceded that main issue they encountered with non-white claimants was that "their presence in the Board's offices leads to complaints about wasting the taxpayer's money."[120]

That said, the influence even of racism on solidarity is not predetermined. As I have shown, one of the key ways that welfare states responded to (post)colonial migrants was by promoting cultural change among racialised citizens, or distributing resources so as to protect the dignity

111 Michel, *Les Travailleurs Algériens En France*, 128.
112 Michel, 30.
113 FR-PaAN-19830235/28-Report, "Les travailleurs nord-africains et la sécurité sociale." 14.
114 UK-LoNA-CO1028/22-Draft report, "Working Party on Coloured People Seeking Employment in the United Kingdom," 28 October 1953, p 9
115 Said, "Imaginative Geography and Its Representations," 19.
116 Fields and Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*.
117 FR-PaAN-F/1A/5137-Letter from Mme Etourneu-Copin to Mr Lienart, Service des Rapatriés d'AFN, 14 May 1963.
118 Fields and Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*, 22.
119 UK-LoNA-CO1028/22-Draft report, "Working Party on Coloured People Seeking Employment in the United Kingdom," 28 October 1953, p 9
120 UK-LoNA-CO 1028/22-Note by National Assistance Board, 5 October 1953.

of "Europeans." In this sense, racism may well have produced incentives for an *increase* in social spending rather than its opposite.

9.4.3. Homogenising the heterogeneous[121]

If my first contribution redirects the attention of the heterogeneity-redistribution tradeoff away from race, my second contribution is to provide evidence for a different relationship between solidarity and diversity. In my dissertation, I have shown that welfare states can actively subdue and suppress diversity by *homogenising* an ostensibly heterogeneous population.

The welfare state can act as a powerful instrument for promoting behaviour change and by extension, cultural assimilation. In 9.3.4, I argued that disciplinary forms of welfare (like paternalism and ghettoisation) respond to this impulse. In this sense, the fact that Western-oriented Indische Nederlanders graduated from minority status by the 1980s is no accident. Decades of subsidising religious education and household courses, rewarding linguistic, culinary, and interior design preferences, and punishing undesirable practices like divorce and out-of-wedlock pregnancies, had nullified difference.

Policymakers also have other tools at their disposal, like conditionality. Thus, in the Netherlands, an applicant who had fallen on hard times because they were a divorcée or "pregnant and unmarried" would not be eligible, while someone fleeing persecution in Indonesia would.[122] This disincentivised undesirable cultural practices, like divorce and out-of-wedlock pregnancy. The same tactic was at play when officials were instructed to reward self-employed repatriates more generously for opening a clinic than for opening a bar.[123]

Welfare states also affect the perceived homogeneity or heterogeneity of a community by creating a shared fate. Social psychologists of the 1960s and 1970s stressed that group construction precedes group prejudice. In one experiment, Tajfel et al. find that the "interdependence of fate" - which they modelled in experiments by telling participants they would be working together on a common task - played a major role in the perception of groupness.[124] In other words, when participants have experiences in common and anticipate that they will continue to do so, they begin to perceive themselves as members of a group.

The welfare state creates fate interdependence not by instructing participants to work in groups, but rather by creating a sense of affiliation, reciprocity, and loyalty. In my research, contemporaries understood very well the power of welfare states to accomplish this. This was in part why I argued that welfare was deployed as a means of responding to (the threat of) dissidence (9.3.3). It is also why British policymakers convened conferences with the old Dominions in order to set up a system of "Imperial social insurance" wherein "contributions can be made in any one country of the empire and the benefits paid in any other country where the British citizen may find himself."[125] Besides its symbolic clout, such an arrangement

121 For this formulation, I am indebted to Pavithra Suryanarayan.

122 NL-Ha-NA-2.27.02-1008-Verslag van de op vrijdag 15 oktober 1965 op het Districtskantoor te Arnhem gehouden bespreking omtrent vraagstukken betreffende de Rijksgroepsregeling Gerepatrieerden.

123 FR-PaAN-19770391/9-Circular from Secretary of State of Repatriates (Robert Boulin) to Regional Delegates, IGAME, and Prefects, 22 May 1962, p 10

124 Tajfel et al., "Social Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour," 153.

125 UK-LoNA-CO 859/124/2-Daily Express article, "Hear the call of Empire," 25 May 1948.

would ensure that Canadians and Rhodesians would be dependent on the vitality of the same funds. In this way, welfare states contribute to homogeneity, and therefore cannot be said to depend on it.

9.4.4. The malleability of attitudes

A final contribution that my project makes to the literature has to do with public opinion. As mentioned in the introduction (1.3.3), one of the central ways that European welfare state scholarship engages with discussions of immigration and welfare is by researching whether survey respondents punish hypothetical claimants for having specific cultural identities.

The justification for studying attitudes is that they are grounds for policy reform. The implication is that if a particular group falls out of favour with the electorate, the welfare state will respond by limiting its redistributive reach. However, my project suggests that these attitudes are not always decisive for the policy course to be charted. In fact, the public was not keen on the arrival and integration of *any* of the (post)colonial migrants that I studied. The most-likely case for public approval might have been pieds-noirs or repatriates, who had lighter skins and had enjoyed higher status in colonial status. Even then, the French and Dutch public reacted with at least some degree of hostility. The Dutch public bitterly called the earliest repatriates in The Netherlands, who by definition belonged to the higher echelons of colonial society, names like "coupon eaters."[126] Meanwhile, as Jordi documents, repatriates arriving in Marseille reported encountering "anti-repatriate public opinion"[127] and stereotypes, including that they were "brute, racist, right-wing, [or] uneducated."[128] Skirmishes between the Marseille population and repatriates ensued.

However, policymakers did not lament an "inevitable deservingness gap," as some researchers today are inclined to do when encountering hostile attitudes.[129] Nor did they conclude, as Hansen had, that a restrictive course of action was a "difficult but essential decision."[130] In fact, despite these negative attitudes, French policymakers concluded the exact opposite: that it was "*necessary* to welcome, house, reclassify, protect" and "*necessary* to build a vast legal and financial system particularly protective of all repatriates."[131] Rather than acquiesce to the restrictive attitudes of Marseille residents, policy-makers continued to maintain entitlements for pieds-noirs even though it only *increased the hostility* of Marseille residents, who felt neglected.[132] Racist or exclusionary attitudes were not the be-all, end-all of public policy. Instead, they constituted one input of many into a policymaking process. If anything, given their influence on both discourse and material distribution of resources, welfare states are particularly adept at modifying public opinion, and the conditions under which they do so deserves much more scholarly attention than it currently receives.

126 Willems, *De Uittocht Uit Indië, 1945-1995*, 53.
127 Jordi, *1962: L'arrivée Des Pieds-Noirs*, 55.
128 Jordi, 49.
129 Reeskens and van der Meer, "The Inevitable Deservingness Gap."
130 Hansen, Randall. *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 78.
131 FR-PaAN-AG/5(1)/857-Report, "sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961," 1965, p 280. In this case, I am translating both the French verb *devoir* and *falloir* as versions of necessary.
132 Jordi, *1962: L'arrivée Des Pieds-Noirs*, 55–56.

9.4.5. Society

Boundaries, like identities, are never fixed. El-Enany has argued that "the task of bordering Britain is an ongoing and centuries-old process."[133] This is not just because new economic opportunities and constraints change the balance of power and give rise to new institutions, like the European community.[134] Nor is it because the global rise in xenophobia, alt-right nationalisms and populist right-wing parties force mainstream parties to continuously revisit the constitution of the national community and the identity of the insiders.[135] It is also because, as I have argued, boundary-making is a process with both ideological and material underpinnings and is thereby inherently unstable. Interpretations require varying degrees of evidence and ideological work in order to sustain themselves; reality is almost always a stubborn and fickle partner in this process.

In each of the country-cases I studied, the awkwardness of the post-war overlap between expanding social security provisions, on the one hand, and the legal and moral complexities and exclusions of imperial rule, on the other hand, continues to have present-day repercussions on the descendants of (post)colonial migrants. The cabinets of all three countries have in recent years taken responsibility for the exclusion of (post)colonial migrants.

In The Netherlands, the *missing pensions*, or the AOW-hole (*AOW-gat*) provides the most stark example.[136] For years, Dutch citizens of Surinamese origin have protested that thirty thousand elderly members of their community have been receiving a reduction on their old-age pension of 16 to 18 percent.[137] Following a 1954 Charter, Suriname was legally considered an equal, constituent component of the Dutch kingdom prior to its independence in 1975. Nonetheless the period in which these individuals lived in Suriname prior to 1975 is not equated with residence in the Netherlands, the central criterion for the build-up of pension rights under the General Old Age Act (AOW) of 1956. While the opportunity to compensate affected citizens shrank with time, the cabinet investigated the possibility of offering a one-off financial "gesture" to affected citizens.[138] In 2023, a one-time grant amounting to 5,000 euros was offered as compensation to those who had lived long enough to receive it.[139]

133 El-Enany, *Bordering Britain*, 3.

134 El-Enany, 15.

135 V Spike Peterson, "State/Nation Histories, Structural Inequalities and Racialised Crises," *New Political Economy* 26, no 2 (March 4, 2021): 291, https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2020.1841142.

136 Gijs Herderscheê, "Kamer wil spoed met AOW-compensatie voor Surinaamse Nederlanders," de Volkskrant, November 17, 2022, https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/kamer-wil-spoed-met-aow-compensatie-voor-surinaamse-nederlanders~b5b2a9b7/.

137 Raoul du Pre, "Commissie: AOW-gat Surinaamse Nederlanders moet gerepareerd," de Volkskrant, July 2, 2021, https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/commissie-aow-gat-surinaamse-nederlanders-moet-gerepareerd~b86a2fdc/.

138 Herderscheê, "Kamer wil spoed met AOW-compensatie voor Surinaamse Nederlanders."

139 Franca van Hooren and Eline Westra, "Wanneer Volgt de Echte Reparatie van Het 'AOW-Gat' van Surinaamse Nederlanders?," *NRC*, May 8, 2023, https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2023/05/08/wanneer-volgt-de-echte-reparatie-van-het-aow-gat-van-surinaamse-nederlanders-a4164120.

In France, the government has also taken responsibility for some of the exclusions it engineered during the period I studied. The Council of State (*Conseil d'Etat*)[140] issued a historic judgment in late 2018. Reversing the rulings of two prior administrative courts,[141] the Council ruled that the French government was responsible for medical, psychological and social damage caused to the claimant, Charles Tamazount, while resident at camp Bias, one of the many reception camps for harkis.[142] The Council ordered the government to pay Tamazount 15,000 euros in material and moral damages.[143] Seeking better redress, Tamazount and his siblings turned to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), where they have accused the French state of violating their right to life and to privacy, among other things.[144] The case is ongoing at the time of writing.

Three days after the ECHR requested observations on the same from the French government, and some six months before the end of his term, President Macron issued a formal presidential pardon to harkis in September 2021. In his address, Macron acknowledged that the French Republic had "abandoned" harkis. A few months later, he introduced a bill to the National Assembly enshrining a right to compensation for harki families imprisoned in collective reception centres. The law, which interest groups had demanded for a long time, eventually passed in February 2022.[145] The amount that claimants could access was set in relation to the amount that Tamazount was granted by the Council of State: 2,000 euros for three months spent in a camp, 3,000 euros for one year, and 1,000 euros for each additional year, with the total sum not exceeding 16 thousand euros.[146] As of September 2022, some 2,577 applications have been approved out of the 2,647 examined, with 21,273 submitted in total.[147]

Last but not least, the infamous Windrush scandal rocked British public opinion in recent years. In a 2012 interview with the Telegraph, Theresa May, then Home Secretary, had announced her aim to "create, here in Britain, a really hostile environment for illegal

140 The French Council of State is sometimes translated into the "Supreme Administrative Court" of France, but this is somewhat misleading. Although it is the court of last appeal in the administrative system, the judicial and constitutional system are each subject to different courts of last appeal. Moreover, it also functions as a council, preparing bills, ordinances and decrees, and answering questions from ministers. Pierre Delvolvé, "The Council of State, the Supreme Court of the French Administrative System," *Pouvoirs* 123, no 4 (2007): 51–56.

141 In the French legal system, the administrative courts deal with litigation concerning the public exercise of power.

142 Dalila Kerchouche, "« Entre Les Barbelés, Les Enfants de Harkis Du Camp de Bias Dribblent Pour Échapper à La Folie Postcoloniale »," *Le Monde.Fr*, March 18, 2022, https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2022/03/18/entre-les-barbeles-les-enfants-de-harkis-du-camp-de-bias-dribblent-pour-echapper-a-la-folie-postcoloniale_6118036_3232.html.

143 Le Conseil d'Etat, "Responsabilité de l'État Concernant Les Conditions de Vie Réservées Aux Familles de Harkis," Conseil d'État, October 3, 2018, https://www.conseil-etat.fr/actualites/responsabilite-de-l-etat-concernant-les-conditions-de-vie-reservees-aux-familles-de-harkis.

144 Mustapha Kessous, "La Cour européenne des droits de l'homme s'invite dans le débat sur les harkis," *Le Monde.fr*, December 15, 2021, https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2021/12/15/la-cour-europeenne-des-droits-de-l-homme-s-invite-dans-le-debat-sur-les-harkis_6106080_823448.html.

145 Loi n° 2022-229 du 23 février 2022 portant reconnaissance de la nation envers les harkis et les autres personnes rapatriées d'Algérie anciennement de statut civil de droit local et reparation des prejudices subis par ceux-ci et leurs familles du fait de l'indignité de leurs conditions d'accueil et de vie dans certaines structures sur le territoire français, JORF n°0047.

146 Mustapha Kessous, "La délicate question de la réparation des harkis et de leurs enfants," *Le Monde.fr*, September 20, 2022, https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2022/09/20/la-delicate-question-de-la-reparation-des-harkis-et-de-leurs-enfants_6142441_823448.html.

147 Kessous.

immigrants."[148] The policy proposals and accompanying rules and regulations of the Immigration Act of 2014 would come to lay the foundations of the "hostile environment" that May envisaged.[149] The crux of these legislative acts was to enshrine the devolution or "deputisation" of immigration control.[150] Private and public bodies like employers, landlords, hospitals, police, and schools became required to verify their employee or client's residence status; failing to do so would provoke sanctions. If no residence permit could be produced, the above actors became legally bound to revoke services - benefits, jobs, housing, a drivers' license, bank accounts and medical treatment - until the Home Office can take over. The legislation remains intact to this day, though government officials prefer the title "compliant environment" policy.[151]

Among those groups most affected by the hostile environment policy are the 'Windrush generation.' Named after the *HMT Empire Windrush,* one of the earliest ships to carry fee-paying migrants from Jamaica to the British Isles, the Windrush generation refers usually to the thousands of Caribbean-born individuals who arrived on the British Isles anywhere from 1948 to 1962. At the time, their entry and residence rights were uncomplicated; they shared a citizenship with metropolitan UK citizens until the early 1960s.[152] However, when their territories of origin gained independence, their rights of stay were subject to renegotiation. Many did not acquire residence permits. In late 2017, reporting by the Guardian revealed that they were being threatened with detention and deportation. Many of the affected were of retirement age and had lived in the UK for over half a century. As public outrage mounted, the Home Office apologised, creating a team dedicated to compensation and regularising their status.

In all of these cases, (post)colonial migrants themselves have introduced cracks in the ideologies that won out in the post-war period, where formal citizenship status did not guarantee a substantive right to *social* citizenship, and where new forms of inclusion in the distributive community emerged. I have titled this project *Social Subjecthood* as an homage to the disparate forms of belonging that accompanied welfare expansion. Like the "welfare state" itself, the concept bears the onerous responsibility of uniting an assemblage of different phenomena: from targeted assistance schemes to reception camps, from discrimination in the allocation of rent allowance to social security funds devoting their budget to cleaning courses for "Muslim" women. Nonetheless, if *social subjecthood* has any merit, it is its ability to cast aspersions on Marshall's conception of social citizenship. It does so in a far less powerful way than the Surinamese activists who delivered a petition to the Dutch Parliament, than Tamazount who took his case to administrative courts, or the members of the Windrush generation who got an apology from the very same Home Office who recruited the Ministry of

148 Colin Yeo, "Briefing: What Is the Hostile Environment, Where Does It Come from, Who Does It Affect?," May 1, 2018, https://freemovement.org.uk/briefing-what-is-the-hostile-environment-where-does-it-come-from-who-does-it-affect/.

149 Melanie Griffiths and Colin Yeo, "The UK's Hostile Environment: Deputising Immigration Control," *Critical Social Policy* 41, no 4 (November 2021): 521–44, https://doi.org/10.1177/0261018320980653.

150 Griffiths and Yeo, 525.

151 Russell Taylor, "Impact of 'Hostile Environment' Policy: Debate on 14 June 2018," Library Briefing (London: House of Lords, June 11, 2018).

152 Grenada did not gain independence until 1974.

National Insurance to track them down just forty years earlier. But, to repeat Ferrera's mantra: if "*nomina sunt numina*" (names are like gods), and new ways of naming things can offer a window into new ways of seeing things,[153] then maybe the concept of social subjecthood will have something to offer activists of future generations who hold their national communities to the standards embedded in Marshall's declaration: that "the basic human equality of membership had been enriched with new substance."[154]

153 Ferrera, *The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection*, 35.
154 Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class: And Other Essays*, 9.

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Appendix

Appendix A. Historical-interpretivism examples

A.1 Du Bois' contextualised self-interpretation

Consider Du Bois' introduction to the ninth chapter of *Black Reconstruction in America*. In this book, Du Bois revisits accounts of the role that Black people played in the American Civil War, the abolition of slavery and the Reconstruction era that followed the war, covering a period of around 1861 to 1877.

> The year 1867 comes. The election of 1866 has sent to the 40th Congress a Republican majority... The decisive battle of Reconstruction looms. Abolition-democracy demands for Negroes physical freedom, civil rights, economic opportunity, and education, and the right to vote... Industry demands profits, and is willing to use for this end Negro freedom or Negro slavery, votes for Negroes, or Black Codes... In the midst of these elements stood Andrew Johnson, with the tremendous power which lay in his hands as commander-in-chief of the Army, with the large patronage which arose through the expansion of governmental functions during the war, and with a stubborn will, and a resourceful and astute secretary of state. Logically, Andrew Johnson, as an early leader of land reform, and of democracy and industry, for the peasant farmer in the labouring class, was in position to lead the democracy of the West. But, perversely, he had been induced by flattery, by his Southern birth, and his dislike of New England puritanism, to place himself at the head of the Southerners.[1]

Du Bois aptly illustrates contextualised self-interpretations. He foregrounds several elements of setting, like a previous election and a future battle, considers the demands of interest groups as a means of dislodging the ideological battlefield, and lingers on material economic conditions as interpreted by key industrial stakeholders. He equally pays attention to the past experiences, expanded administrative role, and personality of a powerful figure in the narrative. The meanings that Andrew Johnson makes of his surroundings are recovered, without any of his actions reduced to those meanings. Du Bois portrays Johnson as facing cross-pressures from industry, his Southern supporters, the army, and his secretary of state, but still exhibiting preferences and qualities of his own: disliking New England puritanism, for instance. Du Bois also demonstrates how to adjudicate among various factors. Although Johnson was an early leader of land reform, which could have shaped whose patronage he sought, his history as a campaigner appears as a less important driver for his decisions than his preferences for Southern ideology given that he positioned himself to lead the South.

1 Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction in America: An Essay Toward the History of the Part Which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860-1880*, 325.

A.2 Fox' and Cooper's entangled comparisons

Fox' *Three Worlds of Welfare Relief* initially set out to disentangle the relative individual influence of race, citizenship, and legal status on the access of Mexican immigrants, European immigrants, and Black Americans to the American social safety net from 1890s to the 1930s.[2] Ultimately, however, "adjudicat[ing] between competing theories that highlighted politics, class, race, or other factors," proved difficult, not least because each group was concentrated in a specific region, which in turn was "different from the rest of the country on so many dimensions that it is hard to know with any certainty which factor or combination of factors" explained the outcome.[3] Her solution was to compare across groups *and* regions. Fox reconstructed three distinct and internally coherent configurations of institutions that, nodding to Esping-Andersen, she called "worlds" of relief. Each world differed in the amounts and character of public and private spending. Most European immigrants lived in urban areas of the Northeast and Midwest, where they worked manufacturing jobs that offered generous coverage when the Social Security Act (1935) entered into force. Black Americans, in contrast, lived in rural areas in the South where, besides being subject to Jim Crow laws they worked agricultural occupations that were excluded from the provisions of the Social Security Act. Meanwhile, Mexican immigrants worked in the Southwest where there was far less public relief and in general a more stratified benefits system than the areas in which European immigrants live, for example.

Similarly, in *Decolonisation and African Society,* Cooper studies how the colonial state responded to challenges from African workers by comparing efforts under late colonial rule in British and French Africa from the 1930s to the 1950s.[4] There is no attempt to tease apart analytically distinct variables, nor to assume that France or Britain were perfectly contained systems. In fact, Cooper shows how both French and British governments were influenced by discussions of minimum wage and social security during International Labour Conferences of the 1920s.[5] In addition, both were under pressure from the Allies and in particular the US to universally grant the right to self-determination.[6] Still, Cooper's constant comparison brings the reader's attention to distinctive elements of each context. For example, although both France and Britain were interested in 'stabilising' the colonial system in the 1930s, imagining themselves as enlightened imperialists who would break with archaic traditions of the colonial past, France modelled codified labour practices after their metropolitan model, while Britain avoided centralised solutions and instead entered into dialogue with African trade unions. This was in part a response to the strikes and riots they staged in 1935.[7]

Done correctly, these geographies of inclusion are not just descriptive, but provide the skeleton of a socially meaningful explanation. For Fox, the entanglement of race, labour and politics becomes itself a topic of study: racialisation determined employment opportunities, and stigmatising attitudes about group-level welfare use were linked to labour relations and their

2 Fox, *Three Worlds of Relief*, 2.
3 Fox, 11.
4 Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa*.
5 Cooper, 24.
6 Cooper, 112.
7 Cooper, 18.

political manifestations.[8] Geography-specific material conditions, like the political strength of white supremacist Democrats in the South, the level of respect that social workers commanded, or the existing structure of the labour market, influenced the interests and ideologies of employers, politicians and researchers. In Cooper's work, equally, context-specific structural constraints and "constraints of the imagination"[9] that policymakers faced become particularly clear only through comparison.

Appendix B. Nomenclature

B.1 Common-sense categories

Common-sense categories in the sources I consulted were value-laden and wrapped up in the politics of state intervention. In France and the Netherlands, repatriate (*rapatrié* and *gerepatrieerde*) was used frequently to refer to displaced persons after war, and then to citizens leaving former colonies.[10] Repatriate status conferred a self-evident right both to national belonging in the abstract (in relation to an imagined *patria*), and to its realisation through state intervention, since the term gained currency from state-sponsored repatriating efforts. However, as I detail in chapters 6 and 7, the status was granted selectively. Those who had been granted 'native' or 'Muslim' status under Dutch or French colonial law respectively were usually excluded and assigned specific group names. In the Netherlands, former colonial soldiers from the Moluccas were called *Ambonezen* (Ambonese), and former soldiers who transferred to metropolitan France from Algeria were known as *harkis*.

British common-sense categories are noteworthy for their absence of reference to national belonging. Official texts called new arrivals *Colonials* if not *Coloured Colonials*. They were also frequently referred to by their region of origin, even before the independence of that region: *West Indians, West Africans, East Africans, Arabs, Pakistanis,* etc. *Commonwealth immigrants* came closest in referring to a shared national heritage by invoking the term that the post-war British empire used for itself. However, it was misleading when used to describe Caribbeans, whose legal status from 1948 to 1962 was technically "Citizens of the UK and Colonies." The term *Commonwealth immigrants* therefore actually increased the discursive distance between the UK citizen from the British Isles and the UK citizen from the colonies, an increase which was augmented by its frequent marriage with the word immigrant (rather than subject, citizen or patrial).

I therefore tried to avoid using common-sense categories inclined to reproduce patterns of state power, like *Commonwealth immigrant*. I also discarded terms that (some) interviewees rejected outright, like *Muslim French*.[11]

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8 Fox, *Three Worlds of Relief*.

9 Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa*, 3.

10 Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir Métropolitain: Politique d'intégration et Parcours de Rapatriés d'Algérie En Métropole (1954-2005)*, 91; Janssen, Leenders, and van Rooij, inventory of the archives of the *Ministerie van Sociale Zaken: Regeringscommissaris Voor Repatriëring; Afdeling Repatriëring En Opsporing; Missie Tot Opsporing van Vermiste Personen Uit de Bezettingstijd, 1943-1952*, 2.15.43.

11 Jordi and Hamoumou, *Les Harkis, Une Mémoire Enfouie*, 20.

B.2 Analytical categories

Some scholars fuse common-sense and analytical categories, especially in the French case. For example, for those whom the French government had considered European, Scioldo-Zürcher uses the terms Français d'Algérie (French of Algeria) prior to Algerian independence and *rapatriés* afterward.[12] He describes all those who the French state had called Muslim or 'native' as *Algériens* (Algerian). Many others follow suit in this latter respect.[13] Cohen complements this with the term migrants *(post)coloniaux*.[14] Fewer scholars of the Dutch case repurpose the translation of repatriate. Jones and Laarman both trade in the plethora of terms used by the Dutch administration for *postkoloniale burgers* (postcolonial citizens).[15] Schuster uses terms that differentiate by region and social designation, like *Indische Nederlanders* and *Surinamers*.[16] Manuhutu and many others prefer the term *Molukkers* to *Ambonezen*, arguing that the latter reflects the dominance of Ambon and its adjacent islands, relative to other islands located further southeast in the Moluccas.[17]

Scholars of British history tried somewhat harder than their French and Dutch colleagues to discard common-sense categories. Banerjee uses *imperial citizens* to place greater emphasis on the web of ties, statutory rights and obligations woven between the UK and its colonial subjects than common sense categories of the time did.[18] Legal scholar El-Enany takes issue with the designation of *citizen*, however, arguing that British citizenship did not exist in its modern form at that time and that this categorisation risks "legitimising the colonial British state's immigration regime by ceding to it the power of recognition."[19] Sivanandan opts for *black settlers* rather than immigrants, expanding and claiming the settler status hitherto reserved for white British nationals.[20] Gilroy follows suit, referring either to black settlers or *black citizen/settlers*.[21] Goodfellow avoids a specific term and describes instead *people of colour who lived in colonies and former colonies [who] decided to make the journey to the metropole*.[22]

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12 Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir Métropolitain: Politique d'intégration et Parcours de Rapatriés d'Algérie En Métropole (1954-2005)*, 22.

13 Pitti, "La Main d'oeuvre Algérienne Dans l'industrie Automobile (1945-1962), Ou Les Oubliés de l'histoire." Emmanuel Blanchard, "29 Contrôler, Enfermer, Éloigner La Répression Policière et Administrative Des Algériens de Métropole (1946-1962):," in *La France En Guerre 1954-1962* (Autrement, 2008), 318–31, https://doi.org/10.3917/autre.branc.2008.01.0318; Caroline Izambert, "20 Le Rendez-Vous Manqué Des Algériens et Du Parti Communiste Français L'expérience de L'Algérien En France (1950-1960):," in *La France En Guerre 1954-1962* (Autrement, 2008), 222–27, https://doi.org/10.3917/autre.branc.2008.01.0222.

14 Cohen, "Les Circulations Entre France et Algérie."

15 Jones, "Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten En Nederlanders: Nederlandse Politici over Burgers Uit Oost En West En Nederland, 1945-2005"; Laarman, *Oude Onbekenden: Het Politieke En Publieke Debat over Postkoloniale Migranten, 1945-2005*.

16 Schuster, *Poortwachters over Immigranten: Het Debat over Immigratie in Het Naoorlogse Groot-Britannië En Nederland*.

17 Wim Manuhutu, "Moluccans in the Netherlands: A Political Minority?," *Publications de l'École Française de Rome* 146 (1991): 497–511.

18 Banerjee, *Becoming Imperial Citizens: Indians in the Late-Victorian Empire*.

19 El-Enany, *Bordering Britain*, 32–33.

20 Ambalavaner Sivanandan, *A Different Hunger: Writings on Black Resistance* (London: Pluto Press, 1982), 111.

21 Paul Gilroy, "Race Is the Prism," in *Selected Writings on Race and Difference*, ed Paulina De Los Reyes and Ruth Wilson Gilmore (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2021), 6.

22 Goodfellow, *Hostile Environment: How Immigrants Became Scapegoats*, 57–58.

With the exception of (translations of) *repatriate,* these terms have the advantage of resisting the re-embedding of power dynamics associated, for example, with the state's efforts. As Sivanandan illustrates, they are also imbued with attempts to renovate those political landscapes. However, they suffer sometimes from presentism - for example, analysing pre-1962 Algerian migrants as "Algerian" denies their then-formal status as French citizens - and depart sometimes from self-determined categories.

B.3 Self-determined categories

In this section, I recover the terms used by the individuals in question to describe themselves. An important caveat is that I do not share their experiences, and base my information off of secondary sources containing interviews with these individuals. For the French case, Jordi and Hamoumou interviewed "pro-French Muslims" from Algeria in France - including from other types of military units and in administrative roles during colonial rule.[23] Their respondents identify as harkis and firmly reject any 'Muslim' or 'North African' qualifiers. One respondent explained: "I don't understand why they keep calling us 'Muslims.' My mom is from Brittany, my dad is from Kabylia. I don't speak a word of Arabic and I was a practicing Catholic."[24] Another expressed in no uncertain terms: "the term 'Muslim French,' we don't want it… I ask to be called 'harki' because it has historic meaning. We define ourselves in relation to that, and not in relation to a religion."[25] Meanwhile, those whom the French government designated repatriates reclaimed an originally derogatory term to identify as *pieds-noirs* ('black feet').[26]

In the Netherlands, interviewees with whom Molemans spoke identified as *Indo* and *Indisch*, for example: "We Indo's are not like Jews [in how we support each other]. Indisch people keep all their emotions to themselves instead of looking for support from each other."[27] However, those who passed as Dutch - for whatever reason - were also often adamant about being Dutch, as illustrated by the following quote from someone whose mother came from the Moluccan islands and whose father had Dutch citizenship: "throughout 1956, we Dutch were no longer welcome in Indonesia."[28] Meanwhile, respondents interviewed by Snels and van Inge identified as *Moluks* (Moluccan).[29] One of Huijsman's interviewees outright rejected the *Ambonese* label and to some extent the political project of Ambonese fighters for an independent country, pointing out that the island from which they hailed - Fornata - was "closer to Australia than to Ambon" and identified instead in relation to their specific archipelago of origin - *Tanimabarezen*.

In the UK, a strong (initial) identification with Britishness seems to have overlapped with a secondary identification with the specific (subnational or subimperial) region of origin. Colin Grant, whose parents arrived in England from Jamaica in the late 1950s, interviewed over fifty

23 Jordi and Hamoumou, *Les Harkis, Une Mémoire Enfouie*.
24 Jordi and Hamoumou, 20.
25 Jordi and Hamoumou, 20.
26 Jordi, *1962: L'arrivée Des Pieds-Noirs*.
27 Molemans, *Opgevangen in Andijvielucht: De Opvang van Ontheemden Uit Indonesië in Kampen En Contractpensions En de Financiële Claims Op Basis van Uitgebleven Rechtsherstel*, 204.
28 Molemans, 203.
29 HAN, "Molukken: het leven en de identiteit van Molukse Nederlanders," *Oral History In De Klas* (blog), accessed July 17, 2023, https://blog3.han.nl/oralhistory/interviews-uit-de-klas/molukken/.

people from his parents' generation.[30] Many emphasised that prior to coming to England, they identified as British. Said one respondent: "[as] a small boy growing up in my Jamaican rural village, the idea of being British made us special; we were not African, not American, we were British."[31] Grant describes his respondents as West Indian, a term that many also use for themselves or their families.[32] Similarly, in the interviews conducted by Mike and Trevor Phillips, identification with Britishness seems to take precedence over regional identity. Says one former Windrush passenger: "I wouldn't say that we had our own identity. We were always British."[33] Another clarifies in more nuanced but somewhat contradictory terms, "I mean, I didn't have any strong sense of British identity. In ever really had it. But it's the only identity I had, because people from the Caribbean are not from the Caribbean originally. We were taken there, either slaves or indentured labour, or whatever. And I didn't have any strong great feeling for Guyana."[34] On the other hand, in *The Lonely Londoners,* a short novel written by Sam Selvon who migrated from Trinidad to the UK in the 1950s, the characters call each other by their region of origin and emphasise the distinct experiences with which this is associated. "I wish I was like all you Jamaican," says one character; later, another calls him out: "Moses don't know a damn thing about Jamaica. Moses come from Trinidad, which is a thousand miles from Jamaica..."[35]

30 Grant, *Homecoming: Voices of the Windrush Generation*.
31 Grant, 36.
32 Grant, 119.
33 Phillips and Phillips, *Windrush: The Irresistable Rise of Multi-Racial Britain*, 12.
34 Phillips and Phillips, 12.
35 Sam Selvon, *The Lonely Londoners* (London: Allan Windgate, 1956), 26.

Dutch summary

"Sociale burgers of sociale onderdanen? De inclusie van (post)koloniale migranten in Nederlandse, Franse en Britse verzorgingsstaten, 1945-1970."

Probleemstelling

Verzorgingsstaten, die gefinancierd worden via belastingen en sociale premies, berusten op solidariteit binnen de samenleving. Wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar natievorming in de sociologie en de politieke filosofie wijst op het belang van duidelijk afgebakende grenzen voor het bevorderen van deze solidariteit. Een centrale vraag hierbij is echter hoe de gemeenschap wordt afgebakend en hoe wordt bepaald wie wel of geen deel uitmaakt van de gemeenschap. Volgens bestaand onderzoek geven wij voorkeur aan mensen die "op ons lijken." Daarom wordt er door politicologen, economen en sociologen in toenemende mate aandacht besteed aan de vraag of diversiteit, bijvoorbeeld als gevolg van immigratie, een bedreiging voor het voortbestaan van Europese verzorgingsstaten vormt. Sommigen onderzoeken deze vraag door Europese en Amerikaanse verzorgingsstaten met elkaar te vergelijken, waarbij vaak gesuggereerd wordt dat Europese verzorgingsstaten genereuzer zijn dan de Amerikaanse verzorgingsstaat, omdat Europese landen homogener zouden zijn.

Echter, er wordt weinig aandacht besteed aan de opvallende gelijktijdigheid van twee belangrijke historische verschijnselen die de onderbouwing van deze stelling in twijfel trekken. In de naoorlogse periode is *sociaal burgerschap* ontwikkeld en zijn moderne verzorgingsstaten opgericht en uitgebouwd. Tegelijkertijd vond een grote dekolonisatiegolf plaats waarin nagenoeg alle gekoloniseerde landen onafhankelijk zijn geworden, en begon de migratie naar Europa van miljoenen (voormalige) burgers en onderdanen uit deze (voormalige) koloniën. De mate waarin Europeanen in de naoorlogse periode op elkaar leken wordt dus schromelijk overschat binnen de literatuur die zich bezighoudt met de relatie tussen diversiteit en solidariteit. Dit levert een puzzel op: als homogeniteit een voorwaarde is voor solidariteit, hoe kon de oprichting en uitbouw van de verzorgingsstaat ontstaan?

Het doel van dit proefschrift is om na te gaan wat er over sociale zekerheid, diversiteit, burgerschap, en solidariteit valt te leren door een blik te werpen op dit moment in de geschiedenis. Dit proefschrift tracht de volgende vraag te beantwoorden: *hoe werden (post)koloniale migranten opgenomen in de naoorlogse verzorgingsstaten?* Deze vraag wordt beantwoord met behulp van historische casestudies. Dit onderzoek richt zich met name op de analyse van de sociale rechten van migranten uit het huidige Indonesië, Algerije en het Caribisch gebied binnen de naoorlogse context in Nederland, Frankrijk en het Verenigd Koninkrijk, met speciale aandacht voor zowel sociale verzekeringen als bijstandsuitkeringen.

Theorie

De onderzoeksvraag richt zich op het beschrijven en begrijpen van patronen van inclusie. Voor beide doeleinden heb ik een origineel theoretisch raamwerk ontwikkeld. Met inclusie

bedoel ik dat iemand binnen de grenzen van een bepaalde verzorgingsstaat valt. Ik betoog dat inclusie moet worden beoordeeld aan de hand van twee dimensies: hoeveel hulp iemand ontvangt en hoe deze hulp eruitziet. Deze dimensies zijn vernoemd naar de sociologen Thomas Humphrey Marshall en Margaret Somers. Het meten van de Marshall-dimensie vereist een analyse van zowel formele rechten als feitelijk ontvangen steun. De Somers-dimensie beoordeelt het soort hulp dat aangeboden wordt. In het bijzonder wordt er gekeken naar in hoeverre deze steun de privacy, autonomie en het vermogen van de ontvanger om betekenisvolle activiteiten uit te voeren waarborgt. Door de scores op beide dimensies te dichotomiseren ontstaan vier ideaaltypen van inclusie (zie onderstaande tabel).

		Marshall-dimensie	
		Laag	**Hoog**
Somers-dimensie	**Laag**	Gettoïsering	Paternalisme
	Hoog	Symbolische empathie	Hyperassimilatie

Binnen één verzorgingsstaat kunnen er meerdere vormen van inclusie ontstaan. Dit heeft te maken met het feit dat voorzieningen verschillende functies voor de natiestaat vervullen. Bijvoorbeeld, uitkeringen die hoog op de Somers-dimensie scoren kunnen bijdragen aan een gevoel van morele rechtvaardigheid onder ontvangers. Uitkeringen die laag op de Somers-dimensie scoren, bijvoorbeeld doordat ze van de ontvangers eisen dat zij aan bepaalde voorwaarden voldoen voordat zij steun kunnen krijgen, kunnen culturele en/of sociale gedragsveranderingen aandrijven die als wenselijk worden beschouwd. Paternalisme kan toezicht mogelijk maken op bevolkingsgroepen die als (sociaal of cultureel) bedreigend worden gezien, terwijl gettoïsering de ultieme grenzen van de gemeenschap aangeeft door een signaal te geven over wie er juist *niet* bij hoort.

Waar iemand binnen de 2x2-matrix valt hangt af van hoe zijn identiteit geconstrueerd wordt. De constructie van een identiteit is een ideologisch proces. Met ideologie wordt geduid op conceptuele schema's die mensen helpen hun realiteit te verwerken. Ideologie bevat aannames over hoe de wereld in elkaar steekt, welke waarden belangrijk zijn en welke conflicten centraal staan. Ideologieën kennen over het algemeen (groepen van) individuen specifieke posities binnen hun ideologisch kader toe; dit zijn identiteiten. Identiteiten worden gecreëerd door kenmerken aan groepen toe te wijzen en deze kenmerken vervolgens te verbinden aan dominante waarden. Het concept ras, bijvoorbeeld, berust op de ideologische veronderstelling dat mensen kunnen worden ingedeeld in samenhangende, zelfstandige biologische eenheden. Racialisatie komt voor wanneer iemand een plek in dit schema krijgt toegewezen doordat bepaalde kenmerken als vast en aangeboren worden beschouwd. Iemands identiteit bepaalt hoe diegene door de staat of samenleving wordt gezien. Zo kunnen er verschillen ontstaan in hoe belangrijk het wordt geacht om bijvoorbeeld iemand onder toezicht te houden, iemand zijn gedrag te veranderen of iemand zijn vertrouwen te winnen. Daardoor kunnen ideologische constructies een effect hebben op hoe iemand opgenomen wordt in de verzorgingsstaat.

Methodologie

In dit proefschrift wordt de historisch-interpretatieve methodologie toegepast. Historisch-interpretivisme combineert het vermogen van de historicus om de rol van context te begrijpen met de interpretatieve focus op hoe mensen betekenis geven aan hun wereld. De conclusies in dit proefschrift worden getrokken door middel van (a) voorzichtige vergelijkingen tussen verschillende eenheden, waarbij deze holistisch worden benaderd en niet in variabelen worden opgesplitst; (b) abductie, ofwel het voortdurend in gesprek brengen van theorie en data; en (c) het contextualiseren van de redenen die door mensen worden gegeven. De drie casussen werden geselecteerd door te kijken naar de Europese landen waar postkoloniale migratie het grootst is geweest (zowel in aandeel van de totale bevolking als in verhouding tot het aantal buitenlandse migranten) en waarvan ik de taal voldoende beheerste om diepgaande analyses uit te voeren. Zowel sociale verzekeringen als sociale voorzieningen worden onderzocht, omdat er belangrijke institutionele verschillen bestaan tussen deze vormen van steun. Sociale verzekeringen worden bijvoorbeeld grotendeels vanuit premies gefinancierd terwijl sociale voorzieningen uit de staatskas worden betaald. Deze verschillen zijn belangrijk omdat bestaand onderzoek suggereert dat 'deservingness' – de mate waarin iemand zijn rechten 'verdient' volgens publieke opinie – per uitkering kan variëren. Zo kan het voorkomen dat iemand die via het betalen van premies heeft bijgedragen aan de steun die hij ontvangt bijvoorbeeld als meer 'deserving' wordt beschouwd dan iemand die gebruikmaakt van sociale voorzieningen. De data zijn afkomstig van nationale en gemeentelijke archieven in de drie onderzochte landen. Interviews vielen buiten de reikwijdte van dit proefschrift, maar vormen een belangrijke vervolgstap voor toekomstig onderzoek.

Bevindingen

De Franse en Nederlandse verzorgingsstaten hebben op een soortgelijke wijze gereageerd op de komst van (post)koloniale migranten uit respectievelijk Algerije en Indonesië in de naoorlogse periode. In beide gevallen ontstond er fragmentatie omdat zowel in Frankrijk als in Nederland hyperassimilatie, paternalisme en gettoïsering naast elkaar bestonden. Hyperassimilatie was voorbehouden aan individuen die als 'repatrianten' werden beschouwd, een status die voornamelijk gereserveerd was voor witte ("Europese") migranten die na de onafhankelijkheid het staatsburgerschap behielden dankzij de erfenis van koloniale nationaliteitscodes. Voor de repatrianten waren er gerichte steunregelingen en werd er bovendien aandacht besteed aan spiritueel en mentaal welzijn. In beide landen werden ook de criteria voor toegang tot de sociale zekerheid versoepeld. In Nederland duurde deze wereld van hyperassimilatie van 1946 tot ongeveer 1968 en in Frankrijk ontstond de dynamiek later en duurde die korter (van 1961 tot 1966).

Ondertussen leek de opname van Algerijnse arbeidsmigranten in de Franse verzorgingsstaat (1946-1962), en van repatrianten uit Indonesië die een 'Oosterse' identiteit kregen toegewezen (1951-1963) eerder op paternalisme, gekenmerkt door een relatief hoge score op de Marshall-dimensie en een lage score op de Somers-dimensie. Beide groepen konden aanspraak maken op algemene bijstand en werden verplicht deel te nemen aan sociale verzekeringen. Hun materiële

rechten werden echter ondermijnd door pogingen om hen in cultureel opzicht te assimileren. Algerijnse migranten droegen evenveel bij aan de kinderbijslagfondsen als inwoners van Europese afkomst, maar werden minder uitbetaald. Vanaf 1958 werd het verschil tussen hun bijdragen en uitkeringen niet gebruikt om hun uitkering te verhogen, maar om hen toegang tot sociale diensten zoals klinieken, opvanghuizen, en schoonmaakcursussen te bieden. Deze vorm van inclusie verhinderde hun vermogen om voor hun eigen gezinnen te zorgen en zorgde op andere manieren voor een gebrek aan autonomie. In Nederland had enkele jaren daarvoor een (geheim) rapport de repatrianten conceptueel verdeeld in 'Westerse' en 'Oosterse' Nederlanders. Maatschappelijke werksters controleerden vervolgens of de repatrianten wat betreft koken, aankleden, meubileren en kinderopvang, voldoende Westers waren.

Ten slotte werden voormalige soldaten en ondersteunend personeel die in het koloniale leger hadden gediend in Frankrijk (1962-1976) en Nederland (1951-1970) bij aankomst geconfronteerd met gettoïsering. Harki's en Molukkers werden naar kampen gestuurd waar kampbewakers toezicht hielden op hun dagelijkse activiteiten. Ze werden niet als repatrianten beschouwd en kwamen door formele en informele barrières grotendeels niet in aanmerking voor de steunregelingen voor repatrianten. Alexandre Parodi, een van de grondleggers van de Franse verzorgingsstaat, was verantwoordelijk voor het ontwerpen en uitvoeren van een parallel systeem van sociale zekerheid dat "geschikt voor moslims" werd genoemd. Dit werd opgevat als het voorzien van "complete voogdij." In Nederland heeft het netwerk van kerkelijke en particuliere organisaties dat zich met repatrianten bezighield, het *Centraal comité van kerkelijk en particulier initiatief voor de sociale zorg ten behoeve van gerepatrieerden* (CCKP), expliciet afstand gedaan van iedere verantwoordelijkheid jegens Molukkers en geklaagd toen deze gebruik maakten van hun diensten.

De Britse verzorgingsstaat vertoonde, in tegenstelling tot de Nederlandse en de Franse, meer universalisme ten opzichte van de nieuwkomers. Uniforme bijdragen en uitkeringen vormden de hoeksteen van de naoorlogse hervormingen van Beveridge. Caribische migranten hadden dezelfde (formele) sociale rechten als alle andere burgers. Wel waren ze vaker aangewezen op een bijstandsuitkering dan andere uitkeringen omdat sociale verzekering vereiste dat een minimumaantal weken premies werd betaald. Dit bracht zijn eigen uitdagingen met zich mee, aangezien de bijstand behoorlijk veel discretie overliet aan ambtenaren van de *National Assistance Board* (NAB). In Londen en in Birmingham werden systematisch lagere uitkeringen aan aanvragers van kleur uitbetaald dan aan witte aanvragers. Niettemin was de belangrijkste vorm van uitsluiting te vinden in de vorm van de immigratiewetten die toegang tot Groot-Brittannië belemmerde voor Britse burgers uit de koloniën. In de debatten voorafgaand aan de totstandkoming van deze wetten is duidelijk te zien dat de besluiten onderbouwd werden met verwijzingen naar het vermeende (over)gebruik van sociale bijstand. Echter, de NAB wees er regelmatig op dat het beroep van deze groepen op de staatskas niet uit de pas liep met andere groepen.

Wat betreft het verklaren van deze patronen betoog ik dat ideologische constructies van migranten als '*deserving*' invloed hebben uitgeoefend op de vormen van inclusie die zijn ontstaan. Ongelijkheden waren vaak raciaal van aard maar vertoonden belangrijke inhoudelijke verschillen tussen landen. In Nederland en Frankrijk was culturele proximiteit

een belangrijk onderdeel van de discussie; in Nederland uitte dit zich in verwijzingen naar Europees- of Westers-zijn, terwijl in Frankrijk het discours vaak gedomineerd werd door religie. Deze geschillen brachten de identiteiten van Oosterse Nederlanders en Franse Moslims tot leven. In het Verenigde Koninkrijk ging het conflict hoofdzakelijk over de werkbereidheid van mogelijke ontvangers. Britse bijdragers aan een gloednieuwe universele verzorgingsstaat stonden sympathiek tegenover dit bevoorrechten van wederkerigheid en werkethiek. Er ontstonden weliswaar raciale ongelijkheden, maar deze kwamen niet voort uit vaste identiteiten en aangeboren eigenschappen. Zo konden dezelfde feiten door twee verschillende ideologische standpunten anders worden opgevat. De hogere ongevallencijfers onder Algerijnse werknemers in Frankrijk werden door één kamp verklaard door de werknemers eigen slordigheid, en door de ander als bewijs dat deze migranten de meest gevaarlijke taken werden toegewezen binnen een bedrijf. De moeilijke woonomstandigheden van Caribische migranten in Engeland werden door één kamp beschreven als een gevolg van hun eigen voorkeuren en door de ander verklaard door discriminatie op de woningmarkt.

Ongelijkheden waren dus niet vooraf bepaald, hoewel de raciale ideologie een belangrijke erfenis van de koloniale wetgeving was. Constructies van '*deservingness*' werden voorgesteld en betwist door verschillende actoren, waaronder juristen, lobbyisten, Kamerleden, maatschappelijke werksters, en ambtenaren. Uit deze constructies vloeide een bepaalde opvatting over de juiste vorm van inclusie voort. Tijdgenoten verantwoordden hun besluiten met argumenten over wat noodzakelijk was, vaak voor het welzijn van de migranten zelf. Zo reageerde een anonieme Nederlandse minister in februari 1960 over de ruimhartigheid van hyperassimilatie als volgt: "de gerepatrieerden *behoeven* een hogere norm dan de Armenwet omdat zij in moeilijke omstandigheden verkeren."[36] Het framen van een besluit in deze termen hielp om beleid te depolitiseren en de verantwoordelijkheid voor de gevolgen ervan te ontlopen.

Algemene conclusies

Dit proefschrift verbetert de theoretische gereedschapskist die tot onze beschikking staat voor het beoordelen van inclusie in verzorgingsstaten en het analyseren van de relatie tussen zowel diversiteit en solidariteit als ras en herverdeling. Mijn bevindingen suggereren dat migratie geen bedreiging vormde voor de solidariteit. In plaats daarvan bood migratie een mogelijkheid om solidariteit bewust en handmatig te creëren. Als iets als bedreigend zou kunnen worden opgevat was het racisme en niet diversiteit. Echter, racisme leidde tot nieuwe, aparte vormen van inclusie en niet tot een inkrimping van de verzorgingsstaat. Dit onderzoek trekt in zekere zin ook het vermeende belang van publiek draagvlak voor beleid ter discussie. Ik toon namelijk aan dat dit minder invloedrijk is dan vaak verondersteld wordt. Het publiek is geen monoliet; er zijn belangrijke geschillen op ideologisch niveau. Wanneer één ideologisch standpunt aan invloed wint, kan beleid worden gemaakt dat niet alleen de grenzen van de gemeenschap verlegt of beperkt, maar ook de mening van het publiek over waar deze grenzen horen te liggen verandert.

36 NL-HaNA-2.27.02-1013-Minutes of Ministerial Council, 5 February 1960.

APPENDIX

About the author

Emily Anne Wolff (The Hague, 1994) obtained an International Baccalaureate (IB) diploma from the American School of The Hague in 2011. Subsequently they began their undergraduate studies as a Jefferson Scholar at the University of Virginia (USA) before transferring to the London School of Economics (UK), where they graduated with a BSc. in Environment and Development and an MSc. in Global Politics in 2016 and 2018 respectively (both with First Class Honours). They spent one year as an Erasmus exchange student at Sciences Po Paris, Campus Dijon (France), and one year in Nairobi (Kenya) doing research and project management in the sustainability sector. At LSE, Emily developed an interest in dependency theory, global political economy and the imprints left by colonialism on North-South politics and trade. This culminated in a research project on foreign interventions in East African industrial policies which was published in the *Review of International Political Economy* in 2020.

In 2019, Emily joined the Institute of Public Administration at Leiden University as a PhD candidate on the NWO-funded project, *Borders of Equality*, led by Dr. Alexandre Afonso. The project provided Emily with the opportunity to explore an array of new ideas, epistemologies and methods with which to approach their enduring interest in inequality. As part of their PhD trajectory, Emily attended the NordWel Summer School, the ECPR Winter School, and various courses from the Netherlands Institute of Governance and Aarhus University. Emily also undertook research stays at the Max Planck-Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo) in Paris, France (Oct 2021- Apr 2022) and the Department of Sociology at the University of Cambridge, UK (Nov 2022). Alongside the dissertation, Emily maintained an interest in political economy, (co-) authoring articles published in the *Journal of European Social Policy, the Brazilian Journal of Public Administration* and *New Political Economy*.

As a PhD candidate, Emily obtained a University Teaching Qualification (UTQ) and taught several courses on inequality, the governance of global challenges and qualitative research methods. In 2019 Emily was a founding member of the Staff Alliance for Equity (SAFE), a platform responsible for engaging constructively with issues around diversity, inclusion and social safety at the workplace. Since 2024 Emily Anne Wolff holds a position as Assistant Professor at the Institute of Public Administration at Leiden University.

In 2019, the UK Home Secretary Sajid Javid addressed elderly Caribbeans who had arrived on the British Isles as UK citizens to apologise for having gradually stripped them of their rights to welfare and social services over the preceding five years. In 2021, President Macron asked for forgiveness on behalf of the French state from harkis, former colonial auxiliaries from Algeria, for interning them in camps upon their arrival in mainland France in the 1960s. In 2023, Dutch Pensions Minister Carola Schouten announced a compensatory payment to those retirees whose residence in the Surinamese part of the Dutch empire did not count for the build-up of their pension rights. The messy encounter between the post-war European welfare state, on the one hand, and the empire(s) within which it took shape, on the other, is of ongoing relevance to the rights and livelihoods of many Europeans today.

This dissertation pulls into focus the social rights of over one million individuals who traveled from colony to metropole in the post-war period. It does so to contribute to a broader research agenda focused on the impact of migration and (racial) diversity on solidarity. If diversity and solidarity are incompatible, how did the so-called Golden Age of welfare expansion coincide with such substantial migration flows? Moreover, if welfare states need boundaries, how did emerging welfare states in decolonising empires draw them? Through historical-interpretivist comparative case studies of different groups of (post)colonial migrants in the Netherlands, France, and the UK, this dissertation builds original theory about the character and drivers of inclusion that will be useful for students of welfare, race, citizenship, and migration, as well as anyone interested in the location and dynamics of community boundaries, or curious about whether immigration threatens welfare states ■