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An architecture for peace: deciphering the UN's multidimensional approach to the Israel - Arab Conflict (1967 - 1982)

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Chapter 2

Foundations and Frameworks: Tracing the Israel-Arab Conflict and the Evolution of the UN's Peacekeeping Architecture

This chapter endeavours to unravel the genesis and evolution of the conflict and, concurrently, spotlight the role, successes and challenges of the UN as it sought to navigate the tempestuous waters of the Middle East. To achieve this, the chapter draws a cohesive narrative that does justice to both the enormity of the conflict and the multidimensional involvement of the UN. As a means to ensure clarity and chronological coherence, the chapter introduces every part of the architecture in the sequence of its deployment. To commence, we will delve into the roots of the Israel-Arab conflict, tracing its origins, major events and the resultant geopolitical landscape. This foundational understanding is vital, for it sets the stage upon which the UN made its entry and shaped its interventions.

Following this, the chapter critically assesses the early forays of the UN into the conflict, one of its highlights being UNTSO's deployment and the involvement of the Office for Special Political Affairs. These initial steps marked the beginning of a long and intricate dynamic between the UN, Israel and the entire Middle East.

The chapter then transitions to an in-depth exploration of the UN's interventions between 1948 and 1967, a period that saw a mix of tensions, confrontations and tentative truces. It is during these two pivotal decades that the UN's position was formulated, its record of accomplishment established and its challenges magnified. Subsequently, the narrative introduces the remaining parts of the architecture post-1967: UNEF II, UNDOF, the Office of Chief Coordinator and UNIFIL. Each of these entities brought with it a distinct mandate, operational challenges and diplomatic nuances, all set against the backdrop of the larger Israel-Arab narrative.

This chapter discusses each of these actors and their mandate and introduces their leadership. The sub-sections on UNTSO, UNEF II and UNDOF draw significantly from a

Working Paper drafted for the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations¹¹ (UNA, 1977). Moreover, the sub-sections on the Chief Coordinator, OUSGSPA and UNIFIL draw information from the Archives and scholarly contributions from some key players who published books and papers after their departure.

The introductory overview goes into much more detail on UNTSO, OUSGSPA and the Office of Chief Coordinator of UN peacekeeping in the Middle East. The section also discusses UNEF II, UNIFIL and UNDOF; however, because their establishment and functioning are the focus of Chapters 3 and 4, this Chapter limits itself to a brief introduction.

In summation, this chapter aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the dynamic interplay between the Israel-Arab conflict and the UN's evolving role. By the end of this exposition, readers should have a lucid understanding of the multifaceted architecture of the UN's peacekeeping and mediation efforts in the region up to 1967, setting the stage for deeper dives in subsequent chapters.

The Israel-Arab Conflict: A Never-Ending Quagmire

The Israel-Arab conflict is a protracted multi-dimensional conflict between the State of Israel, its Arab neighbours and the Palestinian people. The conflict started in the late 19th century when nationalist sentiments began within both Jewish and Arabic populations. Both peoples claimed they had the right to self-determination and denounced Ottoman and later British occupation and control over the area (Bickerton & Klausner, 2017). The conflict intensified after the end of World War II due to the British withdrawal from the area and the rising tension between Arabs and Jews who lived there. In 1948, after a period of upheaval and civil war, the Zionists established the State of Israel. Creating a Jewish State at the heart of the Middle East led to wars, border disputes, and a complex web of political and security issues. In the first 30 years of Israel's existence, the country fought multiple battles with its Arab neighbours.

¹¹ The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34) conducts in-depth reviews of all operations and provides recommendations. The Secretary-General responds to these recommendations through yearly reports outlining to what extent the Secretariat complied with the Committee's suggestions. For more on C34 see: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/recommendations-of-special-committee-peacekeeping-operations-c34>

However, the Yom Kippur War of 1973 was the last conventional war Israel fought with its neighbours (Rabinovich, 2004). The conflict's epicentre moved from the grievances the neighbouring countries had with Israel to the complex issue of the status of the Palestinian people. Israel's establishment resulted in the displacement of more than half a million Palestinians who became refugees. This has led to a long-standing demand for a Palestinian state and refugees' right to return to their original homes. In 1964, the Palestinian people created the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as a political and paramilitary organisation that claimed Israel was an occupying force, which they pledged to fight (Irfan, 2020).

Israel-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian Conflicts

For this study, it is paramount to highlight the two different angles of this overarching conflict: the 'Israel-Arab' and the 'Israeli-Palestinian' conflicts. While they are part of one holistic strife and are inextricably interdependent, they have slightly different dynamics.

The Israel-Arab conflict refers to the disputes and tensions between Israel and its neighbouring Arab countries, such as Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Israel fought several conventional wars with its neighbours, including the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 1967 Six-Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Over time, Israel has forged peace agreements with some Arab neighbours, notably Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994. But the Israel-Arab conflict maintains broader geopolitical considerations that affect dynamics, bringing into play regional rivalries, balances of power and vast ideological differences (Bickerton & Klausner, 2017).

Over time, the conflict has evolved. After the Yom Kippur War, with the help of the UN¹², Israel signed disengagement agreements with Syria and Egypt, which lowered the tension and reduced the chances for war. In 1978, Israel and Egypt stunned the region and the world when they signed the Camp David Accords (Kuruvilla, 2022). In 1994, Israel signed a Peace Treaty with Jordan. Furthermore, the Abraham Accords of 2020 normalised relationships between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, and later with Sudan and Morocco (Guzansky & Marshall, 2020). The political landscape in the region also continuously

¹² See Chapters 3 and 4

changed. The decline of pan-Arabism and the growing rivalry between Shia and Sunni countries affected the conflict, and many countries in the Middle East began to engage with Israel. These shifts took place *even though* the Palestinian question remained unresolved. While all these treaties and accords pledge to tackle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, they have not succeeded.

In contrast, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict predominantly revolves around the political aspirations of the Palestinian people and their plight for statehood, involving the Israeli occupation and settlement expansion in the Gaza Strip¹³, the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Moreover, the Palestinian people have remained bitterly divided and did not speak with one voice. These two issues make finding a lasting solution to the conflict almost impossible (Bickerton & Klausner, 2017; Tessler, 2009).

In 1974, the General Assembly passed Resolution 3236, reaffirming Palestinian people's rights and recognising the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as their representative. Furthermore, the Assembly granted the PLO observer status¹⁴, which allowed it to participate in General Assembly sessions and have a permanent observer mission in New York to represent Palestinian interests. After the Yom Kippur War, the United States, the Soviet Union and the UN Secretariat prepared the Geneva Peace Conference through which they hoped to find a regional solution. However, Chapter 4 discusses how Israel excluded the PLO from the negotiating table while they engaged with Syria and, more importantly, Egypt. Chapter 5 illustrates that the Camp David Accords marked the first and last time Israel signed a peace treaty before meaningfully discussing the Palestinian issue.

Another fundamental issue at play is the status of Jerusalem. Israelis and Palestinians both claim the ancient city as their capital. After the 1948 War, Israel and Jordan each controlled half of the city. The former set up most government institutions in West Jerusalem, while the

¹³During the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel captured the Gaza Strip. In 2005, it unilaterally withdrew all 8,000 settlers and disbanded all 21 settlements. Israel and Egypt maintain a blockade over Gaza which prevents the free flow of people, goods and services.

¹⁴ The General Assembly and the Security Council both adopted resolutions declaring Israel's activities in East Jerusalem as illegal. For more on Jerusalem's legal status see Klein (2008).

latter held the East, including the Old City (Sebag Montefiore, 2011). During the Six-Day War, Israel captured East Jerusalem and declared¹⁵ Jerusalem its indivisible capital.

During the 1970s, the PLO became influential in the Middle East, primarily in Jordan and Southern Lebanon. In 1982, Israel invaded Southern Lebanon to destroy the PLO and remove it from Lebanon altogether. As a result, the 1980s were a lost decade in conflict resolution. Chapter 5 provides an in-depth analysis of the conflict's evolution, the increasingly pressing importance of solving the Palestinian question, and the role of the United Nations.

The United Nations & Israel-Arab Conflict

Throughout the conflict's seven decades, multiple countries and international entities have gotten involved either in maintaining international peace and security or in their self-interest, usually a mixture. However, without a doubt, the United Nations (UN) is the organisation that has spent the most time and resources on this conflict. "It is often remarked that the United Nations devoted more time to the Arab-Israeli conflict than any other matter in its history" (Forsythe, 1972, p. 705). It is telling that in 1972, scholars and even diplomats already saw the Israel-Arab conflict as one of the most cumbersome and protracted challenges the UN had to face. This trend continued for decades to come. The organization began its work in the conflict less than two years after the Member States ratified the Charter.

The UN in the Middle East: UNSCOP, UNPAC and Baptism by Fire

Between 1946 and 1948, the political and social situation in the British Mandate Palestine was immensely challenging. During this period, violence between Jews and Arabs escalated dramatically. The situation became even more difficult with the large influx of Jewish migrants who arrived in the region after surviving the horrors of the Holocaust. The newly created UN, which officially began in 1945, started to deal with the conflict almost as soon as it began its operations (Ben-Dror, 2007).

The United Kingdom, which administered Palestine and Transjordan, brought the future of the region to the UN's agenda. London realised it was unable to keep control over the area,

¹⁵ In 2012, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 67/19, which elevated Palestine from "observer entity" to "non-member observer state". This upgraded status allowed Palestine to join certain international treaties and organisations without being a UN Member State.

and despite the lobbying efforts of both Arabs and Jews, London was unwilling to make a unilateral decision on the future. Therefore, in 1947 the United Kingdom officially brought the matter to the attention of the General Assembly.

The request put the newly founded organisation in a difficult situation. The Security Council members had split views, and the Secretariat did not have experience dealing with such a complex situation. This moved the General Assembly to adopt Resolution 106 (S-1) on 15 May 1947, establishing the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). The Assembly entrusted the Committee with the responsibility of conducting an in-depth study of the situation and issuing recommendations. The Resolution states that UNSCOP “shall have the widest powers to ascertain and record facts and to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine” (1947). UNSCOP had 11 Member States¹⁶ each of which appointed two diplomats to participate in the proceedings. The Assembly decided to exclude the permanent members of the Security Council (P5) from joining UNSCOP. The Committee visited the area, conducted hearings and collected testimonies from various stakeholders, including Jewish and Arab representatives. In addition, the parties lobbied the Secretary-General in New York (Ben-Dror, 2014).

In September 1947, UNSCOP submitted its report to the General Assembly, presenting two proposals: a majority plan recommending the partition of Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states, with an international administration for Jerusalem and a minority plan supporting a federal state composed of Jewish and Arab provinces. Ultimately, the majority plan served as the basis for the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine (Ben-Dror, 2014). The partition plan provided territory for the Zionist and Arab peoples to each establish their political units, albeit the former got the lion’s share of the land.

Interestingly, UNSCOP wanted Jerusalem to be an international protectorate. Due to the city’s historical and religious significance for all three Abrahamic religions, the Committee proposed that it fall outside the partition plan. UNSCOP proposed that the UN Trusteeship Council appoint a governor and oversee the overall administration of Jerusalem and

¹⁶ Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia.

Bethlehem (Golani, 1995). However, the plan never came to fruition, and Jerusalem became central to the Israel-Arab conflict.

The Secretariat was heavily involved in translation of the report into an operating plan. The Secretary-General established a task force to gather all available information and prepare documents and briefing notes for UNSCOP. The Secretary-General dispatched Bunche to work as Principal Secretary of UNSCOP and, simultaneously, mandated all senior management of the Secretariat to provide UNSCOP with the necessary assistance. Bunche's team drafted the *Handbook for Members of the United Nations Commission for Palestine*, which provided an in-depth analysis of the situation, the challenges of implementing the partition plan and policy recommendations (Ben-Dror, 2007).

On 29 November 1947, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 181, also known as the "Partition Plan for Palestine". The resolution called for establishing separate Jewish and Arab states in Palestine, with Jerusalem under international administration. The resolution envisioned a gradual transition from British administration to establishing a governance mechanism in the two states and established the United Nations Palestine Commission (UNPAC)¹⁷ to assist in the implementation. To that effect, the resolution granted UNPAC executive functions to facilitate power transfer from the United Kingdom.

Unfortunately, UNPAC faced two significant challenges. First, the United Kingdom Government was unwilling to coordinate its retreat with UNPAC and stated it would retain control over the area until two weeks before their departure (Leonard, 1949). The British argued they would not support the Commission's work unless both sides accepted the partition plan. Second, the situation on the ground was ungovernable. Indeed, the Commission reported to the General Assembly that "As a result of Arab armed opposition to the resolution of the General Assembly, counter or preventive measures taken by the organised Jewish community, and the continued activity of Jewish extremist elements, Palestine is now a battlefield" (United Nations Palestine Commission, 1948, p. 10).

¹⁷ While similar in name, UNSCOP and UNPAC were very different entities. UNSCOP was a fact-finding committee, while UNPAC had executive and legislative authority over the area.

The resolution was highly controversial. On the one hand, the Jewish Agency, on behalf of the Zionist authorities on the ground, accepted the plan, as it saw an opportunity to establish its State. That said, it expressed reservations on issues such as the status of Jerusalem. Meanwhile, the Palestinians and the entire Arab world bitterly rejected the plan, claiming that it undermined the self-determination rights – and disregarded the human rights – of Palestinians. The day after the vote, a civil war broke out. The United Kingdom Government could not maintain control and announced British retreat by 15 May 1948 at the latest, and the first few months of 1948 saw heavy violence and quasi-anarchy. Both sides ramped up their efforts to secure their power to fill the vacuum (Golani, 2001).

The Zionist authorities took quick and decisive steps, and on 14 May 1948, David Ben-Gurion read the Declaration of Independence, which established the State of Israel¹⁸. Immediately after, Egypt, Transjordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, with the assistance of Saudi Arabia, declared war on Israel and proceeded to launch an air assault on Tel Aviv and a ground invasion across the newly founded state. The battle lasted between May 1948 and March 1949. Against all odds, Israel repelled its invaders and secured its territory. Israel had a clear advantage over its enemies by the end of the conflict, but after fighting for more than a year, it as well as Palestine had suffered tremendous human and economic consequences, which encouraged both sides to agree on a cease-fire (Morris, 2009). The Security Council adopted multiple resolutions demanding a halt to the violence and exerted political pressure on both sides (UNA, 1977).

The impact of the Independence War was profound in territorial and political terms. Israel controlled around 78 percent of the territory – far more than the partition plan outlined. The remaining 22 percent did not constitute a Palestinian State. Instead, Jordan annexed the West Bank, and Egypt asserted control over the Gaza Strip (Bickerton & Klausner, 2017).

As Israel secured its territory, many Palestinians were either expelled or fled in fear of violence. The refugees sought shelter in neighbouring countries, in the West Bank and Gaza

¹⁸ The UN admitted Israel as a Member State in a two-step process in early 1949. On 4 March, the Security Council adopted Resolution 69, which recommended to the General Assembly to officially accept Israel's application. The vote was nine in favour, one against (Egypt) and one abstention (United Kingdom). On 11 May, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 273, which officially accepted Israel as a UN Member State. The Resolution passed with 37 votes in favour, 12 against and 9 abstentions.

Strip, in turn overwhelming the region with refugees and creating a humanitarian crisis. In response, the General Assembly created the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) with the aim to aid and support the displaced Palestinian population (Peters & Gal, 2009). The unresolved issue of Palestinian statehood haunts the conflict – and the UN – still today. “These dramatic changes greatly influenced the events which followed, including the regional wars in 1967, 1969-70, 1973, 1978-1982” (Theobald, 2015, p. 122).

UN Mediation and the Rhodes Conference

The Secretary-General and his team were instrumental in negotiating armistice agreements between Israel and her immediate neighbours, known as the 1949 Armistice Agreements. These were born from the Rhodes Conference, for which Bunche's diplomatic efforts promoted dialogue and fostered compromise between the conflicting parties. By setting up his headquarters on the relatively isolated island that was the conference's namesake, he conducted indirect negotiations with the Israeli and Arab representatives, keeping the talks away from the media spotlight and reducing external pressures.

Bunche's persistence and diplomatic skills were instrumental in overcoming numerous obstacles and deadlocks during the negotiations (Moghalu, 1997). He built trust between the parties and facilitated the signing of separate armistice agreements between Israel and each of the four Arab countries involved in the conflict. The Agreements established ceasefire lines, facilitated the exchange of prisoners of war and set up demilitarised zones and other security arrangements (Jonah J. O., 2014). Bunche's involvement in the negotiation process started a pattern whereby the Secretary-General appointed a senior official to represent him in the negotiation processes after a war. To this point, this thesis critically assesses the accomplishment of all UN mediators between 1967 and 1982.

While the Agreements eased the tensions, they greatly favoured Israel and left the underlying grievances untouched. As soon as the parties left Rhodes, two things became clear. First, while the guns fell silent, a subsequent war was almost inevitable. Both sides felt extreme animosity against each other, and the Arab world bitterly denounced Israel's territorial gains. On the other hand, Israel had still set its eyes on reclaiming Jerusalem as its

indivisible capital and sought to consolidate its territory. Kissinger stated at the Geneva Peace Conference of 1973¹⁹: “When the history of our era is written, it will speak not of a series of Arab-Israeli wars, but of one war broken by periods of uneasy armistices and temporary cease-fires” (1974, p. 21). The 1949 War became the opening salvo of a never-ending conflict. Second, the Security Council needed a verification mechanism to secure the implementation of the Armistice Agreements. Therefore, it decided to deploy the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).

UNTSO: The Keystone of the Architecture

In the history of UN peacekeeping, UNTSO is one-of-a-kind. “It is a highly specialised force, unique in its duties, organisational structure, function and longevity” (Nachmias, 1996, p. 3). The operation was the Security Council’s first response to the Israel-Arab conflict, which allowed it to build immense institutional memory and relationships with the key stakeholders. Unlike the rest of the actors within the architecture, UNTSO had a quarter of a century under its belt *before* the period this dissertation covers. Therefore, this summary covers only a brief glimpse into the operation. The work of Andrew Theobald (2015; 2009) provides critical insights into UNTSO, while Rosalyn Higgins (1970; 1968) gathers all relevant primary sources and analyses them through the lenses of politics and law. UNTSO’s regional mandate allows the operation to be a regional player, it has liaison offices in every capital, and it has longstanding relationships with critical actors in every country. Moreover, the officers working at UNTSO are highly trained in observation, reporting and even mediation between countries that are at odds with each other.

Establishment and Authorization

UNTSO is the first and the oldest peacekeeping operation in the history of the UN. The primary mandate of UNTSO is to monitor and maintain ceasefires and armistice agreements between Israel and its Arabic neighbours, including Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Since its inception, UNTSO has played a significant role in supporting the Council’s conflict management efforts in the region while adapting its work to the evolving dynamics of the Israel-Arab conflict (Higgins, 1970). The Security Council authorised UNTSO’s deployment

¹⁹ Chapter 4 discusses the Geneva Peace Conference at length.

through Resolution 50 (1948); however, Resolution 73 (1949) primarily outlined its mandate later. One of its main responsibilities was the supervision of the Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs) that were established as part of the separate armistice agreements signed between Israel and its neighbours in 1949 (see below for a detailed overview of this process). Each country had its own MAC with Israel, to which each side sent military representatives. UNTSO acted as the Chair of the MACs, and its observers investigated violations, eased tensions and served as an avenue for dialogue between the sides.

From 1949 to 1967, UNTSO faced significant challenges in managing the MACs. The parties did not trust each other, regularly violated the ceasefires and engaged in skirmishes. Moreover, the MACs never addressed deeper issues, such as border disputes or access to resources such as water. Neither UNTSO nor the MACs had the necessary tools to resolve the conflict's structural issues (Theobald, 2009).

Organisation and Deployment

Between 1948 and 1949, the head of UNTSO was the UN Mediator (see below). The Chief of Staff (CoS) coordinated the operation's work in the field. The observers worked in Jerusalem, Ramallah, Tel Aviv, Gaza and Afrula. Moreover, given UNTSO's regional mandate, it stationed observers and liaison officers in Damascus, Beirut, Amman and various ports in Egypt (UNA, 1977). Unlike any other operation, UNTSO is present in multiple countries, which allows it to create relationships with key stakeholders such as government officials, military personnel and even the civilian population (Salama, 2023).

In 1949, the UN Mediator finalised his mission, and the CoS became the Head of UNTSO (Ben-Dror, 2016). Under the Secretary-General's supervision, the CoS's responsibilities include directing and coordinating the work of UNTSO's military observers, reviewing their reports and briefing the Secretariat. To that end, the CoS ensures that UNTSO deploys its observers and resources as efficiently as possible consistent with the mandate and operational requirements. The CoS has a team of military officers and civilians that supports the management of the operation. Among the civilian staff, UNTSO had a Political Affairs Officer, a Chief Administrative Officer, a Legal Advisor and a Public Information Officer (Theobald, 2009).

Between 1967 and 1982, UNTSO had the following Chiefs of Staff

Name	Nationality	Rank	Period
Odd Bull	United States	Lt General	1963 – 1970
Ensio Siilasvuo	Finland	Maj General	August 1970 – October 1973
Richard W. Bunworth	Ireland	Colonel	Nov 1973 – March 1974 (Acting)
Bengt Liljestr�and	Sweden	Maj General	April 1974 – August 1975
K.D Howard	Australia	Colonel	August – December 1975 (Acting)
Emmanuel A. Erskine	Ghana	Maj General	January 1976 – March 1978
William O’Callaghan	Ireland	Lt General	April 1978 – June 1979
Olof Forsgren	Sweden	Colonel	June 1979 – January 1980 (Acting)
Erkki R. Kaira	Finland	Maj General	February 1980 – February 1981
Emmanuel A. Erskine	Ghana	Maj General	February 1981 – May 1986

Over the years, a revolving door became prominent in the architecture. Serving in an UNTSO leadership position became a *de facto* requirement to serve as Force Commander elsewhere in the region. UNTSO’s network and the blend of the political and military tasks the CoS faced on a daily basis provided such an invaluable and specific expertise that the Secretariat,

wisely, decided to use. For example, Siilasvuo and Erskine both went on to serve as Force Commanders of other operations (UNEF II and UNIFIL respectively). Furthermore, after Erskine successfully set up UNIFIL, he went back to UNSTO for a very long tour, and Siilasvuo became Chief Coordinator. Along the same lines, as Chapter 3 discusses, UNTSO provided critical civilian and military personnel to the other operations, particularly at the onset.

Relationship with Host Countries

UNTSO's relationship with its host countries is vital to effectively implementing its mandate. Unlike the other operations on the ground (and anywhere in the world), UNTSO has *five* host countries and is the only operation that works inside Israel²⁰. The CoS served as the main point of contact between UNTSO and the Secretariat, providing regular reports on the operation's activities and developments in the region as well as briefing the Security Council. Additionally, the Chief of Staff liaises with the governments of the conflicting parties, other UN agencies, and international stakeholders to facilitate dialogue, coordinate efforts and manage the conflict. Therefore, the operation is the heart of the architecture, so when the Secretariat created the role of Chief Coordinator, it decided to locate it at the Government House so he could work closely with the CoS.

Between 1949 and 1967, UNTSO liaison activities passed through the MACs because all countries sent high-ranking officials to the meetings (Theobald, 2009). Furthermore, the CoS had a direct line to all foreign ministers for urgent matters. During this period, UNTSO monitored the ceasefire lines and armistice agreements. Of course, UNTSO's overall success and the relationship rely on the hosts' willingness to keep the peace. Therefore, UNTSO's relationships and general *modus operandi* changed after every war. During this study's time, UNTSO had to deal with both the Six-Day War, Yom Kippur and Operation Litani. Chapter 3 illustrates the critical role UNTSO played in setting up the rest of the operations in the region.

The operation is as old as the country, and the connection between the two is profound – albeit extremely complex. Israel never trusted the UN as an organisation or inter-

²⁰ According to Israel, UNTSO Headquarters is *inside* Israeli soil. The neighbours and the Security Council dispute this. However, this detail warrants mentioning because UNTSO is the only operation, which has Israel's *consent* to work inside what the country sees as its territory.

governmental forum. Indeed, the Jewish State questioned its willingness and ability to foster peace in a manner that does not threaten its national security and territorial integrity. Israel does not believe that the UN is an impartial actor and therefore does not fully trust its actions (Comay, 1983). Over the years, Israel complained that the General Assembly became a politicised issue whereby the resolutions adopted were partially against it (Becker, Hillman, Potrafke, & Schwemmer, 2015; Shattan, 1981). In turn, the General Assembly and the Secretariat claim that Israel's occupation of the Palestinian Territories is one of the most challenging obstacles on the road to peace. Both sides make valid points. However, for the most part, Israel and the Secretariat had a respectful working relationship.

In 1956, Israel stopped sending delegates to the Israel-Egypt MAC. UNEF I took over the observation and liaison duties²¹. In 1967, after the Six-Day War, Israel stopped cooperating with all MACs (Mcdermott, 1996). However, Israel maintained a working relationship with the CoS concerning the Israel-Syria and Suez Canal Sectors. The Ministry of Defence acted as UNTSO's counterpart in the Israeli government. While Israel remained suspicious of the UN, it accepted its mediation efforts (Oren, 1992). However, Israel had profound reservations regarding UNTSO's Headquarters, which serves as an illustrative of this challenging relationship.

Israel, UNTSO and the Government House

The British built the Government House in the early 1930s; it served as the residence and office of the British High Commissioner for Palestine. The Government House is located at the intersection of East and West Jerusalem. In preparation for its departure, the British Government handed over the Government House to the International Red Cross, which moved in as soon as the British vacated the premises. The Red Cross kept possession of the Government House for a short time. It departed just a few months later and handed the building to the UN (Leci, 2017).

²¹ UNTSO did not stop working in the Sinai Peninsula. Rather, it worked *through* UNEF I. This was the first iteration of Inter-Operation Collaboration between peacekeeping operations. See Chapter 3.

UNTSO officially moved in mid-1949 (UNA, 1977). Neither the Red Cross nor the UN formally informed or consulted the Israeli Government about the decisions regarding the Government House. However, the decision to use the Government House as UNTSO's headquarters had the support of the Security Council, which meant Israel had to accept this, and it begrudgingly did. In 1967, the Government House became one of the many pawns of the conflict. At the onset of the Six-Day War, Jordanian troops took control of the house. The Secretary-General sent an urgent cable to King Hussein requesting the immediate return of the complex to UNTSO (UNA, 1967). However, the Jordanians did not have a chance to respond because the IDF took control of the property on the same day and refused to give UN Staff Members access to it. As such, UNTSO became homeless and incommunicado (Siilasvuo, 1992).

The Israeli government took the opportunity to express its discontent over UNTSO's presence in Jerusalem. Indeed, the Israeli authorities refused to return the building to UNTSO. Israel treated UNTSO as an unwelcome guest whose 'oversight' it rejected on the principle that Jerusalem is its capital, an issue they considered beyond discussion. Israel's unwillingness to return the Government House to UNTSO forced the Secretary-General to bring the issue to the Security Council. In a report in (1967), the Secretary-General bitterly protested that neither side protected the integrity of the operation. Moreover, he demanded that the Israeli government return the Government House immediately. The Council wholeheartedly and unanimously agreed with the Secretary-General and began to pressure Israel to comply (Higgins, 1968).

The Office of Special Political Affairs began a negotiation process with the Permanent Representation of Israel to the UN, which lasted the entire summer of 1967. Israel stalled during the whole month of July. On 4 July, the Secretary-General requested to begin the process of moving back into the compound two days later. Israel did not reply for weeks. The Secretary-General insisted and re-engaged the Permanent Representative. After significant back-and-forth, they reached an agreement.

On 11 August, the Secretary-General reported that Israel agreed to return an area, which includes "all buildings and approximately one-third of the area in the Government House premises as constituted when UNTSO was forced to evacuate on 5 June 1967" (1967, Para

3). The report concluded that while the Secretariat rejected and denounced Israel's decision to return the compound to UNTSO partially, the situation was so urgent that the Secretary-General accepted it as a first step "without prejudice to all rights and claims of the United Nations to the occupancy and possession of the whole of the premises" (Para. 8). On 22 August, the Permanent Representative of Israel sent a letter to the Secretary-General reconfirming Israel's acceptance of UNTSO's return.

The possession and usage of the Government House remained a contentious subject in Israeli politics. In 1970 an article in the *Jerusalem Post* claimed that the Israeli government adopted a plan to construct housing units in the Government House's area, as it classified it as a residential area. The Secretary-General, once again, brought the issue before the Security Council and sent multiple letters to the Israeli Permanent Representation, which did not submit official responses. Israel had to accept UNTSO's usage and occupancy of the Government House. The Security Council remained unanimously supportive of keeping UNTSO at the compound. While Israel succeeded in reducing the area of the compound, UNTSO will not move from the compound until the day it withdraws from Jerusalem altogether. To this day, the Government House serves as the heart of the UN's work in the region.

Over the decades, UNTSO has had to adapt to various challenges, including restrictions imposed by the Israeli government and the evolving dynamics of peacekeeping in a region marked by persistent conflict. Despite these challenges, UNTSO's commitment to peace through unarmed observation and mediation remains a vital part of the international community's efforts in the Middle East (Howard, 2019)

Budget

UNTSO's financial arrangement is another area where the operation differs from the rest of the architecture. The funding comes from the regular budget of the UN (Higgins, 1970; UNA, 1977). From a budgetary perspective, the Secretariat labels it as a "special mission," keeping it separate from the budget of other peacekeeping operations. This is significant and unique because UN entities with a temporary mandate do not constitute a permanent line item on the budget. The Security Council and the Secretariat see the operation as a key *de facto*

permanent²² player in the region who can represent them in the field. UNTSO's status caused controversy and trouble for the Secretariat.

At various points in UNTSO's history, countries in the Soviet sphere of influence²³ and Arab countries publicly stated they did not wish to contribute to UNTSO's budget because they believed that the operation's quasi-permanence goes against the spirit under which the Security Council deployed it. These countries claimed none of the six organs of the UN ever authorised UNTSO to become a permanent entity of the UN System. In addition, in 1978²⁴ when the Security Council withdrew UNEF II, the Secretary-General stated his intentions to keep UNTSO in the Sinai Peninsula to avoid creating a vacuum. The Arab world denounced the decision, seeing it as indirect assistance to implementing the Camp David Accords (which they also denounced) and decided not to contribute to the budget. Nevertheless, the discussion of UNTSO's budget never moved beyond political posturing. The Security Council wholeheartedly believes in UNTSO's relevance and its value-for-money. Therefore, the operation continues to receive its funding.

Strength of the Force

UNTSO only has officers whose rank spans from Captain to Lt Colonel. Unlike the other operations, UNTSO has had officers from the P5 countries (Jonah, 1975). The Operation is relatively small. After the Armistice Agreements, UNTSO had approximately 500 UNMOs. The number decreased during the 1960s; by 1967, UNTSO only had 128 UNMOs working in the entire AO. Surprisingly, the Security Council did not increase the number of observers immediately after the Six-Day War, the operation dealt with the aftermath of this transformative war with the resources it had *before*, which proved to be a daunting challenge. After the Yom Kippur War, the UNTSO re-deployed UNMOs to UNEF II and UNDOF. Chapter 3 discusses how important UNTSO's quick and expert re-deployment and subsequent integration into the other operations was. Between December 1973 and 1982,

²² Of course, neither the Council nor the Secretary-General would ever make this statement in public however, UNTSO's longevity, legal and budgetary status speak for themselves.

²³ Albania, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Byelorussian SSR, Ukrainian SSR, and the Soviet Union,

²⁴ The Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the UN (who sat as a non-permanent member on the Security Council) sent a letter to the Secretary-General to that effect on behalf of the Arab world. See Chapter 5.

UNTSO had 298 UNMOs, which worked in the operation proper or within the Observer Group Golan (OGG-UNDOF) or Observer Group Lebanon (OGL-UNIFIL) (Myers & Dorn, 2022). UNTSO officers, by virtue of their experience and seniority, bring a depth of understanding and credibility to their roles. They engage directly with local communities, leaders, and influencers to mediate and provide a mechanism for communication between otherwise implacable enemies. This long-standing presence and engagement have made UNTSO an integral part of the fabric of life in southern Lebanon, and the Golan Heights contributing to regional moderation and facilitating indirect communication between Israel and its neighbours (Howard, 2019).

The Secretary-General and the Office for Special Political Affairs liaised with the Member States to request troops. The issue was not straightforward, given that Israel did not grant access to its territory to soldiers from countries with which it did not have diplomatic relations. Furthermore, Syria and Egypt also reserved the right to refuse contributions from specific countries (UNA, 1977). Therefore, the Secretary-General had to ensure high-quality officers only from certain countries. The reasons why Arab countries refused to accept specific contributions were less precise or methodical than Israel's are equally, if not more, problematic.

UNTSO's successes and relevance are often underestimated. This dissertation highlights the manner in which UNTSO supported the rest of the architecture. The Security Council never gave the mandate or resources to the operation to solve the conflict; the operation assisted the parties behind the scenes. In addition, "even during the worst moments of Arab-Israeli tension, UNTSO successfully mediated disputes [...] not as a neutral observer, but as an integral part of the management of Arab-Israeli hostilities" (Theobald, 2009, p. 171). The fact that the conflict is still happening does not undermine UNTSO but stresses the importance of its strategic political position, its mandate and its role in preserving the cease-fire as much as possible. Moreover, as we will see, its institutional memory has been instrumental in the deployment and management of the other missions on the region.

Nachmias (1996) also reaffirms the operation's value. However, it also remains critical of its achievements. The author claims that UNTSO cannot foster peace; therefore, it failed.

Moreover, the author stresses that UNTSO is an operation with a mandate to manage inter-state conflict, which makes it outdated. The rising power and influence of non-state actors such as the Hezbollah and Hamas movement that currently governs the Gaza Strip have further complicated the work of UNTSO because these actors do not 'consent' to have the operation working in the areas they control, and they constantly undermine it.

Overall, the literature consensus is that UNTSO is a unique operation that provides an underappreciated service to the UN. While UNTSO cannot "keep the peace," the Security Council does not expect the operation to do so. Securing a long-term structural peace agreement is "above their pay grade" (Novosseloff, 2022, p. 26). UNTSO continues to perform its duties discretely and expertly.

The UN Office for Special Political Affairs: The Golden Age of UN Staff

The Secretary-General is the chief political officer and senior diplomat of the UN (Johnstone, 2003). The UN Charter grants him or her the authority to bring issues he considers threatening to international peace and security to the Security Council under Article 99 of the Charter (Traub, 2007). Moreover, to different degrees, the Council and the General Assembly expect the Secretary-General to assist in the UN's overall mission of keeping peace throughout the world by way of using his or her good offices.

While the Charter does not mention peacekeeping as a principle or activity, it quickly became one of the organisation's most visible, expensive and complex endeavours. Two examples of the immense pressure the Secretary-General faced were the Israel-Arab conflict and the decolonisation process. Both issues were complex and required the Secretary-General's involvement. It was Dag Hammarskjöld who, during his tenure as Secretary-General, created a support system, the UN Office for Special Political Affairs (OUSGSPA) "in response to the Cold War stalemates occurring in the Secretariat. They took on projects that were not specifically under the mandate of the Secretariat, like conflict control" (UNA, n.d.). To prevent the superpowers from blocking the office, Hammarskjöld initially decided to have two concurrent Under-Secretaries-General (USG), one American and one Soviet.

Gradually, both Hammarskjöld and his successor U Thant delegated the authority of the day-to-day management of the operations to the USGs. “This office exercises on behalf of the Secretary-General the command and control functions of the force. Political and military instructions from Headquarters to the Force Commanders” (Jonah, 1991, p. 79). The Office, given its mandate, stood at the epicentre of the most sensitive issues in the Secretary-General’s agenda. Because all UN Chiefs entrusted them to tackle such challenges, this office enjoyed a considerable latitude to strategize and counsel the Secretary-General. This era can be rightly termed the “golden age” of UN staffers. Luminary figures like Bunche and Urquhart wielded their significant discretion, which tackled the issues of the day and, at the same time, built the Secretariat’s political space and *modus operandi*. Indeed, they set the gold standard for future generations of UN Staff. For this dissertation, three officials are fundamental: Dr Ralph Bunche of the United States, Sir Brian Urquhart of the United Kingdom and Roberto Guyer of Argentina.

Bunche (1904–1971) was an American political scientist with an extraordinary UN career. Bunche's time as a UN Staff Member started in 1946 when he joined the organisation as the Director of the Trusteeship Division, overseeing the administration of trust territories. Secretaries-General Lie and Hammarskjöld held Bunche in very high regard (Jonah J. O., 2014). They trusted him to manage some of the UN’s most challenging problems, most notably the Israel-Arab conflict. Bunche served as the UN Mediator on Palestine and chaired the Rhodes Peace Conference through which Israel and its neighbours signed the 1949 Armistice Agreements. In recognition of his role, he received the Nobel Peace Prize. Between 1955 and 1970²⁵, Bunche worked as co-USG of OUSGSPA, during which the UN was involved in a few major political developments such as the deployment of UNEF I in 1956, the Jarring Mission after the Six-Day War. Without question, Bunche was one of the most influential UN Staff Members, who ensured the Secretariat always had a seat at the table (Lyman, 2004).

Urquhart (1919–2021) was one of the first UN Staff Members to join the organisation. Urquhart served in the British Army during World War II as an intelligence officer; he was

²⁵ During his tenure, Bunche had seven different co-USGs. His institutional memory, experience and diplomatic skills became unparalleled. For two detailed studies of Bunche’s career, see Raustiala (2023) & Urquhart (1998).

involved in planning Operation Overlord. He witnessed first-hand the horrors of the Holocaust when he entered the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp. As soon as the war finished, he began to work for the UN. In 1945, he worked for the Preparatory Commission of the UN and quickly became a close advisor to Trygve Lie. During Hammarskjöld's tenure, Urquhart worked closely with Bunche (his mentor) and eventually succeeded him as USG for OUSGSPA. For over 30 years at the UN, he was instrumental in shaping the Secretariat's *modus operandi*, managing the peacekeeping operation and supporting four Secretaries-General as a senior advisor (Fröhlich, 2021). Urquhart earned a reputation as a skilled diplomat and a gifted strategist involved in peacekeeping's strategic and operational aspects (Jonah, 1991).

After retirement, Urquhart became a prolific and influential writer. He wrote dozens of book chapters, journal articles and Op-Eds on the work of the UN, peacekeeping, and the history and politics of the Office of the UN Secretary-General. Moreover, Urquhart wrote biographies of Hammarskjöld and Bunche, and he wrote an autobiography. Concerning UN Peacekeeping in the Middle East, Urquhart authored multiple pieces that critically assessed the operations' past, present and future. His contributions to the literature are an invaluable asset to UN historians, and this dissertation is no exception.

Guyer (1923–2016) joined the UN in 1946. He served as the Secretary-General's Personal Representative to the Cyprus crisis and played a crucial role in designing UNFCYP. In 1971, he joined Urquhart as co-USG for OUSGSPA. Guyer was critical in the UN's involvement in the Israel-Arab conflict. He participated in the Geneva Peace Conference, coordinated the UN's peacekeeping operations in the Middle East, liaised with the superpowers and led high-level missions to the region. Guyer and Urquhart worked together throughout their UN careers; they had a very close working relationship and split the work evenly (Jonah J. O., 1991).

Between 1967 and 1982, the structure and governance of the OUSGSPA remained condensed and consistent. This was a rather small office, which required the USGs to be closely involved in day-to-day matters in the field. This dissertation highlights the office's efficiency and the limitations that it had.

The following section provides an overview of the peacekeeping architecture between 1948 and 1967 and sets the stage for the analysis.

Peacekeeping in the Middle East (1956 – 1967): A Military Overview

The peacekeeping architecture in the Middle East (or the principle of IOC, for that matter) did not start after the Yom Kippur War – and it certainly did not begin in Africa. It began in the Sinai Peninsula in 1956 and continued until 1967, when UNEF withdrew. This brief overview will outline how UNEF and UNTSO set the groundwork for military collaboration between peacekeeping operations

The Suez Canal Crisis of 1956 complicated the situation in the region considerably and, arguably, unnecessarily. Of course, Israel, the United Kingdom and France had a geopolitical interest in attacking Egypt; however, the war only tarnished the two European belligerents' reputations in the Arab world and, at the same time, made the prospect of peace between Israel and its neighbours even more unlikely (Bickerton & Klausner, 2017). The war proved to be "a debacle and a misguided exercise" (Cohen, 1968, p. 18) . Due to the implications left by military and political blunder, the Secretary-General had to react swiftly to prevent an escalation.

The Secretary-General submitted two reports²⁶ to the General Assembly in 48 hours, where he outlined his vision regarding the operation. These documents detailed the principles of peacekeeping: consent, impartiality and non-use of force. The Secretary-General had to navigate the difficulty of doing all of this without the Security Council's blessings in a conflict where two permanent members had boots on the ground (Alexandrowicz, 1962). While Hammarskjöld and Bunche worked on the political aspects, Urquhart sorted out the logistics.

It is important to stress that Urquhart²⁷ was the only senior staffer at the Secretariat with extensive military experience. With no blueprint in place and improvising all their work, Urquhart's team tackled all logistical challenges he could from New York; this included procurement, supply pipelines, establishment of bases and Observation Posts, and force

²⁶ UNGA/A/3289 on 4 November and UNGA/A/3290 on 6 November

²⁷ As Major in the British Army during World War II, he assisted in the planning of Operation Overlord and Operation Market Garden, to name a few.

protection. In addition, his team coordinated with the soon-to-be TCCs to ensure all contingents arrived in the Sinai Peninsula already knowing what the Secretariat was expecting of them (Urquhart, 1987). The diligence and effort paid off. Eleven days after the Secretariat started working on the first contingent arrived. UNEF was one of the quickest operations deployed to the field (Fleitz Jr, 2002).

Despite their almost complete improvisation, with little political cover or mandate from the Security Council, "the speed and efficiency with which UNEF was organised cannot be overstated. Hammarskjöld worked around the clock to get suitable contingents from ten nations, as well as the necessary logistical support" (Higgins, 1968, p. 261). The majority of the literature on UNEF's genesis certainly agrees with this sentiment. However, the literature often misses an essential element: UNTSO. For those 11 days between conceptualisation and deployment, the Secretariat needed to do something to lower the temperature, and this is where the assets in the field became invaluable.

Through UNTSO, the Secretariat had vast experience dealing with Israel, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan. UNTSO's regional mandate allowed it to serve as a regional conduit for consultation and liaison. Moreover, the operation staffed observation posts in the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights and the Israel-Lebanon border. The operation had an already-built infrastructure, which the other operations inherited.

The Secretariat requested UNTSO to play a decisive role almost immediately. UNTSO's Chief of Staff²⁸, General Tommy Burns of Canada, moved to the Sinai Peninsula and acted as the Force Commander. His appointment made sense; he was already commanding military observers working in the Peninsula, so he had first-hand knowledge of the terrain. In addition, the Israelis and Egyptians already knew who he was, and he knew who to talk to in times of crisis (Khoury, 1977). Burns took a handful of senior officers with him to assist in setting up UNEF's headquarters, *modus operandi* and welcome the contingents (United Nations General Assembly, 1956). The decision of moving UNTSO's Force Commander to a newly established operation became standard practice in the region.

²⁸ UNTSO's commander has the Title of 'Chief of Staff' whereas his counterparts across the other operations have the title of Force Commander.

UNTSO continued to staff the observation posts in the Sinai until UNEF's soldiers were ready to take on the role. This guaranteed continuity of service; the observers delivered daily reports to the Secretariat, which used them to design the incoming operation (Diehl, 2015). After UNEF settled, the two operations continued to communicate constantly for political and administrative affairs.

UNTSO provided an invaluable service to UNEF thorough its lifespan. While UNEF worked toward stabilising the Sinai, UNTSO had observers in Israel's other three borders. These peacekeepers had vast knowledge and experience in the conflict and served as the source of knowledge to UNEF (Theobald, 2009). UNTSO served as a permanent liaison with the Israeli government, and their commanders regularly met to discuss military, logistic and even political challenges. The benefit of having a peacekeeping operation with offices throughout the entire region paid off (Kohavi, 1980). UNTSO and UNEF I are the first two peacekeeping operations engaged in military IOC, and they were very successful at it. UNEF's conceptual framework considered that it could rely on an older, experienced operation that could navigate crises and provide knowledge.

Whether UNEF was successful remains a heated debate. Cohen (1968) argues that UNEF's successes are twofold. First, the operation provided a face-saving mechanism for the aggressors to withdraw. Perhaps more importantly, it was an effective buffer between Israel and Egypt in Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula. Bligh (2014) disagrees and stresses that the Security Council was not involved. The Secretary-General's micromanaging the operation, lack of funding and TCCs wanting to draw back their commitment made the mission unworkable. All these deficiencies rendered it unable to stop the Six-Day War.

Diehl (2015) takes a middle of the road approach. The author stresses that one of the key, unsung successes was that between 1957 and 1967, the region was quiet; the operation was successful in preventing a full-scale war. This analysis stresses that many skirmishes in the border regions and the overarching grievances between Israel and its neighbours were only growing. The result is quite good if one looks at the mandate and resources they worked with; unfortunately, ultimately, UNEF did not keep the peace.

UNEF II: A Short-lived Success

UNEF II was the Security Council's first response to the Yom Kippur War. On 25 October, a few days after the guns fell silent, the Council adopted Resolution 340 authorising UNEF II's deployment. The Resolution placed the overall management and supervision of the operation to the Secretary-General. The Security Council gave the Secretariat an extraordinarily tight deadline to have boots on the ground and construct a powerful buffer between the Egyptian military and the IDF. The mandate of UNEF II was to supervise the ceasefire between the warring parties and to oversee the disengagement of their forces, acting as a buffer zone to help prevent further hostilities within the East of the Suez Canal. In addition to monitoring the ceasefire and disengagement agreements, UNEF II also played a significant role in providing humanitarian assistance to the local population, as well as facilitating the return of prisoners of war (Diehl, 2015).

During its six years in the field, the operation had three Force Commanders, of which the first two came from UNTSO.

Name	Nationality	Rank	Period
Ensio Siilasvuo	Finland	Lt General	26 October 1973 – August 1975
Beng Liljenstrand	Sweden	Lt General	August 1975 – December 1976
Rais Abin	Indonesia	Maj General	December 1976 (acting) and 1977 – 1979

At the time of its deployment, UNEF II was one of the largest peacekeeping operations in the field. The Council authorised the initial deployment of 6,973 soldiers. However, the

operation's numbers varied over time; by 1976, UNEF II had 4,174 soldiers. Between 1967 and 1982, UNEF II had around 200 civilian staff.

UNEF II's relationship with its host country and with Israel had significant challenges. While both sides, generally, cooperated with the operation, the Secretariat did not manage to sign a Status-Of-Force-Agreement (UNA, 1977). A critical challenge was the operation's freedom of movement. Israel did not grant permission for movement within its territory to countries with whom it did not have diplomatic relations (Siilasvuo, 1992). While the Security Council demanded Israel to change its stance, Jerusalem usually refused. In 1974, at the personal request of the Secretary-General and Kissinger, Israel allowed Polish troops to travel from the Sinai Peninsula to the Golan Heights and thereby pass through Israel.

UNEF II's initial headquarters was in Cairo, however the Secretariat decided to move the operation closer to the AO. The Egyptian government gave UNEF II a few buildings in Ismailia, a city on the Peninsula's edge. After the Suez Canal reopened in 1976, Cairo requested UNEF II to vacate some of the premises and offered a few buildings in exchange.

Chapter 3 discusses how UNEF II benefited and built from the experiences of its predecessor UNEF I, which assisted in lowering the tensions in the Peninsula after the Suez Crisis. It is important to make a distinction between the two operations. While they have the same name, they responded to different moments of the conflict and thus, 'UNEF's deployment was not continuous. The General Assembly authorised UNEF I's deployment through Resolution 1001 with the mandate to ensure the withdrawal of Israeli, Egyptian and French forces from Egyptian territory and create a buffer between the Egypt and Israel. As Chapter 3 discusses, the Secretary-General withdrew UNEF I after Egypt revoked its consent in 1967, a few days before the Six-Day War (Rikhye, 1980). Between 1967 and 1973, UNTSO took over all responsibilities entrusted to UNEF I. After the Yom Kippur War, the Security Council adopted Resolution 341, through which it deployed UNEF II to create lower tensions in the Sinai Peninsula. Because of the Soviet Union's rejection of the Camp David Accords, UNEF II left the Peninsula, and the Multinational Force and Observers took over. Chapter 5 discusses UNEF II's withdrawal and the long-term consequences it had for the UN's involvement in the conflict.

UNEF II witnessed several critical landmarks throughout its operation. One of the most notable achievements of the mission was the successful supervision of the disengagement of Israeli and Egyptian forces in early 1974, as agreed upon under the terms of the Six-Point Agreement negotiated at the Km 101 (Diehl, 2015 ; Shlomo, 2017). The establishment of buffer zones and the presence of UNEF II peacekeepers helped prevent further outbreaks of violence, creating an environment conducive to diplomatic negotiations. Subsequently, the mission also oversaw the implementation of the 1975 Sinai Interim Agreements, which further solidified the disengagement process and paved the way for the historic Camp David Accords in 1978, leading to a lasting peace between Israel and Egypt.

Despite its accomplishments, UNEF II faced several challenges during its operation. The volatile nature of the region and the deep-seated animosities and mistrust between Israel and Egypt made things rather difficult for UNEF II. Moreover, while Israel consented to UNEF II's presence, it did not give it permission to operate within Israeli soil. Despite these obstacles, UNEF II played a pivotal role in establishing peace between Israel and Egypt. Chapter 3 provides an in-depth analysis on UNEF II and its place within the larger peacekeeping architecture in the Middle East.

The operation provides an interesting example whereby most of the literature concurs that the operation was a success. Diehl (2015b) views UNEF II as successful in several aspects. It effectively limited armed conflict, with no military confrontations occurring in the area of UNEF II deployment once the peacekeeping force was fully established. The disputes did not produce fatalities involving direct engagements between Israeli and Egyptian military forces. Bratt (2007) writes that UNEF II's mandate was concise and not overly ambitious; the Security Council only expected the operation to assist in managing the conflict while political negotiations between Israel and Egypt lowered the tensions. Wiseman (1976) writes that UNEF II was a dual success. In the field, the operation provided the mechanism to reduce the tensions. However, the author remarks that UNEF II's most significant success occurred in New York. The author praises the management of UNEF II, stating that the demands of time and events forced agreements, which had proved impossible in the many years of deliberation of the Special Committee. The result was apparent satisfaction at the Security Council regarding the operation's structure. Moreover, some Council Members, C34 Member

States and TCCs believed it could provide a blueprint for future peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, the paper highlights that throughout the operation's history, the Secretary-General (and therefore the Office of Special Political Affairs) regularly consulted with and informed the Security Council, which built trust between Waldheim and the P5 and gave the Secretariat autonomy to carry out its work.

UNDOF: A Sentinel in the Heights

UNDOF started its mission later than UNEF II. The negotiation process between Israel and Syria was much longer and challenging, which delayed UNDOF's deployment (Siilasvuo, 1992). The operation's mandate is to maintain the ceasefire between the two countries, supervise the disengagement of their forces, and ensure the establishment of a buffer zone in the Golan Heights.

Security Council Resolution 350 authorised UNDOF to maintain the cease-fire and, more importantly, supervise the continuous disengagement in the Area of Separation (AoS) and an Area of Limitation (AoL) on both sides of the AoS, which are central elements of its mandate. The AoS is an 80-kilometre buffer zone, from Mt. Hermon (near the border with Lebanon) to the Yarmouk River (near the border with Jordan). It spans 6 to 20 kilometres wide in order to adapt to the terrain. The AoL is immediately adjacent to the AoS on both the sides of the border. It comprises of three zones with different limitations for the two militaries – the closest zone (up to 10 kilometres from the AoS) has the most severe restrictions, with the following two zones (up to 20 and 25 kilometres respectively), which have progressively less restrictions on the amount of troops and the kind of hardware they can deploy. UNDOF's objective is to inspect and ensure that neither side breaks into the AoS and sticks within the limits in the AoL. UNDOF maintains permanent observation posts and conducts patrols – both during the day and night, and both on foot and with vehicles. UNTSO's Military Observers work in UNDOF through the OGG, which deploys them to UNDOF's AO²⁹.

²⁹ Chapter 3 provides an in-depth discussion of UNDOF's relationships with the rest of the UN peacekeeping architecture in the Middle East.

Name	Nationality	Rank	Period
Gonzalo Briceño	Peru	Brig General	December 1974 – May 1975
Hannes Philipp	Austria	Maj General	December 1974 – May 1979
Günther Greindl	Austria	Maj General	May 1979 – February 1981
Erik Kaira	Finland	Maj General	March 1981 – April 1982

Rudloff & Diehl (2015) discuss the process that led to UNDOF’s deployment. Unlike UNEF II, the negotiation of the operation was tough and protracted. Israel and Syria wanted very different things from the operation. The former wanted a robust operation of around 3,000 soldiers and observers, and the former only wanted a limited operation composed mainly of unarmed observers (similar to UNTSO). Ultimately, the parties compromised with an operation with 1,250 UNMOs and soldiers working in a very narrow AO.

Between 1974 and 1982, UNDOF achieved several significant milestones. James (1987) notes that UNDOF succeeded in maintaining the peace in Golan Heights. UNDOF provides a comprehensive observation of the demilitarised zone; if the Syrian military or the IDF deploy forces to UNDOF’s AO, the operation has the necessary equipment and personnel to highlight the incidents to the Security Council. Of course, throughout the operation’s lifespan, both sides violated UNDOF’s AO; however, the operation’s quick reactions, coupled with pressure from the Security Council, deterred the countries from an all-out war.

Lindley (2010) provides a detailed analysis of UNDOF’s structure and its role in keeping the peace in the Golan Heights. The author critically examines UNDOF's operational

effectiveness and identifies several issues that hinder its performance. The author provides an overarching critique of the operation due to structural problems. First, UNDOF's functional limitations, which range from force size to rigid standard operating procedures, prevent it from managing crisis adequately and, equally concerning, render the operation somewhat predictable, which means both sides plan their military work *around* it.

One of the most notable accomplishments was the successful supervision of the disengagement process between Israeli and Syrian forces, which took place shortly after the establishment of the mission. Additionally, UNDOF peacekeepers managed to maintain a relatively stable environment in the Golan Heights during this period, despite the underlying tensions between the two parties. The presence of UNDOF not only helped prevent the escalation of violence but also fostered an atmosphere conducive to diplomatic negotiations, albeit with limited progress on a comprehensive peace agreement between Israel and Syria (Shlomo, 2015).

However, the operation faced several challenges. From a political standpoint, Israel and Syria had no interest in negotiating substantially beyond the ceasefire. Israel was not willing to negotiate the return of the Golan Heights, and Syria was not willing to discuss anything else until they did (Kumaraswamy, 1999). The tension between Israel and Syria remained dangerously high throughout this period. From a military standpoint, UNDOF's AO was and remains a challenge. The Golan Heights is a hilly and rugged area with challenging and changing weather conditions.

Fetterly (2003) concurs and points out that UNDOF is relatively static. The Security Council renews the operation's mandate; however, it does not seriously discuss the operation's tasks and whether the operation needs an updated mandate beyond the disengagement agreement's supervision. The author suggests that UNDOF should delve deeper into peacebuilding. The Security Council, true to form, remains bitterly divided regarding Syria, and therefore it simply renews the mandate without amending it to avoid altering the status quo. UNDOF is a frozen operation with a first-generation mandate, deterring Israel and Syria from going to war; however, this is as far as the operation can go.

Despite these challenges, UNDOF played a crucial role in maintaining the ceasefire between Israel and Syria and minimizing the risk of renewed hostilities in the Golan Heights between 1974 and 1982. While the conflict between the two countries remains unresolved, UNDOF's presence has provided a measure of stability in the region. UNDOF continues to serve as an essential component of the international community's efforts to achieve a lasting peace.

The Peacekeeper's Maestro: The Chief Coordinator of the UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Middle East

As previously mentioned, one of the most critical yet underappreciated, understudied and unseen players in the peacekeeping architecture is Ensio Siilasvuo³⁰ from Finland³¹ (1922–2003). For over half of his distinguished career in the Finnish military, Siilasvuo worked in service of the UN in the Middle East. In 1956, he served as Company Commander of the Finnish contingent deployed at UNEF I. In 1958, he held his first post at UNTSO as a UNMO in the Israel-Lebanon sector. Between 1964 and 1965, Siilasvuo served as commander of the Finnish Battalion deployed at the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFCYP). After the Six-Day War, the Secretary-General appointed him Deputy Chief of Staff at UNTSO; he held that post until 1970, when he became Chief of Staff.

The Yom Kippur War required an immediate response in the Sinai Peninsula, including military and diplomatic duties. The Secretary-General appointed Siilasvuo as UNEF II's Force Commander and the UN's representative to the Km 101 negotiations between Israel and Egypt. Siilasvuo's mediation significantly contributed to the Six-point agreement signed by the two countries and paved the way for the Geneva Peace Conference of December 1973 (Shlomo, 2017). While the conference's overarching objective of settling the conflict failed, Siilasvuo chaired the Military Working Group through which Israel-Egypt and Israel-Syria negotiated their disengagement agreements. In addition, Siilasvuo was instrumental in designing and negotiating UNDOF's mandate (Uola, n.d.). By mid-1974, Siilasvuo was one, if

³⁰ During his time at UNTSO, Siilasvuo was a Maj General. By the time he started his role as Chief Coordinator, he was a Lt General. In 1998, in recognition to his dedicated service to Finland and the UN, he was promoted to full General.

³¹ Siilasvuo was a second-generation military officer; his father was also Lt General in the Finnish military.

not the most experienced peacekeeper in the UN's history, not only in the Middle East but worldwide.

During late 1973 and the first half of 1974, Siilasvuo had two main tasks. First, consolidating UNEF II's work and ensuring the operation fulfilled its mandate. This period was challenging due to Israel's occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, the IDF's encirclement of Egypt's Third Army and the post-war tension (Winokur, 2009). UNEF II, in close cooperation with UNTSO, positioned itself as a buffer between the two militaries. Second, Siilasvuo and a few key staff members from the Office of Special Political Affairs shuttled between the field and Geneva to participate in high-level military negotiations. This was the first time a Force Commander had such a challenging and multi-faceted task. Siilasvuo became equal parts diplomat and military officer.

By the autumn of 1974, UNTSO, UNDOF and UNEF II were up and running. That said, just because two or more UN entities are working close by, this does not automatically mean they are inclined to collaborate or are efficient when they do. The organisation had limited resources, the TCCs had a finite amount of soldiers, and the region was dealing with one conflict; this situation begged for coordination. Siilasvuo, as one of the Force Commanders, believed the case required a better framework, which he designed by himself.

The idea to have an office to coordinate the operations – or, in UN jargon, the terms of reference for this position – came from the field. This is a crucial detail, which goes to show not only that the Secretary-General was amenable to co-designing a regional strategy, but also, at the same time, that the operations had sufficient agency to come up with these ideas.

There are three possible reasons for this. First, another Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim of Austria, replaced U Thant. Waldheim wanted the Secretariat to be one of the key players in the conflict. Second, the number of operations within driving distance of each other multiplied in 1974, meaning better coordination was required. The third possible reason was that the Secretariat wanted to be more proactive and use the ceasefire as an opportunity to advance the quest for peace. Regardless of what happened in New York, the peacekeepers themselves imagined a better way to do things.

Siilasvuo wrote a thorough proposal and submitted it to New York. A memorandum from Erik Suy, Legal Counsel to Guyer, elaborates on Siilasvuo's proposals (UNA, 1975). The first essential element to discuss is the legal aspect. Force Commanders, to this day, have a strict mandate and jurisdiction: command their operation. Creating a *unified command* would challenge this paradigm, which the Secretariat saw as one step too far.

The matter becomes even more interesting in the annex to that memo, which outlines the General's five-point proposal and the Secretariat's reactions. First, the perspective in New York is quite favourable: "an overall coordinator would be a great improvement on the present situation" (UNA, 1975, p. 2). However, the memorandum also stresses that the host countries, particularly Egypt and Syria, may view the appointment as a sign of the permanence of the status quo in terms of how long operations would serve and that they might see this appointment as an unsanctioned evolution of the architecture. At that point, the operations³² had three or six months' mandates, their renewal was a matter of discussion, and they had clear reporting lines from the Force Commander to the Secretary-General.

Second, Siilasvuo proposed that the coordinator holds the USG rank. Here the Secretariat pushed back because this would create difficulties if the Secretary-General had given Siilasvuo the rank of USG. He would have then had the same rank as the USG for Special Political Affairs, to whom he *de facto* reported (Jonah J. O., 1991). Therefore, Headquarters determined that he would remain an Assistant-Secretary-General (one rank below³³).

Third, he proposed that all three missions report to New York *through* the Chief Coordinator, and fourth, he requested staff to support his work. New York accepted with caveats; for military and organisational matters, the operations would report directly to the Secretary-

³² This was the case for UNDOF and UNEF II, not UNTSO, which had a different timeline and the permanence of which the Security Council never seriously challenged.

³³ The Secretary-General changed his mind after a few months and decided to promote him to USG. Given that Siilasvuo *de jure* reported directly to the Secretary-General, he was able to justify this promotion. Moreover, given the close and solid working relationship Siilasvuo had with both Urquhart and Guyer, they welcomed his promotion as a recognition of his performance.

General and *inform*³⁴ Siilasvuo, and a small staff would support him. The main concern at this stage was to keep the identity of the three operations separate for political, military and administrative issues. From the onset of this idea, the highest form it could have achieved was one of *coordination*. Merging the operations would have been too far for everyone involved, especially the host countries. Fifth, the General proposed to have his headquarters at the Government House, which was accepted.

The Secretary-General officially proposed this formula to the Security Council. His letter underscored the necessity of this innovation and considered the legal caveats. This was an ingenious plan drawn in Jerusalem and fine-tuned in New York. Without a doubt, this shows that, at least to a degree, Secretary-General Waldheim and his advisors wanted a regional approach and perhaps even a strategy. Waldheim explained to the Council:

There would be, I believe, a great advantage in establishing a co-ordinating mechanism for their activities and administration[...] I believe that it would be of benefit to all concerned, including the parties themselves, the countries providing contingents and also the United Nations, if a greater degree of coordination among the three operations could be established. Such an arrangement should also make it possible to some extent to streamline the administrative and logistical set-up (United Nations Security Council, 1975)

The Security Council agreed shortly thereafter and confirmed the appointment and the establishment of the office. The Council reaffirmed that the Chief Coordinator would *only* liaise between the operations and all parties involved. In addition, he would be attending the Military Working Group of the Geneva Peace Conference. While the Council stressed the need to keep the identity of the operations intact, they understood the importance of taking this step.

One of Siilasvuo's most significant challenges came in 1978. The increasingly difficult situation in Southern Lebanon and the need of the U.S. to save the Camp David Accords (see

³⁴ The Chief Coordinator had the same degree of authority as OUSGSPA; while neither had *de facto* oversight authority over the operations, the Coordinator liaised with the Secretary-General *through* OUSGSPA, and the operations liaised with OUSGSPA *through* the Chief Coordinator.

Chapter 5) forced the Security Council to deploy UNIFIL. Chapter 3 discusses how Siilasvuo played an instrumental role in the operation's deployment and in establishing the necessary relationships on the ground. Chapter 5 discusses that the Camp David Accords envisioned a specific part for the Chief Coordinator in implementing the Israel-Egypt peace treaty; however, due to the Soviet Union's objections, UNEF II left the Sinai Peninsula, and the Secretariat was unable to support the treaty's implementation. In 1979, Siilasvuo retired from active duty and left the Middle East. The Secretariat decided against appointing a successor (Bar-Yaacov, 1980).

Like much of the inter-operation dynamics, Siilasvuo's role as Chief Coordinator remains grossly understudied. In the four chapters of the *Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (Diehl; Ruddlof & Diehl; Novosseloff; Theobald, 2015), which deal with our operations, the role barely gets a mention in passing. Kohavi (1980); Thakur (2008); Sommereyns (1980), who conducted in-depth studies on the operations in the Middle East, barely reference Siilasvuo's work. While this might suggest that the role was minimal, after a careful review of the archives, it is clear that the General does not get all the credit he deserves.

Understanding the role of the Coordinator matters a great deal, both for the subject at hand and for historical reasons. This was one of the first appointments to oversee and coordinate two or more operations. If we look at the work done by current Special Representatives of the Secretary-General at the helm of peacekeeping operations, or even the work of the UN Special Coordinator in the Middle East (UNSCO) in Jerusalem, their terms of reference are guided by Siilasvuo's experience. Fortunately, the General made two contributions to the literature through a journal article (1981) and a memoir (1992). Both resources are critical to this dissertation

UNIFIL: Welcome to Hell

The UN was not equipped or prepared to deal with Southern Lebanon. The situation was one of chaos, lawlessness and competing factions with very different agendas (Novosseloff, 2015a). The Palestinians, the Syrians, the Israelis and the Lebanese themselves had their own interests, which were at odds with each other. In 1978, after the IDF's Operation Litani,

the Security Council, at the forceful behest of the U.S., deployed UNIFIL. The operation did not have a clear strategy, the mandate was weak and all sides treated the operation like an enemy (Nachmias, 1999). The main objectives of UNIFIL were to confirm the IDF's withdrawal, restore a modicum of peace and assist the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. The mandate of UNIFIL, while seemingly clear-cut, proved to be fraught with numerous challenges during the period between its establishment and the Israeli invasion of 1982.

Novosseloff (2015a) provides a comprehensive history of the operation and, crucially, stresses the multiple challenges the operation faces. First, the Security Council was bitterly divided; the U.S. forced the Council to deploy the operation and prevented the Secretariat from providing critical input (see Chapter 3 for details). The Soviet Union begrudgingly agreed to let the resolution pass; however, it never supported its work. Second, the critical players in Southern Lebanon rejected the idea of an operation and therefore treated it as a hostile actor. Third, the Lebanese government's inability to control Southern Lebanon endangered the operation when they set foot in their AO.

The Secretary-General, with the Security Council's approval, appointed Erskine to serve as the first Force Commander. Chapter 3 discusses how Erskine and UNTSO served as UNIFIL's support system both in military and administrative terms. Moreover, the Chapter highlights the role Siilasvuo played as Chief Coordinator. While UNIFIL had structural issues exogenous to its work (weak mandate and a hostile AO), the Secretariat deployed the operation as smoothly and efficiently as possible. However, as soon as the operation had its boots on the ground, it began to struggle. At its inception, UNIFIL had around 6,000 troops. However, the Security Council quickly increased the strength to approximately 9,000 troops.

UNIFIL set up its headquarters in Naqoura, a city in southern Lebanon, very near the border with Israel. The city is a strategically advantageous location for UNIFIL due to its proximity to the AO, and the remoteness of the city kept UNIFIL away from Lebanese politics. However, the location has constraints. The operation's distance from large Lebanese cities makes it very reliant on Israeli willingness to cooperate. A significant portion of UNIFIL's civilian staff

lives in Israel, which meant they had to request permission from the IDF and the Christian Militias to enter Naqoura every day (Makdisi, Goksel, Hauck, & Reigeluth, 2009).

Howard (2019) explains that UNIFIL's approach has evolved over time, emphasizing inducement—material and institutional incentives for behaviour change—alongside traditional peacekeeping methods of persuasion and coercion. UNIFIL employs various assistance programs, development aid, and efforts to build local governing and security institutions, aiming to foster peaceful relations and cooperation. Additionally, UNIFIL's significant role as a formal-sector employer in southern Lebanon inadvertently provides it with economic leverage, further underpinning its mission with an unexpected source of influence. Despite challenges and limitations, its presence has contributed to local and regional stability, reduced violence, and enhanced economic development, underscoring the multifaceted nature of modern peacekeeping operations.

Thakur (1981) outlines three main challenges for the operation. First, UNIFIL did not have combat duties³⁵; therefore, it relied on the goodwill of the local factions for its security. As Chapters 3 and 5 discuss, UNIFIL suffered regular attacks against its positions and sustained casualties. If UNIFIL had retaliated, the operation would have faced the possibility of expulsion and even greater violence. UNIFIL's biggest challenge was the complexity of the political landscape in Lebanon. The presence of various armed factions, including the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Lebanese militias, and other non-state actors, greatly complicated UNIFIL's mandate (Parker, 1986). The operation sustained attacks and suffered casualties along the way. Moreover, the lack of a strong government presence in Southern Lebanon made things worse. The Lebanese military was unable to support UNIFIL in controlling the AO.

The constant fight between the PLO, the Lebanese government, the Christian militias, the Israelis and the Syrians made it impossible for UNIFIL to control the area. Third, there was no political process advancing the quest for peace. Whereas UNEF II and UNDOF supported

³⁵ What contemporary operations such as MINUSMA, MONUSCO and MINUSCA call “peace enforcement mandates.” For more see Karlsrud (2015).

the ongoing negotiation of the disengagement agreements, the politics of Lebanon were so tricky that the chances of peace were non-existent.

Moreover, UNIFIL faced a range of operational challenges, such as insufficient resources and personnel, which limited its capacity to carry out its mandate effectively. The deployment of peacekeepers was often slow and faced logistical obstacles, while the Force was generally under-equipped to deal with the complex and volatile environment in southern Lebanon (Gööksel, 2007; Howard, 2019). This lack of resources and capabilities hindered UNIFIL's ability to prevent violations of the ceasefire and ensure the return of Lebanese government authority to the area.

James (1983) conducted an in-depth analysis of UNIFIL between 1978 and 1982 and concluded that the operation faced “painful peacekeeping,” given that the operation lacked political allies in the field and support from New York. The author notes that both Israel and the PLO pledged to cooperate with the operation; however, they both ignored their own pledges and turned against the operation. UNIFIL constantly faced attacks and harassment from every actor on the ground whilst not having freedom of movement, which made it impossible to achieve its mandate.

Nachmias (1999) declares UNIFIL as a failure. After 20 years on the ground, the operation failed to induce peace, prevent daily skirmishes and confrontations between the warring factions, and, perhaps most importantly, it did not secure the withdrawal of foreign forces from the country. The core of UNIFIL's mandate is to get Israeli and Syrian troops out of Lebanon; however, the operation could not achieve this goal. The author highlights an example after this dissertation's period, which exemplifies UNIFIL's challenges. In 1996, more than 100 Lebanese civilians died in an IDF attack on a UNIFIL base. Despite the operation's significant military size, it failed to deter violence. The author does highlight that UNIFIL has made some positive contributions, such as coordinating humanitarian support within its AO and liaising between the IDF and the Lebanese Armed Forces. However, UNIFIL's shortcomings eclipse any of these minor successes.

UNIFIL had a very complex and contradicting relationship with Israel. While the country accepted UNIFIL's deployment, it prevented it from working in Israel. The IDF made it

painfully clear that it would not cooperate with UNIFIL beyond the bare minimum. UNIFIL did not have the political capital or support to deter the IDF. This became apparent in 1982 when Israel decided to invade Southern Lebanon, siege Beirut and occupy the country despite UNIFIL's presence. Chapter 5 discusses in the detail the 1982 invasion and the impact it had on UNIFIL and peacekeeping in the Middle East.

Without a doubt, UNIFIL is the most challenging operation of peacekeeping architecture in the Middle East, and, arguably, when the operation started its work, it was the most challenging operation worldwide. UNIFIL was deployed into an anarchic area. It could not rely on the support of its host country because the government did not control half of its territory. Therefore, the operation attracts significantly more scholarly attention than the rest of the architecture. Unfortunately, the overall conclusion of the literature is that between 1978 and 1982, UNIFIL was and still is an operation that did and does not have the resources or mandate to secure itself, let alone achieve its mandate.

Conclusion

This chapter outlines the foundations of the peacekeeping architecture in the Middle East and assesses the extent to which the Secretariat had a positive impact in managing the Israel-Arab conflict between 1948 and 1967. Without a doubt, the Secretariat and the Security Council were deeply entrenched in the efforts to deal with the conflict and tried to foster a peaceful settlement of the strife. The achievements of the Secretariat during this era are noteworthy, most prominently in the successful negotiation of the Armistice Agreements and the subsequent establishment of the Military Armistice Commissions (MACs). The intellectual conception and deployment of UNEF I in 1956 stand out as a testament to both Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld's foresight and his adept political manoeuvring. His proactive stance and inventive approach, coupled with a rare consensus between the Americans and Soviets on the necessity of an UN-led initiative, proved vital in fostering an environment conducive for the conception of such a peace operation.

In the field, UNTSO and UNEF I established a solid working relationship whereby the former supported the latter through providing UNMOs and serving as a liaison with both Israel and Egypt. While each operation had its own duties and mandate, the fact that they collaborated

so well laid the foundations for the post-1973 IOC framework, which is the subject of Chapter 3. Between the years 1956 and 1967, the region, though simmering with underlying tensions, was somewhat stable. The Security Council and the Secretariat seemed satisfied with the existing architectural arrangements and felt no pressing need for expansion or revision. However, the winds of change were in the offing, and the Six-Day War in 1967 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973 drastically increased the size of the architecture together with its challenges.