Just to be sure? An analysis of security in relation to the values of well-being, freedom, and equality

Daemen, J.A.M.

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Cover design by Studio Nergens
Printed by Ipskamp Printing

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Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van
de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden,
op gezag van rector magnificus prof.dr.ir. H. Bijl,
volgens besluit van het college voor promoties
te verdedigen op donderdag 2 mei 2024
klokke 16.15 uur
door
Josette Anna Maria Daemen
geboren te Schimmert
in 1993

Promotor
Prof.dr. P. Nieuwenburg

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Prof.dr. M. R. Rutgers
Dr. R. A. Ploof

Financieel ondersteund door
Coryfeeënfonds Universiteit Leiden
Instituut Politieke Wetenschap Universiteit Leiden

Acknowledgements

When I decided that I was going to spend three years of my life writing a doctoral dissertation about the value of security, I didn't foresee how often during those five years (that's right) I would feel that there was something rather ironic about this whole endeavour. There I was, writing days on end about the importance of security for leading a flourishing life, while I myself was moving down a path of so much *in*security. Insecurity about my job and income once my PhD contract would end (after which I would have to try my luck on the dreaded academic labour market); insecurity about the direction into which my research would take me (wasn't I running in circles, or stuck on a dead-end road?); insecurity about whether or not it would ultimately all be good enough. It looks like I made it to the end, though, and this is in large part because of one thing that I *did* always have security of in the past few years; one thing that I *could* consistently count on: the support of a whole lot of wonderful people that I found by my side. I want to express my special gratitude to some of them.

Firstly, my supervisors, whose guidance has been invaluable throughout my PhD journey. Paul Nieuwenburg has inspired, encouraged, and supported me for almost twelve years already – first as a teacher, later as a colleague, finally as my promotor. He gave me exactly the freedom that I needed to make this project my own, while also drawing on his unbelievably vast knowledge of political philosophy literature to point me at precisely those resources that helped me ahead most. Marco Verschoor taught me not just how to be a truly rigorous thinker, but also how to be a good and fair and kind teacher. Ingrid Robeyns gave me both fantastic feedback on my work and indispensable advice for navigating academia, and showed me that doing political philosophy can really be a way of making the world better.

Then, Leiden's Institute of Political Science, where I had already felt so at home as a student, and where – after two years abroad – I was welcomed so warmly as a PhD candidate. My work has benefited tremendously from the constructive comments I received from various colleagues, among them Becky Ploof, Matthew Longo, Jelena Belic, Francesco Ragazzi, and Huib Pellikaan. I owe special thanks to Tom Theuns, who was exceptionally generous with his feedback, advice, and encouragement. For

moral support I am particularly grateful to Petr Kopecký and Frank de Zwart, who adopted me in their Anarchy Reading Group; Maria Spirova, Daniëlle Lovink, and Thomas Scarff, who always created a warm atmosphere at the department; Arjen Boin, who had my back during the COVID-19 pandemic; and Joop van Holsteijn, who has supported me in countless ways from my bachelor's onwards. Finally, my PhD comrades, especially Alex Schilin and Lukas Spielberger, who stood next to from the beginning until the end, as well as Diana Dávila Gordillo, Rick van Well, Elia Zorina, Hannah Kuhn, Denny van der Vlist, Katie Brown, Alessia Aspide, Sasha Khokhlova, Ruben van de Ven, Anouk van Vliet, Lefteris Karchimakis, Thijs Vos, and Jesse Doornenbal.

Outside the Institute, too, I have met several brilliant people over the past couple of years who engaged with my research, challenged my thinking, or helped me in my work in some other way. I am thinking of, among many others, Tim Meijers, Kritika Maheshwari, Enzo Rossi, Yvette Drissen, Sven Nyholm, Constanze Binder, Rutger Claassen, Uğur Aytaç, Maurits de Jongh, Martha Claeys, Janosch Prinz, Nicholas Vrousalis, Marli Huijer, Martijntje Smits, and Daan Roovers. And although there isn't enough space to mention them by name here, I also want to express my gratitude to the inspiring people I've cooperated with at *Bij Nader Inzien*, *Socialisme & Democratie*, *Mare*, and *NRC*. Working and writing for these non-academic outlets often felt like a way of keeping myself sane.

Speaking of my sanity, I'm absolutely certain that I would have lost it altogether if it weren't for my friends, including my dear ones from *Huize Hugo*, *Fabel*, and *SPIL* – I can't name them all, but let me at least mention Diede, Marieke, Lieve, Josefien, Aimee, and Jana, who always care so much. My paranymphs Jip and Lisa, who do not just challenge me intellectually but also manage to lift my spirits under any circumstance. My warmhearted family-in-law, and my amazing parents Ank and Mark, who are always, always there, just like my extraordinary *Geschwister* Loek and Celine – plus Aron, who together with Celine designed this book's beautiful cover.

Daan, my love, I owe you so much that I could write a whole new thesis about it – but I sincerely promise you that I'll never do this again.

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Abstract

Security is something that people tend to care about, both in their own individual lives and in politics. But is security also something that people *should* care about? When looking for answers to this question, we may think of political philosophy as a good place to start. Contemporary political philosophers, however, have in fact paid relatively little attention to the concept and value of security. This dissertation aims to expand our understanding of both. First, it develops a new conceptual framework of security. It suggests that security can be understood as a particular mode in which individuals can enjoy goods, whereby this mode entails a factual, a cognitive, and an emotional aspect. Next, this dissertation analyses how security relates to a number of key values for liberal democratic societies. The first of these values is well-being. It is argued that there are important ways in which security can contribute to somebody's well-being – but there are also a number of ways in which security may actually hamper a person's flourishing. The second value is freedom. It is shown that, although there is no *necessary* conflict between freedom and security in public decision-making, the two *may* indeed come at the each other's cost – yet there are also ways in which security and freedom can actually work to each other's benefit. The third value is equality. It is demonstrated that in order for a society to meet the demands of equality in the moral, economic, and political domain, it must provide its members with a particular set of securities – while at the same time the pursuit of equality puts another set of securities out of reach. Ultimately, this dissertation finds no reason for considering security to be an intrinsic value; to be good for its own sake. It shows that security *can*, however, have extrinsic value: it can be good for the sake of well-being, freedom, and equality. In a liberal democratic society, then, security may well be something for which we should strive – but not in security's own name; never 'just to be sure'.

Samenvatting

Zekerheid is iets waar mensen om geven, zowel in hun eigen leven als in de politiek. Maar zouden ze er ook om *moeten* geven? De politieke filosofie lijkt een goede plek om antwoorden te zoeken op die vraag. Hedendaagse politiek filosofen blijken echter relatief weinig aandacht te besteden aan het concept en de waarde van zekerheid. Dit proefschrift beoogt bij te dragen aan ons begrip van beide. Eerst ontwikkelt het een nieuw conceptueel raamwerk. Daarin wordt zekerheid voorgesteld als een bepaalde modus waarin individuen goederen kunnen genieten, waarbij die modus een feitelijke, cognitieve, en emotionele component kent. Vervolgens analyseert dit proefschrift hoe zekerheid zich verhoudt tot een aantal kernwaarden voor liberaal-democratische samenlevingen. De eerste van die waarden is welzijn. Beargumenteerd wordt dat zekerheid op belangrijke manieren kan bijdragen aan iemands welzijn – maar dat zekerheid iemands geluk ook op bepaalde wijzen in de weg kan staan. De tweede waarde is vrijheid. Er wordt aangetoond dat, hoewel vrijheid en zekerheid in publieke besluitvorming niet *noodzakelijk* met elkaar conflicteren, de twee inderdaad ten koste van elkaar kunnen gaan – maar dat er ook manieren zijn waarop zekerheid en vrijheid elkaar juist ten goede kunnen komen. De derde waarde is gelijkheid. Er wordt betoogd dat, wil een samenleving gelijkheid realiseren in het morele, economische, en politieke domein, haar leden enerzijds van bepaalde zekerheden moet worden voorzien – maar dat het streven naar gelijkheid tegelijkertijd een paar andere zekerheden buiten bereik plaatst. Uiteindelijk vindt dit proefschrift geen reden om zekerheid te beschouwen als een intrinsieke waarde; als iets wat goed is omwille van zichzelf. Wel toont het aan dat zekerheid van extrinsieke waarde kan zijn: het kan goed zijn omwille van welzijn, vrijheid, en gelijkheid. In een liberaal-democratische samenleving kan zekerheid daarom wel degelijk iets zijn om naar te streven – maar niet voor de zekerheid zelf.

Chapter 1

Security and the Values of Well-being, Freedom, and Equality

1. Security and the Values of Well-being, Freedom, and Equality

1.1. Security and values

Security is something that we tend to care about. Being sure of our future enjoyment of some good – whether that good is our health, a decent income, or the absence of attack – we generally see as desirable. We attach importance to security, in the first place, *in our own individual lives*. We prefer not to be exposed to health risks. We pick a permanent job contract over a temporary one. We like to be certain that we can walk down the street without facing assault or harassment. In the second place, we regard security as a relevant concern *at the societal level*. When determining what would be the right way for the government to respond to the outbreak of a pandemic, we consider people's health security as at least one important factor to take into account. When evaluating our society's economic arrangements, including labour laws and the system of social security (a telling term indeed), we want to know to what extent these provide people with security of key resources. When judging the performance of the state in maintaining law and order, we ask if it succeeds in giving people security from personal violation. Security, in brief, is something that we take to matter.

On one particular view, the foregoing would be enough to establish that security is *a value*. A value, according this view, is simply anything that people consider to be important in life (Friedman et al., 2006, p. 349). On this perspective, if people find security important, then security counts as a value. This view corresponds to a certain class of philosophical theories about *the good*.[1] According to this class of theories, generally referred to as 'desire-fulfilment theories' (Parfit, 1984, p. 493), the good consists in the satisfaction of desires.[2] From the perspective of these theories, if people

[1] Not everyone may agree that the notion of 'value' and the notion of 'good' can be associated with each other in the way suggested here. Some may hold, for instance, that 'value' does not just concern what is 'good' but also what is 'right'. This dissertation, however, places itself within a leading philosophical tradition in which 'value' is indeed equated with 'good' (see, for instance, Schroeder, 2021; Wenar, 2023). Considering literature decoupling these two notions would go beyond the scope of this project.

[2] In the text cited here, Parfit (1984) actually describes 'desire-fulfilment theories' – as well as 'hedonistic theories' and 'objective-list theories', which will be introduced shortly – not as a class of theories about 'the good', but as a class of theories about 'self-interest' (p. 493). In contemporary philosophy, the categories of theories distinguished by Parfit are mostly described as categories of theories about 'well-being', that is, as theories about what is 'good for' a person or a being (Alexandrova, 2017, p. 28). Although the debates about 'the good' and 'the good-for' are distinct, they have been parallel in their leading theories as well as their main objections (Wenar, 2023, p. 195). The distinction between 'desire-

desire security, then it is good if they have it. The problem with these theories, as with the view that values are simply those things that people consider important in life, is that people may very well have a desire for, or attach importance to, things that intuitively seem to be bad. They may, for instance, find it desirable or important to discriminate between people based on their race (Van de Poel, 2021, p. 301). If we want to exclude the possibility of having to classify something like racism as a value, then we must opt for a different perspective on values instead.

On another view, whether or not security is a value would depend entirely on how it makes people feel. The only things that are values in their own right, according to this view, are positive mental states. On this perspective, security counts as a value if people experience it as a pleasant emotional condition (Herington, 2019, p. 188). This view corresponds with a second class of philosophical theories about the good, usually named 'hedonistic theories' (Parfit, 1984, p. 493), which equate the good with pleasure. From the viewpoint of these theories, security is good insofar as it constitutes or causes a pleasurable mental state. Just like desire-fulfilment theories, however, hedonistic theories suffer from a significant problem. From the perspective of these theories, it does not matter whether or not some pleasant experience also matches with reality: on a hedonistic view, pleasure that someone experiences from the *mistaken* impression that she has made a friend or written a fantastic novel, is just as good as pleasure that someone experiences upon *really* making a friend or writing a great novel (Nozick, 1974, p. 42). If we want to accommodate the intuition that the latter type of experience is more valuable than the former type of experience, then we must take yet another perspective on values.

A third view that we may adopt in order to establish whether or not security is a value, we can refer to as an 'objectivist' perspective. Values, on this view, are things that are 'objectively good', meaning that their goodness does not depend entirely on people's subjective judgments or impressions of them. It is from this perspective, corresponding to so-called 'objective-list theories' of the good (Parfit, 1984, p. 493), that security will be considered in this dissertation. In order to determine which things are objectively good, different objectivist theories employ different methods. Some rely on

fulfilment', 'hedonistic', and 'objective-list' theories can thus be seen to characterise the debate about 'the good' as well as that about 'well-being'.

thought experiments, asking whether a world *with* a particular thing would be better than a world *without* that thing, or whether a universe containing *only* this thing would be good (Moore, 1903; Ross, 1954). Others, placing themselves in an Aristotelian tradition, start by looking at the essential properties of beings – mostly, the focus is on *human* beings, but non-human beings such as animals and plants may be considered too – and ask what it would entail for them to develop or perfect these properties (Hurka, 1993; Kraut, 2007). Objectivist theories often distinguish between two kinds of goodness. Things that are good in themselves – common examples include happiness, autonomy, justice, knowledge, beauty, and love – are referred to as 'intrinsically good' or 'intrinsic values' (Korsgaard, 1983, p. 170). Things that derive their goodness from some other source – an example would be wealth, the goodness of which could be seen to depend on its instrumental role in increasing people's happiness – are called 'extrinsically good' or 'extrinsic values' (ibid.). What do we see if we look at security from an objectivist perspective on values? How does security relate to things that are generally considered to be key values from this viewpoint? Does security itself deserve to be called a value on this view, and if so, what kind of value is it?

Existing academic literature does not provide immediate clarity on these questions. In the field of ethics, first of all, we find various lists of values developed from an objectivist perspective. Most of the classical lists, it is safe to say, do not include security (see, for example, Moore, 1903; Ross, 1930; Mason, 2018; Rasmussen, 1999). At the same time, some prominent thinkers do put security on their list of values (see Berlin, 1969, p. 169; Frankena, 1963, p. 88). Yet, it remains unclear how exactly they understand security, and why they consider it to be a value. In the history of political thought, secondly, security is an important theme in a number of seminal texts within the tradition. It can be found, for instance, in the first formulations of social contract theory (Hobbes, 1996, pp. 89, 110, 117; Locke, 1988, pp. 331, 367, 413) and the philosophy of utilitarianism (Bentham, 1843, p. 110; Mill, 1871, p. 81). However, as the next section will show by considering the example of the Hobbesian and Lockean social contract theories, these accounts still leave important puzzles regarding the concept of security and its relations to core values unresolved. In contemporary political philosophy, thirdly, there has been considerable attention for topics that are closely *related* to

security, such as the ethics of risk, precarity, and social safety arrangements. Yet, studies explicitly addressing the topic of security *itself* are in fact rather scarce within the field (Herington, 2015, p. 28, 2017, p. 187; Waldron, 2006, p. 458). Notwithstanding a number of notable exceptions, which will be discussed further on in this dissertation, there are relatively few contributions to contemporary political philosophy specifically analysing the concept of security, or its relationships to what are generally regarded as core values within the discipline.[3]

This dissertation is an attempt to expand and deepen our knowledge of security and its relationships to a number of key values in contemporary political philosophy. Specifically, this study asks: *how should we understand security, and how does security relate to the values of well-being, freedom, and equality?* Connected to this double research question, there are two main ways in which this investigation enriches existing literature. Firstly, it contributes a conceptual analysis of security itself. This is the primary task of the second chapter of this dissertation. Building on insights from Jeremy Waldron (2006) and Jonathan Herington (2012, 2015, 2017, 2019), and paving the way for the chapters to follow, that chapter presents a novel framework for understanding security. Secondly, this dissertation contributes an analysis of the relationships between security and what may be considered as three core values for liberal democratic societies: well-being, freedom, and equality. This is the project of the third, fourth, and fifth chapter of this collection. Each of these has been written, and should be read, as a self-standing investigation. The third chapter thereby analyses security in relation to well-being, the fourth analyses security in relation to freedom,

[3] A final branch of academic literature that deserves to be mentioned here is that of 'security studies', a subfield within international relations research (IR). Within the tradition of so-called 'critical security studies' in particular, we can indeed find scholarship that adopts a more value-inspired approach to security (for useful overviews, see Williams & McDonald, 2018; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2015; Nyman & Burke, 2016). This scholarship, however, focuses mainly on critiquing security *as a practice*, involving, for example, military threat and defence, policing, and emergency politics (Floyd, 2019, p. 37; Herington, 2015, p. 30). In this corner of the literature, starting points for developing critiques of security practices are often sought in continental philosophy (for instance, Foucault, 2007; Agamben, 2005). Notwithstanding the great contribution that continental philosophers and critical security scholars have thus made to IR, their topic is actually rather different from that of this dissertation: here I am not concerned with security as a practice, but with security as a mode in which individuals can enjoy goods – a concept to be elaborated in the next chapter. In what follows, I will thus draw mainly on literature from contemporary ethics and political philosophy rather than security studies, although I will occasionally borrow ideas from critical security studies as well.

and the fifth analyses security in relation to equality. The sixth chapter concludes by returning to the question whether security may rightly be considered a value itself, and if so, what kind of value it would then be.

The goal of the current chapter is to provide an introduction to the analysis in the remaining chapters. This chapter starts with a note on the position of security within the tradition of political philosophy (section 1.2). Although security has long been a central theme in the history of political thought, it is demonstrated with reference to the classical social contract theories, important puzzles about security and values still beg to be resolved by political philosophers today. The subsequent section of this chapter sets a couple of preliminaries for the analysis of security in relation to the values of well-being, freedom, and equality that follows in the remainder of this research (section 1.3). A number of questions have to be answered. Why does this dissertation study the relationships between security and precisely these three values? What particular accounts of these values are thereby adopted as starting points? What insights can be found in existing literature that could be of use in an analysis of security in relation to these accounts? After these issues have been addressed, finally, this chapter provides a preview of the key findings that will be presented in the rest of this dissertation (section 1.4).

1.2. Security beyond Hobbes and Locke

If we look at contemporary literature in political philosophy, I already noted, security does not seem to be a highly popular topic within the field (Herington, 2015, p. 28, 2017, p. 187; Waldron, 2006, p. 458). Especially in comparison to concepts such as well-being, freedom, and equality – three values that will be studied elaborately in this dissertation too – but also autonomy, justice, and legitimacy – other values that are attracting a lot of attention in the discipline today – security appears to be receiving surprisingly little interest from political philosophers currently. If we take a look at the history of political thought, however, security actually emerges as a theme that has long been important within the field. Rothschild (1995), indeed, notes that '[t]he idea of security has been at the heart of European political thought since the crises of the seventeenth century' (p. 61). Illustrating her claim, she highlights key texts featuring the topic of security by Leibniz (1866), Montesquieu (1973), Smith (1976), Rousseau (1964), and

many other European thinkers. Within the history of the tradition, however, the most well-known works of political philosophy in which security figures as a core theme are probably the classical social contract theories by Hobbes (1996) and Locke (1988). Given that these works have had an extraordinary influence on people's thinking about security and the state both within and outside of political philosophy, it is worth lingering for a moment on the Hobbesian and Lockean accounts of security as they are usually interpreted.

The Hobbesian story about security starts with the image of an anarchic, chaotic, and grisly 'state of nature'. In this condition, people live alongside one another, ruthlessly pursuing their self-interest, without some higher power to keep them all in check. The result is best described as a state of utter *in*security: 'every man is Enemy to every man', there is 'continuall feare, and danger of violent death', and life is – notoriously – 'solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short' (Hobbes, 1996, p. 89). In their desire for security, then, people rationally decide to band together into a political community and hand over their right of self-government to a sovereign. This sovereign – the 'Leviathan' – may subsequently 'use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence' (p. 121). Importantly, after people have authorised the sovereign to govern over them, his rule is not to be disputed: his power is unlimited and absolute. By uniting under the Hobbesian state, then, people ultimately trade their natural liberty for security (Lazarus, 2015, p. 424).

The Lockean story about security, too, starts with the image of a state of nature. This time, however, the condition is described as a state of perfect freedom and equality, in which all people enjoy equal natural rights to their life, liberty, and possessions – jointly referred to as their 'property' – and no one has more power than another. Yet, because people also have the power to punish and police invasions of their rights single-handedly, there being no higher authority to adjudicate between them, their enjoyment of these rights 'is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the Invasion of others' – it is 'very unsafe, very unsecure' (Locke, 1988, p. 350). Hence, those living in the Lockean state of nature, too, ultimately decide to unite under a governing authority, which is supposed to secure the property of every member of the political community against intrusions by both other members and outsiders. The power of this government, however, is not unrestricted: when rulers 'endeavour to grasp themselves, or put into the hands of any other an

Absolute Power over the Lives, Liberties, and Estates of the People; By this breach of Trust they forfeit the Power, the People have put into their hands, for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the People, who have a Right to resume their original Liberty' (p. 412). In the end, then, under the Lockean political arrangement, people enjoy security not just against outsiders and each other, but also against the state itself (Lazarus, 2015, p. 426).

To what extent these common interpretations of Hobbes's and Locke's ideas about security really constitute accurate representations of the original texts of *Leviathan* (Hobbes, 1996) and *Two Treatises of Government* (Locke, 1988) is an interesting question in its own right. This is not the place, however, for an exegesis of these rich and complex texts. The point of highlighting them here, besides exemplifying the claim that security is an important theme in key works within the history of political philosophy, is to illustrate the proposition that there are still important puzzles regarding security and values for political philosophers to resolve today. The first of these puzzles concerns the concept of security itself: what does this concept entail exactly? Although the noun 'security' (as well as the verb 'to secure' and the adjectives 'secure' and 'in/un-secure') can be found at various points in the writings of both Hobbes and Locke, neither of them provides a clear definition of the term that can explain what exactly it is supposed to mean throughout the text. The second puzzle regards the status of security from a value perspective: is security a value itself, and how does it relate to (other) things that we generally consider to be significant values? Both thinkers explicitly label security as the very purpose of the political community – Hobbes (1996) describes 'Security' as 'The End of Commonwealth' (p. 117); Locke (1988) describes people's 'Safety and Security' as 'the end for which they are in Society' (p. 413) – but this does not yet provide us with obvious answers to the questions just raised. Is security a kind of 'prime value' (Baldwin, 1997, p. 18); 'a value so important as to supersede other goods in a political community' (Lazarus, 2015, p. 427), as some have taken Hobbes's theory to imply? Or is security inextricably tied up with liberal values such as freedom and equality (ibid.), as some have thought Locke's account to suggest?

Looking at the history of political thought, then, we can conclude that security may in fact be a classical theme within the field, but the tradition does not provide any straightforward answers to the core questions of this

dissertation. Meanwhile, these questions have not lost any of their relevance since the days of Hobbes and Locke. As I already suggested in the previous section, political philosophers and citizens of liberal democratic societies in the present continue to treat security as an important point of reference in their thinking about the state. As I will explain in the upcoming section, however, people's relation to the state is now at the same time often characterised with reference to the concepts of well-being, freedom, and equality. How the concept of security is to be understood, and how it relates to these three core values of liberal democratic societies, thus remain key puzzles for political philosophers to resolve today.

1.3. Well-being, freedom, and equality

In order to resolve these puzzles, I already indicated, the next chapter of this dissertation will conduct a conceptual analysis of security; the three subsequent chapters will take up the project of analysing the relationships between security and the values of well-being, freedom, and equality respectively. For the present chapter, there still lies the task of clarifying a couple of points in advance of this project. Firstly, why would it be interesting to study security in relation to precisely the values of well-being, freedom, and equality? Secondly, of all the various accounts of these values that can be found in the literature, which ones would it be best to adopt as starting points for this study? Thirdly, aside from these accounts of well-being, freedom, and equality, is there any additional scholarship that contains useful insights for the study of security in relation to these values? Let me take up these questions one by one.

First up is the question concerning the selection of values whose relationships to security will be analysed in this dissertation. In the introduction, I already indicated that I take an objectivist perspective on values in this research. I also mentioned a number of examples of values that we frequently encounter in the literature adopting such a perspective: well-being, autonomy, justice, freedom, knowledge, beauty, equality, love… Presumably, interesting insights could emerge from analysing security in relation to *any* of these values. Given the constraints that apply to this study, however, I have to concentrate on just a selection of values here. One possible strategy for making this selection would be to take one particular objectivist theory of values as a starting point – say, Moore's (1903), or

Ross's (1930), or Frankena's (1963) – and consider only those values that are listed by that particular account. Hoping to make my study maximally useful from both an academic and a societal point of view, however, I will follow a different approach: I will focus on three items that are widely regarded as key values within contemporary political philosophy, that can rightly be considered as indispensable building blocks for liberal democratic societies – *and* that seem to play a crucial role in a number of assumptions that I believe to underlie much of present-day thinking about security.

The first of these assumptions, one that was already hinted at in the first section of this chapter, is that it is good for people to have security. In his 19th century classic *Utilitarianism*, John Stuart Mill (1871) indeed suggests that security is something 'which everyone feels to be the most vital of all interests' (p. 81), and without a doubt security continues to be regarded as something in which individuals have an important interest today. But are we actually right to think that having security is strictly beneficial for us? Probing this first assumption would require analysing security in relation to the value of *well-being*. The second assumption that runs through much of contemporary thinking about security is that, at the state level, there is an important trade-off between security and liberty. Waldron (2003) notes how this idea gained significant ground in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, when governments implemented significant restrictions on civil liberties in the name of security restoration. Something similar could be observed during the COVID-19 pandemic. Waldron also remarks, however, that according to a 'common suggestion', 'it is *always* necessary – even in normal circumstances – to balance liberty against security' (p. 192). But is this actually true? In order to scrutinise this second assumption about security, we would have to study more deeply the relationship between security and the value of liberty, or *freedom* as I shall generally call it here. The third and last assumption that seems to underlie quite some current-day thinking about security is that, in politics, security is mainly a theme 'for the right'. As Keating & McCrone (2013) suggest, the populist right in particular has been successful in expanding its support base through an appeal to security – albeit only the security of 'an imagined community of insiders' (p. 7), as they put it– whereas left-of-centre parties do not seem to have a clear and attractive story when it comes to security. But is it really so that security is not a good fit with the egalitarian ideals that

we usually find 'on the left'? If we wanted to find out if this idea makes any sense, we would finally need to examine how security relates to the value of *equality*.

Thus we have a first indication that there are interesting questions to explore when it comes to security and three values in particular: well-being, freedom, and equality.[4] The case for focusing on these particular values is not complete, however, as long as it has not been shown that these three values can at the same time be seen as essential building blocks for the kind of society that I adopt as a point of departure in this study: a liberal democratic society. In such a society, I take it here, no member is naturally placed above another, every member is granted a core set of individual rights, and all members jointly decide on the political course of their community. Why would well-being, freedom, and equality be core values for societies that are arranged in this way? Let me explain by briefly addressing each value in turn.

Well-being, to begin with, might at first sight seem a little odd on a list of core values for a liberal democratic society. One of the defining features of such a society, after all, is that the state does not impose on people a particular conception of the good life – a particular idea of what it means to 'be well': it does not dictate a certain religion; it does not prescribe a certain lifestyle; it does not mold all its members into one and the same shape. However, it would be a mistake to interpret this as a sign that well-being is not a key value within a liberal democratic society. Indeed, one could argue that it is *because* well-being is taken to be so important within liberal democratic societies, that such societies are set up in the way they are set up. The thought thereby is that it would not be *good for* people if the state imposed a particular conception of the good life on them; that they would live *better lives* if they could form their own views and pursue their own projects (see Kraut, 2007, p. 197). The task of the liberal democratic state thereby is to create the conditions under which individuals can pursue their

[4] At this point, one might ask whether well-being, freedom, and equality count as intrinsic or extrinsic values. The answer to this question depends on which particular objectivist theory of values one embraces. On some theories, well-being, freedom, and equality are good in themselves, and therefore classified as intrinsic values. On other theories, well-being, freedom, and equality derive their goodness from some other source – for example, they are seen as necessary for the realisation of autonomy – and hence they are regarded as extrinsic values. Given that I do not adopt one particular objectivist theory of values as a starting point here, I will remain neutral between both views.

well-being as they themselves understand it. And performing this task may indeed involve efforts on the part of the state to provide people with certain basic goods. As long as there exists broad agreement about the valuableness of these goods, *and* it has been democratically decided that they should be publicly provided, *and* this public provision would not coerce people into a particular way of life, public policies aimed at realising these goods for citizens would not be in violation of liberal democratic principles. Indeed, where universally valuable goods can *only* be realised collectively, it could be argued that such policies are even *required* in the name of well-being (see Chan, 2000, p. 42). Within a liberal democratic society, then, the value of well-being is a crucial point of orientation for *public goods provision*.

Freedom, secondly, is a more obvious candidate when we are construing a list of core values of a liberal democratic society. As it was pointed out above, in such a society, the state does not impose a particular conception of the good life on its members. That is, in principle, the individuals making up this society are at liberty to decide for themselves how they want to live their lives. Yet, a liberal democratic society is not an anarchic society. In order to prevent the freedom of one individual from coming at the cost of the freedom of another, it is assumed in the spirit of Hobbes and Locke, some higher authority needs to mediate the relations between them. This higher authority takes the shape of a state. The state, however, occupying this authoritative position, inevitably constitutes a powerful actor in its own right. In order to prevent the state from abusing this power, thereby eroding the liberty of the people at last, various institutional arrangements can be put in place. In a liberal democratic society, these typically include a set of basic individual rights, procedures ensuring democratic accountability of public officials, and a division of powers at the state level. These arrangements, too, may be brought under the heading of freedom. In liberal democratic societies, in sum, the value of freedom constitutes an essential focal point when it comes to *the organisation of the state*.

Equality, finally, is often mentioned as a core value of a liberal democratic society in combination with either well-being or freedom. What matters in such a society, it is normally accepted, is not just the well-being or the freedom of people generally, but the well-being and freedom of all members equally. At the same time, if this were all that the value of equality

was about, then it would add little substance to the values of well-being and freedom. On a sufficiently thick understanding of the term, however, equality really does give additional depth to the ideal of a liberal democratic society. Because on top of the imperatives that come attached with the value of well-being for public goods provision, and the conditions that come attached with the value of freedom for the organisation of the state, the value of equality comes attached with certain requirements for the entire societal architecture. Essentially, in a liberal democratic society, the value of equality can be taken to entail that members view and treat each other as equals, and structure their community accordingly. This means that in the moral sphere, as well as the economic sphere, as well as the political sphere, the rules of the game have to express, embody, and sustain equal respect for all. Within a liberal democratic society, one could say, the value of equality is key in shaping *the architecture of the community at large*.

Taken together, the values of well-being, freedom, and equality can thus be seen to constitute three fundamental building blocks for a liberal democratic society, which also interlock in various ways. They can only be expected to fulfil their critical function, however, if the concepts at issue are given sufficient substance. This brings me to the second question of this section: which accounts of well-being, freedom, and equality are best adopted as starting points for the analysis to be conducted here? As it was pointed out earlier on in this chapter, in contemporary political philosophy, works focusing specifically on the concept of security are relatively scarce. The field abounds, however, with theories of well-being, freedom, and equality. From among these various accounts, I must now pick those that are thick enough to support the idea of these values as the substantive building blocks for liberal democratic societies as described above. Let me take up this assignment for each of the three values respectively.

When it comes to the value of well-being, firstly, philosophical accounts can basically be divided into three categories: desire-fulfilment theories, which take people's well-being to consist in the satisfaction of their desires; hedonistic theories, which take people's well-being to consist in their experience of pleasure; and objective-list theories, which regard people's well-being as constituted by a specified set of things that are objectively good (Parfit, 1984, p. 493). The reader will recognise these categories from the distinction between different classes of theories about

the good that I introduced at the start of this chapter. Explaining that desire-fulfilment theories and hedonistic theories suffer from significant problems, I opted for an objectivist perspective on values there. For the same reasons, I embrace objective-list theories of well-being here. Specifically, in my study of security and well-being, I will take inspiration from the works of Kraut (2007), Nussbaum (2000), and Hurka (1993). Building on the Aristotelian tradition of thinking about the good life, also referred to as 'eudaimonia' or 'human flourishing', these thinkers give rich content to the concept of well-being. At the same time, by grounding their theories in an analysis of human nature rather than controversial metaphysical views, these authors provide useful cues for identifying goods whose valuableness could be the object of a broad agreement across society. Thus these accounts give the concept of well-being exactly the kind of substance that it would need in order to fulfil the role that I envisioned for this value above: inspiring public goods provision.

When it comes to the value of freedom, secondly, philosophical accounts could be separated into two groups: those that depict freedom primarily as a personal matter – as a matter of self-expression or self-creation, for instance – and those that describe freedom rather as a political matter – as something to do mainly with how individuals relate to the government. In my study of freedom and security, I will focus on accounts of freedom that specifically bring out its political character. In particular, I draw on the accounts of, among others, Hobbes (1996), Berlin (1969), Pettit (1997), and Sen (1985). Each of these authors defines freedom in a different way: Hobbes's definition can be characterised as 'pure negative', Berlin's as 'liberal', Pettit's as 'republican', and Sen's as inspired by the idea of 'capabilities'. All of these authors do, however, characterise freedom in such a manner that the value comes to tell us something about how the state should be organised: in Hobbes's view, it is rational for individuals to exchange at least some of their freedom for security by uniting in a state; on Berlin's account, the state is always to leave at least some area within which people are free from its interference; according to Pettit, the exercise of power by the state must be forced to track the interests of citizens; for Sen, state action should be focused on people's freedoms to attain valuable functionings. Together, these accounts thus provide a broad overview of the different ways in which the value of freedom can shape the institutions of

the state. This is exactly why I take these accounts of freedom, rather than accounts focused on self-actualisation, as a point of departure: as I explained above, freedom can serve as a building block of liberal democratic societies precisely if and because it can tell us how we should organise the state.

When it comes to the value of equality, finally, philosophical accounts could again be split into two categories: distributive accounts, according to which equality is about the way in which goods are distributed, and relational accounts, according to which equality is about the way in which people relate to one another. In my analysis of security and equality, I will take relational egalitarian views as a starting point. To be precise, I start from the accounts of Anderson (1999), Scheffler (2015), and Kolodny (2014). In recent decades, these thinkers have attracted much acclaim for their articulations of an egalitarian ideal that seems to be much richer than the distributive concepts of equality adopted by many earlier egalitarian thinkers. On the relational understanding of equality, the value comes to have normative implications not just at the formal or legal level, but also for the way in which people see and treat one another, for the way in which the economy is organised, and for the way in which the community reaches collective decisions. Concretely, a society modelled on the basis of relational equality effectively grants equal basic rights, a decent living standard, and democratic decision-making power to all its members. The relational egalitarian account of equality is thereby excellently equipped for the task that I described above as 'adding additional depth to the ideal of a liberal democratic society': by characterising equality as a value with implications in the moral domain, as well as the economic domain, as well as the political domain, it gives exactly the kind of guidance that we would need as to the shaping of the societal architecture at large.

Notwithstanding the tremendous contributions that the authors mentioned above have made to our understanding of well-being, freedom, and equality, in their writings about these values they generally do not address explicitly or extensively how the concepts that they theorise relate to the concept of security. The final question of this section, then, is this: what leads *are* there to be found in existing literature as to the relationships between security and the values at issue on the accounts selected here? First, it must be pointed out that security and related themes do come up at a few places in the accounts referenced above. Nussbaum (2000), for one,

mentions '[n]ot having one's emotional development blighted by overwhelming fear and anxiety' in the list of central human capabilities that form the core of her idea of human flourishing (p. 79). Pettit (1997), secondly, sometimes uses 'security against interference on an arbitrary basis' as a synonym for 'freedom as non-domination' (p. 45). Anderson (1999), lastly, speaks of the need for egalitarians to 'secure' certain kinds of goods for people (p. 302). Still, these points could do with much further elaboration, and there remains a lot more to be said about security from the perspective of the accounts listed above.

Fortunately, there also exist a number of works in contemporary political philosophy that do provide explicit and elaborate treatment of the topic of security, thereby posing notable exceptions to my earlier observation about a general scarcity of interest in security within the field. John (2011), Herington (2019) and Wolff & De-Shalit (2007) have written valuable contributions illuminating the ways in which security may – or may not – contribute to well-being. Waldron (2003), Newey (2012), Posner & Vermeule (2007), Binder & Binder (2019), Shue (1980), and Meisels (2008) have shared interesting insights into the connections between security and freedom, bringing out both tensions between the two, and ways in which they may be mutually constitutive. Wolfendale (2017) and Milstein (2020), finally, have done thought-provoking work on certain aspects of the relationship between security and equality, emphasising both the importance and the shortcomings of strictly legal equality when it comes to security. Combining these newer insights with the substantive accounts of well-being, freedom, and equality by the authors named above, I will try to construct a detailed and inclusive overview of the relationships between security and the values of well-being, freedom, and equality in the third, fourth, and fifth chapter of this collection.

1.4. Looking ahead

Now that I have set the necessary preliminaries for what follows in the rest of this dissertation, the only task that there is still left for the present chapter is to disclose what the reader can expect in the chapters to come. The next chapter will analyse the concept of security. Below, I briefly summarise how I go about this task, and how I end up defining security. The three chapters following my conceptual analysis will investigate security in relation to the

values of well-being, freedom, and equality respectively. Given that each of these three chapters was set up as an independent inquiry, so as to be publishable as a stand-alone article, the exact way in which I approach the task of analysing the relationship between security and the value at hand differs per chapter. Below, I specify for each of these chapters what exact question I start out with, what conceptual clarifications I have to make in order to address it, and what answer I ultimately arrive at.

Chapter 2 considers the concept of security on its own. It provides a detailed answer to the question: how should we understand security? Given that we cannot hope to grasp how security relates to other important concepts before we have worked out what exactly the concept of security entails itself, addressing this question constitutes an obvious starting point for this study. I open this second chapter by introducing Waldron's (2006) idea that security may best be thought of 'as a mode in which other goods are enjoyed' (p. 462): 'I enjoy my property or my health securely', he illustrates; 'I may enjoy certain liberties, such as the practice of my religion or the freedom to express my political views, securely' (ibid.). Inspired by Herington's (2019) account of security, I then try to work out what security as a 'mode of enjoying goods' may actually amount to, proposing that we view it as involving a factual aspect, a cognitive aspect, and an emotional aspect. I ultimately stipulate that if an individual has security of a good, this means that she is *in fact* bound to enjoy this good in the future, she has the *belief* that she will enjoy this good, and she has *no fear* that she won't (whereby this belief and this absence of fear must be based on an awareness of the facts on her part). Systematically elaborating the differences between my own account of security and that of Herington, I finally argue that my conceptual framework is not only more in line with how we normally tend to think of security, but that is also better suited for an analysis of security from an objectivist value perspective. I call my concept of security 'security as sureness'.

Chapter 3 is dedicated to the relationship between security and well-being. More precisely, it asks: how does security affect well-being? Within the context of this dissertation, this is a key question to raise. As I wrote in section 1.1, security is generally assumed to be something desirable for people. It would be interesting to investigate, however, to what extent that assumption is actually justified. In order to facilitate this investigation, in

this third chapter, I start by rehearsing the main features of my conceptual framework of security, comprising a factual aspect, a cognitive aspect, and an emotional aspect, together making up the integrated ideal of security as sureness. As it was already pointed out, the value of well-being will be understood in an objectivist way, inspired by accounts of 'human flourishing'. I show that there are various ways in which security can contribute to human flourishing: if we are *in fact* bound to enjoy a good, in principle this is positive for our flourishing in the future; if we also *believe* that we will enjoy this good, we can be more efficient in pursuing our well-being; if we also have *no fear* that we will not enjoy this good, this supports our physical and mental capacities. I stress that for some of these benefits to obtain fully, it is important that our beliefs and emotional condition align with the facts. I then demonstrate that mirroring security's upsides, there are also ways in which security can *hamper* our flourishing: it can obstruct the change, surprise, and pleasurable fear that are sometimes required for a good life too. I conclude that living a good life requires having security in neither too few, nor too many aspects of one's life: ultimately, there is a balance to be struck.

Chapter 4 is devoted to the relationship between security and freedom. Concretely, it asks: in what ways may security impact freedom, and in what ways may freedom impact security? This question seems particularly relevant in light of how security and freedom are often spoken about in the public and political debate. Frequently, it is said that the two have to be 'balanced' or 'traded off' against one another. It would be interesting to examine, however, if this is a correct representation of the matter. In order to enable this examination, in this fourth chapter, I first explain how the concept of security links to the notion of risk. In the rest of the chapter, I consecutively draw on four different concepts of freedom, as indicated previously: a pure negative concept, a liberal concept, a republican concept, and a concept inspired by the capability approach. I show that each of these concepts brings into focus a different connection between freedom and security: the pure negative concept makes clear how freedom can come at the cost of security, the liberal concept helps us to understand how security can come at the cost of freedom, the republican concept makes apparent how freedom can work to the benefit of security, and the capability-inspired concept helps us to see how security can work to the

benefit of freedom. I illustrate each of these connections with a concrete example from the COVID-19 pandemic. I ultimately claim that in the face of challenges such as this one, taking into account all four connections between freedom and security can help decision-makers in upholding both.

Chapter 5 addresses the relationship between security and equality. More precisely, it asks: what securities are there to be found in an egalitarian society? The relevance of this question is underlined by the way in which the slogan of security is currently used by political actors. Generally, it is those at the right of the political spectrum who seem to attract appeal by promising security. It would be interesting to explore, however, what left-of-centre parties could offer in terms of security while staying true to their commitment to equality. My exploration, in this fifth chapter, yields a distinction between the securities that *are* in keeping with equality – these will be called 'egalitarian' securities – and the securities that are *not* – these will be respectively characterised as 'conservative', 'libertarian', and 'authoritarian' securities. My starting point in this chapter, I already indicated, is formed by the relational egalitarian concept of equality. I show that given the demands of relational equality in society's moral, economic, and political domains, a true community of equals must indeed provide each of its members with a broad set of securities: (i) security of restraint on the part of other members, security of being treated respectfully, and security of not facing violence ('egalitarian moral security'); (ii) security of access to sufficient means for fulfilling one's human needs, security of access to education and work and a fair income, and security of access to public goods enabling civic engagement ('egalitarian economic security'); (iii) security of the ability to form and voice one's own political views, security of the chance to have a say in the political decisions of one's society, and security of not facing state interference on an arbitrary basis ('egalitarian political security'). I also show, however, that there are particular securities that an egalitarian society cannot or should not promise: (i) security of an unchanging cultural or symbolic order, security of a fixed identity or self-conception, and security of always being viewed and treated by others in accordance with this exact image ('conservative moral security'); (ii) security of income or wealth above the level of sufficiency, security of one's acquired economic privilege, and security of never having to give up any property against one's own will ('libertarian economic security'); (iii)

security of continuous rule by one particular person or party, security of the community being led into the direction of one's own individual liking, and security of 'having it one's own way' in politics ('authoritarian political security'). I finally suggest that what I identify as 'egalitarian' securities may just be the best we can get when it comes to security, at least when that is something to be enjoyed by all.

Chapter 6, at last, concludes. First, it returns to the two main questions of this dissertation: how should we understand security, and how does it relate to the values of well-being, freedom, and equality? In answer to these questions, I reiterate the findings from chapters 2 through 5, this time presenting them in such a way that the connections between the different arguments become more clear. Next, the chapter revisits a question raised at the very beginning of the current chapter: if we adopt an objectivist perspective on values, does security deserve to be called a value itself? I argue that it does, but only in a very specific way. Building further on insights from the other chapters, I show that there are no grounds for thinking that security is a value of an intrinsic kind, but there are strong reasons for considering it to be a value of an extrinsic kind. More precisely, I demonstrate that security can possess extrinsic goodness by virtue of its relationships to each of the values analysed in this study: security may not be good for its own sake, but it *can* be good for the sake of well-being, freedom, and equality. Finally, the chapter moves the focus from theory to practice: how might the insights from this dissertation be used when determining the right course of action in the face of real-world issues whereby security seems to be a point of concern – from terrorism to the COVID-19 pandemic, from climate change to the flexibilisation of labour? I argue that there are three ways in which my analysis can be of help in dealing with such issues: it can help us to *specify* in what sense security is at stake in the case at hand; it can help us to *assess* why that may be problematic; and it can help us to *respond* to this problem in a way appropriate to a liberal democratic society. In such a society, I conclude, security must ultimately be approached not as a good in itself, but as something that stands at the service of well-being, freedom, and equality. It is for the sake of these values, then, that we may strive for security – not in the name of security itself; not 'just to be sure'.

Chapter 2

Security: A Conceptual Analysis

2. Security: A Conceptual Analysis

2.1. How to understand security?

If we would review the literature on security throughout history, starting with Seneca's teachings about 'securitas' from around A.D. 55 and working our way up to the most recent text books on security, we would find that the concept has been understood in various different ways in different times (see Gros, 2019; Herington, 2015; Rothschild, 1995). Even if we focus exclusively on contemporary academic literature, however, we see that security has been described in various different terms by different authors. Within the field of 'security studies', a subarea in the study of international relations, we can find extensive debates about what is 'the right way' of understanding security, as well as various publications professing to 'redefine' the term (Baldwin, 1997, p. 5). At first sight, then, it may seem only fair that some scholars, borrowing Gallie's well-known phrase, have described security as an 'essentially contested concept': a concept 'the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about [its] proper use on the part of [its] users' (Gallie, 1956, p. 169; further see Buzan, 1983, p. 6 and Williams & McDonald, 2018, p. 6).

In a perceptive commentary, however, Baldwin (1997) argues that security is actually not so much an essentially contested concept, but it is rather a 'confused' or 'inadequately explicated concept' (p. 12): what we need in the literature, he suggests, is a proper conceptual analysis of security. Within the field of security studies, he concludes, such analysis is in fact rather sparse. If we are not going to find it in that corner of the literature, one might think, the next best place to look for a conceptual analysis of security would be the field of political philosophy. As Waldron (2006) and Herington (2015, 2017) have pointed out, however, political philosophers have in recent times paid relatively little thematic attention to the concept of security. Fortunately, there are some notable exceptions, including John (2011), Floyd (2019), and Welch (2022), as well as Waldron (2006) and Herington (2012, 2015, 2017, 2019) themselves. Taking the works of the latter two thinkers as a starting point, I will use this chapter to develop my own conceptual framework of security, thus answering the question how

security will be understood throughout this research, and laying a necessary foundation for the chapters to come.[5]

The present chapter will proceed as follows. In the next section, I first introduce the ideas of Waldron and Herington, followed by my own conceptual framework of security (section 2.2). In the subsequent sections, I further clarify my conceptual framework by addressing the main differences between my own view and that of Herington in particular (section 2.3, section 2.4, and section 2.5). Throughout these sections, I will argue that my framework ultimately provides the best starting point for analysing security from the objectivist value perspective that I adopt in this dissertation. I end with a small note on the chapters to follow (section 2.6).

2.2. Security as a mode of enjoyment

In an insightful exploration of the concept of security, Waldron (2006) suggests that security should actually not be thought of 'as a good in its own right', but rather 'as a mode in which other goods are enjoyed' (p. 462). He illustrates this idea with a couple of examples: 'I enjoy my property or my health securely. I may enjoy certain liberties, such as the practice of my religion or the freedom to express my political views, securely' (ibid.). Waldron, then, seems to see security as a *relational* concept: as a mode in

[5] As indicated here, the rest of this chapter will consider only the conceptual frameworks put forward by Waldron and Herington, elaborating how these two thinkers understand security and how their understandings of security can be improved upon. The accounts of security developed by the other scholars mentioned in this paragraph – John, Floyd, and Welch – will thus be left to one side in what follows. Let me briefly explain here why I refrain from further engagement with these accounts. John (2011), firstly, states that '[a]n agent enjoys complete physical security if and only if there is warrant for her to believe that she will continue to achieve normal human physical functioning across the range of plausible futures, and this belief would be true' (p. 73). This is an analytically very sophisticated definition – but since it is only a definition of *physical* security, as the citation just given makes clear, we must look further for a definition of security simpliciter. Floyd (2019), secondly, focuses on a concept that is actually different from security altogether: the concept of *securitisation*, which she defines as 'the process whereby an issue is moved from normal politics into the realm of security politics' (p. 63). Again, this is a valuable definition – but it is not a definition of security. Welch (2022), finally, does put forward a definition of security (simpliciter). 'Security', he writes, 'is an objective condition of relative safety from harm' (p. 18). This definition, Welch stresses, leaves open the question of 'which referents are worth securing'. In order to answer this question, he claims, we need 'a theory of value' (p. 32); a theory of what is 'good' (p. 33). In making security about the protection of 'goods', Welch's view actually comes close to the views of Waldron and Herington that I will be considering in the rest of this chapter. As will become clear in what follows, however, Herington's conceptual framework is much more analytically sophisticated than Welch's, so it is Herington's rather than Welch's account that I will be taking as a starting point for developing my own definition of security in what follows.

which an *individual* can enjoy a *good*. Security, on this view, is something that we can have (or lack) with regard to various different goods – much like freedom, on some understandings, is something that we can have (or lack) with regard to various different activities. Let me take this idea as a starting point.

One clarification is in order straightaway. Suppose that we understand security, like it was just proposed, as a mode in which individuals can enjoy goods. Can we then still make sense of all those security utterances in everyday language that are *not* accompanied by an explicit reference to some good – be it property, or health, or civil liberties – the security of which would be at issue? I think that in many cases we still can. This is because very often when we talk about security without mentioning a particular good, we do actually have in mind some good, or some set of goods, but we just leave implicit what this would be. Generally, it will be clear from the context what good, or what set of goods, we are thinking of. When we remark that 'the government needs to take measures against the coronavirus for the sake of our security', for instance, we are thinking of security of health. When we say that 'the flexibilisation of labour is weakening the security of workers', on the other hand, we have in mind security of jobs or incomes. When we speak of 'a refugee camp providing displaced people with basic security', finally, we are talking about security of basic needs fulfilment and freedom from attack.

The next question is: if security is a kind of mode in which individuals may enjoy goods, then what exactly does this mode entail? When trying to give content to the idea of security as a mode of enjoyment, we can draw inspiration from a series of innovative contributions by Herington (2012, 2015, 2017, 2019). In his most recent analysis, Herington (2019) distinguishes between what he refers to as someone's 'fact-relative security' of some good, someone's 'belief-relative security' of some good, and 'the affect of security' (p. 181). These he defines as follows:

i. 'The fact-relative security of some prudential good *G* for an individual *S* at some time *t* is the objective probability that *S* will enjoy *G*, given the state of the world at *t*. This is the chance at *t* that *S* will enjoy *G*' (p. 183).

ii. 'The belief-relative security of some good *G* for an individual *S* at some time *t* is S's subjective probability of enjoying *G*, given her beliefs at *t*. This is *S*'s credence at *t* that *S* will enjoy *G*' (ibid.).

iii. 'The affect of security is an emotional state of calm assurance. (…) It is the directly apprehended experience of freedom from anxiety, rather than the belief that one is safe or secure' (p. 184).

In practice, Herington emphasises, these three may well come apart for someone. That is, if someone has a certain degree of fact-relative security of some good, then it is *not* necessarily the case that she has the same degree of belief-relative security of this good, and that she has a corresponding experience of affective security. It is perfectly possible, after all, that the facts, our beliefs, and our feelings do not align with one another. Naturally, this is true for many aspects of our lives, and Herington rightly points out that things are no different when it comes to our future enjoyment of goods.

Developing an interpretation of Waldron's idea of security as a mode in which individuals can enjoy goods, and taking inspiration from Herington's distinction between fact-relative, belief-relative, and affective security, let me now put forward my own conceptual framework of security. My purposes in presenting a new framework, rather than adopting Herington's exactly as he spells it out, are twofold. Firstly, I hope to resolve a number of problems that I see in Herington's account, thereby improving our general understanding of what security really is. Secondly, I aim to set up my framework in such a way that it is optimally suited for analysing security from the objectivist perspective on values described earlier in this chapter, thereby laying the best groundwork for my analysis of security in relation to well-being, freedom, and equality in the remainder of this dissertation.

I call my concept of security 'security as sureness'.[6] In the most general wording, on my view, if an individual has security of a good, this means that she 'is sure' of her future enjoyment of this good. This 'sureness',

[6] I am aware that the word 'sureness' is not used very often in the English language. My choice for adopting it in my characterisation of security here reflects the fact that I started my thinking about security having in mind the Dutch notion of 'zekerheid', the common translation of which is 'security', but the literal translation of which would be 'sureness'. Adopting the word 'sureness' in my description of 'security' can be seen as an attempt to connect the connotations of the Dutch word 'zekerheid' to the English word 'security' as I use it in this study. Besides, precisely because the word 'sureness' is not so common in the English vocabulary, I enjoy more liberty to fill it in in my own way here.

in turn, has a factual aspect, a cognitive aspect, and an emotional aspect. Borrowing Herington's style for a moment, let me define these aspects as follows:

i. The factual aspect of security of some prudential good *G* for an individual *S* at some time *t* entails that given the state of the world at *t*, *S* is *actually* bound at *t* to enjoy *G* in the future. Put more simply, security's factual aspect entails the fact that *S* is bound to enjoy *G*.

ii. The cognitive aspect of security of some prudential good *G* for an individual *S* at some time *t* entails that because *S* is aware of the relevant facts of the world at *t*, *S* also *believes* at *t* that she will enjoy *G* in the future. In simpler phrasing, security's cognitive aspect entails an appropriate belief on the part of *S* that she will enjoy *G*.

iii. The emotional aspect of security of some prudential good *G* for an individual *S* at some time *t* entails that because *S* is aware of the relevant facts of the world at *t*, *S* also has *no fear* at *t* that she will *not* enjoy *G* in the future. Phrased in a simpler way, security's emotional aspect entails an appropriate absence of fear on the part of *S* that she will not enjoy *G*.

An example may clarify things. Say that someone is renting an apartment. In order for this person to count as having security of this place, it has to be the case that:

i. The renter's landlord is in fact planning to continue letting his property to the renter, with the result that the renter is *actually* bound to enjoy her apartment in the future.

ii. Because the renter is aware of her landlord's plans, the renter also *believes* that she will hold onto her apartment.

iii. Being aware of her landlord's plans, our renter has *no fear* that she will come to lose her apartment either.

As becomes clear from the above, my understanding of security departs from Herington's in a number of ways. Below, I explain the most important differences between our accounts, thereby clarifying crucial features of my concept of security along the way.

2.3. The factual aspect and the cognitive aspect of security

The first major difference between Herington's account and my own regards the way in which we define the factual aspect of security (i) and the cognitive

aspect of security (ii). Whereas Herington links what he calls 'fact-relative' and 'belief-relative' security to the concept of 'probability', I characterise the factual aspect and the cognitive aspect of security – just like the emotional aspect, which I address in the next subsection – in absolute terms. That is, while Herington defines fact-relative security as the 'objective probability' that an individual will enjoy some good, I stipulate that the factual aspect of security concerns the *flat-out fact* that she is bound to enjoy this good. By this I mean that the state of the world at present is such that it simply must be the case that this individual will enjoy this good in the future. And while Herington defines belief-relative security as the 'subjective probability' that an individual will enjoy some good, I stipulate that the cognitive aspect of security concerns the *flat-out belief* on her part that she will enjoy this good. By this I mean that this individual herself believes that she will enjoy it.

Why would I characterise the factual aspect and the cognitive aspect of security in absolute terms, instead of defining these as probabilities? In order to answer this question, let me begin by repeating that the concept of security that we seek to describe here is that of security as a particular mode in which individuals can enjoy goods. When security is defined as the 'probability' that an individual will enjoy some good, however, then actually the word 'security' does *not* refer to a particular mode of enjoying goods. Rather, under this definition, the word 'security' – much like the words 'height', 'weight', or 'temperature' – refers to a *parameter*: a scale on which various scores are possible. Now, each *score* on the parameter of probability – be it 0%, or 30%, or 100% – *does* refer to a particular mode of enjoying goods. But the probability parameter itself does *not* represent one such a mode. So if we want to define security as itself a particular mode of enjoying goods, then we should not define it as probability. Rather, it makes sense to define it as we would define the ideal found at the upper end of the probability parameter. In the case of fact-relative security, this would be the flat-out fact that an individual is bound to enjoy some good; in the case of belief-relative security, this would be her flat-out belief that she will enjoy this good.

This is all consistent with submitting that in practice, security is often not a matter of 'all or nothing'. Someone may very well have security of some good *to a certain extent*. And we could indeed view the extent to which she has security along the factual dimension and the extent to which she has

security along the cognitive dimension as matters of probability. Consider, first, the factual aspect of security, which entails that an individual is bound to enjoy some good. When determining the extent to which this aspect of security obtains for her, the relevant probability is the *objective* probability that she will enjoy this good: the chance that would follow from a perfect probability calculation based on all the relevant facts of the world at present.[7] Consider, second, the cognitive aspect of security, which entails that an individual herself believes that she will enjoy some good. When determining the extent to which this aspect of security obtains for her, the relevant probability is the *subjective* probability that she will enjoy this good: her own estimation of this chance.[8] However, the fact that *the extent to which* someone has security along the factual dimension and *the extent to which* she has security along the cognitive dimension can be viewed as matters of probability, does not entail that *the concept of security* should be defined in terms of probability. As I argued above, it should not: rather, we must define it in its ideal form.

Before moving on to the second difference between Herington's scheme and mine, let me highlight that the practice of defining concepts in their ideal form fits within a larger tradition of theorising values. When defining concepts such as freedom, justice, or democracy, for example, many philosophers choose to describe ideal types rather than actually existing phenomena. They describe freedom as, say, 'the absence of interference'; justice as 'those principles that all reasonable persons would agree to in a hypothetical position of perfect equality'; democracy as 'rule by the people' – knowing full well that in the actual world out there, these things hardly ever (or maybe even never) exist in their pure form. Instead of taking this as a reason to water down their definitions, however, they hold on to their ideal-typical concepts and subsequently characterise and evaluate practical reality by describing and assessing *to what extent* and *in what ways* it

[7] Admittedly, objective probability is a tricky concept (see Hayenhjelm & Wolff, 2011; Perry, 2007). Causal determinists would say that the only possible objective probability values are 0 and 1 (Schaffer, 2007). Nonetheless, I follow Herington (2019) in assuming that whether someone is in fact bound to enjoy a good can indeed be viewed as a matter of (objective) probability.

[8] Of course, we often do not have clear-cut beliefs about the probability that we will enjoy goods. Nevertheless, I follow Herington (2019) in thinking that we can indeed describe our credence that we will enjoy goods in terms of (subjective) probability.

matches, or departs from, the ideal as they have characterised it. With my ideal-typical definition of security, I adopt a similar approach.

2.4. The emotional aspect of security

The second major difference between Herington's account an my own concerns the way in which we define the emotional aspect of security (iii). Let me first point out that Herington's definition of what he calls 'the affect of security' or 'affective security' does not suffer from the same shortcoming as his definitions of fact-relative and belief-relative security. After all, by defining affective security as 'an emotional state of calm assurance', Herington already describes this affect not as a parameter but as a particular condition. Nevertheless, I let my characterisation of the emotional aspect of security depart from his definition of affective security in two particular ways. Firstly, I avoid the positive phrasing that Herington uses in his definition of affective security, and describe the emotional aspect of security in negative terms instead. The emotional aspect of security, I stipulate, considers not the *presence* of 'a felt quality of tranquility' (Herington 2019, p. 184), but rather it concerns the *absence* of a particular kind of fear. Secondly, I avoid the general phrasing that Herington uses in his definition of affective security, and link the emotional aspect of security specifically to the enjoyment of a good. The emotional aspect of security, I stipulate, considers not the absence of just *any* fear, but rather it concerns the absence of the *particular* fear *that one will not enjoy some good*.

Why do I, firstly, define the emotional aspect of security as the absence of some kind of fear, and not as the presence of feelings of calmness or tranquility? The reason is that my definition appears to align better with the ways in which we tend to think and speak of security when we view it as a mode of enjoying goods. In order to consider someone as having security of some good, it seems, it is not necessary that she experiences some determinate positive affect in relation to her future enjoyment of this good. It suffices that she does *not* hold some determinate *negative* affect in relation to it: a particular kind of fear, to be specified below. This is not to say that people never experience positive sensations – peace, calmness, tranquility – linked to their possession of security of some good. Obviously, they sometimes do. The point is, however, that experiencing this positive

sensation is not necessary for them to be considered as having security of this good. The absence of a particular kind of fear is enough.

Herington himself provides two arguments for adopting a positive understanding of affective security, both of which ultimately fail. In the first place, Herington (2019) lists a number of practical examples to suggest that people experience affective security as a positive and directly noticeable sensation: the lost toddler who is reunited with her parents; the job seeker in a bad labour market who is offered work; the patient with a suspect mole who is told that it is benign (p. 184). The affect that he is referring to in these situations, however, actually seems better characterised as an emotion of relief than as a feeling of security. In the second place, Herington refers to a number of texts from classical times in which security is defined in positive terms: as a calm mental state. Yet, as it appears from his own analysis of security in the history of political thought, within the literature security has at least as often been described in negative terms: as 'freedom from fear' (Herington 2015, p. 25). All in all, I conclude, the emotional aspect of security is best defined in a negative way.

Why do I, secondly, define the emotional aspect of security as the absence of the specific fear that one will not enjoy some good, rather than a general state of being without fear? This has to do with the relational character of the concept of security adopted here. Remember Waldron's original idea of security as a mode in which an *individual* enjoys a *good*. Now, if we describe the emotional aspect of security as a general absence of fear, the 'good' has disappeared from our definition. If, instead, we define the emotional aspect of security as the absence of fear *that one will not enjoy a good*, the 'good' makes its way back in.[9] That way, our characterisation of the emotional aspect of security aligns nicely with the definitions of the factual and cognitive aspects of security, which, after all, also reflect the idea that security is a mode in which an individual enjoys a good.

Before turning to the third and final difference between Herington's scheme and mine, it is worth pointing out that under the definition proposed

[9] In relation to this point, let me stress that I choose to characterise the emotional aspect of security as an absence of *fear*, rather than an absence of *anxiety*. Fear, I take it, is a more 'focused' emotion. The kind of fear that I refer to in my characterisation of security, for instance, is focused on the possibility of not enjoying a good. Anxiety, by contrast, is rather a generalised emotional condition, which lacks focus on a specific risk or object. Although fear may lead to anxiety (a point that will be addressed in chapter 3), it is important to emphasise that they are not the same thing.

here, the emotional aspect of security concerns the absence of a kind of fear that is not episodic, but rather dispositional. The fear at issue is such that when somebody has this fear, this does not entail that the fearful feeling is necessarily and constantly present for her. Instead, it entails that such a fearful feeling can be triggered under particular circumstances. Think back, for a moment, of the example of the person who is renting a place to live. The emotional aspect of security, for her, would consist in an absence of fear that she will lose her apartment. Now, suppose that this aspect of security is not fulfilled: she actually *does* fear that her landlord will throw her out. This does not have to mean that she continuously *experiences* this fear. More likely, she really *feels* afraid only when she bumps into her landlord in the street, when she is thinking over her living situation, and perhaps when her friends ask her 'how are things at home?'. The emotional aspect of security, in other words, consists in the absence of a disposition to feel afraid in relation to one's future enjoyment of some good, rather than the absence of a fearful feeling of an episodic kind.

2.5. Security as an integrated concept

The last major difference between Herington's account and my own concerns the linkages between the factual aspect of security (i), the cognitive aspect of security (ii), and the emotional aspect of security (iii). I agree with Herington that when analysing security, it is useful to distinguish between a dimension of facts, a dimension of beliefs, and a dimension of emotions. At the same time, I want to emphasise more than Herington does that the factual aspect, the cognitive aspect, and the emotional aspect of security should *not* be regarded as three self-standing security concepts. On my view, they are three different aspects of *one and the same* concept of security, and they are tied up with each other in important ways.[10] Thus in order for someone to count as having security as sureness, in the first place, I stipulate that all three of security's aspects must obtain for her: she must be sure of her future enjoyment of some good along the factual dimension, *as well as*

[10] Whether Herington also sees fact-relative, belief-relative, and affective security as three aspects of one and the same concept of security does not become clear from the analysis in which he introduces this distinction (Herington, 2019). What does become clear from his account is that Herington sees no necessary connections between the concepts of fact-relative, belief-relative, and affective security (p. 188): on his definitions, the extent to which any of the three can be said to obtain does not by itself affect the extent to which the other two can be said to obtain.

the cognitive dimension, *as well as* the emotional dimension. In the second place, I stipulate that the fulfilment of the factual aspect of security, the fulfilment of the cognitive aspect of security, and the fulfilment of the emotional aspect of security must be connected to each other in particular ways: both the *belief* that one will enjoy a good and the *absence of fear* that one will not enjoy this good must spring from an awareness of the relevant features of the world determining whether or not one will *in fact* enjoy this good. Security thereby becomes a decidedly integrated concept.

Why present security as an integrated concept, instead of separating the factual aspect, the cognitive aspect, and the emotional aspect of security as if they are three independent security concepts? Part of the reason is, again, that I believe that my view stays closer to how we tend to think of security in our everyday lives and how we tend to use the word in our everyday language. Going back to the case of our renter once more, we can imagine the following scenarios:

a) The renter's landlord is in fact planning to evict the renter. The renter, however, does not know this yet, and thus she believes that she will continue to enjoy her apartment, and she feels assured accordingly.
b) The landlord is in fact planning to do no such thing, but he is bluffing to the renter that she will be evicted. The renter, as a result, believes that she will come to lose her home. Yet, because after a life of terrible hardship she has become entirely numb to anything that ever happens to her, she is not disposed to feel any fear about her predicament.
c) The landlord is in fact not planning to evict the renter, and the renter believes this as well. However, because the renter has an awful trauma from lacking a place to live in the past, she cannot get rid of a nagging fear that she will come to lose her home.

When considering these scenarios, we may notice two things. Firstly, in each of the three scenarios, it seems wrong to say that our renter has security. In scenario (a), clearly, the fact that the renter is bound to lose her apartment makes it incorrect to speak of her as having security. In scenario (b), similarly, the fact that the renter believes that she will be thrown out makes it improper to say that she has security. Scenario (c) is the most ambiguous one. Supposedly, some people would find that the renter has security, even

though she has a strong feeling of *in*security. Yet, because the absence of fear tends to be so central in our thinking about security (Herington, 2015, p. 25; Rothschild, 1995, p. 62), to me it seems that it would indeed be wrong to speak of someone who fears that she will lose her home as having security of her home. I conclude that in order to count as having security of some good, all three aspects of security must be fulfilled for someone: the factual aspect, the cognitive aspect, and the emotional aspect.

There is also a second lesson to be learned from the scenarios above. It seems that in order to establish if the cognitive aspect and the emotional aspect of security are fulfilled for our renter, we have to consider whether or not her beliefs and her emotional condition are based on an awareness of the factual state that she is in. In scenario (a), although the renter believes that she will continue to enjoy her apartment, this does not seem to warrant the conclusion that 'the cognitive aspect of security' is fulfilled for her. Because the belief of the renter is not based on an awareness of the facts – after all, without her knowing, her landlord is actually planning to evict her – her belief does not seem to be an element of security, but it seems to be just that: a belief (and a mistaken one at that). Likewise, in scenario (b), although the renter has no fear that she will lose her home, this does not seem to justify concluding that 'the emotional aspect of security' obtains for her. Because the absence of fear on the part of the renter is not based on an awareness of the facts – after all, her emotional condition does not result from an awareness of her landlord's plans, but from a psychological pathology – her emotional condition does not seem to be an element of security, but it seems to be just that: an emotional condition (and a pathological one at that). I conclude that in order for a belief that one will enjoy a good to count as realising security's cognitive aspect, and in order for an absence of fear that one will not enjoy a good to count as realising security's emotional aspect, both these things have to be based on an awareness of the facts. In short, both the belief and the emotional condition have to be *appropriate*.[11]

[11] At this point, one might ask why I describe the cognitive aspect of security as a belief that is 'appropriate', rather than as a belief that is 'justified' and 'true' – the qualifications that are usually taken to be jointly necessary and sufficient for a belief to count as 'knowledge'. The reason why I do not characterise the cognitive aspect of security as a *true* belief is that this aspect of security concerns a belief about the future enjoyment of goods, and whether or not beliefs about the future can at all be true remains a controversial philosophical issue (see Øhrstrøm & Hasle, 2020). The reason why I do not describe the

Before closing, let me point out that within the context of this research, there is a further reason for adopting an integrated understanding of security as sketched above. This relates to the objectivist perspective on values adopted in this study. Within the objectivist tradition of thinking about values, I already suggested in the introduction, the goodness of a particular state of affairs is not seen as purely a matter of how people subjectively evaluate or experience this condition. Certain states of affairs, so it is assumed, can also be good in an objective sense. Now, on many objectivist accounts of values, one important factor in determining the objective goodness of a particular state of affairs is whether or not, in this situation, there is a certain alignment between the facts, people's beliefs, and their feelings. Consider, for instance, the Aristotelian understanding of 'virtuous activity'. In order for an individual to count as acting virtuously, on this understanding, it is not enough that she *in fact* acts in a specific manner – that is, in accordance with virtue. She must also have correct *beliefs* about her action – namely, that this is the right action for particular reasons. Finally, she must *feel* a certain way about it – she must experience pleasure in the activity (Aristotle, 2000, pp. 25–28; Kelly, 1973, p. 401). If any of these three things does not obtain for her, then she is not really acting virtuously. Similarly, whether or not any of these three things counts as a part of virtuous activity depends on whether the other things are present. If she correctly believes that a particular action is the right one, for instance, but she fails to act in accordance with this belief, then her belief is not an aspect of virtuous activity. And if she experiences pleasure in a way of acting that is *not* in accordance with virtue, then this pleasant experience is not an aspect of virtuous activity either.

From an objectivist point of view, then, in order for a particular concept to qualify as a serious candidate for earning the status of 'a value', the concept must be defined in a properly integrated way. This gives me a second reason to characterise security as I have characterised it above: as involving not just the *fact* that an individual is bound to enjoy some good, but also a *belief* on the part of this individual that she will enjoy this good,

cognitive aspect of security as a *justified* belief is that this term would raise questions about the conditions under which a belief may be considered to be justified, which is again something about which philosophers hold diverging views (see Jenkins Ichikawa & Steup, 2017). The boundaries of the current study do not allow me to address these issues, let alone resolve them.

and an *absence of fear* on her part that she will not enjoy this good – whereby both the belief and the absence of fear at issue must be based on an awareness of the relevant facts. I conclude that in comparison to Herington's account, the conceptual framework that I set out gives a description of security that is not only more in line with how we commonly tend to think of security, but that is also better suited for an analysis of security from an objectivist perspective on values.

2.6. A starting point for further analysis

Equipped with the conceptual framework of security developed in this chapter, we can finally turn to the investigation around which the remainder of this dissertation revolves: an analysis of the relationships between security and a number of core values in contemporary political philosophy. The upcoming three chapters will analyse security in relation to the values of well-being (chapter 3), freedom (chapter 4), and equality (chapter 5). Given that these chapters are set up as independent inquiries, and clarifying the concept of security constitutes an important step within each of these inquiries, some of the information from the current chapter also comes up in the chapters to follow. Repetition is thereby kept to a necessary minimum: the key task in the rest of this dissertation is to use the conceptual framework set out here as a starting point for uncovering the ways in which security relates to a number of key values for liberal democratic societies.

Chapter 3

Being Sure and Living Well: How Security Affects Human Flourishing

3. Being Sure and Living Well: How Security Affects Human Flourishing[12]

3.1. Security and well-being

Why do we consider a worker with a permanent contract to be better off than one on temporary hire? To some extent, this has to do with the symbolic value of a permanent contract: it serves as a sign of recognition and trust on the part of the employer vis-à-vis the employee. But most importantly, we consider such a contract to be more valuable because it gives the worker more security. And security, we feel intuitively, is good for people. This is not only true for security of bodily integrity, that is, security in the narrow sense of the word. It applies to security of all things that contribute to a person's well-being, such as her health, her income, or her relationship. But why exactly would *security* of something that contributes to a person's well-being, also *itself* contribute to her well-being? Are there ways in which security of a good might actually be bad for someone? Just how much security should we aim to create for ourselves? These are the questions that concern me here.

In a way, these are old and familiar issues. It seems plausible that human beings have always found their well-being importantly to hinge on their security of goods, be it at first perhaps only of food and the tools used to procure that food. Two great utilitarian thinkers already addressed the significance of security for people's well-being back in the nineteenth century. According to Jeremy Bentham (1843), 'we must consider that man is not like the animals, limited to the present, whether as respects suffering or enjoyment; but that he is susceptible of pains and pleasure by anticipation; and that it is not enough to secure him from actual loss, but it is necessary also to guarantee him, as far as possible, against future loss' (p. 110). John Stuart Mill (1871) described security as 'the most vital of all interests', stating that '[w]e depend on it for all our immunity from evil' and 'for the whole value of every single good that goes beyond the passing moment; because if we could be deprived of anything the next instant by

[12] An earlier version of this chapter has been published as an article in *The Journal of Value Inquiry* (Daemen, 2022a). In turning that article into this chapter, I have kept the adjustments to a necessary minimum: aside from minor cosmetic improvements, the only revisions that I have made to the paper are those that were strictly needed in order to attain maximal conceptual consistency across the chapters of this dissertation.

whoever was at that moment stronger than ourselves, nothing could be of any worth to us except the gratification of the instant' (p. 81).

Questions about security and well-being are clearly relevant in today's society as well. Around the world people currently are concerned about security of many different kinds of goods. Pandemics compromise security of our health and that of our loved ones, flexibilisation of labour makes job and income security less accessible for a large part of the workforce, and climate change leads many to worry about their future living environment. Nonetheless, thinkers in contemporary analytical political philosophy have paid rather little thematic attention to the topic of security. There are a couple of notable exceptions. Waldron (2003, 2006) has done useful exploratory groundwork on the concept and value of security. Wolff & De-Shalit (2007) have provided an illuminating account of the ways in which people are disadvantaged when their functionings are or become insecure. John (2011) has developed a stimulating argument for considering physical security a constituent of well-being. But the most important source to be acknowledged here is the work of Herington (2015, 2017, 2019). Particularly valuable is his analysis of the contribution that security makes to well-being, which he investigates from the perspectives of hedonistic, desire-fulfilment, and objective-list theories of well-being (2019).[13]

This chapter is an attempt to deepen our understanding of the ways in which security affects well-being. It adds something new to the existing literature in a number of ways. Firstly, it starts from an improved understanding of security, interpreting it as an integrated ideal encompassing a *factual aspect*, a *cognitive aspect*, and an *emotional aspect* (section 3.2). Secondly, different from the writings on the value of security mentioned above, this work relates security to the concept of *human flourishing*. This is a specific understanding of well-being (section 3.3). Thirdly, this study pays special attention to the importance of the connections between the factual aspect of security, the cognitive aspect of security, and the emotional aspect of security. When and why it matters whether the facts, our beliefs, and our emotional condition are in line with

[13] In addition to the works just mentioned, which are especially relevant for an inquiry about security and well-being, there are a number of writings in contemporary political philosophy that address security in relation to other topics, such as human rights (Binder & Binder, 2019; Shue, 1980; Wolfendale, 2017) and emergency politics (Floyd, 2019; Neocleous, 2007).

one another when it comes to security, becomes clear from the investigation of the ways in which security can make a *positive* contribution to our well-being (section 3.4). The last novelty of this chapter lies in its exploration of the question whether security might also impact our flourishing *negatively*. It is demonstrated that there are indeed ways in which security can also hamper our well-being sometimes (section 3.5). I conclude by reflecting on the question what we can learn from these findings in shaping our own lives and working towards a better society (section 3.6).

3.2. Security as sureness

What is security? At the most general level, security, as it is understood here, is a mode in which a *person* can enjoy a *good* (see Herington, 2017, p. 187; Waldron, 2006, p. 462).[14] But what exactly does this mode entail? In answering this question, it is common to distinguish between 'objective' and 'subjective' security, whereby the former refers to some fact about a person's enjoyment of a good, and the latter concerns her own experience of the matter.

Herington (2019), however, replaces this contrast by a more refined conceptual framework, comprising three different elements. Firstly, there is 'fact-relative security'. According to Herington, '[t]he fact-relative security of some prudential good *G* for an individual *S* at some time *t* is the *objective* probability that *S* will enjoy *G*, given the state of the world at *t*' (p. 183). It is the answer to the question: what is the *actual* chance that this person will enjoy this good? Fact-relative security refers purely to the actual state of the world; what a person thinks or feels about this is irrelevant. Secondly, there is 'belief-relative security'. On Herington's definition, '[t]he belief-relative security of some good *G* for an individual *S* at some time *t* is *S*'s *subjective* probability of enjoying *G*, given her beliefs at *t*' (ibid.). It is the answer to the question: how likely does this person *herself* think it is that she will enjoy this good? Belief-relative security refers purely to the actual beliefs of a person; whether these are justified or true does not matter. Thirdly, there is 'the affect of security' or 'affective security'. On Herington's view, '[t]he affect

[14] In chapter 2 of this dissertation, I speak of security as a mode in which *individuals* can enjoy goods; in the current chapter, I rather speak of security as a mode of enjoying goods for *persons*. This is because this chapter specifically looks at how security relates to well-being, a concept that is commonly treated as something pertaining to 'persons' rather than 'individuals'. Following Locke (1975), we can understand the term 'person' to refer to an individual with particular mental properties (p. 335).

of security is an emotional state of calm assurance' (p. 184). It is not by definition experienced in regard to a good and it is not necessarily attached to a certain belief or a certain state of the world; it is just a feeling.

The distinction that Herington introduces between the facts, our beliefs, and our feelings when it comes to security is of great value when we try to make sense of security and its effects on well-being. At the same time, the conceptual framework set out above can be improved in a number of ways, especially if we want to use it for the project of investigating how security affects well-being. Building on Herington's analysis, I therefore propose a new conceptual framework of security. In the most general wording, on my view, if a person has security of a good, this means that she 'is sure' of her future enjoyment of this good. This 'sureness', in turn, has what I call a 'factual aspect', a 'cognitive aspect', and an 'emotional aspect'. Together, these constitute an integrated concept that I name 'security as sureness'.

I define the three aspects of security as sureness as follows. The factual aspect of security, firstly, entails that given the state of the world right now, a person is *actually* bound to enjoy a good in the future. In short, security's factual aspect simply entails the fact that this person is bound to enjoy this good. The cognitive aspect of security, secondly, entails that because this person is aware of the relevant facts of the world currently, she also *believes* that she will enjoy this good in the future. Put differently, security's cognitive aspect entails an appropriate belief on the part of this person that she will enjoy this good. The emotional aspect of security, thirdly, entails that because this person is aware of the relevant facts of the world presently, she also has *no fear* that she will *not* enjoy this good. In other words, security's emotional aspect entails an appropriate absence of fear on the part of this person that she will not enjoy this good. Importantly, the fear at issue is not episodic but rather dispositional: it does not concern the experience of being afraid per se, but a *disposition* to feel fearful in relation to one's future enjoyment of a good. Security's emotional aspect, then, entails an appropriate absence of such a disposition.

In order to make clear what security as sureness entails exactly, a brief illustration may help. Think, for a moment, of a person who has a nice job that she would like to keep. In order for her to count as having security of her job, in the first place, it must be the case that her employer is in fact

planning to continue her employment, with the result that the employee is *actually* bound to still have her job in the future. In addition, it must be the case that the employee, because she is aware of her employer's intention of keeping her on, also *believes* that she will continue to enjoy her job. Finally, it must be the case that our employee, given her awareness of her employer's plans, also has *no fear* that she will lose her job: she is not disposed to feel afraid in relation to her employment situation.

My understanding of security departs from Herington's (2019) in a number of ways. Let me highlight the three most significant ones. Firstly, I define the factual aspect and the cognitive aspect of security in absolute rather than relative terms. Whereas Herington describes fact-relative and belief-relative security as the objective and subjective 'probability' that a person will enjoy a good (p. 183), I say that the factual aspect of security concerns the *flat-out fact* that a person is bound to enjoy a good, and that the cognitive aspect of security concerns the *flat-out belief* that a person will enjoy a good. Secondly, I define the emotional aspect of security in negative rather than positive terms. Whereas Herington describes affective security as the presence of 'an emotional state of calm assurance' (p. 184), I say that the emotional aspect of security concerns the *absence of fear* that one will not enjoy a good. Thirdly, I emphasise that security as sureness is one integrated ideal comprising three different aspects, rather than separating between fact-relative security, belief-relative security, and affective security as if they were three self-standing security concepts. When I call my concept of security 'integrated', I mean this in a double sense. In the first place, I stipulate that in order for a person to count as having security of a good, the factual aspect *and* the cognitive aspect *and* the emotional aspect have to obtain for her. In the second place, I stipulate that the fulfilment of the cognitive aspect and the fulfilment of the emotional aspect are connected to the fulfilment of the factual aspect in important ways: in order for the belief that one will enjoy a good to count as realising the cognitive aspect of security, and in order for the absence of fear that one will not enjoy a good to count as realising the emotional aspect of security, the belief and the emotional state at issue have to be based on an awareness of the facts – they have to be *appropriate*.[15]

[15] A more elaborate account of my conceptual framework of security and my reasons for departing from Herington's in the ways mentioned here is given in chapter 2 of this dissertation.

Security as sureness should be distinguished from a number of other concepts. First of all, security is different from safety. Safety, as I understand it, is a narrower notion than security. It may be regarded as security of one particular kind of good: the basic good of being alive and unharmed.[16] Security is also not the same as unconditionality. A person can have security of a good – say, an income – even though she has to meet certain requirements in order to continue or come to enjoy this good – say, she has to work – provided that she is sure to meet these requirements.[17] Furthermore, security differs from control. We can very well have security of things that are not under our control. The weather, for instance, does not depend on our will, and still we can be quite sure to have nice weather in the weekend.[18] Security is also different from certainty. Someone can have or claim certainty of beliefs about various kinds of issues – from what is the speed of light to the reason why England lost the football cup final – but only certainty of beliefs about one's future well-being (insofar as such a thing can exist) is directly relevant for one's security.[19] Lastly, security should be distinguished from robustness. Robustness is about whether a person *would* enjoy a good – say, her friend's support – if circumstances were relevantly different than the way they actually are – say, if she were chronically ill. Security, on the other hand, concerns whether someone *will* actually enjoy a good as time goes by.[20] Of course, there are important connections between security and these other notions. At the same time, however, security is a distinct concept worth studying on its own.

[16] For an exploration of safety in relation to security, see the analysis of Waldron (2006). It is from this analysis that I have borrowed the definition of safety given here (p. 461).

[17] For an argument that does link (income) security to unconditionality, see the work of Standing (2008).

[18] For an analysis of the balance between luck and control in the good life, see the account of Nussbaum (2001).

[19] For a thorough study of the concept of certainty, see the analysis of Reed (2008). Note, however, that if we understand certainty as 'the highest form of knowledge' or indeed as 'the only epistemic property superior to knowledge' (two views mentioned by Reed), then we may debate about the question whether being 'certain' about the future even is conceptually possible. Also see footnote 11, chapter 2. I will leave this issue to one side here.

[20] For an extensive treatment of robustness and its relation to the good, see the account of Pettit (2015). The difference between security as it is understood here, and robustness as Pettit sees it, is also important for his republican theory of freedom. On this view, a person is free insofar as she enjoys non-interference across different possible *worlds* – that is, to the extent that her non-interference is *robust* (p. 3). This need not be the same as the degree to which she enjoys non-interference across different possible *futures* – that is, in how far her non-interference is *secure*.

3.3. Human flourishing

Before delving into the question of how security relates to well-being, let me explain how well-being is understood here. I adopt a concept of well-being that I refer to as 'human flourishing'. This term is sometimes used as a translation of Aristotle's (2000) notion of 'eudaimonia' specifically. Here, however, it is used as an objective concept of well-being more generally. It points us to what things in life have 'prudential value', that is, what things are 'good for' persons.

If we take well-being to consist in human flourishing, we adopt an objectivist theory of the good. Such a theory can be contrasted with two subjectivist theories of the good: hedonism, which takes a person's well-being to consist only in her experience of pleasure, and desire-fulfilment theory, which takes someone's well-being to consist exclusively in the satisfaction of her desires. Instead of providing a full-blown defence of human flourishing as an understanding of the good, let me just highlight two important shortcomings in the other two theories, which we can overcome if we adopt an objective concept of well-being. Hedonism implies that nothing can matter prudentially to a person but the quality of her experience (Arneson, 1999, p. 114). On this view, the life of a person who *really* makes a friend or writes a great novel is no better than the life of a person who has the mere *illusion* that she does so – the experience, after all, is the same for both (Nozick, 1974, p. 42). Many people find this unintuitive and therefore renounce the hedonistic understanding of well-being. Desire-fulfilment theory, at least on its simplest version, implies that the satisfaction of a person's desires is good for her regardless of the content of these desires. On this view, fulfilment of a person's desires is good for her even if these desires do not seem to regard her *own* life – think of a desire that distant strangers are adequately nourished – or if she has these desires only because she is *confused* – think of a desire to eat food that will actually make her sick (Arneson, 1999, p. 124). Again, many people find this not intuitive and therefore renounce the idea of well-being as desire-fulfilment.

An objectivist theory of the good does not suffer from these difficulties, because it does not make a person's well-being hinge entirely on her subjective experience or desires. Instead, it puts forward an objective list of the things that a good human life consists in – the things that make up human flourishing. Different philosophers have included different things in

this list. Placing themselves within an Aristotelian tradition of thinking about the good life, many thinkers thereby refer to the natural characteristics that humans have as the kind of beings that they are. Kraut (2007), for example, takes human flourishing to consist in the possession, development, and enjoyment of our physical, cognitive, affective, sensory, and social powers (pp. 136-137). Others focus on the things that people can obtain by putting these characteristics to use. Rasmussen (1999), for instance, mentions health, knowledge, achievement, pleasure, and friendship (p. 4). As these lists suggest, the experience of pleasure and the satisfaction of desires may very well contribute to people's flourishing – it is just not exhaustively made up of these things.

I will not spell out what I take human flourishing to consist in specifically here. Instead of starting from a particular list of items and figuring out how security relates to each of these, I will try and make intuitive what a flourishing human life looks like and how security fits into this picture as we go. A couple of points, however, need to be clarified in advance. From the viewpoint of human flourishing, something can be good for someone for two different reasons: either it forms a *component of* a flourishing human life, or it is an *instrument for* leading such a life. In the first case, it can be said to possess 'final' value; in the latter case, its value is merely 'instrumental' (Korsgaard, 1983, p. 170).[21] Whether one sees something as a component or rather as an instrument depends on the definition of human flourishing that one adopts. On Kraut's view, for instance, the use of my social skills would count as a component of my flourishing; Rasmussen, on the other hand, would see it an instrument for achieving a component of flourishing (friendship, for example).

It is important to note that when we consider a person's *security* of a *good*, there are two factors at issue that potentially affect this person's

[21] As Korsgaard (1983) points out, 'instrumental' values are often mistakenly contrasted with 'intrinsic' values (p. 170), a category that we encountered in chapter 1 of this dissertation. In fact, Korsgaard explains, there are two separate distinctions of values that should not be confused. The first is the distinction between ends and means: the distinction between 'final' and 'instrumental' values (ibid.). This is the distinction that I refer to in the present chapter, whereby I classify components of human flourishing as 'final' goods and instruments for human flourishing as 'instrumental' goods. The second distinction is that between things that have value in themselves and things that derive their value from some other source: the distinction between 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' values (ibid.). This is the distinction that was introduced in chapter 1, and that will concern me further in chapter 6, whereby I will distinguish between different kinds of extrinsic values, of which instrumental values form only one category.

flourishing. The first one is the good that this person has security of. Throughout this text, the noun 'good' is taken to refer to something that contributes to this person's well-being, in some way, at some point, either as a component of or an instrument for her flourishing. This definition is deliberately kept vague so that a variety of things that we might speak of as matters that we can have some degree of security of can fit under this heading – from concrete stuff like our bicycle or our eyesight, to more abstract goods such as our ability to move or our aesthetic pleasure. The second factor potentially affecting human flourishing that is implied when we consider a person's security of a good, is security itself. As was explained above, security comprises a fact, a belief, and an emotional condition. The main question of this chapter is whether and how these three things impact people's well-being, be it as components of or instruments for human flourishing. Let us turn to that question now.

3.4. What is good about security?

Why would it be good for a person to have security of a good? Remember that the ideal of security as sureness has three aspects: a factual aspect, a cognitive aspect, and an emotional aspect. Below, I investigate how each of these may contribute to human flourishing. I will thereby consider them one by one, but also indicate when and why it matters that the fulfilment of a certain aspect of security is connected to the fulfilment of another aspect of security in order for the benefits of security to obtain.

Firstly, consider the factual aspect of security. Recall that when a person has security of a good, security's factual aspect entails that given the state of the world at present, this person is *actually* bound to enjoy this good in the future. Also remember that the good the security of which is at issue must be something that somehow, sometime, contributes to this person's well-being, as a component of or an instrument for her flourishing. Let us take some nice house to live in as an example. When a person has security of this house at some point, the factual aspect of security entails that she will in principle continue or come to enjoy this house at a later point. Generally, her well-being will be positively affected by this *at that later point in time*. It must be noted, however, that it really is *the house* that makes a contribution to this person's flourishing here, rather than the factual aspect of her security of this house. Hence, the contribution at issue only obtains when the house

actually stays or becomes present in this person's life, not at the point when she just has security of it. Strictly speaking, the factual aspect of a person's security of a good therefore does not itself contribute to her flourishing. In other words, the mere fact that we are bound to enjoy a good tomorrow, does not make us any better off today.[22] Still, it is important to recognise the role of the factual aspect of security in supporting our well-being over time: if the factual aspect of security obtains for us now, this generally means that we will flourish later. Indeed, it is this aspect of security that we normally consider the most significant: we primarily care about security of, say, our house, not because of the contribution that this security makes to our current well-being, but because of the contribution that this house will make to our future well-being.

Secondly, consider the cognitive aspect of security. Remember that when a person has security of a good, security's cognitive aspect entails that because this person is aware of the relevant facts of the world at present, she also *believes* that she will enjoy this good in the future. Shortly, I will explain in what way such a belief can contribute to human flourishing. But first, let me consider and refute an argument for the prudential value of the cognitive aspect of security developed by Herington (2019). He suggests that belief-relative security contributes to our well-being because we need it in order to make rational plans. Before I go on to challenge this view, a few words on the role that planning can be seen to play in a flourishing life. As mentioned before, many philosophers take the possession and exercise of the core human properties to be crucial for human flourishing. From an Aristotelian viewpoint, one of the essential human properties is that of practical rationality (Hurka, 1993). Making rational plans, in turn, is one of the central activities in which we put this property to practice. And for this activity, Herington (2019) argues, belief-relative security is critical.

The argument is as follows. For plans to be rational, they must be means-end coherent. Bratman (2009) explains it this way: 'The following is always pro tanto irrational: intending E while believing that a necessary means to E is M and that M requires that one now intend M, and yet not now intending M' (p. 413). Now, Herington (2019) argues that '[i]n order to make

[22] This view has been contested by John (2011), who argues that physical security, objectively defined, is indeed a constituent of well-being. However, this argument has convincingly been refuted by Herington (2019, pp. 194-198).

means-end coherent plans, we must believe (or presuppose) that we will possess all of the necessary means to realizing those plans' (p. 198). He appeals to the example of someone who believes that she will likely die from a congenital heart defect soon, and therefore is unable to make complex rational plans for the future. He concludes that we need belief-relative security, at least of our vital needs, in order to function as rational planners.

On closer inspection, however, this argument does not hold. Plans are different from fantasies in the sense that plans are actually intended to be carried out. Still, plans can and often do take a conditional form. Just like I could say: 'later, I am going to start a family', I could say: 'if I find a caring partner, I am going to start a family'. That my plan to start a family is conditional on my finding a partner does not make it any less of a plan, and it does not make my plan irrational in any way. In order to make the plan to start a family, then, I do not need to believe that I will find a partner – that is, I do not need security of partnership. I do, however, need to *not* believe that I will *not* find a partner, otherwise my plan to start a family would indeed be means-end incoherent; irrational; fantastical. Similarly, in order to make complex rational plans for the future, the person who worries about her heart condition in Herington's example does not need to believe that she will definitely live – that is, she does not need security of her vital needs. She just needs to *not* believe that she will definitely die. In line with this, Bratman (1999) writes that 'there need be *no* irrationality in intending to A and yet still not believing one will', but 'there *will* normally be irrationality in intending to A and believing one will *not* A' (p. 38, emphasis mine). Thus we do not need the cognitive aspect of security in order to function as rational planners.

Nonetheless, the cognitive aspect of security can contribute to human flourishing in a different way. In their study of 'disadvantage', Wolff & De-Shalit (2007) describe several manners in which people are *inhibited* in their flourishing when their functionings are or become *in*secure. When a person believes her functionings to be insecure, they point out, she tends to take actions to evade or brace herself for potential blows, and these actions are often costly in themselves. They mention the example of someone who 'fears being attacked on the street, and so has insecure bodily integrity', and therefore chooses 'always to travel by taxi, and suffer the financial costs, or simply not go out, and lose many opportunities as a result' (p. 68). If a person

has security of a good, on the other hand, she does not need to spend her energy, time, and money on preventing or preparing herself for scenarios in which she does not enjoy the good. Therefore, she can achieve more well-being in the present. At the same time, she can make sure that she is all set up to derive the maximum benefit from the good that awaits her. For instance, if someone is sure in advance that she will get a job in a different part of the country, she can arrange a nice place to live there at an early stage and thus get a head start when she takes up her new position. As a result, she can achieve more well-being in the future as well. Thus we can see that security can deliver an efficiency benefit that helps one to live a more flourishing life both in the present and in the future.

Although it is the cognitive aspect of security that does the main work here – it is because a person *believes* that she will enjoy a good that she forgoes costly precautionary measures now, and sets herself up for full enjoyment of the good later – this benefit importantly depends on the connection between the cognitive aspect of security and the factual aspect of security. To put it more concretely, in order for someone to reap the full efficiency benefit of her security of some good, it is important that her belief that she will enjoy this good is also backed up by the facts. After all, if someone is *in fact* bound to enjoy some good, then the belief that she will enjoy it can indeed help her to pursue her well-being in an efficient way. But if she is actually *not* bound to enjoy this good, then she better prepare for the scenario that she not enjoy it. In that case, allocating resources to this scenario may not be a waste at all, but may in fact be necessary for doing well in the future. Suppose that someone believes that she will always enjoy perfect health, and therefore does not purchase any health insurance. If, against her optimistic expectations, at some point she does fall ill, and then cannot afford the costs of treatment, these expectations did not make her better off after all. Thus the efficiency benefit of the cognitive aspect of security is importantly related to the fulfilment of security's factual aspect.[23]

[23] It must be noted that the belief that one will enjoy a good *can* also yield an efficiency benefit if it is *not* backed up by the facts. This is the case when the costs that one is bound to face when one does not anticipate some harm (say, the costs of medical treatment) are less than the costs of the precautions that one would have taken had one anticipated this harm (the costs of health insurance). However, the efficiency benefit will of course be higher if one is bound not to suffer this harm at all. I therefore say that security's efficiency benefit only obtains *fully* if the belief that one will enjoy a good is backed up by the facts.

Now we can see why it matters that I have characterised security's cognitive aspect as involving a belief that is based on an awareness of the relevant facts of the world; as a belief that is *appropriate*. By connecting the cognitive aspect of security to the factual aspect of security in this way, I have ensured that the cognitive aspect of security does come attached with the full efficiency benefit as described above.

There is an additional reason to think that human flourishing is better served by a belief that one will enjoy a good if that belief is backed up by the facts, which has to do with the particular character of this understanding of well-being. As noted before, human flourishing is not a purely subjective notion of the good: on this understanding, what matters for someone's well-being is not only whether she *experiences* the world in a certain way – whether she *thinks* that she has made a friend or written a great novel – but also whether that experience *matches reality* – whether the friendship is *in fact* mutual and the novel is *actually* great. In similar vein, it seems that it matters whether the belief that one will enjoy a good aligns with the facts. Not just because the efficiency benefit that comes attached with the cognitive aspect of security can only be reaped fully when the belief that one will enjoy a good is backed up by the facts, but also because a fitting belief about one's personal condition has more prudential value than an unfitting one. Someone who rightly believes that she will later enjoy good health, from this point of view, is currently better off than someone who falsely believes so, even if neither of them acts on her belief in a way that delivers her an efficiency benefit. Again, it turns out to be significant that I have described the cognitive aspect of security as an *appropriate* belief that one will enjoy a good in the future, thereby linking the cognitive aspect of security to the factual aspect of security. The cognitive aspect of security, as I have defined it, can thus be seen to be prudentially valuable in all of the ways just described.

Thirdly, consider the emotional aspect of security. Recall that when a person has security of a good, security's emotional aspect entails that because this person is aware of the relevant facts of the world at present, she also has *no fear* that she will not enjoy this good in the future. As I pointed out earlier, the fear under consideration is of a dispositional kind: it does not involve the experience of being afraid per se, but a disposition to feel fearful in relation to one's future enjoyment of this good. Obviously, when such a

feeling is triggered, it is generally experienced as a negative emotion. Think of the dread that we would feel at the thought of losing our house, or our job, or a sick family member. If a disposition to experience such a fearful feeling is frequently or constantly triggered, then this can also put us in a generalised state of stress and anxiety that makes us suffer in a more indirect way: by constraining our enjoyment of the physical and psychological capacities that we have as human beings. Wolff & De-Shalit (2007) point out that stress and anxiety resulting from the perception that we are at risk may hamper our bodily as well as mental health, and our ability to play and to plan (pp. 68-69). Nussbaum (2006) suggests that fear and anxiety can stand in the way of our emotional development (p. 77). Psychologists have long established connections between (prolonged) feelings of insecurity and stress on the one hand, and psychosomatic complaints and physical strains on the other (De Witte, 1999; Schneiderman et al., 2005). Probably, many of us can relate to this on a personal level as well: feelings of stress and anxiety connected to the future of our health, finances, social relationships, or other key goods, can gravely inhibit us in our normal functioning, by causing us difficulties to sleep, concentrate, and relax. If we have security of a good, by contrast, the emotional aspect of security entails that we do *not* have a disposition to experience such negative feelings in relation to our future enjoyment of this good. It can therefore be seen to fulfil a crucial function in our flourishing – not so much as itself a source of pleasure, but rather as a condition indirectly supporting various aspects of our well-being.

Does the benefit of the emotional aspect of security, just like the benefit of the cognitive aspect of security, significantly hinge on the fulfilment of the factual aspect of security? In other words, is it important that a lack of fear that one will not enjoy a good is also backed up by the facts? On the one hand, it may seem that this is not the case. It could be argued, after all, that it is good for us not to be disposed to suffer from fearful feelings in the ways specified above even if harm is in fact impending. Even if, say, we are about to be robbed of our wallet, perhaps it is good for us not to be afraid when it happens: because fear is unpleasant in itself, and because feeling fearful might actually undermine our ability to function properly both before and during the robbery (Herington, 2019, p. 187). On the other hand, there are reasons to think that the extent to which it is good for us to be without

fear depends greatly to the extent to which this emotional condition fits with our factual condition.

For a start, it seems that a fear that we will not enjoy a good can actually have a function in making our mind and body alert to dangers that we face to our enjoyment of this good, which in turn enables us to react to them timely and appropriately when they materialize (again, see the psychological research by Schneiderman et al., 2005). Not being disposed to experience any fearful feelings with regard to our future enjoyment of a good may therefore work out badly for us if we do in fact have good reason to be fearful in this regard. In the above example, having no fear as to our future enjoyment of our wallet might actually inhibit us from running away fast enough or screaming loud enough when the robber appears. Thus the benefit of the emotional aspect of security as just described *does* importantly depend on the fulfilment of the factual aspect of security.[24] This underlines the significance of my characterisation of the emotional aspect of security as an *appropriate* absence of fear that one will not enjoy a good. Aristotle (2000), too, often underlines the importance of emotions being 'appropriate'. Whereas the Stoics considered emotions such as fear and anger always inappropriate, as Kraut (2018) points out, Aristotle thought 'not simply that these common passions are sometimes appropriate, but that it is essential that every human being learn how to master them and experience them in the right way at the right times' (§ 5.1).

One additional and related reason for thinking that an absence of fear that one will not enjoy a good is more valuable if the factual aspect of security is fulfilled as well, takes us back once more to the particular character of human flourishing as an understanding of well-being. Remember that on this view, it is not only our experience that determines our good, but also the match between our experience and reality. A friendship that is *truly* mutual has more prudential value than a friendship that only *appears* mutual to a person. Similarly, we may say that being *rightfully* free from fear that one

[24] Note that there *can* also be advantage to a lack of fear if it is *not* backed up by the facts. This applies when the costs that come attached with inappropriately lacking fear that one will not enjoy a good (the costs of not being sharp in the face of danger) are less than the costs that come attached with fearing that one will not enjoy this good (the cost of great stress and anxiety). However, the benefit of not fearing that one will not enjoy a good will of course be higher if one really is bound to enjoy this good. Making a point similar to the one made in footnote 23 about the cognitive aspect of security, I therefore say that the benefit of the emotional aspect of security described here only obtains *fully* if the factual aspect of security is fulfilled as well.

will not enjoy a good is more valuable than a state of 'blissful ignorance' regarding the fact that one's enjoyment of this good is actually on the line. In more than one way, then, the prudential value of the emotional aspect of security hinges on my stipulation that the absence of fear which this aspect concerns is *appropriate*.

Before closing, let me add one more point.[25] This chapter analyses the ways in which people's security impacts their well-being without differentiating between the various goods that they can have (or lack) security of, or the various sources of their (in)security. But there is good reason to think that these factors do mediate the ways in which security affects well-being. People's security of basic needs fulfilment probably makes a greater contribution to their flourishing than their security of less vital goods. And insecurity that obtains structurally – think of the higher risk of violence faced by members of discriminated groups – is likely to reduce people's flourishing more than insecurity that is rather incidental – think of the fear of someone who finds himself in a dark alley just once. These issues deserve more attention than they can be given here. One account that illuminates both of them is that of Wolfendale (2017). She proposes to incorporate into the right to security not only the usual requirement of basic physical safety, but also a demand for 'moral security': that everyone *believes* that her basic interests and welfare will be accorded moral recognition by society, and that society *actually* regards everyone's interests and welfare as morally important (p. 238). Presumably, there exists not only a case for including this particular type of security among our basic human rights, but also for taking it to be of special importance for human flourishing.

All in all, we may safely conclude that security can make significant contributions to human flourishing. The factual aspect of security generally means good news for our flourishing in the future; the cognitive aspect of security enables us to be more efficient in our pursuit of well-being; the emotional aspect of security supports our enjoyment of many of our human capacities. Furthermore, we can conclude that it matters a great deal whether or not the facts, our beliefs, and our emotional condition are aligned with one another when it comes to security. Firstly, if a person is actually bound to enjoy a good but she is not aware of the fact, strictly speaking this

[25] I thank one of the anonymous reviewers from *The Journal of Value Inquiry* for raising this point and coming up with the example mentioned here.

fact itself does not even contribute to her well-being. Secondly, if a person believes that she will enjoy a good but the factual aspect of security is not fulfilled, then this can actually stand in the way of efficient preparation for the future. Thirdly, if a person has no fear that she will not enjoy a good but this emotional condition is not backed up by the facts, this may indeed detract from the sharpness that she might need in order to deal with an impending harm. Finally, from the viewpoint of human flourishing, it matters in itself that our beliefs and emotional conditions are appropriate to the facts that we find ourselves in. When it comes to its contribution to our flourishing, the integrated ideal of security as sureness thus turns out to be more than the sum of its parts.

3.5. What is bad about security?

Might there also be ways in which it is not good for a person to have security of a good? Let me now explore for each of the three aspects of security whether they can also hamper human flourishing.

Firstly, consider the factual aspect of security again. Can it ever be bad for a person if she is bound to enjoy a good? At first sight, this seems an absurd question. We already learned that strictly speaking, the factual aspect of security does not itself make a contribution to well-being. Instead, the contribution comes from the good the security of which is at issue. By calling this thing a 'good', we assumed that it is something that contributes to this person's well-being, in some way, at some point, either as a component of or an instrument for her flourishing. Therefore, it seems that by definition, the factual aspect of a person's security of a good cannot be bad for this person. On closer inspection, however, there actually is a way in which it can turn out badly for someone if she is bound to enjoy a good. This is when the good at issue might be good for her at a certain moment in time, but will be bad for her later.

Consider the following example. During my time as a student, I lived in a house together with twelve other students, with whom I had dinner every night, drinks every week, and a party every month. It was great fun, and I cannot imagine any other living situation that would have contributed more to my flourishing back then. Yet, it would not be good for me to still be living at that place right now. Indeed, it would have been bad for me if I had been bound to live there after I graduated. For one thing, having my own

apartment is a far better fit with my present occupations, and communal living would actually inhibit my well-being presently. For another thing, I consider my life enriched by having experienced different living situations, and I would not have achieved such diversity in my life experience if I were still living in my student flatshare. The general point is this: something that is good for a person at some point need not be good for her forever. Therefore, we could say that the factual aspect of a person's security of a good can, paradoxically, turn out badly for this person – although again, it must be noted that the negative effect on her well-being actually comes from the good in question, and only occurs as soon as this good stays or becomes present in her life when it is no longer good for her. Against this view one might raise two points, which are semantic but important.

For a start, it might be said that even if the factual aspect of security of a good obtains for a person, she can still opt not to enjoy this good, and therefore it seems that security's factual aspect cannot inhibit flourishing. Applied to the above example, the thought is that having security of my flatshare would not prevent me from deciding to move out. However, as long as it is true that I have security of my house, it must necessarily be the case that I have not (yet) decided to move out – for if I had decided to move out, I would no longer be bound to continue living there, and I would thereby have cancelled the factual aspect of my security of the house. Only if the good in question were the *option* of living in that house, would it be true that the factual aspect of my security of this good would not exclude the possibility of me moving out.

Relatedly, one might say that we should be stricter in our use of the word 'good'. Arguably, the word 'good' should be reserved for things that are good for people *at the point that they have them*. In the example mentioned above, this would mean that my flatshare would simply lose its status of 'good' for me when what was at issue was my potential enjoyment of the house after my graduation; perhaps this status would then be passed on to the *option* for me to live there. Of course, we could agree to use the word 'good' only in this stricter sense, and thereby make it by definition impossible for the factual aspect of a person's security of a good to turn out badly for this person. The basic point, however, still holds true: if a person has security of things that contribute to her well-being at one point in time,

the factual aspect of this security can indeed turn out disadvantageous for this person at a later point in time.

Secondly, let us revisit the cognitive aspect of security. Can it ever be bad for a person to believe that she will enjoy a good? One type of case was already discussed in the previous section: one believes that one will enjoy a good, but unrightfully so. We saw that this could indeed be bad for a person because it could hinder her in preparing herself for what will come. Here I focus on cases in which a person believes that she will enjoy a good, and this belief is also appropriate. Can that ever be bad? My thesis is that it can. Go back to the moment when you found out that you got accepted to graduate school, or got hired at your job. Would that moment have been just as valuable to you if you were already sure of the happy news beforehand? I think most of us would answer 'no'. Now remember a moment in your life when you were expecting one thing to come your way, but what you got was something completely different, which actually turned out great for you – perhaps a new hobby or haircut that was very different from what you planned for. Would you have preferred to have expected it beforehand? Likely the answer again is 'no'. Larmore (1999) captures these intuitions in his insight that 'being surprised by a good of which we had no inkling is itself an invaluable element of what makes life worth living' (p. 99). In a sense, living your life is like reading a book: a big part of the joy lies in not foreseeing what will happen next. Indeed, if the whole plot develops exactly according to your expectations, you might not even consider the story worth reading. For Larmore, this is one of the reasons to oppose an idea found in western political philosophy from Socrates to Rawls, namely that the good life is a life lived according to a rational plan. In the present context, it is a reason to think that the cognitive aspect of security can indeed sometimes impede human flourishing.

Thirdly, we go back to the emotional aspect of security. Can it ever be bad for a person to be without fear that she will not enjoy a good? We already learned that an absence of such fear may be bad when it is not backed up by the facts. Again, let us put such cases aside and think for now of a person who is rightfully free from fear that she will not enjoy a good. My thesis is that even this can sometimes be bad. Remember that the kind of fear under consideration concerns a disposition to feel fearful with regard to one's future enjoyment of a good. Of course, feelings of fear are mostly

experienced as unpleasant sensations. Yet, sometimes they can be enjoyable as well. People with risky hobbies such as climbing mountains or lighting fireworks will readily confirm this. But also those who do not actively seek risks will admit that a certain level of fear can be pleasurable in some circumstances – when you pick up the phone to hear the result from a job interview, or right before you profess your love to someone. And one need not be a hedonist to acknowledge the prudential value of such feelings: as noted before, pleasure may well be part of what constitutes a flourishing human life, even though such a life requires more than pleasure alone. Now, if we have security of a good, then the emotional aspect of security entails that we are not disposed to experience *negative* feelings of fear with regard to our future enjoyment of this good – but it also entails that we are not disposed to experience *positive* variants of fearfulness in relation to our future enjoyment of this good. We will not feel a tingle in our stomach before hearing whether we got the job, or making our romantic gesture. By robbing us of enjoyable fears, I conclude, the emotional aspect of security, just like the other two aspects of security, can indeed sometimes hamper our flourishing.

One final point should be noted.[26] Aside from the specific ways in which security can hamper a person's well-being analysed above, an abundance of sureness in any of its aspects might also inhibit a flourishing human life in a more general manner. This has to do with the fact that a good life is not the same as a life that is continuously smooth, easy, and painless. Facing and overcoming difficulty may indeed be crucial for developing the practical and rational abilities that we need in order to assume some kind of agency over our lives, and may well be essential to the good of achievement (see Bradford, 2015). Insecurity – be it in a factual sense, a cognitive sense, or an emotional sense – could be a source or manifestation of such difficulty, opening up chances for fostering resilience and individual growing. Absolute and permanent security in too many aspects of our lives, on the other hand, would indeed obstruct these elements of flourishing.

All in all, we can conclude that security is not always and only good for people. Indeed, the fact that one is bound to enjoy a good can turn out badly for a person. The belief that one will enjoy a good, too, can inhibit one's

[26] Again, I thank one of the anonymous reviewers from *The Journal of Value Inquiry* for making me aware of this point.

flourishing, as can an absence of fear that one will not enjoy a good – and this applies even if the belief and the emotional condition at issue are backed up by the facts. These findings are far from trivial. They teach us that it would not be wise to 'lock ourselves in' by securing forever what is good for us now, leaving nothing to be surprised by, nothing to be scared of. Also, there is good reason to think that even if we wanted to create such complete security, we could not achieve it anyway. Some philosophers have argued that however much we would like to foresee or control our future, many of the good things in life simply cannot be predicted or managed like that. Paul (2014), for one, points out that for a lot of big life choices we cannot know beforehand how they will turn out for us in the end – think, for instance, of the decision to have children, or the decision to convert to a certain religion. Nussbaum (2001), furthermore, draws attention to the elements of life that seem indispensable for the goodness of it, but are not entirely under the control of the agent living it – examples here include love and friendship with others. Although these thinkers focus on the lack of *control* that we have with respect to matters such as these, it may also be argued that it is impossible for human beings to have *security* in the areas at issue. However, such an argument should be distinguished from the thesis defended here: regardless of whether it is *possible* for people to have security of goods, it is sometimes even *bad* for them to have it.

3.6. Striking a balance

This analysis has shown that there are multiple ways in which security can contribute to our well-being: if we are in fact bound to enjoy a good, in principle this is advantageous for our flourishing in the future; if we also believe that we will enjoy this good, we can be more efficient in the pursuit of our well-being; if we also have no fear that we will not enjoy this good, this supports our enjoyment of our physical and mental capacities. For some of these benefits to obtain fully, it is important that our beliefs and our emotional condition align with the facts. From the viewpoint of human flourishing, this also matters because *appropriate* beliefs and emotions can be seen to have more prudential value than inappropriate ones, regardless of the consequences that these beliefs and emotions may have. Mirroring the upsides of security, finally, there are also ways in which security can impact our flourishing negatively on occasion: it can stand in the way of the change,

surprise, and pleasurable fear that are sometimes required for a good life too.

So what does a flourishing human life look like in terms of security? This research suggests that it has neither too little, nor too much security: one must be sure in a number of aspects of one's life, but not in all. There is a balance to be struck. Probably, the ideal level of security differs per person. Some people are like Hobbes, who claimed to have been born with fear as his twin (Hobbes, 1680, p. 2), and took 'the object of mans desire' to be 'not to enjoy once onely, and for one instant of time; but to assure for ever, the way of his future desire' (Hobbes, 1996, p. 70). Others are more like Nietzsche, who insisted that 'the secret to harvesting the greatest fruitfulness and the greatest enjoyment from existence is to *live dangerously*' (Nietzsche, 2018, p. 283). Presumably, in order to live your best possible life, you need a little bit of both.

To some readers, this conclusion may sound rather anticlimactic. Those who had hoped that the foregoing analysis would yield a straightforward checklist for determining when exactly security is good for us and when it is not, or a set of concrete instructions for balancing security and insecurity in the good life, will probably be a bit disappointed. I believe, however, that it would be deceiving to suggest that we could devise such general guidelines when it comes to being sure and living well. The Aristotelian tradition of practical wisdom teaches us that prudential judgment is indispensable in determining the right course of action in every case, and to me it seems that this lesson also applies in matters concerning the relationship between security and human flourishing. Borrowing the words of Kraut (2018), I say that we cannot expect to be able to make the right decision on each occasion 'solely by learning general rules': '[w]e must also 'acquire, through practice, those deliberative, emotional, and social skills that enable us to put our general understanding of well-being into practice in ways that are suitable to each occasion' (§ 0).

Does this analysis also have political implications? More specifically, does it imply that the state ought to create particular forms of security for its citizens? Not directly. For one thing, if we wanted to make such an argument based on the value of well-being, then we would need not just an analysis of the ways in which security affects people's flourishing, but also answers to the questions what particular goods it would be important for people to have

security *of*, and what sources it would be best for them to derive security *from*. Only if we managed to identify a specific list of goods the security of which people need in order to lead good lives, *and* the security of which can best be provided by the state, would such an argument be complete. For another thing, if we wanted an argument for state provision of securities to inform the politics of contemporary liberal democracies, then we would be wise to also take into account considerations other than well-being. After all, striving for security by the state is often not without its costs and dangers. As many scholars have pointed out (see, for example, Neocleous, 2007; Waldron, 2003), and as has become clear for example from the ways in which governments have responded to the threats of terrorism and the COVID-19 pandemic, the state's aiming for security in practice often comes at the cost of people's freedom. And the restrictions of civil liberties that may form part of the state's security policies may in turn end up undermining citizens' security. These issues will be examined in depth in the next chapter.

Finally, when considering if we should ask the state to relieve us from nagging insecurities, we should also remember that a world with only absolute securities would not be good for us either. As the current chapter has argued, a flourishing human life is also a diverse life, with occasional plot twists and a decent portion of suspense – be it with a solid foundation of securities to build on.

Chapter 4

Freedom, Security, and the COVID-19 Pandemic

4. Freedom, Security, and the COVID-19 Pandemic[27]

4.1. Freedom versus security?

Freedom and security are often believed to be in conflict with one another. As a result, it is frequently thought that there is a need to 'balance' or 'trade off' freedom and security in public decision-making. This can be observed, for example, in the debate about counter-terrorism after the 9/11 attacks.[28] The 'freedom vs. security' frame also emerges in the discussion about the appropriate response to the COVID-19 pandemic.[29] The idea that freedom and security have to be balanced against one another is not only popular in the public and political debate, it is also found in academic literature. Posner & Vermeule (2007) present it in the form of a 'tradeoff thesis' (p. 21). They suggest that generally speaking, an increase of freedom in society entails a decrease of security, and the other way around. According to them, the challenge for governments is to balance freedom and security in such a way that the total welfare of the population is maximised.

In political philosophy, however, the view that freedom and security are in conflict with one another has received considerable criticism. Waldron (2003) investigates the image of balance between freedom and security in the context of increased terrorist threat. He expresses a number of concerns about this way of seeing the freedom-security relationship, and cautions against giving up civil liberties in the name of security. Newey (2012) analyses freedom and security at the conceptual level. He also raises strong doubts about the idea of a necessary opposition between the two, and shows how the language of 'liberty' can frequently even be translated into that of 'security'. These and other authors furthermore make clear that there are important connections between freedom and security that are obfuscated by

[27] An earlier version of this chapter has been published as an article in the *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* (Daemen, 2022b). In turning that article into this chapter, I have kept the adjustments to a necessary minimum: aside from minor cosmetic improvements, the only revisions that I have made to the paper are those that were strictly needed in order to attain maximal conceptual consistency across the chapters of this dissertation.

[28] See, for instance, the op-ed *Liberal Reality Check* by N.D. Kristof in The New York Times (2002), and the discussion paper *Counter-terrorism Powers: Reconciling Security and Liberty in an Open Society* by the British Home Office (2004).

[29] See, for example, the documentary *Corona: Sicherheit kontra Freiheit* by J. Pinzler, S. Gerhards, S., K. Heinrichs, and M. Gronemeyer for the European TV channel Arte (2020), and the video *Baudet in Coronadebat: Geef ons onze vrijheid terug!* by the Dutch political party Forum voor Democratie on YouTube (2020).

the idea of a simple trade-off. Both Waldron (2003) and Newey (2012) point out that civil liberties actually have a positive function in providing people with security against the state. Shue (1980), Meisels (2008), and Binder & Binder (2019) suggest that security in turn serves as a supportive condition for the enjoyment of liberties. Neocleous (2007), on the other hand, draws attention to the danger of calling anything a 'security issue' at all, alluding that this almost inevitably invites the state to restrict people's freedoms.[30]

Each of the works cited above brings out one or more interesting aspects of the relationship between freedom and security. What is missing in the literature, however, is a clear overview of the different ways in which freedom and security relate. By that I mean a systematic analysis that on the one hand considers the tension between freedom and security – pointing out where the trade-off thesis goes wrong, but also showing why freedom and security may indeed get in each other's way – and on the other hand considers how freedom and security can actually reinforce one another. This chapter provides such an analysis. Drawing both on theoretical literature and on practical examples from the context of the coronavirus pandemic, it brings out four different connections between freedom and security: how freedom can come at the cost of security, how security can come at the cost of freedom, how freedom can work to the benefit of security, and how security can work to the benefit of freedom.

This analysis contributes to existing knowledge about freedom and security in two different ways. Firstly, it shows that particular understandings of freedom can help us to observe and comprehend particular connections between freedom and security. After setting some preliminaries as to the concepts of freedom and security to be used in this chapter (section 4.2), it demonstrates that whereas the Hobbesian or pure negative understanding of freedom makes us especially prone to seeing how freedom can compromise security (section 4.3), the republican interpretation of freedom provides us more clarity about the way in which freedom can indeed support security (section 4.5). And whereas viewing

[30] Furthermore, there exists a broader field of 'critical security studies', which is mainly concerned with the study of security *practices* and *discourses* (see Herington, 2015, p. 30). The implications of these practices and discourses for people's liberties form a recurring theme in this branch of literature. Important contributions here have been made by Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde (1998), Huysmans (1998, 2004), and Bigo (2010); useful overviews have been drawn up by Aradau et al. (2006) and Peoples & Vaughan-Williams (2015).

freedoms as basic liberties helps us to note how security can come at the cost of freedom (section 4.4), understanding freedoms as capabilities enables us to grasp how security can indeed work to the benefit of freedom (section 4.6). Secondly, the analysis provided by this chapter serves a more practical purpose: the overview it gives of the different connections between freedom and security can be of help in public decision-making in the face of real-world situations in which the two seem to conflict. I suggest that by taking into account all four connections between freedom and security, decision-makers ultimately become better able to uphold both. In order to illustrate this, I end this chapter by drawing from my theoretical account of the freedom-security relationship a number of practical lessons for future pandemic policies (section 4.7).

4.2. The concepts of freedom and security

Before moving on to a discussion of the connections between freedom and security, let us first have a closer look at each of these two concepts in turn. Political philosophers have long debated the meaning of the word 'freedom', and thinkers from different traditions still understand the term in different ways. Let me highlight a number of these. Hobbes (1996) famously describes freedom as 'the absence … of externall Impediments of motion' (p. 145). A similarly 'negative' view of freedom is defended by Berlin (1969), who suggests that someone's freedom consists in the absence of one particular kind of impediment: other persons' interference. In order to protect individuals against such meddling, liberal thinkers such as Mill (1859) favour the legal demarcation of particular areas in which people should in principle be free from interference by others, including the state. The basic liberties that are enshrined in the constitutions of many states around the world today – among them, for example, freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, and freedom of association – can be seen to serve this function. Republican thinkers such as Pettit (1997) and Skinner (1998) share with liberals a concern for freedom, but they do not equate it with plain non-interference. Rather, they consider someone free to the extent that she is not subject to other people's arbitrary power or – to use Pettit's preferred term – domination. Finally, there is a group of philosophers who challenge the idea that other persons' interference or domination are the only things that can render an individual unfree. By associating freedom with capabilities,

that is, actual opportunities to achieve well-being, Sen (2009) and other capability theorists draw attention to the fact that people's material circumstances and physical abilities affect their level of freedom as well.

Although political philosophers often commit themselves to one specific understanding of freedom, I believe that in the minds of most people freedom constitutes a complex and multi-layered ideal that cannot be fully captured by any of the abovementioned understandings of freedom on its own. Rather, I take it that each of these understandings brings out one important element of what we tend to value as 'freedom': from not being constrained in our activities, to holding basic liberty rights; from not being at the mercy of a despot, to having valuable opportunities available. These are all distinct matters, but they are not per se incompatible, and in practice they are indeed often positively connected to one another. As a way of doing justice to the many-sided character of the ideal of freedom, this analysis does not single out one specific understanding of freedom in order to investigate how security relates to freedom on this particular view, but instead it draws on different understandings of freedom in order to elucidate different connections between freedom and security. As we shall see, each of the views mentioned above can help us to comprehend one important aspect of the freedom-security relationship.

When it comes to debating the meaning of the word 'security', political philosophers have been surprisingly silent (Herington, 2015, p. 35; Waldron, 2006, p. 456). Although the term appears in many classical texts within the field, for example those by Hobbes (1996), Locke (1988), Bentham (1843), and Mill (1871), its meaning is generally not discussed explicitly. In more recent literature, security is often associated with either of two things. On the one hand, it is frequently linked to the absence of a *risk*. This risk can be one of 'personal violation' (Rothschild, 1995, p. 62) or 'deliberate attacks' (Hildebrandt, 2013, p. 359), but the risk of falling victim to an illness or natural disaster is just as well something that people can be said to have (or lack, or want) 'security from'. On the other hand, security is occasionally described as a mode in which an individual can enjoy a *good* (Herington, 2019, p. 182; Waldron, 2006, p. 462). This good can be the fulfilment of 'basic needs' (Herington, 2017, p. 187) or achievement of 'normal human physical functioning' (John, 2011, p. 73), but a job or a place to live is just as well something that people can be said to have (or lack, or

want) 'security of'. Now, what would it mean to have security of a good? In an earlier paper (Daemen, 2022a), I have described security as involving a factual aspect, a cognitive aspect, and an emotional aspect. If someone has security of some good, I suggested, she *is in fact* bound to enjoy this good, she *believes* that she will, and she *has no fear* that she won't.[31]

In the context of the current chapter, it is worth asking: might there be a way to combine the idea of security as the absence of a risk and the idea of security as a mode in which an individual can enjoy a good? Perhaps somewhat unexpectedly, valuable inspiration for answering this question can be found in a famous article by MacCallum (1967) on the concept of freedom. In this article, aiming to clarify the stakes in the debate between adherents of 'negative' and 'positive' conceptions of freedom, MacCallum portrays freedom as a triadic relation involving an *agent* (i) who is free from a *constraint* (ii) to undertake an *action* or to achieve a *condition* (iii) (p. 314). My idea, then, is to apply a similar structure to the concept of security. Security, on this understanding, concerns as a triadic relation involving an *individual* (i) who is secure against a *risk* (ii) in her enjoyment of a *good* (iii). We could say that risks curtail security (as I understand this concept) analogously to how constraints curtail freedom (as MacCallum understands this concept). This view will turn out to be helpful in the analysis to follow in the rest of this chapter. Before turning to that analysis, let me provide some final conceptual clarifications.

Given the close correspondence between the concepts of security and freedom when characterised in this way, one might suggest that we could just as well try and bring the things that we normally describe using the terminology of 'security' under the heading of 'freedom' (say, by construing risks as one particular type of constraints) or the other way around (say, by construing freedoms as goods that we can have more or less security of). Consequently, we might reconstruct the connections between freedom and security as connections between different freedoms (or the freedoms of different people), or as connections between different securities (or the securities of different people). Indeed, I believe that a translation of

[31] For a further elaboration of my concept of security, see chapter 2 of this dissertation. There I emphasise (among other things) that in order for an individual to count as having full security of a good, the belief and the emotional condition as described above also have to be 'appropriate': they have to be based on an awareness of the facts. In order to avoid wordiness, I omit this detail in the present chapter.

'securities' into 'freedoms' could work (see Newey, 2012, p. 9), and that an analysis of the freedom-security relationship in terms of the exercise and protection of liberties could yield valuable insights (see Binder & Binder, 2019, pp. 17–19). But given that freedom and security do generally form distinct categories in our minds and are generally treated as distinct factors in public decision-making, our thinking and decision-making can also benefit from an analysis that conceptualises the two as separate matters and then investigates how they relate to one another. That is the function of this chapter.

Just like MacCallum does not fix what may count as a constraint or as an action or condition in his understanding of freedom, I do not specify what exactly may count as a risk or a good in my understanding of security. Neither do I require that the word 'security' is always accompanied by an explicit reference to a risk that someone is 'secure from' and a good that she is 'secure of'. Although these referents are generally there in the background, one or both of them are often left implicit. In the context of the coronavirus pandemic, for instance, talk of 'security' normally regards the risk of coronavirus infection or disease and the good of bodily health, even though these things are often not mentioned explicitly. I do stipulate that the unit that takes the first place in the triadic relation of security is an individual human being – just like freedom, on the various understandings mentioned above, is generally considered as something held by human individuals. This is because I take it that what should ultimately matter in public decision-making is the security (and freedom) of individuals, not that of the state or some other collective entity. In practice, of course, two individuals rarely have exactly the same level of security against a particular risk. The risk of serious illness as a result of coronavirus infection, for example, greatly varies between people of different age groups and with different underlying medical conditions. Yet, in this chapter, I generally speak of people's security against a particular risk as if it pertains not just to one single individual, but to a larger number of individuals. My assumption thereby is not that all of them face exactly equal risk levels, but that at least some level of this risk applies to them all – and that both the risk and the number of people to whom it applies are significant enough to warrant considering people's security against it a proper concern for public decision-making.

4.3. How freedom can come at the cost of security

At the beginning of the pandemic of the coronavirus disease – which first broke out in China at the end of 2019, and quickly spread over the rest of the world during the first few months of 2020 – it was distressing for many people to experience that common activities such as meeting up with friends or moving about in close proximity to others had suddenly turned into risky engagements. Each of such meetings or movements came with a danger of infection, disease, and even death. It was not long before governments around the world concluded that the freedom to engage in activities of this kind came at the cost of people's security of health, and would have to be restricted until the threat of serious infection outbreaks had waned.[32] This example points us at the first of the connections between freedom and security to be analysed here: freedom can come at the cost of security. In order to understand how exactly, it helps to consider freedom from the perspective of Hobbes and later so-called 'pure negative' theorists.

In the previous section, we already came across Hobbes's canonical description of freedom as 'the absence of … externall Impediments of motion' (1996, p. 145). Hobbes thus views freedom in a purely negative way: as the absence of constraints. He thereby takes someone's freedom only to be limited by constraints that are strictly external to her: freedom can be restricted by 'walls' and 'chayns', but not by 'sicknesse' and 'feare' (p. 146). Later proponents of what has come to be known as the 'pure negative' view of freedom, such as Kramer (2008) and Carter (2008), modify the Hobbesian account in two ways. Firstly, they consider someone's overall freedom as a composition of her particular freedoms to do particular things. And somebody's particular freedom to do a particular thing is not only restricted if she *actually* faces constraints when trying to do this thing, but also if she *would* face constraints in case she were to try it. As Kramer (2008) puts it: 'If the only door to a room would be immediately locked in the event that a man inside were to attempt to leave, then he is unfree-to-leave regardless of whether the attempt and the locking ever actually take place' (p. 38). Freedom, on this view, is thus not a matter of unconstrained action, but of *options* for unconstrained action. Secondly, contemporary pure negative

[32] Although the exact policy response to the coronavirus pandemic differed per country, the vast majority of states adopted various restrictive measures in order to prevent people from travelling, meeting in groups, or leaving their homes. For an overview, see the research of Hale et al. (2021).

theorists generally only take constraints to limit someone's freedom if these are brought about by other persons. Obstacles created purely by nature are not seen as rendering people unfree. This is in line with what Berlin (1969) writes in his famous essay distinguishing between negative and positive freedom, where the former is related to the absence of one specific type of constraint: 'interference by other persons' (p. 122). On the modified version of the pure negative view, then, an individual's freedom is determined by her options for acting without being constrained by others.

How can freedom, understood in this way, come at the cost of security? In order to see this, let us have a closer look at one of the examples that this section started out with: at the beginning of the pandemic, people's freedom to move about in close proximity to one another suddenly turned out to come at the cost of their security of health. What was going on there exactly? At the most basic level, what was happening was that people's *actions* were coming at the cost of people's *goods*. Namely, instances of people moving about in close proximity to each other led to instances of people's health being damaged. Not every single time that this action was performed it led to this good being damaged – not every close encounter between people led to a new virus infection – but it certainly did some of the time. We could say that the action came with a health *risk*. In other words, the action came at the cost of health *security*. But did the *freedom* to perform this action also come at the cost of security? In some sense, it did. This is because people were apparently *inclined to make use* of the option to move about in proximity to one another. Not all people – definitely not those homebound by 'sicknesse' or 'feare' – but some, and this was enough for people's security of health to be compromised to such an extent that governments decided to restrict people's freedom to come close to one another. By instituting and enforcing laws restricting travel, social gatherings, and movement in the public space, states effectively imposed 'externall Impediments of motion'.

It has now become clear how freedom, understood as a matter of people's options for acting without being constrained by others, can come at the cost of security. It is important to stress, however, that freedom does not *need* to come at the expense of security. Freedom only compromises security on two conditions: firstly, that it concerns an option of acting in a way that brings damage to a good or risks causing such damage, and secondly, that

people are inclined to make use of this option. Whether and to what extent these conditions are met differs per context. Reconsider the example mentioned above. Moving in close proximity to one another was far less risky before the time of the coronavirus pandemic than right in the middle of it. And in cultures where people were already more accustomed to keeping some physical distance from one another, people were less inclined to make use of the option of getting close to others anyway.[33] If and to what extent freedom comes at the cost of security thus depends on the particular freedom at issue and on the circumstances in which it obtains. Portraying the relationship between freedom and security in general as a zero-sum-game, as Posner & Vermeule (2007) do with their trade-off thesis, is therefore misguided.

Given that the pure negative understanding of freedom inspired by Hobbes makes us particularly aware of how freedom can come at the cost of security, it is not so surprising that Hobbes is also the philosopher to suggest that rational people choose to *exchange* at least some freedom for security (Holzleithner, 2017, p. 11). They obtain this security by joining together in a state, where they find their freedom curbed through laws (Hobbes, 1996, p. 147). If it turns out that a particular freedom comes at the expense of security, the typical Hobbesian response is thus to impose legal restrictions on it – as governments did with the freedom of movement in the face of the pandemic. However, before making such a choice, decision-makers would generally be wise to take into account the remaining three connections between freedom and security as well.

4.4. How security can come at the cost of freedom

Not long after the start of the coronavirus pandemic, it was already noted, governments around the world introduced a variety of measures aimed at bringing the quick spreading of the virus to a halt. Many of these measures, which ranged from restrictions on group size to curfews to full lockdowns, were unprecedented in the recent history of liberal states. Indeed, part of them interfered with freedoms that are generally considered to be of fundamental importance from a liberal perspective. Restrictions on group gatherings, for example, impinged on the freedom of assembly and

[33] See the blogpost *Social Distance, Swedish Style: It's Not Disruptive if It's How You Live All Year Round* by L. Bjurwald on Politico (2020).

association, and – where the rules applied to religious ceremonies and places of worship as well – the freedom of religion.[34] This draws our attention to the second connection between freedom and security to be analysed in this chapter: security can come at the cost of freedom. Clearly, this connection mirrors the one examined in the previous section, and it would be very well possible to analyse it on the basis of the Hobbesian or pure negative understanding of freedom adopted there. Yet, new insights can be gained if we move our focus to a different understanding of freedom instead, one that is focused on what we tend to refer to as our 'basic liberties'.

The section above already mentioned Berlin's (1969) idea of freedom as non-interference. Liberal thinkers generally take it that the state has the task to protect people against interference by others. At the same time, they often stress that the state must thereby restrict its own interventions to the absolute minimum necessary for executing this task. Different thinkers provide different reasons for this. Mill (1859) emphasises how the meddling of the collective in the life of the individual can inhibit human flourishing, which indeed requires 'the cultivation of individuality' (p. 114). Berlin (1969) and Shklar (1989) rather point at the lessons of history and the political reality of their own day: practice shows that governments can and often do subject populations to the greatest oppression and cruelty, be it in the name of some positive conception of freedom (Berlin, 1969, p. 134) or some other kind of *summum bonum* (Shklar, 1989, p. 29). In order to protect people against too much state interference, then, liberal philosophers from Mill (1859) to Rawls (1971) favour the idea of 'basic liberties': that individuals hold a core set of legal rights that governments should in principle respect. Examples of basic liberties commonly found in liberal theories and constitutions are freedom of speech, freedom of association, and freedom of religion, but also rights to privacy, due process, and equal treatment under the law.

How can security come at the cost of freedom, when understood in this way? The simple explanation is that in their efforts to promote security, governments can and often do decide to restrict basic liberties. Why would they do this? In the first place, *people's exercising* of basic liberties can come

[34] In Germany, for instance, the Federal Constitutional Court concluded that the coronavirus-related restrictions on religious gatherings interfered with the freedom of religion, although they were judged legitimate in light of the risk of further spreading of the virus (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2020).

with risks, be it to themselves or to others. In the latter case, government intervention is not uncommon even in liberal states. Reconsider the example of the freedom of religion mentioned above. Throughout the pandemic, religious gatherings regularly turned out to be sources of large infection outbreaks, and many governments, also liberal ones, instituted temporary bans or restrictions on religious congregations in order to restore health security. In the second place, *the state's respecting* of basic liberties can stand in the way of efforts to track and eliminate risks before they materialise. This can be observed if we consider the example of the right to privacy during the pandemic. In the fight against the coronavirus, public authorities around the world embraced digital contact tracing apps to detect infections and prevent further transmissions of the virus (Ventrella, 2020, p. 383). The impingement on the right to privacy that the use of such tools may entail can again be regarded as a sacrifice in terms of basic liberties made for the sake of security.

We have now seen how security can come at the cost of freedom, understood as a matter of basic liberties. Yet, it must be emphasised that security does not *need* to come at the expense of such liberties. This relates back to what was established in the previous section: whether and to what extent particular freedoms pose risks to people's goods is very much dependent on the context in which these freedoms obtain. If this context changes, security can indeed expand without freedom shrinking. In the case of the coronavirus pandemic as well, people's security of health can increase because of various changes in circumstances that do not entail a sacrifice of basic liberties. This may happen, for instance, when people themselves decide not to exercise the liberties that are found to be risky,[35] or when health dangers temporarily decrease because of the virus's seasonal effect (Burra et al., 2021). Again, this challenges Posner & Vermeule's (2007) thesis that freedom and security generally have to be traded off against one another.

Interestingly, although security does not *need* to come at the cost of freedom, when states *do* interfere with people's basic liberties, their justification for this often *does* rely on an appeal to security. Indeed, it is

[35] An example is when believers or religious institutions themselves decide to forgo or call off in-person services. See the news article *One of the Country's Largest Megachurches Says It's Canceling All In-person Services for the Rest of 2020 over Coronavirus Concerns* by A. Rose and S. Andrew for CNN (2020).

generally only by reference to 'security', 'public safety', or a 'national emergency' that such far-reaching government intervention can be legitimised.[36] This has led empirical students of security to conduct extensive research into what has come to be known as 'securitisation' (Wæver, 1995): the process whereby a particular issue gets framed as a matter of security, and is consequently raised 'out of normal politics and into the realm of exceptional politics, where it is addressed by extraordinary measures' (Floyd, 2019, p. 2). Although the general public indeed sometimes wants issues to be securitised, the process is not without dangers: it may 'for example, result in the systematic infringement of key rights, the loss of civil liberties, an increase in police powers, 'othering'/alienation of suspect individuals and groups, the use of lethal force, and because the issue itself is removed from democratic decision-making, a reduction of the democratic process' (ibid.). From this it seems that securitisation, and the loss of freedom that can accompany it, may actually produce significant risks to people's well-being – and thus, paradoxically, end up undermining security itself. This insight remains relevant when we turn to the next connection between freedom and security.

4.5. How freedom can work to the benefit of security

Although the exact policy response to the coronavirus pandemic differed per country, stringent measures were adopted by authoritarian and democratic states alike.[37] Mandatory quarantining, obligatory face covering, restrictions on social contacts, and extensive policing and surveillance geared towards checking compliance with these rules were part of the policy toolbox not only of authoritarian regimes but of many liberal democracies too. Naturally, all governments claimed to be acting in their citizens' own interests, and it is reasonable to assume that many of the measures helped to prevent great suffering in the form of illness and death. At the same time, it stands to reason that policies such as the ones just mentioned also impact the well-being of citizens in negative ways, and power-holders should carefully weigh their costs and benefits in order to best serve the interests of the people –

[36] See, for example, the European Convention on Human Rights, which at various points mentions 'national security', 'public safety', and the occurrence of a 'public emergency' as potential grounds for limiting human rights (Council of Europe, 1950).

[37] See also the blogpost *Liberty in the Time of Corona* by C. Laborde on the Oxford University politics blog OxPol (2020).

and never abuse these tools for their own purposes. In this regard, citizens of democratic states have less to fear than citizens of authoritarian states. This brings us to the third connection between freedom and security to be analysed here: freedom can work to the benefit of security. One way to comprehend this connection is to approach it from yet another understanding of freedom: the republican idea of freedom as 'non-domination'.[38]

In the previous section, freedom was identified with the absence of interference. As Skinner (1998) has shown, however, this liberal notion of freedom was historically preceded by a different understanding of the term, dating back to the distinction between free men and slaves in ancient Roman law. On this republican interpretation of freedom, someone is free to the extent that others do not have the power to interfere with her *on an arbitrary basis* – or, in the terminology suggested by Pettit (1997), to the extent that she is not subject to 'domination' (p. 52). On the one hand, this view implies that people's freedom can be compromised even if they are never actually interfered with: the mere fact that another agent has the power to constrain them in their choices can render them less free. As Skinner (2008) puts it: 'Slaves whose choices happen never to fall out of conformity with the will of their masters may be able to act without the least interference', and yet they 'remain wholly bereft of liberty' (pp. 89-90). On the other hand, the republican view implies that people's freedom can be left untouched even if they are indeed subject to another agent's power to constrain them in their choices, whether these choices affect themselves or also others: if the exercise of this power is not based on the arbitrary will of the power-holder, but – to use Pettit's (1997) words again – it is instead 'forced to track the interests and ideas of [those] suffering the interference' (p. 55), then this does not come at the cost of their freedom. If the power of the state is to be in line with the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination, then, there must be certain conditions in place ensuring that government interference does indeed strictly happen in the interest of the people. Among these requirements we find the rule of law, separation of powers, and protection

[38] How freedom can work to the benefit of security may also be analysed on the basis of the understanding of freedom adopted in the previous section, centering around basic liberties (cf. Waldron, 2003, p. 205). Yet, as the present analysis will show, this connection can be elucidated especially well from a republican perspective.

against all too sweeping majoritarian authority (see pp. 172-183), but also – and this is the condition that we will focus on here – democratic rule. Although this final requirement is interpreted in different ways by different republican thinkers (Laborde & Maynor, 2008, p. 11), there is general agreement that democracy in some form or the other constitutes an important condition for the fulfilment of the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination.

How can freedom, when understood in this way, work to the benefit of security? Let us go back to the example of the stringent measures that states adopted in the fight against the coronavirus, such as restrictions on movement and group gatherings. From a republican perspective, these measures do not need to come at the cost of freedom. Yes, they constrain people's choices, thus constituting an interference. But as long as the requisite checks on state power are in place and the policies are the product of democratic decision-making, they do not entail domination. These conditions, after all, force the rules imposed by the government to track the interests of the citizens; they ensure that the interference is not *arbitrary*. Importantly, the conditions at issue *must* be in place for the exercise of power by the state to be consistent with the ideal of freedom as non-domination. In this sense, a kind of security is actually baked into the very concept of freedom as republicans understand it, namely, 'security against interference on an arbitrary basis' (Pettit, 1997, p. 45). In fact, Pettit repeatedly uses this phrase as a synonym for freedom as non-domination. Thus we can see why people living under democratic regimes fulfilling the conditions of the republican ideal have less reason to worry, at least in one respect, than people living under authoritarian regimes falling short of these requirements – even when both groups face the same interfering policies.

It has now become clear how freedom, understood as non-domination, can work to the benefit of security. To the extent that the citizens of liberal democracies possess this kind of freedom, they also have security against state interference on an arbitrary basis. Importantly, this is not to say that they can just take this freedom and security for granted. Democracy – and, by extension, republican freedom and security against arbitrary state interference – requires that citizens constantly stay on their toes to check whether the government indeed rules in their best interest; that citizens display 'eternal vigilance' in relation to 'those who hold power

within the state' (Pettit, 1997, p. 250). This applies in a crisis situation such as a pandemic as well as during normal times. Now, having achieved these insights about how freedom can support security, we only have one more connection between freedom and security left to explore.

4.6. How security can work to the benefit of freedom

Around the turn of the year from 2020 to 2021, roughly one year after the beginning of the pandemic, the first countries managed to start large-scale vaccination campaigns in order to get their populations inoculated against the coronavirus disease. First in line for the vaccine were those groups who had the highest risk of suffering serious health consequences from infection. People belonging to these groups often experienced their vaccination not only as a return to safety, but also as a kind of liberation.[39] Many of them had spent months in self-isolation, and the protection afforded by the vaccine enabled them to finally go out and see people again.[40] This points us to the last connection between freedom and security to be analysed in this chapter: security can work to the benefit of freedom. In order to grasp this connection, let us shift our focus to another understanding of freedom once more: an understanding of freedom that is focused on 'capabilities'.[41]

All of the different notions of freedom adopted in the previous three sections are 'negative', in the sense that they render someone free to the extent that particular things are *absent*. For Hobbes, what matters is the absence of external impediments; for liberals, this is the absence of interference; for republicans, it is the absence of domination. Other

[39] An illustration of the different ways in which people experience the effect of their vaccination can be found on the website of the City of Portland (2021). Interviewees report feeling 'safe' and 'secure', but also 'free'. As one Portlander puts it: 'I'm free, COVID-19 can't catch me anymore'.

[40] One complication here is that in many countries at some point vaccination did not just expand people's freedom in the ways described in this section, it also granted them more *legal* freedoms. The right to enter bars or restaurants, for example, was made conditional on showing proof of vaccination in various states. Austria even banned unvaccinated people from leaving their home 'for non-essential reasons', as reported in the news article *'No Way around It': Austrians Queue for Jabs as Unvaccinated Told to Stay Home* by P. Oltermann in The Guardian (2021). Because such policies interfere with the right to bodily integrity and self-determination (Krasser, 2021, p. 232), they can actually be seen as an instance of security coming at the expense of basic liberties – the second in our overview of the connections between freedom and security. I will leave this complication to one side in this section.

[41] We could also analyse how security can work to the benefit of freedom if we again interpret freedom as a matter of basic liberties (cf. Binder & Binder, 2019, pp. 28–29; Meisels, 2008, pp. 71–75; Shue, 1980, pp. 26–27). However, as we will see in what follows, we can gain new insights if we view freedom as a matter of capabilities instead.

philosophers, however, adopt a 'positive' understanding of freedom instead, relating someone's freedom to what is *present*. Some thereby focus on the presence of self-control (see, for example, Taylor, 1979); others look at the presence of actual opportunities to achieve well-being. Sen refers to the latter as 'capabilities' (1980, 1985, 2009) or 'well-being freedom' (1992, p. 40). Capabilities can be described as an individual's actual opportunities to achieve beings and doings that she has reason to value. Unlike the options that are the focus of contemporary pure negative theorists, capabilities do not just pick up on constraints created by other persons, but also on the inhibiting effects of factors like poverty, disability, and disease. Examples of capabilities, as listed by Nussbaum (2003), are the ability 'to have good health', the ability 'to move freely from place to place', and the ability 'to engage in various forms of social interaction' (p. 41). Importantly, what matters for someone's overall well-being freedom is not just the *single* opportunities available to her – take the ability to have good health and the ability to engage in social interaction – but rather the *combinations* of opportunities open to her – the ability to have good health *and* social engagement (Robeyns, 2016). Someone who has to choose between both options thus has fewer capabilities – less well-being freedom – than someone who can combine the two.

How can security work to the benefit of freedom, when understood in this way? In order to see this, let us have another look at the example of vaccination against the coronavirus. The vaccine gives people security – at least to some degree – against the risk of severe health consequences from the virus. That way, it makes them better able to achieve one particular valuable being: it enables them to be healthy. At the same time, it makes them better able to combine this valuable being with various valuable doings: moving about freely, for example, and meeting up with family and friends. In other words, after vaccination, people are better able to be healthy *and* see other people. What about before vaccination? Actually, in some instances, people would then also have been able to be healthy *and* see other people: even in the midst of the pandemic, as was noted before, not every single encounter between people led to a coronavirus infection or to serious health damage. However, in other instances, people would in fact not have been able to combine both options: had they met up with their friends, then they would have fallen ill. The point is that before vaccination, people

did not know if they had the ability to be healthy *and* see other people; they were *unsure* if this combination of options was available to them. This insecurity was enough for some people, especially those belonging to vulnerable groups, either to rationally decide to forgo the option of going out and meeting others, or to be too scared to try using this option. In the latter case, when people are too afraid to dare exercising an option, it is actually doubtful whether they can be considered to have this option at all: their fear may be so incapacitating that they are, de facto, robbed of their capability to achieve the doing at issue.

Thus we can see how security can work to the benefit of freedom, when understood as a matter of capabilities. If people have security in one particular aspect of their lives, this can broaden the range of valuable doings and beings that they are able to combine, take away the idea that they have to choose between these different options, and remove incapacitating fear. Moreover, especially if they have security of core goods such as bodily integrity, shelter, food, etcetera, this can release people from a constant preoccupation with survival, from nagging feelings of stress and anxiety, and from what Wolff & De-Shalit (2007) call 'paralysis of the will', 'where much of the world begins to appear beyond one's control, even when in fact this is not the case' (p. 69). This may in turn strengthen their capacity for exercising self-control, pursuing self-expression, or participating in collective self-rule – activities often associated with freedom on other positive understandings of the term (see Inglehart, 2018, p. 1; Loader & Walker, 2007, p. 153). In this sense, security appears to function as a supportive condition for freedom on some alternative positive conceptions as well. This completes our overview of the connections between freedom and security.

4.7. Taking all four connections into account

We have now seen that the relationship between freedom and security is much more complicated than it is often portrayed. Yes, freedom can come at the cost of security, and security can come at the cost of freedom. But the idea of a simple trade-off between the two is misguided. For one thing, freedom need not always come at the cost of security, and security need not always come at the cost of freedom. Freedom can even work to the benefit of security, and security can work to the benefit of freedom. 'The'

relationship between freedom and security thus turns out to be an intricate knot comprising multiple different threads.

We have also seen that different understandings of freedom can help us to comprehend different connections between freedom and security. From the viewpoint of Hobbes and other pure negative theorists, it becomes particularly clear how freedom can come at the cost of security. If we look at basic liberties, we can see especially well how security can come at the expense of freedom. From a republican perspective, it becomes particularly apparent how freedom can work to the benefit of security. And if we focus on capabilities, we can best observe how security can support freedom. In order to disentangle the various connections that together make up the freedom-security relationship, it thus helps to draw on a variety of different interpretations of freedom.[42]

What, then, is the practical use of these findings? I claim that taking into account all four connections between freedom and security can ultimately help decision-makers in preserving and promoting both. The key is for them to try to prevent freedom from coming at the cost of security, and security from coming at the cost of freedom, while upholding the ways in which freedom supports security, and security supports freedom. In order to illustrate this, let me end by revisiting the practical examples from the context of the COVID-19 pandemic mentioned earlier, and translating this chapter's core theoretical lessons into a number of practical recommendations for future pandemic policies.

Firstly, remember that we found that people's freedom to move about in close proximity to one another can come at the cost of their security of health. Whether it actually does, however, depends on the circumstances: only if a dangerous and infectious virus is going around and people are inclined to use their freedom to move in close proximity to each other, does this freedom come at the expense of security. As long as both these conditions apply, governments may be justified in restricting freedom of movement for the sake of health security. Yet, in order to save both freedom and security in the long run, *governments should also think of measures to*

[42] This is not to say that each of the four connections between freedom and security only applies if we adopt one of the four understandings of freedom. Presumably, each of the connections would hold and could be analysed on the basis of other understandings of freedom as well. See my remarks at the end of the first paragraph of section 4.4 and in footnotes 38 and 41.

prevent circumstances in which the freedom of movement comes at the expense of health security to begin with. That is, governments should act now in order to prevent novel infectious diseases from emerging and spreading in the future – so that trade-offs between freedom of movement and security of health are less likely to arise further down the road. Examples of such measures include strengthening animal health and phasing out unsustainable agricultural practices, which may be a source of zoonotic diseases such as the coronavirus (United Nations Environment Programme, 2020).

Secondly, we saw that the search for health security can be accompanied by restrictions of basic liberties: bans on social gatherings come at the cost of the freedom of assembly; restrictions on religious congregations infringe on the freedom of religion; vaccine mandates limit the right to bodily integrity. Again, in certain circumstances, such restrictions may be justified in the name of health security, even if they concern restrictions of basic liberties. Yet, especially given the important status of these liberties, in the face of infectious disease outbreaks, *governments should try to preserve health security first and foremost in ways that do not infringe on basic liberties*. Once more, there is a lot that governments can do now in order to prevent restrictions of basic freedoms from being the only options on the table later. Options that do not come at the cost of basic liberty rights include improving ventilation of indoor spaces in order to reduce transmission of respiratory infections (Morawska et al., 2021), investing in healthcare so as to increase treatment capacity, and enabling people to lead healthier lives so that they become more resilient against novel diseases.

Third, we found that living under a democratic regime upholding the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination provides security against the risk of state interference on an arbitrary basis. Especially if the state intervenes in people's lives in far-going ways – as we have seen during the pandemic, for example – it is important that these guarantees against arbitrary state interference are robust. This means that *measures that governments adopt in the name of health security should be the product of democratic politics*. Of course, when first confronted with an urgent health emergency that clearly calls for immediate action, governments may be justified in resorting to exceptional decision-making procedures that do not

take as long as the usual democratic process. Yet, such derogations from normal politics should only be possible for a limited period of time, and there should always be mechanisms in place through which people can hold decision-makers accountable for their actions retrospectively (cf. Floyd, 2019).

Fourth, remember the finding that if people gain security of health, this can expand their range of capabilities. After all, it does not just grant them the opportunity to stay healthy, it may also enable them to combine this opportunity with other valuable opportunities: meeting with friends; going to work; participating in the social life of the community; and so on. Arguably, this is what should be the ultimate aim of public decision-making in a long-lasting pandemic: *governments should try to enable people to stay healthy and at the same time achieve other valuable beings and doings*. This means that the success or failure of pandemic policies should be evaluated not only by monitoring infections, hospitalisations, and deaths, but also by looking at the actual opportunities that people have to lead meaningful lives and participate in society (Putters & Bussemaker, 2022). In the end, policies should be geared towards upholding and creating such opportunities for everyone, including those with vulnerable health.

Of course, these are only general guidelines, and pandemic policies would in practice have to be further specified and tailored to the particular circumstances in which they apply. In the present context, these recommendations primarily serve as an illustration of the way in which the theoretical findings of this chapter can be put to practical use. The most important of these findings is that the relationship between freedom and security is not one of straightforward opposition, but one of a complex entanglement of multiple different connections. Faced with a situation in which freedom and security seem to be in conflict, then, decision-makers would do well to take into account all four of the ways in which the two relate to one another. Ultimately, this may help them in upholding both freedom and security as much as possible.

Chapter 5

Finding Security in Equality: On the Securities (Not) to Be Offered by an Egalitarian Society

5. Finding Security in Equality: On the Securities (Not) to Be Offered by an Egalitarian Society[43]

5.1. Security on the left

In 2018, the Dutch Labour Party launched a campaign centred around one core theme: '*zekerheid*', a word that literally means 'sureness', but is more commonly translated as 'security', connoting something like continuity, certainty, and confidence about the future. In a set of slogans all starting with the phrase '*zeker zijn van*', 'being sure of', the party promised security in relation to things as varied as housing, healthcare, education, and neighbourhood safety. The campaign was an attempt to win back voters' trust after the social democrats had suffered the biggest electoral defeat ever in the parliamentary history of the Netherlands. With left-of-centre parties losing ground throughout the continent, the defeat seemed to exemplify what Keating & McCrone (2013) had at that point proclaimed to be a wider 'crisis of social democracy in Europe' (p. 1). According to Keating & McCrone, the most serious challenge for European social democracy was posed by the populist right, which had managed to frame not only increasing economic insecurity but also immigration and European integration as threats to the security of 'an imagined community of insiders' (p. 7). In their analysis, this created the need for social democratic parties to develop 'an alternative security prospectus that is both effective and convincing' (p. 10). With the launch of its security campaign, the Dutch Labour Party seemed to take a step in that direction.

Aside from the interesting empirical questions that this story raises – can the adoption of security discourse indeed serve social democrats electorally, or does it only play to the narrative of their populist competitors? – the case also inspires a question with an important philosophical dimension: what can left-of-centre parties promise voters in terms of security, while staying true to their typical commitment to equality? In other words, what securities does an egalitarian society have to offer? And might there also be securities that such a society can*not* offer? Behind these

[43] A version of this chapter has been submitted to an academic journal. In turning that article into this chapter, I have kept the adjustments to a necessary minimum: aside from minor cosmetic improvements, the only revisions that I have made to the paper are those that were strictly needed in order to attain maximal conceptual consistency across the chapters of this dissertation.

questions lies the assumption, to be elaborated below, that security is something that people generally do value, and have reason to value, at least to some extent. As suggested above, those who champion political ideals other than equality – conservatives, libertarians, authoritarians – often seem successful in presenting their agenda as an answer to people's longing for security. As we will see later, however, this framing may actually be deceiving. The question is, then, if egalitarians *are* able to put forward an ideal in which people can find security.

Although contemporary political philosophy has so far not addressed this question head-on, it does harbour various resources to draw on in search of an answer. When it comes to thinking about equality, the starting point for the present inquiry is a body of thought that we may, in the well-known terminology of Anderson (2010), refer to as 'relational egalitarianism'. Within this tradition, equality is viewed not in the first place as a property of distributions of goods, but rather as a quality of relations between persons. Thus understood, equality can be construed as a rich ideal with implications spanning what I take to be three core domains of society: the moral domain, which considers the allocation of *respect* or *recognition*; the economic domain, which regards the distribution of *resources*; and the political domain, which concerns the exercise of *rule*. In order to establish what exactly equality demands in each of these domains, in the next sections of this chapter, I build on the works of prominent thinkers within the relational egalitarian school, including Scheffler's (2015) account of respect within egalitarian relations, Anderson's (1999) depiction of an egalitarian economy, and Kolodny's (2014) egalitarian justification of democracy. In addition, I draw on the writings of some neo-republican theorists, who – given their central commitment to the relational ideal of non-domination – could also be qualified as relational egalitarians (Garrau & Laborde, 2015, p. 50). Together, these texts provide us with an inclusive picture of what an egalitarian society would look like.

The thinkers just mentioned, however, generally do not frame their ideas about equality in terms of security. When it comes to understanding security, the starting point for the current study lies with the works of Waldron (2006) and Herington (2019). Inspired by their analyses, we can view security as a mode in which *individuals* can enjoy *goods*. We may refer to these goods explicitly, as when we speak of people's 'security of health' or

'job security', for example. Or the reference may be implicit, as when we speak of 'security' simpliciter, perhaps thinking of people's security of bodily integrity or basic needs fulfilment, for instance, but without actually mentioning these goods. Now, what would it mean for an individual to have security of a good? In earlier papers (Daemen, 2022a, 2022b), I have characterised security as having a factual aspect, a cognitive aspect, and an emotional aspect. If an individual has security of a good, I proposed, ideally this means that she *is in fact* bound to enjoy this good in the future, she *believes* that she will, and she *has no fear* that she won't.[44]

Connected to these three aspects of security, I have also shown earlier, there are different ways in which security can be seen to be of value for people. If an individual *is in fact* bound to enjoy a good over the course of time, instead of only enjoying it momentarily or intermittently, this means that she can continuously derive benefit from the presence of this good in her life. If she also *believes* that she will enjoy this good stably over time, this supports her in preparing for the future and using her resources, energy, and time efficiently. And if she also *has no fear* that she will miss out on this good at some point, this serves as a foundation for much of her physical and mental functioning. In these ways, security can be considered to make a significant contribution to somebody's well-being (Daemen, 2022a, pp. 8–13; cf. Herington, 2019, pp. 185–198; Wolff & De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 68–69), as well as her positive freedom (Daemen, 2022b, pp. 12–14). Thus we can see why security may indeed be something for people to value.

Nevertheless, this still does not tell us whether society ought to provide its members with particular securities, and if so, what securities those would be. In other words, what (if any) are the goods that people should get security of? By exploring how this question may be answered from a relational egalitarian perspective, this chapter builds a bridge between acclaimed work about equality on the one hand, and the study of security on the other. It thereby contributes to a growing scholarship connecting these (or closely related) themes. In the field of critical security studies, for example, Booth (1991) and other members of the so-called

[44] For a further elaboration of my concept of security, see chapter 2 of this dissertation. There I emphasise (among other things) that in order for an individual to count as having full security of a good, the belief and the emotional condition as described above also have to be 'appropriate': they have to be based on an awareness of the facts. In order to avoid wordiness, I omit this detail in the current chapter.

'Aberystwyth School' have long pressed for linking the notion of security to emancipation. More recently, political theorists such as Lorey (2015) and Näsström & Kalm (2015) have problematised the insecurities produced by neoliberal policies under the heading of 'precarity'. Relatedly, Standing (2011) and Bieber & Moggia (2021) have proposed ways to reinforce securities for those in the most precarious positions in the economic domain. Finally, Wolfendale (2017) and Milstein (2020) have explored avenues for more egalitarian conceptions and practices of security in the moral and political domain.

All of these works make valuable contributions to our understanding of the relations between equality and security, and some of them provide important pieces of the puzzle that I here aim to complete. That puzzle is a full story of the securities that are – and are not – to be found in an egalitarian society. The first part of this chapter constructs the positive side of this story, setting out the securities that an egalitarian society *does* have to offer its members (section 5.2). The second part addresses the negative side, exploring what securities such a society does *not* have to offer (section 5.3). Ultimately, I suggest that the securities that *are* on offer in an egalitarian society are the best we can get when it comes to security, if that is something to be enjoyed by all (section 5.4).

5.2. The securities that an egalitarian society does have to offer

I start with the positive question: what securities *does* an egalitarian society have to offer to its members? In the coming three sections, I address this question by considering the moral, economic, and political domain of society in turn. For each of these domains, I take a similar approach. Drawing on relational egalitarian literature, first I explore the demands of equality in the domain at issue. Analysing the implications of these demands in terms of security, I then list a particular set of securities that an egalitarian society does provide its members with. In order to distinguish these from the securities that an egalitarian society cannot or should not offer to its members – which we will encounter later on in this chapter – I bring the securities that such a society does have to deliver under the heading 'egalitarian security'.

5.2.1. Egalitarian moral security

Although the egalitarian ideal has many implications for the way in which a society should structure its economic and political life, the most fundamental demand of equality is located in what I earlier called the 'moral domain' – the domain that concerns the allocation of *respect* or *recognition*. Like much of contemporary political thought on these themes, relational egalitarian thinking has been greatly influenced by the work of Kant. According to Kant (1785), respect is owed to all persons just in virtue of the fact that they are beings with a rational and autonomous will, and this puts constraints on what we may do to them. This idea also inspires Darwall's (1977) account of 'recognition respect', which entails that we take seriously and weigh appropriately the fact that others are persons in deliberating about what to do (p. 38). Egalitarians, too, tend to reserve a central place in their thinking for the notion of respect or recognition – whereby the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably, or refer to ideas that are strongly related (see, for instance, Anderson, 1999, pp. 289, 314). In an egalitarian society, it is generally held, respect and recognition are enjoyed by all members equally. Or, as Scheffler (2015) puts it, in a 'society of equals', 'each member accepts that every other member's equally important interests should play an equally significant role in influencing decisions made on behalf of the society as a whole', and 'each member has a normally effective disposition to treat the interests of others accordingly' (p. 35).

The demand of equal respect has a strong connection to the idea of equal basic liberties. On the famous account by Rawls (1971), these at any rate comprise political liberty, freedom of speech and assembly, freedom of conscience and thought, freedom of the person and the right to hold property (p. 61). To interfere with a person in these intimate spheres – unless it were strictly necessary for protecting others in *their* spheres of personal choice – would be to deny her status as a person; to disregard her interests; to express disrespect. In an egalitarian society, then, all members are entitled to equal basic liberties. Crucially, this principle must be legally codified and publicly known. This is not just so that it can be effectively enforced. It is also because the principle of equal basic liberties, by giving public expression to the idea of equal respect for all members of society, supports people's disposition to treat one another's interests as equally important. In the words of Milstein (2020), through both their protective

and expressive functions, '[e]qual rights before the law anchor the capacities of citizens to recognize each other, understand themselves, and act in a democracy as equals' (p. 845).

In order to see what the demand of equal respect might imply for people's security, it helps to bring in Pettit's (2015) account of respect as what he calls a 'robustly demanding good' (p. 12). In line with the above, Pettit connects the 'rich' good of respect to the 'thin' benefit of 'non-interference or restraint in the basic liberties' (p. 86) – whereby he specifically mentions freedom in the spheres of speech, religion, association, movement, occupation, leisure, and property. Furthermore, just like the thinkers mentioned earlier, Pettit relates the enjoyment of respect by a person to the existence of a certain disposition on the part of others: a disposition not to interfere in this person's basic liberties; a disposition to show restraint. Finally, Pettit, too, believes that the law can play a significant role in supporting a respectful disposition in people. Now, what is important about his account here, is that it allows us to see how all of this could link to security. As Pettit stresses, if a person enjoys respect from the others in her society – that is, if they have a disposition to treat her with restraint – this does not just entail that they *actually* refrain from interference in her personal decisions, but that they would do so *across a range of possible scenarios*. They would also leave her be, for example, in the case that her choices were less congenial to them, or mingling in her life was more convenient for them. If a person enjoys respect, then, we could say in Pettit's words, she is thereby guarded in an important way 'against the will of others', and provided 'with an important form of security' (p. 111).

The themes of equality, recognition, and security are linked even more explicitly in Wolfendale's (2017) account of what she terms 'moral security' (p. 238). Echoing core themes discussed previously in this section, Wolfendale proposes to view a person as possessing moral security when this person *believes* that her basic interests and welfare are accorded moral recognition by her society, and *as a matter of fact* her interests and welfare are regarded by her society as morally important – for instance, when violence against her is taken to warrant the same punishment and condemnation as similar violence against others (ibid.). In order to grant this security for all members of a community, Wolfendale suggests, formal legal and political equality – think of the equal basic liberties advocated by Rawls

(1971), Milstein (2020), and Pettit (2015) – may well be necessary. Yet, she emphasises, equal rights alone are not sufficient. After all, as cases of racial and sexual discrimination and violence make clear, equality before the law does not always translate into equal treatment under the law. Therefore, she argues, 'rather than seeing the goal of equality as separate from or even secondary to the goal of ensuring security, measures to combat discrimination may be required by the state's duty to ensure citizens' right to security' (p. 238).

Let us take stock now: considering the demands of equality in the moral domain, what securities could we say the members of an egalitarian society must have at any rate? This section took the fundamental demand of equality to be that all members of society enjoy equal respect or recognition. This means that they acknowledge each other's status as persons, that they regard one another's interests as important, and that they have a disposition to treat each other accordingly – all of this backed up by a legal code that gives public expression to the idea of equal respect by specifying equal basic liberties for all. The result is that in a true community of equals, everyone has security of restraint on the part of others in the sphere of her personal choices; security of being treated respectfully; security of not facing violence. Let me put these securities under the heading 'egalitarian moral security'.

5.2.2. Egalitarian economic security

Above I suggested that of all the demands of the egalitarian ideal, the demand located in the moral domain – that all members of society enjoy equal respect or recognition – is the most fundamental. Nevertheless, relational egalitarians generally hold that this also has significant implications for the proper allocation of goods other than respect or recognition, that is, for the way in which *resources* should be distributed – which is the concern of what I termed the 'economic domain'. The reasons are twofold. Firstly, the principles by which resources are distributed in a society express something about the character of that society, thereby also impacting how members think of themselves and others within their community. If a society is to be an egalitarian one, and its members are to regard themselves and others as equals, then the principles regulating its economic domain – just like the rules defining its other basic arrangements – ought to reflect the idea that all members deserve equal respect. Secondly,

the distribution of resources in a society, by affecting what people can do to each other, and what they can make each other do, influences the relations in which people stand to each other. If they are to relate to one another as equals, then this distribution must not – in neo-republican language – give some people a form of dominating power over others. Summarising in the words of Anderson (2010), the principles ordering the economic domain of an egalitarian society must 'express, embody, and sustain relations of social equality' (p. 2).

What this could mean concretely becomes clear from Anderson's (1999) description of the economy under her own version of relational egalitarianism, called 'democratic equality' (p. 289). According to Anderson, egalitarians essentially want to realise two goals: the negative goal of ending oppression, and the positive goal of constructing a community of equals. Democratic equality, then, 'requires that everyone have effective access to enough resources to avoid being oppressed by others and to function as an equal in civil society' (p. 320). What resources would those be? Inspired by Anderson's account of the conditions of equal citizenship, we could divide them into three categories. Firstly, a number of resources are essential for functioning *as a human being*: Anderson lists 'the means of sustaining one's biological existence – food, shelter, clothing, medical care' (p. 317). Secondly, there are resources that one needs in order to function *as a participant in a system of cooperative production*, namely 'the education needed to develop one's talents', 'the means of production', and 'fair value for one's labor' (p. 318). Finally, some resources are required for functioning *as a citizen of a democratic state*: 'public spaces such as roads, parks, and public accommodations including public transportation, the postal service, and telecommunications', as well as 'private spaces' where one is 'protected from the scrutiny and intrusions of others' (ibid.). It is to a sufficient level of these resources that people ought to have access in order not to be oppressed by others and stand as equals in society.

To see how Anderson's (1999) theory of equality connects to the topic of security, note that she proposes to guarantee all citizens access to sufficient resources 'over the course of an entire life' (p. 319). Hers is thus not a starting-gate theory, which would have people start off with equal resources, but allow any disparities between them to emerge from their own choices afterwards. Under democratic equality, no member will ever be

denied access to the resources that she needs in order to stand as an equal in society.[45] From an egalitarian perspective, this matters for two reasons. Firstly, this principle expresses precisely the idea of equal respect that egalitarianism can be considered to revolve around: society will never give up on any of its members. Secondly, it prevents that some people end up in relations of domination: even if someone is taken to have lost her resources as a result of her own choices, she is not allowed to sink to a position where others can push her around or take advantage of her. All of this is not to say that equality demands that people be provided with resources completely unconditionally. To obtain the resources needed for functioning in society as an equal, one may still have to exercise responsible agency, by making a productive contribution to society, for instance, insofar as one's circumstances allow it and the terms of cooperation are fair. Yet, access to the resources listed above, even if it is not entirely unconditional, should indeed be granted to all for the duration of their whole lives. Using the preferred language of this chapter, I conclude that under democratic equality, all members of society have *security* of access to a level of resources that is sufficient for avoiding oppression and participating as an equal in the community.

The importance of such security for the realisation of equality also becomes apparent from recent works on precarity. Näsström & Kalm (2015) describe precarity as 'a generalized state of insecurity produced by neoliberal economic reforms' (p. 562) – among them the flexibilisation of employment, retreat of the welfare state, and promotion of market solutions in more and more spheres of society. Precarity-inducing policies can threaten the egalitarian ideal in at least three ways. Firstly, people who experience great insecurity with regard to their work and income are often especially vulnerable to oppression. As Bieber & Moggia (2021) suggest in their discussion of low-skilled gig work, those who hold such precarious positions may be unable to turn down work offers, which can put them into relations of domination or exploitation (p. 291). Secondly, people who face extensive economic insecurity may have trouble participating in society as

[45] One exception must be mentioned here: if one is convicted of a crime, Anderson (1999) points out, then one's access to these resources may indeed be taken away, and one may lose one's status as an equal in civil society. Yet, she adds, even convicted criminals 'retain their status as equal human beings, and so are still entitled to basic human functionings such as adequate nutrition, shelter, and medical care' (p. 327).

equal citizens – or engaging with others in political activity at all. Indeed, Lorey (2015) describes the flexibilisation of labour and trimming of the welfare state as ways in which workers are individualised and traditional possibilities for collective organisation are eroded (pp. 5-7). Thirdly and relatedly, it is doubtful whether the principles upon which neoliberal policies operate – arguably making people responsible for their own welfare alone; turning fellow workers and citizens into competitors – really 'express, embody, and sustain relations of social equality', to speak with Anderson (2010) once again (p. 2). Näsström & Kalm (2015), at any rate, argue that precarity-producing policies, 'by displacing onto individuals a responsibility that ought to be shared and divided between citizens', are incompatible with 'the principle of democracy' (pp. 557, 565).

From the inegalitarian implications of insecurity, let us now return to the positive question that this section set out to answer: looking at the demands of equality in the economic domain, what securities can we say the members of an egalitarian society should enjoy? Most importantly, we learned, the principles that regulate the distribution of resources must express, embody, and sustain equal respect for all citizens. Following Anderson's interpretation of this idea, we could say that every member of the community should be guaranteed effective access to enough resources in order to stand as an equal in society over the course of her entire life. Concretely, this means that in a real community of equals, each member has security of access to sufficient means to fulfil her human needs; security of access to education, work, and a fair income; security of access to public goods making civic engagement possible. I refer to these securities under the heading 'egalitarian economic security'.

5.2.3. Egalitarian political security

So far, I have elaborated the demands of equality in the moral domain – all members of society must enjoy equal respect – and in the economic domain – resources ought to be distributed according to principles that endorse relations of social equality. To conclude my exploration of the securities that an egalitarian society should offer its members, let me now turn to the demands of equality in what I named the 'political domain' – the domain that concerns how society is *ruled*. In order to establish what kind of rule fits with a community in which people relate to one another as equals, we could

follow Kolodny (2014) and start by considering what characterises relations of social *in*equality. In relations of social inequality, Kolodny suggests, some are 'above' others in the sense that they have greater power over others, greater authority over others, or attributes that attract greater consideration than those of others (pp. 295-296). Now, to enjoy influence over political decisions clearly is to enjoy a kind of power and authority over others. Given that such decisions cannot be escaped at will, Kolodny argues, 'it is a particularly important component of relations of social equality among individuals that they enjoy equal opportunity for influence over the political decisions to which they are subject' (p. 308).

In principle, equal opportunity for influence over political decisions can be realised in a number of different ways. One possibility, Kolodny (2014) points out, would be anarchism: 'that no political decisions are made at all' (p. 310). Let us assume, however, that political decisions will in fact be made. This still leaves us with two options: decisions can be reached 'without giving any of us any opportunity for influence, such as by lottery', or 'by giving each of us some positive, but equal, opportunity for influence, such as by voting' (p. 313). Although both procedures would be in line with the demand of equal opportunity for influence over political decisions, the latter option may be preferable for reasons that are not straightforwardly grounded in social equality – for instance because positive democracy would be more reliable than lottery in producing substantively good decisions. Again, Kolodny shows, different formal arrangements are possible: from direct to representative democracy, and from simple majority to supermajority requirements (pp. 317-332). At the same time – and this will become important later on in this chapter – equal opportunity for influence over political decisions demands a lot of informal conditions: given that people's opportunities for influencing political decisions can vary considerably with their level of resources, resource inequalities may also have to be countered in order to fulfil the demands of equality in the political domain (pp. 332-336).

Whereas Kolodny leaves open quite a broad variety of options for the formal realisation of equal opportunity for influence over political decisions, Anderson (1999) clearly favours a more specific form of rule. To live in a society of equals, she suggests, is 'to live together in a democratic community, as opposed to a hierarchical one', whereby democracy is to be

understood 'as collective self-determination by means of open discussion among equals, in accordance with rules acceptable to all' (p. 313). Realising democracy on this thicker interpretation requires, firstly, that all citizens enjoy formal rights to political participation, including freedom of speech and the franchise. Informally, they must also enjoy 'effective access to the goods and relationships of civil society', including 'the social conditions of being accepted by others, such as the ability to appear in public without shame, and not being ascribed an outcast status', as well as access to the resources already listed in the previous section (p. 318). And just like access to these resources, the formal rights and informal conditions for political participation mentioned in the present section have to be guaranteed to citizens throughout their whole lives. In the language of the current chapter, we could say that all members of society should have *security* of these rights and conditions.

We might observe another link between democracy and security if we consider the neo-republican ideal of non-domination. Neo-republicans generally agree that in order not to be dominated by the state, the people must somehow be involved in its government (Laborde & Maynor, 2008, p. 11). In the words of Pettit (1997), we could say that citizen involvement is necessary for ensuring that state interference will be 'forced to track the interests and ideas of the [persons] suffering the interference' (p. 55). In this sense, democracy can indeed be seen as a condition for 'security against arbitrary interference' (p. 46), namely: security of citizens against arbitrary interference by the state. It is important to emphasise, however, that democracy can only be regarded to give citizens security against arbitrary interference by the state on a specific understanding of the term 'arbitrary'. After all, democracy does not ensure that any political decision will be in line with *all* citizens' interests and ideas: actually, those who make up the minority that is outvoted will *not* find that the state only interferes to their own benefit. Democracy provides security against arbitrary interference, then, not in the substantive sense that it guarantees that state interference never goes against any citizen's interests or ideas, but in the procedural sense that it guarantees that all citizens have the opportunity to make their interests and ideas weigh in the process by which decisions about state interference are reached (see Bellamy, 2008, p. 164). Trying to make our

terminology more sensitive to this nuance, we could say that democracy offers citizens security against state interference 'on an arbitrary basis'.

Let us end with an explicit answer to the core question of this section: what securities can the members of an egalitarian society derive from the demands of equality in the political domain? We saw that egalitarians advocate equal opportunity for influence over political decisions more generally, and – at least under the circumstances of the present world – democratic rule more specifically. This requires that citizens are granted a range of formal political rights and a number of informal conditions, and implies that certain bases for exercising rule are out of the question. Using the language of security, we could say that in any egalitarian society worthy of the name, each member enjoys security of the ability to form and voice her own political views; security of the chance to have a say in the political decisions of her community; security of not facing state interference on an arbitrary basis. Let me bring these securities under the heading 'egalitarian political security'.

5.3. The securities that an egalitarian society does not have to offer

My positive account of security, setting out the various securities that a community of equals *does* have to offer its members, is now complete. So it is time to turn to the negative question: are there also securities that an egalitarian society does *not* have to offer? Yes, I am going to argue in what follows. Again, I discuss the moral, economic, and political domain of society in turn. Revisiting the demands of equality in each of these domains, I argue that egalitarians are indeed unable to promise a particular set of securities. Noting that these are securities that certain actors at the right of the political spectrum do seem to offer, and distinguishing these securities from what I earlier called 'egalitarian moral security', 'egalitarian economic security', and 'egalitarian political security', I bring the securities that an egalitarian society cannot provide under the respective headings 'conservative moral security', 'libertarian economic security', and 'authoritarian political security'.

5.3.1. Conservative moral security

Previously, I claimed that the most fundamental demand of equality is found in the moral domain. It entails that all members of society ought to receive

equal respect or recognition. Meeting this demand, I argued following Rawls (1971), Milstein (2020), and Pettit (2015), requires that all citizens are granted equal basic liberties by the law. Nevertheless, I added following Wolfendale (2017), formal equality alone may not be enough to really instill in people a disposition to treat each other as equals. This becomes particularly clear from the existence of social hierarchies such as those based on race, gender, or sexuality. Typically, the interests of those in the lower echelons of these orderings receive less regard than the interests of those in the upper ones. In other words, those at the bottom enjoy less respect than those at the top. Trying to approach the ideal of equal respect as much as possible, then, requires efforts to topple these hierarchies. My earlier analysis suggests that such efforts ideally result in a situation where each member of society enjoys what I called 'egalitarian moral security': security of restraint on the part of others in the sphere of her personal choices; security of being treated respectfully; security of not facing violence. Presently, however, I want to argue that the pursuit of equal respect may simultaneously put other securities out of reach.

To see why, consider what it may take to remedy inequalities in respect or recognition, besides the formal institution of equal rights. Fraser (1995) suggests that whereas resource inequalities can be corrected through redistribution, recognition inequalities must be amended through some form of cultural or symbolic change. She distinguishes between two strategies for bringing such change about. 'Affirmative remedies', on the one hand, 'redress disrespect by revaluing unjustly devalued group identities, while leaving intact both the contents of those identities and the group differentiations that underlie them' (p. 82). As an example, Fraser mentions the gay identity politics movement, which aims to remedy homophobia and heterosexism by revaluing gay and lesbian identity. 'Transformative remedies', on the other hand, 'redress disrespect by transforming the underlying cultural-valuational structure' (p. 83). Such remedies do not only 'raise the self-esteem of members of currently disrespected groups' – in fact, by 'destabilizing existing group identities and differentiations' they 'change *everyone's* sense of belonging, affiliation, and self' (ibid.). To illustrate this strategy, Fraser points at queer theory, which does not aim to strengthen gay identity, but rather upsets all fixed sexual identities by deconstructing the homo-hetero dichotomy.

Slowly, we can begin to see why striving to fulfil the demand of equal respect may be incompatible with realising particular securities. For a start, consider that any remedy of recognition inequalities ultimately entails a change in the cultural or symbolic architecture within which *all* members of society are placed. A transformative strategy might aim for more radical change than an affirmative one, but it would be mistaken to think that either of these strategies would only impact how members of one particular group perceive themselves. Both gay identity politics and queer theory, for example, do not just seek to change the self-conceptions of gay people, they also intend to alter the views of other members of society – who should at any rate unlearn negative biases towards gay people, but might also come to think differently of their own sexual identity, no longer seeing it as 'natural' or 'static', for instance.

It is also important to consider that the kind of cultural or symbolic change required for remedying recognition inequalities is something that an egalitarian society must de facto *always* remain open to. Even if at some point it seems that there are no social hierarchies in place anymore, new recognition inequalities may always come into existence or rise to the surface, and the ideal of equal respect may yet again require some alteration of society's cultural or symbolic architecture. As gay liberation activism was followed by the transgender rights movement, the transgender rights movement will likely be followed by another group calling for equal recognition. From the viewpoint of equality, then, it is unrealistic that society's cultural or symbolic architecture is ever really 'done'. Borrowing the terminology of Huysmans (1998), we could say that an egalitarian society cannot provide full 'ontological security', as it resists permanently 'fixing social relations into a symbolic and institutional order' (p. 242).

All in all, looking at the demands of equality in the moral domain, we find that there are indeed certain securities that an egalitarian society cannot offer its members. In practice, striving to realise equal respect for all will require that society remains forever open to forms of cultural or symbolic change that to some extent impact all members' perceptions of themselves and others. Therefore, an egalitarian society will be unable to offer its members security of an unchanging cultural or symbolic order; security of a fixed identity or self-conception; security of always being viewed and treated by others in accordance with this exact image. Since

these are securities that conservative politicians – who typically treasure tradition and caution against cultural change – sometimes do appear to offer, let me bring them under the heading 'conservative moral security'.[46]

5.3.2. Libertarian economic security

Earlier I explained that although equality's most fundamental demand may be located in the moral domain, there are also implications for the way in which a society should organise its economic domain. Essentially, I took it from Anderson (1999, 2010), the principles by which resources are distributed ought to express equal respect for all members of society, and promote relationships of social equality between them. More specifically, I proceeded, they must all be guaranteed access to sufficient resources in order to avoid oppression and participate as equals in society. By implication, I concluded, in a truly egalitarian society, all members enjoy what I termed 'egalitarian economic security': security of access to sufficient means to fulfil their human needs; security of access to education, work, and a fair income; security of access to public goods facilitating civic engagement. At the same time, I want to argue presently, fulfilling the demands of equality in the economic domain may be incompatible with promising another set of securities.

To understand why this would be so, consider the steps that may be necessary in order to make sure that resources are distributed in accordance with the demands of equality. Most obviously, intervention is required if some citizens do not enjoy access to a level of resources sufficient for functioning as an equal in society, whereas others enjoy means beyond this level. In that case, wealth from the latter group must be used to lift the former group up to the level of sufficiency. This may be done, for example, by expanding the provision of public goods, or by instituting a more generous social security system, in each case drawing the required funds from increased taxation of those who have more than enough. But intervention in the economic domain may also be required given the demands of equality in the political domain. As I highlighted earlier, Kolodny

[46] I deliberately say that these are securities sometimes offered by conservative *politicians*. What I write here does not necessarily apply to conservative *philosophers*, many of whom have developed rich and nuanced theories that cannot simply be characterised as 'treasuring tradition and cautioning against cultural change'.

(2014) suggests that disparities in resources may have to be squeezed if they cause inequalities in opportunities for influencing political decisions. Making this more concrete, Robeyns (2019) argues that in order to stop the superrich from exerting undue influence over political processes, we need to adopt not just institutional measures aimed at preventing economic power from turning into political power, but also a wealth cap above which no one should be allowed to rise at any rate (p. 256).

We can now start to see why fulfilling the demands of equality in the economic domain cannot go hand in hand with granting people some particular securities. Clearly, the steps described above can be seen to benefit citizens in the sense that they may raise the welfare level of some, promote egalitarian economic security for all, or bring society closer to the ideal of a community of equals which likely appeals to many. Yet, they may also entail that some members of society actually lose something that they are reluctant to give up – be it a part of their absolute level of income or wealth, a position of relative economic privilege, or some immaterial benefits that come attached with material advantage. The prospect or even just the possibility that this will happen may instill in them a feeling of insecurity that we could, using a well-known phrase coined by Ehrenreich (1989), describe as a 'fear of falling': a fear to lose an acquired level of prosperity; a fear to slide down from a position of socioeconomic privilege.

People with abundant means might experience such insecurity specifically in the face of a transition from an inegalitarian economic system to a more egalitarian one. But even after such an initial transition, in practice, an egalitarian society cannot guarantee that those with more than enough means will never be required to give up some of their wealth in the name of equality. After all, the economy may always be hit by unexpected events – wars; pandemics; natural disasters – as a result of which further redistribution is necessary in order to prevent some people from dropping below the level of sufficiency. In that sense, the demands of equality in the economic domain may be vulnerable to a version of Nozick's (1974) famous criticism of so-called 'end-state' or 'patterned' principles of justice: that such standards cannot be 'continuously realized without continuous interference with people's lives' (p. 163). Although in this formulation the criticism would be too strong, we must submit that an egalitarian society *cannot* guarantee that there will *never* be interference with people's lives aimed at correcting

the distribution of resources. At the same time, there are good reasons for thinking that egalitarians, when making decisions about redistribution, will always want to pay decent consideration to the rights that people previously acquired in their property (Buchanan, 1975, p. 424) and the expectations that they built up under society's lawful institutions in the past (see Brown, 2011, 2017). Nevertheless, egalitarians will presumably have to bite Nozick's bullet at least to some degree: in an egalitarian society, indeed, people's property rights cannot be entirely absolute, and their legitimate expectations will only be paid consideration as one important concern alongside others.

From the demands of equality in the economic domain, then, it appears that there are again some securities that an egalitarian society is unable to offer its members. In order to guarantee that all citizens have access to sufficient resources to stand as an equal in society, and in order to prevent that any of them come to own so much that it offends equality in political power, in practice, society must always remain open to the possibility of interventions in the distribution of resources. This implies that one cannot expect an egalitarian society to offer full security of income or wealth over and above the sufficiency level; security of one's acquired economic privilege; security of never having to give up any property unless one freely chooses to dispose of it. Given that these are securities that some libertarians – who endorse a more absolute form of property rights – do seem to offer, I bring them under the heading 'libertarian economic security'.[47]

5.3.3. Authoritarian political security

Based on the demands of equality in the moral and economic domain, I have so far identified two sets of securities that an egalitarian society is unable to offer its members. This leaves me with the question if equality's demands in the political domain, too, entail that some securities must remain out of reach. The core demand here, I suggested previously following Kolodny (2014), is that all members of society enjoy equal opportunity for influence

[47] I deliberately say that these are securities sometimes offered by *some* libertarians. What I write here does not necessarily apply to those who adhere to some form of *left*-libertarianism, which takes individuals to have strong rights to self-ownership, but not to unlimited appropriation of external resources (Fried, 2004, p. 67).

over political decisions. In principle, this leaves open the options of anarchy and lottocracy as well as democracy. Anderson (1999) clearly favours the latter form of rule, whereby all citizens have an actual opportunity to take part in the self-determination of their community. Under this option, I argued, all members of society must enjoy what I named 'egalitarian political security': security of the ability to form and voice their own political views; security of the chance to have a say in their community's political decisions; and, by implication, security of not having the state interfere with them on an arbitrary basis. However, I want to argue now, indeed there are also securities that an egalitarian society cannot offer its members as a result of fulfilling the demands of equality in the political domain.

This becomes clear already if we look at the practical reality of representative democracy as we know it in countries around the world today. Here, citizens periodically elect rulers or representatives who are then to make key political decisions about their community for a limited stretch of time. Obviously, but importantly, the outcome of true democratic elections – and ensuing political decisions – can never be certain beforehand. In a recent analysis, Müller (2021) emphasises the fine balance that representative democracy requires in practice. On the one hand, he writes, '[t]here's got to be a reasonable chance that our side can win again; we need to be certain that this is at least somewhat of a possibility, for otherwise why not quit the game altogether?' On the other hand, he adds, 'if we were always assured of winning, we might well like that outcome, but observers would rightly suspect that democracy has disappeared'. In a democracy, then, 'political outcomes – elections, above all – have to be uncertain' (p. 71). Indeed, borrowing the words of Przeworski (1991), Müller (2021) describes democracy as 'institutionalized uncertainty' (ibid.).

The connection between modern democracy and uncertainty may also be observed at a more fundamental level. In an influential account, Mouffe (2000) argues that what distinguishes modern from ancient democracy is 'the acceptance of pluralism' (p. 18): the end of the idea that we may identify a substantive conception of the good life, which all members of society could or should get behind. In a pluralist society, Mouffe believes, conflict and antagonism are permanent and inevitable. The goal of democratic politics, therefore, is not to discover or produce a view that all reasonable people would share. Instead, the aim is to turn the antagonism

between individuals who do hold different views from a 'struggle between enemies' into a 'struggle between adversaries' (pp. 102-103): into a conflict between people who combat one another's ideas, but do not put each other's right to defend those ideas into question. Because the outcome of this conflict – the political decision that is ultimately taken – is never a consensus, in a sense, it must always be preliminary; it must always remain open to contestation. As Mouffe puts it: 'What is specific and valuable about modern liberal democracy is that, when properly understood, it creates a space in which [agonistic] confrontation is kept open, power relations are always being put into question and no victory can be final' (p. 15). From this account, some degree of uncertainty; some degree of insecurity emerges as an inescapable condition of democracy in a pluralist society.

At this point, let me consider one potential criticism. From previous sections, it seems that the kind of egalitarianism discussed here already puts on the table quite a number of demands that a society would have to meet in order to realise the ideal of equality: the state should guard everyone's basic liberties, citizens should have access to a sufficient set of resources, no one should be so wealthy that it would undermine equality in political power… Do all of these demands even leave meaningful room for political decision-making; for democratic contestation; for uncertainty in the space of politics? In response, I want to make three points. Firstly, suppose that a society only meets some minimal conditions of equality – say, all citizens hold an essential set of fundamental rights, including the franchise. In that case, the larger ambitions of egalitarianism – say, full de facto equality in recognition, or complete absence of resource disparities compromising equal opportunity for influence over political decisions – must still be pursued by way of democratic decision-making. The ideal of equality, then, may at the same time prescribe that steps are taken to topple social hierarchies or squeeze resource inequalities, *and* that these steps are taken in a democratic way. Secondly, even when there is a democratic majority behind the ideal of equality, there may still be disagreement as to the interpretation of this ideal's demands. What exactly are the basic liberties to be enjoyed by all? How wide can wealth disparities be before they start undermining relations of social equality? Different answers are possible, and the proper way of settling such matters is the democratic way. Thirdly, the various demands of equality may also come into conflict with one another. What if, say, in a

pandemic, the only way to guarantee everyone's access to healthcare is by interfering with citizens' freedom of movement – that is, what if egalitarian economic security and egalitarian moral security are not straightforwardly compatible? Again, such questions must be decided democratically. For these reasons, in practice, the political domain of an egalitarian society *will* be meaningfully democratic – and therefore marked by some uncertainty; some insecurity.

It turns out, then, that the demands of equality in the political domain do imply that the members of an egalitarian society must remain deprived of a particular set of securities. If we follow Anderson (1999) and leave the options of anarchism and lottocracy to one side, we can say that an egalitarian society must be ruled in a democratic way. This means that rulers are not appointed for once and for all, the community's political course is never definitely decided, and incumbent powers must always be contestable. Therefore, in a society of equals, you cannot enjoy security of continuous rule by one particular person or party; security of society being led into the direction of your own individual liking; security of not just 'having a say' but also 'having it your way'. Because these are securities that authoritarians – who principally reject, or at least effectively block, contestation of ruling powers – do promise, be it only to a selected part of the community, let me bring them under the heading 'authoritarian political security'.

5.4. The best security we can get?

We now have a full overview of the securities that *are* to be found in an egalitarian society, and those that are *not* to be found in such a society. Firstly, all members of an egalitarian society enjoy security of restraint on the part of others; security of being treated respectfully; security of not facing violence – securities that can be united under the heading of egalitarian moral security. But a community of equals does not give people security of an unchanging cultural or symbolic order; security of a fixed identity or self-conception; security of always being viewed and treated by others in accordance with this exact image – that is, conservative moral security. Secondly, members of an egalitarian society enjoy security of access to sufficient means to fulfil their human needs; security of access to education, work, and a fair income; security of access to public goods

enabling civic engagement – that is, egalitarian economic security. But a society of equals does not provide people with full security of income or wealth above the level of sufficiency; security of their acquired economic privilege; security of never having to give up any property against their own will – that is, libertarian economic security. Finally, members of an egalitarian society enjoy security of the ability to form and voice their own political views; security of the chance to have a say in the political decisions of their society; security of not facing state interference on an arbitrary basis – that is, egalitarian political security. But such a society does not grant people security of continuous rule by one particular person or party; security of the community being led into the direction of their own individual liking; security of 'having it their way' in politics – that is, authoritarian political security. Thus an egalitarian society *creates* some securities on the one hand, but simultaneously *excludes* some securities on the other. This raises the question: when it comes to security, overall, how appealing is the egalitarian ideal? Let me end this chapter by giving some considerations in its favour.

Firstly, although an egalitarian society cannot deliver all the securities that people might desire, there are good reasons to think that the securities that it does offer provide people with a strong bedrock for dealing with any insecurities that remain. Being short of security of a fixed cultural order is a lot more bearable if you *do* know that you can always count on being treated with respect. Lacking security of your current prosperity level is far more endurable if you *are* certain that you will never lose access to a sufficient level of resources. And not having security of your own party's victory in the upcoming elections is much more tolerable if you *are* sure that you will again have a vote like everybody else in all elections yet to come. The presence of one set of securities, we could say, may enable people to handle the absence of another. In line with this, Inglehart (2018) claims on the basis of extensive empirical research that it was '[u]nprecedently high levels of economic and physical security' that 'reshaped the values and worldviews' of people in economically advanced countries after World War II, away from 'conformity to group norms' into the direction of 'gender equality, tolerance of gays, lesbians, foreigners and other outgroups, freedom of expression and participation in decision-making in economic and political life' (pp. 1-2). We might cautiously interpret this as an indication

that if people have a basic foundation of egalitarian security to build on, they are indeed better prepared to face the insecurities that may accompany the pursuit of greater egalitarian ambitions.

Secondly, even if egalitarian security would not be enough to satisfy people's need for security fully, it seems doubtful that the alternatives offered by some politicians of conservative, libertarian, or authoritarian bent would lead to a better outcome in terms of security *overall* – that is, if we consider the security of *all* members of society. Security of an unchanging cultural order would presumably serve only those who already feel perfectly at home in society, while sentencing those at the bottom of social hierarchies to continued risk of disrespectful treatment. Security of absolute rights in property would benefit mainly those who have already amassed abundant means, while potentially endangering the survival of those who have missed out. And security of uncontested rule by one particular strongman would of course just be great for him and his supporters, while giving the rest of society good reason to worry. Conservative, libertarian, and authoritarian security, then, seem to serve only some, while simultaneously undermining different securities of others. Egalitarian security, by contrast, at least provides a bedrock that in principle serves all members of society. Even though it would not deliver all the securities that we could possibly imagine or might ever hope for, we may conclude, egalitarian security is simply the best we can get when it comes to security, if that is something to be enjoyed by all.

Chapter 6

The Value of Security: Lessons for Theory and Practice

6. The Value of Security: Lessons for Theory and Practice

6.1. Concluding the analysis

In the first chapter of this dissertation, I indicated that this study had the purpose of expanding and deepening our understanding of security and its relationships to a number of key values within contemporary political philosophy. To this end, the second chapter conducted a conceptual analysis of security, and each of the three chapters that followed scrutinised the relationship between security and one value in particular: the third chapter concentrated on well-being, the fourth on freedom, and the fifth on equality. These chapters were set up as independent investigations, and throughout the texts I have done little to show how all the different lines of argumentation connect to one another. In this concluding chapter, I will not pretend that the separate plotlines of the preceding chapters ultimately fit together into one ingenious story of which I can now present a perfect denouement. What I will do, in the first place, is reiterate the insights that I reached so far in a way that the connections between them become more clear. In the second place, I will present a number of new lessons that can be drawn from the combination of these previous insights.

This chapter will proceed as follows. First of all, I summarise the findings of the previous four chapters of this dissertation, this time also adding indications as to how each chapter connects to the preceding one (section 6.2). Subsequently, I take up the only theoretical question posed at the beginning of this study that has not yet been addressed explicitly: from the objectivist perspective on values adopted here, does security itself deserve to be called a value, and if so, what kind of value would it be? (section 6.3) Lastly, reflecting on the practical implications of my findings, I present three lessons about how to deal with real questions about security that may arise within the context of a liberal democratic society (section 6.4).

6.2. Looking back

At the beginning of this dissertation, I suggested that we cannot hope to discover how security relates to core values such as well-being, freedom, and equality before we have established how security itself is to be understood. In order to get this straight, chapter 2 presented a conceptual analysis of security. The point of departure was formed by Waldron's (2006) idea that

security may be thought of as a mode in which an individual can enjoy a good. The good at issue can be anything that contributes to this individual's well-being: we can speak of someone's security of her health or her employment; we can talk about security of not being attacked or security of having the franchise, and so on. But what does it mean for someone to have security of a good; what does this 'mode of enjoyment', as Waldron calls it, entail? In order to answer this question, the chapter built further on Herington's (2019) idea of distinguishing between a factual dimension, a cognitive dimension, and an emotional dimension when it comes to security. In order for someone to count as having full security of a good, it was stipulated, she must 'be sure' of her future enjoyment of this good along all three dimensions: she must *actually* be bound to enjoy this good, she must *believe* that she will, and she must *not fear* that she won't. Furthermore, the belief and the emotional condition involved must be appropriate: they have to be based on an awareness of the facts. This makes security into an integrated concept, which we can call 'security as sureness'. Equipped with the conceptual framework just laid out, I embarked on my analysis of security from an objectivist value perspective.

An obvious starting point for this analysis was the observation that security is generally assumed to be good for people. To what extent is that assumption actually justified? In order to answer this question, chapter 3 investigated the relationship between security and well-being. On the one hand, the chapter argued, having security can indeed be seen to contribute to a person's well-being in three ways. Firstly, if someone is *actually* bound to enjoy some good, this means that she in principle stands to benefit from this good at a later point in time. Secondly, if this person also *believes* that she will enjoy this good, this helps her to avoid wasting resources preparing for a scenario in which she does not enjoy this good, and to set herself up for deriving maximum benefit from the good that awaits her instead. Finally, if she also has *no fear* that she will not enjoy this good, this supports various of her mental and physical functionings. In order for someone to reap the full benefits of security, the chapter demonstrated furthermore, it is important that the facts, her beliefs, and her emotional condition regarding her future enjoyment of a good also align with one another. On the other hand, the chapter continued, there are also three ways in which security may actually *hamper* people's well-being. Firstly, if somebody is *in fact* bound to enjoy a

good, this will actually not make her better off if the good at issue ceases to be good for her at some point – think of a form of housing that serves one's needs first, but does not suit one's mode of life later. Secondly, if somebody *believes* that she will enjoy a good, and she is right in this belief, this may actually rob her of an element of surprise that belongs to a flourishing life too. Lastly, if someone has *no fear* that she will not enjoy some good, she may also miss out on pleasurable experiences of this feeling – the suspense or excitement that one can feel when taking a risk or encountering something new – which can also be a part of human thriving. In a truly flourishing life, the chapter concluded, one does have a steady basis of securities to build on, but at the same time one does not have security in too many aspects of one's life.

Given that security turns out to contribute to our well-being in significant ways (as long as an excess of securities is avoided), it does not seem inappropriate that security is often treated as an important consideration in public decision-making. But there is also another factor that seems crucial in public decision-making, because it plays a central role in the organisation of the state: freedom. It is often suggested, for example in the context of the fight against terrorism and the COVID-19 pandemic, that there is a necessary conflict between security and freedom. But is this really the case? In order to find this out, chapter 4 took a deep dive into the relationship between security and freedom. Upon closer inspection, the chapter discovered, there are actually four different ways in which security and freedom connect to each other. Firstly, freedom *can* indeed come at the cost of security – even though it does not always *need* to. Think of how the freedom of movement comes at the cost of health security when a dangerous virus is going around – but not so much when there is no such a disease spreading. Secondly, security *can* also come at the cost of freedom – but, again, it does not necessarily *have* to. Consider how security against infectious diseases can be promoted through freedom restrictions – but it may also increase as a result of voluntary behavioural adaptations. Thirdly, moving onto the positive connections, freedom can work to the benefit of security. Think of how the freedom that is constituted by the checks and balances of democratic institutions gives citizens security against arbitrary state interference. And fourthly, in turn, security can work to the benefit of freedom. Consider how enjoying more security against virus infection can

expand the freedom that people experience to go out and engage in social activities. All in all, the chapter concluded, the relationship between freedom and security is much more complicated than it is often portrayed, and it is important for public decision-makers to take into account all four connections between freedom and security in cases where the two at first sight seem to conflict.

Given that security makes important contributions to our well-being (as long we have no excess of securities), and that security can promote our freedom (even though conflicts between security and freedom may also arise), it seems increasingly reasonable that security is indeed given substantial consideration in the running of society at large. The second, third, and fourth chapter of this dissertation, however, described security in a very open-ended way – as a mode in which an individual can enjoy *any* good. Thus, at the beginning of the fifth chapter, we were still left with the question: if security is indeed to be adopted as an important factor in the organisation of society, then security *of what goods* should be the point of focus? In order to settle this matter, chapter 5 brought in the value of equality. The ideal of equality, the chapter postulated, has implications in three domains of society: the moral domain, which concerns the allocation of *respect* or *recognition*; the economic domain, which concerns the distribution of *resources*; and the political domain, which concerns the exercise of *rule*. From the requirements of equality in these three domains, the chapter argued, we can derive an argument for providing people with three categories of securities. Firstly, they need security of restraint on the part of others in the sphere of their personal choices, security of being treated respectfully, and security of not facing violence ('egalitarian moral security'). Secondly, people require security of access to sufficient means to fulfil their human needs, security of access to education, work, and a fair income, and security of access to public goods making civic engagement possible ('egalitarian economic security'). Thirdly, people must have security of the ability to form and voice their own political views, security of the chance to have a say in the political decisions of their community, and security of not facing state interference on an arbitrary basis ('egalitarian political security'). On the flipside, the chapter pointed out, there are also three categories of securities that members of an egalitarian society *cannot* be provided due to the demands of equality. Firstly, the members of such a

society cannot be granted security of an unchanging cultural or symbolic order, security of a fixed identity or self-conception, and security of always being viewed and treated by others in accordance with this exact image ('conservative moral security'). Secondly, they do not get absolute security of income or wealth above the level of sufficiency, security of some acquired economic privilege, and security of never having to give up any property against their own will ('libertarian economic security'). Thirdly, they enjoy no security of continuous rule by one particular person or party, security of the community being led into the direction of their own individual liking, and security of 'having it their way' in politics ('authoritarian political security'). Because the securities that can be derived from the ideal of equality – unlike those that go against it – together constitute a bedrock of security that in principle serves *all* members of society, the chapter ultimately suggested, these egalitarian securities may just be the best we can get when it comes to security, at least when that is something to be enjoyed by all.

6.3. The value of security

The two main questions of this dissertation – how should we understand security, and how does it relate to the values of well-being, freedom, and equality? – have now been answered. At the start of this work, however, I also raised another question, which has not yet been addressed explicitly. Looking at security from an objectivist perspective on values, I asked, should we also consider security *itself* to be a value? And if the answer is yes, I added, then what *kind* of value is it?[48] The answers to these questions are importantly connected to the answers to the two main questions of this dissertation. Let me therefore try to answer to the questions just raised by drawing on the findings reached in the preceding chapters.

First of all, it is good to refresh our memories of what an objectivist value perspective entails exactly. On such a perspective, I wrote at the start of this dissertation, values are things that are 'objectively good', meaning that their goodness does not depend completely on people's subjective judgments or impressions of these things. Often, I added, objectivist theories distinguish between things that are good in themselves – these are called

[48] In line with common discourse in existing literature in the philosophy of values, throughout this chapter, I will assume that there is no difference between saying that 'something *is* a (particular kind of) value' and saying that 'something *has* (a particular kind of) value'.

'intrinsically good' or 'intrinsic values' – and things that derive goodness from some other source – these are called 'extrinsically good' or 'extrinsic values' (Korsgaard, 1983, p. 170).[49] In light of this, we may reformulate the question posed earlier as follows: is security an intrinsic value, an extrinsic value, both, or neither?

Let me start by considering the possibility that security is an *intrinsic* value – that it is 'nonderivatively good'; that it is 'good for its own sake' (Zimmerman, 2019, § 2). Within the entire literature on values and the entire literature on security that I have studied, I have not found a single argument for regarding security as an intrinsic value. Frankena (1963) does include security in his long list of things that may be considered as intrinsic values (p. 88), but he does not provide any argumentation for putting security on this list. Berlin (1969) and many others do talk of security as a value (p. 169), but this does not necessarily entail that they view it as a value of an intrinsic kind, let alone that they would have good grounds for regarding it as such. I myself also find it hard to think of arguments for considering security to be an intrinsic value. With the help of existing literature within the objectivist tradition of thinking about values, however, I can at least attempt to construct such an argument. Different theories within this tradition employ different methods for identifying intrinsic values. I will now try out two of the most well-known methods, and show that these, too, do not give us any grounds for thinking that security would be an intrinsic value.

According to Moore (1903), in order to find out whether a particular state has intrinsic value, we should apply the 'method of isolation': we should ask ourselves if a universe containing only that state would be good (pp. 93, 187, 197). Although some have questioned the merits of this method (Feldman, 1998, p. 353), let us at least give it a try and see if it can provide us with new insights about the value of security. If we imagine a universe containing only a state of security, would that be good? To me, it seems very difficult to imagine such a universe. Insofar as we *can* imagine it, furthermore, it seems hard to see what would be good about it. We might

[49] Next to 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' values, some philosophers distinguish additional kinds of values, such as 'moral values', 'contributory values', and 'inherent values' (Frankena, 1963, p. 82). Furthermore, remember that the distinction between 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' values is different from the distinction between 'final' and 'instrumental' values (Korsgaard, 1983, p. 170). For a further explanation of this latter point, see footnote 21, chapter 3. Given that the division between 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' values is central within the tradition, I focus only on these two categories of values here.

picture a sole individual, at a particular point in time t_0, who is sure of her enjoyment of a good at a future point in time t_1. In chapter 3, I suggested that this is good for this individual in three ways: it means that she will in principle enjoy this good in the future, it enables her to use her resources more efficiently with an eye to this future, and it liberates her from fear about this aspect of her future. At first sight, then, it seems that there is indeed a certain goodness about the state of security that we are trying to evaluate. At second glance, however, it seems that everything that is good about the state that we are imagining at t_0 actually depends on the fact that there will also be a future state t_1: every single one of the three benefits of security just mentioned bears a reference to this later state, and seems meaningless if this later state were never to come about. This leads us to either of two conclusions. On the one hand, we may conclude that the method of isolation cannot be applied to the case of security, because the very concept of security does not allow us to isolate states of the world in the manner required by Moore's method. On the other hand, we may conclude that the method of isolation suggests that security is not an intrinsic value, because we cannot see what would be good about a universe containing only a state of security without bringing a future state into the picture as well.

Within the Aristotelian tradition of thinking about values, philosophers tend to use a different method for identifying what is intrinsically valuable: they start by looking at the essential properties of beings and ask what it would mean for them to develop or perfect these properties – what it would mean for them to flourish (Hurka, 1993; Kraut, 2007). Although we may raise this question about different kinds of beings, human and non-human alike, since the concept of security is here understood as pertaining to human individuals, let me focus on human beings now. Might it be that security is an intrinsic value because it is a fundamental part of what it means for humans to flourish? The answer must be no, for two reasons. Firstly, on Aristotle's view, strictly speaking, the only thing that actually counts as having intrinsic value for us is human flourishing *itself*. True, human flourishing is made up of various components – common examples are health, knowledge, achievement, pleasure, and friendship (Rasmussen, 1999, p. 4). But in the end, in Aristotle's philosophy, these goods indeed derive their value from the good that they constitute jointly: from the good of human flourishing. Only this good, then, may be

considered as an intrinsic value itself. Secondly, even if we moved away from a strict reading of Aristotle and adopted the view that the various *components* of human flourishing, too, can be said to possess intrinsic value,[50] it would be hard to see why security would count as such a component. In chapter 3, I revealed a number of ways in which security can be *instrumental* for human flourishing, which I just repeated above. In my analysis of the relationship between security and human flourishing in that chapter, however, I found no reason for thinking that security would also be a *component* of human flourishing, deserving of a similar status as the grand goods of knowledge, pleasure, friendship, and so on. Indeed, I found that security may also *hamper* human flourishing in certain ways, providing further reason for being skeptical of the possibility that security may be called an intrinsic value from an Aristotelian point of view, broadly construed.

Having found no grounds for believing that security is an intrinsic value, let me now consider the possibility that security is an extrinsic value – that it is good not 'for its own sake', but 'for the sake of something else to which it is related in some way' (Zimmerman, 2019, § 6).[51] Something can have extrinsic value, for instance, because it is *instrumental for* achieving something else that is good. In chapter 1, I mentioned the example of wealth, the goodness of which could be seen to depend on its role as an instrument for increasing people's happiness. Something can also have extrinsic value, Zimmerman points out, because it is *indicative of* something else that is good. 'Suppose', he illustrates, 'that the results of a certain medical test indicate

[50] People might take this view, for example, because they subscribe to the widely held belief that the category of 'intrinsic' values stands in contrast to the category of 'instrumental' values. Because the components of human flourishing are not merely 'instrumentally' valuable, these people might think, the components of human flourishing must indeed constitute 'intrinsic' goods. As pointed out by Korsgaard (1983), however, the category of 'instrumental' values actually stands in contrast with that of 'final' values (and the category of 'intrinsic' values stands in contrast with that of 'extrinsic' values). For a further explanation of this point, see footnote 21, chapter 3. Understanding it helps us to see that the components of human flourishing actually need not be 'intrinsic' values.

[51] Note that the 'something else' from which an extrinsic value derives its goodness does not need to be an intrinsic value. An extrinsic value may also derive its goodness from another extrinsic value. This second extrinsic value may in turn derive its goodness from a third extrinsic value, and so on. It seems logical to suppose that in order for some extrinsic value to exist, somewhere down the chain of value derivation there must be some intrinsic value from which the goodness ultimately springs. Whether this must indeed be the case, however, is a matter of philosophical dispute (Zimmerman, 2019, § 6). I will not go into this here.

that the patient is in good health, and suppose that this patient's having good health is intrinsically good. Then we may well want to say that the results are themselves (extrinsically) good. But notice that the results are of course not a means to good health; they are simply indicative of it' (ibid.). In an earlier analysis of different kinds of extrinsic value, Bradley (1998) reaches a similar insight. 'Something could be good', he notes, 'not because of what it causes or is a means to, but rather because of what it *signifies*' (p. 110). Extrinsic values, then, include not just instrumental values, but also values that are 'indicative' (the qualification proposed by Zimmerman (2019, § 6)) or 'signatory' (the term used by Bradley (1998, p. 110)).[52] With these preliminaries out of the way, we may ask: is security an extrinsic value? Is security indeed good for the sake of something else? What would this 'something else' be then? I will now argue that security can indeed be good for the sake of something else. Specifically, I will argue that security derives extrinsic goodness from no less than four values. I will address each of them in turn.

The first source from which security derives extrinsic goodness is constituted by the good the security of which is at issue. In chapter 2, I described security as a mode in which an individual *S* can enjoy a good *G*. This mode, I argued there, has a factual aspect, a cognitive aspect, and an emotional aspect. Now, the factual aspect of security entails that the individual will in principle continue or come to enjoy *G* in the future. The factual aspect of security can thus be seen to *indicate* or *signify* the presence of something of value in the future, that is: *G* (cf. Herington, 2019, p. 179). This points us at a first reason for thinking that security is an extrinsic value; that security is good for the sake of something else: it is indicative of some good *G* that is situated in the future.[53]

The second value by virtue of which security can have extrinsic goodness is constituted by well-being. In chapter 3, I wrote that security can

[52] Next to 'instrumental' and 'indicative/signatory' values, some philosophers distinguish additional kinds of extrinsic values. Some, for instance, treat 'inherent values' as another kind of extrinsic values (Zimmerman, 2019, § 6). Others also consider 'contributory values' as a particular kind of extrinsic values (Bradley, 1998, p. 110). Given that the distinction between 'instrumental' and 'indicative/signatory' values suffices for the purposes of this section, I focus only on these two categories of extrinsic values here.

[53] In line with footnote 51, let me highlight that *G* may itself be something of either intrinsic value or extrinsic value. For an extensive analysis of the kinds of values that it would be 'worth securing', see Welch (2022, p. 33).

contribute to well-being in various ways. If a person has security of a good, I explained, she will in principle benefit from this good in the future, she is able to use her resources more efficiently, and she enjoys an emotional basis supporting various of her physical and mental functionings. In all of these ways, security can be seen to help a person to achieve a higher level of human flourishing; a higher level of well-being. Presumably, all of the benefits of security just mentioned are importantly dependent on and mediated by the value of the good the security of which is at issue: the higher the value of *G*, the more that having security of *G* will benefit a person in the ways just specified. At the same time, the argument rehearsed above suggest that a person's security of *G* derives goodness from more than *G* alone: it derives additional value from helping this person to flourish; from playing an instrumental role in the good life. Thus we have found a second reason for considering security as an extrinsic value: it can serve as an instrument for realising the value of well-being.

The third value for the sake of which security can be extrinsically good is the value of freedom. In chapter 4, I argued – among other things[54] – that security can work to the benefit of freedom. Somewhat analogously to how security can contribute to a person's well-being, I pointed out, security can also contribute to someone's freedom. We can see this especially well if we consider freedom as a matter of capabilities. If someone has security in a particular aspect of her life, I demonstrated, this can broaden the range of valuable doings and beings that she can combine, it can liberate her from the idea that she might not be able to combine these different options and should therefore forgo some of them, and it can remove incapacitating feelings of fear. In all of these ways, security can function as an instrument for increasing someone's capabilities; for expanding her 'well-being freedom'. Supposedly, the positive effects of security just mentioned, just like those summed up in the previous paragraph, significantly hinge on the value of *G*: the good the security of which is at issue. Again, however, there appears to

[54] The other things that I argued in chapter 4 include my argument that security and freedom can come at each other's cost, and my argument that freedom can work to security's benefit. One might suspect that I conveniently leave out these arguments here, because they threaten the argument that I want to make presently: that security derives extrinsic goodness from freedom. The present argument, however, is perfectly consistent with my earlier arguments: that security has extrinsic value for the sake of freedom does not imply that it is impossible for security (of particular individuals of particular goods) to come into conflict with freedom (of particular individuals to undertake particular activities), or that (a particular form of) freedom cannot also derive some extrinsic value from (a particular form of) security.

be an additional source from which security derives goodness: this time, it is the value of freedom. Thus we have discovered a third reason for taking security to be an extrinsic value: it can be instrumental in promoting the value of freedom.

The fourth and final value from which security can derive extrinsic goodness is the value of equality. In chapter 5, I claimed that the ideal of equality demands that a society provides its members with security of a whole range of goods, including the goods of respectful treatment at the hands of others, access to sufficient means for fulfilling basic human needs, possessing democratic powers, and many more. Security *of these particular goods*, then, seems to have extrinsic value not just by virtue of the goodness of *G*, the goodness of well-being, or the goodness of freedom, but also by virtue of the goodness of equality. Take, for instance, security of being treated respectfully. If all members of some society can be said to have this security, this likely signifies that this society fulfils the demand of equal respect – and thereby, at least partly, the ideal of equality. Or take security of access to sufficient means for basic needs fulfilment. If all members of a society possess this security, it will be difficult for one member to exploit or oppress another, and thus this security serves as an instrument towards realising egalitarian relationships between people. It must be emphasised, however, that the extrinsic value that security may possess for the sake of equality is only borne by security *of particular goods* – the goods the security of which I referred to as 'egalitarian securities' – and not by security *tout court*. Security of goods other than these does not necessarily bear value for the sake of equality. Indeed, security of some goods – the goods the security of which I described as 'conservative', 'libertarian', or 'authoritarian' – may actually be said to have *dis*value in terms of equality. Nonetheless, we have now identified a fourth reason for considering security, at least in some cases, to constitute an extrinsic value: if it concerns security *of some particular goods*, it can be an instrument for or an indication of the value of equality.

The conclusion, then, must be that security does deserve to be called a value, but only in a particular sense. There are no grounds for thinking that security is a value of an intrinsic kind. There are various reasons, however, for considering security to be an extrinsic value. Specifically, security can derive extrinsic goodness from four different sources: from good *G*, whose

future presence it signifies; from well-being, for which it can serve as an instrument; from freedom, for which it can also be instrumental; and from equality, the realisation of which can be promoted or signaled by security of particular goods. Note that I write: security *can* derive extrinsic goodness from well-being, freedom, and equality. Whether it *does* derive goodness from these sources may depend on the circumstances, as well as the particular good the security of which is at issue. The value of security must therefore not be seen as something constant: in different instantiations of security in the real world, security may possess different amounts of value, and derive this value from different sources. This remains important when we turn to the final section of this dissertation.

6.4. Dealing with security issues

At this point, the main theoretical questions of this study have been answered. We now have a better understanding of the concept of security, a stronger grasp of the relationships between security and a number of core values in contemporary political philosophy, and a clearer idea of the sense in which security may be considered to be a value itself. The purpose of this dissertation, however, was not just to advance the academic debate, but also to provide a source of inspiration or guidance for practical action. Indeed, it was primarily with an eye to the societal relevance of this research that it adopted a focus on the relationships between security and the values of well-being, freedom, and equality, which were argued to be three essential building blocks for a liberal democratic society. In closing this study, then, let me try and make explicit how my theoretical insights may be of practical use within the context of such a society.

In today's world, people are confronted with various issues whereby security seems to be at stake in some way. From wars to pandemics, from terrorism to climate change, from the flexibilisation of labour to the question if private lighting of fireworks should be legally allowed. Although it is a contingent matter whether any of these issues is actually framed or perceived as 'a matter of security' within the public or political debate, security can in fact be seen to constitute a relevant concern in dealing with all of these issues. It is by virtue of this fact that I here understand them as 'security issues'. Could my study be of use in determining the right course of action in the face of such issues? I believe that it could. Without pretending

to be able to lay out a perfect roadmap for tackling all issues of security, let me end this dissertation by illustrating three ways in which my insights can be of help when we are confronted with such issues within the context of a liberal democratic society.

Firstly, this study can be helpful in *specifying* the issue at hand. According to my conceptual framework, security is a mode in which an individual can enjoy a good, whereby this mode involves a factual, a cognitive, and an emotional aspect. Whenever we are confronted with an issue of security, then, we are encouraged by my framework to ask a set of clarificatory questions first. Security of *which individuals* is at stake? Security of *what goods* is in question for these individuals? Do they have a lack of security along the factual dimension, the cognitive dimension, the emotional dimension, or all three at once?

In the messy reality of the world as it is, issues are often presented or regarded as 'a matter of security' without any of the details just summed up being specified. If we want to get a clear picture of the issue at hand, however, and if we want to find out where exactly there might be a problem, it is crucial that we do try and answer the questions mentioned above. In some cases, answering these questions will already point in the direction of a certain course of action (or, indeed, suggest that a particular course of action is *not* in order). Let me illustrate this briefly. On the one hand, we can imagine cases whereby the public perceives a risk to be much higher than it actually is – as Goodin (2006) has argued to be the matter, for instance, when it comes to terrorism in the Western world (p. 14). This may suggest that the problem in this case does not primarily lie with the factual aspect of security, but rather with the cognitive and emotional aspects of security. The solution, then, might not be a further reduction of actual risk, but rather an effort to bring the public's risk perception in line with the real risk. On the other hand, we can also imagine cases whereby the public perceives some risks to be much lower than they actually are – climate change might be a good example – which may suggest that action should target the factual aspect of security as well.

Secondly, this study can be of help in *assessing* a security issue. Earlier in this chapter, I showed that security is not good in itself, but it derives goodness from at least four other sources: the good the security of which is at issue, the value of well-being, the value of freedom, and the value

of equality. This entails that if we find that security is compromised in some way, and we have answered the questions put forward in the previous paragraph, we should ask a further set of questions. Why exactly would it be bad that this particular form of security is not realised for these particular people? Does the lack of security of the good at issue cause or signify a harm to their well-being, or their freedom, or equality? Does the shortage of security really present a problem in terms of any of these values?

Often when we identify a lack of security in the real world, we jump to the conclusion that this is a problem in itself. The objectivist perspective on values adopted in this study, however, invites us to reflect a little deeper on the situation at hand. Again, such reflection may already give us some clues about what would be the right course of action (if any action is in order at all). Suppose that we find that many young people leaving school and about to start higher education are insecure as to what is awaiting them in their student lives. Notwithstanding how challenging such a lack of security may be, it seems doubtful that it would be problematic from a value perspective: as long as feelings of insecurity are not gravely incapacitating, indeed, not being sure about what the future holds in a situation like this may be an essential part of living a flourishing life. Now suppose that we find that many young people face uncertain prospects as to the question whether they will at all be able to find a house, a job, and a decent income after they graduate. In this case, we seem to have identified a lack of security that *is* problematic from a value perspective, since insecurity in such crucial areas of life may seriously inhibit people's flourishing, and it goes against equality's demand that all members of society be guaranteed access to such core goods. Action aimed at fostering security, then, is only in order in the second case.

Finally, this study can help in *responding* to issues of security. Throughout this research, I have analysed security in relation to no less than three different values: well-being, freedom, and equality. Above, I suggested that a lack of security can be problematic in terms of any of these values. Action aimed at promoting security, then, may be required in the name of well-being, freedom, equality, or any combination of them. At the same time, it is very well possible that such action *itself* is also problematic in terms of these very values. Think back of the central example of the fourth chapter, the COVID-19 pandemic: although measures against the spreading of the

virus were necessary to protect freedom in some ways, the measures also compromised freedom in other ways. There is no guaranteed harmony, then, between all the various demands of the values of well-being, freedom, an equality. Demands regarding security in the name of these values are no exception to this rule. In light of this, I want to emphasise now, when dealing with an issue of security, we should always adopt a value-pluralist perspective, taking into account all core values that have bearing on the situation, and acknowledging the possibility that these values conflict in the case at hand. This requires that we answer one additional set of questions before deciding on a certain course of action in the face of a security issue. What are the effects of different courses of action, not just in terms of security, but also in terms of well-being, freedom, and equality? Is there a way to promote security without compromising any of these values? Insofar as a certain conflict between security and any of these values is unavoidable, how can value loss be minimised?

This recommendation is especially important given the fact that security in practice often has a tendency to 'crowd out' other values. As security scholars studying the phenomenon of 'securitisation' have frequently pointed out, when an issue is framed or perceived as 'a matter of security', the public is generally inclined to accept extraordinary measures to handle the issue, even if such measures come at the cost of values that are normally viewed as non-negotiable. As Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde (1998) put it: 'Traditionally, by saying "security", a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development' (p. 21). Using the word 'security' in the public or political debate, then, is not seldom a political move. Instead of referring primarily to the concept of security as I have characterised it, security utterances by political actors in practice often mainly serve to confer the message: 'here is an issue that deserves our urgent attention'. And, in the more extreme cases studied by securitisation scholars: 'addressing this issue justifies suspending our usual values, in the name of restoring security'.

My research provides strong reasons to avoid such an approach. Under highly exceptional circumstances, whereby security in all (or almost all) aspects of life is on the line – a situation of war may be a good example – prioritising security may be justified for a strictly limited period of time.

Generally, however, focusing exclusively on the value of security is not the right way of dealing with problems, even if they do have significant bearing on this value (cf. Floyd, 2019). The COVID-19 pandemic can be seen as a case in point. From the viewpoint of my analysis, people's security of health would certainly constitute one important factor to take into account in public decision-making in a situation such as this one. Promoting this security, however, should not be a goal in itself, but it should happen in the name of other values: people's well-being, for instance, or their positive freedom, or equality between those in good health and those in a more vulnerable condition. Furthermore, measures promoting health security would always have to be evaluated also in terms of their *remaining* effects on people's well-being, freedom, and equality. Giving absolute priority to security, on my view, would be the wrong way to go.

Dealing with issues of security in a manner appropriate to liberal democratic societies, then, requires that we answer all of the questions summed up above. It requires that we approach security not as something that is desirable or important for its own sake, but as something that is good for the sake of well-being, freedom, and equality. Security may thus indeed be a thing that we should strive for. But we should only ever do so in the name of the values on which our society is built – and not for the sake of security itself; never 'just to be sure'.

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Curriculum Vitae

Josette Daemen was born in Schimmert, the Netherlands, on 7 February 1993. In 2011 she obtained her gymnasium diploma from Stella Maris College Meerssen (*summa cum laude*). She then moved to Leiden to study political science. Also wishing to explore aspects of student life other than studying alone, she first served as president of study association SPIL, later as student member of the board of the Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, and finally as a lecturer at the Institute of Political Science. After obtaining her BSc and MSc degrees in political science from Leiden University (both *cum laude*), in 2016 Josette left Leiden for Oxford in order to specialise in political philosophy. In 2018 she obtained her MPhil degree in political theory from the University of Oxford with a distinction for her thesis. She then returned to the Netherlands, where she started as a doctoral researcher at her Alma Mater Leiden University in 2019. Under the supervision of Prof.dr. Paul Nieuwenburg, Prof.dr. Ingrid Robeyns, and Dr. Marco Verschoor she wrote her PhD dissertation on the concept and value of security. As of 2023 she holds a position as a postdoctoral researcher at Leiden's Institute of Political Science. Josette's academic work has been published in international peer-reviewed journals such as the *Journal of Value Inquiry*, *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, and *Basic Income Studies*, as well as a number of Dutch journals, including *Socialisme & Democratie* and *Algemeen Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte*. Striving to make a valuable contribution to not just the academic literature but also the public debate, Josette regularly writes essays and columns for various media outlets, including *Mare* and *NRC*.



Security is something that we care about. In our own lives, we like to have security of our health; security of our job and income; security of being treated right by others. In politics, too, we expect our security to be considered as an important concern – as a key factor in public decision-making; perhaps even as the prime value on which the state should be oriented. But is security really a value? How does security relate to the core values on which liberal democratic societies are built? What *is* security even?