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Leiden
The Netherlands

North Korea and the liberation of Southern Africa, 1960-2020

Hoog, T.A. van der

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SOLIDARITY

THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN STRUGGLE

In retrospect, a revolution always seems like an eruption, observes the writer Namwali Serpell in her great Zambian novel *The Old Drift*. Revolution is commonly understood as ‘a massive upheaval that overturns everything, flips the tables, shatters the sky, fractures the earth’. Yet, in truth, ‘no one talks about how long a revolution takes or how boring it can be, how it can slowly chew time with grinding teeth before gulping it down at once’.⁶⁷

Between 1960 and 1990, Southern Africa was a region engulfed in revolution. The end of World War II unleashed a whirlwind of nationalist campaigns for self-determination while colonial empires crumbled. As the Cold War came to an end, the region regained its political freedom. So, within half a century, the political conditions in Southern Africa had changed completely.

The African nationalists, these agents of change, characterised their campaigns for independence as a *struggle* – and that is exactly what it was. For outsiders, the political turnaround in Southern Africa may seem remarkably fast; yet, for the people in the midst of the struggle, it was often painfully long. The burden of a century of colonial occupation weighed heavily on those that made history. Anticolonial campaigns could last decades, as was the case in South Africa – which only held its first democratic elections in 1994.

During the decades of decolonisation, the eyes of the world were fixed upon Southern Africa. As the region captured international headlines, powerful external forces sought to influence the unfolding events. This chapter highlights a crucial dimension in the fight for freedom, namely, solidarity. The first section provides a historical summary of the occupation of Southern Africa and introduces the national liberation movements that opposed the racially divided status quo. The chapter then zooms out to examine African solidarity, most notably the Frontline States and the Liberation Committee. Finally, the chapter considers the global implications of African decolonisation through a discussion of the United Nations and the necessity for Afro-Asian solidarity.

The Occupation and Liberation of Southern Africa

Most of the African continent had achieved independence by the 1960s – except for Southern Africa, the last region in the world to remain colonised. A loose coalition of white minority governments ignored the thundering calls for liberation and ‘stubbornly held on to power’: the Portuguese Empire controlled Angola and Mozambique; Ian Smith’s settler regime governed Rhodesia (modern Zimbabwe); and the Nasionale Party ruled South Africa and Namibia with an iron fist.⁶⁸

South Africa is the key to unlocking the various interwoven liberation struggles of the entire Southern African region. Its unwavering commitment to apartheid determined events far beyond its borders. South Africa had incorporated South West Africa (modern Namibia) as an unofficial fifth province and backed Smith’s minority rule in Rhodesia. When Angola and Mozambique suddenly became independent in 1975 (an outcome of the Carnation Revolution in Portugal that overthrew the *Estado Novo* regime), and were subsequently plunged into civil wars, South Africa interfered by supporting armed groups that opposed the newly elected African governments.⁶⁹ The result was a complicated mix of prolonged guerrilla wars across the Southern Africa region, a messy history that is explored in more detail in Chapter 6.

⁶⁷ Serpell 2019, p. 533.

⁶⁸ Passemiers 2019, p. 3.

⁶⁹ Correia and Verhoef 2009.

African resistance to minority rule was organised through national liberation movements, the protagonists of this book. Every revolution needs its administrators. Liberation movements were complex organisations with extensive bureaucracies that gradually came to mirror the states they vowed to overthrow. Their civil servants were essentially revolutionaries with business cards. Long before independence, the most successful African liberation movements operated as proto-states: led by a president and a central committee that acted as a cabinet, these organisations coordinated various departments, small armies, and foreign missions that functioned as informal embassies.⁷⁰ When SWAPO opened an office in India in 1986 (four years before Namibian independence), Sam Nujoma called it a ‘SWAPO Embassy’.⁷¹ During the struggle, the ANC had more foreign missions than the South African apartheid government.⁷²

In response to their fight to introduce majority rule, African liberation movements were banned, oppressed, and persecuted. This only added fuel to the fire. Numerous freedom fighters poured into exile in the Frontline States (such as Zambia and Tanzania), where the most powerful liberation movements established headquarters and camps. Most, if not all, key figures in the struggle passed through these camps at a certain point in time, and some lived there for years on end.

In these exile camps, national liberation movements were able to govern their own citizens and exercise the traditional functions of a state for the first time: the rule of law; the monopoly of violence; and the administration of public institutions such as schools and hospitals.⁷³ ‘The nature of our struggle’, according to the ANC, ‘calls upon us to exercise some of the functions of an embryonic state. We have our army, we have our security, we already express the beginnings of a new popular sovereignty’.⁷⁴ When the journalist Lisa Distelheim visited an ANC camp near Lusaka (Zambia), she described the movement as a ‘state within a state waiting to go home’. The camp included a radio station, a publishing house, a clinic, and a farm.⁷⁵ Similarly, Machel called the liberated areas during the Mozambican struggle ‘a school in the exercise of power’. In these areas, FRELIMO ‘gained experience in alternatives of government ... They were the decisive factor in the transformation of the struggle into a revolutionary struggle’.⁷⁶

For anticolonial movements, the route to freedom was uncertain. As captured in Serpell’s novel, it could take years or even decades before a revolution was successful in securing independence. The time spent in limbo was a daunting challenge, trapped between a shackled past and a liberating future. As these movements organised themselves into proto-states,⁷⁷ it was a time of both imagining new and different worlds and of day-to-day survival and power struggles.

The decolonisation of Southern Africa is a transnational history marked by complex regional dynamics of cross-border interactions between national liberation movements.⁷⁸ This was

⁷⁰ Melber 2002.

⁷¹ [NSS] SWAPO Information Bulletin: October 1986. Prior to Namibian independence, SWAPO officials were already trained as diplomats. See [SWAPOA] 02000009-9A/9C; [SWAPOA] 02000006. I want to thank Saima Ashipala for sharing these files with me.

⁷² Meeting with Hugh Macmillan, 22 March 2022.

⁷³ Williams 2015.

⁷⁴ [MA] ANC Lusaka Box 46: Draft ANC code of discipline.

⁷⁵ [SEA] 2.5.4.3: Lisa Distelheim, 30 October 1986]

⁷⁶ [NAI] PC Mozambique NLM FRELIMO: speech by Machel, 27 April 1984.

⁷⁷ Suttner 2008.

⁷⁸ Saunders 2010; Alexander et al. 2017; Alexander et al. 2020, p. 821.

largely the result of exile: examples include the camps and headquarters of liberation movements that were scattered across the region; the party conferences that were organised on foreign soil; and the ad hoc diplomatic or military alliances between anticolonial movements.⁷⁹ Even their propaganda was transnational: published from exile, the public messaging of liberation movements often contained profiles, solidarity statements, and interviews with leaders from fellow revolutionary organisations.

The historian Jan-Bart Gewald conceptualises Southern Africa as ‘a single whole, albeit with different accents’. This region is bound together by deep cultural and economic structures that have been forged over the past thousand years.⁸⁰ The political history of decolonisation in Southern Africa only reinforces Gewald’s observations. To reiterate, most of Southern Africa continues to be ruled by former liberation movements and thus shares a similar political culture, one that is rooted in the transnational struggles of the recent past.⁸¹

Within the parameters of this study, Tanzania is an integral part of Southern Africa. For African liberation fighters, its capital, Dar es Salaam, was a ‘hub of decolonisation’ where exiled nationalists could establish headquarters and camps.⁸² Neto called the city ‘one of the heroic capitals of African resistance to colonial and racist rule’.⁸³ The city operated as a ‘gatekeeper’ between African liberation movements and the outside world. ‘New connections and channels for mobility could be forged, maintained and managed’, notes the historian Eric Burton. This was especially true for the relations between African revolutionaries and communist countries, which were dependent on hubs such as Dar es Salaam, as colonial countries cracked down on contacts with the Communist Bloc.⁸⁴

Tanzania was one of the principal stages for the politics of African solidarity, and therefore a strategic place for North Korean investment.⁸⁵ As an exiled North Korean diplomat with working experience in Dar es Salaam told me, Tanzania became one of the core countries of North Korea’s Africa policy: the two nations had ‘a very close relationship’. Dar es Salaam hosted the largest North Korean embassy in Africa and the only one built by the North Koreans themselves. Among the approximately 40 staff members, a special diplomat was dispatched to forge relationships with Southern African liberation movements.⁸⁶ The two nations had established diplomatic relations in 1965, which was followed by a succession of visits and pledges for cooperation.⁸⁷ North Korea had had ‘singled out Tanzania among the developing countries as an area of special interest’, and utilised the country as an entry point into the various liberation struggles in Southern Africa.⁸⁸

African Solidarity

The diplomacy of African liberation movements ‘was crucial’ to maintaining the ‘flows of weapons, material aid, and humanitarian support’ upon which the survival of said movements depended.⁸⁹ To a large extent, liberation movements launched these diplomatic efforts from Tanzania and other members of the Frontline States. During the Cold War, the Frontline States

⁷⁹ For instance, the ANC-ZAPU alliance or the ZANU-FRELIMO alliance in the 1970s. See Macmillan 2017; Mungambe 2017.

⁸⁰ Gewald 2014.

⁸¹ Melber 2002.

⁸² Burton 2019.

⁸³ [NAI] PC Angola NLM MPLA: speech by Neto, 8 September 1972.

⁸⁴ Burton 2019, p. 29.

⁸⁵ Roberts 2021.

⁸⁶ Interview with an anonymous North Korean diplomat, Seoul, 19 July 2021.

⁸⁷ The Nationalist, 13 January 1966. I wish to thank Brooks Marmon for sharing this file with me.

⁸⁸ [NARA] RG 59, SNF Entry# 1613-D, Box# 2616, POL 19 TAIWAN -- POL 6 TANZAN: Dar es Salaam to Department of State, 6 November 1973.

⁸⁹ Alexander et al. 2017.

operated as a loose alliance of African states that opposed South African apartheid. Through its summits and interpersonal relations, the group would ‘shape Africa’s position on decolonisation’.⁹⁰

The Frontline States originated from informal consultations between Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere in the 1960s on the question of how to support liberation movements in neighbouring countries. When other leaders joined, this group became known as the Mulungushi Club.⁹¹ In 1969, these leaders produced the Lusaka Manifesto, a statement that outlined the African strategy to challenge South Africa. In the words of the Zimbabwean nationalist Nathan Shamuyarira, the Lusaka Manifesto became a ‘rallying point for all African states, moderate and radical’.⁹² Chapter 6 discusses the Manifesto and subsequent African policy documents in further detail.

The Frontline States gradually expanded as a deterrent against South Africa. Formally established by name in 1975, the group originally consisted of Botswana, Lesotho, Tanzania, and Zambia, and in subsequent years incorporated Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe.⁹³ This created a liberated zone that stretched roughly from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean. The Frontline States found themselves in a precarious position, as their expressions of solidarity were published by South Africa’s strategies of destabilisation. Kaunda described Zambia’s predicament as ‘sitting at the edge of an active volcano whose lava spills beyond its crater’.⁹⁴

In addition to the Frontline States, the Liberation Committee was a key factor in the support of African liberation movements. Established by the Organisation of African Unity in 1963, the Liberation Committee was headquartered in Dar es Salaam and mobilised political support and material resources for exiled nationalists.⁹⁵ Machel, the leader of FRELIMO, stated that the Liberation Committee was ‘above all an essential instrument of African solidarity’.⁹⁶ At a 1975 meeting of the OAU, Machel characterised the organisation as a ‘Blood Bank’.⁹⁷ He reminisced about how Tanzanian people would queue up in hospitals to donate blood to Mozambican people, and claimed that ‘Tanzanian blood saved many Mozambican lives’.⁹⁸

However, Machel’s powerful prose cannot disguise the fact that there was also a strong degree of competition between liberation movements for recognition. For each colonised territory in Southern Africa there were multiple nationalist groups that were bitter rivals and competed with each other for funding and status.⁹⁹ The Liberation Committee tried to foster unity between rivalling groups but often failed.¹⁰⁰ Its ability to fund certain liberation movements and set aside others turbocharged intra-nationalist competition.

The liberation governments that are in power today were not always the obvious frontrunners in the past. Namibia’s political history seems defined by SWAPO but, in truth, the nationalist campaign in Namibia was initially spearheaded by the rival SWANU, which was recognised by the OAU and was a member of the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation.¹⁰¹ The SWAPO diplomat Andreas Shipanga described his ‘horror’ at discovering that he was not allowed to attend the opening ceremony of an AAPSO conference in Havana (Cuba), in 1965. After ‘flying halfway round the world’ he was stopped at the entrance of the

⁹⁰ Khadiagala 1994, p. 24.

⁹¹ Khadiagala 1994, p. 24.

⁹² [NAI] PC Southern Africa NLM: Shamuyarira and Leonard.

⁹³ Khadiagala 1994.

⁹⁴ [NAI] PC Southern Africa NLM: Shamuyarira and Leonard.

⁹⁵ Saunders 2018, p. 154.

⁹⁶ [NAI] PC Southern Africa NLM: Shamuyarira and Leonard.

⁹⁷ [NAI] PC Mozambique NLM FRELIMO: speech Machel, 8 January 1975.

⁹⁸ [NAI] PC Southern Africa NLM: Shamuyarira and Leonard.

⁹⁹ Alexander et al. 2017.

¹⁰⁰ Saunders 2018, p. 154.

¹⁰¹ See Emmett 1999, p. 315-337.

conference venue because it was the rival SWANU that was identified as the representatives of the Namibian struggle, instead of SWAPO. Shipanga was ‘furious’ that he missed Fidel Castro’s speech but decided to make the most of his time in Cuba (no doubt helped by the Cubans stocking a ‘fresh bottle of Bacardi rum’ in his room every day).¹⁰²

The fortunes of liberation movements could easily change. The main difference between SWANU and SWAPO was the decision to pick up arms against South Africa. The Liberation Committee and other benefactors favoured nationalist organisations that were willing to wage war on the battlefield and sidelined organisations that confined themselves to conference rooms. Fanuel Kozonguizi, a founding member of SWANU, said that ‘SWAPO’s single asset in the battle for recognition was their declaration of an armed struggle in 1966’.¹⁰³ SWANU was expelled from AAPSO in 1967 and lost OAU recognition in 1968.¹⁰⁴ Kozonguizi no longer received a stipend from the Liberation Committee, as one of the OAU officials argued that ‘we have neither time nor money for movements that do not produce results’.¹⁰⁵ Abruptly, SWAPO became the leading light of the Namibian struggle.

Similar examples can be found across the Southern African region. In Zimbabwe, for example, nationalist energies were initially channelled through ZAPU, led by Joshua Nkomo, but internal disputes impeded the organisation. The historian Stuart Doran describes how gradually ‘tensions morphed into open hostility’ among the ZAPU leadership, and when the rift reached a climax in Dar es Salaam, Mugabe and others left the party and formed ZANU. The schism between the two parties came to define much of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle.¹⁰⁶ It was ultimately ZANU that would win the first democratic elections in Zimbabwe, in 1980, and the party would subsequently use its state power and North Korean help to crush ZAPU (more on this in Chapter 9).

The Liberation Committee clearly had its limits. It had to navigate complicated nationalist rivalries – not only with regard to Namibia and Zimbabwe, but also in the case of Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa. Furthermore, the Liberation Committee was incapable of meeting the material and financial needs of the liberation movements. This is illustrated by a military budget that SWAPO submitted to the OAU in 1967 (for a total sum of 65,000 British pounds). In the conclusion, SWAPO stressed that ‘the financial assistance we receive from the Committee is always far below our needs’.¹⁰⁷ In short, African liberation movements could not rely on African solidarity alone and had to search for alternative sources of support.

Global Solidarity

The historian Alanna O’Malley describes how the UN ‘enjoyed an unprecedented and unique moment of influence’ around the time of African decolonisation and the Korean War, as the Afro-Asian Bloc within the organisation grew considerably. At the time, the UN developed an ‘activist and interventionist’ agenda, offering political support for African and Asian actors.¹⁰⁸

For African liberation movements, the UN was a vital forum that offered funding, legitimacy, and political capital. In Namibia, for example, nationalist Africans in the 1950s automatically ‘looked to the UN for help in their struggle’ and petitioned the world body to intervene on their behalf. The UN General Assembly later recognised SWAPO as ‘the sole and authentic representative’ of the Namibian nation, a status that greatly contributed to the credibility of the nationalist movement.¹⁰⁹ Lydia Walker argues that ‘the prospect and presence’

¹⁰² Armstrong 1989, p. 8-845.

¹⁰³ [BAB] PA.48: No 4.

¹⁰⁴ [BAB] PA.48: No 5.

¹⁰⁵ [NAI] PC History: Solana, January 1969.

¹⁰⁶ Doran 2017, p. 8.

¹⁰⁷ [UNAM] PA1/20/13.

¹⁰⁸ O’Malley 2018, p. 2.

¹⁰⁹ Saunders 2007.

of a UN committee dedicated to Namibia ‘completely shaped the Namibian independence struggle’.¹¹⁰ SWAPO was not the only liberation movement that travelled to New York in search of support – the UN received numerous African liberation movements throughout the Cold War. Chapter 2 describes in more detail how North Korea approached the UN as a venue to cooperate with African actors. The Korean peninsula was the oldest Cold War affair debated in the UN General Assembly.¹¹¹

The supranational power of the UN had its limits, though, because the world body ultimately consisted of national states that determined its policies. The historian Christopher Saunders shows that, in Namibia, the UN ‘only played its role when the Western countries allowed it to do so’. While SWAPO ‘never entirely lost faith’ in the UN, it did have ‘major doubts’ about its effectiveness.¹¹² O’Malley argues that the UN ‘itself became a contested battleground for different ideas and visions of world order’.¹¹³

As African solidarity was insufficient to support the needs of African liberation movements, and the United Nations was limited in its power, liberation movements became dependent on sponsorship from powerful countries in the West and the East. Consequently, they were inadvertently sucked into the vortex of Cold War tensions.

The Western and Eastern Blocs approached African decolonisation from entirely different angles. The stark difference in assistance from both parts of the world is well captured in diplomat Shipanga’s testimony during a United States Senate hearing in 1982. During the 1960s, he had established several offices and military camps for SWAPO in exile and made the rounds at foreign embassies to rally support. He described that ‘either it was because of great naiveté or some strange illusion’ that he first tried to approach the Western Bloc, as he was met with ‘open hostility and contempt’ in Western missions in Dar es Salaam, Kinshasa, Accra, Cairo, and Algiers. Finally, he knocked on the doors of Asian and socialist countries, who ‘not only sympathised but also supported our struggle’.¹¹⁴

The relations between the Western world and Southern Africa were tense. The United States ‘had an ambivalent attitude towards decolonisation’, and was widely condemned in Southern Africa for linking Namibian decolonisation to the withdrawal of Cuban troops in Angola, a position that severely delayed Namibian independence.¹¹⁵ Portugal and the United Kingdom were obviously tarnished by their own colonial exploits, while NATO countries supplied military hardware to Portugal and the apartheid regime of South Africa. The Western indifference to the Southern African struggles is captured in Mvula ya Nangolo’s poem, in which he laments the distance between Robben Island and the UN headquarters, the London Stock Exchange, and the White House.¹¹⁶

As a side note, there was oftentimes a discrepancy between the position of Western states and (parts of) their populations. Citizens across the Western world and beyond established solidarity groups to support African anticolonial movements.¹¹⁷ The Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) in particular became ‘one of the most significant social movements during the post-war era’.¹¹⁸ North Korea carefully studied the AAM’s statutes, publications, and staff in an attempt to understand the Southern African struggles.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁰ Walker 2019.

¹¹¹ Park 1978, p. 73.

¹¹² Saunders 2007.

¹¹³ O’Malley 2018, p. 2.

¹¹⁴ [UNAM] PA1/1/5; see also Armstrong 1989.

¹¹⁵ Walker 2019; Saunders 2007.

¹¹⁶ ‘Robben Island’, by Mvula ya Nangolo. See Moore and Beier 2007.

¹¹⁷ Gurney 2000.

¹¹⁸ Thörn 2006.

¹¹⁹ [BL] MSS. AAM 2323.

Whereas the doors of the Western world remained largely closed for African diplomats, the gates to the East were swung open, especially those in Asia. This moment in time was the breakthrough of Afro-Asian solidarity, an intercontinental alliance that emerged from the Bandung Conference of 1955. ‘Bandung’ was a key moment to ‘discuss the possible futures of the postcolonial world’, notes the historian Christopher J. Lee, and became the moniker of an era during which new networks were established between non-aligned countries.¹²⁰ In particular, the founding of the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation and the Non-Aligned Movement presented novel opportunities for African liberation movements to find support among Asian states. Chapter 2 elaborates upon the question of how AAPSO and NAM were used by North Korea to connect to African liberation movements.

Asian support for African liberation movements was often seen by Western stakeholders as evidence of communist indoctrination. In 1967, Kaunda proclaimed that he did not know ‘whether to be angry or to laugh’ at accusations that he was ‘a man moving towards the East ... towards the communist camp’. He stressed that Zambian policy was informed by domestic principles and criticised Western hypocrisy: when he made four trips to the West he was not labelled as a capitalist, but when he made one trip to Peking he was immediately branded as a communist. ‘We will get aid wherever it is available’, Kaunda said, ‘but we never allow those who give us aid to influence our thinking’.¹²¹

The driving force behind African liberation movements was a quest for self-determination, not ideological competition. Yet, such accusations became even stronger when African liberation movements accepted military aid from communist states in Asia, a tension that is further explored in Chapter 7. In reality, the Cold War lens is ‘inadequate’ for understanding the true meaning and extent of African–Asian encounters, including those between African liberation movements and North Korea.¹²²

Conclusion

The twentieth century was an era of bold ideas. The ‘Third World’ must start ‘a new history of Man’, wrote Frantz Fanon in 1961.¹²³ People dreamt with unparalleled energy of new directions.¹²⁴ The age of revolution in Southern Africa, especially the decades between the 1960 and the 1990s, embodies this vigour.¹²⁵ Despite significant impediments, the Black majorities of Southern Africa successfully defied the ‘South African-dominated security system for the preservation of minority rule’ while navigating a bipolar international security system.¹²⁶

The struggle was a formative experience, not just for the individuals within liberation movements, but for nations as a whole. Between the point of departure (the start of anticolonial resistance) and the final destination (the attainment of independence) was a period of time that represented endless opportunities to visualise a future world. The connections made with outside sponsors during these formative years would therefore have a lasting impact.

In Southern Africa today, the experience of the various intertwined liberation struggles of the twentieth century continue to define political culture.¹²⁷ Henning Melber describes the transformation of liberation movements into governments as a process in which the boundaries between party, government, and state became blurred.¹²⁸ A crucial facet of African–North

¹²⁰ Lee 2010, p. 3.

¹²¹ [NAI] PC Zambia Politics Kaunda: speech by Kaunda, 14–20 August 1967.

¹²² Dallywater et al. 2019, p. 7.

¹²³ Fanon 1961, p. 315.

¹²⁴ Prashad 2007.

¹²⁵ Bianchini, Sylla, and Zeilig 2023.

¹²⁶ Khadiagala 1994, p. 1.

¹²⁷ Melber 2004.

¹²⁸ Melber 2002.

Korean history is that, unlike most Western actors, North Korea did not treat Africans liberation movements as non-state actors, but rather as states-in-waiting.

Gilbert Khadiagala argues that the Frontline States illustrate how ‘small states have a knack for seizing opportunities to exploit changes in their immediate environments’.¹²⁹ This observation extends to non-state actors. African liberation movements navigated treacherous waters while securing recognition and funding. This included the crushing of internal disputes; the lobbying for African support; and the accessing of global funds of solidarity, all the while balancing an ever-increasing group of outside actors that intervened in the struggle, among them: the Frontline States; the OAU Liberation Committee; the United Nations; AAPSO; the Non-Aligned Movement, and foreign governments.

In the end, African liberation movements realised that Asian support was inevitable, simply because African funding was insufficient and Western support was limited. The material support from non-African socialist countries ‘far outstripped’ what the Liberation Committee could offer.¹³⁰ Aid from countries such as North Korea was thus a necessary lifeline for African liberation movements, in a time of great need. Kim Il Sung believed that ‘the road of national liberation’ was the ‘road of arduous struggle’, and saw it as an ‘important principle of foreign policy’ to support African decolonization.¹³¹

If liberation was the leitmotif of African–North Korean relations, then the Cold War was the background music – sometimes a bit louder, sometimes a bit softer, but ever present. The Cold War was shaping, but not driving, the interactions between the African liberation movements and their North Korean comrades. They did not see their alliance as a Cold War issue – only the outside world did.

Much of this chapter focused on the predicaments of African liberation movements, as the struggle in Southern Africa is key to understanding why they made a pact with North Korea. In the next chapter, we turn to the Korean peninsula.

¹²⁹ Khadiagala 1994, p. 18.

¹³⁰ Mubako 1975, p. 9.

¹³¹ Kim 1984, p. 338-339.