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Understanding coercive nuclear reversal dynamics: a comparative case study of US coercive diplomacy against the nuclear programs of Iran, Libya, and South Africa

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UNDERSTANDING COERCIVE NUCLEAR REVERSAL DYNAMICS. A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF US COERCIVE DIPLOMACY AGAINST THE NUCLEAR PROGRAMS OF IRAN, LIBYA, AND SOUTH AFRICA.

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PhD THESIS

TOPIC:

**UNDERSTANDING COERCIVE NUCLEAR REVERSAL
DYNAMICS. A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF US
COERCIVE DIPLOMACY AGAINST THE NUCLEAR
PROGRAMS OF IRAN, LIBYA, AND SOUTH AFRICA.**

Candidate: Jean Yves Ndzana Ndzana

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AEB	Atomic Energy Board
AECA	Arms Export Control Act
AEOI	Atomic Energy Organization of Iran
ANC	African National Congress
ANO	Abu Nidal Organization
BPD	Barrels per Day
CAAA	Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy.
CISADA	Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act
DIO	Defense Industries Organization
EGOMA	Experts Group of Multilateral Approaches
EO	Executive Order
EU	European Union
FEP	Fuel Enrichment Plant
FNLA	National Front for the Liberation of Angola.
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
FRELIMO	Liberation Front of Mozambique
GDP	Growth Domestic Product
IEEPA	International Emergency Economic Powers Act
ILSA	Iran Libya Sanction Act
IR	International Relations
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IRGC	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

KEC	Kalaye Electric Company
LEU	Low Enriched Uranium
MCSUASCA	Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation
MEC	Mesbah Energy Company:
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MIT	Massachusset Institute of Technology
MODAFL	Ministry of Defense and Arms Forces Logistics
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MWe	Mega Watt Electrical
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCRI	National Council of Resistance of Iran
NFC	Nuclear Fuel Cycle
NIC	National Identity Conception
NIE	National Intelligence Estimate
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSCWMD	National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction
NSS	National Security Strategy
NWS	Nuclear Weaponized States
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PAC	Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania
PFLP	Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PM	Prime Minister
PNE	Peaceful Nuclear Explosive
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
PT	Process tracing
RCC	Revolutionary Command Council
S.A.	South Africa
SAA	South African Act
SADF	South African Defense Force
SBIG	Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group
SHIG	Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group
SMP	Single-Member Plurality
SNSC	Supreme National Security Council
SSC	State Security Council
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organization
SWIFT	Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
TNRC	Tajoura Nuclear Research Center
TRR	Tehran Research Reactor

TUT	Third Universal Theory
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VOC	Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization
WWII	World War II

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