An architecture for peace: deciphering the UN's multidimensional approach to the Israel - Arab Conflict (1967 - 1982)

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Chapter 3

Inter-Operation Collaboration

Introduction

After the Yom Kippur War, the Israel-Arab conflict had three peacekeeping operations on the ground. The Security Council deployed UNEF II and UNDOF to oversee the cease-fires in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. While the Council maintained the traditional legal setup of giving each operation its own structure, AO, this chapter highlights that the Council both explicitly and implicitly authorized the Secretary-General to maximize the efficiency of the architecture by way of pulling and sharing personnel and resources. In 1978, the Secretary-General once again, leveraged the existing resources and expertise of the entire architecture to deploy UNIFIL. The degree to which the operation collaborated on military and operational affairs certainly proves the claim that it did not have standalone efforts but rather was part of one interdependent and complex architecture.

A priori, it is almost self-evident that the four operations worked together during the 1970s. After all, The Security Council deployed UNDOF and UNEF II as tools to verify two ceasefire agreements from the same war in their respective areas of operation. In addition, UNTSO's political reach deals with the regional dynamics of the conflict and its observers worked in the areas of operation taken by the four operations. Even though UNIFIL came four years after UNDOF and UNEF II, the deployment of this new operation did not signal that a new conflict had started. UNIFIL was an acknowledgement and a response to the fact that the conflict had evolved from being predominantly state-centric Israel-Arab to an Israel-Palestine strife where different non-state actors, chief among them the PLO, played a role.

What happened on the shores of the Litani River, the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula had a profound impact everywhere else in the region. If we see the Israel-Arab conflict as one overarching strife, did the UN see its four operations as part of one significant effort to tackle the issue? Did the operations collaborate to achieve their mandates? Was this a field-driven imitative, or did it come from New York if they did collaborate? These are the driving questions for this chapter.

This dissertation hypothesizes that IOC is a critical component of developing and implementing a regional strategy. IOC revolves around coordinating activities and pooling and sharing resources and information (Luiijf & Healey, 2012). In addition, this chapter evaluates the hypothesis that, given the regional dynamics of the Yom Kippur War and its aftermath, the operations' success depended on them engaging in collaboration.

This chapter's guiding research question is: To what extent did UNTSO, UNEF, UNDOF and UNIFIL collaborate on tactical and operational matters between 1973 and 1982?

This analysis will employ Complexity Theory to evaluate the architecture of the United Nations' peacekeeping operations in the Middle East. Complexity Theory, with its focus on the interconnectedness, adaptability, and emergent behaviours within systems, offers a robust theoretical framework for understanding the intricate dynamics of inter-operation collaboration (IOC) among UNTSO, UNEF II, UNDOF, and UNIFIL..

The application of Complexity Theory to this evaluation will facilitate a deeper understanding of how the collective efforts of these operations contributed to the overarching goal of peacekeeping in the region. It will explore the mechanisms of coordination, resource sharing, and information pooling that underpinned the operations' collaborative endeavours. Furthermore, this theoretical lens will allow for an exploration of the emergent properties of the UN's peacekeeping architecture, revealing how the collaborative dynamics between the operations enhanced their collective efficacy in responding to the conflict.

In essence, this chapter aims to bridge the gap in the literature by providing a holistic analysis of the UN's peacekeeping operations in the Middle East as part of a single, complex system. Through the lens of Complexity Theory, it will offer both a policy and theoretical contribution, shedding light on the significance of inter-operation collaboration in the development and implementation of a regional strategy for peacekeeping. This comprehensive evaluation will contribute to a richer understanding of the UN's efforts to navigate and mitigate the diplomatic and security challenges presented by the Israel-Arab conflict during a critical period in its history.

Inter-Operation Collaboration: Necessity is the Mother of Innovation

Collaboration existed and continues to exist among peacekeeping operations. However, there is neither agreed-upon definition of IOC nor a framework or policy directive outlining best practices. Therefore, IOC is an ad-hoc tool meant to *respond* to developments on the ground, such as the regionalisation of armed conflict. This chapter critically reviews the experience in the Middle East and share the lessons the UN System ought to learn from them.

There are two contributions to inter-operational collaboration, which have informed this chapter. However, while their conclusions are valuable and will be a part of this chapter's theoretical framework, it is essential to insert a caveat. Both papers focus on post-Cold War peacekeeping operations in Africa. At this time, the Security Council started to conceptualise peacekeeping as a tool for conflict management, which includes civil and political affairs alongside military considerations (Doyle & Higgins, 1995). On the other hand, the Council designed Peacekeeping in the Middle East[36] mainly as a tool to maintain cease-fires between Israel and her neighbours. It is essential to highlight the contributions to the concept of inter-operation collaboration.

Angelo[37] (2011) provides an insightful study on the subject. Peacekeeping operations, the author claims, ought to collaborate for two main reasons. First, the Member States continuously ask the UN to be cost-effective and efficient. Even though peacekeeping is a relatively cheap way to conduct military interventions in post-conflict countries, the leading financial contributors always require the Secretariat to find ways to maximise value for money (Day, 2020; Peterson, 2017). Second, and most important for this research, Angelo points out that "the changing nature of violent conflict throughout the world is increasingly characterised by cross-border conflict systems, where national boundaries are of diminishing importance, and regional dimensions acquire greater relevance" (p.7). His research dealt with post-Cold War peacekeeping in Africa; however, this same sentence

[36] As we see throughout this entire dissertation, UNIFIL is an exception. While the Council gave the operation a first generation mandate in 1978, UNIFIL deployed to deal with an asymmetrical conflict between Member States and non-state actors (Boerma, 1979). Moreover, in 2006 the Security Council adopted resolution 1701, which gave the operation a broader mandate (Novosseloff, 2015).

[37] Victor Angelo was the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad between 2008 and 2010.

applies to the Israel-Arab conflict almost word for word. From the Israeli War of Independence in 1948 to the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Israel-Arab conflict always had a regional component, which warranted the peacekeeping architecture to have them.

Angelo provides a framework of six areas where operations in the same region should collaborate. Most of his recommendations for this study are anachronistic because, between 1973 and 1982, the UN did not have the bureaucratic size it does today. However, his paper gave a much-needed frame of reference to evaluate the extent to which peacekeeping in the Middle East collaborated and how much they relied on each other to succeed.

Aubyn (2015) focuses on IOC in West Africa in the early 2000s. His contribution revolves around the necessary exogenous elements needed for successful cooperation. He highlights that collaboration must revolve around specific initiatives, such as military support, to secure elections from one operation to another. In addition, for peacekeepers to move away from their AO, it is fundamental to have a robust Security Council blessing, typically in the form of a resolution. These contributions deserve mentioning because of their original approach; evaluating inter-operation collaboration is a creative way to look at the efficiency of peacekeeping in an entire region. Moreover, they agree that more collaboration is a way to tackle financial constraints from New York and the regionalisation of conflict from the field.

Both authors highlight that in West Africa, the Secretary-General created the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), which served as an umbrella for the peace operations deployed in Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Ivory Coast. Through UNOWA, the operations coordinated their activities, shared information and conducted joint activities both on civilian and military issues. They both highlight this office as one of the genesis for Inter-Operation Collaboration; however, they do not mention the Office of the Chief Coordinator for UN Peacekeeping in the Middle East and his role more than three decades before. In other words, they do discuss the notion of collaboration across peacekeeping operations. However, they must see that this process started in the Middle East.

The Six-Day War: Filling in the Vacuum

By 1967, the situation in the Middle East had begun to heat up. The Government of the United Arab Republic started to prepare for war. Cairo knew it had to eliminate the peacekeepers to advance its plans. After a tumultuous political back-and-forth between Cairo and UNHQ (see Chapter 4), UNEF started to pull back, and the Egyptian Army began to occupy the operation's observation points. In a matter of days after, the Six-Day War began. UNTSO stayed behind; however, it did not have the material capacity or political mandate to stop the outbreak of war by themselves.

The Six-Day War was, simply put, stunning. It changed the region forever. Summarising the War goes far beyond the scope of this dissertation. The analysis focuses on the impact the war had on UNTSO. The operation was entirely in the middle of things; its headquarters was – and continues to be – right in one of the most contentious areas: Jerusalem. During the war, UNTSO observers, putting themselves at significant risk, continued providing information to New York, which proved crucial for its decision-making process. Indeed Security Council resolution 236 (1967) called for "full cooperation with the Chief of Staff […] including freedom of movement and adequate communications facilities". The parties did not adhere to this call, and the operation suffered.

For UNEF and UNTSO, the situation was extremely complicated; they faced continuous pressure and harassment by both sides, which prevented them from doing their job. Both Force Commanders had to use non-official channels to communicate with New York. UNTSO assisted in creating the conditions for the ceasefire to last. It created and operated 36 additional observation points on the Suez Canal, the Golan Heights and Lebanon. Its observers quickly deployed to all areas that needed them. Overall, they performed well (Theobald, 2015), and UNTSO had the daunting challenge of covering its original area of operation and filling UNEF's vacuum as much as possible. Overall, "UNTSO was able to reposition itself – as well as figuratively – to respond to the new environment after 1967" (Londey, Crawley, & Horner, 2020, p. 251).

The war froze UNTSO's work because it rendered one of its core activities irrelevant: the Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs). After the 1948 War, the parties signed armistice

agreements with Israel. Therefore, Israel maintained a commission with each belligerent bilaterally: Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt (Mcdermott, 1996). UNTSO's Chief of Staff attended these meetings as a neutral observer and chairperson. UNTSO played a significant role in observing the cease-fire and processing complaints from both sides. In addition, the operation reports to the Secretary-General on the progress of all MACs (Higgins, 1970). After the Six-Day War, however, Israel did not recognise and stopped participating in all MACs, which begged the question: should UNTSO continue to be on the ground? The answer to that question came in the affirmative from all parties involved; there was never serious consideration of ending the operation.

Despite these challenges, the operations provided up-to-date information to the Council ahead of its sessions. This shows the importance of having a reliable partner on the ground, not only because of the information but also because the hostility shown by the parties to the observers served as a political barometer to measure the degree to which there was tension. Of course, this also showed that the UN had a deficit of trust in the region. In August 1970, the Secretary-General, with the blessing of the Security Council, appointed then Maj. General Ensio Siilasvuo as the operation's Chief of Staff, who would remain in place until 1973, when he moved to the UNEF.

Of course, UNTSO had to deal with many obstacles, making it less effective than it would have liked to be. Israel's position vis-à-vis the operation was not entirely favourable because it simply did not trust it. For six years, UNTSO stood alone in one of the most tumultuous regions in the world, and it proved that it could manage as long as the status quo remained, which it did until October 1973.

The Yom Kippur War

On 6 October 1973, as Israelis prepared to observe Yom Kippur, the region again went to war. The Yom Kippur War shook the area and threatened to destabilise the international system. The war began in the early morning of Yom Kippur, one of the holiest days in the Jewish calendar, during which a large portion of the population fasted. The Syrian Army invaded the Golan Heights, and its Egyptian counterparts crossed the Suez Canal. During the first 10 days of the war, Egypt and Syria won many battles, bringing the IDF to the brink of

defeat. The IDF managed to reclaim the high ground at a high cost and through the help of the U.S. By 20 October, the IDF took the Suez Canal and Mt. Hermon and positioned forces less than 50 kilometres from Damascus (Rabinovich, 2004).

The Americans wanted to ensure Israel's military victory whilst avoiding another humiliating defeat for Egypt and Syria; therefore, they delayed their weapons shipment and encouraged them to agree to a cease-fire. The Soviet Union provided significant military assistance to Cairo and Damascus and threatened to intervene directly when the tide started to turn against them. The United States put its armed forces on high alert to join the fight. Luckily, cooler heads prevailed, and instead, the two superpowers and their clients agreed on a ceasefire, which took place on 24 October (Bickerton & Klausner, 2017). The UN celebrated its 28th anniversary, trying to avert a nuclear confrontation between the superpowers and thinking, yet again, of concrete ways to contain further war in the Middle East.

The Security Council behaved differently after the Six-Day and the Yom Kippur wars. The Council did not alter the peacekeeping architecture by strengthening UNTSO's numbers in the former. In the latter's case, international buffers' political discussions and plans began before the war ended.

The Six-Day War was a clear and stunning victory for Israel. Egypt, for example, "lost all but 15 per cent of its military hardware worth $2 billion" (Oren, 2002, p. 306). While the Soviet Union swiftly provided its clients with aircraft and other equipment, it took them over half a decade to have the necessary strength to re-challenge Israel. There was no need for an immediate buffer between the countries in the short or medium terms. The Security Council and the Secretariat believed that Security Council Resolution and the Jarring Mission would find a way to solve the conflict politically. Therefore, there was no need to do anything else militarily. As we see in Chapter 4, they were sorely mistaken.

The Yom Kippur War, however, was a completely different encounter. Israel did not lose but did not win the type of victory it did in 1967 (Rabinovich, 2004). The war did not produce a knockout, which ensured quiet in the field; the parties were still standing, and there was a real fear that they would continue fighting without an international response. There was a

clear-cut need for a mechanism with political and military components that ensured the cease-fire holds. The Security Council, the Secretariat and the U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, understood this and designed this mechanism. In the field, this eventually led to UNEF and UNDOF; at the political level, this led to the Geneva Peace Conference process (see Chapter 4).

Right after the war, the Security Council, at the behest of the Secretary-General and with concurrent support of the Soviet Union and the U.S., agreed to deploy UNEF II to, once again, monitor the ceasefire in the Sinai Peninsula and later monitor the IDF's withdrawal. Similarly to 1956, the Security Council needed troops on the ground in days, and the Secretariat needed to deliver. Once again, a team led by Urquhart in New York set up the groundwork, and in the field, Siilasvuo became equal parts Force Commander and Diplomat.

The Israel-Syria disengagement negotiations were far more difficult for political reasons. This delayed UNDOF's deployment for a few months. Until then, UNTSO continued to work in the Golan Heights (Rudloff & Diehl, 2015).

Creative & quick (re) deployments

The Security Council, breaking with its usual gridlock pattern, negotiated and agreed quickly on deploying UNEF II. The Council adopted resolution 340 (1973) and requested the Secretary-General to inform the Council of the progress in 24 hours. The report of the Secretary-General (1973) outlined the operation's terms of reference, which mentioned, "In the fulfilment of its tasks, the Force will have the cooperation of the military observers of UNTS0" (p.1). Furthermore, in a letter sent to the Security Council (1973), the Secretary-General requested that UNTSO's Chief of Staff, General Siilasvuo, serve as interim Force Commander.

The Council agreed and, at the same time, it concurrently appointed the General to serve as the chair, host and representative of the Secretary-General at the upcoming Israel-Egypt military discussions at the Km 101 negotiations. This meant the Secretary-General had to split his time and attention between handing over his duties at UNTSO, preparing and leading the discussions between the parties, and setting up a new operation.

Once again, similar to 1956, the Secretariat needed to fill in the gap within hours. There was no time to wait for the operation to arrive. UNTSO's resources and troops made it possible for UNEF II to get "the first units of the force into the field within 24 hours of Security Council decision" (Urquhart, 1980, p. 91). This was a fundamental stepping-stone toward ensuring the ceasefire held. At the same time, it gave the UN sufficient credibility to chair the disengagement negotiations; Siilasvuo needed to project to both parties that UNEF II was operational from the moment the Security Council permitted it to proceed.

In the field, the situation was not easy. The Secretariat, knowing that UNTSO would be fundamental in implementing UNEF II and that Siilasvuo himself was at the centre of this, decided to keep UNTSO out of the loop.

> It sounds strange in retrospect that no information was leaked to the field [...] the decision on the setting up of UNEF took us in UNTSO completely by surprise [...] the appointment of UNEF Force Commander meant once again a complete change in my plans for the future (Siilasvuo, 1992, p. 150).

The Secretariat probably wanted to avoid any risk of leaks to the media while it negotiated with the parties and the TCCs. However, this also stresses that, at that time, the field had no input in the Secretariat's decision-making process. The General learned about his appointment on 25 October, and the Secretary-General requested it to the Security Council. Siilasvuo understood the political pressure but challenged that the Secretariat did not use the 1956 experience to build a roadmap for subsequent rapid deployment.

Once the Secretariat included UNTSO, they got to work. The Secretariat consulted the General on UNEF's organisational structure and location of the headquarters. In addition, he directed a few critical senior staffers to move to Ismailia with him. However, UNTSO assisted UNEF; IOC could not solve the structural challenges peacekeeping had in New York. Siilasvuo lamented that the Secretariat had to, once again, improvise and make up things as they went along. "One of the great shortcomings was the lack of preparations by the UN for launching a new peacekeeping mission and for giving administrative support" (Siilasvuo, 1981, p. 4). The Secretariat had not fully negotiated with the host country basic logistical arrangements; Headquarters did not fully brief the TCCs, which led to their contingents arriving without

being fully aware of the challenges. This is an instance where the small size of the Office for Special Political Affairs started to have a negative effect. As difficult as it was, the Israel-Arab conflict was not the only one they had to address; perhaps they did not have the time to conduct in-depth scenario planning.

All the challenges notwithstanding, UNEF II received its first supply of shipments from UNTSO, a practice that would continue over the next few years (Rudloff & Diehl, 2015). Moreover, UNTSO staffed the observation posts in the Sinai Peninsula. While these decisions proved fundamental to UNEF's early successes, UNTSO alone did not have enough assets to hold the line in the Sinai and, at the same time, continue to perform its tasks. They did not have enough observers; supporting UNEF stretched them to capacity.

Therefore, the Secretary-General needed to perform another creative IOC act: redeployment. Around 500 kilometres away from the Sinai Peninsula, the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) worked to keep the peace in the bitterly divided island of Cyprus for nine years. The Secretary-General requested that Finnish, Austrian and Swedish contingents serving in Cyprus temporarily and immediately transfer to UNEF II. It is important to stress how groundbreaking this decision was. Former UNFICYP Chief of Staff, who wrote a paper on UNEF II and highlighted the importance of its former operation's contribution, reflects:

> There were no contingency plans for transferring contingents from one force to create another […] UNFICYP, therefore, had to proceed from a clean sheet. It follows also that the contingents involved were not experienced in crash moves of this kind. Move from one operational theatre and role to another always pose problems, increased in ad-hoc conditions (Harbottle, 1974, p. 20).

Without a doubt, this decision proved to be very successful; however, it is essential to understand why. First, Cyprus is very close to UNEF's theatre of operations; second, the Soviet Union, the U.S. and the United Kingdom airlifted peacekeepers to Egypt immediately. Second, UNPICYP's Force Commander reacted quickly, redeployed units and ensured continuity of operations. Third, the United Kingdom allowed the UN to use its airbase in Southern Cyprus (Harbottle, 1974). The Secretary-General's quick reaction, combined with

the willingness of the permanent members of the Security Council and UNPICYP, allowed all of this to happen. In other words, the stars aligned.

Siilasvuo requested more troops. In a letter written by USG Brian Urquhart (UNA, 1973) to UNTSO's acting Chief of Staff, Col. R.W. Bunworth, he explains that Headquarters obtained Siilasvuo's request for 43 additional observers, some of which went to UNEF II to manage to help the operation setup. Interestingly, the abovementioned letter highlighted a political problem with this deployment. The U.S. and the Soviet Union offered/requested to provide 36 observers each to UNTSO. While the Secretary-General agreed to the proposal, the situation became very complicated. The letter explains that the Soviet officers did not speak good English, creating internal trouble within the mission. Because the 72 officers reported to UNTSO headquarters quite rapidly, the Secretariat asked the European states to hold off on sending the officers to Jerusalem. Another critical challenge the Secretariat faced was pressure to widen the geographical representation among the observers. This proved very difficult given that Israel would not grant freedom of movement to soldiers of countries, which did not recognise the state. The politics of deployment (covered in Chapter 4) remained a challenge for the operations throughout their lifetime.

After a few months, UNTSO and UNEF II started to look north where its next challenge awaited them: UNDOF.

UNDOF's deployment provides a fascinating example of field-driven IOC. UNDOF's setup was much more complicated for several reasons. There was no political will to have dialogue beyond setting a ceasefire; Syria bitterly resented Israel's 1967 conquests. Israel clearly stated that it would never willingly return the Golan Heights. While Israel and Syria signed a disengagement agreement, the root causes of their conflict were not resolved, making the situation complicated and potentially volatile (Sharon, Morrison, & Weiner, 2010).

UNTSO and, more importantly, UNEF II had time to think about the Israel-Syria disengagement from a military perspective between February and May. Siilasvuo created a UNEF military and civilian staffers committee that drew a hypothetical peacekeeping operation to work in the Golan Heights. The group made a few key recommendations to the Secretariat, which became the bedrock of the new operation (Siilasvuo, 1992)

First, following the pattern of redeployment, they knew that the first contingents had to come from TCCs with assets already on the ground. They recommended Austria, Peru and Nepal due to their experience with similar geographic characteristics as the Golan Heights. Second, the committee recommended that Canada and Poland cover the operations logistical needs, given that they were doing the same for UNEF II – these two countries represented NATO and the Warsaw Pact, respectively. Siilasvuo rightly planned for a smaller operation in the Golan, which would have fewer logistical needs. Instead of bringing in a new contingent, Canada and Poland[38] needed to move some of their troops to the Golan Heights (Olejarz, 2015). Third, Siilasvuo identified Brig. Gen Briceño of Peru – already on the ground as Commander of Peru's Battalion – as the potential Force Commander (James, 1987). This appointment broke away from the tradition of moving UNTSO's Chief of Staff to a new operation; Maj Gend Bengt Liljestrand of Sweden had been on the job only since March 1974, so moving him in June did not make sense.

On 31 May 1974, the same day Israel and Syria signed the disengagement agreement, the Security Council adopted resolution 350 (1974) authorising UNDOF's deployment. The resolution requested the Secretary-General to inform the Council of the progress. Because the details of the disengagement and UNDOF's mandate were unclear, the Council did not put a deadline for the Secretary-General. The idea was for the report and UNDOF's mandate to include the group's results.

The Secretary-General sent a report on 5 June (1974). The document contained every single one of Siilasvuo's recommendations. It is noteworthy how vital IOC was for UNDOF's success. UNEF II sent 1,100 troops, including 500 Austrian, 350 Peruvian, 250 Polish and 250 Canadian.

In addition, UNDOF also needed seasoned observers. Therefore, UNTSO redeployed 90 officers to UNDOF to support the peacekeepers in the field. By that moment, UNTSO had already had much experience working in the Golan Heights. Indeed, the operation had observation posts between Israeli and Syrian forces since 1967 (Fetterly, 2003). UNDOF took

[38] Moving the Polish contingent through Israel was difficult because the country had a strict policy of refusing entry to soldiers from countries with which it did not have diplomatic relations. The Secretary-General himself requested the Israeli Prime Minister to make an exception, which she, reluctantly, made.

command and control and, with the continued help of UNTSO, continued to observe and monitor the situation (Houghton & Trinka, 1984). It is important to note that the Syrian government did not want multiple operations working in its country; therefore, UNTSO observers became embedded into UNDOF.

The military strategy was a product of the field. UNEF II, with some assistance from UNTSO, planned the deployment and gave the Secretariat all the relevant information on the conditions on the ground. This was possible because Siilasvuo played a unique role in peacekeeping. When he instructed UNEF to create the Golan Heights planning committee, he was not yet the Chief Coordinator of Peacekeeping in the Middle East. However, he was at the centre of all political and military discussions, much more so than his counterpart at UNTSO was. In November 1973, he successfully chaired the Km 101 talks between Israel and Egypt (Shlomo, 2015). In December, he participated in the Geneva Peace Conference and in January, he chaired the Israel-Egypt Military Working Group meetings. Unlike other Force Commanders, he had access to high-level political discussions to antipate an acceptable formula for the parties (Urquhart, 1987).

UNIFIL presents an interesting case because it can evaluate how the UN has perfected its IOC mechanism in the Middle East. The Council deployed UNIFIL *four* years later, with the Chief Coordinator for Peacekeeping in the Middle East already working on the ground for a few years. The status quo was volatile, extremely delicate, nowhere near peaceful, and could spark any moment. In New York, diplomats and the Secretariat discussed deploying some sort of international operation to stabilise the country (Nachmias, 1999). Deploying a peacekeeping operation in the traditional sense would be a daunting challenge for two reasons. First, there would be no Km 101-style negotiations between the factions and no peace to keep. Second, the idea of peacekeeping at that time was to serve as a buffer between two warring states; one of the protagonists of this conflict was not a state (Erskine, 1989).

From the field, UNTSO observers continuously warned the Security Council that the situation in Southern Lebanon was getting worse each day. UNTSO had a forward operating base in Naqoura and half a dozen observation posts. In February 1978, the observers reported their activities were under constant attack by de facto forces in the form of "vehicle hijackings,

denial of freedom of movement, armed thefts, forced entry into OPs, mined roads and shooting at or into the immediate vicinity of OP relief/logistics operations" (1978, p. para 1). Despite all the risks, UNTSO observers continued to perform; however, these reports clearly showed that the situation was very volatile and that the UN could not deal with the conflict. They could barely report what happened (James, 1983; Sommereyns, 1980).

The Secretary-General sent two confidential letters to the Security Council expressing concern regarding the situation in the Israel-Lebanon sector. On 15 June 1976, Waldheim reported that many vehicles and other equipment were robbed. The Secretary-General stressed that the government of Lebanon is not in a position to protect the observers. In a subsequent letter sent on 15 November 1977, Waldheim once again complained that UNTSO observers were constantly harassed, attacked and robbed; between 1975 and 1977, UNTSO lost 369,000 USD worth of equipment. He also stated that the operational conditions were so bad that "if they continue unabated, UNTSO may well find itself in a position in which its operation will have to be curtailed" (UNA, 1977, p. 2). These two letters are relevant not only because of their content but also because of the method employed. The Secretary-General sent them discretely with no intention of opening a public discussion; probably, his staff had already briefed him on the immense difficulties a new operation would face.

The Secretariat saw the situation as a clear risk to international peace and security; however, they did not want another peacekeeping operation. Urquhart (1980) comments that while the situation in southern Lebanon was nothing short of "anarchic" (p. 92) and he saw the prospect of deploying an operation to stabilise the area as complicated at best and downright impractical at worst. "The hard facts militated against deploying such a force" (Urquhart, 1987, p. 288). The lack of government authority in the South and the rugged terrain (hills and valleys) were ideal for guerrilla warfare and cumbersome for peacekeepers, making this prospect daunting. Siilasvuo was "'strongly against the idea of a force being sent to the area and 'went to New York and tried to convince them not to take that step'" (James, 1983, p. 618). The General believed that civil wars presented 'an impossible job' for peacekeeping[39].

[39] With the benefit of hindsight, the Urquhart and Siilasvuo were right. The reason stabilization operations today such as UNMISS in South Sudan, MINUSCA in the Central African Republic and MINUSMA in Mali are enjoying a limited degree of success is because their mandates allowed them to engage proactively. The development of operations working under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which vests them with enhanced rules

The two architects of UN Peacekeeping in the Middle East stood against the idea of going into Lebanon. This should have set the alarm given their direct experience in New York and the field. The Council, however, had other ideas.

Unfortunately, the conflict forced the UN's hand. On 11 March 1978, a Palestinian Liberation Organisation group landed on Tel Aviv's shores and carried out a terrorist attack. They took control of a bus, which was travelling near Tel Aviv. They assassinated 38 civilians, including 13 children and wounded 71 (Omer-Man, 2011). Israel's reaction was swift, and its intensity was, to most, surprising. Three days after the attack, the IDF launched 'Operation Litani', which deployed "20,000-25,000 ground troops backed by tanks, artillery, fighter planes and gunboats" (Keesing's Record of World Events, 1979). The IDF's objective was to destroy all PLO bases south of the Litani River and establish a security zone.

The United States took the lead and proposed the establishment of an operation to ensure Israel's withdrawal from the area. The United States' forcefulness in deploying a peacekeeping operation was unusually robust (for more on the politics of UNIFIL's deployment, see Chapter 4 and 5). On 19 March, the Security Council adopted resolution 425 (1978), which authorised the deployment of an Interim Force to confirm Israel's withdrawal from Lebanese territory and assist the Lebanese government in restoring its control and authority over the area.

Once again, the Council gave the Secretary-General 24 hours to report progress. Waldheim complied and sent his report (1978) to the Security Council outlining UNIFIL's terms of reference. The Secretariat decided to stick with the formula for UNEF II and UNDOF. The report states, "although the general context of UNIFIL is not comparable with that of UNEF and UNDOF, the guidelines for these operations, having proved satisfactory, are deemed suitable for practical application to the new Force" (para. 4). UNIFIL was under the command of the Secretary-General; the troops were provided with self-defence weapons, which they could use when attacked and when it faced "resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties" (para. 4 (d)). The Secretary-General decided to use an

of engagement, better equipment and clear orders was decades away. See Karlsrud (2015) ; Aoi & Coning (2017) for more on the challenges peacekeeping is facing in this regard today.

existing template to make the recruitment of TCCs quick and, at the same time, to avoid becoming bogged down with the politics in Lebanon. (Findlay, 2002).

The Secretariat did not have time to prepare or plan UNIFIL's deployment. Perhaps inevitably, "the sense of urgency and haste surrounding the establishment of UNIFIL seems to have precluded adequate planning and a careful examination of the military and political factors necessary for successful execution of the Force's mandate" (Heiberg, 1991, p. 3). The solution to this predicament was non-other than Inter-Operation Collaboration. The Secretariat relied on UNTSO for the operational planning and "relied heavily on the quick dispatch and experience of […] UNEF and UNDOF" (Boerma, 1979, p. 54). UNIFIL benefited from half a decade of intense IOC and having a Chief Coordinator with the gravitas and authority to speak on its behalf. While its senior officers were establishing themselves and began their operations, Siilasvuo engaged in diplomatic work on their behalf. In addition, the rapid redeployment of troops and using existing supply chains made things easier for mission start-ups.

The Secretariat relied on Inter-Operation Collaboration to deploy UNIFIL; UNTSO, UNDOF and UNEF II played a significant role in the operation's quick setup. The Secretary-General appointed Maj Gen Emmanuel Erskine[40] of Ghana as Force Commander. At the time of this appointment, he was UNTSO Chief of Staff since 1976 and previously was UNEF II Deputy Force Commander[41] between 1974 and 1976. His appointment continued the Secretariat's successful *modus operandi* of using UNTSO as the cornerstone for deploying a new operation.

Erskine was able to focus almost exclusively on the military aspects of setting up UNIFIL because, unlike in 1974, Siilasvuo was the Chief Coordinator of Peacekeeping in the Middle East. In addition, from the political side, Urquhart dispatched James Jonah, a Senior Political Affairs Officer, to accompany the Generals in their high-level meetings. By 1978, Siilasvuo and Jonah had over a decade of experience working in the region. The Generals divided the tasks where Siilasvuo focused on dealing with Israel and Lebanon and served as a political

[40] Erskine also wrote a seminal memoir, titled *Mission with UNIFIL: An African Soldier's perspective*. This dissertation frequently references the book as a vital primary source.
[41] Erskine was Siilasvuo's Deputy at UNEF II, they worked together to facilitate UNDOF's deployment. Their working relationship was very cordial and close.

liaison to the Secretariat. Erskine prepared the operational elements and, equally, if not more critically, organised the logistics of receiving thousands of soldiers worldwide.

Of course, this did not mean Erskine was side-lined from the politics; the Secretariat wanted to use its resources more strategically. The Secretariat instructed Siilasvuo to liaise with the Israeli and Lebanese governments; the General's good offices proved to be quite helpful given that he achieved consensus from the Israeli and Lebanese governments on UNIFIL's AO. At the same time, the Secretary-General instructed Erskine to reach out to the PLO. Unlike the Chief Coordinator, the Force Commander could explain dealing directly with the PLO as an operational necessity. The double team shielded the Secretariat from criticism for dealing with a the PLO –who Israel did not see as a legitimate counterpart. Siilasvuo stated that this procedure "confirmed the division of labour that was adhered to later on" (1992, p. 344). The strategic division of labour shows the Secretariat understood the necessity for a multidimensional strategy whereby the different players on the ground could cooperate; UNIFIL's deployment shows the importance of using all the available assets on the ground.

Immediately after the Council adopted resolution 425, Erskine started working on the implementation; he took several vital early decisions. First, he put an Observer Group on standby to deploy in 12 hours. Second, he designated a senior observer, with the rank of Lt Col, as the officer-in-charge of operations and dispatched him to Naquora; the UNTSO forward base would later become UNIFIL's headquarters. "For all operational, administrative and logistical planning purposes, UNTSO HQ was reorganised to serve as the Rear HQ for UNIFIL" (Erskine, 1989, p. 21). While UNTSO devoted its resources to planning, the other two operations contributed to redeploying some of its troops. The Secretariat contacted Austria, Iran, Sweden, and Canada (mainly for logistical purposes), asking them to redeploy some of their soldiers in UNEF and UNDOF. Everyone except Austria agreed to immediately put one company at UNIFIL's disposal (Stjernfelt, 1992). Three days after resolution 425 was adopted, UNIFIL already had a command structure, a temporary headquarters, and a core contingent of soldiers redeployed from UNEF II and UNDOF. Furthermore, the UNTSO observers already working in the Israel-Lebanon sector stayed behind and contributed to the operation.

Within days, an active and experienced presence allowed the Secretariat to recruit more TCCs. By April 1978, "UNIFIL numbered around 2,500 troops from France, Nepal, Norway, Sweden, Iran and Canada; and by early May, there were already over 3,100 ground troops" (Makdisi, Goksel, Hauck, & Reigeluth, 2009). Later, the operation increased its numbers to 6,000 with contributions from Ireland, Fiji, Nigeria, and Senegal.

Once again, the Secretariat succeeded in deploying peacekeeping operations quickly. Siilasvuo reflected on the matter:

> The establishment of UNIFIL was a relatively smooth operation, much easier than setting up UNEF […]. We had learned our lessons from the mistakes we made then. The resources from UNEF, UNTSO and UNDOF were available, and, if need arose, the material could also be drawn from UNFICYP (Siilasvuo, 1992, p. 345)

UNIFIL's deployment was an example of Inter Operation Collaboration at its finest. Without an existing and well-oiled collaboration framework between the operations, UNIFIL would not have been able to have boots on the ground for weeks. In addition, at the planning stages, UNTSO proved the importance of having UN staff and senior military observers working on the ground.

Post-deployment military cooperation

The necessity to deploy a peacekeeping operation within one or two days put everyone involved in crisis mode. This mentality was beneficial because it allowed the Secretariat, the Force Commanders, the TCCs and even the host countries to be very pragmatic. After the operations settle and receive their troops, equipment and logistics, the nature of Inter-Operation Collaboration evolves; the feeling of being in a crisis fades, and the operations (re)establish routine standard operating procedures.

While the four operations did collaborate intensely, the period of most intense cooperation from the military standpoint was at the onset; the Security Council identified a vacuum, which the operations desperately needed to fill, which is why they redeployed. The following section discusses how operations continue engaging in military cooperation after settling down.

Once again, the analysis begins with UNTSO. The operation was (and still is) perfectly designed to support any future peace operation. UNTSO's area of operation is all other operations combined, and the operation has had observers in every sector since 1949. UNTSO stood alone from 1948 – 1956[42] and 1967-1973 (Diehl, 2015b). UNTSO observers worked with both iterations of UNEF, UNDOF and UNIFIL, performing observation and inspection duties for them (Hylton, 2013).

After the Yom Kippur War, UNTSO was relieved of operating in the areas now occupied by the others *de jure*; the host countries –especially Syria– wanted only *one* operation working inside their country. However, UNTSO was the only operation with seasoned officers who could staff observation posts and write detailed reports to the Force Commander; their expertise was more relevant than ever. The Secretariat circumvented the issue by embedding UNTSO observers into the other operations.

During the second half of 1974, senior officers of UNTSO and UNEF prepared several discussion papers and memoranda outlining proposals to streamline the integration of UNTSO observers in UNEF and UNDOF. The issue required thinking because of the different soldiers deployed in the operations. UNTSO exclusively employed company and field officers such as captains, majors and lieutenant colonels. The majority of UNDOF troops were non-commissioned officers. Of course, UNDOF (and UNEF) also had officers who commanded the different battalions; however, their terms of reference were not equal; each operation managed its troops differently. Inter-Operation Collaboration post initial deployment required harmonisation of rules and procedures. Between July and December, the operations discussed how to tackle the issue. Three seminal documents outline the challenges and the way forward.

While UNTSO collaborated with UNEF constantly, most inter-operation collaboration occurred between UNTSO and UNDOF. On 9 July 1974, Erskine sent an inter-office memorandum to Siilasvuo[43] to explain why (UNA, 1974). The situation in the Golan Heights was volatile and very fragile. Unlike the Sinai Peninsula, the Heights had civilians living on

[42] UNEF relieved UNTSO of her duties in the Israel-Egypt Sector only.
[43] At the time Siilasvuo was UNEF Force Commander and Erskine was his Deputy.

both sides of the line–they were close to Damascus, and the two parties had enormous animosity towards each other. In addition, UNDOF's area of operation is extremely narrow. Therefore, UNDOF needed to create a mechanism to identify who enters the area and for what purpose. UNDOF required experienced officers to perform "quasi-political and intelligence functions" (p.1). The General proposed integrating UNTSO observers to complete the "collection of intelligence". He further suggested that the observers have an area of responsibility with multiple observation posts.

Integrating the operations was not straightforward. On 24 July, Col. Kuosa, Chief Operations Officer of UNEF II, also sent a memorandum to Siilasvuo discussing the integration of UNTSO observers in UNDOF (UNA, 1974). The memo outlines the main objective: integrating UNTSO observers to make UNDOF "an integrated force". The challenge was that the observers had different command structures and *modus operandi* from the Austrian and Peruvian battalions they would be supporting. Before the war UNTSO, observers had a very narrow mandate of observing and reporting. UNDOF's mandate was much more involved because the operation had to exert control over its AO, control civilian movement, report military violations, clear minefields, and liaise with the civilian population. The priorities of the integration revolve around the following:

1. Staffing observation points and entry and existing points to the AO;
2. Inspections of limited forces and armament areas. The parties agreed to bi-weekly inspections to ensure they did not have more than the maximum type and number of weapons adjacent to UNDOF's AO;
3. Staff UNDOF Headquarters and forward HQs;
4. Collect and evaluate relevant information on military, and political matters which can affect UNDOF's role;
5. Provide officers for the execution of humanitarian operations.

The memo recommends that during their redeployment, the observers must work under the authority of UNDOF's Force Commander. Moreover, ensuring a coherent chain of command in every observation post and mission conducted jointly was crucial[44].

On 9 December, after a few months of inter-operation collaboration and noting that the Security Council renewed UNDOF's mandate[45], the leadership of all three operations gathered in Jerusalem to discuss the matter again; James Jonah from Headquarters also attended. UNTSO senior staffers drafted an extensive working paper outlining the discussions' results, evaluated the collaboration's first six months, and provided policy recommendations for the future (UNA, 1974).

The working paper starts by highlighting a few deficiencies in this effort. The issues they identified were inaccuracies in the reporting process, failure to utilise the skills of military observers, and maintaining a harmonious relationship among the soldiers. The paper makes substantive recommendations to tackle these issues; the overarching issue was improving the coordination between the battalions and the observers. The paper recommended organising the observers in the same way as national battalions, as a single unit. The objective was to streamline the relationship between the observers and the Force Commander. The existing reporting mechanism was convoluted and inefficient; the observers' reports went to the Force Commander via the battalion commanders. Organising the observers into a single unit cut through the red tape.

The working paper needs to be concurrently analysed with a Note Verbale[46] (UNA, 1974) written by the Secretary-General sent to the Permanent Representative of Sweden. He discusses the procedure for the redeployment of UNTSO Officers to UNDOF. The Secretariat wanted to create a mechanism to redeploy UNTSO observers to UNDOF when the situation

[44] This is to say that the senior officer on the ground, regardless of whence he came, serves as the commanding officer in according to standard military practice.
[45] For the first few renewals of UNDOF's mandate, the government of Syria made a political point of showing hesitation to agree however, this posturing was purely a move for domestic consumption. For more see chapter 4.
[46] The Secretary-General sent the exact same Note Verbale to the missions of Austria, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden.

required. He asked permission to do this without consulting the respective TCC. This was an apparent attempt to institutionalise Inter-Operation Collaboration.

These recommendations significantly improved the relationship between the operations and the efficiency of the UNTSO observers embedded within UNDOF. The inter-operation collaboration between the operations started with difficulties; UNTSO and UNDOF have profound conceptual differences. At the time, the former had a few hundred senior officers whose role was to observe and report. The latter had a broader mandate, more troops and worked in a very tense area. This section demonstrates that the operations could cooperate beyond the initial crisis.

Administration: Who is paying for what?

Article 17 of the UN Charter clearly states that every Member State must contribute to the organisation's overall budget. In addition, the Charter gives the General Assembly the responsibility of adopting the overall budget. Until 1973, the UN financed peacekeeping through its regular budget and voluntary contributions. This became a problem when Security Council started authorising larger operations they could not afford. The situation became untenable in 1973 when the Secretariat was preparing two significant new operations: UNEF II and UNDOF.

While the Secretariat was preparing for the Geneva Peace Conference of December, the General Assembly was working on the financial matters of peacekeeping. On 11 December, the Assembly adopted resolution 3101 (1973), "which established non-voluntary assessment accounts that assigned members fixed shares of UN annual peacekeeping expenses" (Sandler, 2017, p. 1880). The resolution relieved the organisation from the pressure of supporting such a significant endeavour. Moreover, this set a dual precedent separating peacekeeping costs from the regular budget[47] and requesting the Member States to cost-share based on their capacity to pay. That said, the Secretariat made sure to announce that, for the time being, these decisions were ad-hoc and did bind the Member States by its

[47] Interestingly enough, The General Assembly kept UNTSO (and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)) in the regular budget. UNTSO is an open-ended permanent fixture in the Israel-Arab conflict landscape; the Secretariat does not want to risk losing UNTSO funding because of its important work. For more see Chapter 1

precedent. The General Assembly cemented these principles many years later by adopting resolution 55/235 (2001), which states, "Financing of such operations is the collective responsibility of all States Members". To make things more precise, the organisation funds each operation through a different account, considering its specific needs and challenges in the field (United Nations Department of Peace Operations, n.d).

With resolution 3101, the General Assembly laid the foundations for effectively managing peacekeeping operations in the Middle East (and everywhere else). However, the implementation of this mechanism was not straightforward. The operations had significant challenges. Once again, the solution to this challenge came through Inter-Operation Collaboration. In late 1973, when Siilasvuo moved from Jerusalem to Ismailia to command UNEF II, he struggled to set up the operation from a management and logistic perspectives. On 12 February 1974, he sent a very bitter memorandum to the Secretary-General complaining,

> One of the significant shortcomings of the early days was the complete unpreparedness of the UN central administration to launch a new operation. There would appear to have been no contingency planning for administrative support [...] this is an emergency force. The methodical, administrative procedures of standard times and inadequate financing will not see it through its early, difficult days (UNA, 1974, p. 1)

The TCCs did not comply with the Secretariat's requirements and arrived "poorly equipped". To make matters worse, setting up the Canadian and Polish logistic support units took longer than anticipated. As hard as things were, Siilasvuo needed to find a way forward. As a seasoned peacekeeper, Siilasvuo understood that moving things along in New York takes time, so he needed to look elsewhere to solve his immediate problems. He found solutions in Jerusalem.

In the same memorandum, Siilasvuo highlighted that the operation was performing its duties whilst circumventing the abovementioned issues because UNEF II could rely on the UNTSO and UNFICYP. UNTSO sent many of its senior staff (both civilian and military) to staff UNEF Headquarters. Furthermore, UNEF continued to rely on UNTSO for administrative support throughout its lifespan. The General expressed that the peacekeepers from UNFICYP were

experienced and logistically independent; they hit the ground running and started to work immediately after arrival.

On 14 March, the Secretary-General responded. He sent an extensive memorandum to Siilasvuo, answering his questions and explaining the Secretariat's political challenges in New York. "The General Assembly has never agreed to provide additional funds or resources for planning […] due to the deep-seated political differences on the question of UN peacekeeping" (UNA, 1974, p. 1). In addition, Waldheim stated that the Security Council made decisions regarding the TCCs without consulting the Secretariat; he flagged specifically the logistic units, which arrived later than planned. At the very end of the memorandum, almost in passing, the Secretary-General highlighted a fascinating detail regarding cooperation. He mentioned that UNTSO's support "was not wholly accidental. Throughout the years, we have tried, as you know, to keep an element of personnel in UNTSO who would be called on at short notice to assist new United Nations Operations as they might occur" (UNA, 1974, pp. 6-7). This statement confirms the hypothesis that UNTSO's longevity goes beyond its mandate; the operation serves as a brain trust and a source for the quick redeployment of senior officials to new operations. UNEF benefited from having UNTSO's undivided attention for a few months; the two managed to get the former up and running before UNDOF's deployment.

Despite the extra few months between UNEF and UNDOF, the Secretariat still heavily relied on UNTSO to support the newly minted operation in the Golan Heights. In fact, "UNDOF was initially financed out of funds authorised and appropriated for UNEF and UNTSO, from which the personnel of UNDOF had been drawn" (Sommereyns, 1980, p. 29). Sending a peacekeeping operation to work with other operations' budgets was unorthodox. The General Assembly, the Security Council and the Secretariat considered this whilst designing the operation. Once again, the solution came in the form of inter-operational collaboration. UNTSO provided services inter alia transport, radio facilities and maintenance of infrastructure. In other words, UNDOF had a very small number of people not seconded from elsewhere (UNA, 1974).

As the section on post-deployment cooperation showed, UNTSO redeployed 90 observers to the Israel-Syria sector to assist the troops. The General Assembly had not yet determined UNDOF's budget; therefore, UNTSO initially covered the cost from its regular budget (United Nations Security Council, 1974). As the section on post-deployment cooperation shows, the Secretariat wanted to institutionalise sending UNTSO observers to the Golan Heights. In a Note Verbale sent to the TCCs, he stressed that this "Would enable (him) to utilise the resources of UNTSO to the fullest extent and dispense with the establishment of a new and costly administrative setup […] It would also afford greater flexibility in the use of observers" (UNA, 1974, p. 2). The Secretariat designed the procedure to make things faster from an administrative perspective.

The experiences of 1974 clearly showed to the staff in the field that collaboration was fundamental for each operation to achieve its particular mandate. However, the Secretariat did not have guidelines for the operations, and Siilasvuo was not the Chief Coordinator yet; therefore, it fell upon the Chief Administrative Officers (CAO) to develop a coordination mechanism.

On 1 March 1975, Dennis Holland, UNEF's CAO, sent a memorandum to Siilasvuo. "The problem is that there is at the moment insufficient experience in group discussions of this kind" (United Nations Security Council, 1974, p. 1). The memorandum proposes meeting at the senior staff level every quarter and rotating the location. Regarding the agenda, Holland suggested inviting every operation to make an opening statement and then have a frank discussion. Siilasvuo agreed. He believed "In many administrative fields, it was better to treat the Middle East as one entity as we had always done in UNTSO" (Siilasvuo, 1992, p. 295). A few months after this memorandum, the Secretary-General appointed the General as Chief Coordinator; Holland joined Siilasvuo in Jerusalem and supported him throughout his tenure. The three operations regularly met to discuss military affairs logistics and cooperated from now on.

The degree to which UNDOF relied on UNTSO and UNEF went beyond Inter-Operation Collaboration to outright dependency. UNDOF could not plan its logistical support without UNEF and UNTSO. While cooperation is paramount to success, a certain degree of

operational autonomy is equally essential. At the onset, it made sense for the UN to keep UNDOF subordinate (administratively speaking) to the others. The Syrian government made a spectacle of renewing its mandate and only allowed three or six months of renewals.

However, after the Council showed its intent to keep UNDOF for the medium term, the Secretariat had to start thinking about decoupling it from the others. The core issues they discussed revolved around logistics, procurement, warehousing of assets, and usage of ports of entry, finance and personnel arrangements. These meetings were particularly vital to UNDOF because its administrative framework was smaller than its counterparts were.

On 29 September 1975, UNDOF senior staff drafted an in-depth study outlining their administrative and logistic challenges (UNA, 1974). A contingent of Canada and Poland's UNEF logistic units managed UNDOF logistics; however, these detachments answered directly to their respective battalion commanders. Having the two operations so closely bound created a risk of one operation suffering the consequences for what happens outside its area of operation. If Egypt had expelled UNEF II the same way it did so in 1967, this would have left UNDOF unable to perform its functions. The memorandum served as a blueprint for UNDOF's decoupling. Over the coming months, the operation started to gain an essential degree of administrative autonomy. Luckily, for UNDOF, UNEF remained in the Sinai Peninsula for a few years, giving the Secretariat, the Chief Coordinator, and UNDOF sufficient time to grant it sufficient autonomy.

The issue of administration and logistics seldom gets an equal amount of attention than military and political affairs. This can be because budgets and supply chains are duller than those tasks done by soldiers, such as ensuring cease-fires, demarcating lines and responding to the outbreak of war. However, we can undoubtedly conclude that Inter-Operation Collaboration in administrative matters was fundamental for the operations throughout their lifespan.

A Definition and Framework for Inter-Operation Collaboration

The aftermath of the Yom Kippur War transformed peacekeeping in the Middle East. The Security Council tripled its presence in the region in just a few months. While designing the operations, the Secretariat always treated peacekeeping in the Middle East and, to an extent,

Cyprus as one architecture to the extent that the operation's success depended on the input from the rest.

Four years later, UNIFIL's deployment was the pinnacle of Inter-Operation Collaboration in the Middle East. Under Siilasvuo's leadership, the three operations set up a quick and efficient coordination mechanism whereby each provided UNIFIL with the necessary tools for a successful deployment. UNTSO, once again, proved to be an invaluable living repository of experience and expertise. UNIFIL has seconded its entire senior staff from UNTSO at the start of its deployment. Moreover, the Force Commander, Erskine, moved from Jerusalem to Naqoura. UNTSO was flexible enough to transform itself into the nucleus of another peacekeeping operation and simultaneously perform its duties.

The Security Council usually gave the Secretariat a few days to develop a plan and presence on the ground. This would not happen if they did not pull and share resources. That said, the Secretariat always treated this process as ad-hoc measures and never codified what this paper treats as Inter-Operation Collaboration. There are a few reasons why the Secretariat preferred acting this way. While the Security Council had the appetite for deploying peacekeeping operations in the Middle East as a whole, the Council, and the General Assembly, preferred to treat each operation as a standalone exercise for two reasons: politics and finance.

The host countries preferred to have one operation working within their borders. Syria, in particular, was ready to receive one –relatively small– operation and specifically demanded that no other operation work in the Israel-Syria sector; this is why UNTSO embedded its observers within UNDOF. Damascus did not want to give the appearance of being 'occupied' by foreign actors.

Israel also preferred to deal with each operation working in its sector along the same lines. They even prevented the movement of troops through Israel unless the TCC, from which the troops in question hailed, had diplomatic relations with them. Of course, after the Six-Day War, where they reunified Jerusalem, they had no choice but to continue to host UNTSO; removing the operation from Jerusalem would have been an unnecessary political mistake. That said, the Israeli government also wanted to keep the operations squarely within their

areas of operations (Comay, 1983). Furthermore, the TCCs also preferred to treat peacekeeping operations as standalone exercises. The countries wanted to know in advance, where their troops were going, what the conditions looked like and, above all, what the threat level was in the field. Fortunately, the TCCs showed enormous flexibility when accepting to redeploy their troops to other operations.

When it comes to financing peacekeeping operations, the chapter showed that while there was a keen political interest in engaging in Inter-Operation Collaboration, the General Assembly did not want to codify inter-operation exchanges because it would complicate matters when it comes to their budgets; they wanted one budget per operation. In addition, given that the other peacekeeping operations did not work so closely with others, the Assembly preferred to deal with each operation individually. There was a considerable difference between New York and the field. Despite the calls for independence, UNDOF was, essentially, a child of UNEF and UNTSO. The former provided troops and equipment and offered political support and military observers.

The best example was the terms of reference of the Chief Coordinator of Peacekeeping in the Middle East. The Secretariat and the Security Council agreed to keep each operation independent with its own Force Commander and administrative structure (UNA, 1975). Siilasvuo, at least on paper, acted purely as a political liaison for all host countries and representative of the Secretary-General for significant events such as the Km 101 negotiations.

The Secretariat, therefore, had to engage in Inter-Operation Collaboration in an ad-hoc manner and systemise it as much as it could without appearing to do so. Under the blanket of practicality, they pulled and shared resources claiming, rightly so, that it was the only way they could meet the tight deadlines the Security Council gave them. Moreover, UNTSO's quarter of century experience working in every single sector in the conflict made it almost self-evident that the new operations would closely collaborate with UNTSO.

Even though the UN itself did not codify the concept of Inter-Operation Collaboration as a result of the experiences of the Middle East, there is much value in constructing a working definition and identifying the different aspects that made up this process.

Inter-Operation Collaboration of Peacekeeping Operations is the process through which two or more UN peacekeeping operations embark on joint political, military, and logistic activities to achieve their mandates. Collaboration involves temporarily transferring staff, sharing logistic tools, and pooling and sharing resources. It can be a reactive measure adopted due to an emerging regionalisation conflict or proactive by being included in a new operation's original mandate and modus operandi.

This chapter looks at Inter-Operation Collaboration from an operational perspective; this involves military and programme management/logistics. Moreover, the framework involves two distinct moments. Mission start-up involves the first three months after the Security Council adopts the resolution deploying the operation. Post-deployment collaboration involves collaboration afterwards. This time split might appear arbitrary; however, the first 60-90 days is the most intense period for Inter-Operation Collaboration.

Mandate & Consent		
	Military	**Programme Management/ Logistics**
Mission start-up	• Redeployment of assets and personnel • Appointment of the Force Commanders.	• Temporary relocation of senior staff. • Pull and share financial resources to cover initial costs.
Post-deployment collaboration	• Embedding of Observers for longer than three months after initial deployment	• Sharing logistics supply lines

Mandate and consent

Mandate

At the base of the entire process of Inter-Operation Collaboration, there are two critical requirements: consent and mandate. The Security Council deployed each operation under its own Security Council resolution, with a specific mandate and AO. Although UNEF and UNDOF are measures created to deal with the aftermath of one war, they were the product of two different negotiation processes. Israel and Egypt negotiated the first bilateral disengagement agreement[48] between November 1973 and January 1974. In May 1974, Israel and Syria finalised their disengagement agreement, which paved the way for UNDOF. Four years later, the Security Council deployed UNIFIL in response to tensions in Southern Lebanon. Therefore, at least theoretically speaking, engaging in inter-operation collaboration meant the operations worked beyond their area of operation and mandate.

The Secretariat played a strategic and proactive role. The Security Council instructed the Secretary-General to produce results very quickly. However, the texts of the resolutions are short and somewhat vague[49]. "The Secretary-General was thus given an opportunity for creative participation in establishing UNEF and UNIFIL, subject to the final approval of the Security Council. When UNIFIL was created, the Secretary-General could rely on the already tested precedents of UNEF and UNDOF" (Sommereyns, 1980, p. 16). In UNEF and UNIFIL's case, the Secretariat had days to deploy the operations because of the ongoing crises they tackled. In UNDOF's case, the Secretariat also had a few days after the parties adopted the disengagement agreement because they needed a reason to bring back their forces and regroup.

The reports of the Secretary-General interpreted the resolutions and outlined how the operations would implement their mandate. In these two reports, the Secretary-General

[48] The first Israel-Egypt disengagement agreement had two distinct landmarks. First, the Km 101 talks held in November 1973, which laid out the foundations for broader discussions. Second, because of the Geneva Peace Conference, the parties established a Military Working Group, which continued the discussion in January 1974. Chapter 4 discusses the Egypt-Israel disengagement agreements in depth.

[49] If we compare Security Council resolutions 425 and 426, which established UNIFIL in 1978 with resolution 1701, which enhanced UNIFIL's mandate in 2006, the result is rather telling. The first resolutions are less than one page long; they have less than a dozen operative clauses. The latter has 4 pages, and 19 very specific operative clauses. The Security Council gave the Secretariat much more room for manoeuvre in the 1970s to design the mandates.

used Inter-Operation Collaboration. The reports discussed all the concrete steps the operations took to help each other. The Council accepted the reports, which gave the necessary green light to start. This phenomenon is essential because Inter-Operation Collaboration does not appear in the resolutions; therefore, this did not create a legal precedent to which the hosts and TCCs could object.

Consent

Even if the process of Inter-Operation Collaboration was not codified or concretely discussed by the resolutions, the Secretariat was not immune to negotiating consent by the TCCs and the host countries. Regarding the TCCs, the Secretary-General held meetings and sent letters to the TCCs asking them to agree to redeploy, sometimes partially, their contingents to other operations for a short period. Luckily, most TCCs who already had contingents in the region quickly agreed. For example, the redeployment of Swedish and Iranian battalions and the partial redeployment of the Canadian and Polish logistics units from UNEF II to UNIFIL were fundamental to the early success (Stjernfelt, 1992).

Moreover, the Secretariat always had to remember the needs and wants of the host countries and Israel. For example, Israel and Syria had difficulty negotiating UNDOF's size (Shlomo, 2015). The former wanted a strong 3,000 force, and the latter wished 300 unarmed observers. Ultimately, the Secretariat found a compromise, and UNDOF had 1,200 troops and 90 observers (James, 1987). The Security Council gave the Secretariat an opening to play a proactive, strategic role in designing and implementing the mandates, and they succeeded. Unlike the purely political sphere of the Israel-Arab conflict, where the Secretariat had a limited role, their role was effective and influential in peacekeeping.

Military Operations

Military matters are the most extensive area where the four operations collaborated; there are two critical reasons for this. The Secretariat designed them (and the Security Council approved them) to be buffers between two states after a war (UNDOF-UNEF), to supervise the withdrawal of Israel from Southern Lebanon (UNIFIL) and to observe and supervise the agreements between the belligerents of the 1948 War (UNTSO).

Peacekeeping in the Middle East was predominantly a military endeavour to maintain the absence of war in their sectors (Saikal, 1998). Keeping the areas of operations were inherently interdependent; what happened in one sector had a direct impact elsewhere. The Secretariat needed a regional military approach that allowed each operation to be as efficient as possible in its area. Sometimes, this required pulling and sharing of staff and resources.

Overall, borrowing from NATO's terminology, regional peacekeeping collaboration on military matters is anachronistically called "smart defence", which would create joint processes for procurement, supply lines and sharing forces and conduct operations across areas of operations (Giegerich, 2012).

Redeployment of Personnel and Assets

Mission start-up

The *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines*[50] –colloquially known as the 'Capstone Doctrine'– define this period as the "earliest phase of establishing a mission in the field. During mission start-up, the main priority is to bring internal mission processes, structures and services to an initial level of operating capability so that mandate implementation can begin across the mission area" (2008, p. 63). The Secretariat did not have time to do a proper mission start-up because there was insufficient time and no processes. The Security Council expected boots on the ground almost immediately. Therefore, the operation borrowed from the others to achieve operating capability. The Secretariat treated the entire region as one big theatre of operations and deployed troops whenever possible.

Post-deployment collaboration

Once UNEF, UNDOF and UNIFIL got their troops, they could stand independently. However, there was a need for UNTSO observers to work within the three other operations for a longer time. This area of military collaboration is unusual; after all, the Secretariat could have asked the TCCs to send observers to the operations instead of redeploying from UNTSO. This could have saved the Force Commanders and the Chief Coordinator time because there would have

[50] While, of course, using the definition outlined by the Capstone doctrine is anachronistic, the framework outlined by this document remains valid and useful.

been no need to discuss integration. However, keeping UNTSO in the picture had a few very valuable advantages. Expert observers working in the field for many years staffed the operation.

The institutional memory and expertise the operation brought to the table were instrumental. General Erskine reflects, "The system of joint peacekeeping operations between troops and [UNTSO] observers has been effective" (Erskine, 1989, p. 147). The three other operations relied on UNTSO observers to conduct the most sensitive tasks they had to perform: inspecting the areas of separation and the area of limitation of forces. These activities required ample experience, which the recent troops that arrived in the field did not necessarily have. The process was not always smooth, and the early problems forced the Secretariat to build a strategy. With Siilasvuo's and his team's help, the relationship between UNTSO observers and the other operations improved. To this day, this partnership continues.

Appointment of the Force Commanders

Along the same lines of redeployment of troops, one of the most critical factors in mission start-up success is a good Force Commander. In almost all cases, the Force Commander of a new operation was the incumbent Force Commander in one of the operations already on the ground. In addition, whenever one of them moved to a new operation, the Secretariat preferred to appoint someone with experience in the region to succeed him. Because the operations were the product of a crisis, the Secretary-General believed in selecting a safe pair of hands.

Two examples of this procedure are Siilasvuo and Erskine. Siilasvuo served as UNTSO Chief of Staff between 1970 and 1973. He then moved to UNEF II between 1973 and 1975. Siilasvuo started his tenure at UNEF concurrently with his duties at the km 101 negotiations. After implementing the two disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt, the Secretary-General appointed him Chief Coordinator of Peacekeeping in the Middle East. When the Secretariat began to create this position, there was never a discussion about appointing someone outside the regional peacekeeping architecture. Erskine served as UNTSO Chief of Staff between 1976 and 1978. He then moved to UNIFIL, where he stayed

until 1981. In his last posting in the Middle East, he succeeded Siilasvuo as Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Middle East

Adopting this policy exposed the senior officers on the ground to confirmation bias; they brought to their new posting the experiences and opinions of key players from both sides of the conflict. However, the Secretariat believed institutional memory outweighed this risk. The mechanism of moving senior military officers from one operation to the other proved to be an invaluable measure. They always brought experienced existing relationships with their counterparts in the region. Moreover, using this mechanism meant that the Force Commanders had an excellent working relationship with each other; this facilitated the Inter-Operation Collaboration process.

Programme Management/logistics

All the endeavours mentioned above required the operations to collaborate equally and profoundly on the programme management. Some of the unsung heroes of UN peacekeeping are the operation's Chief Administrative Officers. They worked very well together in the mission start-up and post-deployment collaboration phases.

Pulling and Sharing of Resources & Staff

Mission start-up

The Secretariat was not the only victim of the Security Council's haste; the General Assembly did not have enough time to sort out the finances; the Assembly needed to cut corners. Typically, the General Assembly adopts budgets for peacekeeping operations during their regular sessions.

When the Security Council deployed UNDOF, the Assembly was not in session; therefore, the Secretariat had to pay for the initial costs from UNEF and UNTSO's budget (United Nations Security Council, 1974). This mechanism did not work four years later because UNIFIL's costs were too high for the operations to bear. Therefore, the Assembly convened a special session to discuss and adopt UNIFIL's budget (Sommereyns, 1980).

The burden of getting the operations off the ground fell on the Force Commanders. Siilasvuo in 1973 and Erskine in 1978 worked similarly to make progress work for their new operations. At the time of their appointment to UNEF and UNIFIL, respectively, they served

as UNTSO Chief of Staff. They used UNTSO's infrastructure and staff to set up their new operations. The two Generals had to move quickly because the Council expected them to soon have the skeleton of their new operations.

In the case of UNDOF, Siilasvuo did not move to become its Force Commander; however, his role in the Military Working Group gave him much foresight into what would happen after Israel and Syria signed their disengagement agreement. Siilasvuo knew months in advance that a new operation was coming; therefore, he instructed his staff at UNEF to design it according to the reality on the ground. UNEF provided a very detailed plan, which included a recommendation on which countries to approach to get troops, which should be the interim Force Commander, and how the operation would get its equipment and supplies.

Post-deployment collaboration

This chapter shows that UNDOF still relied on the other operations considerably after the mission-start-up. In addition, all operations saw great value in fostering collaboration in administrative matters. The meetings of CAOs in 1975 proved to be very successful at ensuring transparency and smooth sharing of resources. The discussions showed that the operations supported each other in finance, redistribution of equipment, logistical setup, etc.

Of course, the UNDOF example showed that too much collaboration could be challenging and problematic because it exposed the operation to the risk of a single point of failure. Siilasvuo knew that UNDOF could not rely entirely on UNEF's support. If the Egyptian government had expelled it (as it did in 1967), the operation would not have had the means to perform its duties.

UN Headquarters took notice of the importance of administrative inter-operation collaboration. On 10 October 1977 –just four months before UNIFIL's deployment– Mr George Lansky, Director of the Field Operations Service, sent a memorandum to all three CAOs to discuss planning. He stated that the Secretariat recycles logistics directives and standard operating procedures whenever a new operation starts. The document states that headquarters wanted to avoid the need to improvise.

As the CAOs began their work with Headquarters, the crisis in Southern Lebanon put the new way of working to the test. While the idea of creating standardised directives for future

operations was in development, UNIFIL's deployment required field-based solutions, which meant that, once again, the CAOs had to figure out the logistics.

Conclusion

In examining the intricacies of inter-operation collaboration (IOC) among UNTSO, UNEF II, UNDOF, and UNIFIL from 1973 to 1982, this chapter has leveraged Complexity Theory to provide a nuanced understanding of how these operations worked together tactically and operationally. This analytical approach has been instrumental in uncovering the depth of collaboration that underpinned the success and efficiency of each mission, particularly in the face of the stringent timelines and operational demands set by the Security Council for deployment.

The original research question sought to determine the extent of collaboration on tactical and operational matters between these peacekeeping operations within the specified timeframe. Through the lens of Complexity Theory, it has become evident that the success of these operations was indeed deeply intertwined with their ability to share resources, expertise, and insights. This was most apparent during the critical start-up phases of the missions, where the need for rapid deployment necessitated innovative and non-conventional solutions to meet both military and logistical challenges. The exchange between Siilasvuo and the Secretary-General highlighted the reliance on UNTSO's foundational expertise and political network, reinforcing UNTSO's role as a cornerstone of the UN's peacekeeping architecture in the region.

Furthermore, the chapter has elucidated the continuous nature of IOC beyond the establishment phase, demonstrating how these operations maintained a delicate balance between autonomy and strategic collaboration. The institutionalization of the Chief Coordinator role, aided by Siilasvuo's expert leadership, facilitated the establishment of a structured approach to pulling and sharing resources and personnel, which was pivotal for the operational work of the operations. Complexity Theory has proven to be a valuable framework for analysing these dynamics, emphasizing the importance of adaptability, interdependence, and emergent behaviour in the operational efficacy of UN peacekeeping efforts.

This analysis serves as a critical first step in addressing the broader research question of how the four peacekeeping operations, along with the Office of the Chief Coordinator of Peacekeeping in the Middle East and the Office of Special Political Affairs, influenced the diplomatic and security landscape of the Israel-Arab conflict between 1967 and 1982. By dissecting the operational and tactical collaboration among these entities, this chapter lays the groundwork for a holistic examination of their collective impact on the conflict's resolution and management. It underscores the necessity of considering the UN's peacekeeping architecture as an interdependent system, where the strategic interplay between its components shapes the overall effectiveness of its peacekeeping efforts.

In conclusion, the utilization of Complexity Theory to analyse IOC within the UN's peacekeeping operations in the Middle East has illuminated the critical role of collaboration in enhancing the missions' operational capabilities. This foundational analysis not only contributes to our understanding of the UN's operational dynamics during a pivotal period in the Israel-Arab conflict but also sets the stage for a comprehensive exploration of the UN's strategic impact on the diplomatic and security dimensions of the conflict.