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Article

Joy as Contextualized Feeling: Two Contrasting Pictures of Joy in East Asian Yogācāra

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ABSTRACT

In this article, I elaborate on the approach to joy preserved in East Asian Yogācāra texts authored by Xuanzang and his disciple, Kuiji. I argue that these Yogācāra Buddhists propose a contextualist approach that does not presume joy to be an emotion with an essential property but rather perceives joy as always contextualized in lifeworlds at the personal and interpersonal levels. As such, Xuanzang and Kuiji outline two contrasting pictures of joy to capture how it is experienced in the lifeworld of ignorance and the lifeworld of wisdom, respectively. Upon delineating what joy is and how it is experienced, I continue to explore what joy can promise. Since joy does not have an inherent property, people can always make a collaborative effort to recontextualize joy for inclusion and emancipation. As such, I hope to draw on the Yogācāra analysis of joy to enrich the feminist discussion on happiness.

WE OFTEN speak of joy in connection with happiness, which probably explains why the *Oxford English Dictionary* (2000) defines *joy* as "a vivid emotion of pleasure arising from a sense of well-being or satisfaction." Indeed, joy is not only an emotion qua a strong feeling of delight but also related to well-being and life satisfaction. In her study, Sara Ahmed coins the term "the happiness turn" to capture an ongoing development, most notably from 2005 onwards, that "therapeutic cultures and discourses of self-help" have garnered growing popularity in academic studies of happiness, in the commercial sectors, and in public policy (Ahmed 2010, 3). Unsurprisingly, the popular discourse of happiness mirrors the two aforementioned senses of joy. Being joyful is crucial for being happy. As presented by classical utilitarianism, happiness is a joyful and pleasant feeling transparent to each person that forms the basis of personal and social well-being (Ahmed 2010, 6). Once people internalize the viewpoint that happiness is

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the perfect end of human flourishing, business institutions mobilize their services to market it as a desirable product, which leads to the booming industry of happiness (Ahmed 2010, 7). As observed by Ahmed, Buddhism has a strong presence in the happiness industry (Ahmed 2010, 226). But does Buddhism endorse the popular definition of being happy and joyful?

From a Buddhist perspective, this popular discourse of happiness comes with two sets of issues. First, it conceptualizes the experience of being happy in an essentialist manner. In the larger context, such a conception epitomizes philosophers' efforts to delineate emotion as an entity with an essential property, such as a self-evident subjective feeling qua phenomenological quality (Kripke 1972; Nagel 1974), or the directedness toward something being felt (Crane 2001). Second, it confirms and prioritizes an unchanging self that sustains a coherent life story for the pursuit of a perfect end qua happiness. Considering how the popular definition of being happy and joyful is at odds with a Buddhist refutation of essentialism and egoism, Buddhist philosophers, especially experts in ethics, have tackled the question whether a Buddhist teaching promises the utilitarian version of happiness.[1] Whereas most of them focus on the resources in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, I confine my scope to East Asian Yogācāra literature authored by Xuanzang (c. 602–664) and his disciple Kuiji (632–682) to explore how they define *joy*, which lays the groundwork for inquiring into what joy can do. On this front, instead of venturing into Buddhist ethics (especially moral psychology), I intend to follow Ahmed to discuss the promise of joy for enriching a critical phenomenology of this emotion.

Joy is clearly a chief concern for Xuanzang and his fellow Yogācāra Buddhists. In the opening verse of his *Cheng Weishi Lun* (Treatise on Perfecting the Doctrine of Consciousness-only, 成唯識論, henceforth *CWSL*), a foundational treatise in East Asian Yogācāra, Xuanzang clarifies that the doctrine of consciousness-only promotes the "benefit and joy of sentient beings (利樂諸有情)" (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 1a8).[2] Yogācārins are Mahāyāna Buddhists known for their doctrine of consciousness-only (*vijñaptimātra*), which details the functionality of consciousness (*shi* 識, *vijñāna*) for realizing the wisdom of emptiness. From Xuanzang's viewpoint, this doctrine not only facilitates sentient beings' personal realization of wisdom but also enables them to guide their fellow sentient beings to the shared path of awakening. As elaborated by his disciple Kuiji in his commentary on the *CWSL* (T no.1830, vol. 43, 233c7–9), this opening remark encapsulates the Bodhisattva ideal in Yogācāra terms, considering how the doctrine of

[1] In Buddhist ethics, scholars are debating whether there is a matching term for *happiness* in Buddhist vocabulary. Acknowledging how *happiness* is polysemous, Owen Flanagan demarcates the Aristotelian *eudaimonia* (an active life of reason and virtue) from the colloquial use of the term as a subjective mental state of feeling happy (Flanagan 2011, 11–12). In Buddhism, *eudaimonia* is both "a stable sense of serenity and contentment" and a lifestyle constituted by enlightened wisdom, virtue of goodness, and meditative practice (Flanagan 2011, 16), whereas Buddhist *happiness* is caused by virtue with its constituent structure exemplified by the "four required virtues of compassion, loving-kindness, sympathetic joy, and equanimity" (Flanagan 2011, 54). Proposing a causalist approach to happiness that does not assume an unchanging ego or an essential property of this feeling, Flanagan outlines happiness and flourishing (qua Buddhist *eudaimonia*) as different stages of the bodhisattvas' practice. Whereas Flanagan does not consider the Buddhist sense of *eudaimonia* and happiness to be synonymous with the notion of *sukha*, Charles Goodman thinks otherwise. Scrutinizing Flanagan's study, Goodman contends that the "relationship between eudaimonist and utilitarian strands in Buddhist ethics is more complex" (Goodman 2014, 220). He defines *happiness* as attitudinal pleasure qua "a mental state of accepting and rejoicing in the present situation," which is expressed as *sukha* (Goodman 2009, 32). This definition allows Goodman to read Buddhist ethics as character consequentialism: sentient beings cultivate their virtues to realize attitudinal pleasure as the good consequences for all sentient beings, which harmonizes virtue ethics and classical utilitarianism (Goodman 2009, 115). Character consequentialism bears clear resemblance to what Barbra Clayton refers to as "spiritual consequentialism," which also underscores the altruistic aspect of happiness (Clayton 2006, 149). To problematize further the essentialist understanding of happiness, Jay Garfield specifies how pleasure is not inherently good and worth pursuing but should be theorized in relation to alleviating suffering (Garfield 2021, 21). Drawing on their insights about the transformative (subject in flux), cultivating (fluidity of emotion), and contemplative (unity of knowledge and action) aspects of joy, I hope to explore the intersubjective dimension of this emotion to suggest how joy is always contextualized in a lifeworld, and its transformation calls for a collaborative effort. This exploration will also use East Asian Yogācāra resources to make a case for Garfield's reading of Buddhist ethics as moral phenomenology.

[2] In this article, I use Buddhist texts collected in the *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō* edited by Takakusu, Watanabe, and Ono 1924–1932 and *Shinsan Dai Nihon Zoku Zōkyō* edited by Kawamura 1975–1989. When citing passages from these texts, I acknowledge their source collection (T as from the *Taishō* and X as from the *Zoku Zōkyō*) together with their sequence, volume, page, and column numbers.

consciousness-only establishes the true teaching of wisdom, while the care for others' benefit (*parārtha*) and joy (*sukha*) bespeaks compassion.

In contemporary studies of Yogācāra, scholars have analyzed the theory of consciousness to enrich the study of knowledge acquisition.[3] In comparison, the Yogācāra approach to joy has not been fully surveyed. In part, this is because joy is placed under the umbrella term *emotion*, and this English word *emotion*, unlike the word *consciousness* that is considered the synonym of *shi* 識 (*vijñāna*), does not have a perfect match in Buddhist vocabulary.[4] In her research, Maria Heim suggests that Buddhists in the Pali tradition propose a phenomenology of emotional life in their analysis of feeling (*vedanā*) (Heim 2021, 87). Largely indebted to Pali and Sanskrit Abhidharma, Yogācārins, including Xuanzang and Kuiji, also delve deeper into sentient beings' emotional life in their account of feeling (*shou* 受, *vedenā*).[5] Joy as *le* (樂, *sukha*) is first and foremost a type of *vedanā*, and *vedanā* pertains to the category of *caitta* (*xinsuo* 心所) as the mental factors that are always associated with consciousness and thus contribute to a given mental event. In the Yogācāra framework, it is impossible to approach a mental factor like joy independent of its related consciousness qua the way of knowing and discerning. The mind (*citta* qua the system of eight types of consciousness), together with its associated mental factor (*caitta*), serves as the condition for the possibility of the appearance of phenomena. Since nothing can appear in our experience without the functionality of consciousness, this doctrine is referred to as consciousness-only. To illustrate the interplay of *citta* and *caitta*, Xuanzang speaks of our lived experience as a scroll of painting that is finalized through the joint effort of *citta* and *caitta*, given that the mind sketches the basic outline on the drawing paper and the mental factors supply the sketch with colors to make it into a coherent painting (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 26c18). By the mind, a sentient being reaches out to the perceptual field to make it into a meaningful lifeworld. Every lifeworld, thus, is a concrete world of lived experience dwelled in and navigated by sentient beings in a specific mindset. Moreover, one sentient being's mind also extends its reach to other minds to constitute a larger shared lifeworld at the interpersonal level. Although these lifeworlds are primarily constituted by minds, the associated mental factors, like joy, help to cohere them.[6]

Following this way of characterizing experience at both the personal and interpersonal levels, I contend that Xuanzang and Kuiji propose a contextualist approach to feeling that can be epitomized by their analysis of joy.[7] In his study of Vasubandhu, Sonam Kachru (2021a) interprets the transformation from ignorance to awakening as a recontextualization of experience.

[3] See Lusthaus 2002; Waldron 2003; Jiang 2006; Arnold 2012; Coseru 2012; Ganeri 2012; Gold 2014; Tzohar 2018; Kachru 2021a.

[4] In modern Chinese, emotion is usually translated as *qing* 情, a term Xuanzang evokes to define sentient beings (*sattva*) *qua youqing* 有情 (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 1a8). Kuiji elucidates three senses of *youqing* as situationally existent consciousness (*qingshi* 情識), those with nature (*qingxing* 情性), and those with desire (*qingai* 情愛) (T no. 1830, vol. 43, 234a1–4). All three senses do not conform to the modern definition of *emotion* as an agitation of the mind. For more discussion on *qing* in ancient Chinese thought, see Anderl 2004; Virág 2017.

[5] In his study of pain (*duḥkha*), Sonam Kachru translates *vedanā* as "affect," which is supported by his detailed analysis of affect as phenomenal consciousness (Kachru 2021b, 139). Although I am much inspired by Kachru's work, I keep the translation of *vedanā* as "feeling" because affect can include a wide range of mental factors that are not limited to *vedanā*. In contemporary Euro-American philosophy, "to be affected by something is to evaluate that thing" and "to give value to things is to shape what is near us" (Ahmed 2010, 24). If affect entails "a pre-judgmental orientation towards" and "a pre-judgmental disclosure of sensuous values" (Johnston 2001, 182), then affect might include not only *vedanā* but other emotion-related *caitta*, such as self-arrogance and anger.

[6] Here I borrow the term *cohere* from Ahmed's study of happiness to characterize the capacity of mental factors in relation to the constructive functionality of consciousness. I use *cohere* as a transitive verb to show how mental factors make lived experience more coherent, which assists and reinforces the work of consciousness. This corresponds to Xuanzang's depiction of how "the *citta* is targeted at the overall characteristic of the perceived phenomenon and the *caitta* is directed at the specific characteristic of such phenomenon to assist the accomplishment of the *citta* (心於所緣, 唯取總相; 心所於彼, 亦取別相, 助成心事)" (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 26c16–18).

[7] I am inspired by Gertrude E. M. Anscombe's analysis of enjoyment, especially how she argues that our expression of joy "is just the sort of connection into which we introduce negative signs and quantifying applicatives, and which we combine with others by truth connectives" (Anscombe 1967, 614). I consider Anscombe's reference to "connection" as a suggestion on how our joy is always positioned in a linguistic, semantic context that makes the expression of enjoyment meaningful. That is why I use the term *contextualization* instead.

Building on and expanding his argument, I explore how feelings like joy will also be recontextualized together with the transformation of a sentient being's mindset. That is to say, joy does not have any essential property and does not always presume an immutable self, because it is always contextualized first in the lifeworld of a sentient being and then in the larger shared lifeworld of a group of sentient beings. With this contextualist approach, these Yogācārins offer two contrasting pictures of how joy is experienced. For those who are ignorant of the impermanent nature of things, they experience joy as an affirmative embracing of an agreeable phenomenon that elicits their desire and prompts egocentric actions. Joy thus coheres the lifeworld characterized by ignorance, which obstructs the eradication of attachments and entraps sentient beings in endless suffering. In contrast, for those who see things as empty, their joy is no longer inwardly looking at an ego. Rather they cultivate their joy as a contemplative performance of affirmatively embracing any manifested phenomenon at the intersubjective, interpersonal level. More importantly, since these wise ones understand how all minds are experientially and epistemically interconnected, they are determined to help their fellow sentient beings break through their old horizon. In Buddhist terms, these wise sentient beings become the bodhisattvas, who compassionately vow not to leave anyone behind. In bodhisattvas' engagement with others, joy as the cultivated contemplative performance becomes the bodhisattvas' resilience. Thus, joy coheres bodhisattvas' lifeworld of wisdom and compassion. Joyful bodhisattvas work with their target audience to open a new window in the lifeworld of ignorance to shed light on the possibility of purifying ignorance into wisdom. Only when all sentient beings transform their consciousness into wisdom and realize universal awakening will their joy evolve into happiness (*anle* 安樂 *sukha*) to end suffering for good.[8] Thus, true happiness is not possible unless the entirety of sentient beings is free from misperception and attachment. Approaching joy as a contextualized feeling, Xuanzang and Kuiji suggest that sentient beings can always make a collaborative effort to transform their lifeworlds and recontextualize their joy, which incorporates the interpersonal aspect of emotion and entails a more multifaceted understanding of being happy and joyful than that in classical utilitarianism.[9]

To facilitate the following discussion, I preserve the concept of happiness, specifically for the evolved form of joy that entails liberation from suffering on universal awakening, while reserving the term *joy* more generally for the *vedanā*-related emotional life that can be experienced by sentient beings in the context of their lifeworlds. In unpacking this contextualist approach, I first provide an analysis of feeling and then detail two contrasting pictures of joy depicted by Xuanzang and Kuiji. To end the discussion, I illustrate the Bodhisattvas' joy with the story of a happy Devī in the *Vimalakīrti Sūtra*. In this manner, I hope to add another perspective on joy from a feminist standpoint.

THE ANALYSIS OF FEELING IN THE *CWSL*

Since joy is first and foremost a type of feeling, it is helpful to trace how Xuanzang defines *vedanā*.[10] In the *CWSL*, Xuanzang introduces it as follows:

[8] Although the Sanskrit term remains the same as *sukha*, Xuanzang translates the type of joy shared by the entirety of sentient beings upon universal awakening as *anle* 安樂, not just as *le* 樂 in Chinese, which I interpret as his way of drawing a distinction between being happy upon universal awakening and being happy without such universal awakening.

[9] In doing so, I consider the contextualist approach to be commensurable with and complementary to the utilitarian/consequentialist approach and the causalist approach. The main difference between these approaches stems from whether we shall only prioritize the first-person (as in utilitarianism) or the third-person (as in causalism) perspective as the starting point for discussing our emotional life. In contrast, the contextualist approach underscores the second-person perspective of interpersonal experience and thus expands the discussion of happiness and joy. Since these perspectives of personal and interpersonal experience are beyond the scope of this article, I have unpacked them elsewhere (Li 2016, 2017, 2019, 2022).

[10] There has been a wealth of scholarship on *vedanā* in Abhidharma and Indo-Tibetan Yogācāra (De Silva 1995; Lusthaus 2002; Kramer 2012; Heim 2021; Kachru 2021b). Inspired by their research, I turn to East Asian Yogācāra to show how feeling always points back to an underlying transformable subject and thus can be experienced differently in the context of a lifeworld.

> Feelings (*shou* 受, *vedanā*) can embrace (*lingna* 領納, *anubhava*) agreeable (*shun* 順), disagreeable (*wei* 違), and neutral (*zhong* 中) objects (*jing* 境, *viṣaya*), further making the mind generate the images (*xiang* 相, *nimitta*) of pleasure (*huan* 歡), displeasure (*qi* 慼), and neutrality (*she* 捨). It is never the case that the mind functions without the company (*sui* 隨) of one of these feelings. (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 28a13–14)

In this definition, Xuanzang characterizes feeling through its function of *lingna* 領納 (*anubhava*), further outlining the interplay between feeling as a mental factor and its corresponding consciousness. Here, *ling* 領 means "following the lead of" and *na* 納 entails "accepting," which bespeaks how feeling arises upon and follows the lead of consciousness to accept the perceived object as part of the experience.

Lingna is evoked by Xuanzang to translate *anubhava*, the Sanskrit term that expresses how, through feeling, sentient beings come to experience and embrace something alongside the activity of consciousness. Indeed, as suggested above, when consciousness perceives an object, feeling arises upon this perception and continues to embrace this object as agreeable, disagreeable, or neither. And this embracing is further comprehended by the mind to be pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral. From the interplay between feeling and consciousness, it can be inferred that feeling is a compounded, synthetic mental act that arises based on consciousness. Moreover, feeling is not only intentionally about an object but can also be intended by consciousness to produce a more explicit comprehension of that object. Contingent on how an object is perceived and embraced, sentient beings can experience an object agreeably as joy (*le* 樂, *sukha*), disagreeably as suffering (*ku* 苦, *duḥkha*), or neither as equanimity (*she* 捨, *upekṣā*) (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 27a10–12).

Now that Xuanzang describes joy as the embracing of agreeable objects, does it mean that an object is inherently agreeable and such agreeableness is given to the subject through joy? In answering this question, it is crucial to delve deeper into the examination of the structure of consciousness and its mental factors in the *CWSL*:

> For those who realize that no perceived objects are consciousness-independent, the image part (*xiangfen* 相分, *nimittabhāga*) turns out to be the perceived phenomenon (*suoyuan* 所緣, *ālambana*); the seeing part (*jianfen* 見分, *darśanabhāga*) becomes the act of perceiving (*xingxiang* 行相, *ākāra*); the seeing part and the image part rely on the underlying self-awareness of the consciousness, which is called the event, namely, self-awareness (*zizhengfen* 自證分, *svasaṃvitti*).... *Citta* and *caitta* have the same faculty root and share similar perceived phenomena, although their acts of perceiving remain dissimilar. This is because the function of the act of knowing (*liaobie* 了別, *vijñapti*) and the function of the act of embracing (*lingna* 領納, *anubhava*), etc., shall be distinguished from one another.... If *citta* and *caitta* are further delineated, then there should be four parts (*fen* 分, *bhāga*): the first three parts remain the same as previously mentioned, plus a fourth part of the awareness of the self-awareness (*zhengzizhengfen* 證自證分, *svasaṃvitti-saṃvitti*), without which, who can know the third part *qua svasaṃvitti*?[11] (T no.1585, vol.31, 10b5–18)

That is to say, every consciousness is a synergy of four correlative parts: the image part qua the perceived phenomenon that appears as an object, the seeing part qua the act of perceiving, the

[11] Since the *CWSL* was originally composed in classical Chinese, I draw on Louis de la Vallée Poussin's (1928) Sanskrit reconstruction of these concepts. Nevertheless, as one of the reviewers noted, Buddhist scholars are still debating how to reconstruct the corresponding Sanskrit versions of these Sinitic notions. Moreover, the fourfold structure has been examined extensively in the scholarship; see Lusthaus 2002; Yao 2005; Funayama 2020; Li 2016, 2017, 2022.

underlying self-awareness that supports the phenomenon and the act, as well as the reflexive awareness of such underlying self-awareness.

In presenting this structure, Xuanzang elucidates how objects are not directly given to the *citta* and *caitta*, insofar as what is to be perceived as a phenomenon is not a mind-independent object but rather becomes the image part arising from consciousness itself. Hence, *citta* and *caitta* actively serve as the condition for the possibility of the phenomena that appear as various types of objects. The underlying self-awareness that reflexively knows itself serves as the origin of all acts and phenomena, further ensuring the retainment of previous perceptions in experience. These four aspects of consciousness are distinct from each other due to their respective roles in the process of knowing. Nevertheless, they also mutually constitute one another to enable sentient beings to know and discern. Due to the interdependence of these four parts, sentient beings are furnished with an open possibility. Either sentient beings regard the seeing part and image part as mutually exclusive entities and reduce their interdependence into subject-object duality, which defines their mindset as ignorant and dualistic; or they will realize the subject-object interdependence and see things as empty of any fixed essence, further transforming their consciousness into non-dual wisdom.

When an object appears as a phenomenon for consciousness, it manifests as the image part and is perceived by the seeing part. Based on the activity of consciousness, the mental factor of feeling (*vedanā*) arises.[12] Just like consciousness, feeling also takes on a fourfold structure. Directed toward the original image part of consciousness, feeling acts to give rise to its seeing part as the act of embracing (*lingna* 領納, *anubhava*), through which this original image part of consciousness becomes modified to manifest as the new image part of feeling. Considering how this new image part of feeling is synthesized and modified from the original image part of consciousness, Xuanzang speaks of feeling's targeted phenomenon as similar (*xiangsi* 相似) to, but not identical with, that of its related consciousness. As such, it is hardly the case that an object is innately agreeable, disagreeable, or neutral. Rather, sentient beings come to embrace an object that appears as agreeable, disagreeable, or neutral in the context of how it is perceived. When we affirmatively (*shun* 順) embrace a phenomenon in our experience and welcome it as agreeable upon perceiving it, joy arises and brings satisfaction. Similarly, our suffering evinces a confrontational and adverse (*wei* 違) embracing of a phenomenon in our experience,[13] while our equanimous feeling captures a neutral embracing without an explicit welcoming or confronting attitude.[14]

More importantly, since consciousness functions to give sentient beings an open possibility of either misperceiving things as mutually exclusive entities or seeing things as empty of essence, feeling as a mental factor that is founded upon consciousness sustains such a possibility. Indeed, the *Yogācārabhūmi* underscores how feeling "acts to serve as the support for the generation

[12] As I have detailed elsewhere (Li 2022), in Yogācāra, *vedanā* is one of the five universal (*bianxing* 遍行, *sarvatraga*) mental factors that always accompany eight types of consciousness: when consciousness functions, the mental factor of contacting (*chu* 觸, *sparśa*) arises to ensure the harmonious collaboration of consciousness, faculty root, and perceived object (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 11b20). Based on the support of contacting, attending (*zuoyi* 作意, *manaskāra*) arises to alert sentient beings to direct their attention to the object (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 11c7). Feeling arises to discern objects as favorable, unfavorable, or neither. Thinking (*xiang* 想, *saṃjñā*) functions to produce names and words (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 11c23), and purposing (*si* 思, *cetanā*) acts to maneuver consciousness to conduct moral actions (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 11c26). Hence, it is in virtue of these universal mental factors that various types of mental acts translate into and prompt action.

[13] I want to thank Fan Lin for her remark that *wei* 違 is paired with *shun* 順 to describe the more subject-related side of experience; for instance, *shun* and *wei* often appear with *xin* 心 (the heart-mind) to describe whether something is (dis)affirming one's desire. In contrast, *shun* 順 is paired with *ni* 逆to depict the more object-related side of experience; for instance, a favorable situation is called *shunjing* 順境, and a challenging situation is *nijing* 逆境.

[14] I believe Ye Jiaying's remark on Matsu Bashō's (1644–1694) famous frog haiku is quite helpful in understanding the equanimous feeling. Think about the moment one hears a frog jumping into the pond (Ye 2019, 121). This is evidently not yet a moment of explicit joy, anger, sadness, or pleasure, yet, the sudden sound of water, especially when the frog does not meet any of our instrumental purposes, strikes us so unexpectedly, further making us mindful that we are living in resonance with nature. Ye refers to this feeling as "subtle and wondrous (*weimiao* 微妙)" (Ye 2019, 121), which illustrates the feeling of equanimity.

of craving and desire (*aishengsuoyi weiye* 愛生所依為業)" (T no. 1579, vol. 30, 291c10). As unpacked by Kuiji, for sentient beings whose minds are polluted (*ran* 染) by ignorance (*wuming* 無明), their feeling of joy will animate the desire to be united (*he* 合) with what they conceive of as an agreeable object, whereas their feeling of suffering generates the desire to be separate (*li* 離) from what they consider a disagreeable object (T no. 1830, vol. 43, 331a16–18). That is to say, in the context of a lifeworld of ignorance, joy arouses desire and thus coheres this lifeworld. Contrariwise, for those who have realized the wisdom of seeing things as interdependent and empty, they will only experience joy and equanimity, affirmatively (*shun* 順) embracing all perceived objects in their experience (T no. 1830, vol. 43, 427a20–23). In the next two sections, we will detail these two contrasting pictures of joy.

JOY CONTEXTUALIZED IN THE LIFEWORLD OF IGNORANCE

In the *CWSL*, Xuanzang presents a more detailed account of joy to unpack how it, as a type of feeling (*vedanā*), accompanies consciousness:

> Affirmatively embracing the appearance of an agreeable object and pleasing the body and the mind is named the feeling of joy.... All the comfortable and pleasant feelings, if they are associated with the five consciousnesses, are always named "somatic joy (*le* 樂, *sukha*)." If they are associated with the sixth consciousness *manovijñāna*, they are called "intellectual joy (*xi* 喜, *saumanasya*)" in the realm of desire and in the preliminary concentration of the first two meditations (*jinglü* 靜慮, *dhyāna*), insofar as they only please the mind. In the first two meditations *per se*, they can be called both somatic and intellectual joy because they please both the body and the mind.[15] In the third meditation, both its preliminary concentration and its root meditation, they are called somatic joy because they are calm and heavy, devoid of any conceptualization (*fenbie* 分別, *vikalpa*). (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 27a10–b5)

Here, Xuanzang follows previous Yogācārins to differentiate somatic joy from intellectual joy in accordance with their related consciousnesses. Due to the prevalent Cartesian understanding of mind-body bifurcation in modern European philosophy, it is crucial to elucidate the somatic-intellectual distinction in the Yogācāra framework. As previously mentioned, Yogācārins consider the experience of a sentient being to be coalesced through the joint effort of *citta* and *caitta*. The mind qua *citta* consists of eight types of consciousness (*shi* 識, *vijñāna*): the first five consciousnesses amount to the five senses that provide manifold sense data to be synthesized and processed by the sixth consciousness, called *manovijñāna* (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 7b29). The sixth consciousness can be interrupted in extreme moments, such as a coma. Hence, this conceptually active *manovijñāna* presupposes a more profound seventh consciousness named *manas*, which sustains the self-identity of a sentient being (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 7b28). *Manas* is further supported by the eighth consciousness, known as *ālaya*, which ensures the continuity of life between death and rebirth (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 7b27). Since every consciousness functions to give rise to a fourfold structure, the functionality of consciousness makes it possible for sentient beings to misperceive things as self-determined entities qua essences. When the eighth consciousness acts to generate its image part as three phenomena—the material cosmos, the corporeal body, and seeds, with its seeing part as the act of constituting these phenomena (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 10a13–14)—*manas* takes the eighth consciousness's

[15] As I will explain shortly afterwards, I translate *xi* and *le* as somatic and intellectual joy to show that they are delineated in terms of their associations with consciousnesses. Nevertheless, I do not translate them as pleasure and joy to underscore how they encapsulate different types of affirmative embracing in the framework of consciousness-only. Here, I am grateful to one of the reviewers for the comment on this translation.

act of constituting as its target and habitually perceives it as an unchanging ego (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 22a7). This seventh consciousness qua *manas* produces the innate self-attachment (*jushengwozhi* 俱生我執, *sahaja-ātmagrāha*) and innate dharma-attachment (*jushengfazhi* 俱生法執, *sahaja-dharmagrāha*) in the subjective sense (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 2a13; 7a1). Meanwhile, based on the phenomena of the material cosmos and the corporeal body, the five senses generate their respective image parts through their acts of sensing (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 26a22–23). They are grouped as somatic consciousnesses because of their capacity qua bodily sensation. The five senses produce sense data to be processed by the sixth consciousness, which habitually combines these data into a representation and, thus, objectifies them (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 26a24). This is how the sixth consciousness acts as the source of both innate self-attachment and innate dharma-attachment in the objective sense (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 2a14; 7a2). The sixth consciousness further exercises its capacity for abstract thinking to produce discriminative self-attachment (*fenbiewozhi* 分別我執, *vikalpita-ātmagrāha*) and dharma-attachment (*fenbiefazhi* 分別法執, *vikalpita-dharmagrāha*) that conceptually consolidate the self-other polarity (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 2a17–19; 7a5–7). Due to its functionality of synthesizing and objectifying, the sixth consciousness becomes conceptually active and intellectually productive. As such, the somatic-intellectual distinction is not a Buddhist variation of Cartesian dualism, in which the body senses and the mind thinks, but rather captures different modes of knowing in virtue of consciousness. Among all consciousnesses, only the seventh and the sixth can produce misperceptions that propel sentient beings to treat their ego and other phenomena as mutually exclusive essences. The mindset, full of subject-object duality and self-other polarity, conditions how various phenomena appear in sentient beings' experience when they navigate life and orient themselves toward these phenomena. Gradually, sentient beings develop a way of living in which they are ignorant of the interdependent, non-dual, impermanent feature of phenomena. A lifeworld of ignorance becomes constituted by consciousness.

Although the seventh consciousness, just like the eighth consciousness, is only associated with the equanimous feeling (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 23b29–c2), the sixth consciousness, together with the five senses, can experience all three types of feeling qua joy, suffering, and equanimity (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 27a9). To be more specific, when the five senses act to produce sense data, a sensible phenomenon appears for sentient beings and becomes further targeted by feeling. If such an encountered phenomenon satisfies the senses, somatic joy arises as an affirmative embracing of the phenomenon. Marked as devoid of conceptualization, somatic joy involves no conceptual thinking but emerges as an instinctive enjoyment, which, in turn, explicitly comforts and affects the five senses. Kuiji speaks of such an instinctive mode of joyful experience as "affective but not eager (動而不勇)" (T no. 1830, vol. 43, 424a19). Combining sense data into a unified representation, the sixth consciousness objectifies a phenomenon into a synthetic unity to establish a fixed sense of the self (in the objective sense) and various types of things. Upon the appearance of such objective representation, intellectual joy arises to affirmatively embrace this unified phenomenon into experience. Given that intellectual joy evinces a lighthearted, comprehensive encounter of a phenomenon, Kuiji speaks of intellectual joy as both "affective and eager (動勇)" that is further cognized by the sixth consciousness as comforting and pleasing (T no. 1830, vol. 43, 424a18).

Practically, somatic and intellectual joy "acts to elicit craving and desire (起愛為業)" (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 11c11). That is to say, when a phenomenon appears as an unchanging entity in the ignorant mindset and satisfies the mind somatically or intellectually, sentient beings affirmatively embrace this phenomenon into experience. Since then, "if they have not obtained [what they perceive to be the agreeable object], they desire to be united with it and if they have already attained it, they desire not to be separated from it (未得希合, 已得復有不乖離欲)" (T no. 1830, vol. 43, 331a17–18). Here, Kuiji portrays how joy consolidates

misperception through regulating sentient beings' desire when they navigate life. After sentient beings act to meet their wants and unite with what they perceive to be desirable objects, their actions do not vanish but leave a karmic imprint as a seed (*bīja* 種子) in the eighth consciousness. These seeds become habitual tendencies that will mature into more misperceptions and desires ad infinitum. As such, joy exerts a regulative power to set up expectation, which further propels sentient beings to internalize an ignorant mindset as the natural way of living. The lifeworld of ignorance, once constituted by consciousness, continues to be cohered by joy.

This is why, for instance, after a long working day, we experience joy on our way home, because we know we will be reunited soon with our beloved ones, our cat for instance, even when this union has not arrived yet. When we reach home and cuddle the cat, the somatic and intellectual joy arise based on our perception, further welcoming the cat into our experience as a favorable entity and deepening our attachment. Although, undoubtedly, we know one day the cat will eventually leave us, the way in which our joy sets up our expectation subtly makes us wish this moment would never arrive. Hence, it is not that an inherently pleasant object acts to cause our joy. Rather, our experience of joy coheres a lifeworld of ignorance in which we approach a phenomenon as inherently pleasant for ourselves. More importantly, Xuanzang reminds us how joy is always contextualized in a more commonly shared lifeworld of a group of sentient beings because of the way in which the mind of a sentient being is interconnected with other minds. Far from being closed within itself solipsistically, one mind always extends its reach to other minds to mutually constitute a shared lifeworld on a communal horizon, a mutual constitution that is compared in the *CWSL* to how "when lamps are lit up, they illuminate one another as if they were one (如眾燈明, 各遍似一)" (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 10c15–16). As unpacked by Tao Jiang, each sentient being constitutes its own lifeworld through its own mind and collaborates with other sentient beings to build a larger shared lifeworld as a community (Jiang 2006, 81). It is on this communal horizon that the experience of joy conditions our expectation both at the personal and interpersonal levels. For those we affirmatively embrace as self-pleasing, either somatically or intellectually, we generate desires to be united with them, even if it sometimes means we need to compete with others to fulfill our satisfaction. These interpersonal actions are sedimented as shared seeds in the common lifeworld of all sentient beings, which, generation after generation, cultivates the tendency that shapes the arrival of a phenomenon in what can be referred to as the social context.

JOY CONTEXTUALIZED IN A BODHISATTVA'S LIFEWORLD

Since the functionality of consciousness furnishes sentient beings with an open possibility of either reducing phenomena to mutually excluded entities or realizing their interdependence, they can always try to remove misperception. Such a transformative process from ignorance to awakening (qua the attainment of non-dual wisdom) is known as the Bodhisattvas' path. In the Yogācāra framework, as previously presented, the lifeworld marked by ignorance takes a deep root insofar as it extends its arms to habitual and conceptual misperceptions to innate and discriminative attachments and also to the actualized function of *citta* and *caitta* and the unactualized tendencies qua seeds. Thus, bodhisattvas, as the exemplary ones in Mahāyāna Buddhism, need to go through an overall rehabitualization through both a conceptual comprehension of interdependence and a habitual realization of it. At that point, it becomes clear to them that, due to the interconnectedness of all minds, they are obliged to help those who remain entrapped in ignorance in order to purify all the shared seeds. In their engagement with the ignorant ones, Bodhisattvas come to experience joy quite differently. In his commentary on the *CWSL*, Kuiji explicates the five senses of the bodhisattvas' joy:

> Joy entails five types of joy. First, joy-as-cause (*yinle* 因樂, *hetusukha*): those that are affirmative (*shun* 順) to the feeling of joy, namely, the faculty roots, the objects, the related dharmas of joy, and the karma of joy, are named joy-as-cause because they can give rise to joy. Second, joy-as-feeling (*shoule* 受樂, *veditasukha*): this is the feeling of joy that penetrates the pure and impure. The impure joy is tied (*xi* 繫) to that which pleases the body and the mind in all three realms (i.e., the desire, form, and formless realms), which is not limited to joy in the universal (*bianxing* 遍行, *sarvatraga*) mental factor of *vedanā*. The pure joy penetrates the experience of trainees (*youxue* 有學, *śaikṣa*) and non-trainees (*wuxue* 無學, *aśaikṣa*). This is joy by its own nature.[16] Third, joy-as-counter-suffering (*kuduizhile* 苦對治樂, *duḥkhaprātipakṣikasukha*): when joy arises to temporarily alleviate suffering from things like cold, hot, hunger, and thirst etc., it is called joy-as-counter-suffering, not necessarily the joy by its own nature. Fourth, joy-as-the-end-of-feeling (*shouduanle* 受斷樂, *veditopacchedasukha*): in intense meditation on the cessation of feeling and thinking (*mieshouxiangding* 滅受想定, *saṃjñāveditanirodhasamāpatti*), feeling related to the activity of obstruction (*cu* 麁, *dauṣṭhulya*) has ceased, which is called joy. Fifth, joy-as-unblocking (*wunaohaile* 無惱害樂, *avyābādhyasukha*), which further consists of four kinds: joy of renunciation for those who leave home; joy of detachment in the first meditation; joy of calmness, namely, *nirvāṇa*; [and] joy of awakening, namely, *bodhi*.[17] (T no. 1830, vol. 43, 234a22–b4)

As Kuiji specifies, bodhisattvas will enjoy only the feeling of somatic joy, intellectual joy, and equanimity once they "attain the first stage (初地即得)" (T no. 1830, vol. 43, 427a23).[18] This first stage is where bodhisattvas have initially purified their sixth and seventh consciousnesses into non-dual wisdom through considerable meditative practice.[19] Xuanzang presents that such non-dual wisdom encompasses both original wisdom (*genbenzhi* 根本智, *mūlajñāna*) and acquired wisdom (*houdezhi* 後得智, *pṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna*) (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 50b16–17).

[16] According to Kuiji's disciple Zhizhou (智周 668–723), the second type of joy is called such by its nature for two reasons: first, it indicates the specific mode (*ti* 體) of mental activity for joy, and second, it demarcates joy-as-feeling from other types of joy, such as joy-as-cause, in this outline (云是樂自性者, 體是受數, 簡異前後因樂等也) (T no. 1833, vol. 43, 815b3–4). Zhizhou specifies that joy as a mode of mental activity encompasses not only somatic and intellectual joy but also equanimity (T no. 1833, vol. 43, 815a29). Since joy-as-feeling defines joy as it is without situating it in relation to other factors, it is called joy by its nature. In this way, it does not entail the ontological primacy of this type of joy but one of the many aspects of joy. If Zhizhou includes equanimity into joy, it probably implies that the fully awakened one qua the Buddha also enjoys a quiescent type of happiness as the happiness of both *nirvāṇa* and *bodhi*. Besides, Zhizhou also interprets the third type of joy as *yile* 漪樂 (T no. 1833, vol. 43, 815b6). In his interpretation of Zhizhou's characterization, Ruli (如理, dates unknown) details that *yile* captures a type of joy experienced by those in meditation, in parallel to the ripples on the surface of water (X no. 816, vol. 50, 5a5–6). Indeed, as one of the reviewers has noted, the five types of joy for Bodhisattvas come with a meditative feature, which alludes to the Abhidharma influence on Yogācāra thought. Since the relationship between meditative practice and joy is beyond the scope of this article, I will put this discussion aside. Nevertheless, both Zhizhou and his disciple Ruli explored this relationship in their treatises (T1833; X816).

[17] The corresponded passage in the *Yogācārabhūmi* has been translated by Louis de Vallée Poussin (1928, 701–702).

[18] As I have detailed elsewhere (Li 2017; 2022), in the *CWSL*, the bodhisattvas' path unfolds through five periods. Sentient beings start with collecting merit and wisdom in the first accumulation period (*ziliangwei* 資糧位, *saṃbhāravasthā*) (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 48c2–3), which enables them to enact meditative practice in the second preparatory period (*jiaxingwei* 加行位, *prayogāvasthā*), where they eradicate the actualized form of discriminative attachments and conceptual misperceptions (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 49c4–7). Advancing meditation, sentient beings can realize non-dual wisdom in the third penetration period (*tongdawei* 通達位, *prativedhāvasthā*) (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 49c19–22). By then, sentient beings remove most of their discriminative and innate attachments, further becoming ready to refine their wisdom at the cultivation period (*xiuxiwei* 修習位, *bhāvanāvasthā*) (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 51b8), until a universal awakening of all sentient beings is realized at the last, ultimate period (*jiujingwei* 究竟位, *niṣṭhāvasthā*) (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 57a14–19). Since the fourth period is when these advanced sentient beings qua bodhisattvas ameliorate their achievement through helping others who remain in ignorance, these bodhisattvas will go through ten stages (*shidi* 十地, *daśabhūmayaḥ*) (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 51b9–c23). Nevertheless, at the first stage, they have initially acquired the non-dual wisdom of emptiness, which allows them to refine further their achievements and purify the contaminated shared seeds (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 50c14–15).

[19] As I have explained (Li 2017; 2022), although bodhisattvas have initially purified their sixth and seventh consciousnesses upon entering the fourth period of cultivation, the full transformation of all consciousnesses into corresponding wisdoms will appear toward the end of the ultimate period, which suggests how awakening is realized through the collaborative effort of all sentient beings. Due to the limitation of space, I will not unpack how *manas* and *manovijñāna* initially transform into wisdom through meditation at the personal level in the first three periods, which has been detailed by Bryce Huebner and Genevieve Hayman elsewhere (2022).

While the former enables the bodhisattvas to penetrate emptiness in meditation, the latter offers these compassionate ones the set of skills to enter the commonly shared lifeworld of ignorance. That is to say, these bodhisattvas enact intense meditation to extinguish various types of phenomena and attain original wisdom. Afterward, they advance their meditation to achieve acquired wisdom. By then, these phenomena that are once extinguished reappear in Bodhisattvas' experience as seemingly (*si* 似) real images that facilitate the mission of confronting others' ignorance and teaching them to see things as empty of essence (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 50 b21–24). That is why Xuanzang contends that when consciousnesses transform into acquired wisdom, they retain the seeing part and image part, although these two parts are not reduced to mutually exclusive entities but are experienced as mutually interdependent and seemingly real phenomena (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 50b28). The salient feature of these seemingly real phenomena in bodhisattvas' lifeworld can be compared to that of magic (*huan* 幻) (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 46b28–29). Extending the magic analogy to interpersonal experience,[20] Kuiji underscores that a successful magic show derives from a collaborative effort of the magician, the trick, and the audience (T no. 1782, vol. 38, 1081c17). For the bodhisattvas who take on the persona of a magician, they never mistake their persona, their performance of a trick, or their target audience for fixed essences in order to satisfy an instrumental purpose of entertainment. Nor do they dismiss the magic show as a void. Taking a middle path between essentialism and annihilationism, the bodhisattvas perceive their magician persona, the trick, and their audience to be interdependently and mutually constituted. As such, the magic show appears to be a situationally, seemingly real skillful means that is utilized by bodhisattvas to teach. Indeed, they teach like talented magicians and use various techniques to challenge the habitualized expectation and internalized ignorance of the audience. By force of this critique, the Bodhisattvas open a new window in the audience's commonly shared lifeworld of ignorance to shed light on the possibility of correcting the naturalized perspective (qua ignorance) and transforming the dualistic mindset. Their audience will aspire to embark on the bodhisattvas' path themselves to join the force of ending suffering. In this manner, these two types of non-dual wisdom constitute the bodhisattvas' lifeworld, further allowing them to work with their target audience to constitute a larger shared lifeworld of teaching.

And joy continues to cohere this lifeworld of bodhisattvas. The five types of joy, as unpacked in the quote, provide us with a map to understand bodhisattvas' joy contextualized in the lifeworld of wisdom and the larger common lifeworld of teaching.[21] This map points us to what joy is (joy-as-feeling), how it arises (joy-as-cause), what it accomplishes (joy-as-counter-suffering), and how it is cultivated as a contemplative performance of both a meditative practice (joy-as-the-end-of-feeling) and an altruistic lifestyle (joy-as-unblocking). By its own nature, joy remains a welcoming attitude qua an affirmative embracing of a phenomenon into experience. Nevertheless, for bodhisattvas, joy is neither inwardly looking at an unchanging ego nor directed toward an immutable entity with an expectation to fulfill desire and craving. Since phenomena always appear to be interdependent in the mindset of non-dual wisdom, there is nothing to which to be attached. Even when an unpleasant, unfavorable object is encountered, it will appear as only a seemingly real phenomenon to be affirmatively embraced into experience

[20] Scholars have detailed how magic is used to unpack the theory of three natures (Garfield 2014; Brennan 2018; Huebner et al. 2022). Due to the limitation of space, I will not delve deeper into the theory of three natures. Instead, I hope to underscore the critical function of magic at the interpersonal level to expand their findings. My analysis here also complements Roy Tzohar's interpretation of magic and the bodhisattvas' acquired wisdom in Indian Yogācāra (Tzohar 2018).

[21] As I have detailed elsewhere (Li, forthcoming), it thus means that at the personal level, sentient beings dwell either in a lifeworld of ignorance or that of wisdom. At the interpersonal level, they can dwell in three types of larger common lifeworlds: that of ignorance, where all community members are ignorant; that of teaching others as the community of bodhisattvas and the ignorant ones; and a shared lifeworld of universal awakening, where every community member transforms their consciousness into wisdom and becomes awake.

by the bodhisattvas. That is why bodhisattvas' joy acts to counter suffering at both the personal level and the interpersonal level. With its function as counter-suffering, joy becomes the bodhisattvas' resilience in the process of teaching others and criticizing others' ignorance. Such resilience can be further refined first and foremost as a meditative practice when these wise ones have not yet encountered anyone to teach. Bodhisattvas engage in intense meditation in which the five senses and the sixth consciousness, together with their mental factors, such as feeling, will temporarily terminate their activities. Such intense meditation is considered joyful because it perfects the first type of bodhisattvas' non-dual wisdom, namely, the original wisdom of penetrating emptiness. When the time arrives for bodhisattvas to guide others back to the correct path, they revert to the lifeworld of ignorance with the second type of non-dual wisdom qua the acquired wisdom of seeing things as only seemingly real, further cultivating joy as an altruistic lifestyle. Such cultivation starts with complying with various types of monastic disciplines (*jie* 戒, *śila*) exemplified by the renunciation of regular family life. Then, they maintain the attitude of meditation (*ding* 定, *samādhi*) to refine joy as a lifestyle. At this point, every action in their daily life becomes their meditation. After gradually purifying shared seeds through collaborating with others, the bodhisattvas manage to remove—both habitually and conceptually, both actualized in experience or unactualized as seeds—self-attachments to attain great *nirvāṇa* and dharma-attachments to achieve great *bodhi*, which yields a lived knowledge (*hui* 慧, *prajña*) of a joyful life. The bodhisattvas' joy will evolve into happiness (*anle* 安樂) when the entirety of sentient beings realize universal awakening and become liberated from suffering. Xuanzang speaks of this larger shared lifeworld of universal awakening as "the pure dharma realm (清淨法界)," which is made coherent by the shared happiness of all sentient beings (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 57c11).

THE JOYFUL DEVĪ AS THE BUDDHIST FEMINIST IDEAL

To illustrate the bodhisattvas' joy as envisioned by Yogācāra Buddhists, I shift our focus to the joyful Devī in Xuanzang's translation of the *Vimalakīrti Sūtra*. This Buddhist text is named after its protagonist, Vimalakīrti, a layperson who realizes non-dual wisdom and problematizes the presumed distinction between monasticism and laity. In the seventh chapter of this text, Vimalakīrti gives the stage to a Devī who joyfully appears to engage Śāriputra in a conversation.[22] Although the Devī's appearance is depicted as joyful, the conversation proves to be quite unsettling for Śāriputra. Now, what is the conversation about?[23]

The Devī appears upon hearing Vimalakīrti's discussion on how bodhisattvas should act as magicians to perceive sentient beings as only seemingly real when guiding them back to the path of awakening. Joyfully, the Devī approaches Śāriputra. To draw his attention, the Devī starts scattering flower petals that do not stick to other bodhisattvas' clothing but could not be removed by Śāriputra. While Śāriputra is puzzled by these unmovable flowers, the Devī seizes the chance to ask Śāriputra why he is so persistent in removing them. Śāriputra lays down a standard answer that flowers are against monastic disciplines. To expose Śāriputra's tendency to misperceive things—flowers and monastic disciplines, for instance—as fixed entities, the Devī urges Śāriputra to deliberate on the ultimate nature of reality. For Śāriputra, various types

[22] The *Vimalakīrti Sūtra* is known for promoting the concept of non-duality. For scholars of Buddhist feminism, the Devī is admired as an advocate for gender equality against sex discrimination (Schuster 1981; Paul 1985; Balkwill 2021; Wright 2021). Here, I shift the focus from her magical performance to her feeling of joy to expound on how she is a feminist ideal in the Yogācāra sense.

[23] I paraphrase the story of the Devī based on Xuanzang's translation of the seventh chapter of *Vimalakīrti Sūtra* (T476). The Sanskrit version is also available at the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Database at Bibliotheca Polyglotta at the University of Oslo. 2006–2007. https://www2.hf.uio.no/polyglotta/index.php?page=volume&vid=37. The most recent translation of the Sanskrit version just has been accomplished by Gómez and Harrison (2022).

of phenomena in experience have an inherent essence, but the Devī disagrees and prompts Śāriputra to reflect. Eventually, Śāriputra launches his final move and questions why the Devī remains in a female form, because he deems the female form to be as essentially impure as the trigger of desire.[24] At the climax of the story, the Devī turns Śāriputra into herself and changes her appearance into that of Śāriputra. She relays the same question to Śāriputra: why does the female form remain? This is when Śāriputra cannot offer an answer, and Vimalakīrti comes back to the stage to reveal the identity of the Devī as a bodhisattva who has been quite advanced in practice.

In this story, Śāriputra becomes a trope for those who have not yet removed their dharma-attachment but continue to reduce various types of phenomena, such as monastic rules, gender identities, material bodily forms, etc., into fixed essences. This is why this fictional figure epitomizes those who dwell in the lifeworld of ignorance. For sentient beings in this lifeworld, the Devī's appearance is unsettling and unpleasant, because the Devī keeps breaking socially accepted norms on how to behave appropriately in a dharma talk and how to please the monastic majority. Nevertheless, the Devī, at least in the narrative offered in Xuanzang's translation of the *Vimalakīrti Sūtra*, is not discouraged by others' judgment. The salient feature of her appearance is joy, which is specified as "happy, joyful, jumping, and leaping (歡喜踴躍)," a phrase Xuanzang uses to translate the Sanskrit compound of *tuṣṭodagrāttamanā* (T no. 476, vol. 14, 573b23). Although this compound does not directly incorporate the term *sukha*, its meaning as making the mind (*manas*) extremely (*udagra*) pleased (*tuṣṭa*) and captivated (*āpta*) conforms to Kuiji's definition of bodhisattvas' joy as the affirmative embracing of that which pleases the body and the mind.[25]

As an advanced bodhisattva, the Devī enacts her acquired wisdom of seeing things as only seemingly real and puts on the persona of a magician to teach Śāriputra. Instead of understanding her techniques as hagiographical or even mystical, I recommend that we perceive them as critical; that is, her engagement with Śāriputra is a skillful critique of ignorance, because she forces Śāriputra to reflect on his unquestioned presumptions that stem from a dualistic mindset to underpin a lifeworld of ignorance. Indeed, the Devī presents various phenomena as neither inherently real nor void. She affirms the seemingly real existence of the flower petals, monastic rules, and her own material form not to consolidate misperception. Like a talented magician, she breaks the widely held expectation of her audience to problematize the tendency of reducing interdependently arising phenomena into statically fixed essences that facilitate attachments. Especially when she encounters sentient beings who do not share her perspective and do not dwell in her lifeworld, she affirmatively welcomes these encounters as a golden opportunity to teach, which enables her to counter suffering. In the process of teaching, she continues to

[24] The idea that the bodily form of a woman is impure, as preserved in several Buddhist texts, has been extensively discussed and critically examined by Buddhist scholars. For this discussion, see Paul 1985; Sponberg 1992; Faure 1999; Ohnuma 2001; Li 2021.

[25] The compound *tuṣṭodagrāttamanā* centers on the joyful state of the mind, and I am grateful to Caley Smith for a helpful discussion on this compound in the Sanskrit context. Contrariwise, in the Chinese context, when Xuanzang translates this compound as "happy, joyful, jumping, and leaping," he seems to present the Devī's joy not merely as an inner, affective mental state at the personal level. Hence, I proffer to connect *manas* in this compound more specifically with the seventh consciousness. According to the CWSL, for high-level bodhisattvas like the Devī, their *manas* eschews misperceptions and evolves into the wisdom of equality (平等性智 *samatājñāna*) for benefiting others through bodily performances (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 56a16–20). In particular, this wisdom has the purified *manovijñāna*, also evolved into the wisdom of wondrous observation (妙觀察智 *pratyavekṣaṇājñāna*), as its "leading support (開導依)" (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 21b2–3) and in turn becomes the "unshared support (不共所依)" for this undefiled sixth consciousness (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 56a19). That is to say, the bodhisattvas' mindset is both compassionate and observant, always proactively observing the situation and ready to help others compassionately (further suggesting the functionality of these purified consciousnesses as the acquired wisdom qua *pṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna*). In this process, their joy comes to arise from the uncontaminated *manovijñāna* and continues to cohere the interplay between the wisdom of equality and the wisdom of wonderous observation in the compassionate and observant mindset of bodhisattvas. It can thus explain why the Devī's extremely captivated and pleased mind features her joy, which is bodily performative and mentally transformative at the interpersonal level.

cultivate the bodhisattvas' joy as a refinement of her contemplative performance, especially her altruistic lifestyle. As such, she shows Śāriputra another way of living and perceiving, thus opening a new window in Śāriputra's lifeworld of ignorance to shed light on the possibility of correcting biases and stereotypes. Hence, instead of reproducing the type of joy contextualized in Śāriputra's lifeworld, the Devī displays another type of joy as intersubjectively oriented, mutually transformative, practically resilient, and interdependently emancipatory, which coheres a lifeworld of wisdom and compassion. In his silence, Śāriputra has probably comprehended that the female form remains only in his lifeworld of ignorance because he is accustomed to reducing people to unchanging entities, a comprehension that can make Śāriputra reflect on his internalized ignorance and thus aspire to rehabitualize himself. As such, sentient beings initiate self-critique to break the shared lifeworld of ignorance and enter the shared world of teaching, with the help of bodhisattvas. Together with bodhisattvas, they collaborate to realize a shared lifeworld of universal awakening where joy evolves into true happiness. Such a shared lifeworld of universal awakening is cohered by true happiness as the ultimate liberation from suffering.

CONCLUSION

In our discussion, we have unpacked the contextualist approach to joy in East Asian Yogācāra literature penned by Xuanzang and Kuiji. If joy is always contextualized in the lifeworld of a sentient being and then in the commonly shared lifeworld of a group of sentient beings, can we change the promise of joy through recontextualization? In the Yogācāra framework, we can indeed envision this possibility once sentient beings rehabitualize themselves to transform their personal and shared lifeworld through a collaborative effort. The Yogācāra proposal may enrich the current discussion on the promise of happiness in feminist theories.

As detailed by Ahmed, once we internalize the utilitarian sense of happiness as the perfect end of life, we also turn happiness into a discourse that marginalizes and excludes the unhappy others in our society (Ahmed 2010, 48). Indeed, the discourse of happiness can yield oppression since we tend to blame unhappy others, feminist killjoys, for instance, for not trying hard enough to make their life flourish (Ahmed 2010, 65). However, the story of a happy Devī evinces that we can work together to recontextualize joy for inclusion and emancipation when we approach joy as a contextualized feeling without any inherent quality. This joyful Devī serves as an inspiration for navigating a feminist life by embodying a killjoy as a skillful means to concurrently criticize ignorance and embrace joy as a resilient attitude to transform ignorance. She also reminds us to constantly reflect on our unquestioned presumptions to facilitate the combat against exclusion and oppression. This is where the bodhisattvas' path and the feminist path can converge: through constant critiques of reducing interdependently constituted things to static essences, sentient beings like us collaborate with one another to transform lifeworld(s), recontextualize joy, and evolve joy into happiness for ending suffering. On this front, the Devī is an exemplar of both the Bodhisattva ideal and the feminist ideal.

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