Just to be sure? An analysis of security in relation to the values of well-being, freedom, and equality

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Chapter 2

Security: A Conceptual Analysis

2. Security: A Conceptual Analysis

2.1. How to understand security?

If we would review the literature on security throughout history, starting with Seneca's teachings about 'securitas' from around A.D. 55 and working our way up to the most recent text books on security, we would find that the concept has been understood in various different ways in different times (see Gros, 2019; Herington, 2015; Rothschild, 1995). Even if we focus exclusively on contemporary academic literature, however, we see that security has been described in various different terms by different authors. Within the field of 'security studies', a subarea in the study of international relations, we can find extensive debates about what is 'the right way' of understanding security, as well as various publications professing to 'redefine' the term (Baldwin, 1997, p. 5). At first sight, then, it may seem only fair that some scholars, borrowing Gallie's well-known phrase, have described security as an 'essentially contested concept': a concept 'the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about [its] proper use on the part of [its] users' (Gallie, 1956, p. 169; further see Buzan, 1983, p. 6 and Williams & McDonald, 2018, p. 6).

In a perceptive commentary, however, Baldwin (1997) argues that security is actually not so much an essentially contested concept, but it is rather a 'confused' or 'inadequately explicated concept' (p. 12): what we need in the literature, he suggests, is a proper conceptual analysis of security. Within the field of security studies, he concludes, such analysis is in fact rather sparse. If we are not going to find it in that corner of the literature, one might think, the next best place to look for a conceptual analysis of security would be the field of political philosophy. As Waldron (2006) and Herington (2015, 2017) have pointed out, however, political philosophers have in recent times paid relatively little thematic attention to the concept of security. Fortunately, there are some notable exceptions, including John (2011), Floyd (2019), and Welch (2022), as well as Waldron (2006) and Herington (2012, 2015, 2017, 2019) themselves. Taking the works of the latter two thinkers as a starting point, I will use this chapter to develop my own conceptual framework of security, thus answering the question how

security will be understood throughout this research, and laying a necessary foundation for the chapters to come.[5]

The present chapter will proceed as follows. In the next section, I first introduce the ideas of Waldron and Herington, followed by my own conceptual framework of security (section 2.2). In the subsequent sections, I further clarify my conceptual framework by addressing the main differences between my own view and that of Herington in particular (section 2.3, section 2.4, and section 2.5). Throughout these sections, I will argue that my framework ultimately provides the best starting point for analysing security from the objectivist value perspective that I adopt in this dissertation. I end with a small note on the chapters to follow (section 2.6).

2.2. Security as a mode of enjoyment

In an insightful exploration of the concept of security, Waldron (2006) suggests that security should actually not be thought of 'as a good in its own right', but rather 'as a mode in which other goods are enjoyed' (p. 462). He illustrates this idea with a couple of examples: 'I enjoy my property or my health securely. I may enjoy certain liberties, such as the practice of my religion or the freedom to express my political views, securely' (ibid.). Waldron, then, seems to see security as a *relational* concept: as a mode in

[5] As indicated here, the rest of this chapter will consider only the conceptual frameworks put forward by Waldron and Herington, elaborating how these two thinkers understand security and how their understandings of security can be improved upon. The accounts of security developed by the other scholars mentioned in this paragraph – John, Floyd, and Welch – will thus be left to one side in what follows. Let me briefly explain here why I refrain from further engagement with these accounts. John (2011), firstly, states that '[a]n agent enjoys complete physical security if and only if there is warrant for her to believe that she will continue to achieve normal human physical functioning across the range of plausible futures, and this belief would be true' (p. 73). This is an analytically very sophisticated definition – but since it is only a definition of *physical* security, as the citation just given makes clear, we must look further for a definition of security simpliciter. Floyd (2019), secondly, focuses on a concept that is actually different from security altogether: the concept of *securitisation*, which she defines as 'the process whereby an issue is moved from normal politics into the realm of security politics' (p. 63). Again, this is a valuable definition – but it is not a definition of security. Welch (2022), finally, does put forward a definition of security (simpliciter). 'Security', he writes, 'is an objective condition of relative safety from harm' (p. 18). This definition, Welch stresses, leaves open the question of 'which referents are worth securing'. In order to answer this question, he claims, we need 'a theory of value' (p. 32); a theory of what is 'good' (p. 33). In making security about the protection of 'goods', Welch's view actually comes close to the views of Waldron and Herington that I will be considering in the rest of this chapter. As will become clear in what follows, however, Herington's conceptual framework is much more analytically sophisticated than Welch's, so it is Herington's rather than Welch's account that I will be taking as a starting point for developing my own definition of security in what follows.

which an *individual* can enjoy a *good*. Security, on this view, is something that we can have (or lack) with regard to various different goods – much like freedom, on some understandings, is something that we can have (or lack) with regard to various different activities. Let me take this idea as a starting point.

One clarification is in order straightaway. Suppose that we understand security, like it was just proposed, as a mode in which individuals can enjoy goods. Can we then still make sense of all those security utterances in everyday language that are *not* accompanied by an explicit reference to some good – be it property, or health, or civil liberties – the security of which would be at issue? I think that in many cases we still can. This is because very often when we talk about security without mentioning a particular good, we do actually have in mind some good, or some set of goods, but we just leave implicit what this would be. Generally, it will be clear from the context what good, or what set of goods, we are thinking of. When we remark that 'the government needs to take measures against the coronavirus for the sake of our security', for instance, we are thinking of security of health. When we say that 'the flexibilisation of labour is weakening the security of workers', on the other hand, we have in mind security of jobs or incomes. When we speak of 'a refugee camp providing displaced people with basic security', finally, we are talking about security of basic needs fulfilment and freedom from attack.

The next question is: if security is a kind of mode in which individuals may enjoy goods, then what exactly does this mode entail? When trying to give content to the idea of security as a mode of enjoyment, we can draw inspiration from a series of innovative contributions by Herington (2012, 2015, 2017, 2019). In his most recent analysis, Herington (2019) distinguishes between what he refers to as someone's 'fact-relative security' of some good, someone's 'belief-relative security' of some good, and 'the affect of security' (p. 181). These he defines as follows:

i. 'The fact-relative security of some prudential good *G* for an individual *S* at some time *t* is the objective probability that *S* will enjoy *G*, given the state of the world at *t*. This is the chance at *t* that *S* will enjoy *G*' (p. 183).

ii. 'The belief-relative security of some good *G* for an individual *S* at some time *t* is S's subjective probability of enjoying *G*, given her beliefs at *t*. This is *S*'s credence at *t* that *S* will enjoy *G*' (ibid.).

iii. 'The affect of security is an emotional state of calm assurance. (…) It is the directly apprehended experience of freedom from anxiety, rather than the belief that one is safe or secure' (p. 184).

In practice, Herington emphasises, these three may well come apart for someone. That is, if someone has a certain degree of fact-relative security of some good, then it is *not* necessarily the case that she has the same degree of belief-relative security of this good, and that she has a corresponding experience of affective security. It is perfectly possible, after all, that the facts, our beliefs, and our feelings do not align with one another. Naturally, this is true for many aspects of our lives, and Herington rightly points out that things are no different when it comes to our future enjoyment of goods.

Developing an interpretation of Waldron's idea of security as a mode in which individuals can enjoy goods, and taking inspiration from Herington's distinction between fact-relative, belief-relative, and affective security, let me now put forward my own conceptual framework of security. My purposes in presenting a new framework, rather than adopting Herington's exactly as he spells it out, are twofold. Firstly, I hope to resolve a number of problems that I see in Herington's account, thereby improving our general understanding of what security really is. Secondly, I aim to set up my framework in such a way that it is optimally suited for analysing security from the objectivist perspective on values described earlier in this chapter, thereby laying the best groundwork for my analysis of security in relation to well-being, freedom, and equality in the remainder of this dissertation.

I call my concept of security 'security as sureness'.[6] In the most general wording, on my view, if an individual has security of a good, this means that she 'is sure' of her future enjoyment of this good. This 'sureness',

[6] I am aware that the word 'sureness' is not used very often in the English language. My choice for adopting it in my characterisation of security here reflects the fact that I started my thinking about security having in mind the Dutch notion of 'zekerheid', the common translation of which is 'security', but the literal translation of which would be 'sureness'. Adopting the word 'sureness' in my description of 'security' can be seen as an attempt to connect the connotations of the Dutch word 'zekerheid' to the English word 'security' as I use it in this study. Besides, precisely because the word 'sureness' is not so common in the English vocabulary, I enjoy more liberty to fill it in in my own way here.

in turn, has a factual aspect, a cognitive aspect, and an emotional aspect. Borrowing Herington's style for a moment, let me define these aspects as follows:

i. The factual aspect of security of some prudential good *G* for an individual *S* at some time *t* entails that given the state of the world at *t*, *S* is *actually* bound at *t* to enjoy *G* in the future. Put more simply, security's factual aspect entails the fact that *S* is bound to enjoy *G*.

ii. The cognitive aspect of security of some prudential good *G* for an individual *S* at some time *t* entails that because *S* is aware of the relevant facts of the world at *t*, *S* also *believes* at *t* that she will enjoy *G* in the future. In simpler phrasing, security's cognitive aspect entails an appropriate belief on the part of *S* that she will enjoy *G*.

iii. The emotional aspect of security of some prudential good *G* for an individual *S* at some time *t* entails that because *S* is aware of the relevant facts of the world at *t*, *S* also has *no fear* at *t* that she will *not* enjoy *G* in the future. Phrased in a simpler way, security's emotional aspect entails an appropriate absence of fear on the part of *S* that she will not enjoy *G*.

An example may clarify things. Say that someone is renting an apartment. In order for this person to count as having security of this place, it has to be the case that:

i. The renter's landlord is in fact planning to continue letting his property to the renter, with the result that the renter is *actually* bound to enjoy her apartment in the future.

ii. Because the renter is aware of her landlord's plans, the renter also *believes* that she will hold onto her apartment.

iii. Being aware of her landlord's plans, our renter has *no fear* that she will come to lose her apartment either.

As becomes clear from the above, my understanding of security departs from Herington's in a number of ways. Below, I explain the most important differences between our accounts, thereby clarifying crucial features of my concept of security along the way.

2.3. The factual aspect and the cognitive aspect of security

The first major difference between Herington's account and my own regards the way in which we define the factual aspect of security (i) and the cognitive

aspect of security (ii). Whereas Herington links what he calls 'fact-relative' and 'belief-relative' security to the concept of 'probability', I characterise the factual aspect and the cognitive aspect of security – just like the emotional aspect, which I address in the next subsection – in absolute terms. That is, while Herington defines fact-relative security as the 'objective probability' that an individual will enjoy some good, I stipulate that the factual aspect of security concerns the *flat-out fact* that she is bound to enjoy this good. By this I mean that the state of the world at present is such that it simply must be the case that this individual will enjoy this good in the future. And while Herington defines belief-relative security as the 'subjective probability' that an individual will enjoy some good, I stipulate that the cognitive aspect of security concerns the *flat-out belief* on her part that she will enjoy this good. By this I mean that this individual herself believes that she will enjoy it.

Why would I characterise the factual aspect and the cognitive aspect of security in absolute terms, instead of defining these as probabilities? In order to answer this question, let me begin by repeating that the concept of security that we seek to describe here is that of security as a particular mode in which individuals can enjoy goods. When security is defined as the 'probability' that an individual will enjoy some good, however, then actually the word 'security' does *not* refer to a particular mode of enjoying goods. Rather, under this definition, the word 'security' – much like the words 'height', 'weight', or 'temperature' – refers to a *parameter*: a scale on which various scores are possible. Now, each *score* on the parameter of probability – be it 0%, or 30%, or 100% – *does* refer to a particular mode of enjoying goods. But the probability parameter itself does *not* represent one such a mode. So if we want to define security as itself a particular mode of enjoying goods, then we should not define it as probability. Rather, it makes sense to define it as we would define the ideal found at the upper end of the probability parameter. In the case of fact-relative security, this would be the flat-out fact that an individual is bound to enjoy some good; in the case of belief-relative security, this would be her flat-out belief that she will enjoy this good.

This is all consistent with submitting that in practice, security is often not a matter of 'all or nothing'. Someone may very well have security of some good *to a certain extent*. And we could indeed view the extent to which she has security along the factual dimension and the extent to which she has

security along the cognitive dimension as matters of probability. Consider, first, the factual aspect of security, which entails that an individual is bound to enjoy some good. When determining the extent to which this aspect of security obtains for her, the relevant probability is the *objective* probability that she will enjoy this good: the chance that would follow from a perfect probability calculation based on all the relevant facts of the world at present.[7] Consider, second, the cognitive aspect of security, which entails that an individual herself believes that she will enjoy some good. When determining the extent to which this aspect of security obtains for her, the relevant probability is the *subjective* probability that she will enjoy this good: her own estimation of this chance.[8] However, the fact that *the extent to which* someone has security along the factual dimension and *the extent to which* she has security along the cognitive dimension can be viewed as matters of probability, does not entail that *the concept of security* should be defined in terms of probability. As I argued above, it should not: rather, we must define it in its ideal form.

Before moving on to the second difference between Herington's scheme and mine, let me highlight that the practice of defining concepts in their ideal form fits within a larger tradition of theorising values. When defining concepts such as freedom, justice, or democracy, for example, many philosophers choose to describe ideal types rather than actually existing phenomena. They describe freedom as, say, 'the absence of interference'; justice as 'those principles that all reasonable persons would agree to in a hypothetical position of perfect equality'; democracy as 'rule by the people' – knowing full well that in the actual world out there, these things hardly ever (or maybe even never) exist in their pure form. Instead of taking this as a reason to water down their definitions, however, they hold on to their ideal-typical concepts and subsequently characterise and evaluate practical reality by describing and assessing *to what extent* and *in what ways* it

[7] Admittedly, objective probability is a tricky concept (see Hayenhjelm & Wolff, 2011; Perry, 2007). Causal determinists would say that the only possible objective probability values are 0 and 1 (Schaffer, 2007). Nonetheless, I follow Herington (2019) in assuming that whether someone is in fact bound to enjoy a good can indeed be viewed as a matter of (objective) probability.

[8] Of course, we often do not have clear-cut beliefs about the probability that we will enjoy goods. Nevertheless, I follow Herington (2019) in thinking that we can indeed describe our credence that we will enjoy goods in terms of (subjective) probability.

matches, or departs from, the ideal as they have characterised it. With my ideal-typical definition of security, I adopt a similar approach.

2.4. The emotional aspect of security

The second major difference between Herington's account an my own concerns the way in which we define the emotional aspect of security (iii). Let me first point out that Herington's definition of what he calls 'the affect of security' or 'affective security' does not suffer from the same shortcoming as his definitions of fact-relative and belief-relative security. After all, by defining affective security as 'an emotional state of calm assurance', Herington already describes this affect not as a parameter but as a particular condition. Nevertheless, I let my characterisation of the emotional aspect of security depart from his definition of affective security in two particular ways. Firstly, I avoid the positive phrasing that Herington uses in his definition of affective security, and describe the emotional aspect of security in negative terms instead. The emotional aspect of security, I stipulate, considers not the *presence* of 'a felt quality of tranquility' (Herington 2019, p. 184), but rather it concerns the *absence* of a particular kind of fear. Secondly, I avoid the general phrasing that Herington uses in his definition of affective security, and link the emotional aspect of security specifically to the enjoyment of a good. The emotional aspect of security, I stipulate, considers not the absence of just *any* fear, but rather it concerns the absence of the *particular* fear *that one will not enjoy some good*.

Why do I, firstly, define the emotional aspect of security as the absence of some kind of fear, and not as the presence of feelings of calmness or tranquility? The reason is that my definition appears to align better with the ways in which we tend to think and speak of security when we view it as a mode of enjoying goods. In order to consider someone as having security of some good, it seems, it is not necessary that she experiences some determinate positive affect in relation to her future enjoyment of this good. It suffices that she does *not* hold some determinate *negative* affect in relation to it: a particular kind of fear, to be specified below. This is not to say that people never experience positive sensations – peace, calmness, tranquility – linked to their possession of security of some good. Obviously, they sometimes do. The point is, however, that experiencing this positive

sensation is not necessary for them to be considered as having security of this good. The absence of a particular kind of fear is enough.

Herington himself provides two arguments for adopting a positive understanding of affective security, both of which ultimately fail. In the first place, Herington (2019) lists a number of practical examples to suggest that people experience affective security as a positive and directly noticeable sensation: the lost toddler who is reunited with her parents; the job seeker in a bad labour market who is offered work; the patient with a suspect mole who is told that it is benign (p. 184). The affect that he is referring to in these situations, however, actually seems better characterised as an emotion of relief than as a feeling of security. In the second place, Herington refers to a number of texts from classical times in which security is defined in positive terms: as a calm mental state. Yet, as it appears from his own analysis of security in the history of political thought, within the literature security has at least as often been described in negative terms: as 'freedom from fear' (Herington 2015, p. 25). All in all, I conclude, the emotional aspect of security is best defined in a negative way.

Why do I, secondly, define the emotional aspect of security as the absence of the specific fear that one will not enjoy some good, rather than a general state of being without fear? This has to do with the relational character of the concept of security adopted here. Remember Waldron's original idea of security as a mode in which an *individual* enjoys a *good*. Now, if we describe the emotional aspect of security as a general absence of fear, the 'good' has disappeared from our definition. If, instead, we define the emotional aspect of security as the absence of fear *that one will not enjoy a good*, the 'good' makes its way back in.[9] That way, our characterisation of the emotional aspect of security aligns nicely with the definitions of the factual and cognitive aspects of security, which, after all, also reflect the idea that security is a mode in which an individual enjoys a good.

Before turning to the third and final difference between Herington's scheme and mine, it is worth pointing out that under the definition proposed

[9] In relation to this point, let me stress that I choose to characterise the emotional aspect of security as an absence of *fear*, rather than an absence of *anxiety*. Fear, I take it, is a more 'focused' emotion. The kind of fear that I refer to in my characterisation of security, for instance, is focused on the possibility of not enjoying a good. Anxiety, by contrast, is rather a generalised emotional condition, which lacks focus on a specific risk or object. Although fear may lead to anxiety (a point that will be addressed in chapter 3), it is important to emphasise that they are not the same thing.

here, the emotional aspect of security concerns the absence of a kind of fear that is not episodic, but rather dispositional. The fear at issue is such that when somebody has this fear, this does not entail that the fearful feeling is necessarily and constantly present for her. Instead, it entails that such a fearful feeling can be triggered under particular circumstances. Think back, for a moment, of the example of the person who is renting a place to live. The emotional aspect of security, for her, would consist in an absence of fear that she will lose her apartment. Now, suppose that this aspect of security is not fulfilled: she actually *does* fear that her landlord will throw her out. This does not have to mean that she continuously *experiences* this fear. More likely, she really *feels* afraid only when she bumps into her landlord in the street, when she is thinking over her living situation, and perhaps when her friends ask her 'how are things at home?'. The emotional aspect of security, in other words, consists in the absence of a disposition to feel afraid in relation to one's future enjoyment of some good, rather than the absence of a fearful feeling of an episodic kind.

2.5. Security as an integrated concept

The last major difference between Herington's account and my own concerns the linkages between the factual aspect of security (i), the cognitive aspect of security (ii), and the emotional aspect of security (iii). I agree with Herington that when analysing security, it is useful to distinguish between a dimension of facts, a dimension of beliefs, and a dimension of emotions. At the same time, I want to emphasise more than Herington does that the factual aspect, the cognitive aspect, and the emotional aspect of security should *not* be regarded as three self-standing security concepts. On my view, they are three different aspects of *one and the same* concept of security, and they are tied up with each other in important ways.[10] Thus in order for someone to count as having security as sureness, in the first place, I stipulate that all three of security's aspects must obtain for her: she must be sure of her future enjoyment of some good along the factual dimension, *as well as*

[10] Whether Herington also sees fact-relative, belief-relative, and affective security as three aspects of one and the same concept of security does not become clear from the analysis in which he introduces this distinction (Herington, 2019). What does become clear from his account is that Herington sees no necessary connections between the concepts of fact-relative, belief-relative, and affective security (p. 188): on his definitions, the extent to which any of the three can be said to obtain does not by itself affect the extent to which the other two can be said to obtain.

the cognitive dimension, *as well as* the emotional dimension. In the second place, I stipulate that the fulfilment of the factual aspect of security, the fulfilment of the cognitive aspect of security, and the fulfilment of the emotional aspect of security must be connected to each other in particular ways: both the *belief* that one will enjoy a good and the *absence of fear* that one will not enjoy this good must spring from an awareness of the relevant features of the world determining whether or not one will *in fact* enjoy this good. Security thereby becomes a decidedly integrated concept.

Why present security as an integrated concept, instead of separating the factual aspect, the cognitive aspect, and the emotional aspect of security as if they are three independent security concepts? Part of the reason is, again, that I believe that my view stays closer to how we tend to think of security in our everyday lives and how we tend to use the word in our everyday language. Going back to the case of our renter once more, we can imagine the following scenarios:

a) The renter's landlord is in fact planning to evict the renter. The renter, however, does not know this yet, and thus she believes that she will continue to enjoy her apartment, and she feels assured accordingly.
b) The landlord is in fact planning to do no such thing, but he is bluffing to the renter that she will be evicted. The renter, as a result, believes that she will come to lose her home. Yet, because after a life of terrible hardship she has become entirely numb to anything that ever happens to her, she is not disposed to feel any fear about her predicament.
c) The landlord is in fact not planning to evict the renter, and the renter believes this as well. However, because the renter has an awful trauma from lacking a place to live in the past, she cannot get rid of a nagging fear that she will come to lose her home.

When considering these scenarios, we may notice two things. Firstly, in each of the three scenarios, it seems wrong to say that our renter has security. In scenario (a), clearly, the fact that the renter is bound to lose her apartment makes it incorrect to speak of her as having security. In scenario (b), similarly, the fact that the renter believes that she will be thrown out makes it improper to say that she has security. Scenario (c) is the most ambiguous one. Supposedly, some people would find that the renter has security, even

though she has a strong feeling of *in*security. Yet, because the absence of fear tends to be so central in our thinking about security (Herington, 2015, p. 25; Rothschild, 1995, p. 62), to me it seems that it would indeed be wrong to speak of someone who fears that she will lose her home as having security of her home. I conclude that in order to count as having security of some good, all three aspects of security must be fulfilled for someone: the factual aspect, the cognitive aspect, and the emotional aspect.

There is also a second lesson to be learned from the scenarios above. It seems that in order to establish if the cognitive aspect and the emotional aspect of security are fulfilled for our renter, we have to consider whether or not her beliefs and her emotional condition are based on an awareness of the factual state that she is in. In scenario (a), although the renter believes that she will continue to enjoy her apartment, this does not seem to warrant the conclusion that 'the cognitive aspect of security' is fulfilled for her. Because the belief of the renter is not based on an awareness of the facts – after all, without her knowing, her landlord is actually planning to evict her – her belief does not seem to be an element of security, but it seems to be just that: a belief (and a mistaken one at that). Likewise, in scenario (b), although the renter has no fear that she will lose her home, this does not seem to justify concluding that 'the emotional aspect of security' obtains for her. Because the absence of fear on the part of the renter is not based on an awareness of the facts – after all, her emotional condition does not result from an awareness of her landlord's plans, but from a psychological pathology – her emotional condition does not seem to be an element of security, but it seems to be just that: an emotional condition (and a pathological one at that). I conclude that in order for a belief that one will enjoy a good to count as realising security's cognitive aspect, and in order for an absence of fear that one will not enjoy a good to count as realising security's emotional aspect, both these things have to be based on an awareness of the facts. In short, both the belief and the emotional condition have to be *appropriate*.[11]

[11] At this point, one might ask why I describe the cognitive aspect of security as a belief that is 'appropriate', rather than as a belief that is 'justified' and 'true' – the qualifications that are usually taken to be jointly necessary and sufficient for a belief to count as 'knowledge'. The reason why I do not characterise the cognitive aspect of security as a *true* belief is that this aspect of security concerns a belief about the future enjoyment of goods, and whether or not beliefs about the future can at all be true remains a controversial philosophical issue (see Øhrstrøm & Hasle, 2020). The reason why I do not describe the

Before closing, let me point out that within the context of this research, there is a further reason for adopting an integrated understanding of security as sketched above. This relates to the objectivist perspective on values adopted in this study. Within the objectivist tradition of thinking about values, I already suggested in the introduction, the goodness of a particular state of affairs is not seen as purely a matter of how people subjectively evaluate or experience this condition. Certain states of affairs, so it is assumed, can also be good in an objective sense. Now, on many objectivist accounts of values, one important factor in determining the objective goodness of a particular state of affairs is whether or not, in this situation, there is a certain alignment between the facts, people's beliefs, and their feelings. Consider, for instance, the Aristotelian understanding of 'virtuous activity'. In order for an individual to count as acting virtuously, on this understanding, it is not enough that she *in fact* acts in a specific manner – that is, in accordance with virtue. She must also have correct *beliefs* about her action – namely, that this is the right action for particular reasons. Finally, she must *feel* a certain way about it – she must experience pleasure in the activity (Aristotle, 2000, pp. 25–28; Kelly, 1973, p. 401). If any of these three things does not obtain for her, then she is not really acting virtuously. Similarly, whether or not any of these three things counts as a part of virtuous activity depends on whether the other things are present. If she correctly believes that a particular action is the right one, for instance, but she fails to act in accordance with this belief, then her belief is not an aspect of virtuous activity. And if she experiences pleasure in a way of acting that is *not* in accordance with virtue, then this pleasant experience is not an aspect of virtuous activity either.

From an objectivist point of view, then, in order for a particular concept to qualify as a serious candidate for earning the status of 'a value', the concept must be defined in a properly integrated way. This gives me a second reason to characterise security as I have characterised it above: as involving not just the *fact* that an individual is bound to enjoy some good, but also a *belief* on the part of this individual that she will enjoy this good,

cognitive aspect of security as a *justified* belief is that this term would raise questions about the conditions under which a belief may be considered to be justified, which is again something about which philosophers hold diverging views (see Jenkins Ichikawa & Steup, 2017). The boundaries of the current study do not allow me to address these issues, let alone resolve them.

and an *absence of fear* on her part that she will not enjoy this good – whereby both the belief and the absence of fear at issue must be based on an awareness of the relevant facts. I conclude that in comparison to Herington's account, the conceptual framework that I set out gives a description of security that is not only more in line with how we commonly tend to think of security, but that is also better suited for an analysis of security from an objectivist perspective on values.

2.6. A starting point for further analysis

Equipped with the conceptual framework of security developed in this chapter, we can finally turn to the investigation around which the remainder of this dissertation revolves: an analysis of the relationships between security and a number of core values in contemporary political philosophy. The upcoming three chapters will analyse security in relation to the values of well-being (chapter 3), freedom (chapter 4), and equality (chapter 5). Given that these chapters are set up as independent inquiries, and clarifying the concept of security constitutes an important step within each of these inquiries, some of the information from the current chapter also comes up in the chapters to follow. Repetition is thereby kept to a necessary minimum: the key task in the rest of this dissertation is to use the conceptual framework set out here as a starting point for uncovering the ways in which security relates to a number of key values for liberal democratic societies.