An architecture for peace: deciphering the UN's multidimensional approach to the Israel - Arab Conflict (1967 - 1982)

Salama, D.

This dissertation embarks on an ambitious journey to enrich the scholarly understanding of the United Nations' multidimensional approach to managing the Israel-Arab Conflict from 1967 to 1982. The thesis makes two critical contributions to the literature.

First, it challenges the traditional paradigm of studying peace operations as standalone endeavours, opting for a holistic approach that examines the interdependence and collective strategy of the UN entities involved. Second, the analysis is further enriched by including the Office of Special Political Affairs and, crucially, the Office of Chief Coordinator of Peacekeeping in the Middle East, an understudied figure.

This thesis is more than a historical account; it is a testament to the adaptability and resilience of UN peacekeeping operations in the face of evolving global challenges. It provides insights for scholars, policymakers, and practitioners alike, offering lessons from the past to illuminate the path forward in the pursuit of peace and security.

An Architecure for Peace

Diego Salama



Diego Salama

An Architecture For Peace

Deciphering the UN's Multidimensional Approach to the Israel – Arab Conflict (1967 – 1982)

An Architecture for Peace: Deciphering the UN's Multidimensional Approach to the Israel – Arab Conflict (1967 – 1982)

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van
de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden,
op gezag van rector magnificus prof.dr.ir. H. Bijl,
volgens besluit van het college voor promoties
te verdedigen op dinsdag 16 april 2024
klokke 11:15 uur

door
Diego Salama
geboren te Cochabamba, Bolivia
in 1989

Promotores:
Prof.dr. A.W.M. Gerrits
Dr. A.M. O'Malley

Promotiecommissie

Prof.dr. I.G.B.M. Duijvesteijn
Prof. dr. J.A. Koops
Prof. dr. M.O. Hosli
Prof. dr. L.M. Howard (Georgetown University)
Prof dr. J Karlsrud (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs)

Cover Photo
From left to right: Sir Brian Urquhart, George Lansky, Lt Gen Ensio Siilasvuo, Jaques Schoelkopf and Gen Koho.
UNEF HQ, 1974
Credit: UN Photo/ Yukata Nagata

Back Cover Photo
A view of Government House in Jerusalem, the headquarters of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). This scene, taken from the radio antenna towards the northwest, shows the Kidron Valley and the Old City of Jerusalem with the Temple area in the background to the right. Part of the New City of Jerusalem is seen to the left.
Jerusalem, 1968
Credit: UN Photo

Acknowledgements

This dissertation stands as a milestone in my ongoing journey through the annals of United Nations history, a journey I am privileged to undertake at Leiden University. It's with profound gratitude that I reflect on the contributions of those who have made this work not just possible, but deeply enriching.

Foremost, my supervisors, Andre Gerrits and Alanna O'Malley, have been the Sherpas of this endeavour. Their incisive critiques, encouragement to grapple with complex questions, and unwavering patience have profoundly shaped this work. Our sessions, always a vibrant blend of intellectual challenge and a necessary dash of good humour, have been invaluable. Thank you, both.

I extend my appreciation to the distinguished reading committee: Professors Duijvesteijn, Hosli, Koops, Karlsrud, and Howard. Having my work scrutinized by such luminaries in peacekeeping and international organization studies has been an extraordinary privilege. Their insightful feedback has not only enriched my dissertation but also fortified its final form.

My tenure at the United Nations University was instrumental in reaching this goal, made possible by the support and understanding of my managers, Howard Hudson and Bartel Van de Walle. Their flexibility and encouragement were critical as I navigated the dual demands of work and research.

A critical component of this dissertation is the research I was able to conduct at the UN Archives in New York. The staff at the Archives deserves recognition for their assistance and the insightful recommendations that enhanced my research. A special note of thanks goes to my Uncle Roberto and Aunt Jadranka Salama, whose hospitality in New York allowed me to spend as much time as I did at the Archives.

Embarking on a PhD while working full-time is a solitary venture, yet it was made lighter by the companionship of dear friends. Dr. Ortrun Merkle, in particular, has been a source of unwavering support, invaluable insights, and academic camaraderie. Gabrielle Lipton's keen editorial eye has significantly shaped the clarity and coherence of my work. To my friends—Raoul, Robin, Matthew, Fabrizio, Stefano, Daniel, Felix, Adina, Florian, Iman, Thomas,

Virginia, Veronica, and Andrew—your encouragement and humour have been a constant source of joy and perspective.

To Tamara, my partner, your steadfast love and support made it possible for me to cross the finish line. Over the last 18 months, her unwavering support, patience and love gave me the inspiration this dissertation required.

This work is dedicated to my family, whose belief in me has been unwavering. My Aunts Silvia, Ester, Maria Del Sol always reminded me the importance of perseverance and resilience. My Sister Gabriela, stepmother Judy, and brother-in-law Rodrigo who, at times, were challenged by my academic endeavours even more so than I was, had never-ending patience and were the pillars of encouragement.

Lastly, but most importantly, my father, Rodolfo, deserves my deepest gratitude. His emotional support, intellectual engagement, and guiding discipline have been foundational to my development and achievements. His unwavering belief in me, even in moments of doubt, has been my greatest source of strength. Gracias, Pa.

As I stand on the threshold of this academic achievement, I am keenly aware that the work and history of the United Nations, while marked by aspirations towards a more just and peaceful world, are also characterized by imperfections and challenges. Despite these complexities, the imperative to study the United Nations—its achievements, its challenges, and its evolving role in the tapestry of international relations—has never been more critical.

In an era where the principles of multilateralism are under threat and the global landscape is rife with uncertainty, the role of historians in illuminating the United Nations' journey becomes indispensable. By delving into its history, we not only acknowledge its contributions and shortcomings but also reinforce the importance of multilateralism as the cornerstone of international cooperation and peace. This dissertation, therefore, is not merely an academic exercise but a reaffirmation of my commitment to contributing to a deeper understanding of the United Nations, believing that such insights are vital for safeguarding the future of global governance and sustainable development.

Maastricht, February 2024.

Table of Contents



Figure 1. UNTSO Area of Operations as of 1978 (Source: UN Archives)



Figure 2. UNEF II Area of Operations as of 1978 (Source: UN Digital Library)



Figure 3. UNDOF Area of Operations as of 1981 (Source: UN Digital Library)



Figure 4. UNIFIL Area of Operations as of 1978 (Source: UN Archives)

List of Acronyms

AO	Area of Operations
CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
CoS	UNTSO Chief of Staff
FC	Force Commander
IDF	Israel Defence Forces
IOC	Inter-Operation Collaboration
MAC	Mixed-Armistice Commission
MFO	Multinational Force and Observers
MNF	Multinational Force
OGL	Observer Group Lebanon
OLG	Observer Group Golan
OP	Observation Post
OUSGSPA	Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organisation
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
TCCs	Troop Contributing Countries
UN	United Nations
UNA	United Nations Archives
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNEF I	First United Nations Emergency Force
UNEF II	Second United Nations Emergency Force
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMO	United Nations Military Observer
UNPAC	United Nations Palestine Commission
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCO	United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process
UNSCOP	United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
UNSTO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation
USG	Under-Secretary-General

Chapter 1

The UN Architecture in the Middle East

Introduction

The Government House is a magnificent compound atop a hill in Jerusalem. Its location provides a stunning view of the Old City and the Mount of Olives. For the last 75 years, this historic and impressive compound has served as the headquarters of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) and the epicentre of the UN's diplomatic and security work in the region. This beautiful building is a prominent and permanent fixture in the Jerusalemite skyline as much as the United Nations (UN) is one in the Israel-Arab conflict.

Over the decades, the UN employed two mechanisms to facilitate dialogue and manage the conflict: peacekeeping operations and high-level diplomatic engagement. In the former, the Security Council authorised the deployment of the following operations: UNTSO in 1948, two iterations of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I and II) in 1956 and 1973, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in 1974, and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 1978. All of these operations except UNEF I and II remain on the ground today.

This prolonged high degree of operational concentration is undoubtedly an anomaly, which warrants discussion for three reasons. First, while the Security Council (UNSC) withdrew both iterations of UNEF (see Chapters 3 and 5 respectively), the remaining operations have a quasi-permanent status on the ground. Even though peacekeeping in the Middle East receives criticisms (Abrams, 2018; Nachmias, 1996; Orion, 2016) due to its inability to prevent confrontations, there is no indication that the Council is seriously considering withdrawing these operations (Myers & Dorn, 2022; Novosseloff, 2022).

Second, UNTSO, UNDOF and UNIFIL appear to be impervious to the sort of political turmoil other operations face such as budget cuts from the principal donors, unwillingness from Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) to send troops, even if the situation in Syria and between Israel and Lebanon continues to be downright dangerous for peacekeepers, and

serious resistance from host countries to hosting the operations for decades. Moreover, no other conflict has had more operations on the ground than the Israel-Arab conflict. While the processes have different mandates, Areas of Operations (AO) and face different challenges, they are working to deal with *one* overarching conflict. This dissertation studies all operations as part of a regional architecture rather than standalone endeavours.

Third, the operations' structure and *modus operandi* are not entirely self-contained. Throughout the history of UN peacekeeping in the Middle East, the operations relied on each other in areas such as sharing military assets, logistics and even administrative affairs. Despite the fact that each operation had and has its own mandate, structure and budget, they rely on each other to achieve success and, at times, ensure their survival. This dissertation highlights that the Secretariat created an interdependent and complex architecture in the Middle East, which pulls and shares resources and charters a unified set of long-term objectives.

Throughout their time on the ground, the operations shared their most important asset: people. Between 1967 and 1982, almost all first Force Commanders in the region had previously served in a leadership role in UNTSO. To this day, UNTSO continues to provide UNDOF and UNIFIL with Military Observers (UNMOs), which carry out sensitive tasks such as reporting violations to the Security Council and performing observation duties (Howard, 2019; Myers & Dorn, 2022). The degree to which the Security Council implicitly and explicitly *expects* the operations to cooperate is unique. This dissertation looks at the processes through the lens of Inter-Operation Collaboration (IOC) and provides a working definition of a theoretical framework for this understudied concept.

On the diplomatic front, the Secretariat in New York dealt with the Israel-Arab conflict through three main activities: the (co) organisation of multilateral conferences, the dispatch of high-level diplomatic envoys, and the creation of an office tasked with coordinating the UN's actions (and the operations on the ground). In 1947, the Secretary-General dispatched Count Folke Bernadotte[1], the first-ever UN Mediator, to the partition plan, who negotiated

[1] Members of the paramilitary group Lehi assassinated Bernadotte on September 1948.

the first cease-fire (Stanger, 1988). Dr Ralph Bunche, one of the most influential and skilled UN Staff Members in the UN's history, succeeded him and chaired the Rhodes Conference, where the parties discussed the 1949 Armistice Agreements (Ben-Dror, 2016). Chapters 3 and 4 critically analyse the role of subsequent high-level mediators, envoys that include the Under-Secretaries-General for Special Political Affairs. The diplomatic engagement was complementary to the work of the operations, and they often successfully collaborated. This dissertation critically analyses the relationship between the operations in the field, diplomatic initiatives and the politics in New York.

The UN's involvement in the Israel-Arab conflict was particularly significant between 1967 and 1982. Throughout this period, the Council deployed UNEF II, UNDOF and UNIFIL. UNTSO, which managed the transformational aftermath of 1967's Six-Day War fought between Israel and the Arab states by itself, became the keystone of the UN peacekeeping architecture in the region, while the Secretariat tried to manage the conflict with varying degrees of autonomy and success. Following the Six-Day War, the Secretary-General dispatched Gunnar Jarring to negotiate the implementation of the Security Council Resolution 242 (Waage & Mørk, 2015). After the Yom Kippur War in 1973, UNEF II's Force Commander chaired the initial military negotiations between Israel and Egypt held at Km 101 on the road between Suez and Cairo and the Military Working Group, which followed the Geneva Peace Conference (Jonah, 1992). The Secretary-General supported the organisation of said conference, which served as the framework through which Israel signed two disengagement agreements, with Egypt and with Syria. In 1975, the Secretary-General created the role of Chief Coordinator of UN Peacekeeping in the Middle East, an actor who played a significant role in the UN's work until it was prematurely abandoned in 1978 (see Chapter 5) – and one whom the academic literature has forgotten. This study sheds light on the importance of this role throughout the timeline.

Undoubtedly, the Secretariat invested significant time, resources and political capital into managing the conflict. Between 1967 and 1982, three individuals held the post of UN Chief:

U Thant (1961-1971), Kurt Waldheim (1972-1981) and Javier Perez de Cuellar[2] (1982-1991). Regardless of the different approaches and successes and failures, the region "dominated each one's attention during his time in office" (Gilmour, 2017, p. 48). However, the effectiveness and impact of these initiatives in achieving peace and stability in the region remain subject to debate. This dissertation will critically analyse the political role of each Secretary-General and elaborate on how their decisions shaped the UN's work in the region.

Studying the UN's history in the Israel-Arab conflict can shed light on the UN's history for several reasons. First, the UN's involvement in the conflict is prolonged and multidimensional. Throughout the conflict, the Secretariat had to respond to changing dynamics. Chief among them is the transformation from a state-centric, Israel-Arab conflict to an Israeli-Palestinian conflict whereby the epicentre became the Palestinian question. Understanding the UN's involvement throughout provides insights into the organisation's evolution, capacity to adapt to changing circumstances, and efforts to address multifaceted and deeply rooted issues.

Second, the Israel-Arab conflict has significantly influenced the development of the UN's structure and mandate over time. The Secretariat co-created the principles of peacekeeping – neutrality, consent and use of force only in self-defence – as a response to the Suez Canal Crisis (Urquhart, 1994). Moreover, while most of the literature on peacekeeping claims that the concept of Inter-Operation Collaboration (IOC) started in West Africa in the 2000s (Angelo, 2011; Aubyn, 2015; Doss, 2020), this thesis will show that it began in the Middle East in the 1970s. The operations engaged in unprecedented (and unforeseen) tasks such as the re-deployment of military personnel, sharing administrative and programme services, and helping other operations at the onset. Furthermore, the establishment of the Office of the Chief Coordinator of Peacekeeping in the Middle East was unprecedented in the history of the UN. For the first time, the Secretariat had a high-level UN Staff Member with a *regional* mandate and became the focal point for Headquarters *and* the host countries. The Chief

[2] Out of the three UN Chiefs, Perez de Cuellar receives the least amount of attention because he took office on the last year of this study's timeline. The work of U Thant and Waldheim are at the centre of Chapters 3, 4 and 5.

Coordinator set a precedent for peacekeeping leadership[3], as he was the first person to hold the rank of Under-Secretary-General[4]. Today, the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, who are civilians, do similar work as their predecessor; however, they do so for *one* operation (Karlsrud, 2013). The one-of-a-kind Chief Coordinator post had a very positive impact on military and political affairs, working as an honest broker, supported the Heads of Operations in their dealings with the host countries and served as the highest-ranking UN Staff Member in the region.

Third, the Middle East became one of the most prominent battlefields of the Cold War (Yaqub, 2013). The evolution and tensions of the international system affected the conflict and vice versa. Studying the UN's involvement in the conflict offers an opportunity to examine how these power dynamics have shaped its actions and the constraints and opportunities it faces in navigating competing interests among Member States.

Fourth, studying the UN's involvement in the Israel-Arab conflict provides a deeper understanding of the conflict itself. It offers critical insights into the history, evolution and effectiveness of the UN as an organisation dedicated to maintaining international peace and security. “We cannot understand where we are now, and what problems the United Nations faces today in the field of peace and security, without understanding what was intended, and what has occurred in the past” (Higgins, 1970, p. 445). This dissertation critically assesses whether the UN was a proactive or reactive actor in the conflict. Whether the UN shaped history or let itself be led by history is a crucial question at the heart of this study.

[3] The main difference between the Chief Coordinator and the contemporary SRSGs is that the former was a military officer who had a regional mandate while the SRSGs are civilians with a mandate focused only in the operation’s area of operations.

[4]General Siilasvuo also made history even before his appointment as Chief Coordinator. When the Secretary-General appointed him as Force Commander of UNEF II, he concurrently chaired the negotiations between Israel and Egypt at km 101. In short, he was the first Force Commander to have a quasi-diplomatic and a military role at once.

A new approach

From a research perspective, while plenty of scholars tackle '*UN peacekeeping in the Middle East*' (Higgins 1995; Hylton 2013*;* Mackinlay 1989; Sommereyns 1980), little work provides a nuanced understanding of the degree of interdependence the operations had and whether the Secretariat had a regional strategy to deal with the conflict holistically .

The Secretariat plays a pivotal role in shaping institutional behaviours of all the elements of the architecture because it establishes the frameworks that guide the actions of all the actors. Therefore, the Secretariat, understood as the designer and implementer of norms, values, and standards, delineate the behavioural boundaries for all actors working under its preview (Balding and Wehrenfennig. 2011). Conversely, the Secretariat embody the regulatory structures that delineate the operationalization of these shared norms, values, and standards (Traub 2007). These organizational mechanisms are not merely peripheral components of an institution but are fundamental in determining its evolutionary trajectory and its capacity to achieve the Security Council's mandates.

Complexity Theory and UN Peacekeeping in the Middle East

Throughout the dissertation, the guiding theoretical lens is complexity theory (Day and Hunt 2023; Hunt 2020; Paananen, et al. 2021). Employing a complexity theory lens reveals the nuanced dynamics *both within* the UN System and *within* the region and this highly regionalized conflict. The Security Council, at various junctures, *de facto* sanctioned expansions of roles and responsibilities of the operations beyond the original mandates, facilitating resource sharing, personnel deployment, and cost distribution without formally amending the operations' mandates *de jure*. Such decisions, indicate two critical points. First, the Council, at the time and insofar peacekeeping in the Middle East, took a very pragmatic approach as the operations kept both sides of the Cold War sufficiently content. Second, the Secretariat implemented the work of all operations and built one strategy for the entire architecture. In other words, the Security Council designed a complex system and the Secretariat built it.

The Secretariat adopted a complexity-aware perspective where its actions reflect an understanding of the interconnected nature of peacekeeping in general and the Israel-Arab

conflict in particular. Guided by a holistic vision, the Secretariat navigated the multifaceted dimensions of the conflict, leveraging operational interdependencies to enhance the coherence and effectiveness of the UN's peacekeeping architecture in the region. The application of complexity theory to analyse the UN's architecture in the Middle East offers a novel approach to understanding the UN's historical engagement with the Israel-Arab conflict. It highlights the importance of recognizing the interconnected, adaptive nature of peacekeeping operations and the strategic, albeit implicit, efforts of the UN Secretariat to manage the conflict through a comprehensive, integrated framework. This approach not only enriches the scholarly discourse on UN peacekeeping but also provides valuable insights into the operational dynamics and strategic considerations underlying the UN's efforts to navigate complex conflict scenarios in the Middle East.

One of the most important elements of using a complexity lens is the recognition of how multiple actors can be decisive in the overall work of the architecture. Case in point, the literature does not adequately study the role of General Ensio Siilasvuo during his tenure as UNEF II Force Commander and, later, Chief Coordinator of UN Peacekeeping in the Middle East. Siilasvuo was instrumental in the early stages of the road toward peace between Israel and Egypt, and yet the literature does not study his role with sufficient care. This oversight stems from the fact that Siilasvuo was a relatively unknown player in the political arena whose expertise was, above all, in military affairs. Furthermore, Siilasvuo's role at the Km 101 and during the Geneva Peace Conference occurred before he became Chief Coordinator. The Secretary-General dispatched Siilasvuo from UNTSO to UNEF II as a stopgap measure and, simultaneously, gave him the task of chairing the meetings at Km 101. Most scholars treat the initial discussions as part of Henry Kissinger's step-by-step approach and are correct. However, they also neglect that the United States did not have a representative at the tent and, at times, did not know what the countries discussed. In addition, while Israeli and Egyptian scholars tend to minimise the UN's role, evidence from the archives shows the extent to which Siilasvuo's mediation was instrumental in brokering the Six-Point Agreement. In addition, his tenure as Chief Coordinator – and the role's existence – were short. While the Secretariat discussed his appointment as of 1974, it only became effective in 1975 and lasted until 1978. During this time, Siilasvuo focused on improving the

peacekeeping architecture from within through standardising procedures, ensuring that the cooperation of operations during the crisis became standard practice in military and administrative affairs. While these issues are fundamental to understanding IOC and regional strategy, they seldom get attention from scholars. Moreover, as Chapter 5 explains, the role became part of Camp David's collateral damage, and the Secretariat decided against appointing a successor.

Lastly, the literature does not adequately study the UN Office of Special Political Affairs' work. The personalities and personal stories of UN giants like Ralph Bunche and Brian Urquhart have received attention (Fröhlich, 2021; Lyman, 2004; Jonah J. O., 2014) the work of this small office as a whole warrant a more nuanced survey. From the moment peacekeeping started until the early 1990s, this small office managed the entire peacekeeping effort. The degree to which Bunche, Urquhart and Guyer participated in the day-to-day management of the operations is stunning. With such a small bureaucracy, the office provided policy advice to the Secretary-General, provided guidance to the field and liaised with the TCCs. This dissertation highlights this office's work, challenges and shortcomings, and outlines how its effectiveness was disproportionate to its size.

Therefore, this dissertation reviews all aspects of the UN peacekeeping architecture, with each chapter a stepping-stone in breaking away from the usual paradigm of evaluating peacekeeping in the Middle East. Instead of having separate chapters per operation, the thesis discusses them holistically, as approached from different angles.

Research Question

This research aims to better understand the role of UN peacekeeping architecture in the Middle East and whether the UN has had a successful comprehensive strategy to deal with the overarching Israel-Arab conflict.

The overarching research question is:

> *To what extent did the four peacekeeping operations UNTSO, UNEF II, UNDOF and UNIFIL; the Office of the Chief Coordinator of Peacekeeping in the Middle East; and the*

Office of Special Political Affairs shape the diplomatic and security landscape of the Israel-Arab conflict between 1967 and 1982?

Supplementary Research Questions:

To what extent did UNTSO, UNEF II, UNDOF and UNIFIL collaborate on tactical and operational matters between 1973 and 1982?

To what extent did the Secretariat successfully act as a policy broker in the political negotiations in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War and Operation Litani River?

To what extent did the Camp David Accords and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon affect the ability of the UN Peacekeeping Architecture to perform its duties?

The "diplomatic and security landscape" refers to the complex interplay between diplomatic efforts, political negotiations, and security arrangements that define the state of international relations within a specific context, such as the Israel-Arab conflict. Diplomacy in international relations involves the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys (Berridge, 2022). Security, on the other hand, encompasses measures taken by states and international organizations to ensure mutual survival and safety, including military operations, peacekeeping operations, and conflict resolution strategies (Buzan, 1991).

The intertwining of diplomatic and security dimensions within the context of UN peacekeeping operations underscores the complex nature of managing and resolving conflicts through the UN. The military dialogue in the Israel-Arab conflict was military diplomacy, particularly after the Yom Kippur War. The literature defines this term, broadly speaking, as a set of international activities based mainly on peaceful dialogue and cooperation carried out by high-level military officers on behalf of their governments at bilateral and multilateral fora (Drab, 2018; Cheyre, 2013; Swistek, 2012; Harkavy & Neuman, 2001).

UN Peacekeeping diplomacy is the “effort initiated by impartial UN military representatives in conflict and post-conflict situations” (Schori, 2013, p. 2). Military officers played a fundamental role in the military diplomacy needed to advance the cause of UN Peacekeeping

in the Israel-Arab conflict. This is another example demonstrating that peacekeeping in the region was dynamic and flexible (more on this in Chapter 5).

In the specific cases of UNEF II, UNDOF, and the negotiation processes leading to the Israel-Egypt and Israel-Syria disengagement agreements, military officers played pivotal roles not just in operational capacities but also in diplomatic negotiations. Moreover, the UN was represented throughout the process by Siilasvuo, a military officer as opposed by the civilian UN Staff. Siilasvuo, equipped with a deep understanding of the military stakes and strategic considerations, were instrumental in bridging the gap between diplomatic negotiation and military strategy (Cottey & Forster, 2004).

This fusion of military and diplomatic efforts is particularly evident in the negotiation of peacekeeping mandates and disengagement agreements. The mandates for UNEF II and UNDOF were not merely military directives but diplomatic tools negotiated to stabilize tense situations and create conditions conducive to conflict management and stabilization. The initial steps toward the Israel-Egypt and Israel-Syria disengagement agreements further illustrate this point, showcasing how military diplomacy can lead to significant diplomatic breakthroughs and how military decisions cannot be decoupled from diplomacy. These negotiations, often conducted or facilitated by military officers, underscore the necessity of incorporating military perspectives into diplomatic efforts to ensure that peacekeeping mandates are realistic, achievable, and sensitive to the security concerns of all parties involved (Boulden, 2006).

The integration of diplomatic and security components within the landscape of the architecture reveals the essential nature of military diplomacy in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. By leveraging the unique capabilities and insights of military personnel in diplomatic processes, UN peacekeeping operations navigated the complex dynamics of the conflict. This approach not only enhances the likelihood of successful conflict resolution but also contributes to a more nuanced understanding of peacekeeping's role in shaping the diplomatic and security landscape.

Brief Reflections on the Research Questions

The overarching research question is designed to explore the impact of the architecture *as a whole* on the Israel-Arab conflicts diplomatic and security dimensions between 1967 and 1982[5]. The question is pertinent because it acknowledges the intertwined nature of diplomatic negotiations and security arrangements, reflecting the complexity of international relations where diplomatic efforts are often supported by security measures to ensure their success and sustainability.

The first supplementary question delves into the operational and tactical collaboration among the operations. This question is crucial for understanding the security landscape, as it examines the extent of coordination and joint efforts in peacekeeping, which directly impacts the effectiveness and outcomes of each operation's mandate. By analysing this collaboration, the research sheds light on the practical challenges and successes of implementing security measures in a highly volatile environment. In other words, the only way to assess each operation is by discussing their place within the architecture.

The second supplementary question investigates the Secretariat's role as a policy broker in political negotiations, particularly following the Yom Kippur War and Operation Litani River. This question addresses the diplomatic side of the equation, highlighting the UN's efforts to mediate and facilitate negotiations between conflicting parties. It underscores the significance of diplomatic initiatives in achieving and maintaining peace, as well as the challenges faced by international actors in navigating the complex political landscape of the Middle East.

The third supplementary question focuses on the impact of two transformational events: the Camp David Accords and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. This inquiry is vital as it examines instances that had transformative (and detrimental) impacts on the Secretariat's capacity and leverage to influence the diplomatic and security landscape. By exploring these events, the research aims to understand how significant geopolitical developments can reshape the operational environment and effectiveness of peacekeeping efforts.

[5] For a more detailed discussion on the time period, see 'Methodology' section.

The research questions collectively aim to critically and thoroughly understand the history of the UN within the Israel-Arab conflict. By adopting a multifaceted approach that explores tactical and operational collaboration, the role of (military) diplomacy, and the influence of transformational geopolitical events, the research endeavours to provide a comprehensive understanding of how these elements interplay to shape the course of the conflict. Adopting a multidimensional approach is not only justified but an absolute requirement for grasping the full spectrum of challenges and opportunities faced by the United Nations in one of the conflicts which still haunts the organization and the international system in 2024.

Methodology

It is critical to outline the systematic approach that forms the backbone of this analysis. The methodology section, structured to offer clarity and precision, has three distinct yet interrelated sections. The first section discusses archival research, illuminating the sources, their relevance and the rationale behind their selection. In the second section, the focus pivots to a comprehensive explanation of the actors chosen for this study, outlining their significance and roles within the larger context of the research. The third section delves into a thoughtful discussion on the rationale behind the specific time chosen, highlighting its importance and the unique insights it offers. This tripartite structure ensures a holistic and rigorous methodological foundation, setting the stage for the subsequent chapters of this work.

UN Archives

The UN Archives and Records Management Section – UN Archives (UNA) for short – is an invaluable resource for historians. The Archives store all non-current records "preserved as evidence of the organisation's functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations or other activities of the United Nations or because of the informational value contained therein" (United Nations Secretary-General, 1947, p. 1). While the UN is obligated to be transparent and accountable to its Member States, the organisation deals with sensitive issues that warrant confidentiality. Therefore, the Secretary-General outlined rules on information management and the classification of documents. In 2007, the Secretary-General refined the rules by outlining three classification levels: unclassified, confidential and strictly confidential (2007). Moreover, the policy also stated, "documents are automatically

declassified after 20 years, and strictly confidential documents require reviews by the SG or his/her representatives" (Habermann-Box, 2014, p. 22). The Secretary-General discussed the usage of the Archives for academic research in 1977; his directive reaffirmed the importance of scholarly research on the UN and instructed the Archives to provide access to the records in line with the regulations in place (1977). This dissertation relies extensively on the UN Archives.

I visited the UN Archives twice for a total period of 25 days. Before each visit, I studied the finding aids. I requested documents, records, and correspondence that can offer unprecedented insights into these entities' decision-making processes, internal dynamics and day-to-day operations within the context of the Israel-Arab conflict. I requested access to 69 folders from the files of the Secretary-General, UNTSO[6], and the Office of Special Political Affairs. I also requested access to 20 strictly confidential folders and 10 confidential folders, which dealt with, inter alia, correspondence between the Secretary-General and the operations, internal and external meeting minutes, mail between the Secretary-General and Henry Kissinger[7], confidential political reports and memoranda. The Archives granted me access to 14 strictly confidential and 10 confidential folders. In addition, I reviewed 46 folders, which are unclassified, or that the Archives had previously declassified. Overall, I reviewed over 2,000 individual documents.

Moreover, I supplemented documents from the Archives with documentation from the UN Digital Library. This online repository has digital versions of all relevant Reports and Special Reports of the Secretary-General, Resolutions from the Security Council and General Assembly, press releases, speeches, voting records and budgets. Furthermore, I triangulated information and insights gathered from the UN Archives and the UN Digital Library with secondary sources, such as books, peer-reviewed articles, reports, and literature on the Israel-Arab with, UN peacekeeping, and the specific operations and offices under study. At

[6] Documents related to UNDOF, UNEF II, UNIFIL, and the Chief Coordinator for Peacekeeping in the Middle East are within UNTSO's files.

[7] Kissinger played a major role in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War (see Chapter 4). The Secretary-General liaised with Kissinger with the objective of securing the UN's participation in the 1973-4 Geneva Peace Conference, and assisting (where allowed) in the negotiation processes of the disengagement agreements between 1974 and 1975.

this junction, it is critical to highlight the inclusion of a particular type of secondary source: books and papers written by the protagonists.

This dissertation relies on the autobiographies of critical players who wrote about their experiences in the Israel-Arab conflict. This output provides a first-hand account of the decision-makers who shaped the UN's activities vis-à-vis the conflict. Their unique insights into the motivation, the decision-making processes, and the understanding of the relationship with key stakeholders gave this dissertation critical insight. Moreover, these political autobiographies shed light on lesser-known UN actors. The most significant example is the case of Siilasvuo, who played a decisive role in conflict management on behalf of the Secretariat. As his role remains grossly understudied, and many of his experiences did not get sufficient exposure, his book complemented the information from the Archives and the scarce literature available.

Of course, it is also critical to highlight the potential challenges. Autobiographies are subjective, and the author willingly or unwillingly writes through the lens of their personal biases. Moreover, human memory can affect the writing as the author might misremember, embellish or omit certain facts and events. This dissertation tackles these challenges through two avenues. First, all information collected from these books and papers is cross-referenced with primary sources whenever possible. Second, Chapter 2 critically assesses this output and acknowledges that political autobiographies and academic papers, in which the protagonists write about their own experiences, have limitations and weigh their positive contributions against the potential risks.

This serves to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the subject matter and allow for a more robust and well-rounded analysis. By incorporating primary and secondary sources in its research, this thesis will contribute to the existing literature on the topic and provide a unique perspective on the UN's involvement in the Israel-Arab conflict between 1967 and 1982. The following section discusses the period that this dissertation analyses.

1967 – 1982: A Tumultuous Period

The period of 1967 to 1982 represents a critical juncture in the evolution of the Israel-Arab conflict, with a number of significant events happening between these years. During this

time, the region fought the most dramatic wars of the conflict: the Six-Day War in 1967, the War of Attrition between Israel and Egypt between 1967 and 1973, the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the Israeli Operation Litani in 1978 in Southern Lebanon and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. In addition, this period saw Israel sign two disengagement agreements with Egypt. One was with Syria, and in another – the most important – Israel and Egypt signed the Camp David Accords and made peace. These events transformed the region's geopolitical landscape and brought the UN's political role and peacekeeping operations to the fore.

There are three main reasons why this period warrants in-depth analysis. First, it allows for a comprehensive understanding of the UN's political role in mediating the conflict, facilitating negotiations and pursuing diplomatic resolutions. This comes from studying the impact of crucial Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, which became the framework for early negotiations, such as the Geneva Peace Conference of 1973 and the subsequent work of its Military Working Group, which facilitated the Israel-Syria and Israel-Egypt Disengagements. Other opportunities for deeper understanding are when, in 1978, the Security Council deployed UNIFIL to respond to Israel's Operation Litani, and in how the Camp David Accords saw a historic breakthrough in the Israel-Egypt portion of the conflict yet had a profoundly negative impact on the UN's overall efforts (see Chapter 5).

Second, the 1967 to 1982 period was the busiest for UN peacekeeping operations in the region (James, 1983; Jonah J. O., 1975; Salama, 2023; Sommereyns, 1980). Days before the Six-Day War, the Secretary-General had to deal with Egypt's request to withdraw UNEF I from the Sinai Peninsula. After the War, UNTSO worked by itself to manage the aftermath of the Six-Day War. It took another regional war for the Security Council to enhance the architecture. The Yom Kippur War of 1973 required the UN to deploy UNEF II and UNDOF to the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights respectively. During this period, the Security Council relied on the operations to maintain ceasefires, supervising disengagement agreements. The operations became an integral part of the negotiations. Analysing the effectiveness, challenges and limitations of these peacekeeping operations can offer valuable insights into the role of the UN in conflict resolution and management.

Third, by focusing on this specific period, the dissertation can delve into the interactions between various UN entities, such as the Office of the Chief Coordinator of Peacekeeping in the Middle East, the UN Office of Special Political Affairs, and the Executive Office of the Secretary-General. These three entities had interdependent yet distinct roles vis-à-vis the conflict. Studying this period can provide lessons and recommendations for the region's current and future peacekeeping efforts. By analysing the successes and failures of the UN's political and peacekeeping roles in the Israel-Arab conflict during the 1967-1982 period, the thesis can contribute valuable knowledge and inform policymakers and practitioners working to resolve the ongoing conflict.

Moreover, during the late 1970s, the conflict's epicentre moved from the strife of Israel and its neighbours to the Israel-Palestine conflict (see below). The political focus of the time was state-centric, such as the Palestinians using the time to build their political and military agency. During the 1970s, the Secretariat started dealing with the Palestinian people directly at the political level and on the ground through peacekeeping in Southern Lebanon. The following section discusses case selection and introduces the key players.

The UN Architecture in the Middle East: A Note on Case Selection

The UN peacekeeping architecture in the Middle East comprises the operations, the Office of Chief Coordinator (1975-1978), and the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs (OUSGSPA) in New York. Drawing these actors together provides a comprehensive understanding of the internal dynamics and decision-making processes. This study critically assess the extent to which these actors worked in a collaborative and strategic manner and whether their individual and collective decisions contributed to the UN's success in managing the conflict. In New York, the Secretary-General leaned heavily upon the expertise and capabilities of the Office for Special Political Affairs. This office played a pivotal role in overseeing and steering the everyday management of operations, including managing crises on the ground and liaising with the Security Council in New York. Moreover, the Chief Coordinator, alongside the Force Commanders, maintained a consistent line of communication with the Secretary-General, but did so *through* the OUSGSPA. Such a hierarchical structure ensured both coherence in directives and clarity in feedback (Jonah J. O., 1991; Urquhart, 1983).

The interdependence and integrated functionality of these entities are not just structural but also were instrumental in shaping the outcomes on the ground. As James Jonah elucidated (1991), these individual offices and roles were not in silos. Instead, they were interconnected parts of a larger structure, each influencing, supporting and reinforcing the others. The selection of this specific case, therefore, is not merely to dissect individual actors but also to comprehend their collective role and impact in the conflict.

Rationale for Exclusion: UNRWA and the Broader UN System in the Analytical Framework

At this juncture, it is fundamental to discuss the rationale behind excluding the rest of the UN System from the analysis, particularly the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), an Agency almost as old as UNTSO. UNRWA[8], while playing an important role in providing humanitarian assistance to Palestinian refugees, operated primarily within the humanitarian domain rather than the diplomatic or security realms that are the focus of this research (Irfan, 2020; Peters & Gal, 2009). The agency's efforts were fundamentally geared towards relief and development, which, although crucial, do not directly engaged with the operations or their work providing ceasefire monitoring, and buffer between the Israel and all its neighbours. The components of the architecture, by contrast, were explicitly established with mandates to navigate and mitigate the military and diplomatic intricacies of the conflict.

This is not to understate or diminish the critical humanitarian support UNRWA provided to Palestinian refugees, which was of immense importance. However, the political influence and involvement of UNRWA grew significantly after 1982, making it a more central figure in discussions about the current UN architecture in the Middle East. Therefore, a PhD focusing on the contemporary setup and implications of UN involvement in the region would rightly need to include UNRWA in its analysis. The exclusion of UNRWA from this particular study is an acknowledgment of the distinct separation that existed during the specified period between the political efforts to resolve the conflict and the humanitarian efforts to mitigate

[8] Over the decades, UNRWA's political role increased significantly however, at the time of this dissertation, the agency was exclusively dedicated to operational matters and it did not have a seat at the political table. For example, during the Km 101 negotiations, the Geneva Peace Conference of 1973 the Secretariat had senior staff hailed from the Office of the Chief Coordinator and OUSGSPA exclusively.

its impacts on the civilian population. This delineation is not a commentary on the value or impact of UNRWA's work but rather a methodological choice to focus on the political and peacekeeping mechanisms of the UN during a specific historical window.

Extending this line of argumentation, the exclusion of the broader UN system from the analysis follows a similar logic. The UN System was present in the region from the onset; multiple agencies, funds and programmes established field offices across the region and provided support across the board to tackle developmental, humanitarian, and socio-economic challenges. Notably, the UN Development Programme, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the UN Children's Fund provided essential services for Palestinian refugees by way of channelling all the foreign aid in development assistance. However, their mandates and activities did not directly intersect with the strategic interventions and negotiations of those within the architecture (Bennis, 1997).

This approach ensures a targeted investigation into the effectiveness and implications of these operations, shedding light on the UN's capacity to navigate and influence the complex dynamics of international peace and security. Excluding from the analysis does not mean to underplay their work and impact however, analysing the interplay between the operations and the rest of the UN System requires a standalone research project.

A Voice to the Peacekeepers

This dissertation intentionally gives a strong voice to civilian and military peacekeepers. Multiple senior officials wrote journal articles, book chapters and even entire books narrating their experiences and sharing first-hand insights that are extremely relevant and fill gaps that only the protagonists can. Among the key contributors are the ever-prolific Sir Brian Urquhart (1980; 1981; 1983; 1984; 1987; 1994; 1998), Ensio Siilasvuo (1981; 1982), James O.C. Jonah (1975; 1980; 1991; 2014), Emmanuel Erskine (1989), Bertil Stjernfelt (1992), Indar Rikhye (1980), E.L.M 'Tommy' Burns (1968), among others.

Practitioner scholars offer nuanced accounts of decision-making processes, institutional culture, inter-organizational dynamics, and other factors influencing the UN's actions and policies. They enrich our understanding by adding depth and dimension to the historical narrative and allow us to interpret events through the eyes of those directly involved. To

obtain a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the UN's role in the Israel-Arab conflict, we must incorporate these perspectives into our study, balancing them with other scholarly works and primary sources.

Literature Review on 'Peacekeeping in the Middle East': An Incomplete Approach

Several scholars stepped back from the operations and reviewed the entire architecture. This section assesses the extent to which they analyse the dynamics *within* all the UN actors working in the conflict. Sommereyns (1980) analyses the legal aspects of the UN peacekeeping missions' establishment, organisation and operations in the Middle East. The paper makes two significant contributions to our understanding of the architecture. First, on the issue of authority and command, the author stresses that the Security Council established them under their charter-given rule. Moreover, the Secretary-General remarked that the Council vested in him the authority to command the operations. The Security Council, however, requested the Secretary-General to brief them on the operations' functions and challenges. The Secretary-General appointed the Force Commanders with the Council's consent. Second, the author stresses that the processes worked the most efficiently in times of crisis. UNTSO and UNEF II supported UNDOF through the temporary redeployment of assets and personnel and by covering UNDOF's initial budget. Overall, the author concludes that cooperation works well in times of crisis and dwindles afterward, given the constraints of the mandates. The paper however, does not include the role of Chief Coordinator to its analysis, and while it is correct in pointing that the Force Commanders answer directly to the Secretary-General *de jure*, they do so *through* the Chief Coordinator and OUSGPA *de facto.*

Bouillon (2015) stresses that the operations successfully managed crises due to the fact they could rely on each other. The aftermath of the Yom Kippur War and Operation Litani of 1978 required immediate responses in the form of new operations. With significant technical assistance from the existing UN actors on the ground, the Secretariat deployed UNEF II, UNDOF and UNIFIL efficiently and quickly. However, the author limits itself to military cooperation, which took place under specific circumstances. This paints only a portion of the picture. The fact of the matter is that the operations institutionalised their partnership and included both military and political affairs to it.

Saikal (1998) expresses that the operations kept the temperature low enough to avoid a confrontation between the superpowers. Moreover, the author stresses that the Secretariat's peace initiatives (such as the Jarring mission of 1967 and the Geneva Peace Conference of 1974) did not have a real chance to succeed because, during that time, the United States positioned itself as the essential player in the region and decided that any long-term agreement would be on their terms. This contribution eloquently showcases the limitations of the Secretariat's agency; however, it misses the multiple instances whereby the Secretariat played a constructive albeit understated role, such as in the Km 101 negotiations (see Chapter 3).

Walker (1996) discusses the UN's additional roles throughout the conflict. The Security Council and the regional players used the different pieces of the architecture in many ways, including as a mechanism for lowering tensions, a platform for negotiations and a buffer for keeping the peace. While the UN has valuable actors working on the ground, the author expresses that the peacekeeping architecture is only as effective as the Security Council allows. He does not believe the UN's involvement in the Israel-Arab conflict is futile, stating that despite its constitutional and financial limitations, its operations deterred Israel and its neighbours from engaging in another regional war, such as in 1967 and 1973.

Urquhart (1980; 1983) emphasises that a peacekeeping operation can function only with the full cooperation of the parties concerned and their understanding of and acquiescence in what the force is trying to do. Full support of the Security Council and its understanding are essential. Any wavering on the part of its members instantly transmits itself to the parties to the conflict and even to the members of the Force in the field, with highly damaging results. At the same time, the operations and the Secretariat have agency and the ability to influence their work. He highlights that the UNEF II and UNDOF are two examples of the Secretariat taking the initiative and the Security Council endorsing it. Immediately after the Yom Kippur War finished, the UN designed UNEF II's mandate in coordination with Israel and Egypt. Moreover, UNEF II and UNTSO developed UNDOF's mandate and prepared for its arrival. The fact that the UNEF II Force Commander Siilasvuo attended the meetings in Geneva, where the countries negotiated the disengagement agreements, allowed for smooth coordination and division of labour.

Bar-Yaacov (1980) notes that the mere presence of the operations contributed to the satisfactory outcome of the disengagement negotiations. The UN personnel worked efficiently and impartially, and senior UN officers such as the Chief Coordinator, the USGs of Special Political Affairs and the Force Commanders served as proper channels between the parties in matters of alleged violations of the applicable agreements. While the Camp David Accords brought peace in one of the sectors, it also torpedoed the chance of progress in the rest. Therefore, the UN's liaison duties remain vital to managing the conflict.

Kohavi (1980) is more critical as he sees the operations as unable to get the confidence of the countries involved, particularly Israel, which never trusted the UN enough to rely on it for its security arrangement. Of course, the operations provide benefits as they reduce the chance of another surprise regional attack. Overall, the fact that the Security Council placed a buffer at every border deterred the countries from another large-scale war.

This section's last paper is also the latest scholarly contribution. Myers & Dorn (2022) conducted a longitudinal study of UNTSO, UNDOF and UNIFIL to assess their effectiveness and, at the same time, evaluate the extent to which they successfully integrated new technologies. The authors suggest that UNTSO's support of UNIFIL and UNDOF through OGL and OGG allows the operations to carry out the tasks of observing and conducting inspections and investigations. The authors also highlight that the parties themselves continue to support the renewal of the mandates, which is a restatement of the operation's usefulness. They suggest that keeping these missions in place and allowing them to evolve is arguably the less costly option for both dollars and lives. The authors claim that despite criticisms and shortcomings, the operations successfully achieved their mandate in 2006, and the parties have not fought a major war.

The history of UN peacekeeping in the Israel-Arab conflict has received much attention from the literature. However, neither the operation-specific papers nor the regional studies provide an in-depth review of the processes and decision-making of the entire architecture.

This critical survey of relevant academic literature on '*peacekeeping in the Middle East,*' which includes the four Chapters of the *Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (Diehl, 2015; Ruddlof & Diehl, 2015; Novosseloff, 2025; Theobald, 2015)

illustrates the three main gaps in the literature this dissertation addresses. First, while the above mentioned are a step forward in studying the UN's history in the Israel-Arab conflict, they still see the operations as 'neighbours' that happen to work on the same overall conflict and regional cooperation as an ad-hoc response to the conflict's evolution. Academic scholarship on peacekeeping operations usually evaluates the operations one by one, which is a perfectly acceptable method in most cases. However, it is an incomplete way to evaluate, let alone discuss, the history of peacekeeping in the Middle East, because of how much the operations relied on and continue to rely on each other to succeed, and how influential the Chief Coordinator was. For example, the authors only see that UNEF II works within the Israel-Egypt portion of the Israel-Arab conflict; they do not take into consideration the extent to which the operation relied on UNTSO, nor do they understand how many resources UNEF II devoted to supporting UNDOF and UNIFIL. This dissertation bundles all relevant UN entities working in the Israel-Arab conflict through the lens of complexity theory. It reviews their relationships, the roles and actions of each one, and their impact on the overall conflict.

The literature treats each operation as a standalone exercise due the fact that each one has a separate mandate. The reason the literature mainly treats the operations individually revolves around their mandate and the general principles of peacekeeping. The Security Council deploys one operation to deal with one conflict within a specific Area of Operations (AO). The single-operation scholarly contributions provide critical insights into the history and work of the operations. However, almost every single one of them fails to widen its scope and explore to what extent the fact that a single operation belongs to a regional architecture affects the its successes, failures and *modus operandi*. The literature barely acknowledges the other operations and does not explore the implications of having four operations working within driving distance of each other, tackling the same regional conflict, albeit from a different perspective. While the papers do an excellent job of studying an operation's day-to-day work, we must now critically review the literature focusing on regional dynamics.

Theoretical Reflections

This section provides a theoretical reflection on the applicability and limitations of International Relations theory in illuminating the nuances of the UN's peacekeeping architecture in the conflict. This dissertation proposes an innovative and somewhat

pioneering theoretical approach by way of adopting complexity theory. This lens is of particular relevance as it offers a nuanced understanding of the multi-layered interplay of diverse actors within the architecture.

Studying theory allows us to ground our understanding and framing of it. The theory is "a heuristic device for organising what we know, or think we know, at a particular time about some more or less explicitly posed question or issue" (Inkeles, 1964, p. 28). Understanding how international relations theorists have viewed peacekeeping through the years is a valuable tool worthy of consideration (Blaikie, 2010). The study of International Relations (IR) theory is crucial for a comprehensive understanding of any issue within the International System, such as the Israel-Arab conflict. IR theories provide a set of analytical tools and conceptual frameworks through which it is possible to decipher the complex dynamics of the international system.

The objective of this brief, theoretical reflection is to assess the extent to which theory can frame the *sui generis* phenomenon of the peacekeeping architecture in the Middle East. Therefore, this section is not an exhaustive list of all IR theories, which discuss and try to explain peacekeeping. The section draws significant knowledge from a 2020-edited volume titled *UN Peace Operations and International Relations Theory* (Oksamytna & Karlsrud, 2020). The book provides a substantial review of IR theories and their views on peace operations.

Before delving into the complexity theory it is essential to evaluate the framework provided by mainstream international relations (IR) theories, particularly mainstream approaches such as realism and liberalism. Realism, characterized by its state-centric, power-focused perspective, views peacekeeping as a tool wielded by Member States to serve national interests, with the Security Council maintaining overarching control. Cunliffe (2009, 2020) emphasizes that this delegation of implementation to the Secretariat by the Council, under the UN Charter, offers a unique opportunity for the Secretariat to influence international dynamics, albeit within the constraints of Member States' interests. Mearsheimer (1994) and Finnemore (2007) critique international institutions' influence, suggesting that

peacekeeping serves primarily for crisis management, underpinned by the geopolitical interests of powerful states.

However, this perspective is challenged by the complexity of inter-operation collaboration, which realism's focus on power dynamics and Council control cannot fully encapsulate. The critique by Bouillon (2015) on the Council's focus on crisis management, and the observations by Yaqub (2013) on superpower competition, underscore realism's limitations in acknowledging the nuanced, cooperative dynamics within the UN peacekeeping efforts in the Middle East. This gap highlights the necessity for a broader analytical lens that incorporates the collaborative synergy and regional dynamics often emerging between different operations.

Liberalism offers an alternative, emphasizing the role of international institutions in fostering cooperation and promoting shared norms, suggesting a broader potential for agency among peacekeeping operations beyond the immediate dictates of powerful states. Monteleone and Oksamytna (2020) argue that peacekeeping fits well within a liberal framework, emphasizing international cooperation and institution building. Yet, liberalism's optimistic view of institutional agency may overlook the constraints posed by power politics, especially evident in the Israel-Arab conflict where the UN's extensive peacekeeping architecture has struggled to effect lasting peace, and assert itself as a leading actor who had a seat at the decision-making table.

This dissertation seeks to transcend these theoretical confines by viewing the UN's engagement in the conflict as a holistic architecture, a perspective that reveals the interdependent and multidimensional nature of peacekeeping efforts. This approach not only challenges the traditional IR theoretical paradigms but also illuminates the evolution of peacekeeping from isolated operations to a comprehensive strategy aimed at managing the multifaceted dynamics of regional conflicts.

Therefore, the quest of finding a theoretical framework must move beyond mainstream towards a more flexible approach. John Mearshimer and Stephan Walt (2013) stated that understanding certain phenomena of the International System requires a 'middle-range'

theory[9], and this dissertation adopts complexity. The decision to omit other middle-range theories is also deliberate. While these theories could potentially provide additional layers of understanding, the scope of this dissertation would not allow for a comprehensive exploration of each theory and its implications. Therefore, the theoretical reflection opts for a selective theoretical approach that can best facilitate a systematic and coherent historical analysis of the research question without exceeding the limits of a PhD.

Complexity Theory: A New Lens

Complexity Theory, a pivotal framework in understanding the intricate behaviours of systems, emerged from the intersections of mathematics, physics, and computer science. It challenges traditional linear models by emphasizing that systems exhibit properties not predictable by the behaviour of their individual parts alone. Central to this theory is the notion of emergent behaviour, where higher-order complexity arises from simple rules followed by elements within a system (Mitchell, 2009)

At the heart of Complexity Theory lies the concept of non-linearity, where small changes can lead to disproportionately large effects, often referred to as the "butterfly effect" ((Lorenz, 1963). This sensitivity to initial conditions underscores the unpredictability and dynamic nature of complex systems. Emergence, a related concept, describes how novel patterns and properties manifest at the macro level that are not observable at the micro level, challenging reductionist approaches (Goldstein J. , 1999)

Complex systems are characterized by their ability to adapt and self-organize without a central controlling entity. This adaptive capacity enables systems to respond to environmental changes through feedback loops, leading to the evolution of new structures and behaviours (Kauffman, 1993)

The structure of complex systems is often analysed through the lens of networks, where nodes (agents, cells, individuals) are interconnected in ways that influence the system's behaviour and resilience. The study of networks has illuminated how patterns of connectivity affect the diffusion of information, disease, and innovation (Barabási, 2002).

[9] According to the authors, a 'middle-range' theory is one that focuses on specific phenomena rather than explore foundational questions of the International System as a whole.

Another foundational claim of Complexity Theory is the "edge of chaos" principle, positing that complex systems operate in a region between order and complete randomness. This boundary condition is believed to be optimal for creativity, adaptation, and evolution (Langton, 1990)

Application of Complexity Theory to Peace Operations

Incorporating Complexity Theory into the analysis of peace operations offers a nuanced lens through which to examine the multifaceted nature of international interventions in conflict zones. This section will explore the application of Complexity Theory in understanding peace operations, focusing on the inherent unpredictability, the interconnectedness of actors and factors, and the emergence of outcomes unforeseen by linear planning processes. The discussion will be contextualized within the broader field of International Relations, highlighting the theory's relevance and potential to contribute to more effective peacekeeping strategies.

Peace operations are quintessential examples of complex adaptive systems, characterized by a dynamic interplay of political, social, and military factors. Complexity Theory posits that such systems are inherently non-linear, meaning small inputs or changes in one part of the system can lead to disproportionate and unpredictable outcomes (Day & Hunt, 2023; Urry, 2003). This perspective challenges traditional approaches to peace operations that often rely on linear cause-effect assumptions, advocating instead for adaptive strategies that can respond to the system's evolving nature.

The theory underscores the importance of viewing peace operations through the prism of interconnectedness, where various actors—or as this thesis labelled them, the members of the Architecture—are seen as part of a broader network. This approach facilitates an understanding of how relationships and interactions within these networks influence the success or failure of peace operations (Bousquet, 2011)

A key insight from Complexity Theory is the concept of self-organization, suggesting that complex systems have the ability to adapt to changing conditions through internal processes. In the context of peace operations, this implies a need for missions to be designed with

flexibility, allowing for adaptation to unforeseen challenges and the self-organizational capacities of local communities and institutions (Ramalingam, 2008)

With regards to emergence, where new properties or behaviours arise that are not inherent in the individual parts of the system. This aspect is particularly relevant for peace operations, where interventions often lead to unintended consequences. Recognizing the emergent properties of complex systems can help in anticipating and mitigating negative outcomes, while also identifying opportunities for positive change (De Coning, 2016)

The application of Complexity Theory to peace operations has significant theoretical and practical implications. Theoretically, it prompts a revaluation of established paradigms in International Relations and conflict resolution, advocating for a shift towards more holistic and adaptive approaches. Practically, it suggests that peacekeeping strategies should prioritize flexibility, local engagement, and continuous learning to effectively navigate the complexities of conflict environments.

Complexity theory affords us a more nuanced lens to dissect the multifaceted dynamics within the UN peacekeeping architecture in the Middle East. Applying complexity to the study of peace operations confirm that the architecture has intricate relationships, thereby making them interdependent. This lens allows us to deepen our understanding of how the different interactions between the parties affect the course of events. Furthermore, complex systems adapt to change and learn from experience. Treating the architecture in the Middle East as a complex system allows us to explore how the operations adapted to the ever-changing political landscape of the Israel-Arab conflict and how their relationship with each other evolved as time passed.

Perhaps most importantly, complexity theory acknowledges that cause-and-effect relationships in complex systems are often nonlinear, meaning small changes can lead to disproportionately large effects. This can help us understand why some interventions in peacekeeping operations have unexpected outcomes. Over the last five years, Charles T. Hunt spearheaded the usage of complexity in peacekeeping. The author summarises the benefit of this new theory.

> Overall, complexity theory does not offer a theory of IR. As with constructivism, it does not claim to designate the most significant actors, nor does it purport to predict future events. On the contrary, it offers an alternative framework for revealing how seemingly *insignificant* players can have disproportionate influence over the course of events in highly *unpredictable* ways (Hunt, 2020, p. 199)

This dissertation's most prominent contribution to the literature is an in-depth analysis of the 'seemingly insignificant players'. The most prominent example is Ensio Siilasvuo, who served in multiple capacities throughout his tenure in the UN (see Chapter 2). He chaired the initial Israel-Egypt negotiations at the Km 101 tent and the Military Working Group, which negotiated the disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Syria. While the majority of the literature treats Siilasvuo as middle-manager with almost no authority or agency, this dissertation disects the entire architecture and discovers that his role was fundamental in the Secretariat's efforts to manage the conflict.

Day & Hunt (2023) applied complexity theory to peacekeeping and remark that "complexity theory offers insights and perspectives on processes in the peacekeeping system[10] that orthodox social science struggles to reveal and insufficiently explains" (p. 17). The authors argue that a complexity-oriented approach encourages mapping all key actors *within the system* as nodes in the system, focusing on their power relations and the reality that not all nodes are equal. The relevance of using complexity theory in peacekeeping operations is an acknowledgement that the environment where peacekeeping operations work is complex. Day, Gorur, Holt, & Hunt (2020) reaffirm this view and stress that the landscape where peace operations work is becoming more complex, which can reduce the operations' ability to work in the political realm. Embracing complexity allows an operation to build a solid strategy considering all relevant actors and their relationships with each other.

The application of complexity theory in peacekeeping is a new approach, which has, so far, only focused on large operations with stabilisation mandates in Africa. However, the theory also applies to the architecture in the Middle East now and during this dissertation's period. Adopting complexity theory as a prism to study the UN's history within the Israel-Arab

[10] Peacekeeping system is another term for peacekeeping architecture.

conflict is fundamental for four reasons. First, and foremost, this theory provides network perspective, allowing bundling all operations, together with OUSGPA and the Office of Chief Coordinator, as parts of *one* complex web. As Chapter 3 demonstrates, this perspective is especially useful in understanding the regional dynamics and IOC at the military and administrative levels. Chapter 4 demonstrates how the different actors of the architecture engaged with the conflict at the political level and to what extent their interactions answered to a regional strategy.

Second, complexity theory enables us to comprehend the multi-level interactions that are inherent in such conflicts, where individual, organizational, and international actors interact dynamically over time. While this dissertation discusses the personal role of the different Secretaries-General, at heart, the focus revolves around the people *below* the UN Chief. Moreover, the dissertation discusses (particularly concerning UNIFIL and Southern Lebanon) the interactions the different members of the architecture had with non-state actors.

Third, complexity theory understands that the nature of the relationships inside the architecture can lead to interdependence. Chapter 3 is devoted entirely to understanding how the role of one actor had a profound impact on the rest. For example, UNTSO provides critical support to all other operations – and continues to do so to this day. As the chapter clearly demonstrates, the Security Council relied on this interdependence, and the Secretary-General planned the work of all operations with the understanding that they worked in the same ecosystem. Furthermore, Chapter 3 discusses the issue of UNDOF's strategic autonomy and the extent to which the Secretariat succeeded in ensuring that the operation benefits from being part of the system and, at the same time, stand on its own.

Fourth, the theory allows one to study the extent to which the operations adapted to crisis. It understands that the conflict is fluid, and the operations have had to adapt to changing circumstances. Chapter 3 explores the UN's reactions to the wars of 1967, 1973 and to Israel's Operation Litani of 1978. The Secretariat dealt with the crises by way of moving assets between operations and fostering flexibility. Moreover, Chapter 5 discusses how the

architecture adapted to losing UNEF and the Office of Chief Coordinator in 1978. Complexity contrasts with theories that treat such operations as static entities with fixed mandates.

In summary, complexity theory captures the multidimensional and fluidity of the Israel-Arab conflict, providing insights that mainstream and even critical theory do not. It allows for a more realistic and robust understanding of the inter-operation interactions, the influence of the operations and the Secretariat on the design and implementation of mandates, and the complex dynamics of the peacekeeping architecture in the Middle East.

The Role of the UN Secretariat and Peacekeeping Operations

Now we must turn our attention to the scholarly view on the agency of the Secretariat and peacekeeping. The degree to which it has had the autonomy to make decisions, take the initiative and influence events in New York and on the ground is paramount to understanding whether the architecture affected the situation on the ground between 1967 and 1982.

Under the UN Charter, the UN as an organisation is constrained by its creators and donors: states. However, their state-centric features do not necessarily undermine their power and autonomy (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). Indeed, one of the critical innovations the UN made was giving the Secretary-General a broader platform by which to participate in the political side of the organisation. Article 99 of the Charter reads:

> The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter that, in his opinion, may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 99 "both expressly and by implication, gives the Secretary-General greater power and seems to expect more constructive leadership from him" (Goodrich, 1947). Johnstone (2003) concludes that because the article gives the Secretary-General the option to act, he has the latitude to build a political agenda. "The discretion embodied in the notion that he may (not must) bring any matter (not only disputes) which in his opinion may threaten peace requires the SG to exercise independent political judgment" (p. 444). Even with these provisions, the Secretary-General's political manoeuvre room is somewhat constrained by Member States, who elect the Secretary-General and adopt the organisation's budget (Traub, 2007).

Nevertheless, scholars such as Barnett & Finnemore (2004) and Nye (2007) argue that international institutions have a degree of independence stemming from their constituted authority and are given a degree of autonomy to deal with particular issues.

Utilising Principal-Agent (PA) theory, we can understand the balance of power between the Member States (principal actors) and the Secretariat (agents) (Hawkins et al., 2006; Gutner, 2005). This relationship is especially critical in UN peacekeeping, where the Secretariat and the Security Council share the role of Principal. While the Secretariat administers and carries out each mission, the Security Council provides the mandate, and the Secretariat is accountable to the Security Council (Nielson & Tierney, 2003).

The concept of 'agency slack', where the agent's actions diverge from the Principal's expectations, highlights the Secretariat's potential to maximise its autonomy (Copelovitch, 2010). This autonomy enables the Secretariat to act as a regulatory mechanism of the international system and try to influence the agenda of both the General Assembly and the Security Council (Barnett & Duvall, 2005; Broome & Seabrooke, 2012). Hence, the UN Secretariat has considerable agency allowing the UN Chief to be an active player in world politics.

However, the Secretariat's agency has major constraints. The Secretary-General's power relies on the support of the Security Council and other UN Member States. Moreover, the organisation is limited by the mandate provided by the Member States, which can be adapted or withdrawn (Traub, 2007). While the Secretary-General manages the UN from New York, peacekeeping operations worldwide address multidimensional conflict. The agency of these operations and their successful political role are discussed in the following sections.

UN Peacekeeping: An Improvised Development

While peacekeeping, as a principle or activity, was not explicitly written into the Charter of the United Nations, now it is one of the most visible, expensive and complex endeavours the organisation pursues. As a result, peacekeeping is now one of the most important, used and accepted tools for maintaining international peace and security (Bellamy & Williams, 2015). It is necessary to evaluate its history to understand how it became so important. The fact of the matter is that "the history of UN Peacekeeping is a mirror to the record of the

organisation's evolution: the initial high-hopes, the many frustrations on the ground and the sometimes bitter disappointments in the end" (Thakur, 2006, p. 43). Understanding and tracing this evolution will also shed light on the degree of agency of the Secretary-General, which has been the subject of a great deal of academic literature. This study will contribute to that conversation by taking an original view on peacekeeping and the agency it may or may not have in the Middle East. This issue will be discussed in depth at the end of the review and throughout Chapter 3.

To understand how peacekeeping operations can have agency, we must review the work of Barnett & Finnemore (1999). They firmly rebuff the validity of the claim that international organisations are passive and have no independent agendas. In their study of many UN Agencies and UN Peacekeeping Operations, they conclude that while constrained by states, they do have autonomy. The Secretariat and the rest of the UN System often face the fact that their agenda sometimes clashes with the interests of some Member States. Another interesting contribution Barnett & Finnemore make is that the agency derives from the image the UN portrays as an organisation with technical expertise. They interpret the mandates of Security Council resolutions as an investment of the agency. The authors contribute to the subject of agency in peacekeeping operations by reviewing the case of Rwanda (2004). This contribution is essential because it highlights a necessary tension. While Operations and the Secretariat have an agency, they sometimes tend *to refrain from using it*. Indeed the study showed that the Secretariat chose to avoid pushing for a more significant intervention because this would have broken two sacrosanct principles of peacekeeping: consent and impartiality. While true that the notion of impartiality was partially to blame, this case showed an essential degree of agency, but using it requires political courage of the sort Dag Hammarskjöld would approve.

Karlsrud (2016) notes Barnett & Finnemore's contributions and agrees that the UN has agency. However, he questions their approach by highlighting that the different organs (i.e. the Secretariat, General Assembly, Security Council) and even the different departments within the Secretariat have different agendas and levels of agency, which are not static. This results in "diverging and conflicting norm pressures and practices, particularly between

headquarters and the field" (p. 18). This creates a disuniform ecosystem whereby different actors compete for agency and often have conflicting agendas.

Gowan (2016) takes on an even broader stance in support of the notion that there is an agency in peacekeeping, not based on the rules and principles but in practice. While the Security Council and the TCCs have significant influence during the negotiation of an operation's mandate and scope, once the operation is on the ground, they delegate a significant portion of the authority to the Secretary-General and the head of the operation.

Day, Gorur, Holt, & Hunt (2020). The operations can build a political strategy to support the host country by conducting scenario planning and stakeholder mapping to understand for what issues the operation must push forward. Walter, Howard, & Fortna (2021) elaborate by stating that peacekeeping works effectively when it is appropriately tailored to the specific conditions of the conflict and when it receives robust international support. Moreover, they express that operations have a positive impact on strengthening the rule of law in participating countries, primarily through political and economic inducements rather than military force alone.

Stojek & Tir (2014) concur that while the Secretariat might have operational agency once the boots are on the ground, it has less to say in choosing which countries get a task in the first place. Based on a review of the economic relationship between P5 countries with host countries, they find the Security Council is more amenable to sending peacekeepers to countries with whom they have either an economic relation or geopolitical interests. This appears to confirm that the P5 sees peacekeeping through a realist prism.

However, Doyle & Sambanis (2007) took a more nuanced approach. They studied the impact peacekeeping operations have on post-civil war countries. While the success of any mission is partially dependent on external factors, they express that mandates usually allow for the Secretariat in New York and the operations in the field to have a certain degree of manoeuvre. They highlight that the Secretary-General has significant leeway to influence the strategic outlook of the operations. However, Allen & Yuen (2013) caution that the Security Council can revoke the operation's autonomy whenever they feel it is overstepping their

interpretation of the mandate. Moreover, if a P5 country is directly interested in the countries where operations work, they are much more likely to scrutinise the operation.

Given the geopolitical importance of the Middle East during the Cold War, the superpowers scrutinised the work of the UN significantly. Nevertheless, the Council allowed the operations to cooperate in times of crisis, authorised the creation of the Office of Chief Coordinator and empowered the UNEF II Force Commander to chair the initial negotiations between Israel and Egypt at the Km 101 tent (Levitt, 1997). The Council treated the Secretariat as a partner that had the space to think along and co-design the mandate of new operations (UNEF II and UNDOF) and allowed it to play an active political role.

Weiss & Thakur (2010) discuss two critical factors in securing the success of missions. First, mandates need to be more pragmatic and based on the conditions on the ground. This means that the Secretariat has the opportunity (and, therefore, agency) to shape the Security Council's view by providing the necessary information to the TCCs and the P5. Second, to the fullest extent of what is realistically possible, the Secretariat must 'stand up' to the Council by requesting what is needed and making assessments not based solely on the P5's interests.

However, the Security Council revoked that autonomy whenever it felt it was in their interest. The two most prominent examples are UNIFIL's deployment and UNEF II's withdrawal. In the former, the United States forced the Secretariat to deploy UNIFIL to save the Camp David Agreements (Urquhart, 1987). On the latter, the Soviet Union retaliated to the Camp David Agreements by preventing the Secretariat from playing any part in the peace treaty's implementation. Therefore, the Council withdrew UNEF II despite still having work to do.

Ruggie (1985) evaluated the role of the UN in the peace and security area and concluded that the organisation "has not worked at all well in the peace and security area of late because governments have failed to exercise their influence and provide support on behalf of collective efforts" (p. 348). This statement is worth quoting because it comes from a liberal internationalist who has made scholarly and policy contributions to the UN. While he does acknowledge, there is a degree of agency and cooperation. As seen in the previous section, Ruggie has tremendous faith in the Secretariat but is keen to show its limitations. Multiple

authors who take a less idealistic view of the UN have shared and expanded this middle-ground thinking.

Inter-Organization Collaboration

The genesis of inter-agency cooperation in the post-World War II era was marked by an imperative to address the multifaceted challenges of reconstruction, development, and peacekeeping. Early endeavours were characterized by a collaborative spirit among the nascent agencies, each contributing unique expertise towards global recovery and peacebuilding. Despite these noble intentions, coordination and role delineation issues often marred these initial efforts, as agencies navigated the establishment of their operational domains within the UN's broader framework (Urquhart, 1983)

Inter-institutional cooperation involves the collaborative efforts of multiple international organizations to address complex global challenges. This form of cooperation is essential for the effective management of issues that transcend national borders, such as climate change, security, and humanitarian crises. Biermann and Koops (2017) argue that synergistic partnerships among international institutions enhance collective action capabilities, enabling a more cohesive response to global problems. Moreover, Oberthür and Gehring (2011) emphasize the importance of institutional interplay in environmental governance, illustrating how strategic collaboration can lead to significant progress in addressing environmental issues.

The concept and practice of inter-agency cooperation within the UN have significantly evolved, particularly in response to the complex global challenges that emerged towards the end of the 20th century. The introduction of "integrated missions" in the 1990s, aimed at consolidating humanitarian, development, and peacekeeping efforts under a cohesive operational strategy, marked a pivotal shift towards a more holistic approach to conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction (Durch, 1993). Despite advancements, inter-agency cooperation within the UN system continues to confront significant challenges. The overlapping mandates of UN agencies have led to resource competition, jurisdictional conflicts, and operational inefficiencies, often resulting in a fragmented approach to global issues (Barnett & Finnemore, 2007). The decentralized nature of the UN system has impeded

effective coordination and communication, leading to disjointed operations and suboptimal outcomes in humanitarian and peacekeeping missions (Minear, 2002).

The journey of inter-agency cooperation within the UN system from its inception to the present day reflects a complex narrative of ambition, evolution, and persistent challenges. Despite significant progress in fostering collaboration, the literature underscores the ongoing need for reform and innovation to overcome obstacles related to mandate overlap, coordination difficulties, and external political and financial dependencies.

The examination of the United Nations' architectural framework and operations in the Middle East through the lens of Complexity Theory underscores its utility as the most apt theoretical perspective for such an analysis. Complexity Theory, with its emphasis on non-linearity, interconnectedness, adaptation, and emergence, offers a nuanced understanding of the multifaceted nature of peacekeeping operations, the political role of the Secretary-General, and inter-agency cooperation within the UN system. This approach allows for a comprehensive examination of how these elements interact dynamically, influencing both the process and outcomes of peacekeeping efforts in the region.

The arguments presented herein highlight Complexity Theory's ability to capture the essence of the UN's operations in the Middle East. By focusing on the inherent unpredictability and the intricate web of relationships that define the UN's efforts in the area, Complexity Theory illuminates the challenges and opportunities that arise from the system's inherent complexity. It acknowledges the role of the Secretary-General not just as an administrative head but as a pivotal figure in navigating the political and operational terrain of peacekeeping efforts. Moreover, it recognizes the significance of inter-agency cooperation as a critical factor in the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, where synergies and conflicts among UN agencies can significantly impact mission outcomes.

Despite the richness of literature on the evolution of peacekeeping, the political influence of the Secretary-General, and the dynamics of inter-agency cooperation, a gap exists in the holistic examination of these elements within the context of the UN's architecture in the Middle East. Most studies tend to analyze these aspects in isolation or with limited consideration of their interdependence within the broader UN framework. This fragmented

approach overlooks the complex interactions and cumulative effects that shape the UN's peacekeeping architecture and its capacity to address the challenges of the Israel-Arab conflict. This thesis posits that a comprehensive understanding of the UN's operations in the Middle East necessitates a holistic analysis that considers the Secretary-General, the peacekeeping operations, and the Chief Coordinator of Peacekeeping in the Middle East as components of a single, interdependent architecture. By adopting Complexity Theory as the theoretical lens, this research aims to bridge the existing gap in the literature, offering both a policy and theoretical contribution. It seeks to elucidate the complex dynamics at play, providing insights into how the UN's architectural framework can be optimized to enhance the efficacy of peacekeeping efforts in the region. Through this analysis, the thesis will contribute to a deeper understanding of the UN's role in international peacekeeping and the potential for more integrated and adaptive approaches to conflict resolution in the Middle East.

Structure of the Dissertation

The dissertation has six chapters. Chapter 2 offers a critical historical overview of the Israel-Arab conflict and meticulously traces the inception and evolution of the UN's peacekeeping architecture from 1948 to 1967. Setting the geopolitical stage, this chapter first delves into the intricate roots and dynamics of the Israel-Arab conflict, offering readers a nuanced understanding of the broader regional tensions. Following this, the chapter introduces the various peacekeeping entities and mechanisms that the UN instituted, beginning with UNTSO and the Office for Special Political Affairs. Subsequent sections provide insight into the UN's interventions, challenges, and achievements between 1948 and 1967. The latter parts of the chapter present a comprehensive introduction to UNEF II, UNDOF, the Office of Chief Coordinator and UNIFIL. By the end of this chapter, readers will have a firm grasp of the multifaceted architecture of the UN's peacekeeping endeavours and the pivotal role it played amidst the Israel-Arab conflict up until 1967.

Chapter 3 studies the Secretariat's involvement in the conflict from the prism of the operations. Unlike the majority of the existing literature, the dissertation studies them through the concept of IOC – a concept the dissertation builds from very limited literature.

The Chapter provides a nuanced contribution to our understanding of peacekeeping in the Israel-Arab conflict.

Chapter 4 takes a step back from the operations and focuses on the political role of the Secretariat in the conflict. The chapter highlights the extent to which the Secretariat succeeded in becoming a political actor in the conflict. Through documents from the Archives, the chapter highlights the decision-making process within the Secretariat and the relationship the Secretary-General, the OUSGPA and the Chief Coordinator had with the host countries and the superpowers. Moreover, the Chapter places the work of the UN within the context of the Cold War.

Chapter 5 discusses the impact of the Camp David Accords and the Israel invasion of Lebanon of 1982. These two instances shocked the peacekeeping architecture in the Middle East and had a profound and negative impact on the Secretariat's involvement in the conflict and the overarching peace process. Moreover, the chapter discusses how the epicentre of the conflict moved from being state-centric to being an Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These two instances are the end-points of the dissertation because they, effectively, froze the UN's ability to influence the conflict.

Chapter 6 provides a comprehensive analysis to the research question and emphasizes that, despite the various obstacles and limitations, the UN peacekeeping architecture played a significant role in attempting to establish peace and stability in the region, even if it could not fully resolve the underlying issues driving the Israel-Arab conflict.

Chapter 2

Foundations and Frameworks: Tracing the Israel-Arab Conflict and the Evolution of the UN's Peacekeeping Architecture

This chapter endeavours to unravel the genesis and evolution of the conflict and, concurrently, spotlight the role, successes and challenges of the UN as it sought to navigate the tempestuous waters of the Middle East. To achieve this, the chapter draws a cohesive narrative that does justice to both the enormity of the conflict and the multidimensional involvement of the UN. As a means to ensure clarity and chronological coherence, the chapter introduces every part of the architecture in the sequence of its deployment. To commence, we will delve into the roots of the Israel-Arab conflict, tracing its origins, major events and the resultant geopolitical landscape. This foundational understanding is vital, for it sets the stage upon which the UN made its entry and shaped its interventions.

Following this, the chapter critically assesses the early forays of the UN into the conflict, one of its highlights being UNTSO's deployment and the involvement of the Office for Special Political Affairs. These initial steps marked the beginning of a long and intricate dynamic between the UN, Israel and the entire Middle East.

The chapter then transitions to an in-depth exploration of the UN's interventions between 1948 and 1967, a period that saw a mix of tensions, confrontations and tentative truces. It is during these two pivotal decades that the UN's position was formulated, its record of accomplishment established and its challenges magnified. Subsequently, the narrative introduces the remaining parts of the architecture post-1967: UNEF II, UNDOF, the Office of Chief Coordinator and UNIFIL. Each of these entities brought with it a distinct mandate, operational challenges and diplomatic nuances, all set against the backdrop of the larger Israel-Arab narrative.

This chapter discusses each of these actors and their mandate and introduces their leadership. The sub-sections on UNTSO, UNEF II and UNDOF draw significantly from a

Working Paper drafted for the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations[11] (UNA, 1977). Moreover, the sub-sections on the Chief Coordinator, OUSGSPA and UNIFIL draw information from the Archives and scholarly contributions from some key players who published books and papers after their departure.

The introductory overview goes into much more detail on UNTSO, OUSGSPA and the Office of Chief Coordinator of UN peacekeeping in the Middle East. The section also discusses UNEF II, UNIFIL and UNDOF; however, because their establishment and functioning are the focus of Chapters 3 and 4, this Chapter limits itself to a brief introduction.

In summation, this chapter aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the dynamic interplay between the Israel-Arab conflict and the UN's evolving role. By the end of this exposition, readers should have a lucid understanding of the multifaceted architecture of the UN's peacekeeping and mediation efforts in the region up to 1967, setting the stage for deeper dives in subsequent chapters.

The Israel-Arab Conflict: A Never-Ending Quagmire

The Israel-Arab conflict is a protracted multi-dimensional conflict between the State of Israel, its Arab neighbours and the Palestinian people. The conflict started in the late 19th century when nationalist sentiments began within both Jewish and Arabic populations. Both peoples claimed they had the right to self-determination and denounced Ottoman and later British occupation and control over the area (Bickerton & Klausner, 2017). The conflict intensified after the end of World War II due to the British withdrawal from the area and the rising tension between Arabs and Jews who lived there. In 1948, after a period of upheaval and civil war, the Zionists established the State of Israel. Creating a Jewish State at the heart of the Middle East led to wars, border disputes, and a complex web of political and security issues. In the first 30 years of Israel's existence, the country fought multiple battles with its Arab neighbours.

[11] The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34) conducts in-depth reviews of all operations and provides recommendations. The Secretary-General responds to these recommendations through yearly reports outlining to what extent the Secretariat complied with the Committee's suggestions. For more on C34 see: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/recommendations-of-special-committee-peacekeeping-operations-c34

However, the Yom Kippur War of 1973 was the last conventional war Israel fought with its neighbours (Rabinovich, 2004). The conflict's epicentre moved from the grievances the neighbouring countries had with Israel to the complex issue of the status of the Palestinian people. Israel's establishment resulted in the displacement of more than half a million Palestinians who became refugees. This has led to a long-standing demand for a Palestinian state and refugees' right to return to their original homes. In 1964, the Palestinian people created the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as a political and paramilitary organisation that claimed Israel was an occupying force, which they pledged to fight (Irfan, 2020).

Israel-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian Conflicts

For this study, it is paramount to highlight the two different angles of this overarching conflict: the 'Israel-Arab' and the 'Israeli-Palestinian' conflicts. While they are part of one holistic strife and are inextricably interdependent, they have slightly different dynamics.

The Israel-Arab conflict refers to the disputes and tensions between Israel and its neighbouring Arab countries, such as Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Israel fought several conventional wars with its neighbours, including the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 1967 Six-Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Over time, Israel has forged peace agreements with some Arab neighbours, notably Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994. But the Israel-Arab conflict maintains broader geopolitical considerations that affect dynamics, bringing into play regional rivalries, balances of power and vast ideological differences (Bickerton & Klausner, 2017).

Over time, the conflict has evolved. After the Yom Kippur War, with the help of the UN[12], Israel signed disengagement agreements with Syria and Egypt, which lowered the tension and reduced the chances for war. In 1978, Israel and Egypt stunned the region and the world when they signed the Camp David Accords (Kuruvilla, 2022). In 1994, Israel signed a Peace Treaty with Jordan. Furthermore, the Abraham Accords of 2020 normalised relationships between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, and later with Sudan and Morocco (Guzansky & Marshall, 2020). The political landscape in the region also continuously

[12] See Chapters 3 and 4

changed. The decline of pan-Arabism and the growing rivalry between Shia and Sunni countries affected the conflict, and many countries in the Middle East began to engage with Israel. These shifts took place *even though* the Palestinian question remained unresolved. While all these treaties and accords pledge to tackle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, they have not succeeded.

In contrast, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict predominantly revolves around the political aspirations of the Palestinian people and their plight for statehood, involving the Israeli occupation and settlement expansion in the Gaza Strip[13], the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Moreover, the Palestinian people have remained bitterly divided and did not speak with one voice. These two issues make finding a lasting solution to the conflict almost impossible (Bickerton & Klausner, 2017; Tessler, 2009).

In 1974, the General Assembly passed Resolution 3236, reaffirming Palestinian people's rights and recognising the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as their representative. Furthermore, the Assembly granted the PLO observer status[14], which allowed it to participate in General Assembly sessions and have a permanent observer mission in New York to represent Palestinian interests. After the Yom Kippur War, the United States, the Soviet Union and the UN Secretariat prepared the Geneva Peace Conference through which they hoped to find a regional solution. However, Chapter 4 discusses how Israel excluded the PLO from the negotiating table while they engaged with Syria and, more importantly, Egypt. Chapter 5 illustrates that the Camp David Accords marked the first and last time Israel signed a peace treaty before meaningfully discussing the Palestinian issue.

Another fundamental issue at play is the status of Jerusalem. Israelis and Palestinians both claim the ancient city as their capital. After the 1948 War, Israel and Jordan each controlled half of the city. The former set up most government institutions in West Jerusalem, while the

[13]During the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel captured the Gaza Strip. In 2005, it unilaterally withdrew all 8,000 settlers and disbanded all 21 settlements. Israel and Egypt maintain a blockade over Gaza which prevents the free flow of people, goods and services.

[14] The General Assembly and the Security Council both adopted resolutions declaring Israel's activities in East Jerusalem as illegal. For more on Jerusalem's legal status see Klein (2008).

latter held the East, including the Old City (Sebag Montefiore, 2011). During the Six-Day War, Israel captured East Jerusalem and declared[15] Jerusalem its indivisible capital.

During the 1970s, the PLO became influential in the Middle East, primarily in Jordan and Southern Lebanon. In 1982, Israel invaded Southern Lebanon to destroy the PLO and remove it from Lebanon altogether. As a result, the 1980s were a lost decade in conflict resolution. Chapter 5 provides an in-depth analysis of the conflict's evolution, the increasingly pressing importance of solving the Palestinian question, and the role of the United Nations.

The United Nations & Israel-Arab Conflict

Throughout the conflict's seven decades, multiple countries and international entities have gotten involved either in maintaining international peace and security or in their self-interest, usually a mixture. However, without a doubt, the United Nations (UN) is the organisation that has spent the most time and resources on this conflict. "It is often remarked that the United Nations devoted more time to the Arab-Israeli conflict than any other matter in its history" (Forsythe, 1972, p. 705). It is telling that in 1972, scholars and even diplomats already saw the Israel-Arab conflict as one of the most cumbersome and protracted challenges the UN had to face. This trend continued for decades to come. The organization began its work in the conflict less than two years after the Member States ratified the Charter.

The UN in the Middle East: UNSCOP, UNPAC and Baptism by Fire

Between 1946 and 1948, the political and social situation in the British Mandate Palestine was immensely challenging. During this period, violence between Jews and Arabs escalated dramatically. The situation became even more difficult with the large influx of Jewish migrants who arrived in the region after surviving the horrors of the Holocaust. The newly created UN, which officially began in 1945, started to deal with the conflict almost as soon as it began its operations (Ben-Dror, 2007).

The United Kingdom, which administered Palestine and Transjordan, brought the future of the region to the UN's agenda. London realised it was unable to keep control over the area,

[15] In 2012, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 67/19, which elevated Palestine from "observer entity" to "non-member observer state". This upgraded status allowed Palestine to join certain international treaties and organisations without being a UN Member State.

and despite the lobbying efforts of both Arabs and Jews, London was unwilling to make a unilateral decision on the future. Therefore, in 1947 the United Kingdom officially brought the matter to the attention of the General Assembly.

The request put the newly founded organisation in a difficult situation. The Security Council members had split views, and the Secretariat did not have experience dealing with such a complex situation. This moved the General Assembly to adopt Resolution 106 (S-1) on 15 May 1947, establishing the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). The Assembly entrusted the Committee with the responsibility of conducting an in-depth study of the situation and issuing recommendations. The Resolution states that UNSCOP "shall have the widest powers to ascertain and record facts and to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine" (1947). UNSCOP had 11 Member States[16] each of which appointed two diplomats to participate in the proceedings. The Assembly decided to exclude the permanent members of the Security Council (P5) from joining UNSCOP. The Committee visited the area, conducted hearings and collected testimonies from various stakeholders, including Jewish and Arab representatives. In addition, the parties lobbied the Secretary-General in New York (Ben-Dror, 2014).

In September 1947, UNSCOP submitted its report to the General Assembly, presenting two proposals: a majority plan recommending the partition of Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states, with an international administration for Jerusalem and a minority plan supporting a federal state composed of Jewish and Arab provinces. Ultimately, the majority plan served as the basis for the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine (Ben-Dror, 2014). The partition plan provided territory for the Zionist and Arab peoples to each establish their political units, albeit the former got the lion's share of the land.

Interestingly, UNSCOP wanted Jerusalem to be an international protectorate. Due to the city's historical and religious significance for all three Abrahamic religions, the Committee proposed that it fall outside the partition plan. UNSCOP proposed that the UN Trusteeship Council appoint a governor and oversee the overall administration of Jerusalem and

[16] Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia.

Bethlehem (Golani, 1995). However, the plan never came to fruition, and Jerusalem became central to the Israel-Arab conflict.

The Secretariat was heavily involved in translation of the report into an operating plan. The Secretary-General established a task force to gather all available information and prepare documents and briefing notes for UNSCOP. The Secretary-General dispatched Bunche to work as Principal Secretary of UNSCOP and, simultaneously, mandated all senior management of the Secretariat to provide UNSCOP with the necessary assistance. Bunche's team drafted the *Handbook for Members of the United Nations Commission for Palestine*, which provided an in-depth analysis of the situation, the challenges of implementing the partition plan and policy recommendations (Ben-Dror, 2007).

On 29 November 1947, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 181, also known as the "Partition Plan for Palestine". The resolution called for establishing separate Jewish and Arab states in Palestine, with Jerusalem under international administration. The resolution envisioned a gradual transition from British administration to establishing a governance mechanism in the two states and established the United Nations Palestine Commission (UNPAC)[17] to assist in the implementation. To that effect, the resolution granted UNPAC executive functions to facilitate power transfer from the United Kingdom.

Unfortunately, UNPAC faced two significant challenges. First, the United Kingdom Government was unwilling to coordinate its retreat with UNPAC and stated it would retain control over the area until two weeks before their departure (Leonard, 1949). The British argued they would not support the Commission's work unless both sides accepted the partition plan. Second, the situation on the ground was ungovernable. Indeed, the Commission reported to the General Assembly that "As a result of Arab armed opposition to the resolution of the General Assembly, counter or preventive measures taken by the organised Jewish community, and the continued activity of Jewish extremist elements, Palestine is now a battlefield" (United Nations Palestine Commission, 1948, p. 10).

[17] While similar in name, UNSCOP and UNPAC were very different entities. UNSCOP was a fact-finding committee, while UNPAC had executive and legislative authority over the area.

The resolution was highly controversial. On the one hand, the Jewish Agency, on behalf of the Zionist authorities on the ground, accepted the plan, as it saw an opportunity to establish its State. That said, it expressed reservations on issues such as the status of Jerusalem. Meanwhile, the Palestinians and the entire Arab world bitterly rejected the plan, claiming that it undermined the self-determination rights – and disregarded the human rights – of Palestinians. The day after the vote, a civil war broke out. The United Kingdom Government could not maintain control and announced British retreat by 15 May 1948 at the latest, and the first few months of 1948 saw heavy violence and quasi-anarchy. Both sides ramped up their efforts to secure their power to fill the vacuum (Golani, 2001).

The Zionist authorities took quick and decisive steps, and on 14 May 1948, David Ben-Gurion read the Declaration of Independence, which established the State of Israel[18]. Immediately after, Egypt, Transjordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, with the assistance of Saudi Arabia, declared war on Israel and proceeded to launch an air assault on Tel Aviv and a ground invasion across the newly founded state. The battle lasted between May 1948 and March 1949. Against all odds, Israel repelled its invaders and secured its territory. Israel had a clear advantage over its enemies by the end of the conflict, but after fighting for more than a year, it as well as Palestine had suffered tremendous human and economic consequences, which encouraged both sides to agree on a cease-fire (Morris, 2009). The Security Council adopted multiple resolutions demanding a halt to the violence and excerpted political pressure on both sides (UNA, 1977).

The impact of the Independence War was profound in territorial and political terms. Israel controlled around 78 percent of the territory – far more than the partition plan outlined. The remaining 22 percent did not constitute a Palestinian State. Instead, Jordan annexed the West Bank, and Egypt asserted control over the Gaza Strip (Bickerton & Klausner, 2017).

As Israel secured its territory, many Palestinians were either expelled or fled in fear of violence. The refugees sought shelter in neighbouring countries, in the West Bank and Gaza

[18] The UN admitted Israel as a Member State in a two-step process in early 1949. On 4 March, the Security Council adopted Resolution 69, which recommended to the General Assembly to officially accept Israel's application. The vote was nine in favour, one against (Egypt) and one abstention (United Kingdom).
On 11 May, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 273, which officially accepted Israel as a UN Member State. The Resolution passed with 37 votes in favour, 12 against and 9 abstentions.

Strip, in turn overwhelming the region with refugees and creating a humanitarian crisis. In response, the General Assembly created the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) with the aim to aid and support the displaced Palestinian population (Peters & Gal, 2009). The unresolved issue of Palestinian statehood haunts the conflict – and the UN – still today. "These dramatic changes greatly influenced the events which followed, including the regional wars in 1967, 1969-70, 1973, 1978-1982" (Theobald, 2015, p. 122).

UN Mediation and the Rhodes Conference

The Secretary-General and his team were instrumental in negotiating armistice agreements between Israel and her immediate neighbours, known as the 1949 Armistice Agreements. These were born from the Rhodes Conference, for which Bunche's diplomatic efforts promoted dialogue and fostered compromise between the conflicting parties. By setting up his headquarters on the relatively isolated island that was the conference's namesake, he conducted indirect negotiations with the Israeli and Arab representatives, keeping the talks away from the media spotlight and reducing external pressures.

Bunche's persistence and diplomatic skills were instrumental in overcoming numerous obstacles and deadlocks during the negotiations (Moghalu, 1997). He built trust between the parties and facilitated the signing of separate armistice agreements between Israel and each of the four Arab countries involved in the conflict. The Agreements established ceasefire lines, facilitated the exchange of prisoners of war and set up demilitarised zones and other security arrangements (Jonah J. O., 2014). Bunche's involvement in the negotiation process started a pattern whereby the Secretary-General appointed a senior official to represent him in the negotiation processes after a war. To this point, this thesis critically assesses the accomplishment of all UN mediators between 1967 and 1982.

While the Agreements eased the tensions, they greatly favoured Israel and left the underlying grievances untouched. As soon as the parties left Rhodes, two things became clear. First, while the guns fell silent, a subsequent war was almost inevitable. Both sides felt extreme animosity against each other, and the Arab world bitterly denounced Israel's territorial gains. On the other hand, Israel had still set its eyes on reclaiming Jerusalem as its

indivisible capital and sought to consolidate its territory. Kissinger stated at the Geneva Peace Conference of 1973[19]: "When the history of our era is written, it will speak not of a series of Arab-Israeli wars, but of one war broken by periods of uneasy armistices and temporary cease-fires" (1974, p. 21). The 1949 War became the opening salvo of a never-ending conflict. Second, the Security Council needed a verification mechanism to secure the implementation of the Armistice Agreements. Therefore, it decided to deploy the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).

UNTSO: The Keystone of the Architecture

In the history of UN peacekeeping, UNTSO is one-of-a-kind. "It is a highly specialised force, unique in its duties, organisational structure, function and longevity" (Nachmias, 1996, p. 3). The operation was the Security Council's first response to the Israel-Arab conflict, which allowed it to build immense institutional memory and relationships with the key stakeholders. Unlike the rest of the actors within the architecture, UNTSO had a quarter of a century under its belt *before* the period this dissertation covers. Therefore, this summary covers only a brief glimpse into the operation. The work of Andrew Theobald (2015; 2009) provides critical insights into UNTSO, while Rosalyn Higgins (1970; 1968) gathers all relevant primary sources and analyses them through the lenses of politics and law. UNTSO's regional mandate allows the operation to be a regional player, it has liaison offices in every capital, and it has longstanding relationships with critical actors in every country. Moreover, the officers working at UNTSO are highly trained in observation, reporting and even mediation between countries that are at odds with each other.

Establishment and Authorization

UNTSO is the first and the oldest peacekeeping operation in the history of the UN. The primary mandate of UNTSO is to monitor and maintain ceasefires and armistice agreements between Israel and its Arabic neighbours, including Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Since its inception, UNTSO has played a significant role in supporting the Council's conflict management efforts in the region while adapting its work to the evolving dynamics of the Israel-Arab conflict (Higgins, 1970). The Security Council authorised UNTSO's deployment

[19] Chapter 4 discusses the Geneva Peace Conference at length.

through Resolution 50 (1948); however, Resolution 73 (1949) primarily outlined its mandate later. One of its main responsibilities was the supervision of the Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs) that were established as part of the separate armistice agreements signed between Israel and its neighbours in 1949 (see below for a detailed overview of this process). Each country had its own MAC with Israel, to which each side sent military representatives. UNTSO acted as the Chair of the MACs, and its observers investigated violations, eased tensions and served as an avenue for dialogue between the sides.

From 1949 to 1967, UNTSO faced significant challenges in managing the MACs. The parties did not trust each other, regularly violated the ceasefires and engaged in skirmishes. Moreover, the MACs never addressed deeper issues, such as border disputes or access to resources such as water. Neither UNTSO nor the MACs had the necessary tools to resolve the conflict's structural issues (Theobald, 2009).

Organisation and Deployment

Between 1948 and 1949, the head of UNTSO was the UN Mediator (see below). The Chief of Staff (CoS) coordinated the operation's work in the field. The observers worked in Jerusalem, Ramallah, Tel Aviv, Gaza and Afrula. Moreover, given UNTSO's regional mandate, it stationed observers and liaison officers in Damascus, Beirut, Amman and various ports in Egypt (UNA, 1977). Unlike any other operation, UNTSO is present in multiple countries, which allows it to create relationships with key stakeholders such as government officials, military personnel and even the civilian population (Salama, 2023).

In 1949, the UN Mediator finalised his mission, and the CoS became the Head of UNTSO (Ben-Dror, 2016). Under the Secretary-General's supervision, the CoS's responsibilities include directing and coordinating the work of UNTSO's military observers, reviewing their reports and briefing the Secretariat. To that end, the CoS ensures that UNTSO deploys its observers and resources as efficiently as possible consistent with the mandate and operational requirements. The CoS has a team of military officers and civilians that supports the management of the operation. Among the civilian staff, UNTSO had a Political Affairs Officer, a Chief Administrative Officer, a Legal Advisor and a Public Information Officer (Theobald, 2009).

Between 1967 and 1982, UNTSO had the following Chiefs of Staff

Name	Nationality	Rank	Period
Odd Bull	United States	Lt General	1963 – 1970
Ensio Siilasvuo	Finland	Maj General	August 1970 – October 1973
Richard W. Bunworth	Ireland	Colonel	Nov 1973 – March 1974 (Acting)
Bengt Liljestrand	Sweden	Maj General	April 1974 – August 1975
K.D Howard	Australia	Colonel	August – December 1975 (Acting)
Emmanuel A. Erskine	Ghana	Maj General	January 1976 – March 1978
William O'Callaghan	Ireland	Lt General	April 1978 – June 1979
Olof Forsgren	Sweden	Colonel	June 1979 – January 1980 (Acting)
Erkki R. Kaira	Finland	Maj General	February 1980 – February 1981
Emmanuel A. Erskine	Ghana	Maj General	February 1981 – May 1986

Over the years, a revolving door became prominent in the architecture. Serving in an UNTSO leadership position became a *de facto* requirement to serve as Force Commander elsewhere in the region. UNTSO's network and the blend of the political and military tasks the CoS faced on a daily basis provided such an invaluable and specific expertise that the Secretariat,

wisely, decided to use. For example, Siilasvuo and Erskine both went on to serve as Force Commanders of other operations (UNEF II and UNIFIL respectively). Furthermore, after Erskine successfully set up UNIFIL, he went back to UNSTO for a very long tour, and Siilasvuo became Chief Coordinator. Along the same lines, as Chapter 3 discusses, UNTSO provided critical civilian and military personnel to the other operations, particularly at the onset.

Relationship with Host Countries

UNTSO's relationship with its host countries is vital to effectively implementing its mandate. Unlike the other operations on the ground (and anywhere in the world), UNTSO has *five* host countries and is the only operation that works inside Israel[20]. The CoS served as the main point of contact between UNTSO and the Secretariat, providing regular reports on the operation's activities and developments in the region as well as briefing the Security Council. Additionally, the Chief of Staff liaises with the governments of the conflicting parties, other UN agencies, and international stakeholders to facilitate dialogue, coordinate efforts and manage the conflict. Therefore, the operation is the heart of the architecture, so when the Secretariat created the role of Chief Coordinator, it decided to locate it at the Government House so he could work closely with the CoS.

Between 1949 and 1967, UNTSO liaison activities passed through the MACs because all countries sent high-ranking officials to the meetings (Theobald, 2009). Furthermore, the CoS had a direct line to all foreign ministers for urgent matters. During this period, UNTSO monitored the ceasefire lines and armistice agreements. Of course, UNTSO's overall success and the relationship rely on the hosts' willingness to keep the peace. Therefore, UNTSO's relationships and general *modus operandi* changed after every war. During this study's time, UNTSO had to deal with both the Six-Day War, Yom Kippur and Operation Litani. Chapter 3 illustrates the critical role UNTSO played in setting up the rest of the operations in the region.

The operation is as old as the country, and the connection between the two is profound – albeit extremely complex. Israel never trusted the UN as an organisation or inter-

[20] According to Israel, UNTSO Headquarters is *inside* Israeli soil. The neighbours and the Security Council dispute this. However, this detail warrants mentioning because UNTSO is the only operation, which has Israel's *consent* to work inside what the country sees as its territory.

governmental forum. Indeed, the Jewish State questioned its willingness and ability to foster peace in a manner that does not threaten its national security and territorial integrity. Israel does not believe that the UN is an impartial actor and therefore does not fully trust its actions (Comay, 1983). Over the years, Israel complained that the General Assembly became a politicised issue whereby the resolutions adopted were partially against it (Becker, Hillman, Potrafke, & Schwemmer, 2015; Shattan, 1981). In turn, the General Assembly and the Secretariat claim that Israel's occupation of the Palestinian Territories is one of the most challenging obstacles on the road to peace. Both sides make valid points. However, for the most part, Israel and the Secretariat had a respectful working relationship.

In 1956, Israel stopped sending delegates to the Israel-Egypt MAC. UNEF I took over the observation and liaison duties[21]. In 1967, after the Six-Day War, Israel stopped cooperating with all MACs (Mcdermott, 1996). However, Israel maintained a working relationship with the CoS concerning the Israel-Syria and Suez Canal Sectors. The Ministry of Defence acted as UNTSO's counterpart in the Israeli government. While Israel remained suspicious of the UN, it accepted its mediation efforts (Oren, 1992). However, Israel had profound reservations regarding UNTSO's Headquarters, which serves an illustrative of this challenging relationship.

Israel, UNTSO and the Government House

The British built the Government House in the early 1930s; it served as the residence and office of the British High Commissioner for Palestine. The Government House is located at the intersection of East and West Jerusalem. In preparation for its departure, the British Government handed over the Government House to the International Red Cross, which moved in as soon as the British vacated the premises. The Red Cross kept possession of the Government House for a short time. It departed just a few months later and handed the building to the UN (Leci, 2017).

[21] UNTSO did not stop working in the Sinai Peninsula. Rather, it worked *through* UNEF I. This was the first iteration of Inter-Operation Collaboration between peacekeeping operations. See Chapter 3.

UNTSO officially moved in mid-1949 (UNA, 1977). Neither the Red Cross nor the UN formally informed or consulted the Israeli Government about the decisions regarding the Government House. However, the decision to use the Government House as UNTSO's headquarters had the support of the Security Council, which meant Israel had to accept this, and it begrudgingly did. In 1967, the Government House became one of the many pawns of the conflict. At the onset of the Six-Day War, Jordanian troops took control of the house. The Secretary-General sent an urgent cable to King Hussein requesting the immediate return of the complex to UNTSO (UNA, 1967). However, the Jordanians did not have a chance to respond because the IDF took control of the property on the same day and refused to give UN Staff Members access to it. As such, UNTSO became homeless and incommunicado (Siilasvuo, 1992).

The Israeli government took the opportunity to express its discontent over UNTSO's presence in Jerusalem. Indeed, the Israeli authorities refused to return the building to UNTSO. Israel treated UNTSO as an unwelcome guest whose 'oversight' it rejected on the principle that Jerusalem is its capital, an issue they considered beyond discussion. Israel's unwillingness to return the Government House to UNTSO forced the Secretary-General to bring the issue to the Security Council. In a report in (1967), the Secretary-General bitterly protested that neither side protected the integrity of the operation. Moreover, he demanded that the Israeli government return the Government House immediately. The Council wholeheartedly and unanimously agreed with the Secretary-General and began to pressure Israel to comply (Higgins, 1968).

The Office of Special Political Affairs began a negotiation process with the Permanent Representation of Israel to the UN, which lasted the entire summer of 1967. Israel stalled during the whole month of July. On 4 July, the Secretary-General requested to begin the process of moving back into the compound two days later. Israel did not reply for weeks. The Secretary-General insisted and re-engaged the Permanent Representative. After significant back-and-forth, they reached an agreement.

On 11 August, the Secretary-General reported that Israel agreed to return an area, which includes "all buildings and approximately one-third of the area in the Government House premises as constituted when UNTSO was forced to evacuate on 5 June 1967" (1967, Para

3). The report concluded that while the Secretariat rejected and denounced Israel's decision to return the compound to UNTSO partially, the situation was so urgent that the Secretary-General accepted it as a first step "without prejudice to all rights and claims of the United Nations to the occupancy and possession of the whole of the premises" (Para. 8). On 22 August, the Permanent Representative of Israel sent a letter to the Secretary-General reconfirming Israel's acceptance of UNTSO's return.

The possession and usage of the Government House remained a contentious subject in Israeli politics. In 1970 an article in the *Jerusalem Post* claimed that the Israeli government adopted a plan to construct housing units in the Government House's area, as it classified it as a residential area. The Secretary-General, once again, brought the issue before the Security Council and sent multiple letters to the Israeli Permanent Representation, which did not submit official responses. Israel had to accept UNTSO's usage and occupancy of the Government House. The Security Council remained unanimously supportive of keeping UNTSO at the compound. While Israel succeeded in reducing the area of the compound, UNTSO will not move from the compound until the day it withdraws from Jerusalem altogether. To this day, the Government House serves as the heart of the UN's work in the region.

Over the decades, UNTSO has had to adapt to various challenges, including restrictions imposed by the Israeli government and the evolving dynamics of peacekeeping in a region marked by persistent conflict. Despite these challenges, UNTSO's commitment to peace through unarmed observation and mediation remains a vital part of the international community's efforts in the Middle East (Howard, 2019)

Budget

UNTSO's financial arrangement is another area where the operation differs from the rest of the architecture. The funding comes from the regular budget of the UN (Higgins, 1970; UNA, 1977). From a budgetary perspective, the Secretariat labels it as a "special mission," keeping it separate from the budget of other peacekeeping operations. This is significant and unique because UN entities with a temporary mandate do not constitute a permanent line item on the budget. The Security Council and the Secretariat see the operation as a key *de facto*

permanent[22] player in the region who can represent them in the field. UNTSO's status caused controversy and trouble for the Secretariat.

At various points in UNTSO's history, countries in the Soviet sphere of influence[23] and Arab countries publicly stated they did not wish to contribute to UNTSO's budget because they believed that the operation's quasi-permanence goes against the spirit under which the Security Council deployed it. These countries claimed none of the six organs of the UN ever authorised UNTSO to become a permanent entity of the UN System. In addition, in 1978[24] when the Security Council withdrew UNEF II, the Secretary-General stated his intentions to keep UNTSO in the Sinai Peninsula to avoid creating a vacuum. The Arab world denounced the decision, seeing it as indirect assistance to implementing the Camp David Accords (which they also denounced) and decided not to contribute to the budget. Nevertheless, the discussion of UNTSO's budget never moved beyond political posturing. The Security Council wholeheartedly believes in UNTSO's relevance and its value-for-money. Therefore, the operation continues to receive its funding.

Strength of the Force

UNTSO only has officers whose rank spans from Captain to Lt Colonel. Unlike the other operations, UNTSO has had officers from the P5 countries (Jonah, 1975)**.** The Operation is relatively small. After the Armistice Agreements, UNTSO had approximately 500 UNMOs. The number decreased during the 1960s; by 1967, UNTSO only had 128 UNMOs working in the entire AO. Surprisingly, the Security Council did not increase the number of observers immediately after the Six-Day War, the operation dealt with the aftermath of this transformative war with the resources it had *before*, which proved to be a daunting challenge. After the Yom Kippur War, the UNTSO re-deployed UNMOs to UNEF II and UNDOF. Chapter 3 discusses how important UNTSO's quick and expert re-deployment and subsequent integration into the other operations was. Between December 1973 and 1982,

[22] Of course, neither the Council nor the Secretary-General would ever make this statement in public however, UNTSO's longevity, legal and budgetary status speak for themselves.
[23] Albania, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Byelorussian SSR, Ukrainian SSR, and the Soviet Union,
[24] The Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the UN (who sat as a non-permanent member on the Security Council) sent a letter to the Secretary-General to that effect on behalf of the Arab world. See Chapter 5.

UNTSO had 298 UNMOs, which worked in the operation proper or within the Observer Group Golan (OGG-UNDOF) or Observer Group Lebanon (OGL-UNIFIL) (Myers & Dorn, 2022). UNTSO officers, by virtue of their experience and seniority, bring a depth of understanding and credibility to their roles. They engage directly with local communities, leaders, and influencers to mediate and provide a mechanism for communication between otherwise implacable enemies. This long-standing presence and engagement have made UNTSO an integral part of the fabric of life in southern Lebanon, and the Golan Heights contributing to regional moderation and facilitating indirect communication between Israel and its neighbours (Howard, 2019).

The Secretary-General and the Office for Special Political Affairs liaised with the Member States to request troops. The issue was not straightforward, given that Israel did not grant access to its territory to soldiers from countries with which it did not have diplomatic relations. Furthermore, Syria and Egypt also reserved the right to refuse contributions from specific countries (UNA, 1977). Therefore, the Secretary-General had to ensure high-quality officers only from certain countries. The reasons why Arab countries refused to accept specific contributions were less precise or methodical than Israel ares equally, if not more, problematic.

UNTSO's successes and relevance are often underestimated. This dissertation highlights the manner in which UNTSO supported the rest of the architecture. The Security Council never gave the mandate or resources to the operation to solve the conflict; the operation assisted the parties behind the scenes. In addition, "even during the worst moments of Arab-Israeli tension, UNTSO successfully mediated disputes […] not as a neutral observer, but as an integral part of the management of Arab-Israeli hostilities" (Theobald, 2009, p. 171). The fact that the conflict is still happening does not undermine UNTSO but stresses the importance of its strategic political position, its mandate and its role in preserving the cease-fire as much as possible. Moreover, as we will see, its institutional memory has been instrumental in the deployment and management of the other missions on the region.

Nachmias (1996) also reaffirms the operation's value. However, it also remains critical of its achievements. The author claims that UNTSO cannot foster peace; therefore, it failed.

Moreover, the author stresses that UNTSO is an operation with a mandate to manage inter-state conflict, which makes it outdated. The rising power and influence of non-state actors such as the Hezbollah and Hamas movement that currently governs the Gaza Strip have further complicated the work of UNTSO because these actors do not 'consent' to have the operation working in the areas they control, and they constantly undermine it.

Overall, the literature consensus is that UNTSO is a unique operation that provides an underappreciated service to the UN. While UNTSO cannot "keep the peace," the Security Council does not expect the operation to do so. Securing a long-term structural peace agreement is "above their pay grade" (Novosseloff, 2022, p. 26). UNTSO continues to perform its duties discretely and expertly.

The UN Office for Special Political Affairs: The Golden Age of UN Staff

The Secretary-General is the chief political officer and senior diplomat of the UN (Johnstone, 2003). The UN Charter grants him or her the authority to bring issues he considers threatening to international peace and security to the Security Council under Article 99 of the Charter (Traub, 2007). Moreover, to different degrees, the Council and the General Assembly expect the Secretary-General to assist in the UN's overall mission of keeping peace throughout the world by way of using his or her good offices.

While the Charter does not mention peacekeeping as a principle or activity, it quickly became one of the organisation's most visible, expensive and complex endeavours. Two examples of the immense pressure the Secretary-General faced were the Israel-Arab conflict and the decolonisation process. Both issues were complex and required the Secretary-General's involvement. It was Dag Hammarskjöld who, during his tenure as Secretary-General, created a support system, the UN Office for Special Political Affairs (OUSGSPA) "in response to the Cold War stalemates occurring in the Secretariat. They took on projects that were not specifically under the mandate of the Secretariat, like conflict control" (UNA, n.d.). To prevent the superpowers from blocking the office, Hammarskjöld initially decided to have two concurrent Under-Secretaries-General (USG), one American and one Soviet.

Gradually, both Hammarskjöld and his successor U Thant delegated the authority of the day-to-day management of the operations to the USGs. "This office exercises on behalf of the Secretary-General the command and control functions of the force. Political and military instructions from Headquarters to the Force Commanders" (Jonah, 1991, p. 79). The Office, given its mandate, stood at the epicentre of the most sensitive issues in the Secretary-General's agenda. Because all UN Chiefs entrusted them to tackle such challenges, this office enjoyed a considerable latitude to strategize and counsel the Secretary-General. This era can be rightly termed the "golden age" of UN staffers. Luminary figures like Bunche and Urquhart wielded their significant discretion, which tackled the issues of the day and, at the same time, built the Secretariat's political space and *modus operandi.* Indeed, they set the gold standard for future generations of UN Staff. For this dissertation, three officials are fundamental: Dr Ralph Bunche of the United States, Sir Brian Urquhart of the United Kingdom and Roberto Guyer of Argentina.

Bunche (1904–1971) was an American political scientist with an extraordinary UN career. Bunche's time as a UN Staff Member started in 1946 when he joined the organisation as the Director of the Trusteeship Division, overseeing the administration of trust territories. Secretaries-General Lie and Hammarskjöld held Bunche in very high regard (Jonah J. O., 2014). They trusted him to manage some of the UN's most challenging problems, most notably the Israel-Arab conflict. Bunche served as the UN Mediator on Palestine and chaired the Rhodes Peace Conference through which Israel and its neighbours signed the 1949 Armistice Agreements. In recognition of his role, he received the Nobel Peace Prize. Between 1955 and 1970[25], Bunche worked as co-USG of OUSGSPA, during which the UN was involved in a few major political developments such as the deployment of UNEF I in 1956, the Jarring Mission after the Six-Day War. Without question, Bunche was one of the most influential UN Staff Members, who ensured the Secretariat always had a seat at the table (Lyman, 2004).

Urquhart (1919–2021) was one of the first UN Staff Members to join the organisation. Urquhart served in the British Army during World War II as an intelligence officer; he was

[25] During his tenure, Bunche had seven different co-USGs. His institutional memory, experience and diplomatic skills became unparalleled. For two detailed studies of Bunche's career, see Raustiala (2023) & Urquhart (1998).

involved in planning Operation Overlord. He witnessed first-hand the horrors of the Holocaust when he entered the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp. As soon as the war finished, he began to work for the UN. In 1945, he worked for the Preparatory Commission of the UN and quickly became a close advisor to Trygve Lie. During Hammarskjöld's tenure, Urquhart worked closely with Bunche (his mentor) and eventually succeeded him as USG for OUSGSPA. For over 30 years at the UN, he was instrumental in shaping the Secretariat's *modus operandi*, managing the peacekeeping operation and supporting four Secretaries-General as a senior advisor (Fröhlich, 2021). Urquhart earned a reputation as a skilled diplomat and a gifted strategist involved in peacekeeping's strategic and operational aspects (Jonah, 1991).

After retirement, Urquhart became a prolific and influential writer. He wrote dozens of book chapters, journal articles and Op-Eds on the work of the UN, peacekeeping, and the history and politics of the Office of the UN Secretary-General. Moreover, Urquhart wrote biographies of Hammarskjöld and Bunche, and he wrote an autobiography. Concerning UN Peacekeeping in the Middle East, Urquhart authored multiple pieces that critically assessed the operations' past, present and future. His contributions to the literature are an invaluable asset to UN historians, and this dissertation is no exception.

Guyer (1923–2016) joined the UN in 1946. He served as the Secretary-General's Personal Representative to the Cyprus crisis and played a crucial role in designing UNFCYP. In 1971, he joined Urquhart as co-USG for OUSGSPA. Guyer was critical in the UN's involvement in the Israel-Arab conflict. He participated in the Geneva Peace Conference, coordinated the UN's peacekeeping operations in the Middle East, liaised with the superpowers and led high-level missions to the region. Guyer and Urquhart worked together throughout their UN careers; they had a very close working relationship and split the work evenly (Jonah J. O., 1991).

Between 1967 and 1982, the structure and governance of the OUSGSPA remained condensed and consistent. This was a rather small office, which required the USGs to be closely involved in day-to-day matters in the field. This dissertation highlights the office's efficiency and the limitations that it had.

The following section provides an overview of the peacekeeping architecture between 1948 and 1967 and sets the stage for the analysis.

Peacekeeping in the Middle East (1956 – 1967): A Military Overview

The peacekeeping architecture in the Middle East (or the principle of IOC, for that matter) did not start after the Yom Kippur War – and it certainly did not begin in Africa. It began in the Sinai Peninsula in 1956 and continued until 1967, when UNEF withdrew. This brief overview will outline how UNEF and UNTSO set the groundwork for military collaboration between peacekeeping operations

The Suez Canal Crisis of 1956 complicated the situation in the region considerably and, arguably, unnecessarily. Of course, Israel, the United Kingdom and France had a geopolitical interest in attacking Egypt; however, the war only tarnished the two European belligerents' reputations in the Arab world and, at the same time, made the prospect of peace between Israel and its neighbours even more unlikely (Bickerton & Klausner, 2017). The war proved to be "a debacle and a misguided exercise" (Cohen, 1968, p. 18) . Due to the implications left by military and political blunder, the Secretary-General had to react swiftly to prevent an escalation.

The Secretary-General submitted two reports[26] to the General Assembly in 48 hours, where he outlined his vision regarding the operation. These documents detailed the principles of peacekeeping: consent, impartiality and non-use of force. The Secretary-General had to navigate the difficulty of doing all of this without the Security Council's blessings in a conflict where two permanent members had boots on the ground (Alexandrowicz, 1962). While Hammarskjöld and Bunche worked on the political aspects, Urquhart sorted out the logistics.

It is important to stress that Urquhart[27] was the only senior staffer at the Secretariat with extensive military experience. With no blueprint in place and improvising all their work, Urquhart's team tackled all logistical challenges he could from New York; this included procurement, supply pipelines, establishment of bases and Observation Posts, and force

[26] UNGA/A/3289 on 4 November and UNGA/A/3290 on 6 November

[27] As Major in the British Army during World War II, he assisted in the planning of Operation Overlord and Operation Market Garden, to name a few.

protection. In addition, his team coordinated with the soon-to-be TCCs to ensure all contingents arrived in the Sinai Peninsula already knowing what the Secretariat was expecting of them (Urquhart, 1987). The diligence and effort paid off. Eleven days after the Secretariat started working on the first contingent arrived. UNEF was one of the quickest operations deployed to the field (Fleitz Jr, 2002).

Despite their almost complete improvisation, with little political cover or mandate from the Security Council, "the speed and efficiency with which UNEF was organised cannot be overstated. Hammarskjöld worked around the clock to get suitable contingents from ten nations, as well as the necessary logistical support" (Higgins, 1968, p. 261). The majority of the literature on UNEF's genesis certainly agrees with this sentiment. However, the literature often misses an essential element: UNTSO. For those 11 days between conceptualisation and deployment, the Secretariat needed to do something to lower the temperature, and this is where the assets in the field became invaluable.

Through UNTSO, the Secretariat had vast experience dealing with Israel, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan. UNTSO's regional mandate allowed it to serve as a regional conduit for consultation and liaison. Moreover, the operation staffed observation posts in the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights and the Israel-Lebanon border. The operation had an already-built infrastructure, which the other operations inherited.

The Secretariat requested UNTSO to play a decisive role almost immediately. UNTSO's Chief of Staff[28], General Tommy Burns of Canada, moved to the Sinai Peninsula and acted as the Force Commander. His appointment made sense; he was already commanding military observers working in the Peninsula, so he had first-hand knowledge of the terrain. In addition, the Israelis and Egyptians already knew who he was, and he knew who to talk to in times of crisis (Khouri, 1977). Burns took a handful of senior officers with him to assist in setting up UNEF's headquarters, *modus operandi* and welcome the contingents (United Nations General Assembly, 1956). The decision of moving UNTSO's Force Commander to a newly established operation became standard practice in the region.

[28] UNTSO's commander has the Title of 'Chief of Staff' whereas his counterparts across the other operations have the title of Force Commander.

UNTSO continued to staff the observation posts in the Sinai until UNEF's soldiers were ready to take on the role. This guaranteed continuity of service; the observers delivered daily reports to the Secretariat, which used them to design the incoming operation (Diehl, 2015). After UNEF settled, the two operations continued to communicate constantly for political and administrative affairs.

UNTSO provided an invaluable service to UNEF thorough its lifespan. While UNEF worked toward stabilising the Sinai, UNTSO had observers in Israel's other three borders. These peacekeepers had vast knowledge and experience in the conflict and served as the source of knowledge to UNEF (Theobald, 2009). UNTSO served as a permanent liaison with the Israeli government, and their commanders regularly met to discuss military, logistic and even political challenges. The benefit of having a peacekeeping operation with offices throughout the entire region paid off (Kohavi, 1980). UNTSO and UNEF I are the first two peacekeeping operations engaged in military IOC, and they were very successful at it. UNEF's conceptual framework considered that it could rely on an older, experienced operation that could navigate crises and provide knowledge.

Whether UNEF was successful remains a heated debate. Cohen (1968) argues that UNEF's successes are twofold. First, the operation provided a face-saving mechanism for the aggressors to withdraw. Perhaps more importantly, it was an effective buffer between Israel and Egypt in Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula. Bligh (2014) disagrees and stresses that the Security Council was not involved. The Secretary-General's micromanaging the operation, lack of funding and TCCs wanting to draw back their commitment made the mission unworkable. All these deficiencies rendered it unable to stop the Six-Day War.

Diehl (2015) takes a middle of the road approach. The author stresses that one of the key, unsung successes was that between 1957 and 1967, the region was quiet; the operation was successful in preventing a full-scale war. This analysis stresses that many skirmishes in the border regions and the overarching grievances between Israel and its neighbours were only growing. The result is quite good if one looks at the mandate and resources they worked with; unfortunately, ultimately, UNEF did not keep the peace.

UNEF II: A Short-lived Success

UNEF II was the Security Council's first response to the Yom Kippur War. On 25 October, a few days after the guns fell silent, the Council adopted Resolution 340 authorising UNEF II's deployment. The Resolution placed the overall management and supervision of the operation to the Secretary-General. The Security Council gave the Secretariat an extraordinarily tight deadline to have boots on the ground and construct a powerful buffer between the Egyptian military and the IDF. The mandate of UNEF II was to supervise the ceasefire between the warring parties and to oversee the disengagement of their forces, acting as a buffer zone to help prevent further hostilities within the East of the Suez Canal. In addition to monitoring the ceasefire and disengagement agreements, UNEF II also played a significant role in providing humanitarian assistance to the local population, as well as facilitating the return of prisoners of war (Diehl, 2015).

During its six years in the field, the operation had three Force Commanders, of which the first two came from UNTSO.

Name	Nationality	Rank	Period
Ensio Siilasvuo	Finland	Lt General	26 October 1973 – August 1975
Beng Liljenstrand	Sweden	Lt General	August 1975 – December 1976
Rais Abin	Indonesia	Maj General	December 1976 (acting) and 1977 – 1979

At the time of its deployment, UNEF II was one of the largest peacekeeping operations in the field. The Council authorised the initial deployment of 6,973 soldiers. However, the

operation's numbers varied over time; by 1976, UNEF II had 4,174 soldiers. Between 1967 and 1982, UNEF II had around 200 civilian staff.

UNEF II's relationship with its host country and with Israel had significant challenges. While both sides, generally, cooperated with the operation, the Secretariat did not manage to sign a Status-Of-Force-Agreement (UNA, 1977). A critical challenge was the operation's freedom of movement. Israel did not grant permission for movement within its territory to countries with whom it did not have diplomatic relations (Siilasvuo, 1992). While the Security Council demanded Israel to change its stance, Jerusalem usually refused. In 1974, at the personal request of the Secretary-General and Kissinger, Israel allowed Polish troops to travel from the Sinai Peninsula to the Golan Heights and thereby pass through Israel.

UNEF II's initial headquarters was in Cairo, however the Secretariat decided to move the operation closer to the AO. The Egyptian government gave UNEF II a few buildings in Ismailia, a city on the Peninsula's edge. After the Suez Canal reopened in 1976, Cairo requested UNEF II to vacate some of the premises and offered a few buildings in exchange.

Chapter 3 discusses how UNEF II benefited and built from the experiences of its predecessor UNEF I, which assisted in lowering the tensions in the Peninsula after the Suez Crisis. It is important to make a distinction between the two operations. While they have the same name, they responded to different moments of the conflict and thus, 'UNEF''s deployment was not continuous. The General Assembly authorised UNEF I's deployment through Resolution 1001 with the mandate to ensure the withdrawal of Israeli, Egyptian and French forces from Egyptian territory and create a buffer between the Egypt and Israel. As Chapter 3 discusses, the Secretary-General withdrew UNEF I after Egypt revoked its consent in 1967, a few days before the Six-Day War (Rikhye, 1980). Between 1967 and 1973, UNTSO took over all responsibilities entrusted to UNEF I. After the Yom Kippur War, the Security Council adopted Resolution 341, through which it deployed UNEF II to create lower tensions in the Sinai Peninsula. Because of the Soviet Union's rejection of the Camp David Accords, UNEF II left the Peninsula, and the Multinational Force and Observers took over. Chapter 5 discusses UNEF II's withdrawal and the long-term consequences it had for the UN's involvement in the conflict.

UNEF II witnessed several critical landmarks throughout its operation. One of the most notable achievements of the mission was the successful supervision of the disengagement of Israeli and Egyptian forces in early 1974, as agreed upon under the terms of the Six-Point Agreement negotiated at the Km 101 (Diehl, 2015 ; Shlomo, 2017). The establishment of buffer zones and the presence of UNEF II peacekeepers helped prevent further outbreaks of violence, creating an environment conducive to diplomatic negotiations. Subsequently, the mission also oversaw the implementation of the 1975 Sinai Interim Agreements, which further solidified the disengagement process and paved the way for the historic Camp David Accords in 1978, leading to a lasting peace between Israel and Egypt.

Despite its accomplishments, UNEF II faced several challenges during its operation. The volatile nature of the region and the deep-seated animosities and mistrust between Israel and Egypt made things rather difficult for UNEF II. Moreover, while Israel consented to UNEF II's presence, it did not give it permission to operate within Israeli soil. Despite these obstacles, UNEF II played a pivotal role in establishing peace between Israel and Egypt. Chapter 3 provides an in-depth analysis on UNEF II and its place within the larger peacekeeping architecture in the Middle East.

The operation provides an interesting example whereby most of the literature concurs that the operation was a success. Diehl (2015b) views UNEF II as successful in several aspects. It effectively limited armed conflict, with no military confrontations occurring in the area of UNEF II deployment once the peacekeeping force was fully established. The disputes did not produce fatalities involving direct engagements between Israeli and Egyptian military forces. Bratt (2007) writes that UNEF II's mandate was concise and not overly ambitious; the Security Council only expected the operation to assist in managing the conflict while political negotiations between Israel and Egypt lowered the tensions. Wiseman (1976) writes that UNEF II was a dual success. In the field, the operation provided the mechanism to reduce the tensions. However, the author remarks that UNEF II's most significant success occurred in New York. The author praises the management of UNEF II, stating that the demands of time and events forced agreements, which had proved impossible in the many years of deliberation of the Special Committee. The result was apparent satisfaction at the Security Council regarding the operation's structure. Moreover, some Council Members, C34 Member

States and TCCs believed it could provide a blueprint for future peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, the paper highlights that throughout the operation's history, the Secretary-General (and therefore the Office of Special Political Affairs) regularly consulted with and informed the Security Council, which built trust between Waldheim and the P5 and gave the Secretariat autonomy to carry out its work.

UNDOF: A Sentinel in the Heights

UNDOF started its mission later than UNEF II. The negotiation process between Israel and Syria was much longer and challenging, which delayed UNDOF's deployment (Siilasvuo, 1992). The operation's mandate is to maintain the ceasefire between the two countries, supervise the disengagement of their forces, and ensure the establishment of a buffer zone in the Golan Heights.

Security Council Resolution 350 authorised UNDOF to maintain the cease-fire and, more importantly, supervise the continuous disengagement in the Area of Separation (AoS) and an Area of Limitation (AoL) on both sides of the AoS, which are central elements of its mandate. The AoS is an 80-kilometre buffer zone, from Mt. Hermon (near the border with Lebanon) to the Yarmouk River (near the border with Jordan). It spans 6 to 20 kilometres wide in order to adapt to the terrain. The AoL is immediately adjacent to the AoS on both the sides of the border. It comprises of three zones with different limitations for the two militaries – the closest zone (up to 10 kilometres from the AoS) has the most severe restrictions, with the following two zones (up to 20 and 25 kilometres respectively), which have progressively less restrictions on the amount of troops and the kind of hardware they can deploy. UNDOF's objective is to inspect and ensure that neither side breaks into the AoS and sticks within the limits in the AoL. UNDOF maintains permanent observation posts and conducts patrols – both during the day and night, and both on foot and with vehicles. UNTSO's Military Observers work in UNDOF through the OGG, which deploys them to UNDOF's AO[29].

[29] Chapter 3 provides an in-depth discussion of UNDOF's relationships with the rest of the UN peacekeeping architecture in the Middle East.

Name	Nationality	Rank	Period
Gonzalo Briceño	Peru	Brig General	December 1974 – May 1975
Hannes Philipp	Austria	Maj General	December 1974 – May 1979
Günther Greindl	Austria	Maj General	May 1979 – February 1981
Erik Kaira	Finland	Maj General	March 1981 – April 1982

Rudloff & Diehl (2015) discuss the process that led to UNDOF's deployment. Unlike UNEF II, the negotiation of the operation was tough and protracted. Israel and Syria wanted very different things from the operation. The former wanted a robust operation of around 3,000 soldiers and observers, and the former only wanted a limited operation composed mainly of unarmed observers (similar to UNTSO). Ultimately, the parties compromised with an operation with 1,250 UNMOs and soldiers working in a very narrow AO.

Between 1974 and 1982, UNDOF achieved several significant milestones. James (1987) notes that UNDOF succeeded in maintaining the peace in Golan Heights. UNDOF provides a comprehensive observation of the demilitarised zone; if the Syrian military or the IDF deploy forces to UNDOF's AO, the operation has the necessary equipment and personnel to highlight the incidents to the Security Council. Of course, throughout the operation's lifespan, both sides violated UNDOF's AO; however, the operation's quick reactions, coupled with pressure from the Security Council, deterred the countries from an all-out war.

Lindley (2010) provides a detailed analysis of UNDOF's structure and its role in keeping the peace in the Golan Heights. The author critically examines UNDOF's operational

effectiveness and identifies several issues that hinder its performance. The author provides an overarching critique of the operation due to structural problems. First, UNDOF's functional limitations, which range from force size to rigid standard operating procedures, prevent it from managing crisis adequately and, equally concerning, render the operation somewhat predictable, which means both sides plan their military work *around* it.

One of the most notable accomplishments was the successful supervision of the disengagement process between Israeli and Syrian forces, which took place shortly after the establishment of the mission. Additionally, UNDOF peacekeepers managed to maintain a relatively stable environment in the Golan Heights during this period, despite the underlying tensions between the two parties. The presence of UNDOF not only helped prevent the escalation of violence but also fostered an atmosphere conducive to diplomatic negotiations, albeit with limited progress on a comprehensive peace agreement between Israel and Syria (Shlomo, 2015).

However, the operation faced several challenges. From a political standpoint, Israel and Syria had no interest in negotiating substantially beyond the ceasefire. Israel was not willing to negotiate the return of the Golan Heights, and Syria was not willing to discuss anything else until they did (Kumaraswamy, 1999). The tension between Israel and Syria remained dangerously high throughout this period. From a military standpoint, UNDOF's AO was and remains a challenge. The Golan Heights is a hilly and rugged area with challenging and changing weather conditions.

Fetterly (2003) concurs and points out that UNDOF is relatively static. The Security Council renews the operation's mandate; however, it does not seriously discuss the operation's tasks and whether the operation needs an updated mandate beyond the disengagement agreement's supervision. The author suggests that UNDOF should delve deeper into peacebuilding. The Security Council, true to form, remains bitterly divided regarding Syria, and therefore it simply renews the mandate without amending it to avoid altering the status quo. UNDOF is a frozen operation with a first-generation mandate, deterring Israel and Syria from going to war; however, this is as far as the operation can go.

Despite these challenges, UNDOF played a crucial role in maintaining the ceasefire between Israel and Syria and minimizing the risk of renewed hostilities in the Golan Heights between 1974 and 1982. While the conflict between the two countries remains unresolved, UNDOF's presence has provided a measure of stability in the region. UNDOF continues to serve as an essential component of the international community's efforts to achieve a lasting peace.

The Peacekeeper's Maestro: The Chief Coordinator of the UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Middle East

As previously mentioned, one of the most critical yet underappreciated, understudied and unseen players in the peacekeeping architecture is Ensio Siilasvuo[30] from Finland[31] (1922–2003). For over half of his distinguished career in the Finnish military, Siilasvuo worked in service of the UN in the Middle East. In 1956, he served as Company Commander of the Finnish contingent deployed at UNEF I. In 1958, he held his first post at UNTSO as a UNMO in the Israel-Lebanon sector. Between 1964 and 1965, Siilasvuo served as commander of the Finnish Battalion deployed at the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFCYP). After the Six-Day War, the Secretary-General appointed him Deputy Chief of Staff at UNTSO; he held that post until 1970, when he became Chief of Staff.

The Yom Kippur War required an immediate response in the Sinai Peninsula, including military and diplomatic duties. The Secretary-General appointed Siilasvuo as UNEF II's Force Commander and the UN's representative to the Km 101 negotiations between Israel and Egypt. Siilasvuo's mediation significantly contributed to the Six-point agreement signed by the two countries and paved the way for the Geneva Peace Conference of December 1973 (Shlomo, 2017). While the conference's overarching objective of settling the conflict failed, Siilasvuo chaired the Military Working Group through which Israel-Egypt and Israel-Syria negotiated their disengagement agreements. In addition, Siilasvuo was instrumental in designing and negotiating UNDOF's mandate (Uola, n.d.). By mid-1974, Siilasvuo was one, if

[30] During his time at UNTSO, Siilasvuo was a Maj General. By the time he started his role as Chief Coordinator, he was a Lt General. In 1998, in recognition to his dedicated service to Finland and the UN, he was promoted to full General.

[31] Siilasvuo was a second-generation military officer; his father was also Lt General in the Finnish military.

not the most experienced peacekeeper in the UN's history, not only in the Middle East but worldwide.

During late 1973 and the first half of 1974, Siilasvuo had two main tasks. First, consolidating UNEF II's work and ensuring the operation fulfilled its mandate. This period was challenging due to Israel's occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, the IDF's encirclement of Egypt's Third Army and the post-war tension (Winokur, 2009). UNEF II, in close cooperation with UNTSO, positioned itself as a buffer between the two militaries. Second, Siilasvuo and a few key staff members from the Office of Special Political Affairs shuttled between the field and Geneva to participate in high-level military negotiations. This was the first time a Force Commander had such a challenging and multi-faceted task. Siilasvuo became equal parts diplomat and military officer.

By the autumn of 1974, UNTSO, UNDOF and UNEF II were up and running. That said, just because two or more UN entities are working close by, this does not automatically mean they are inclined to collaborate or are efficient when they do. The organisation had limited resources, the TCCs had a finite amount of soldiers, and the region was dealing with one conflict; this situation begged for coordination. Siilasvuo, as one of the Force Commanders, believed the case required a better framework, which he designed by himself.

The idea to have an office to coordinate the operations – or, in UN jargon, the terms of reference for this position – came from the field. This is a crucial detail, which goes to show not only that the Secretary-General was amenable to co-designing a regional strategy, but also, at the same time, that the operations had sufficient agency to come up with these ideas.

There are three possible reasons for this. First, another Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim of Austria, replaced U Thant. Waldheim wanted the Secretariat to be one of the key players in the conflict. Second, the number of operations within driving distance of each other multiplied in 1974, meaning better coordination was required. The third possible reason was that the Secretariat wanted to be more proactive and use the ceasefire as an opportunity to advance the quest for peace. Regardless of what happened in New York, the peacekeepers themselves imagined a better way to do things.

Siilasvuo wrote a thorough proposal and submitted it to New York. A memorandum from Erik Suy, Legal Counsel to Guyer, elaborates on Siilasvuo's proposals (UNA, 1975). The first essential element to discuss is the legal aspect. Force Commanders, to this day, have a strict mandate and jurisdiction: command their operation. Creating a *unified command* would challenge this paradigm, which the Secretariat saw as one step too far.

The matter becomes even more interesting in the annex to that memo, which outlines the General's five-point proposal and the Secretariat's reactions. First, the perspective in New York is quite favourable: "an overall coordinator would be a great improvement on the present situation" (UNA, 1975, p. 2). However, the memorandum also stresses that the host countries, particularly Egypt and Syria, may view the appointment as a sign of the permanence of the status quo in terms of how long operations would serve and that they might see this appointment as an unsanctioned evolution of the architecture. At that point, the operations[32] had three or six months' mandates, their renewal was a matter of discussion, and they had clear reporting lines from the Force Commander to the Secretary-General.

Second, Siilasvuo proposed that the coordinator holds the USG rank. Here the Secretariat pushed back because this would create difficulties if the Secretary-General had given Siilasvuo the rank of USG. He would have then had the same rank as the USG for Special Political Affairs, to whom he *de facto* reported (Jonah J. O., 1991). Therefore, Headquarters determined that he would remain an Assistant-Secretary-General (one rank below[33]).

Third, he proposed that all three missions report to New York *through* the Chief Coordinator, and fourth, he requested staff to support his work. New York accepted with caveats; for military and organisational matters, the operations would report directly to the Secretary-

[32] This was the case for UNDOF and UNEF II, not UNTSO, which had a different timeline and the permanence of which the Security Council never seriously challenged.

[33] The Secretary-General changed his mind after a few months and decided to promote him to USG. Given that Siilasvuo *de jure* reported directly to the Secretary-General, he was able to justify this promotion. Moreover, given the close and solid working relationship Siilasvuo had with both Urquhart and Guyer, they welcomed his promotion as a recognition of his performance.

General and *inform*[34] Siilasvuo, and a small staff would support him. The main concern at this stage was to keep the identity of the three operations separate for political, military and administrative issues. From the onset of this idea, the highest form it could have achieved was one of *coordination*. Merging the operations would have been too far for everyone involved, especially the host countries. Fifth, the General proposed to have his headquarters at the Government House, which was accepted.

The Secretary-General officially proposed this formula to the Security Council. His letter underscored the necessity of this innovation and considered the legal caveats. This was an ingenious plan drawn in Jerusalem and fine-tuned in New York. Without a doubt, this shows that, at least to a degree, Secretary-General Waldheim and his advisors wanted a regional approach and perhaps even a strategy. Waldheim explained to the Council:

> There would be, I believe, a great advantage in establishing a co-ordinating mechanism for their activities and administration[…] I believe that it would be of benefit to all concerned, including the parties themselves, the countries providing contingents and also the United Nations, if a greater degree of coordination among the three operations could be established. Such an arrangement should also make it possible to some extent to streamline the administrative and logistical set-up (United Nations Security Council, 1975)

The Security Council agreed shortly thereafter and confirmed the appointment and the establishment of the office. The Council reaffirmed that the Chief Coordinator would *only* liaise between the operations and all parties involved. In addition, he would be attending the Military Working Group of the Geneva Peace Conference. While the Council stressed the need to keep the identity of the operations intact, they understood the importance of taking this step.

One of Siilasvuo's most significant challenges came in 1978. The increasingly difficult situation in Southern Lebanon and the need of the U.S. to save the Camp David Accords (see

[34] The Chief Coordinator had the same degree of authority as OUSGSPA; while neither had *de facto* oversight authority over the operations, the Coordinator liaised with the Secretary-General *through* OUSGSPA, and the operations liaised with OUSGSPA *through* the Chief Coordinator.

Chapter 5) forced the Security Council to deploy UNIFIL. Chapter 3 discusses how Siilasvuo played an instrumental role in the operation's deployment and in establishing the necessary relationships on the ground. Chapter 5 discusses that the Camp David Accords envisioned a specific part for the Chief Coordinator in implementing the Israel-Egypt peace treaty; however, due to the Soviet Union's objections, UNEF II left the Sinai Peninsula, and the Secretariat was unable to support the treaty's implementation. In 1979, Siilasvuo retired from active duty and left the Middle East. The Secretariat decided against appointing a successor (Bar-Yaacov, 1980).

Like much of the inter-operation dynamics, Siilasvuo's role as Chief Coordinator remains grossly understudied. In the four chapters of the *Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (*Diehl; Ruddlof & Diehl; Novosseloff; Theobald, 2015), which deal with our operations, the role barely gets a mention in passing. Kohavi (1980); Thakur (2008); Sommereyns (1980), who conducted in-depth studies on the operations in the Middle East, barely reference Siilasvuo's work. While this might suggest that the role was minimal, after a careful review of the archives, it is clear that the General does not get all the credit he deserves.

Understanding the role of the Coordinator matters a great deal, both for the subject at hand and for historical reasons. This was one of the first appointments to oversee and coordinate two or more operations. If we look at the work done by current Special Representatives of the Secretary-General at the helm of peacekeeping operations, or even the work of the UN Special Coordinator in the Middle East (UNSCO) in Jerusalem, their terms of reference are guided by Siilasvuo's experience. Fortunately, the General made two contributions to the literature through a journal article (1981) and a memoir (1992). Both resources are critical to this dissertation

UNIFIL: Welcome to Hell

The UN was not equipped or prepared to deal with Southern Lebanon. The situation was one of chaos, lawlessness and competing factions with very different agendas (Novosseloff, 2015a). The Palestinians, the Syrians, the Israelis and the Lebanese themselves had their own interests, which were at odds with each other. In 1978, after the IDF's Operation Litani,

the Security Council, at the forceful behest of the U.S., deployed UNIFIL. The operation did not have a clear strategy, the mandate was weak and all sides treated the operation like an enemy (Nachmias, 1999). The main objectives of UNIFIL were to confirm the IDF's withdrawal, restore a modicum of peace and assist the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. The mandate of UNIFIL, while seemingly clear-cut, proved to be fraught with numerous challenges during the period between its establishment and the Israeli invasion of 1982.

Novosseloff (2015a) provides a comprehensive history of the operation and, crucially, stresses the multiple challenges the operation faces. First, the Security Council was bitterly divided; the U.S. forced the Council to deploy the operation and prevented the Secretariat from providing critical input (see Chapter 3 for details). The Soviet Union begrudgingly agreed to let the resolution pass; however, it never supported its work. Second, the critical players in Southern Lebanon rejected the idea of an operation and therefore treated it as a hostile actor. Third, the Lebanese government's inability to control Southern Lebanon endangered the operation when they set foot in their AO.

The Secretary-General, with the Security Council's approval, appointed Erskine to serve as the first Force Commander. Chapter 3 discusses how Erskine and UNTSO served as UNIFIL's support system both in military and administrative terms. Moreover, the Chapter highlights the role Siilasvuo played as Chief Coordinator. While UNIFIL had structural issues exogenous to its work (weak mandate and a hostile AO), the Secretariat deployed the operation as smoothly and efficiently as possible. However, as soon as the operation had its boots on the ground, it began to struggle. At its inception, UNIFIL had around 6,000 troops. However, the Security Council quickly increased the strength to approximately 9,000 troops.

UNIFIL set up its headquarters in Naqoura, a city in southern Lebanon, very near the border with Israel. The city is a strategically advantageous location for UNIFIL due to its proximity to the AO, and the remoteness of the city kept UNIFIL away from Lebanese politics. However, the location has constraints. The operation's distance from large Lebanese cities makes it very reliant on Israeli willingness to cooperate. A significant portion of UNIFIL's civilian staff

lives in Israel, which meant they had to request permission from the IDF and the Christian Militias to enter Naqoura every day (Makdisi, Goksel, Hauck, & Reigeluth, 2009).

Howard (2019) explains that UNIFIL's approach has evolved over time, emphasizing inducement—material and institutional incentives for behaviour change—alongside traditional peacekeeping methods of persuasion and coercion. UNIFIL employs various assistance programs, development aid, and efforts to build local governing and security institutions, aiming to foster peaceful relations and cooperation. Additionally, UNIFIL's significant role as a formal-sector employer in southern Lebanon inadvertently provides it with economic leverage, further underpinning its mission with an unexpected source of influence. Despite challenges and limitations, its presence has contributed to local and regional stability, reduced violence, and enhanced economic development, underscoring the multifaceted nature of modern peacekeeping operations.

Thakur (1981) outlines three main challenges for the operation. First, UNIFIL did not have combat duties[35]; therefore, it relied on the goodwill of the local factions for its security. As Chapters 3 and 5 discuss, UNIFIL suffered regular attacks against its positions and sustained casualties. If UNIFIL had retaliated, the operation would have faced the possibility of expulsion and even greater violence. UNIFIL's biggest challenge was the complexity of the political landscape in Lebanon. The presence of various armed factions, including the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Lebanese militias, and other non-state actors, greatly complicated UNIFIL's mandate (Parker, 1986). The operation sustained attacks and suffered casualties along the way. Moreover, the lack of a strong government presence in Southern Lebanon made things worse. The Lebanese military was unable to support UNIFIL in controlling the AO.

The constant fight between the PLO, the Lebanese government, the Christian militias, the Israelis and the Syrians made it impossible for UNIFIL to control the area. Third, there was no political process advancing the quest for peace. Whereas UNEF II and UNDOF supported

[35] What contemporary operations such as MINUSMA, MONUSCO and MINUSCA call "peace enforcement mandates." For more see Karlsrud (2015).

the ongoing negotiation of the disengagement agreements, the politics of Lebanon were so tricky that the chances of peace were non-existent.

Moreover, UNIFIL faced a range of operational challenges, such as insufficient resources and personnel, which limited its capacity to carry out its mandate effectively. The deployment of peacekeepers was often slow and faced logistical obstacles, while the Force was generally under-equipped to deal with the complex and volatile environment in southern Lebanon (Gööksel, 2007; Howard, 2019). This lack of resources and capabilities hindered UNIFIL's ability to prevent violations of the ceasefire and ensure the return of Lebanese government authority to the area.

James (1983) conducted an in-depth analysis of UNIFIL between 1978 and 1982 and concluded that the operation faced "painful peacekeeping," given that the operation lacked political allies in the field and support from New York. The author notes that both Israel and the PLO pledged to cooperate with the operation; however, they both ignored their own pledges and turned against the operation. UNIFIL constantly faced attacks and harassment from every actor on the ground whilst not having freedom of movement, which made it impossible to achieve its mandate.

Nachmias (1999) declares UNIFIL as a failure. After 20 years on the ground, the operation failed to induce peace, prevent daily skirmishes and confrontations between the warring factions, and, perhaps most importantly, it did not secure the withdrawal of foreign forces from the country. The core of UNIFIL's mandate is to get Israeli and Syrian troops out of Lebanon; however, the operation could not achieve this goal. The author highlights an example after this dissertation's period, which exemplifies UNIFIL's challenges. In 1996, more than 100 Lebanese civilians died in an IDF attack on a UNIFIL base. Despite the operation's significant military size, it failed to deter violence. The author does highlight that UNIFIL has made some positive contributions, such as coordinating humanitarian support within its AO and liaising between the IDF and the Lebanese Armed Forces. However, UNIFIL's shortcomings eclipse any of these minor successes.

UNIFIL had a very complex and contradicting relationship with Israel. While the country accepted UNIFIL's deployment, it prevented it from working in Israel. The IDF made it

painfully clear that it would not cooperate with UNIFIL beyond the bare minimum. UNIFIL did not have the political capital or support to deter the IDF. This became apparent in 1982 when Israel decided to invade Southern Lebanon, siege Beirut and occupy the country despite UNIFIL's presence. Chapter 5 discusses in the detail the 1982 invasion and the impact it had on UNIFIL and peacekeeping in the Middle East.

Without a doubt, UNIFIL is the most challenging operation of peacekeeping architecture in the Middle East, and, arguably, when the operation started its work, it was the most challenging operation worldwide. UNIFIL was deployed into an anarchic area. It could not rely on the support of its host country because the government did not control half of its territory. Therefore, the operation attracts significantly more scholarly attention than the rest of the architecture. Unfortunately, the overall conclusion of the literature is that between 1978 and 1982, UNIFIL was and still is an operation that did and does not have the resources or mandate to secure itself, let alone achieve its mandate.

Conclusion

This chapter outlines the foundations of the peacekeeping architecture in the Middle East and assesses the extent to which the Secretariat had a positive impact in managing the Israel-Arab conflict between 1948 and 1967. Without a doubt, the Secretariat and the Security Council were deeply entrenched in the efforts to deal with the conflict and tried to foster a peaceful settlement of the strife. The achievements of the Secretariat during this era are noteworthy, most prominently in the successful negotiation of the Armistice Agreements and the subsequent establishment of the Military Armistice Commissions (MACs). The intellectual conception and deployment of UNEF I in 1956 stand out as a testament to both Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld's foresight and his adept political manoeuvring. His proactive stance and inventive approach, coupled with a rare consensus between the Americans and Soviets on the necessity of an UN-led initiative, proved vital in fostering an environment conducive for the conception of such a peace operation.

In the field, UNTSO and UNEF I established a solid working relationship whereby the former supported the latter through providing UNMOs and serving as a liaison with both Israel and Egypt. While each operation had its own duties and mandate, the fact that they collaborated

so well laid the foundations for the post-1973 IOC framework, which is the subject of Chapter 3. Between the years 1956 and 1967, the region, though simmering with underlying tensions, was somewhat stable. The Security Council and the Secretariat seemed satisfied with the existing architectural arrangements and felt no pressing need for expansion or revision. However, the winds of change were in the offing, and the Six-Day War in 1967 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973 drastically increased the size of the architecture together with its challenges.

Chapter 3

Inter-Operation Collaboration

Introduction

After the Yom Kippur War, the Israel-Arab conflict had three peacekeeping operations on the ground. The Security Council deployed UNEF II and UNDOF to oversee the cease-fires in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. While the Council maintained the traditional legal setup of giving each operation its own structure, AO, this chapter highlights that the Council both explicitly and implicitly authorized the Secretary-General to maximize the efficiency of the architecture by way of pulling and sharing personnel and resources. In 1978, the Secretary-General once again, leveraged the existing resources and expertise of the entire architecture to deploy UNIFIL. The degree to which the operation collaborated on military and operational affairs certainly proves the claim that it did not have standalone efforts but rather was part of one interdependent and complex architecture.

A priori, it is almost self-evident that the four operations worked together during the 1970s. After all, The Security Council deployed UNDOF and UNEF II as tools to verify two ceasefire agreements from the same war in their respective areas of operation. In addition, UNTSO's political reach deals with the regional dynamics of the conflict and its observers worked in the areas of operation taken by the four operations. Even though UNIFIL came four years after UNDOF and UNEF II, the deployment of this new operation did not signal that a new conflict had started. UNIFIL was an acknowledgement and a response to the fact that the conflict had evolved from being predominantly state-centric Israel-Arab to an Israel-Palestine strife where different non-state actors, chief among them the PLO, played a role.

What happened on the shores of the Litani River, the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula had a profound impact everywhere else in the region. If we see the Israel-Arab conflict as one overarching strife, did the UN see its four operations as part of one significant effort to tackle the issue? Did the operations collaborate to achieve their mandates? Was this a field-driven imitative, or did it come from New York if they did collaborate? These are the driving questions for this chapter.

This dissertation hypothesizes that IOC is a critical component of developing and implementing a regional strategy. IOC revolves around coordinating activities and pooling and sharing resources and information (Luiijf & Healey, 2012). In addition, this chapter evaluates the hypothesis that, given the regional dynamics of the Yom Kippur War and its aftermath, the operations' success depended on them engaging in collaboration.

This chapter's guiding research question is: To what extent did UNTSO, UNEF, UNDOF and UNIFIL collaborate on tactical and operational matters between 1973 and 1982?

This analysis will employ Complexity Theory to evaluate the architecture of the United Nations' peacekeeping operations in the Middle East. Complexity Theory, with its focus on the interconnectedness, adaptability, and emergent behaviours within systems, offers a robust theoretical framework for understanding the intricate dynamics of inter-operation collaboration (IOC) among UNTSO, UNEF II, UNDOF, and UNIFIL..

The application of Complexity Theory to this evaluation will facilitate a deeper understanding of how the collective efforts of these operations contributed to the overarching goal of peacekeeping in the region. It will explore the mechanisms of coordination, resource sharing, and information pooling that underpinned the operations' collaborative endeavours. Furthermore, this theoretical lens will allow for an exploration of the emergent properties of the UN's peacekeeping architecture, revealing how the collaborative dynamics between the operations enhanced their collective efficacy in responding to the conflict.

In essence, this chapter aims to bridge the gap in the literature by providing a holistic analysis of the UN's peacekeeping operations in the Middle East as part of a single, complex system. Through the lens of Complexity Theory, it will offer both a policy and theoretical contribution, shedding light on the significance of inter-operation collaboration in the development and implementation of a regional strategy for peacekeeping. This comprehensive evaluation will contribute to a richer understanding of the UN's efforts to navigate and mitigate the diplomatic and security challenges presented by the Israel-Arab conflict during a critical period in its history.

Inter-Operation Collaboration: Necessity is the Mother of Innovation

Collaboration existed and continues to exist among peacekeeping operations. However, there is neither agreed-upon definition of IOC nor a framework or policy directive outlining best practices. Therefore, IOC is an ad-hoc tool meant to *respond* to developments on the ground, such as the regionalisation of armed conflict. This chapter critically reviews the experience in the Middle East and share the lessons the UN System ought to learn from them.

There are two contributions to inter-operational collaboration, which have informed this chapter. However, while their conclusions are valuable and will be a part of this chapter's theoretical framework, it is essential to insert a caveat. Both papers focus on post-Cold War peacekeeping operations in Africa. At this time, the Security Council started to conceptualise peacekeeping as a tool for conflict management, which includes civil and political affairs alongside military considerations (Doyle & Higgins, 1995). On the other hand, the Council designed Peacekeeping in the Middle East[36] mainly as a tool to maintain cease-fires between Israel and her neighbours. It is essential to highlight the contributions to the concept of inter-operation collaboration.

Angelo[37] (2011) provides an insightful study on the subject. Peacekeeping operations, the author claims, ought to collaborate for two main reasons. First, the Member States continuously ask the UN to be cost-effective and efficient. Even though peacekeeping is a relatively cheap way to conduct military interventions in post-conflict countries, the leading financial contributors always require the Secretariat to find ways to maximise value for money (Day, 2020; Peterson, 2017). Second, and most important for this research, Angelo points out that "the changing nature of violent conflict throughout the world is increasingly characterised by cross-border conflict systems, where national boundaries are of diminishing importance, and regional dimensions acquire greater relevance" (p.7). His research dealt with post-Cold War peacekeeping in Africa; however, this same sentence

[36] As we see throughout this entire dissertation, UNIFIL is an exception. While the Council gave the operation a first generation mandate in 1978, UNIFIL deployed to deal with an asymmetrical conflict between Member States and non-state actors (Boerma, 1979). Moreover, in 2006 the Security Council adopted resolution 1701, which gave the operation a broader mandate (Novosseloff, 2015).

[37] Victor Angelo was the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad between 2008 and 2010.

applies to the Israel-Arab conflict almost word for word. From the Israeli War of Independence in 1948 to the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Israel-Arab conflict always had a regional component, which warranted the peacekeeping architecture to have them.

Angelo provides a framework of six areas where operations in the same region should collaborate. Most of his recommendations for this study are anachronistic because, between 1973 and 1982, the UN did not have the bureaucratic size it does today. However, his paper gave a much-needed frame of reference to evaluate the extent to which peacekeeping in the Middle East collaborated and how much they relied on each other to succeed.

Aubyn (2015) focuses on IOC in West Africa in the early 2000s. His contribution revolves around the necessary exogenous elements needed for successful cooperation. He highlights that collaboration must revolve around specific initiatives, such as military support, to secure elections from one operation to another. In addition, for peacekeepers to move away from their AO, it is fundamental to have a robust Security Council blessing, typically in the form of a resolution. These contributions deserve mentioning because of their original approach; evaluating inter-operation collaboration is a creative way to look at the efficiency of peacekeeping in an entire region. Moreover, they agree that more collaboration is a way to tackle financial constraints from New York and the regionalisation of conflict from the field.

Both authors highlight that in West Africa, the Secretary-General created the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), which served as an umbrella for the peace operations deployed in Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Ivory Coast. Through UNOWA, the operations coordinated their activities, shared information and conducted joint activities both on civilian and military issues. They both highlight this office as one of the genesis for Inter-Operation Collaboration; however, they do not mention the Office of the Chief Coordinator for UN Peacekeeping in the Middle East and his role more than three decades before. In other words, they do discuss the notion of collaboration across peacekeeping operations. However, they must see that this process started in the Middle East.

The Six-Day War: Filling in the Vacuum

By 1967, the situation in the Middle East had begun to heat up. The Government of the United Arab Republic started to prepare for war. Cairo knew it had to eliminate the peacekeepers to advance its plans. After a tumultuous political back-and-forth between Cairo and UNHQ (see Chapter 4), UNEF started to pull back, and the Egyptian Army began to occupy the operation's observation points. In a matter of days after, the Six-Day War began. UNTSO stayed behind; however, it did not have the material capacity or political mandate to stop the outbreak of war by themselves.

The Six-Day War was, simply put, stunning. It changed the region forever. Summarising the War goes far beyond the scope of this dissertation. The analysis focuses on the impact the war had on UNTSO. The operation was entirely in the middle of things; its headquarters was – and continues to be – right in one of the most contentious areas: Jerusalem. During the war, UNTSO observers, putting themselves at significant risk, continued providing information to New York, which proved crucial for its decision-making process. Indeed Security Council resolution 236 (1967) called for "full cooperation with the Chief of Staff […] including freedom of movement and adequate communications facilities". The parties did not adhere to this call, and the operation suffered.

For UNEF and UNTSO, the situation was extremely complicated; they faced continuous pressure and harassment by both sides, which prevented them from doing their job. Both Force Commanders had to use non-official channels to communicate with New York. UNTSO assisted in creating the conditions for the ceasefire to last. It created and operated 36 additional observation points on the Suez Canal, the Golan Heights and Lebanon. Its observers quickly deployed to all areas that needed them. Overall, they performed well (Theobald, 2015), and UNTSO had the daunting challenge of covering its original area of operation and filling UNEF's vacuum as much as possible. Overall, "UNTSO was able to reposition itself – as well as figuratively – to respond to the new environment after 1967" (Londey, Crawley, & Horner, 2020, p. 251).

The war froze UNTSO's work because it rendered one of its core activities irrelevant: the Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs). After the 1948 War, the parties signed armistice

agreements with Israel. Therefore, Israel maintained a commission with each belligerent bilaterally: Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt (Mcdermott, 1996). UNTSO's Chief of Staff attended these meetings as a neutral observer and chairperson. UNTSO played a significant role in observing the cease-fire and processing complaints from both sides. In addition, the operation reports to the Secretary-General on the progress of all MACs (Higgins, 1970). After the Six-Day War, however, Israel did not recognise and stopped participating in all MACs, which begged the question: should UNTSO continue to be on the ground? The answer to that question came in the affirmative from all parties involved; there was never serious consideration of ending the operation.

Despite these challenges, the operations provided up-to-date information to the Council ahead of its sessions. This shows the importance of having a reliable partner on the ground, not only because of the information but also because the hostility shown by the parties to the observers served as a political barometer to measure the degree to which there was tension. Of course, this also showed that the UN had a deficit of trust in the region. In August 1970, the Secretary-General, with the blessing of the Security Council, appointed then Maj. General Ensio Siilasvuo as the operation's Chief of Staff, who would remain in place until 1973, when he moved to the UNEF.

Of course, UNTSO had to deal with many obstacles, making it less effective than it would have liked to be. Israel's position vis-à-vis the operation was not entirely favourable because it simply did not trust it. For six years, UNTSO stood alone in one of the most tumultuous regions in the world, and it proved that it could manage as long as the status quo remained, which it did until October 1973.

The Yom Kippur War

On 6 October 1973, as Israelis prepared to observe Yom Kippur, the region again went to war. The Yom Kippur War shook the area and threatened to destabilise the international system. The war began in the early morning of Yom Kippur, one of the holiest days in the Jewish calendar, during which a large portion of the population fasted. The Syrian Army invaded the Golan Heights, and its Egyptian counterparts crossed the Suez Canal. During the first 10 days of the war, Egypt and Syria won many battles, bringing the IDF to the brink of

defeat. The IDF managed to reclaim the high ground at a high cost and through the help of the U.S. By 20 October, the IDF took the Suez Canal and Mt. Hermon and positioned forces less than 50 kilometres from Damascus (Rabinovich, 2004).

The Americans wanted to ensure Israel's military victory whilst avoiding another humiliating defeat for Egypt and Syria; therefore, they delayed their weapons shipment and encouraged them to agree to a cease-fire. The Soviet Union provided significant military assistance to Cairo and Damascus and threatened to intervene directly when the tide started to turn against them. The United States put its armed forces on high alert to join the fight. Luckily, cooler heads prevailed, and instead, the two superpowers and their clients agreed on a ceasefire, which took place on 24 October (Bickerton & Klausner, 2017). The UN celebrated its 28th anniversary, trying to avert a nuclear confrontation between the superpowers and thinking, yet again, of concrete ways to contain further war in the Middle East.

The Security Council behaved differently after the Six-Day and the Yom Kippur wars. The Council did not alter the peacekeeping architecture by strengthening UNTSO's numbers in the former. In the latter's case, international buffers' political discussions and plans began before the war ended.

The Six-Day War was a clear and stunning victory for Israel. Egypt, for example, "lost all but 15 per cent of its military hardware worth $2 billion" (Oren, 2002, p. 306). While the Soviet Union swiftly provided its clients with aircraft and other equipment, it took them over half a decade to have the necessary strength to re-challenge Israel. There was no need for an immediate buffer between the countries in the short or medium terms. The Security Council and the Secretariat believed that Security Council Resolution and the Jarring Mission would find a way to solve the conflict politically. Therefore, there was no need to do anything else militarily. As we see in Chapter 4, they were sorely mistaken.

The Yom Kippur War, however, was a completely different encounter. Israel did not lose but did not win the type of victory it did in 1967 (Rabinovich, 2004). The war did not produce a knockout, which ensured quiet in the field; the parties were still standing, and there was a real fear that they would continue fighting without an international response. There was a

clear-cut need for a mechanism with political and military components that ensured the cease-fire holds. The Security Council, the Secretariat and the U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, understood this and designed this mechanism. In the field, this eventually led to UNEF and UNDOF; at the political level, this led to the Geneva Peace Conference process (see Chapter 4).

Right after the war, the Security Council, at the behest of the Secretary-General and with concurrent support of the Soviet Union and the U.S., agreed to deploy UNEF II to, once again, monitor the ceasefire in the Sinai Peninsula and later monitor the IDF's withdrawal. Similarly to 1956, the Security Council needed troops on the ground in days, and the Secretariat needed to deliver. Once again, a team led by Urquhart in New York set up the groundwork, and in the field, Siilasvuo became equal parts Force Commander and Diplomat.

The Israel-Syria disengagement negotiations were far more difficult for political reasons. This delayed UNDOF's deployment for a few months. Until then, UNTSO continued to work in the Golan Heights (Rudloff & Diehl, 2015).

Creative & quick (re) deployments

The Security Council, breaking with its usual gridlock pattern, negotiated and agreed quickly on deploying UNEF II. The Council adopted resolution 340 (1973) and requested the Secretary-General to inform the Council of the progress in 24 hours. The report of the Secretary-General (1973) outlined the operation's terms of reference, which mentioned, "In the fulfilment of its tasks, the Force will have the cooperation of the military observers of UNTS0" (p.1). Furthermore, in a letter sent to the Security Council (1973), the Secretary-General requested that UNTSO's Chief of Staff, General Siilasvuo, serve as interim Force Commander.

The Council agreed and, at the same time, it concurrently appointed the General to serve as the chair, host and representative of the Secretary-General at the upcoming Israel-Egypt military discussions at the Km 101 negotiations. This meant the Secretary-General had to split his time and attention between handing over his duties at UNTSO, preparing and leading the discussions between the parties, and setting up a new operation.

Once again, similar to 1956, the Secretariat needed to fill in the gap within hours. There was no time to wait for the operation to arrive. UNTSO's resources and troops made it possible for UNEF II to get "the first units of the force into the field within 24 hours of Security Council decision" (Urquhart, 1980, p. 91). This was a fundamental stepping-stone toward ensuring the ceasefire held. At the same time, it gave the UN sufficient credibility to chair the disengagement negotiations; Siilasvuo needed to project to both parties that UNEF II was operational from the moment the Security Council permitted it to proceed.

In the field, the situation was not easy. The Secretariat, knowing that UNTSO would be fundamental in implementing UNEF II and that Siilasvuo himself was at the centre of this, decided to keep UNTSO out of the loop.

> It sounds strange in retrospect that no information was leaked to the field [...] the decision on the setting up of UNEF took us in UNTSO completely by surprise [...] the appointment of UNEF Force Commander meant once again a complete change in my plans for the future (Siilasvuo, 1992, p. 150).

The Secretariat probably wanted to avoid any risk of leaks to the media while it negotiated with the parties and the TCCs. However, this also stresses that, at that time, the field had no input in the Secretariat's decision-making process. The General learned about his appointment on 25 October, and the Secretary-General requested it to the Security Council. Siilasvuo understood the political pressure but challenged that the Secretariat did not use the 1956 experience to build a roadmap for subsequent rapid deployment.

Once the Secretariat included UNTSO, they got to work. The Secretariat consulted the General on UNEF's organisational structure and location of the headquarters. In addition, he directed a few critical senior staffers to move to Ismailia with him. However, UNTSO assisted UNEF; IOC could not solve the structural challenges peacekeeping had in New York. Siilasvuo lamented that the Secretariat had to, once again, improvise and make up things as they went along. "One of the great shortcomings was the lack of preparations by the UN for launching a new peacekeeping mission and for giving administrative support" (Siilasvuo, 1981, p. 4). The Secretariat had not fully negotiated with the host country basic logistical arrangements; Headquarters did not fully brief the TCCs, which led to their contingents arriving without

being fully aware of the challenges. This is an instance where the small size of the Office for Special Political Affairs started to have a negative effect. As difficult as it was, the Israel-Arab conflict was not the only one they had to address; perhaps they did not have the time to conduct in-depth scenario planning.

All the challenges notwithstanding, UNEF II received its first supply of shipments from UNTSO, a practice that would continue over the next few years (Rudloff & Diehl, 2015). Moreover, UNTSO staffed the observation posts in the Sinai Peninsula. While these decisions proved fundamental to UNEF's early successes, UNTSO alone did not have enough assets to hold the line in the Sinai and, at the same time, continue to perform its tasks. They did not have enough observers; supporting UNEF stretched them to capacity.

Therefore, the Secretary-General needed to perform another creative IOC act: redeployment. Around 500 kilometres away from the Sinai Peninsula, the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) worked to keep the peace in the bitterly divided island of Cyprus for nine years. The Secretary-General requested that Finnish, Austrian and Swedish contingents serving in Cyprus temporarily and immediately transfer to UNEF II. It is important to stress how groundbreaking this decision was. Former UNFICYP Chief of Staff, who wrote a paper on UNEF II and highlighted the importance of its former operation's contribution, reflects:

> There were no contingency plans for transferring contingents from one force to create another […] UNFICYP, therefore, had to proceed from a clean sheet. It follows also that the contingents involved were not experienced in crash moves of this kind. Move from one operational theatre and role to another always pose problems, increased in ad-hoc conditions (Harbottle, 1974, p. 20).

Without a doubt, this decision proved to be very successful; however, it is essential to understand why. First, Cyprus is very close to UNEF's theatre of operations; second, the Soviet Union, the U.S. and the United Kingdom airlifted peacekeepers to Egypt immediately. Second, UNPICYP's Force Commander reacted quickly, redeployed units and ensured continuity of operations. Third, the United Kingdom allowed the UN to use its airbase in Southern Cyprus (Harbottle, 1974). The Secretary-General's quick reaction, combined with

the willingness of the permanent members of the Security Council and UNPICYP, allowed all of this to happen. In other words, the stars aligned.

Siilasvuo requested more troops. In a letter written by USG Brian Urquhart (UNA, 1973) to UNTSO's acting Chief of Staff, Col. R.W. Bunworth, he explains that Headquarters obtained Siilasvuo's request for 43 additional observers, some of which went to UNEF II to manage to help the operation setup. Interestingly, the abovementioned letter highlighted a political problem with this deployment. The U.S. and the Soviet Union offered/requested to provide 36 observers each to UNTSO. While the Secretary-General agreed to the proposal, the situation became very complicated. The letter explains that the Soviet officers did not speak good English, creating internal trouble within the mission. Because the 72 officers reported to UNTSO headquarters quite rapidly, the Secretariat asked the European states to hold off on sending the officers to Jerusalem. Another critical challenge the Secretariat faced was pressure to widen the geographical representation among the observers. This proved very difficult given that Israel would not grant freedom of movement to soldiers of countries, which did not recognise the state. The politics of deployment (covered in Chapter 4) remained a challenge for the operations throughout their lifetime.

After a few months, UNTSO and UNEF II started to look north where its next challenge awaited them: UNDOF.

UNDOF's deployment provides a fascinating example of field-driven IOC. UNDOF's setup was much more complicated for several reasons. There was no political will to have dialogue beyond setting a ceasefire; Syria bitterly resented Israel's 1967 conquests. Israel clearly stated that it would never willingly return the Golan Heights. While Israel and Syria signed a disengagement agreement, the root causes of their conflict were not resolved, making the situation complicated and potentially volatile (Sharon, Morrison, & Weiner, 2010).

UNTSO and, more importantly, UNEF II had time to think about the Israel-Syria disengagement from a military perspective between February and May. Siilasvuo created a UNEF military and civilian staffers committee that drew a hypothetical peacekeeping operation to work in the Golan Heights. The group made a few key recommendations to the Secretariat, which became the bedrock of the new operation (Siilasvuo, 1992)

First, following the pattern of redeployment, they knew that the first contingents had to come from TCCs with assets already on the ground. They recommended Austria, Peru and Nepal due to their experience with similar geographic characteristics as the Golan Heights. Second, the committee recommended that Canada and Poland cover the operations logistical needs, given that they were doing the same for UNEF II – these two countries represented NATO and the Warsaw Pact, respectively. Siilasvuo rightly planned for a smaller operation in the Golan, which would have fewer logistical needs. Instead of bringing in a new contingent, Canada and Poland[38] needed to move some of their troops to the Golan Heights (Olejarz, 2015). Third, Siilasvuo identified Brig. Gen Briceño of Peru – already on the ground as Commander of Peru's Battalion – as the potential Force Commander (James, 1987). This appointment broke away from the tradition of moving UNTSO's Chief of Staff to a new operation; Maj Gend Bengt Liljestrand of Sweden had been on the job only since March 1974, so moving him in June did not make sense.

On 31 May 1974, the same day Israel and Syria signed the disengagement agreement, the Security Council adopted resolution 350 (1974) authorising UNDOF's deployment. The resolution requested the Secretary-General to inform the Council of the progress. Because the details of the disengagement and UNDOF's mandate were unclear, the Council did not put a deadline for the Secretary-General. The idea was for the report and UNDOF's mandate to include the group's results.

The Secretary-General sent a report on 5 June (1974). The document contained every single one of Siilasvuo's recommendations. It is noteworthy how vital IOC was for UNDOF's success. UNEF II sent 1,100 troops, including 500 Austrian, 350 Peruvian, 250 Polish and 250 Canadian.

In addition, UNDOF also needed seasoned observers. Therefore, UNTSO redeployed 90 officers to UNDOF to support the peacekeepers in the field. By that moment, UNTSO had already had much experience working in the Golan Heights. Indeed, the operation had observation posts between Israeli and Syrian forces since 1967 (Fetterly, 2003). UNDOF took

[38] Moving the Polish contingent through Israel was difficult because the country had a strict policy of refusing entry to soldiers from countries with which it did not have diplomatic relations. The Secretary-General himself requested the Israeli Prime Minister to make an exception, which she, reluctantly, made.

command and control and, with the continued help of UNTSO, continued to observe and monitor the situation (Houghton & Trinka, 1984). It is important to note that the Syrian government did not want multiple operations working in its country; therefore, UNTSO observers became embedded into UNDOF.

The military strategy was a product of the field. UNEF II, with some assistance from UNTSO, planned the deployment and gave the Secretariat all the relevant information on the conditions on the ground. This was possible because Siilasvuo played a unique role in peacekeeping. When he instructed UNEF to create the Golan Heights planning committee, he was not yet the Chief Coordinator of Peacekeeping in the Middle East. However, he was at the centre of all political and military discussions, much more so than his counterpart at UNTSO was. In November 1973, he successfully chaired the Km 101 talks between Israel and Egypt (Shlomo, 2015). In December, he participated in the Geneva Peace Conference and in January, he chaired the Israel-Egypt Military Working Group meetings. Unlike other Force Commanders, he had access to high-level political discussions to antipate an acceptable formula for the parties (Urquhart, 1987).

UNIFIL presents an interesting case because it can evaluate how the UN has perfected its IOC mechanism in the Middle East. The Council deployed UNIFIL *four* years later, with the Chief Coordinator for Peacekeeping in the Middle East already working on the ground for a few years. The status quo was volatile, extremely delicate, nowhere near peaceful, and could spark any moment. In New York, diplomats and the Secretariat discussed deploying some sort of international operation to stabilise the country (Nachmias, 1999). Deploying a peacekeeping operation in the traditional sense would be a daunting challenge for two reasons. First, there would be no Km 101-style negotiations between the factions and no peace to keep. Second, the idea of peacekeeping at that time was to serve as a buffer between two warring states; one of the protagonists of this conflict was not a state (Erskine, 1989).

From the field, UNTSO observers continuously warned the Security Council that the situation in Southern Lebanon was getting worse each day. UNTSO had a forward operating base in Naqoura and half a dozen observation posts. In February 1978, the observers reported their activities were under constant attack by de facto forces in the form of "vehicle hijackings,

denial of freedom of movement, armed thefts, forced entry into OPs, mined roads and shooting at or into the immediate vicinity of OP relief/logistics operations" (1978, p. para 1). Despite all the risks, UNTSO observers continued to perform; however, these reports clearly showed that the situation was very volatile and that the UN could not deal with the conflict. They could barely report what happened (James, 1983; Sommereyns, 1980).

The Secretary-General sent two confidential letters to the Security Council expressing concern regarding the situation in the Israel-Lebanon sector. On 15 June 1976, Waldheim reported that many vehicles and other equipment were robbed. The Secretary-General stressed that the government of Lebanon is not in a position to protect the observers. In a subsequent letter sent on 15 November 1977, Waldheim once again complained that UNTSO observers were constantly harassed, attacked and robbed; between 1975 and 1977, UNTSO lost 369,000 USD worth of equipment. He also stated that the operational conditions were so bad that "if they continue unabated, UNTSO may well find itself in a position in which its operation will have to be curtailed" (UNA, 1977, p. 2). These two letters are relevant not only because of their content but also because of the method employed. The Secretary-General sent them discretely with no intention of opening a public discussion; probably, his staff had already briefed him on the immense difficulties a new operation would face.

The Secretariat saw the situation as a clear risk to international peace and security; however, they did not want another peacekeeping operation. Urquhart (1980) comments that while the situation in southern Lebanon was nothing short of "anarchic" (p. 92) and he saw the prospect of deploying an operation to stabilise the area as complicated at best and downright impractical at worst. "The hard facts militated against deploying such a force" (Urquhart, 1987, p. 288). The lack of government authority in the South and the rugged terrain (hills and valleys) were ideal for guerrilla warfare and cumbersome for peacekeepers, making this prospect daunting. Siilasvuo was "'strongly against the idea of a force being sent to the area and 'went to New York and tried to convince them not to take that step'" (James, 1983, p. 618). The General believed that civil wars presented 'an impossible job' for peacekeeping[39].

[39] With the benefit of hindsight, the Urquhart and Siilasvuo were right. The reason stabilization operations today such as UNMISS in South Sudan, MINUSCA in the Central African Republic and MINUSMA in Mali are enjoying a limited degree of success is because their mandates allowed them to engage proactively. The development of operations working under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which vests them with enhanced rules

The two architects of UN Peacekeeping in the Middle East stood against the idea of going into Lebanon. This should have set the alarm given their direct experience in New York and the field. The Council, however, had other ideas.

Unfortunately, the conflict forced the UN's hand. On 11 March 1978, a Palestinian Liberation Organisation group landed on Tel Aviv's shores and carried out a terrorist attack. They took control of a bus, which was travelling near Tel Aviv. They assassinated 38 civilians, including 13 children and wounded 71 (Omer-Man, 2011). Israel's reaction was swift, and its intensity was, to most, surprising. Three days after the attack, the IDF launched 'Operation Litani', which deployed "20,000-25,000 ground troops backed by tanks, artillery, fighter planes and gunboats" (Keesing's Record of World Events, 1979). The IDF's objective was to destroy all PLO bases south of the Litani River and establish a security zone.

The United States took the lead and proposed the establishment of an operation to ensure Israel's withdrawal from the area. The United States' forcefulness in deploying a peacekeeping operation was unusually robust (for more on the politics of UNIFIL's deployment, see Chapter 4 and 5). On 19 March, the Security Council adopted resolution 425 (1978), which authorised the deployment of an Interim Force to confirm Israel's withdrawal from Lebanese territory and assist the Lebanese government in restoring its control and authority over the area.

Once again, the Council gave the Secretary-General 24 hours to report progress. Waldheim complied and sent his report (1978) to the Security Council outlining UNIFIL's terms of reference. The Secretariat decided to stick with the formula for UNEF II and UNDOF. The report states, "although the general context of UNIFIL is not comparable with that of UNEF and UNDOF, the guidelines for these operations, having proved satisfactory, are deemed suitable for practical application to the new Force" (para. 4). UNIFIL was under the command of the Secretary-General; the troops were provided with self-defence weapons, which they could use when attacked and when it faced "resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties" (para. 4 (d)). The Secretary-General decided to use an

of engagement, better equipment and clear orders was decades away. See Karlsrud (2015) ; Aoi & Coning (2017) for more on the challenges peacekeeping is facing in this regard today.

existing template to make the recruitment of TCCs quick and, at the same time, to avoid becoming bogged down with the politics in Lebanon. (Findlay, 2002).

The Secretariat did not have time to prepare or plan UNIFIL's deployment. Perhaps inevitably, "the sense of urgency and haste surrounding the establishment of UNIFIL seems to have precluded adequate planning and a careful examination of the military and political factors necessary for successful execution of the Force's mandate" (Heiberg, 1991, p. 3). The solution to this predicament was non-other than Inter-Operation Collaboration. The Secretariat relied on UNTSO for the operational planning and "relied heavily on the quick dispatch and experience of […] UNEF and UNDOF" (Boerma, 1979, p. 54). UNIFIL benefited from half a decade of intense IOC and having a Chief Coordinator with the gravitas and authority to speak on its behalf. While its senior officers were establishing themselves and began their operations, Siilasvuo engaged in diplomatic work on their behalf. In addition, the rapid redeployment of troops and using existing supply chains made things easier for mission start-ups.

The Secretariat relied on Inter-Operation Collaboration to deploy UNIFIL; UNTSO, UNDOF and UNEF II played a significant role in the operation's quick setup. The Secretary-General appointed Maj Gen Emmanuel Erskine[40] of Ghana as Force Commander. At the time of this appointment, he was UNTSO Chief of Staff since 1976 and previously was UNEF II Deputy Force Commander[41] between 1974 and 1976. His appointment continued the Secretariat's successful *modus operandi* of using UNTSO as the cornerstone for deploying a new operation.

Erskine was able to focus almost exclusively on the military aspects of setting up UNIFIL because, unlike in 1974, Siilasvuo was the Chief Coordinator of Peacekeeping in the Middle East. In addition, from the political side, Urquhart dispatched James Jonah, a Senior Political Affairs Officer, to accompany the Generals in their high-level meetings. By 1978, Siilasvuo and Jonah had over a decade of experience working in the region. The Generals divided the tasks where Siilasvuo focused on dealing with Israel and Lebanon and served as a political

[40] Erskine also wrote a seminal memoir, titled *Mission with UNIFIL: An African Soldier's perspective*. This dissertation frequently references the book as a vital primary source.
[41] Erskine was Siilasvuo's Deputy at UNEF II, they worked together to facilitate UNDOF's deployment. Their working relationship was very cordial and close.

liaison to the Secretariat. Erskine prepared the operational elements and, equally, if not more critically, organised the logistics of receiving thousands of soldiers worldwide.

Of course, this did not mean Erskine was side-lined from the politics; the Secretariat wanted to use its resources more strategically. The Secretariat instructed Siilasvuo to liaise with the Israeli and Lebanese governments; the General's good offices proved to be quite helpful given that he achieved consensus from the Israeli and Lebanese governments on UNIFIL's AO. At the same time, the Secretary-General instructed Erskine to reach out to the PLO. Unlike the Chief Coordinator, the Force Commander could explain dealing directly with the PLO as an operational necessity. The double team shielded the Secretariat from criticism for dealing with a the PLO –who Israel did not see as a legitimate counterpart. Siilasvuo stated that this procedure "confirmed the division of labour that was adhered to later on" (1992, p. 344). The strategic division of labour shows the Secretariat understood the necessity for a multidimensional strategy whereby the different players on the ground could cooperate; UNIFIL's deployment shows the importance of using all the available assets on the ground.

Immediately after the Council adopted resolution 425, Erskine started working on the implementation; he took several vital early decisions. First, he put an Observer Group on standby to deploy in 12 hours. Second, he designated a senior observer, with the rank of Lt Col, as the officer-in-charge of operations and dispatched him to Naquora; the UNTSO forward base would later become UNIFIL's headquarters. "For all operational, administrative and logistical planning purposes, UNTSO HQ was reorganised to serve as the Rear HQ for UNIFIL" (Erskine, 1989, p. 21). While UNTSO devoted its resources to planning, the other two operations contributed to redeploying some of its troops. The Secretariat contacted Austria, Iran, Sweden, and Canada (mainly for logistical purposes), asking them to redeploy some of their soldiers in UNEF and UNDOF. Everyone except Austria agreed to immediately put one company at UNIFIL's disposal (Stjernfelt, 1992). Three days after resolution 425 was adopted, UNIFIL already had a command structure, a temporary headquarters, and a core contingent of soldiers redeployed from UNEF II and UNDOF. Furthermore, the UNTSO observers already working in the Israel-Lebanon sector stayed behind and contributed to the operation.

Within days, an active and experienced presence allowed the Secretariat to recruit more TCCs. By April 1978, "UNIFIL numbered around 2,500 troops from France, Nepal, Norway, Sweden, Iran and Canada; and by early May, there were already over 3,100 ground troops" (Makdisi, Goksel, Hauck, & Reigeluth, 2009). Later, the operation increased its numbers to 6,000 with contributions from Ireland, Fiji, Nigeria, and Senegal.

Once again, the Secretariat succeeded in deploying peacekeeping operations quickly. Siilasvuo reflected on the matter:

> The establishment of UNIFIL was a relatively smooth operation, much easier than setting up UNEF […]. We had learned our lessons from the mistakes we made then. The resources from UNEF, UNTSO and UNDOF were available, and, if need arose, the material could also be drawn from UNFICYP (Siilasvuo, 1992, p. 345)

UNIFIL's deployment was an example of Inter Operation Collaboration at its finest. Without an existing and well-oiled collaboration framework between the operations, UNIFIL would not have been able to have boots on the ground for weeks. In addition, at the planning stages, UNTSO proved the importance of having UN staff and senior military observers working on the ground.

Post-deployment military cooperation

The necessity to deploy a peacekeeping operation within one or two days put everyone involved in crisis mode. This mentality was beneficial because it allowed the Secretariat, the Force Commanders, the TCCs and even the host countries to be very pragmatic. After the operations settle and receive their troops, equipment and logistics, the nature of Inter-Operation Collaboration evolves; the feeling of being in a crisis fades, and the operations (re)establish routine standard operating procedures.

While the four operations did collaborate intensely, the period of most intense cooperation from the military standpoint was at the onset; the Security Council identified a vacuum, which the operations desperately needed to fill, which is why they redeployed. The following section discusses how operations continue engaging in military cooperation after settling down.

Once again, the analysis begins with UNTSO. The operation was (and still is) perfectly designed to support any future peace operation. UNTSO's area of operation is all other operations combined, and the operation has had observers in every sector since 1949. UNTSO stood alone from 1948 – 1956[42] and 1967-1973 (Diehl, 2015b). UNTSO observers worked with both iterations of UNEF, UNDOF and UNIFIL, performing observation and inspection duties for them (Hylton, 2013).

After the Yom Kippur War, UNTSO was relieved of operating in the areas now occupied by the others *de jure*; the host countries –especially Syria– wanted only *one* operation working inside their country. However, UNTSO was the only operation with seasoned officers who could staff observation posts and write detailed reports to the Force Commander; their expertise was more relevant than ever. The Secretariat circumvented the issue by embedding UNTSO observers into the other operations.

During the second half of 1974, senior officers of UNTSO and UNEF prepared several discussion papers and memoranda outlining proposals to streamline the integration of UNTSO observers in UNEF and UNDOF. The issue required thinking because of the different soldiers deployed in the operations. UNTSO exclusively employed company and field officers such as captains, majors and lieutenant colonels. The majority of UNDOF troops were non-commissioned officers. Of course, UNDOF (and UNEF) also had officers who commanded the different battalions; however, their terms of reference were not equal; each operation managed its troops differently. Inter-Operation Collaboration post initial deployment required harmonisation of rules and procedures. Between July and December, the operations discussed how to tackle the issue. Three seminal documents outline the challenges and the way forward.

While UNTSO collaborated with UNEF constantly, most inter-operation collaboration occurred between UNTSO and UNDOF. On 9 July 1974, Erskine sent an inter-office memorandum to Siilasvuo[43] to explain why (UNA, 1974). The situation in the Golan Heights was volatile and very fragile. Unlike the Sinai Peninsula, the Heights had civilians living on

[42] UNEF relieved UNTSO of her duties in the Israel-Egypt Sector only.
[43] At the time Siilasvuo was UNEF Force Commander and Erskine was his Deputy.

both sides of the line–they were close to Damascus, and the two parties had enormous animosity towards each other. In addition, UNDOF's area of operation is extremely narrow. Therefore, UNDOF needed to create a mechanism to identify who enters the area and for what purpose. UNDOF required experienced officers to perform "quasi-political and intelligence functions" (p.1). The General proposed integrating UNTSO observers to complete the "collection of intelligence". He further suggested that the observers have an area of responsibility with multiple observation posts.

Integrating the operations was not straightforward. On 24 July, Col. Kuosa, Chief Operations Officer of UNEF II, also sent a memorandum to Siilasvuo discussing the integration of UNTSO observers in UNDOF (UNA, 1974). The memo outlines the main objective: integrating UNTSO observers to make UNDOF "an integrated force". The challenge was that the observers had different command structures and *modus operandi* from the Austrian and Peruvian battalions they would be supporting. Before the war UNTSO, observers had a very narrow mandate of observing and reporting. UNDOF's mandate was much more involved because the operation had to exert control over its AO, control civilian movement, report military violations, clear minefields, and liaise with the civilian population. The priorities of the integration revolve around the following:

1. Staffing observation points and entry and existing points to the AO;
2. Inspections of limited forces and armament areas. The parties agreed to bi-weekly inspections to ensure they did not have more than the maximum type and number of weapons adjacent to UNDOF's AO;
3. Staff UNDOF Headquarters and forward HQs;
4. Collect and evaluate relevant information on military, and political matters which can affect UNDOF's role;
5. Provide officers for the execution of humanitarian operations.

The memo recommends that during their redeployment, the observers must work under the authority of UNDOF's Force Commander. Moreover, ensuring a coherent chain of command in every observation post and mission conducted jointly was crucial[44].

On 9 December, after a few months of inter-operation collaboration and noting that the Security Council renewed UNDOF's mandate[45], the leadership of all three operations gathered in Jerusalem to discuss the matter again; James Jonah from Headquarters also attended. UNTSO senior staffers drafted an extensive working paper outlining the discussions' results, evaluated the collaboration's first six months, and provided policy recommendations for the future (UNA, 1974).

The working paper starts by highlighting a few deficiencies in this effort. The issues they identified were inaccuracies in the reporting process, failure to utilise the skills of military observers, and maintaining a harmonious relationship among the soldiers. The paper makes substantive recommendations to tackle these issues; the overarching issue was improving the coordination between the battalions and the observers. The paper recommended organising the observers in the same way as national battalions, as a single unit. The objective was to streamline the relationship between the observers and the Force Commander. The existing reporting mechanism was convoluted and inefficient; the observers' reports went to the Force Commander via the battalion commanders. Organising the observers into a single unit cut through the red tape.

The working paper needs to be concurrently analysed with a Note Verbale[46] (UNA, 1974) written by the Secretary-General sent to the Permanent Representative of Sweden. He discusses the procedure for the redeployment of UNTSO Officers to UNDOF. The Secretariat wanted to create a mechanism to redeploy UNTSO observers to UNDOF when the situation

[44] This is to say that the senior officer on the ground, regardless of whence he came, serves as the commanding officer in according to standard military practice.
[45] For the first few renewals of UNDOF's mandate, the government of Syria made a political point of showing hesitation to agree however, this posturing was purely a move for domestic consumption. For more see chapter 4.
[46] The Secretary-General sent the exact same Note Verbale to the missions of Austria, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden.

required. He asked permission to do this without consulting the respective TCC. This was an apparent attempt to institutionalise Inter-Operation Collaboration.

These recommendations significantly improved the relationship between the operations and the efficiency of the UNTSO observers embedded within UNDOF. The inter-operation collaboration between the operations started with difficulties; UNTSO and UNDOF have profound conceptual differences. At the time, the former had a few hundred senior officers whose role was to observe and report. The latter had a broader mandate, more troops and worked in a very tense area. This section demonstrates that the operations could cooperate beyond the initial crisis.

Administration: Who is paying for what?

Article 17 of the UN Charter clearly states that every Member State must contribute to the organisation's overall budget. In addition, the Charter gives the General Assembly the responsibility of adopting the overall budget. Until 1973, the UN financed peacekeeping through its regular budget and voluntary contributions. This became a problem when Security Council started authorising larger operations they could not afford. The situation became untenable in 1973 when the Secretariat was preparing two significant new operations: UNEF II and UNDOF.

While the Secretariat was preparing for the Geneva Peace Conference of December, the General Assembly was working on the financial matters of peacekeeping. On 11 December, the Assembly adopted resolution 3101 (1973), "which established non-voluntary assessment accounts that assigned members fixed shares of UN annual peacekeeping expenses" (Sandler, 2017, p. 1880). The resolution relieved the organisation from the pressure of supporting such a significant endeavour. Moreover, this set a dual precedent separating peacekeeping costs from the regular budget[47] and requesting the Member States to cost-share based on their capacity to pay. That said, the Secretariat made sure to announce that, for the time being, these decisions were ad-hoc and did bind the Member States by its

[47] Interestingly enough, The General Assembly kept UNTSO (and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)) in the regular budget. UNTSO is an open-ended permanent fixture in the Israel-Arab conflict landscape; the Secretariat does not want to risk losing UNTSO funding because of its important work. For more see Chapter 1

precedent. The General Assembly cemented these principles many years later by adopting resolution 55/235 (2001), which states, "Financing of such operations is the collective responsibility of all States Members". To make things more precise, the organisation funds each operation through a different account, considering its specific needs and challenges in the field (United Nations Department of Peace Operations, n.d).

With resolution 3101, the General Assembly laid the foundations for effectively managing peacekeeping operations in the Middle East (and everywhere else). However, the implementation of this mechanism was not straightforward. The operations had significant challenges. Once again, the solution to this challenge came through Inter-Operation Collaboration. In late 1973, when Siilasvuo moved from Jerusalem to Ismailia to command UNEF II, he struggled to set up the operation from a management and logistic perspectives. On 12 February 1974, he sent a very bitter memorandum to the Secretary-General complaining,

> One of the significant shortcomings of the early days was the complete unpreparedness of the UN central administration to launch a new operation. There would appear to have been no contingency planning for administrative support [...] this is an emergency force. The methodical, administrative procedures of standard times and inadequate financing will not see it through its early, difficult days (UNA, 1974, p. 1)

The TCCs did not comply with the Secretariat's requirements and arrived "poorly equipped". To make matters worse, setting up the Canadian and Polish logistic support units took longer than anticipated. As hard as things were, Siilasvuo needed to find a way forward. As a seasoned peacekeeper, Siilasvuo understood that moving things along in New York takes time, so he needed to look elsewhere to solve his immediate problems. He found solutions in Jerusalem.

In the same memorandum, Siilasvuo highlighted that the operation was performing its duties whilst circumventing the abovementioned issues because UNEF II could rely on the UNTSO and UNFICYP. UNTSO sent many of its senior staff (both civilian and military) to staff UNEF Headquarters. Furthermore, UNEF continued to rely on UNTSO for administrative support throughout its lifespan. The General expressed that the peacekeepers from UNFICYP were

experienced and logistically independent; they hit the ground running and started to work immediately after arrival.

On 14 March, the Secretary-General responded. He sent an extensive memorandum to Siilasvuo, answering his questions and explaining the Secretariat's political challenges in New York. "The General Assembly has never agreed to provide additional funds or resources for planning […] due to the deep-seated political differences on the question of UN peacekeeping" (UNA, 1974, p. 1). In addition, Waldheim stated that the Security Council made decisions regarding the TCCs without consulting the Secretariat; he flagged specifically the logistic units, which arrived later than planned. At the very end of the memorandum, almost in passing, the Secretary-General highlighted a fascinating detail regarding cooperation. He mentioned that UNTSO's support "was not wholly accidental. Throughout the years, we have tried, as you know, to keep an element of personnel in UNTSO who would be called on at short notice to assist new United Nations Operations as they might occur" (UNA, 1974, pp. 6-7). This statement confirms the hypothesis that UNTSO's longevity goes beyond its mandate; the operation serves as a brain trust and a source for the quick redeployment of senior officials to new operations. UNEF benefited from having UNTSO's undivided attention for a few months; the two managed to get the former up and running before UNDOF's deployment.

Despite the extra few months between UNEF and UNDOF, the Secretariat still heavily relied on UNTSO to support the newly minted operation in the Golan Heights. In fact, "UNDOF was initially financed out of funds authorised and appropriated for UNEF and UNTSO, from which the personnel of UNDOF had been drawn" (Sommereyns, 1980, p. 29). Sending a peacekeeping operation to work with other operations' budgets was unorthodox. The General Assembly, the Security Council and the Secretariat considered this whilst designing the operation. Once again, the solution came in the form of inter-operational collaboration. UNTSO provided services inter alia transport, radio facilities and maintenance of infrastructure. In other words, UNDOF had a very small number of people not seconded from elsewhere (UNA, 1974).

As the section on post-deployment cooperation showed, UNTSO redeployed 90 observers to the Israel-Syria sector to assist the troops. The General Assembly had not yet determined UNDOF's budget; therefore, UNTSO initially covered the cost from its regular budget (United Nations Security Council, 1974). As the section on post-deployment cooperation shows, the Secretariat wanted to institutionalise sending UNTSO observers to the Golan Heights. In a Note Verbale sent to the TCCs, he stressed that this "Would enable (him) to utilise the resources of UNTSO to the fullest extent and dispense with the establishment of a new and costly administrative setup […] It would also afford greater flexibility in the use of observers" (UNA, 1974, p. 2). The Secretariat designed the procedure to make things faster from an administrative perspective.

The experiences of 1974 clearly showed to the staff in the field that collaboration was fundamental for each operation to achieve its particular mandate. However, the Secretariat did not have guidelines for the operations, and Siilasvuo was not the Chief Coordinator yet; therefore, it fell upon the Chief Administrative Officers (CAO) to develop a coordination mechanism.

On 1 March 1975, Dennis Holland, UNEF's CAO, sent a memorandum to Siilasvuo. "The problem is that there is at the moment insufficient experience in group discussions of this kind" (United Nations Security Council, 1974, p. 1). The memorandum proposes meeting at the senior staff level every quarter and rotating the location. Regarding the agenda, Holland suggested inviting every operation to make an opening statement and then have a frank discussion. Siilasvuo agreed. He believed "In many administrative fields, it was better to treat the Middle East as one entity as we had always done in UNTSO" (Siilasvuo, 1992, p. 295). A few months after this memorandum, the Secretary-General appointed the General as Chief Coordinator; Holland joined Siilasvuo in Jerusalem and supported him throughout his tenure. The three operations regularly met to discuss military affairs logistics and cooperated from now on.

The degree to which UNDOF relied on UNTSO and UNEF went beyond Inter-Operation Collaboration to outright dependency. UNDOF could not plan its logistical support without UNEF and UNTSO. While cooperation is paramount to success, a certain degree of

operational autonomy is equally essential. At the onset, it made sense for the UN to keep UNDOF subordinate (administratively speaking) to the others. The Syrian government made a spectacle of renewing its mandate and only allowed three or six months of renewals.

However, after the Council showed its intent to keep UNDOF for the medium term, the Secretariat had to start thinking about decoupling it from the others. The core issues they discussed revolved around logistics, procurement, warehousing of assets, and usage of ports of entry, finance and personnel arrangements. These meetings were particularly vital to UNDOF because its administrative framework was smaller than its counterparts were.

On 29 September 1975, UNDOF senior staff drafted an in-depth study outlining their administrative and logistic challenges (UNA, 1974). A contingent of Canada and Poland's UNEF logistic units managed UNDOF logistics; however, these detachments answered directly to their respective battalion commanders. Having the two operations so closely bound created a risk of one operation suffering the consequences for what happens outside its area of operation. If Egypt had expelled UNEF II the same way it did so in 1967, this would have left UNDOF unable to perform its functions. The memorandum served as a blueprint for UNDOF's decoupling. Over the coming months, the operation started to gain an essential degree of administrative autonomy. Luckily, for UNDOF, UNEF remained in the Sinai Peninsula for a few years, giving the Secretariat, the Chief Coordinator, and UNDOF sufficient time to grant it sufficient autonomy.

The issue of administration and logistics seldom gets an equal amount of attention than military and political affairs. This can be because budgets and supply chains are duller than those tasks done by soldiers, such as ensuring cease-fires, demarcating lines and responding to the outbreak of war. However, we can undoubtedly conclude that Inter-Operation Collaboration in administrative matters was fundamental for the operations throughout their lifespan.

A Definition and Framework for Inter-Operation Collaboration

The aftermath of the Yom Kippur War transformed peacekeeping in the Middle East. The Security Council tripled its presence in the region in just a few months. While designing the operations, the Secretariat always treated peacekeeping in the Middle East and, to an extent,

Cyprus as one architecture to the extent that the operation's success depended on the input from the rest.

Four years later, UNIFIL's deployment was the pinnacle of Inter-Operation Collaboration in the Middle East. Under Siilasvuo's leadership, the three operations set up a quick and efficient coordination mechanism whereby each provided UNIFIL with the necessary tools for a successful deployment. UNTSO, once again, proved to be an invaluable living repository of experience and expertise. UNIFIL has seconded its entire senior staff from UNTSO at the start of its deployment. Moreover, the Force Commander, Erskine, moved from Jerusalem to Naqoura. UNTSO was flexible enough to transform itself into the nucleus of another peacekeeping operation and simultaneously perform its duties.

The Security Council usually gave the Secretariat a few days to develop a plan and presence on the ground. This would not happen if they did not pull and share resources. That said, the Secretariat always treated this process as ad-hoc measures and never codified what this paper treats as Inter-Operation Collaboration. There are a few reasons why the Secretariat preferred acting this way. While the Security Council had the appetite for deploying peacekeeping operations in the Middle East as a whole, the Council, and the General Assembly, preferred to treat each operation as a standalone exercise for two reasons: politics and finance.

The host countries preferred to have one operation working within their borders. Syria, in particular, was ready to receive one –relatively small– operation and specifically demanded that no other operation work in the Israel-Syria sector; this is why UNTSO embedded its observers within UNDOF. Damascus did not want to give the appearance of being 'occupied' by foreign actors.

Israel also preferred to deal with each operation working in its sector along the same lines. They even prevented the movement of troops through Israel unless the TCC, from which the troops in question hailed, had diplomatic relations with them. Of course, after the Six-Day War, where they reunified Jerusalem, they had no choice but to continue to host UNTSO; removing the operation from Jerusalem would have been an unnecessary political mistake. That said, the Israeli government also wanted to keep the operations squarely within their

areas of operations (Comay, 1983). Furthermore, the TCCs also preferred to treat peacekeeping operations as standalone exercises. The countries wanted to know in advance, where their troops were going, what the conditions looked like and, above all, what the threat level was in the field. Fortunately, the TCCs showed enormous flexibility when accepting to redeploy their troops to other operations.

When it comes to financing peacekeeping operations, the chapter showed that while there was a keen political interest in engaging in Inter-Operation Collaboration, the General Assembly did not want to codify inter-operation exchanges because it would complicate matters when it comes to their budgets; they wanted one budget per operation. In addition, given that the other peacekeeping operations did not work so closely with others, the Assembly preferred to deal with each operation individually. There was a considerable difference between New York and the field. Despite the calls for independence, UNDOF was, essentially, a child of UNEF and UNTSO. The former provided troops and equipment and offered political support and military observers.

The best example was the terms of reference of the Chief Coordinator of Peacekeeping in the Middle East. The Secretariat and the Security Council agreed to keep each operation independent with its own Force Commander and administrative structure (UNA, 1975). Siilasvuo, at least on paper, acted purely as a political liaison for all host countries and representative of the Secretary-General for significant events such as the Km 101 negotiations.

The Secretariat, therefore, had to engage in Inter-Operation Collaboration in an ad-hoc manner and systemise it as much as it could without appearing to do so. Under the blanket of practicality, they pulled and shared resources claiming, rightly so, that it was the only way they could meet the tight deadlines the Security Council gave them. Moreover, UNTSO's quarter of century experience working in every single sector in the conflict made it almost self-evident that the new operations would closely collaborate with UNTSO.

Even though the UN itself did not codify the concept of Inter-Operation Collaboration as a result of the experiences of the Middle East, there is much value in constructing a working definition and identifying the different aspects that made up this process.

Inter-Operation Collaboration of Peacekeeping Operations is the process through which two or more UN peacekeeping operations embark on joint political, military, and logistic activities to achieve their mandates. Collaboration involves temporarily transferring staff, sharing logistic tools, and pooling and sharing resources. It can be a reactive measure adopted due to an emerging regionalisation conflict or proactive by being included in a new operation's original mandate and modus operandi.

This chapter looks at Inter-Operation Collaboration from an operational perspective; this involves military and programme management/logistics. Moreover, the framework involves two distinct moments. Mission start-up involves the first three months after the Security Council adopts the resolution deploying the operation. Post-deployment collaboration involves collaboration afterwards. This time split might appear arbitrary; however, the first 60-90 days is the most intense period for Inter-Operation Collaboration.

Mandate & Consent		
	Military	**Programme Management/ Logistics**
Mission start-up	• Redeployment of assets and personnel • Appointment of the Force Commanders.	• Temporary relocation of senior staff. • Pull and share financial resources to cover initial costs.
Post-deployment collaboration	• Embedding of Observers for longer than three months after initial deployment	• Sharing logistics supply lines

Mandate and consent

Mandate

At the base of the entire process of Inter-Operation Collaboration, there are two critical requirements: consent and mandate. The Security Council deployed each operation under its own Security Council resolution, with a specific mandate and AO. Although UNEF and UNDOF are measures created to deal with the aftermath of one war, they were the product of two different negotiation processes. Israel and Egypt negotiated the first bilateral disengagement agreement[48] between November 1973 and January 1974. In May 1974, Israel and Syria finalised their disengagement agreement, which paved the way for UNDOF. Four years later, the Security Council deployed UNIFIL in response to tensions in Southern Lebanon. Therefore, at least theoretically speaking, engaging in inter-operation collaboration meant the operations worked beyond their area of operation and mandate.

The Secretariat played a strategic and proactive role. The Security Council instructed the Secretary-General to produce results very quickly. However, the texts of the resolutions are short and somewhat vague[49]. "The Secretary-General was thus given an opportunity for creative participation in establishing UNEF and UNIFIL, subject to the final approval of the Security Council. When UNIFIL was created, the Secretary-General could rely on the already tested precedents of UNEF and UNDOF" (Sommereyns, 1980, p. 16). In UNEF and UNIFIL's case, the Secretariat had days to deploy the operations because of the ongoing crises they tackled. In UNDOF's case, the Secretariat also had a few days after the parties adopted the disengagement agreement because they needed a reason to bring back their forces and regroup.

The reports of the Secretary-General interpreted the resolutions and outlined how the operations would implement their mandate. In these two reports, the Secretary-General

[48] The first Israel-Egypt disengagement agreement had two distinct landmarks. First, the Km 101 talks held in November 1973, which laid out the foundations for broader discussions. Second, because of the Geneva Peace Conference, the parties established a Military Working Group, which continued the discussion in January 1974. Chapter 4 discusses the Egypt-Israel disengagement agreements in depth.

[49] If we compare Security Council resolutions 425 and 426, which established UNIFIL in 1978 with resolution 1701, which enhanced UNIFIL's mandate in 2006, the result is rather telling. The first resolutions are less than one page long; they have less than a dozen operative clauses. The latter has 4 pages, and 19 very specific operative clauses. The Security Council gave the Secretariat much more room for manoeuvre in the 1970s to design the mandates.

used Inter-Operation Collaboration. The reports discussed all the concrete steps the operations took to help each other. The Council accepted the reports, which gave the necessary green light to start. This phenomenon is essential because Inter-Operation Collaboration does not appear in the resolutions; therefore, this did not create a legal precedent to which the hosts and TCCs could object.

Consent

Even if the process of Inter-Operation Collaboration was not codified or concretely discussed by the resolutions, the Secretariat was not immune to negotiating consent by the TCCs and the host countries. Regarding the TCCs, the Secretary-General held meetings and sent letters to the TCCs asking them to agree to redeploy, sometimes partially, their contingents to other operations for a short period. Luckily, most TCCs who already had contingents in the region quickly agreed. For example, the redeployment of Swedish and Iranian battalions and the partial redeployment of the Canadian and Polish logistics units from UNEF II to UNIFIL were fundamental to the early success (Stjernfelt, 1992).

Moreover, the Secretariat always had to remember the needs and wants of the host countries and Israel. For example, Israel and Syria had difficulty negotiating UNDOF's size (Shlomo, 2015). The former wanted a strong 3,000 force, and the latter wished 300 unarmed observers. Ultimately, the Secretariat found a compromise, and UNDOF had 1,200 troops and 90 observers (James, 1987). The Security Council gave the Secretariat an opening to play a proactive, strategic role in designing and implementing the mandates, and they succeeded. Unlike the purely political sphere of the Israel-Arab conflict, where the Secretariat had a limited role, their role was effective and influential in peacekeeping.

Military Operations

Military matters are the most extensive area where the four operations collaborated; there are two critical reasons for this. The Secretariat designed them (and the Security Council approved them) to be buffers between two states after a war (UNDOF-UNEF), to supervise the withdrawal of Israel from Southern Lebanon (UNIFIL) and to observe and supervise the agreements between the belligerents of the 1948 War (UNTSO).

Peacekeeping in the Middle East was predominantly a military endeavour to maintain the absence of war in their sectors (Saikal, 1998). Keeping the areas of operations were inherently interdependent; what happened in one sector had a direct impact elsewhere. The Secretariat needed a regional military approach that allowed each operation to be as efficient as possible in its area. Sometimes, this required pulling and sharing of staff and resources.

Overall, borrowing from NATO's terminology, regional peacekeeping collaboration on military matters is anachronistically called "smart defence", which would create joint processes for procurement, supply lines and sharing forces and conduct operations across areas of operations (Giegerich, 2012).

Redeployment of Personnel and Assets

Mission start-up

The *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines*[50] –colloquially known as the 'Capstone Doctrine'– define this period as the "earliest phase of establishing a mission in the field. During mission start-up, the main priority is to bring internal mission processes, structures and services to an initial level of operating capability so that mandate implementation can begin across the mission area" (2008, p. 63). The Secretariat did not have time to do a proper mission start-up because there was insufficient time and no processes. The Security Council expected boots on the ground almost immediately. Therefore, the operation borrowed from the others to achieve operating capability. The Secretariat treated the entire region as one big theatre of operations and deployed troops whenever possible.

Post-deployment collaboration

Once UNEF, UNDOF and UNIFIL got their troops, they could stand independently. However, there was a need for UNTSO observers to work within the three other operations for a longer time. This area of military collaboration is unusual; after all, the Secretariat could have asked the TCCs to send observers to the operations instead of redeploying from UNTSO. This could have saved the Force Commanders and the Chief Coordinator time because there would have

[50] While, of course, using the definition outlined by the Capstone doctrine is anachronistic, the framework outlined by this document remains valid and useful.

been no need to discuss integration. However, keeping UNTSO in the picture had a few very valuable advantages. Expert observers working in the field for many years staffed the operation.

The institutional memory and expertise the operation brought to the table were instrumental. General Erskine reflects, "The system of joint peacekeeping operations between troops and [UNTSO] observers has been effective" (Erskine, 1989, p. 147). The three other operations relied on UNTSO observers to conduct the most sensitive tasks they had to perform: inspecting the areas of separation and the area of limitation of forces. These activities required ample experience, which the recent troops that arrived in the field did not necessarily have. The process was not always smooth, and the early problems forced the Secretariat to build a strategy. With Siilasvuo's and his team's help, the relationship between UNTSO observers and the other operations improved. To this day, this partnership continues.

Appointment of the Force Commanders

Along the same lines of redeployment of troops, one of the most critical factors in mission start-up success is a good Force Commander. In almost all cases, the Force Commander of a new operation was the incumbent Force Commander in one of the operations already on the ground. In addition, whenever one of them moved to a new operation, the Secretariat preferred to appoint someone with experience in the region to succeed him. Because the operations were the product of a crisis, the Secretary-General believed in selecting a safe pair of hands.

Two examples of this procedure are Siilasvuo and Erskine. Siilasvuo served as UNTSO Chief of Staff between 1970 and 1973. He then moved to UNEF II between 1973 and 1975. Siilasvuo started his tenure at UNEF concurrently with his duties at the km 101 negotiations. After implementing the two disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt, the Secretary-General appointed him Chief Coordinator of Peacekeeping in the Middle East. When the Secretariat began to create this position, there was never a discussion about appointing someone outside the regional peacekeeping architecture. Erskine served as UNTSO Chief of Staff between 1976 and 1978. He then moved to UNIFIL, where he stayed

until 1981. In his last posting in the Middle East, he succeeded Siilasvuo as Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Middle East

Adopting this policy exposed the senior officers on the ground to confirmation bias; they brought to their new posting the experiences and opinions of key players from both sides of the conflict. However, the Secretariat believed institutional memory outweighed this risk. The mechanism of moving senior military officers from one operation to the other proved to be an invaluable measure. They always brought experienced existing relationships with their counterparts in the region. Moreover, using this mechanism meant that the Force Commanders had an excellent working relationship with each other; this facilitated the Inter-Operation Collaboration process.

Programme Management/logistics

All the endeavours mentioned above required the operations to collaborate equally and profoundly on the programme management. Some of the unsung heroes of UN peacekeeping are the operation's Chief Administrative Officers. They worked very well together in the mission start-up and post-deployment collaboration phases.

Pulling and Sharing of Resources & Staff

Mission start-up

The Secretariat was not the only victim of the Security Council's haste; the General Assembly did not have enough time to sort out the finances; the Assembly needed to cut corners. Typically, the General Assembly adopts budgets for peacekeeping operations during their regular sessions.

When the Security Council deployed UNDOF, the Assembly was not in session; therefore, the Secretariat had to pay for the initial costs from UNEF and UNTSO's budget (United Nations Security Council, 1974). This mechanism did not work four years later because UNIFIL's costs were too high for the operations to bear. Therefore, the Assembly convened a special session to discuss and adopt UNIFIL's budget (Sommereyns, 1980).

The burden of getting the operations off the ground fell on the Force Commanders. Siilasvuo in 1973 and Erskine in 1978 worked similarly to make progress work for their new operations. At the time of their appointment to UNEF and UNIFIL, respectively, they served

as UNTSO Chief of Staff. They used UNTSO's infrastructure and staff to set up their new operations. The two Generals had to move quickly because the Council expected them to soon have the skeleton of their new operations.

In the case of UNDOF, Siilasvuo did not move to become its Force Commander; however, his role in the Military Working Group gave him much foresight into what would happen after Israel and Syria signed their disengagement agreement. Siilasvuo knew months in advance that a new operation was coming; therefore, he instructed his staff at UNEF to design it according to the reality on the ground. UNEF provided a very detailed plan, which included a recommendation on which countries to approach to get troops, which should be the interim Force Commander, and how the operation would get its equipment and supplies.

Post-deployment collaboration

This chapter shows that UNDOF still relied on the other operations considerably after the mission-start-up. In addition, all operations saw great value in fostering collaboration in administrative matters. The meetings of CAOs in 1975 proved to be very successful at ensuring transparency and smooth sharing of resources. The discussions showed that the operations supported each other in finance, redistribution of equipment, logistical setup, etc.

Of course, the UNDOF example showed that too much collaboration could be challenging and problematic because it exposed the operation to the risk of a single point of failure. Siilasvuo knew that UNDOF could not rely entirely on UNEF's support. If the Egyptian government had expelled it (as it did in 1967), the operation would not have had the means to perform its duties.

UN Headquarters took notice of the importance of administrative inter-operation collaboration. On 10 October 1977 –just four months before UNIFIL's deployment– Mr George Lansky, Director of the Field Operations Service, sent a memorandum to all three CAOs to discuss planning. He stated that the Secretariat recycles logistics directives and standard operating procedures whenever a new operation starts. The document states that headquarters wanted to avoid the need to improvise.

As the CAOs began their work with Headquarters, the crisis in Southern Lebanon put the new way of working to the test. While the idea of creating standardised directives for future

operations was in development, UNIFIL's deployment required field-based solutions, which meant that, once again, the CAOs had to figure out the logistics.

Conclusion

In examining the intricacies of inter-operation collaboration (IOC) among UNTSO, UNEF II, UNDOF, and UNIFIL from 1973 to 1982, this chapter has leveraged Complexity Theory to provide a nuanced understanding of how these operations worked together tactically and operationally. This analytical approach has been instrumental in uncovering the depth of collaboration that underpinned the success and efficiency of each mission, particularly in the face of the stringent timelines and operational demands set by the Security Council for deployment.

The original research question sought to determine the extent of collaboration on tactical and operational matters between these peacekeeping operations within the specified timeframe. Through the lens of Complexity Theory, it has become evident that the success of these operations was indeed deeply intertwined with their ability to share resources, expertise, and insights. This was most apparent during the critical start-up phases of the missions, where the need for rapid deployment necessitated innovative and non-conventional solutions to meet both military and logistical challenges. The exchange between Siilasvuo and the Secretary-General highlighted the reliance on UNTSO's foundational expertise and political network, reinforcing UNTSO's role as a cornerstone of the UN's peacekeeping architecture in the region.

Furthermore, the chapter has elucidated the continuous nature of IOC beyond the establishment phase, demonstrating how these operations maintained a delicate balance between autonomy and strategic collaboration. The institutionalization of the Chief Coordinator role, aided by Siilasvuo's expert leadership, facilitated the establishment of a structured approach to pulling and sharing resources and personnel, which was pivotal for the operational work of the operations. Complexity Theory has proven to be a valuable framework for analysing these dynamics, emphasizing the importance of adaptability, interdependence, and emergent behaviour in the operational efficacy of UN peacekeeping efforts.

This analysis serves as a critical first step in addressing the broader research question of how the four peacekeeping operations, along with the Office of the Chief Coordinator of Peacekeeping in the Middle East and the Office of Special Political Affairs, influenced the diplomatic and security landscape of the Israel-Arab conflict between 1967 and 1982. By dissecting the operational and tactical collaboration among these entities, this chapter lays the groundwork for a holistic examination of their collective impact on the conflict's resolution and management. It underscores the necessity of considering the UN's peacekeeping architecture as an interdependent system, where the strategic interplay between its components shapes the overall effectiveness of its peacekeeping efforts.

In conclusion, the utilization of Complexity Theory to analyse IOC within the UN's peacekeeping operations in the Middle East has illuminated the critical role of collaboration in enhancing the missions' operational capabilities. This foundational analysis not only contributes to our understanding of the UN's operational dynamics during a pivotal period in the Israel-Arab conflict but also sets the stage for a comprehensive exploration of the UN's strategic impact on the diplomatic and security dimensions of the conflict.

Chapter 4

Architect or Builder? The Political Role of the United Nations Secretariat in the Israel-Arab Conflict

Introduction

Through the peacekeeping operations, we can conclude that the UN Secretariat played an essential tactical role in managing the conflict. They reduced the tension on the ground and served as a valuable vessel for informal communication between the belligerent parties. The insights provided by Chapter 3 are a vital piece of the puzzle. What about politics? Was the UN Secretariat a critical player in the political discussions? Alternatively, was it merely an executor of the countries will? These will be some of the guiding questions of this chapter.

In the multidimensional and explosive landscape of the Israel-Arab conflict, the Secretariat has had duties, which go beyond peacekeeping. Chapter 4 wides the scope by way of stepping back from the field to focus on the broader political dynamics. This portion of the dissertation sheds light on the nuanced strategies, intentions, and actions of the UN Secretariat, positioning it within the larger narrative of post-Yom Kippur War and Operation Litani negotiations. By doing so, it seeks to uncover the overarching question: did the Secretariat craft and pursue a regional strategy? In addition, if so, how effectively was it executed?

Treading this complex political minefield, the Secretariat finds itself constantly juggling the dual challenges of impactful intervention and impartiality. The delicate equilibrium between exerting political influence and maintaining neutrality is of paramount importance, especially in the eyes of the ever-watchful Security Council. Understanding the Secretariat's role in the Arab-Israeli conflict's political processes requires widening Chapter 3's scope to include the period between the Six-Day War and Yom Kippur Wars (hereafter: inter-war period). There are a couple of reasons why. First, at the political level, the Secretariat's activities and diplomatic initiatives in this period directly impact their agency level after the Yom Kippur War. Of course, many external factors affected the actions and the room to manoeuvre they had; it is also fundamental to understand how the Secretariat set itself up to be a successful policy broker after the war. Second, at the military level, the work done by UNTSO in this period planted the seed for the entire peacekeeping architecture; we have to include its record to evaluate the success of UNEF II, UNDOF and, much later, UNIFIL.

All Secretaries-General invested time and resources to find a peaceful solution to the conflict at the political level. Trygve Lie adamantly supported the creation of UNTSO, facilitated the negotiations for its deployment and provided a forum for the various military armistice commissions (Nachmias, 1996). Dag Hammarskjöld single-handedly created UNEF I and secured its deployment even when two of the five permanent members of the Security Council were actively involved (Walker, 1996). The following two Secretaries-General channelled their political role through the Jarring mission between 1967 and 1973. The failure of this endeavour reduced the Secretariat's influence in dealing with the conflict after the War (Waage & Mørk, 2015). During Thant's tenure, the General Assembly and the Security Council increased scrutiny of the Secretariat's role, reducing its room for manoeuvre. As the chapter shows, Thant knew beforehand that the Jarring Mission had a minimal chance of actually succeeding, and, at the same time, he was aware that Cold War politics reduced the power of his office.

Kurt Waldheim managed the organisation's involvement in the conflict after the Yom Kippur War; the Secretariat had to manage three operations (four as of 1978) and fight for its presence in the political sphere (more on this later). In addition, the chapter treats the Secretariat as a political actor with its plan and, to an extent, agency. As Chesterman (2007) and Skjelsbæk (1991) discuss, the different Secretaries-General have interpreted the article differently; some were more entrepreneurial than others were.

The chapter will start with two underlying assumptions. First, the affirmation that the Secretary-General does have –even if contested–sufficient agency to enter the political realm and try to influence the outcome of a particular issue. This study will not discuss *whether* the Secretary-General has the constitutional authority to engage in politics; scholars have a baseline consensus (see Chapter 2). Second, the Secretariat was vital in implementing the political agreement by deploying the operations. While the superpowers had a direct and profound interest in the region and the conflict, they did not deploy assets to the area directly (they only sent a few dozen observers to UNTSO); they relied on the operation to be their eyes and ears. With these two assumptions out of the way, now we must turn to this chapter's central question: *To what extent did the Secretariat successfully act as a policy broker in the political negotiations in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War and Operation Litani River?*

These two flashpoints are the genesis of three of the four operations (UNEF II, UNDOF came due to the former and UNIFIL due to the latter). Understanding the degree to which the organisation positioned itself more than the arena where the negotiations occur will allow us to know whether the organisation had a long-term political strategy. The chapter will review the Secretariat's role in Security Council negotiations, participation in multilateral summits on the topic, bilateral conversations with the countries in the region and the superpowers and other fora where the Secretary-General himself or his duly appointed representatives used good offices to try to broker a peaceful settlement to the Israel-Arab question. While the main objective is to look *beyond* the operations, Siilasvuo's role remains an essential information source. It does fall within the scope of this chapter, given that he worked for the Secretariat.

The application of Complexity Theory remains central to this analysis, emphasizing the interconnectedness and multi-layered nature of the UN's approach to managing the Israel-Arab conflict. This theoretical lens underscores the significance of viewing the work done by the peacekeeping operations not in isolation but as part of a comprehensive and holistic UN strategy aimed at conflict management. The complexity of the conflict, with its evolving dynamics and multiple stakeholders, necessitates an approach that transcends purely military solutions, incorporating political negotiation and diplomacy as integral components of the UN's efforts.

By delving into the political negotiations and the Secretariat's role in these discussions, Chapter 4 addresses the second half of the security and diplomatic landscape. This shift from a focus on the operations' military and logistical work to the realm of political discussions represents a critical step back, allowing for a broader examination of how the UN's peacekeeping architecture contributed to the diplomatic efforts aimed at resolving the conflict. This perspective is crucial for a comprehensive understanding of the UN's multifaceted approach to peacekeeping, which intertwines military, logistical, and political efforts to create conditions conducive to a sustainable peace.

In essence, this chapter aims to illuminate the Secretariat's effectiveness as a policy broker in the aftermath of critical conflict milestones, assessing its contributions to the diplomatic

negotiations that sought to pave the way for peace. Through the prism of Complexity Theory, the analysis will explore the nuanced and often intricate political dynamics that the Secretariat navigated, highlighting its strategic role in facilitating dialogue, mediating between parties, and striving to harmonize international efforts towards conflict resolution. This exploration is pivotal for appreciating the full scope of the UN's engagement in the Israel-Arab conflict, revealing the depth of its commitment to both the security and diplomatic dimensions of peacekeeping.

The first section provides a brief yet foundational review of the prelude and aftermath Six Day War, emphasising the war's effect on UNTSO and the Secretary-General's agency. The second sections review the political activities of the Secretariat during the inter-war period (July 1967 – September 1973) to evaluate their record of accomplishment and understand exactly whether the Secretariat had political capital at the onset of the Yom Kippur War. The fourth section analyses the Secretariat's role in negotiating the Israel-Egypt and Israel-Syria disengagements.

The Six-Day War: When it all changed

While it is possible to argue that to understand the conflict's nuance, it is necessary to review all previous wars, none has changed the regional dynamics as much as the Six-Day War. In the spring of 1967, the Soviet embassy in Cairo sent a detailed cable to Egypt, Syria and Moscow, claiming that Israel put the IDF's Northern Command on high alert along the Syrian border, ready to strike. The intelligence report claimed that the IDF deployed between 10 and 12 brigades to the Golan Heights. The Ambassador delivered the information to a high-level official from the Egyptian Foreign Ministry. On the same day, in Moscow, the speaker of Egypt's parliament and future president, Anwar al-Sadat, received the same information (Parker, 1992).

There is an interesting discussion among scholars on this intelligence report; there is no agreement on whether the Soviet Union fabricated the intelligence or misunderstood the developments on the ground. Scholars who argue for the former theory (Gat, 2005; Goldstein, 2018) believe Israel did not need to prepare a massive visible deployment. Bickerton & Klausner (2017) take it a step further by suggesting that both "the Soviets and

probably Nasser knew […] the information was false" (p. 178). There are various reasons why. First, the IDF had enough assets already standing by to conduct a first strike; redeploying 'twelve brigades' at short notice was not something the IDF could easily do. This would have committed *half* of the IDF's armoured strength for no reason. Besides, with UNTSO observers on the ground, the news of a large-scale troop concentration would quickly reach the Security Council. The Secretary-General addressed the rumour directly in a Report (1967) he sent to the Security Council. "Reports from UNTSO Observers have confirmed the absence of troop concentrations and significant troop movements on both sides of the line." (Para. 9).

Popp (2006) , on the other hand, believes that while the Soviets "might have misinterpreted some minor troop movements in Northern Israel or misjudged a piece of information" (p. 287), the Israeli military activities coupled with Nasser's aggressive rhetoric warranted analysis in Moscow and preparations in Cairo and Damascus. Golan (2006) and Parker (1992) concur that the reports were believable, given how Israel responded to Syrian aggression in the demilitarized zone. Still, they also clearly state that the information was an exaggeration. Therefore, their contributions revolve around *why* the Soviets passed the information to their allies. Their work provides two essential elements. They agreed that Syria was no imminent danger; the report suggested the war was not days away. Their intent was political; the Soviets wanted to give the Syrian people a reason to rally behind their government and foster national unity. The political system in the country was fragile, and Moscow needed a strong ally. Of course, this was an evident miscalculation from Moscow. They did not expect Nasser to use this information as a much-needed reason to attack Israel and thereby ease off the pressure his government was facing domestically and regionally. In addition, the Soviet Union expected to have more control over the UAR and that the United States would have more control over Jerusalem. This was not the case.

Laron (2017) contributes a longer-term perspective by signalling that individual military leaders on both sides were preparing and perhaps even hoping for a confrontation. He goes as far as to claim that the war was a "crucible of weak civilian leadership, trigger-happy generals, and intrusive great powers" (p.4). The extent to which the arguments made by the authors are entirely objective remains up for debate. That said, it is clear that the tension

was palpable. Yet, before Egypt and Syria could ultimately embark on what would inevitably lead to war, Nasser needed to eliminate the last literal roadblock: the peacekeepers.

The withdrawal of UNEF I: An Unforced Error?

The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) was aptly named because it was an emergency product. After the Suez Canal Crisis unfolded, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld, together with Canadian Foreign Minister Lester Pearson, designed the conceptual framework, negotiated with the host country and the TCCs and went as far as bypassing the Security Council to get a General Assembly resolution to authorise the operation's deployment, all in a matter of days (Heller, 2001). The rushed pace and the lack of operational support in New York meant that almost everything around UNEF resulted from high-level improvisation. Its framework prescribed the modus operandi for peacekeeping and invented it (Bligh, 2014). Because of UNEF's creative and innovative deployment, the UN (both as an inter-governmental body and as an organisation) adopted three critical principles of peacekeeping: impartiality, use of force only for defensive purposes and, most notably for our question, consent from the host countries (Goulding, 1993).

However, the issue required additional thinking. Israel did not agree to host UNEF because the possibility of foreign troops inside her borders was politically unacceptable (Garvey, 1970). Therefore, the operation operated only on Egyptian soil, so the farthest north they could deploy was the Gaza Strip. Besides, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld assured the Egyptians that the operation did not intend to upset the balance of power, enforce any actions, or permanently occupy the peninsula. On the other hand, he also got Cairo to agree on a fundamental issue.

> Were either side to act unilaterally in refusing continued presence or deciding on withdrawal, and were the other side to find that such action was contrary to a reasonable faith interpretation of the purpose of the operation, an exchange of views would be called for towards harmonizing the positions (United Nations General Assembly, 1958)

This is one of the many examples of his tactical brilliance (Higgins, 1970). This paragraph bound both sides to deal with the United Nations in good faith and, theoretically, restricted

their agency to unilaterally upset the balance of power. From a military viewpoint, UNEF was a buffer between the two parties deployed to ensure peace and the absence of war (White, 2015). On the other hand, the operation was insurance against further conflict from a political viewpoint. Hammarskjöld negotiated the deal and put the Secretariat at the centre stage because it framed the collaboration UNEF was working with between the UN (as an organisation) and the host country. While the terms were transparent and open for interpretation, this level of imagination allowed him to influence what happened politically (Tandon, 1968). He did not imagine how little resistance his successor would put when the system he carefully designed came under attack.

The UNEF architecture had two other noteworthy elements. First, the operation had an Advisory Committee comprising Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, Norway and Pakistan. The General Assembly mandated the committee to help the Force Commander plan the operation and negotiate with the TCCs, among other duties. Second, UNTSO already had extensive contacts on the ground; its observers had first-hand knowledge of the area, which allowed UNEF to start working very quickly.

UNEF was indeed able to contain the emergency for which it was deployed; however, "it was less successful in containing the broader conflict in the region and assisting it in a peaceful resolution, although it was neither assigned nor equipped to perform those duties" (Diehl, 2015, p. 151). UNEF was not equipped to make peace. Many policymakers blame UNEF for failing to prevent an outbreak; this demonstrates that sometimes there is a vast gulf between the Councils expectations and the tools they give operation has to achieve them. That said, UNEF outlived its shelf life considerably. For 11 years, its presence stabilised the peninsula. The fact that UNEF stood between the two countries and that only after its troops were withdrawn war was able to take place shows that the idea behind peacekeeping worked; however, it also shows the concept's limitations. Unfortunately, all the operation achieved "was somewhat marred by the crisis touched off by its untimely withdrawal" (Lal, 1970, p. 322). The Secretary-General's subsequent actions, and the controversy around them, revolve around his interpretation of the concepts of consent and good faith.

In our quest to discuss the extent to which the UN Secretariat used agency vis-à-vis the Israel-Arab conflict, it is fundamental to spend a few words discussing why UNEF left and what impact it had on the UN's stance in the region and the Secretariat's agency. Coming back to May of 1967, President Nasser began preparations for war. His government embarked on several provocative actions vis-à-vis Israel. He coupled his aggressive rhetoric with deploying soldiers and assets into the Sinai Peninsula. While these actions were quite aggressive and a clear source of concern for Israel and UNEF, the UAR did not cross the threshold of declaring war. His intent was merely to provoke (Gat, 2005). However, by late May, he decided to take his policy to the next level by asking UNEF to leave, which caused a political and even legal storm in New York. This was the first of Nasser's two major decisions, which brought his country to war.

On 16 May 1967, the Chief of Staff of the United Arab Republic sent a letter to the UNEF's Force Commander demanding the operation's withdrawal. The letter stated that the UAR was preparing to act.

> Against Israel, at the moment, might carry out any aggressive action against any Arab country. Due to these instructions, our troops are already concentrated in Sinai on our eastern borders. For the sake of complete security of all UN troops who install OPs along our borders, I request that you issue your orders to withdraw all these troops immediately (United Nations General Assembly, 1967, p. 4)

The recipient of that letter was Major General Indar Jit Rikhye[51] of India, one of the most experienced peacekeepers in UN history. Before serving as UNEF's Force Commander, he worked as a military adviser to Dag Hammarskjöld and U Thant. He first wore a blue helmet as a Commander of the Indian battalion deployed to UNEF almost a decade before serving as the Force Commander. His extensive work in the UN proved very useful in this situation; he understood this letter's profound implications and reacted accordingly. Rikhye discusses this period in a seminal book titled *The Sinai Blunder* (1980), in which he narrates his

[51] After he retired from the military, he served as the President of the International Peace Academy, a think tank, and he became a prolific writer. He authored a number of papers and books reflecting on his experiences as a peacekeeper. This book is as important as the one authored by Siilasvuo because he provides an objective account of the events from the field's perspective.

experience dealing with this crisis. The book serves as an essential source of information throughout this section.

In addition, the Secretary-General presented two critical reports, which provided useful chronological information, important communication between New York and Cairo, and the Secretary-General's decision-making process that led him to agree to withdraw UNEF ultimately. The Secretariat drafted the first report (1967) almost in real-time. It focuses on the difficulties the operation faced on the ground, given the rapid movement of UAR forces into UNEF OPs and the various ultimatums the host country gave the different battalions in Gaza, Shram el-Sheikh and others. The second report (1967) builds on the previous by explaining his communication with the UAR, the TCCs and the Force Commander. It also serves as a post-mortem analysis. Given the extent to which his decisions were criticised across the board, it is likely that the Secretary-General used the report to defend himself against his many critics. Of course, while his defence revolved around the notion of consent (as we will see below), the fact that the region was transformed so stunningly and permanently after the fact goes to show that had he not acted so quickly, maybe the UN could have prevented the war to explode. While it would be rather unfair to claim that UNEF was the *only* thing preventing war in the Sinai, it was a critical instrument, valued across the board, even by Israel.

Back to the field. After receiving the letter, Rikhye quickly escalated the matter to the Secretary-General, noting to the UAR that the Force Commander has no authority to authorise the withdrawal. The following day, the different battalions deployed across multiple Observation Posts communicated to UNEF HQ that UAR units were moving into their positions. Across the entire AO, the UAR military gave UNEF's battalions ultimatums to vacate their positions in 24 or 48 hours; they brought sufficient people and equipment to use the observation posts after UNEF left. The level at which the troops were harassed and threatened is significant. The Troop Contributing Countries were very risk-averse. The increasingly dangerous situation made them less prone to continue exposing their troops.

The Secretary-General engaged in a diplomatic back and forth. He first sought to gain time by recalling the previous agreements and discussing the different interpretations of the

abovementioned documents. He also enquired whether the letter meant a complete and permanent withdrawal. That said, in a meeting with the UAR's Ambassador in New York, he signalled that if his country requests UNEF to move away from Gaza and the Sinai, he would then interpret this as a request to end the operation because those two areas are the most important ones to keep the peace (Elaraby, 1968).

Now, we should point out that U Thant was referring not only to the General Assembly resolutions, which authorised UNEF, but also to an *aide-memoire*, signed 11 years prior by Hammarskjöld. The document signalled that the UNEF would stay on the ground until it fully achieves its mandate. This agreement also expressed that Egypt would accept and work within UNGA Resolution 1000. Because UNEF's mandate came from the General Assembly, it lacked the legal tools that an operation mandate by the Security Council could have had. In addition, a courageous and entrepreneurial Secretary-General negotiated this deployment with no real legal or political backing; unfortunately, his successor proved he did not have similar character traits.

While this bilateral back and forth progressed between New York and Cairo, the Secretary-General convened several meetings with the Security Council members and the TCCs. They all expressed surprise and asked similar questions as he did to the UAR. Multiple countries and the Force Commander expressed the importance of keeping UNEF on the ground. However, India and Yugoslavia did express that if the UAR could not guarantee their peacekeepers' safety, they would bring their troops home. This is important because they were two of the largest TCCs, and UNEF could not function without them.

Israel, who had always been apprehensive of peacekeeping, rejected the notion that the UAR could unilaterally ask UNEF to leave and expressed the view that UNEF was source of stability. The United States and the United Kingdom supported UNEF, and neither wanted to see a full-scale war erupt. After U Thant authorised the operations' departure, they bitterly denounced this decision, which made the Secretariat lose a lot of agency and support for its dealings in the region, but more on that later.

In the field, the situation was becoming quite dire. Rikhye shuttled between the different OPs and Ismailia. He communicated with the various battalion commanders to ensure their

troops were safe and continued to do their duty. He noted that he was able to be in regular contact with his local counterparts amidst the crisis. Unfortunately, even so, he stressed that UNEF's "problems and difficulties would increase each day" (p.27). After brief consideration, the Secretary-General noted this, accepted the UAR's request, and ordered Rikhye to retreat.

The decision to withdraw UNEF was, for all involved, a mistake. It was a grotesque miscalculation for the UAR (and the neighbourhood in general). For the Secretariat, the speed and unilaterality with which he made this decision did not make him appear solid or decisive; it made him look weak. It is unrealistic to expect that UNEF could have stayed much longer; however, the Secretary-General could have managed its exit better to pressure Egypt (and the Security Council) to discuss the issue. Scholars and former UN staff members who became scholars continue to discuss U Thant's decisions. Two main points warrant discussion.

First, as Parker (1992) discusses, the Secretary-General did not exhaust all options; he could have bought time by prolonging the discussions, bringing the matter to the Security Council –which he was entitled to through Article 99 of the UN Charter. Moreover, his stance showed a lack of flexibility. While it is true that UNEF was experiencing almost insurmountable pressure, and it is unlikely they would have been able to carry on as they had been, as Cohen (1968) explains, not all hope was lost. The Secretary-General did not travel to Cairo immediately or use his charter-given power are two examples of the options left on the table. This does not imply that he would have been successful, but it would have signalled that he played all his cards.

In fairness, while he did not request an emergency meeting of the Council, the TCCs, the British, nor the Americans did not do it either. They could have supported the Secretary-General by bringing the matter up for discussion. Perhaps, he would have been emboldened by a strong, unified statement of support from all countries who expressed reservations behind closed doors. Elaraby (1968) & Firestone (2019) point out that by seeking advice from the advisory committee and informing the Security Council and the General Assembly through different reports, the Secretary-General followed many of his duties. Probably the matter was not brought to the Council's attention to avoid a protracted and, ultimately,

useless debate between Moscow and Washington because Israel would have never agreed to accept UNEF to observe the border from its side and, due to the UAR's increasingly confrontational tone, against Israel. While nobody questions Hammarskjöld's political acumen, it is essential to acknowledge that the UN changed between 1956 and 1967; the Secretary-General had considerably less room for manoeuvre and one of the reasons why was the Council's desire not to have another Secretary-General like Hammarskjöld who would challenge them as much (Urquhart, 1981 & Traub, 2007). The Secretary-General's actions show a significant and problematic absence: crisis management. Not a single constituent part of the peacekeeping architecture was ready to deal with this crisis. The Advisory Committee effectively hid behind U Thant. The Security Council, as ever, was paralysed by the two superpowers that were deeply entrenched. In other words, everybody failed. With the benefit of hindsight and first-hand experience, Urquhart (1987) bitterly denounces that this was U Thant's failure and demands that historians condemn everyone equally.

The Secretary-General should have challenged the UAR's understanding of its agreements with the UN. Instead, he immediately agreed with the UAR's interpretation of the agreements and undermined the position of strength built for him by Hammarskjöld. Malawer (1970) discusses that in his haste to agree with the UAR's understanding of the agreements, the Secretary-General spent all his political capital; his position was excessively one-sided. He only had the support of the UAR and the Soviet Union. Under the Aide-Memoire, the UAR had no right to expel UNEF without proper consultation with the Security Council. U Thant dismissed this framework too quickly, costing him much political capital.

On 23 May, U Thant travelled to Cairo to meet with Nasser. While he was en route, the UAR closed the strait of Tiran to Israeli traffic. Urquhart informed him of this while he had a layover in Paris, but he decided to go anyway. The Secretariat knew that Israel would treat this incident as casus belli. Still, at the same time, after winning a quick political victory in New York a few days ago, the UAR was certainly emboldened, so they would not back down. When Nasser met U Thant in Cairo, he admitted that his government quickly closed the strait because they wanted to do so *before* he arrived (Rikhye, 1980). Unfortunately, the Secretary-General's trip was too little, too late; he held very frank discussions with Nasser but did not

lower the tensions. He left Cairo after a two-day visit to brief the Council and continued to try to avert war (Urquhart, 1987).

The signs that another regional conflict was looming were, in hindsight, obvious. Nasser's assertive foreign policy, Syria's constant harassment of Israeli troops at their border, and the Arab world's pressure for the UAR to fight back were not new phenomena. U Thant failed to prepare the Secretariat for a crisis. The Secretariat should have seen this coming. It is telling that most of the Secretariat's crisis management ideas came *after* U Thant agreed to pull UNEF back. Urquhart writes, "After U Thant came back empty-handed […] we set about trying to devise ways of slowing down the onrush of events" (1987, p. 214). The two main ideas were the appointment of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to work as an envoy and negotiator and revive the Israel-Egypt Armistice networks. The Secretariat could have prepared a detailed playbook with achievable, immediate reactions that would have helped his quest. This is where the small bureaucracy showed its limits; very few people who worked on the matter had little time to take a step back and look at the bigger picture. This does not mean that he would have succeeded; he would have probably failed, but he would have been able to fend off his critics. In the end, the Secretary-General concluded that UNEF's prolonged lifespan allowed everyone to "ignore some of the hard realities of the underlying conflict […] and the UN is now confronted with a brutally realistic and dangerous situation" (1967, p. 4). How the Secretary-General withdrew the operation started a chain of events through which the dwindling of the Secretariat's agency in the Israel-Arab conflict began.

The consequences of UNEF's withdrawal were profound. It set a very difficult precedent in terms of consent. It demonstrated that if a country finds hosting a peacekeeping operation politically inconvenient, they expel them without repercussions. The Security Council knew Cairo expelled UNEF because it wanted to wage war, yet they let this happen (Tandon, 1968). In addition, it undermined the effectiveness of the operation because it gave the host country essentially a way out at any time for any reason (Malawer, 1970). Most likely, even if the Secretary-General had adopted a more assertive stance, the war would have broken out anyway. However, he would have avoided political criticism and protected the viability of peacekeeping as a concept. With hindsight, we know that the Security Council continued to

authorise deploying multiple peacekeeping operations. That said, its future was up in the air at that moment.

For the Arab-Israeli conflict, UNEF's withdrawal brought the parties closer to war than they had been since 1956. In Israel's eyes, the UN continued to lose credibility as a reliable, honest broker, which informed many of their decisions vis-à-vis peacekeeping in the coming decade. For the UAR, having the power to withdraw UNEF with almost no political pushback gave them even more confidence to continue their path to war.

By June 1967, all hope for a diplomatic solution to this question was gone.

Sitting Ducks: UNTSO and UNEF in the Six-Day War.

This section will provide a brief overview of the war and analyse the events through the lens of UNTSO and UNEF. Two weeks after U Thant returned from Cairo, the war started. While the UN and the entire architecture around saw this coming, it still presented a hazardous situation for the peacekeepers for two reasons. First, UNEF battalions were still on the field; simultaneously, they waited for their turn to depart; the different battalions were still at the various camps along the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza. Second, the operation was not prepared for this eventuality in any sense of the word. UNEF had strict orders to use force only in the most desperate situations, even more so after U Thant ordered them out of the Peninsula; by the time they started to withdraw, tensions between the peacekeepers ran high, and the Secretary-General wanted to avoid all risk of a confrontation. As seen in the previous section, UNEF's real strength was political because going to war had a political cost. That said, if Israel, the UAR or both decided, as they did, to risk that, there was nothing UNEF could do but protect itself and try to keep its troops alive.

Israel attacked Egypt quite quickly after UNEF left because it did not want to give time to the UAR-led coalition a chance to fortify its position, military and political. On the former, the UAR started to deploy a considerable size of its forces to the Sinai Peninsula, and it reconfirmed the closure of the Strait of Tiran. Nasser and King Hussein of Jordan signed a defence agreement on the political front, which brought the Hashemite Kingdom to the War coalition. Up north, the increasingly aggressive stance against Israel served to solidify Syria's

political regime –which was one of the main reasons why the Soviet Union started this whole situation in the first place (Goldstein, 2018).

The IDF leadership, headed by Lt Gen Yitzhak Rabin, firmly believed that Israel must first attack to establish superiority and end the war on their terms. The IDF had been preparing for a multi-front confrontation for quite some time. Up north, they identified that the northern tip of the Golan Heights was unprotected and designed a plan to take this vital strategic location with a swift battle (Laron, 2017). The Israeli Air Force prepared a bold plan to destroy the Egyptian, Jordanian, Syrian and Iraqi Air Forces to protect the army as it advanced across all fronts (Pollack, 2005). Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, who served as Defence Minister until a few days before the war, did not share this view; he initially refused the generals' calls for war. The defence and political establishments kept clashing as the former wanted to go to war, and the latter kept stalling. In the end, as it became clear that Nasser was looking for war, the Prime Minister and his government agreed that war was the only option, and they proceeded with their plans (Bar-On, 2012).

The Six-Day War temporarily neutralised peacekeeping in the Middle East. Rikhye informed the Secretary-General that war broke out on multiple fronts. For UNEF, the situation was dire. Neither side tried to protect the operation, nor despite constant, urgent requests from the Force Commander to both sides, protect their headquarters. The Secretary-General asked UNEF to keep New York appraised of the information continuously and asked to ensure the safety of the troops. Unfortunately, Rikhye's appeals did not work. On the other side of the border, UNTSO was unequipped to deal with the situation. Neither its observers nor its regional political offices affected the conflict or the safety of their counterparts. The Secretary-General's appeals to a cease-fire at Headquarters did not resonate with anyone. After guns fell silent, real diplomatic work started in the field and in New York.

UNEF's departure and the post-war political climate made UNTSO's position even more complex and permanent. UNTSO quickly deployed observers to the Golan Heights, the Sinai Peninsula, to establish agreed-upon cease-fire lines. It is important to note that the parties never withdrew their consent to have UNTSO working in the Peninsula. Because the Security Council deploys the operations independently, UNEF's expulsion did not affect UNTSO's

relationship with the UAR. In addition, UNTSO continued to work on the Israel-Lebanon border and in East Jerusalem, where it facilitated contact between Israel and Jordan (Siilasvuo, 1992). UNTSO is a clear example that peacekeeping operations are valued even when they cannot promote peace. Their presence can help when its mandate is part of a larger, holistic strategy designed to tackle the conflict. Whether it was part of the Secretariat's long-term approach to the conflict and, more importantly, whether there was a proactive plan for the inter-war period, will be the focus of the next section,

The result of the war was as stunning as it was transformative. In less than 150 *hours*, Israel took over the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank. To top it all, Israel unified Jerusalem. The effect this had on the morale of the IDF and the Israeli population cannot be understated. The victory signalled their superiority over their neighbours. It also gave the defence establishment an undue amount of arrogance, which cost them dearly a few years later (Machairas, 2017). For the Arab world, the war was nothing short of catastrophic. All three principal belligerents lost significant and strategic pieces of territory. In addition, their militaries suffered decimating losses in less than a week. While the Soviet Union swiftly provided its clients with aircraft and other equipment, it took them over half a decade to have the necessary strength to re-challenge Israel.

Now we must turn our attention to New York. The Security Council and the General Assembly gathered over the summer of 1967 for emergency sessions to discuss the aftermath of the war, and the Secretariat started to outline its role in this new Middle East.

The Inter-War Years: A Jarring Period

The inter-war period (June 6 1967 – October 5 1973) saw plenty of diplomatic efforts. This section will review the diplomatic engagements through the lens of the Secretariat and the actions it took throughout this time. This period covers two Secretaries-General: U Thant and Kurt Waldheim. This is important because their approach and views on the Israel-Arab conflict and peacekeeping differed. Moreover, their relationships with the Security Council[52]

[52] It is also important to note that in the autumn of 1971 the People's Republic of China joined the Security Council as a permanent member. The People's Republic of China and Israel have a relationship, which preceded the former's membership at the UN. Israel was one of the first non-communist countries to recognise it. That said, neither side was able to escape the Cold War nor the roles they played in it therefore, the Sino-Israeli relationship and the PRC's stance on the Israel-Arab conflict shifted (Sobin, 1991).

were quite different (Jackson, 1978). This period contributes to the study's overarching research question because it allows evaluation of how the Secretariat changes strategy when a new Secretary-General takes office.

The first diplomatic round revolved around establishing post-war agreements. The parties agreed with the proposed cease-fire lines a few days after the war ended. Unfortunately, as soon as that happened, the complaints started. The Security Council met more than a dozen times (formally and informally) to discuss various accusations of Israel, Syria and Egypt regarding violations of the lines and even clashes. The tension on the ground continued to rise during the entire summer, and both sides tried to capitalise on that by blaming it on each other.

In New York, the discussions over the Israel-Arab conflict took a bicameral flavour because the Security Council and the General Assembly simultaneously had the issue on their respective agendas. At the request of the Soviet Union, the General Assembly gathered for an emergency session to discuss the issue. Moscow's objective was to ensure Israel's condemnation as the aggressor. This view was not widely shared. While multiple countries supported the notion that Israel was occupying territory illegally, the Assembly seemed to want to discuss the conflict more broadly than blame Israel (Feldman & Barromi, 1974; Shapira, 1971). In the end, the emergency session yielded no results, once again confirming that the General Assembly is not an ideal forum to manage post-conflict situations pragmatically. Notably, this was one of the last times the General Assembly would adopt a relatively moderate stance in the conflict. In the coming decades, until this day, the Assembly has a very anti-Israeli voting record.

At the Security Council, the thing did not get much better. The Soviet Union tried to introduce language explicitly naming Israel as the sole responsible for the war. Moscow made multiple attempts to get the other P4 on board. In the end, nothing major passed in the summer because there was a misalignment on the level of pragmatism the situation warranted. On the one hand, The Soviet Union was not pragmatic; it wanted to prove a political point.

On the other hand, the rest of the P5 wanted to tackle the conflict holistically instead of reducing the discussions to assigning blame. While the Council agreed that Israel must

withdraw to the 5 June 1967 borders, they did not entertain the notion of a punitive resolution (Quigley, 2013). In the end, the summer was not very productive, politically speaking. While things in New York stayed frozen, UNTSO provided invaluable service to the Council and the belligerents by way of providing accurate and neutral information, staffing the different observation posts and regularly briefing the Security Council of developments. In the autumn, the Council and the Secretariat would revisit the Israel-Arab question and ignite the political engines once again.

Resolution 242: Ambiguously determined

This diplomatic round robin started in September. The Council knew it had to pronounce itself vis-à-vis this conflict. Therefore, all P5 embarked on diplomatic campaigns to get their views across to the other members. While the Soviet Union and the United States actively engaged both sides and prepared and sponsored draft resolutions, neither side showed sufficient impartiality to earn universal trust. The United Kingdom took over the role of what we can anachronistically call 'penholder[53]'. Under the leadership of their permanent representative, Lord Carandon, the UK worked to bridge the gap between the different proposals and the belligerent parties' different objectives (Ashton, 2016).

Unlike a modern penholder, the UK was not the first or only country to present a resolution. The result was not really "a British text but the result of close and prolonged consultation with both sides and all Council members (Schaeftler, 1974, p. 57). Indeed the non-aligned movement led by India, Nigeria and Mali; the Group of Latin American and the Caribbean; and the United States presented draft resolutions[54] to the Council. The challenge for the UK was to find an agreement the parties would accept and work with. While the Council had hoped to use this resolution as a basecamp to negotiate a comprehensive solution to the Israel-Arab conflict, their views on how they wanted to address the issue were starkly

[53] The penholder system is a tool created by the Security Council to streamline its work. One of the P5 spearheads the management of an issue at the Council and is responsible for writing the initial draft resolution, discuss it with the other P5 and then circulate and discuss it with the entire Council. For more see Loiselle (2019).

[54] The draft resolutions are S/8227 (India et al); S/8229 (United States); S/8235 (Latin America).

different. The stalemate was so profound that there was a serious concern that they would not be able to adopt a resolution at all (McDowall, 2014).

After multiple negotiations, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 242 (1967). Without question, this is the most critical UN document within the Israel-Arab conflict. Scholarly articles discuss this document from legal, political and even linguistic standpoints. The document's language is so important (and controversial) that it is worth quoting it for clarity. The main two operative clauses read

1) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
2) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of force

The resolution's ambiguous language allowed multiple conflicting interpretations. On the one hand, the solution made it clear Israel was not under strict obligation to withdraw from the territories it claimed; however, it left the door open for territorial exchanges when lasting peace agreements would be signed (Rostow, 1993). Besides, the language does not imply that Israel should withdraw from *all* the territories it gained throughout its existence but briefly references the gains made in 1967. This begs the question, why did the Arab States accept it. Essentially, they "concluded that the language of Resolution 242 was the best they could hope to obtain at the time" (Goldberg, 1988, p. 43). Having made several unsuccessful efforts at the General Assembly and the Council itself, they made a pragmatic decision to accept this ambiguous document while they regrouped politically and militarily. After the dust settled, they felt the resolution betrayed their objective of forcing Israel to give up all the territory it conquered in the war (Louis, 2012).

Scholars and even the parties continue to debate whether the resolution helped advance the quest for peace. Dajani (2007), Lynk (2007), and Falk (2007) critically reviewed the resolution on its 40th Anniversary. Their conclusions indicate that the text's ambiguity led to multiple interpretations. The belligerents did not know what the other side meant when they

accepted the document's terms. While some scholars argue that this is the best they could have gotten and that diplomacy is the art of compromise, the degree to which the language is watered-down puts the document's long-term validity in question. In other words, this level of confusion did not help matters.

On the other side of the argument, Lapidoth (1992), and Goldberg (1973; 1988) highlight a few critical positive sides of the resolution. First, even though the parties interpreted quite differently and, at various times, threatened to withdraw their approval, the resolution managed to stand the test of time. In addition, the resolution served as a framework for future negotiations, particularly the peace treaties Israel signed with Egypt in 1978 and Jordan in 1994.

For our question's purposes, the resolution allowed the Secretariat to spearhead the quest for peace. The resolution requested the Secretary-General to "designate a Special Representative [...] to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement" (1967). This clause was the only vessel through which negotiations could resume; therefore, it was a significant decision (Bickerton & Klausner, 2017). The Secretary-General moved swiftly and appointed Ambassador Gunnar Jarring of Sweden as his Special Representative; Jarring led a very active three-year period where the Secretariat had an opportunity to bring the parties to the table and find peace.

Jarring was a skilled and experienced diplomat. He worked worldwide, most notably as Sweden's Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Ambassador to both the United States and the Soviet Union –he was serving in Moscow by the time of his appointment as Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East. His experience and Sweden's foreign policy of neutrality served as a political guarantee to everyone involved that he would only represent the interests of the United Nations in his duties.

It goes beyond the scope of this section to produce a detailed recount of the Jarring mission. This section accounts for the degree to which the mission responded to the Secretariat's strategic thinking. Also, the section discusses whether resolution 242 provided an opportunity for the Secretariat or whether its mission was doomed to fail.

The Jarring mission is considerably understudied. While it appears in many scholarly contributions, few articles dedicate themselves entirely to it. Mørk (2007) and Waage & Mørk (2015) produced extraordinary research that reflects on Jarring's journey and the effectiveness of his mission. Through an extensive review of archival material and interviews with Jarring's inner circle, these papers are an excellent platform to review the mission's interactions with the Secretariat in New York and UNTSO in Jerusalem. The Secretary-General's (1971 & 1973) Reports to the Security Council further complemented these scholarly contributions. U Thant drafted the first, and Kurt Waldheim, the second. That said, here we must insert a vital caveat.

> Very few conversations between Jarring and the few UN officials with whom he discussed the mission were recorded. The meetings held between Secretary-General U Thant and Jarring were often held privately and without transcripts because of the risk of leaks of sensitive information (Mørk, 2007, p. 10)

Therefore, based on the limited information available, this section will draw preliminary conclusions about the degree to which a coordinated strategy was designed by the Secretariat and implemented by Jarring. The mission had two distinctive stages. The first stage started right after his appointment and lasted until April 1970. Jarring set up an office in Cyprus and began a marathon of visits to Israel, Egypt, Jordan, New York and various European capitals. The bilateral talks were protracted, and neither side was willing to engage constructively. Jarring was immensely discouraged, so he decided to return to Moscow until the political climate improved.

While Jarring worked to engage the parties politically, the situation on the ground got worse on two fronts: the Sinai Peninsula and Jordan. These two crises proved to be formidable challenges for UNTSO. Once again, the small operation of observers worked under dire circumstances to remain the eyes and ears of the United Nations.

In early 1969, Egypt started the war of attrition until August 1970. Egypt's strategy consisted of constant attacks against Israeli positions to reclaim the Sinai and use the Suez Canal eventually. This strategy proved to be successful against Israel for two reasons. First, the IDF and the Israeli public were (and continue to be) accustomed to brief wars. The protracted

nature of the war of attrition had a negative psychological and political effect on the country. The media openly questioned if their peace was achievable and whether the status quo was worth maintaining vis-à-vis the Sinai Peninsula. Second, the IDF suffered casualties and loss of equipment. Egypt showed Israel they were still a threat (Khalidi, 1973).

In September 1970, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, attacked the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to depose King Hussein. With the support of the Syrian Army, the PLO attacked various military installations in Jordan. This attack threatened the Jordanian monarchy's survival and opened a new front in the Israel-Arab conflict. The crisis' aftermath brings two essential points for the UN Peacekeeping and the UN's work in the Israel-Arab conflict. First, the PLO mainly relocated to Southern Lebanon, ending up in de facto control. This is the genesis of the situation, which later on required the deployment of UNIFIL. Second, the United Nations (both as an organisation and as an inter-governmental forum) recognised the importance of dealing with Palestinian nationalism (Quandt, 1971).

Siilasvuo provides a very insightful account of both crises from UNTSO's perspective. In the south, UNTSO observers, once again, found themselves trapped between two warring armies and, at times, attacked by them. The General protested that throughout the war, UNTSO was "shot 284 times from the Egyptian side and 61 times from the Israeli side" (Siilasvuo, 1992, p. 86). The operation lost two officers and had multiple wounded. He states that during this confrontation, the General even discussed possibly closing all its OPs deployed in the Peninsula; however, the Secretariat rejected this proposition on two grounds. First, it would have sent a message to the Council and the parties themselves that UNTSO was incapable of fulfilling its mandate, and they would have certainly demanded its closure. The operation was far too valuable, and the Secretariat did not want to risk its future.

Second, the Secretariat reasoned accurately that if UNTSO closed the OPs, it would have been difficult, politically speaking, to re-open them. In other words, UNTSO had to weather the storm as best it could. In Jordan, UNTSO was far less active than in the Sinai. Its small liaison office had less than five staff members. The operation had freedom of movement and a secure

communication line with Jerusalem and New York, so UNTSO allowed the Secretary-General to stay updated (Siilasvuo, 1992) .

One unexpected casualty of this turbulent time was President Gamal Abdel Nasser. On 28 September 1970, he died of a heart attack in Cairo. Nasser's health deteriorated significantly because of stress. Vice-president Anwar Sadat replaced Nasser and began a political revolution in Egypt.

Against this backdrop, the Secretary-General asked Jarring to resume his role and engage the parties. In the second phase, Jarring took two crucial steps. First, he shifted from merely moderating the discussions to proposing his ideas. He "abandoned his studied carefulness […] and at last actively intervened in the negotiating process by proposing his peace plan dealing with fundamental problems in the conflict between Israel and Egypt" (Mørk, 2007, p. 89). Second, he decided to focus his attention on Egypt. The Civil War left Jordan excessively preoccupied with its domestic problems. Amman had little energy or political will to pursue long-lasting peace with the Israelis.

The Secretariat had been pushing Jarring to take at least the first of these two decisions, so they welcomed his proactivity. In 1971 Jarring sent a proposal to Egypt and Israel in which he asked the former to enter into direct negotiations and the latter to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula. Unfortunately, Israel's response to the plan was so negative that they stated their wish to no longer deal with Jarring (Korn, 1992). Ironically, he was condemned when he was passive and when he was active. The Swedish diplomat felt utterly defeated and withdrew from the process. Before analysing the impact of the Secretariat's political activities' results, it is essential to discuss why it came to this.

Jarring used a myriad of techniques, such as shuttle diplomacy. He would meet foreign ministers and other high-level officials and held discussions in New York with the permanent representatives, believing that his mission could get further traction. Also, he proposed to the Secretary-General to host a multilateral conference in Cyprus to find an agreement; the meeting never took place. Throughout the first phase of his mission, the other would step away whenever he got close to getting agreement from one side.

The Secretary-General, a quiet diplomacy practitioner, built a solid relationship with Jarring. They met regularly to strategize, and whenever Jarring encountered a severe roadblock, he would confer with him. That said, the way he worked in the field was very insular and, at times, isolated him from the Secretariat. Jarring was reserved, and his fear of press leaks was borderline paranoid. This working way is not conducive to success because it prevents other parties from entirely buying in, even inside the Secretariat. Urquhart reflects that he was "reticent and discrete to an exceptional degree" (1987, p. 218). While his efforts were herculean and his commitment to neutrality was admirable, his solitary diplomacy failed.

There were three interdependent issues that made the Jarring mission even more challenging: Jarring himself; the support he received throughout the two phases but particularly the firs; and the multi-polarity of diplomatic efforts around the same time. The Jarring mission was one of the many other diplomatic efforts to deal with the issue.

The Secretary-General decided to appoint a diplomat who already had a full-time position and tenure at the Foreign Ministry. Jarring never resigned but instead took leave. This does not question his neutrality or commitment to the United Nations or the mission however, he was an outsider who did not understand the politics and dynamics within the Secretariat or in the relationship, the Secretariat had with the Council. This begs the question, why did the Secretary-General appoint someone outside the Secretariat. Probably, U Thant felt he needed an experienced diplomat with solid credentials from a country whose foreign policy revolved around neutrality. However, perhaps the mission would have succeeded more if the Secretary-General had sent an experienced member of the Secretariat –either a current or an even former senior staffer– with experience in multilateral discussions. For example in 1949, Secretary-General Trygve Lie appointed Bunche to represent him at the Rhodes Conference that facilitated the Israel-Egypt Armistice and provided a precedent for the rest (Waage, 2011).

However, in fairness to Jarring, the Rhodes conference had complete support from the United States, as well as the Secretary-General's direct and prolonged personal engagement. Most importantly, there was a willingness to negotiate. If we compare the personalities and negotiation styles, Bunche was better suited to lead such a process. He was a skilled diplomat

devoted to multilateralism and assertive enough to ensure the UN would not be a silent convener but a force for peace (Moghalu, 1997).

The Middle East and the international system dramatically changed between these two efforts. Jarring did not have the support he needed from the superpowers; he had no advantage in working with them. Of course, he did not make his work more manageable by being reluctant to collaborate and engage them.

The third element was that, unlike the Rhodes conference, the inter-war period saw multiple parties sometimes engaging at cross-purposes. The negotiations in Rhodes were the only ones taking place. The Security Council and the Secretariat governed themselves according to the progress made on the island. In contrast, when the Jarring mission occurred, the different P5 engaged in bilateral discussions with the belligerents and did not coordinate their efforts. Of course, it is not likely that the Soviet Union would work together with the United States. Even the parties, which, to an extent, agreed with each other, failed to funnel their efforts via Jarring.

In conclusion, no matter how good a strategy the Secretariat designs and implements, it has a low ceiling unless it has strong backing from the Security Council. During the two phases, the mission employed multiple tactics and met different officials in different places. Unfortunately, nothing worked. The Secretariat took on a task nobody else wanted to do. It constantly had to adapt its strategy to cope with the superpowers arming their respective sides, which essentially paralleled the Council.

After the cease-fire, the situation on the ground improved, so UNTSO had more bandwidth to engage in political affairs. General Siilasvuo dedicated much of his time to solidifying its relationships with government officials, UN colleagues and diplomats stationed in the region and this 'quiet' period allowed the incoming Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim of Austria, to settle into his new position. Unfortunately, true to form, the Israel-Arab conflict re-ignited in October 1973 in a war that shook the region yet again.

The Yom Kippur War: An October Surprise

The Six-Day War altered the region's map, changed, tipped the geopolitical balance of power and solidified Israel's position as a regional power. It also exasperated the tension and

convinced the Arab world that war was the only way to deal with the Jewish State. Syria and Egypt embarked on a decisive re-armament campaign. With the help of the Soviet Union, they replenished all the assets they lost in 1967, trained a new generation of military officers and started planning an aggressive offensive. Israel had military superiority after the war. However, the more time passed, the better armed and trained her adversaries became. The IDF had various challenges; they had to cover multiple borders with vastly different topographies. As seen in the War of Attrition, the Israeli economy struggles with prolonged conflicts (Safran, 1977).

Military planners in Cairo and Damascus also acknowledged the need to coordinate their attacks, commit equal proportions of their forces, and, if possible, catch Israel by surprise. Just as stunning as Israel's victory in the Six-Day War was, was Israel's inability to predict the Arab invasion of 1973. Indeed, Israel underestimated the capacities of its neighbours and overestimated the IDF's ability to hold the line in case of an attack (Handel, 1977). In addition, the IDF and UNTSO saw first-hand that both Syria and Egypt were preparing for war –both Lt Gen David Elazar, the IDF's Chief of Staff and Siilasvuo received continuous intelligence reports and misinterpreted them. Israel failed to process and prepare the information and its military and civilian leadership remained overconfident (Shlaim, 1976; Kahana, 2002).

The war began in the early morning of Yom Kippur, one of the holiest days in the Jewish calendar, where a large portion of the population fasts and the country comes to a standstill (Handel, 1977). The Syrian Army invaded the Golan Heights and Egypt crossed the Suez Canal. During the first ten days of the war, Egypt and Syria won many battles, bringing the IDF to the brink of defeat (Rabinovich, 2004). The IDF managed to reclaim the high ground at a significant cost and through the help of the United States. By 20 October, the IDF took the Suez Canal, Mt Hermon, and positioned forces less than 50 km from Damascus. The Americans wanted to ensure Israel's military victory whilst avoiding another humiliating defeat for Egypt and Syria; therefore, they delayed their weapons shipment and encouraged them to agree to a cease-fire. The Soviet Union provided significant military assistance to Cairo and Damascus and threatened to intervene directly when the tide started to turn against them. The United States put its armed forces on high alert to join the fight. Luckily,

cooler heads prevailed, and instead, the two superpowers and their clients agreed on a cease-fire, which took place on 24 October (Bickerton & Klausner, 2017).

The Secretariat: A Case of Successful Rapid Response

Before discussing the Secretariat's response and strategy after the cease-fire, it is crucial to establish a methodological caveat and spend a few lines shedding light on the status quo**.** First, this chapter critically assesses the political process of the Israel-Arab conflict from the Secretariat's perspective.

As this section will show, the United Nations played a limited role in the subsequent negotiations whenever the United States –and to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union and the parties– allowed them to. Therefore, the focus will be on the km 101 negotiations, the Geneva Peace Conference 1973, the implementation of both the Israel-Egypt and the Israel-Syria disengagement agreements and the attempts to convene a second conference in 1977. Of course, each section will underline the processes that excluded the Secretariat and their impact on its work.

By October 1973, Kurt Waldheim had been in the job for almost two years. The Secretariat had a hard time adjusting to the new UN Chief. Urquhart shared that his new boss was challenging, especially at the beginning. "Waldheim had not yet understood the peculiar nature of his new job and routinely blamed his early mistakes on his subordinates, particularly those who had tried to prevent them" (n.d). As he settled into the job, Waldheim's relationship with his position and the people around things improved. While today the thought of the Secretary-General having a difficult time with one of his Under-Secretaries-General would hardly make the news –there are so many of them– back then, the number of UN Senior Staff was small. Waldheim needed people like Urquhart for all sorts of things, such as political affairs, managing multiple peace operations, and the overall coordination and management of the organisation.

Waldheim's views on his predecessor's record are also essential because they informed his behaviour after the Yom Kippur War. He saw the Jarring mission as a complete failure and was unwilling to invest the political capital a Jarring-like mission required unless it had the blessing and active support of the Security Council. Waldheim believed the Council

‘abandoned’ Jarring, which made his work impossible. At the same time, the Secretary-General also knew that to maintain personal and institutional relevance, he needed to do two essential things: build a solid relationship with the power brokers and react quickly to their requests. In these two things, he did rather well.

Several factors allowed the United States and Kissinger to become the chief architect of the Middle East peace after the October War. First, the Soviet Union's influence in the region was in decline. The Arab world saw Moscow's rush to promote a cease-fire as a betrayal of their alliance. Egypt decided to build a closer relationship with the United States, and Syria sought a broader foreign policy that looked beyond Moscow (Golan, 1999). The Soviet Union calculated that it was more important to its national interest to keep *détente* and work with the Americans instead of risking what could have been a nuclear war. After spending a lot of time and money re-arming Syria and Egypt and encouraging them to attack Israel, it is understandable that the Arab world bitterly protested this course of action and, more importantly, looked elsewhere for alliances. Second, Israel and Egypt saw an opportunity to capitalise on the American enthusiasm by setting a price for their participation in the subsequent peace talks. Kissinger understood and gladly pledged economic and military support (Scherer, 1978).

From a political standpoint, the war had one clear winner: The United States. Not only because its side won the war militarily but also because it solidified its role as the primary sponsor of peace (Sheehan, 1976; Scherer, 1978). The Security Council adopted Resolution 338 (1973) which decided that cease-fire negotiations would start under 'appropriate auspices'. Essentially this meant that Kissinger was taking the lead. The resolution shows that the United States (and the rest of the Council) wanted a State to lead this instead of UN Staff Members.

The Jarring mission's failure eroded the Council's confidence in the Secretariat –even though Jarring mainly failed because of the Council's unwillingness to back it. Kissinger managed to appoint himself as Jarring's successor. The difference between the two was that the former, in his duty, represented the most powerful country in the world and had enormous resources

to incentivise dialogue. In addition, he was an assertive diplomat who designed a grand strategy, which he would then execute.

The Secretary-General made a conscientious decision to provide the Americans with all the support it could and, by doing so, built a solid personal working relationship with the US Secretary of State. The following section will discuss how the Secretariat influenced the Middle East peace process through a critical review of the communication. *Folder S-0899-0012-01* of the UN Archives provides a fascinating insight into the relationship; it contains letters, minutes of meetings, cables and press telegrams, which discuss the meetings' outcome. The folder is complemented by "*Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises* (Kissinger, 1982a), a book with transcripts of meetings and phone calls Kissinger had during the war. Through a careful review of these documents, this thesis makes an original contribution to the literature.

On 24 September, the Secretary-General met with Kissinger in New York ahead of the General Assembly. They discussed various issues in the meeting, including the Middle East. The minutes of this meeting are particularly illuminating for various reasons. First, the meeting happened a few days before the war and after Kissinger returned from the region. Second, both discussed their interpretation of the threat level, and both sides were horrendously wrong. The war was less than two weeks away, and they did not discuss crisis management. They spoke about long-term issues as if the situation on the ground was quiet. Third, the Secretary-General clarified that the Secretariat had no interest in competing with what he saw as American jurisdiction[55]. From that point onwards, it was clear that the Secretary-General cast himself in a supporting role. Kissinger, in turn, reiterated that any long-term solution to the Israel-Arab conflict needs active UN involvement. He even hinted, "There might be a significant role in negotiating where the Jarring or a similar mission could be very valuable" (1973, p. 2). This statement, it turns out, was incredibly misleading because the Secretariat did not have the opportunity to take the lead on anything political. In the Kissinger mission, the Secretariat played only a supporting role. The American diplomat

[55] In the meeting, Kissinger "humorously observed that he promised that there would be no jurisdictional dispute if the Secretary-General wanted to make an exclusive claim on the problem" (p.1). The comment was, to say the least, ironic. At that stage, the Secretary of State was already working on a grand strategy for the Middle East in which Waldheim would have almost no political jurisdiction.

clarified that the Middle East was at the top of his priorities. It turns out that Yom Kippur was two weeks away from not only taking all of Kissinger's time but also bringing the international system to the brink of nuclear war. The meeting was very positive. From that point onward, the two men established a *modus operandi;* Kissinger would take the lead in dealing with the Israel-Arab conflict, and the Secretariat would support his initiatives. Kissinger's assurances that the UN would be in his plans as he moved forward provided Waldheim with the necessary guarantees to cooperate.

The war caught Kissinger in New York, which proved a helpful coincidence because he could have in-person meetings and phone calls with colleagues and other key people. A few hours after he got confirmation that hostilities started, Kissinger contacted the Secretary-General to discuss the way forward. They agreed to avoid getting the General Assembly involved in order to avoid excessive (and useless) political posturing. The Security Council, Kissinger said, was the best place to hold discussions. A significant detail of the transcript reveals the level of trust they had. Indeed, Kissinger tells Waldheim, "for your information only, and do not share this with others, we are talking with the Soviets to see if we can develop a common approach" (1982a, p. 40). While Washington and Moscow had an entire month of disagreement and proxy war to fight, Kissinger already thought of the aftermath. Sharing these details with Waldheim was, on the one hand, a gesture of trust and, on the other hand, a strategy aimed at controlling the political agenda to the fullest extent possible when meetings at both the Security Council and the General Assembly happened; Waldheim had sway in these matters.

For the Israel-Arab conflict standards, the Yom Kippur War was rather long. During the conflict itself, the Secretariat had little to do. However, they knew they needed to prepare a post-conflict management framework. As the battle started to wind down, both superpowers began to prepare for the cease-fire's political terrain, and the Secretariat had to be ready. Chapter 3 discusses all the relevant logistical preparations, including a plan to redeploy observers, appoint Siilasvuo as interim Force Commander, etc. However, logistics was not the Secretariat's only or most challenging problem. Waldheim needed to create political terms of reference for the operation. The Secretariat is required to balance the need to

protect the neutrality and integrity of the Secretariat with the Security Council's position of authority.

After a few hours of planning and debate, the Secretariat came up with proposed terms of reference, which Waldheim presented to the Security Council on 26 October (1973). This document turned out to be a seminal evolution of peacekeeping as a concept. There are three main guidelines, which warrant a discussion. First, the operation must always have the complete confidence and backing of the Security Council and the parties' cooperation. Second, a Force Commander, who will report to the Secretary-General, would lead the operation. Third, the peacekeepers will carry weapons of defensive characteristics. The Security Council adopted Resolution 341 (1973) which certified its approval of the terms mentioned above of reference. This was an important political win for the Secretariat; its proactivity and planning allowed it to influence the Security Council and solve some of the constitutional deficiencies of peacekeeping. With this political hurdle cleared, the Secretariat needed to prepare for the next one: The negotiations at the km 101 tent.

Km 101: The Rise of Military Diplomacy in UN Peacekeeping

From a political standpoint, the Arab countries could not appear willing to negotiate with Israel because this would amount to their *de facto* recognition as sovereign state. Therefore, as we will see, the parties dispatched Generals to hold bilateral and multilateral discussions. Military diplomacy within this context is essential for a few reasons. First, separating the military from political affairs in the Israel-Arab conflict is impossible. The generals negotiated far more than troop positions. They talked about disengagement plans and the deployment of peacekeeping operations. Second, the negotiations took place both in the field and in Geneva under the Secretary-General's political auspices and the United States watchful eye. Kissinger used the military discussions to inform his diplomatic talks with the parties and elevate the military proposals to the political level and vice versa. Third, at multiple stages throughout the negotiations, the Secretariat had more influence on military diplomacy than the political level. Siilasvuo played an understated but crucial role in facilitating the implementation of Kissinger’s plans.

The military diplomacy effort took place within the framework of the Military Working Group. Israel, Syria and Egypt dispatched some of their senior military officers to represent them. A team led by Siilasvuo, who also chaired every meeting, represented the United Nations.

The first high-level military-diplomatic effort between Israel and Egypt at the km 101 negotiations was in November 1973. A month after, the only prominent outcome of the Geneva peace conference was the creation of the Military Working Group, which met every time the parties signed a disengagement agreement: January 1974 (Egypt – Israel), June 1974 (Syria –Israel) and September 1975 (Egypt – Israel, 2nd disengagement agreement).

Before delving into the role of the UN in the km 101 discussions, it is crucial to provide a brief overview of the political context, a summary of the discussions and a critical analysis of why and how the talks ended. After the guns fell silent, communications channels opened between Egypt and Israel via the US State Department. The idea of holding these discussions came from Egypt, for whom one of the war results produced a political challenge. The IDF encircled and trapped the 200,000 Egyptian Third Army near the Suez Canal. Israel decided to keep them as prisoners of war, and as such, they became a critical bargaining chip in future negotiations (Winokur, 2009). The situation was quite cumbersome to Egypt because a large portion of what was left of her armed forces was captive and because Sadat needed to show, that Egypt was the clear winner publicly. Therefore, Sadat pleaded his case to Kissinger, who, in turn, convinced Israeli leadership to agree to hold bilateral discussions.

Israel also saw the potential value of holding direct talks with the Egyptians to get back its prisoners of war and ensure Egypt would lift its naval blockade on Israeli vessels (Stein, 1999). Kissinger agreed and convinced Israel to sit down with them. However, he had a significant caveat in mind. As he viewed them, the talks should only discuss practical military matters such as prisoner exchange. He wanted to "save" the upcoming Geneva Peace Conference (Levitt, 1997). His support of the discussions rested on the political calculation that Israel and Egypt had no appetite for discussing anything else. This reasoning explains why no American diplomats were present and, instead, Washington quasi-delegated to the UN as the third party and organiser of the talks.

Egypt selected Major General Al-Gamassi to lead his delegation; Israel selected Brigadier General Aharon Yariv. Both Generals were highly respected within their political establishments, and had direct lines to their respective Heads of Government.

The prospect of making real progress in these talks was daunting. After all, a few days prior, the generals were fighting each other on the battlefield. In addition, Egypt and Israel had a quarter of a century of grievance and mistrust. Shlomo (2017) , Stein (1999) & Jonah (1990), provide very eloquent recaps of the discussions. At the onset, the main issues were the exchange of prisoners, the fate of Egypt's Third Army, and the return of civilian life in Suez. Underneath this plan, of course, laid the need to implement a cease-fire. The first few meetings were only to break the ice; both sides aired their grievances and outlined their objectives. Because the discussions at the tent were close to stalling irreparably, Kissinger stepped back in and hosted discussions in Washington with Israeli Prime Minister Meir and Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi. Notably, Yariv joined the discussions in Washington, which informed his behaviour during the remainder of the talks at the tent; he could hear the two countries directly negotiate at the highest levels in front of the United States.

The blend of the meetings at the tent and the Washington meetings allowed the parties to develop a six-point agreement. Waldheim announced the agreement from New York, and the generals signed the agreement on 11 November at a ceremony in the tent, witnessed by Siilasvuo.

The six-points:

1. The implementation of the cease-fire;
2. A broad disengagement to return to 22 October positions;
3. Humanitarian convoys to supply the City of Suez;
4. The free flow of non-military goods to Egypt's Third Army ;
5. The establishment of UNEF checkpoints along the Suez-Cairo road to replace the existing IDF ones;
6. The broad exchange of prisoners of war.

This was an important milestone for both short and long-term reasons. In the short term, the agreement gave the tent a framework to start having practical discussions; the agreement's

implementation was challenging. In the long term, the agreement sent a strong signal to the Middle East, and beyond that, the prospect of peace between Israel and one of the most powerful and influential neighbours was no longer a dream.

After the 11th, both sides started to study how best to implement each point. At this point, Siilasvuo began to play an active role in mediating and ensuring that UNEF would be at the centre of the discussions, particularly related to point five. Things started to move quickly; three days after the agreement, the Generals agreed on a "package-deal that included all outstanding POW issues, evacuation of the wounded, supplies for the Third Army and Suez, and Israeli abandonment of its checkpoints on the road" (Shlomo, 2017, p. 456). The execution of the package deal was challenging, and the Generals had to revert to their capitals constantly for instructions. They could continue the discussions and take advantage of their momentum. It is imperative to stress that the degree of trust and the speed at which the talks moved surprised Jerusalem, Cairo and, especially, Washington.

The last eight meetings held at the tent started to address the most challenging point of the six-point agreement: disengagement. Any discussion on this issue inevitably led to the question of Israel's occupation of the Sinai Peninsula since 1967. At the same time, the initial point at the tent was to ensure Israel's withdrawal to the 22 October line as per UN Security Council 338.

Unlike the other points of the agreement, this one touched on the 25-year-old history of mistrust, grievances and war. Both sides made proposals, but neither side was willing to negotiate them. The generals had strict instructions that their demands were existential; there was little room for manoeuvre. At the latter stages of the month, it became clear that the issues were too big for the tent, and because both sides were unwilling to compromise, the tent diplomacy came to a grinding halt.

The talks were quite productive due to three main factors: personalities, relationship with senior leadership, location and format. First, the personalities of the negotiators played a decisive role. Stein (1999) highlights that the selection of the chief negotiators was brilliant because while they both were proud patriots, they were also consummate professionals who treated each other respectfully. There were no significant cosmetic disagreements or any

diplomatic incidents. By the end of the discussions, they were friendly. Second, they both had a direct line of communication with their President and Prime Minister, respectively; numerous times during the negotiations, they had to consult with their capitals and get instructions in real time. It is illustrative that Yariv went with Prime Minister Meir to Washington to meet Kissinger during the negotiations. This level of access allowed him to translate the political mood of both sets of superiors plus the guarantor of the negotiations into the implementation of the six-point agreement.

Third, the venue and format of the discussion were instrumental. The parties agreed to meet at km 101 between Suez and Cairo. Instead of using the superb facilities in regular diplomatic meetings, they met inside a military tent. The small delegations allowed them to get to know one another personally. Moreover, the venue and format "insulated from the drawbacks of public diplomacy such as negotiating in front of the media, and, above all, constituted direct negotiations between the parties" (Levitt, 1997, p. 157). The talks were straightforward, and unlike lofty diplomatic negotiations, the two military men delivered brief statements and favoured pragmatism over political showmanship.

It is important to note that they did not deliver an agreement on the most contentious issue: disengagement. To answer the question, it is essential to look at the whole players' board. Shlomo (2017) conducted a thorough review of the Israeli State Archives. He concluded that Kissinger's negotiations were only allowed to occur because they served as a stepping-stone towards the Geneva Conference and, ultimately, the Peace Treaty of 1979.

Kissinger only wanted the parties to start talking to cool the waters internationally and buy goodwill and, equally important, time. "As long as that less-pressured condition prevailed, a long-term strategy could be devised" (p. 461). In other words, the km 101 was successful because they it was part of Kissinger's grand strategy vis-à-vis the region. He empowered the countries to meet on their own. By doing so, he gave himself sufficient time to solidify his relationship with the Israelis and Egyptians and get all players to the Geneva Peace Conference (Mandell, 1990).

Kissinger understood that the cessation of hostilities, even temporarily, was a necessary pre-condition for structural peace negotiations. The km 101 discussions allowed both sides to

satisfy immediate needs such as prisoner exchange. Sadat was able to save face by regaining control of the Suez Canal. Israel could solidify its defensive position, bring back its soldiers – an issue of paramount importance to Israeli society– and claim a diplomatic victory. This was the first time the Jewish State signed a formal agreement with an Arab neighbour since 1949 (Cohn, 1974).

Indeed, the American diplomat "manoeuvred Egypt and Israel into negotiating an agreement they both needed while solidifying the centrality of the American mediation role" (Stein, 1999, p. 146). When the conversation turned to political matters, he pulled the plug. His primary interest, of course, was to ensure the American objective of neutralising as far as possible the Soviet influence with both countries and crystallising the role of the United States as the sole guarantor of Israel's security and political stability in the region.

In addition, while he gave his initial blessing for the discussions in this format, he was pretty unhappy with the process. In his own words

> The whole process tested our patience. We never knew exactly what was happening. We got different reports […] Frequently we had three versions of a deadlock to choose from. The only common thing was being at least forty-eight hours behind. On the other hand, we were not, frankly, too eager for a breakthrough at the km 101 before the Geneva Conference (1982b, p. 751)

The Km 101 negotiations proved to be an invaluable first-step in the Israel-Egypt relationship. However, while the Americans saw the importance of the talks at the tent, the speed at which the parties moved exasperated them as well.

Now, we must turn to our overarching research question. Did the UN have a regional strategy similar to Kissinger's? What role did they play in the tent diplomatic encounter? The following section will analyse the political role played by the Secretariat with a particular emphasis on the Secretary-General himself and Siilasvuo.

Role of the UN: A Landmark of Dwindling Agency?

Before analysing the UN's role in the negotiations, it is essential to set all the pieces on the board. In the field, the start of the talks coincided with UNEF II's initial deployment.

Therefore, Siilasvuo, who took the role of Force Commander a few *days* before the negotiations, had to split his time between coordinating the safe, orderly and efficient deployment of his troops and ensuring smooth coordination of the negotiations. In addition, documents from the Archives reveal that the Secretary-General dispatched Under-Secretary-General Guyer between 14 and 22 November to Jerusalem, Cairo and Damascus for a round of discussions (more on that below). Guyer and Siilasvuo sent daily coded cables back to New York (keeping each other in CC) with meeting updates.

In New York, the Secretary-General did not play a significant role. Kissinger relocated the trilateral high-level political discussions to Washington, where he was not invited. While he kept Waldheim moderately well informed, it was clear that it would be field driven if the UN had a role in the Km 101 negotiations.

As we have done in this and previous chapters, we must go back to the accounts of James O.C Jonah, an Assistant-Secretary-General and member of Siilasvuo's team. In a paper he published on the UN's role in the entire process, he discusses the challenging role the UN had to play in the talks (1990). In addition, Siilasvuo's book and the communication between Jerusalem and New York from the Archives serve as decisive sources of information.

The UN Team comprised Siilasvuo, Jonah, Dr Remy George, a senior political advisor and Irish Captain Joseph Fallon. For the first few meetings, the UN Team rotated. After signing the six-point agreement, Siilasvuo and Jonah actively participated in the discussions.

Israel has always been apprehensive of the United Nations as a forum and as an organisation, which is why Yariv saw the role of Siilasvuo with grave apprehension. An illustrative example came when Siilasvuo approached Yariv to discuss the prisoner exchange. The General responded, "El-Gamasy and I get along just fine. Do not try to be a mediator. Your patronage and auspices, yes. But please, sir, don't be a mediator." (Stein, 1999, p. 109). Jonah (1990) also recalls the incident and concludes that Israel believed the UN wanted to prevent face-to-face negotiations between the countries, an intrinsic Israeli foreign policy objective.

Israel's objections notwithstanding, the negotiations needed an intermediary entity to help them find a consensus. The negotiations took place under the "auspices" of the United Nations; this did not give Siilasvuo an automatic role as the chairperson. On a de facto basis,

the need for an honest broker ended up giving him this role. The General routinely adjourned discussions when they were at an impasse and had bilateral conversations with both sides; this allowed parties to vent and, more importantly, to pass ideas for the UN Team to present as their own, "which was usually accepted because they came from the UN" (Siilasvuo, 1992, p. 199). Implementing the six-point agreement required the UN's active participation, a continuous challenge.

This put UNEF and the Secretariat in unchartered waters. In his own words, he reflected: "the new job as Chairman worried me a bit. For the first time in the history of UN Peacekeeping, the Force Commander had been given this extremely responsible and time-consuming assignment in addition to his many other duties" (1992, p. 199). Jonah (1990; 1992) reflects that the role of the UN Team, much like the organisation's role as a whole, depends on the extent to which the Security Council gives it room for manoeuvre. The UN's role as a third-party mediator, he stresses, played a vital albeit quiet role in moving things, despite the fact that Israel did not see the UN Team as anything more than a glorified host.

That said, when the discussion moved beyond prisoner exchanges onto disengagement, the UN Team had less influence, and its role started to dwindle. Because of the issues related to the Third Army, the humanitarian assistance needed by Suez, and the IDF checkpoints with UNEF required the active involvement of the UN, the issue of disengagement did not. In their papers and books, both Jonah and Siilasvuo state that as soon as the discussion progressed to this stage, it needed to be elevated to the highest level, politically speaking, because as laudable as the work done at the tent was, two Generals could not bring peace between the countries.

The UN Team performed an essential part in the km 101 discussions. From a political perspective, the role played by Siilasvuo was unprecedented in the history of UN Peacekeeping. This was not a routine discussion between the Force Commander and his counterparts within the AO; this was a high-level discussion with an ill-defined mandate and a broad scope. When the two countries started floating long-term disengagement plans, they delved into the political realm.

It would be easy to conclude that the km 101 negotiations were another instance of undermining its agency. After all, the process started and finished whenever Kissinger said so. However, after a more nuanced analysis, we can see that the Secretariat played its cards rather well; the UN Team influenced the negotiations and allowed the negotiators to communicate indirectly about issues they could not speak openly. The six-point agreement considerably lowered the temperature between two powerful countries with 25-year-old grievances, provided a framework for humanitarian assistance and set the stage for more discussions.

The Geneva Peace Conference: A Stillborn Process

This section will discuss the Geneva Peace Conference. This study differentiates between the Geneva Peace *Conferences* and the Geneva Peace *Process.* The former were concrete meetings, which took place at the *Palais Des Nations* in 1973 and 1977. The first iteration of the conference provided an overarching framework under which Kissinger facilitated the disengagement plans between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Syria (Atherton, 1992) . While the conference did not produce a tangible outcome, it did serve a purpose. Like the km 101 discussions, Kissinger saw the first Geneva Conference as a stepping-stone towards more strategic conversations.

Round 1: A Conference of Empty Chairs

Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy sought to get the parties together in a conference at the end of the year. Kissinger travelled to different capitals from 26 October until 15 December 1973 to convince them to go to Geneva.

While the km 101 negotiations served their purpose and got Egypt and Israel politically ready to embark on a broader political process, the conference would be more challenging for two reasons. First, the superpowers were the conveners and, more importantly, conference co-chairs. They would not let the parties negotiate independently as they did in the tent. Washington and Moscow had the objective of securing their influence in the region. Second, the chairs invited Syria and Jordan to participate; this presented a vital challenge because there was no rapport between them and Israel; they did not have a good record of accomplishments Egypt and Israel built in the tent.

The first conference was marked not by its accomplishments but by the absent actors, Syria who chose not to attend and the PLO who never received an invitation. It is necessary to discuss the reasons and effects of these two absences and, in Syria's case, discuss the Secretariat's political role.

The PLO did not attend the first conference because Israel blocked[56] their involvement. The issue of Palestinian participation in the overarching process was an ongoing challenge for the superpowers. On the one hand, Israel's objections to their participation were vehement that the conference would have collapsed before it began if the superpowers had insisted. Israel was eager to sit down with Arab countries because, in their eyes, this meant *de facto* recognition. Still, at the same time, they did not want to give the PLO *de facto* recognition of being the legitimate voice of the Palestinian people or a proto-state (Touval, 1987).

On the other hand, the Arab countries were adamant about recognising the PLO as a political actor. After the war, the Arab League adopted a resolution[57] that declared that the PLO was the sole representative of the Palestinian people (Odeh, 1977). This political endorsement is important because it indicates that the Palestinian question should be at the forefront of their dealings with Israel in the League's view. Kissinger found a middle ground through the invitation letter. Instead, the text did not mention the Palestinians and stated that 'the question of additional participants' would be on the agenda right after the conference started (Stocker, 2017). The conference never did, and the PLO's absence was one of the hallmark features of the event. As we will see in a later section, both superpowers and the Secretariat concurred that the following stages of the process must include the PLO.

[56] It is important to stress that Israel was going through a very difficult political period. First, Prime Minister Meir was facing a tough political challenge in an upcoming election in December. Allowing the PLO to attend the conference would probably tipped the scales against her. Second, right after the war, the Israeli cabinet set up the 'Agranat Commission' to do a deep post-mortem study into the government's actions before and during the war. While the Commission published its findings in April 1974, by December it was clear that public opinion blamed the political and military establishment for the outcome. In the end, the Commission did not find the Prime Minister at fault personally. Rather the report focused on the IDF's General Staff. For more on the Agranat Commission and the political ramification of the War on the Meir Premiership see: Bar-Joseph (2008) ; Simpson (1976).

[57] Jordan initially opposed the Arab League decision. However, less than year later, the King changed his country's position at the Rabat Summit of October 1974.

Attending the conference was an important issue for the PLO because they had fundamental apprehension with Jordan and Egypt discussing Palestinian matters independently. With Jordan, the case revolved around representation. The PLO wanted to ensure the title 'sole representative of the Palestinian people'. The organisation wanted to block Jordan's intentions to establish herself as such. Their competition was not due to differences in policy since they broadly saw the conflict similarly. "Rather, they were contesting who should have the authority" (Pearlman, 2008, p. 89). Losing their agency to Jordan would be a political catastrophe for the PLO because if they lose their voice, their *raison d'état* would be in danger. About Egypt, the PLO saw with concern the km 101 negotiations and the slow build-up of trust between Cairo and Jerusalem. The organisation was fearful that Sadat was ready to continue the peace process, even if this meant abandoning the Palestinians (Macintyre, 1975).

The PLO's absence at the first conference had a lasting impact on the entire process. An overwhelming majority of the Arab League and the UN General Assembly believed that excluding the Palestinians from the conference undermined any result it might obtain. The General Assembly started to take a much more active role in the conflict, and this decision coloured multiple subsequent resolutions they adopted. The message sent by the Arab League and the General Assembly was that no matter how much Kissinger shuttled between the countries or hosted a conference, the Israel-Arab conflict could not be solved until the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was settled. Of course, the Geneva Process challenged this assertion when Israel and Egypt signed a peace treaty a few years later.

After Egypt and Jordan agreed to participate, Kissinger turned to Syria, which proved very complex. The Yom Kippur War finished much like on the Southern front, but a few critical issues were outstanding. First, both sides captured many prisoners and were unwilling to share the most basic information regarding them, let alone exchange them. Second, Israel captured even more territory of the Golan Heights. The IDF was less than 50 km away from Damascus and controlled the top of Mt Hermon and a total of 400 square km (Bickerton & Klausner, 2017). The Syrian political establishment was far less inclined to sit down with Israel. At the same time, Kissinger had considerably less political capital to spend in Syria; this changed gradually as Kissinger spent considerable time building a relationship with

Assad in Damascus. That said, the UN saw an opportunity for action at that moment, and the Secretary-General took it.

The Secretariat believed it could facilitate disengagement and prisoner exchange and get Syria to attend the conference. The Secretary-General dispatched Guyer to Damascus and Jerusalem. This effort is quite illustrative of our question of whether the Secretariat had political agency vis-à-vis the conflict.

Guyer sent daily coded cables to New York, where he reported on his meetings and provided analysis based on his interactions. In one of his first meetings with both, Guyer offered, "a solution could be sought inspired in the Egypt/Israel precedent utilising UNTSO as a meeting point" (1973, p. 3). The proposal showed that the Secretariat wanted to replicate its centrality and presence in a bilateral negotiation between Israel and Syria; however, the parties had too many preconditions to meet.

On 14 November, the Syrian Foreign Minister, Abdul Halim Khaddam, told Guyer that they were unwilling to disentangle the issues of territory and prisoner exchange. Guyer sent a cable to New York which explains the two main reasons why Syria was not interested in meeting the Israelis. First, Syria did not have a "pressing problem of Egypt's encircled Third Army and Suez City" (UNA, 1973, p. 2). Second, the Syrian Foreign Minister expressed to Guyer that his country was not interested in anything other than an overarching solution. In his analysis, Guyer stressed that Syria believed that time was on their side and that most of the Arab League supported their position.

Guyer met with President Assad the next day, who mostly reiterated his country's position. He also stressed that his government did not believe the Israeli proposals seriously. Moreover, he emphasised that he would be willing to discuss a broader solution with Israel if would agree to return to October 5 lines and let the villagers return. Guyer pressed him on the issue and enquired whether Syria wanted an actual return to the October 6 lines or a declaration of intent. Assad answered that the latter would suffice at this stage (UNA, 1973).

In Israel, Guyer met with Prime Minister Meir and Ambassador Mordechai Kidron. For the Israelis, the issue of prisoner exchange was paramount. However, in the same cable, Guyer noted that the Prime Minister "at no moment did favour Assad's positions on a return to the

5 October line, even if linked with an exchange of POW" (p.1). Jerusalem sent a few draft proposals to the Americans, including a prisoner exchange, allowing the people to return to the villages and handing the IDF's observation posts around Mt Hermon to UNTSO. Syria outright rejected them.

While Guyer was shuttling between Damascus and Jerusalem, Siilasvuo was chairing meetings at the tent, and he sent similarly detailed coded cables to New York, to which Guyer was privy. This triangulation of information between the Secretary-General, Guyer and Siilasvuo was very useful. Guyer, for example, was able to distil that Syria was not getting as much information on the km 101 negotiations as one would expect her closest war ally would share. Moreover, the Syrians did not believe Egypt would move as fast as to seek peace. Guyer used all the information he obtained from the tent to propose that both sides replicate the model, albeit unsuccessful for the above reasons.

In the end, Guyer's mission did not bring concrete solutions. In an interview published by the Dag Hammarskjöld Library in New York, Guyer (1990) explains that while his mission ended with no tangible outcome, he was able to distil from his conversations with Assad a potential framework for disengagement, which would include a peacekeeping operation. The interviewer asked two interesting questions: 1) whether Kissinger was aware of his mission and 2) to what extent was the Secretary-General in touch with Kissinger. After returning to New York, he briefed them and even went to DC for a bilateral meeting with Kissinger. On the contact issue between Kissinger and Waldheim, he stated, "There were some meetings that took place. It was fluid, I wouldn't say regularly, but it did take place" (p. 4). The mission proved to be a helpful stepping-stone towards the disengagement.

Guyer's mini mission to the Middle East warrants analysis. The fact that the Secretary-General dispatched an Under-Secretary-General to meet Israel and Syria shows that the UN was willing and, more importantly, able to play an active role in the political process. However, its agency was limited. In the coded cables, Guyer highlights, even if obliquely, that parties were also discussing things with Kissinger directly, and he had much more political capital to hammer out an agreement. Guyer met with both heads of government. However, whether they met with him to discuss the situation substantively or out of deference to his

title, the Secretary-General, and out of fear of the international condemnation they would have endured had they chosen to refuse Guyer an audience. A careful review of the communication and the literature demonstrates that his mission was not entirely cosmetic; he could obtain information regarding what it would take sides to agree on a disengagement. However, it was clear the UN would not be in the driver's seat of a future negation.

The fact that an Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations went as far as to deliver political reports to the US Secretary of State shows that the Secretariat was subordinate to the United States' foreign policy. This was not a routine bilateral discussion between the Secretariat and the foreign ministry of a P5 country; after all, he did not visit Moscow to brief the Soviet Foreign Minister, who, at least on paper, had the right to a briefing given that the USSR was the co-chair of the upcoming Geneva Peace Conference.

Guyer's trip to the Middle East was an ad-hoc opportunity the Secretariat embraced. The Secretariat did not have the political capital to propose to the Security Council to appoint another Envoy. The legacy of the Jarring Mission's failure haunted the Secretariat throughout the Geneva Peace Process.

In parallel to Guyer's talks with Syria, Kissinger personally discussed their participation in the upcoming first conference with Damascus. Because the issues addressed by Guyer were too entrenched, the parties made them pre-conditions to attend the conference. Israel stated that if Syria would attend, it would not unless Damascus presented a list of the IDF soldiers held captive. Syria demanded Israeli withdrawal to October 5 in exchange for its attendance. Ultimately, Kissinger decided to hold the conference without Syria and engage with them afterwards (Shlomo, 2015; Bakke & Waag, 2017).

Secretary-General or Conference Manager? The Geneva Peace Conference

Against the background of an interim agreement between Israel and Egypt, the moratorium of the PLO's participation and Syria's empty chair out of the way, the management and agenda of the conference became a priority. To keep the UN relevant in the process, the Secretary-General sought to ensure the active involvement of his office in the political dialogue. He did this by building a relatively close relationship with Kissinger himself. In Waldheim's boxes at the UN Archives, an entire folder of documents provides a fascinating

insight into the UN's role in Kissinger's grand strategy. The folder contains minutes of in-person meetings and letters they exchanged in October (during the war), during the Geneva Peace Conference, and subsequent negotiations.

In the letters between Kissinger and Waldheim, the main issue was the preparation for the Geneva Conference. The Secretary-General sent a letter on 14 November (1973) where he urged the Secretary of State to keep the UN involved in the next steps of the process.

> I have no wish to interfere in any way in the essential negotiations […]. I do feel however, that it is important for several reasons that the United Nations should play a role in the future steps towards a settlement. […] My sole interest as Secretary-General is to ensure the United Nations contributes as much as it possible can to the solution of the problem of the Middle East (1973, pp. 1-2)

The Secretary-General's arguments for a broad UN political engagement are pretty sound. He believes the organisation can provide a political umbrella for bilateral and multilateral discussions. He also stressed that the Secretariat's recent experiences in political negotiations could be an essential asset in the quest for peace. In addition, he reminded Kissinger that the Security Council and the General Assembly had a stake in the conflict, and they were expecting the Secretariat to be a key player. Moving away from the politics, his letter also offered to provide conference management support required for a conference of this complexity. This document is quite illustrative because it shows the Secretary-General *did* want to be in the room. He used the interest the General Assembly started to have in the conflict as political leverage. The letter also shows he was self-aware of his position and the Secretariat, so he began by promising he would not interfere.

On 23 November, Kissinger and Waldheim met in Washington. The minutes of that meeting highlight two critical issues. First, Kissinger expressed his discontent that the negotiations at the tent started to focus on politics. He told the Secretary-General, "he felt these discussions might be better handled at the peace conference and not in meetings like the ones at km 101" (UNA, 1973, p. 1). In addition, he asked the Secretary-General to get clarification from *all* P5 whether they wanted him to attend. The parties agreed that this was a necessary step to avoid any roadblocks. While the Secretary-General might appear to be

coordinating his work with the P5, this goes beyond that. This shows that Kissinger did not see Waldheim as a critical player in the conference –otherwise, he would have personally fought to have Waldheim there. Kissinger made it clear that while the UN Chief would have a seat at the table, he would not have the mandate of chairing both setting the agenda and managing the speakers list. The Secretary-General was, in essence, a glorified observer.

In the end, the co-chairs decided that the conference should take place under the "auspices" of the UN at the *Palais des Nations.* The Secretary-General sent the invitation to Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Syria. He dispatched Urquhart, Guyer and others[58] to Geneva a few days before to prepare the venue and coordinate with the Americans and Soviets.

After so much preparation, negotiations and shuttle diplomacy, the conference was disappointing because most of the attention went to cosmetic problems instead of discussing actual issues. An illustrative example is a seating chart[59]; all three guests were acutely aware of how the negotiations would play out in their domestic constituencies. Therefore, they had different reservations about who to sit next to and why.

The conference met at the foreign minister level a few times in the last ten days of December. The verbatim record of the meetings provides an illustrative insight into the different opening positions (UNA, 1973). In the first meeting, the Secretary-General made a wholehearted call for peace and reminded the delegates that the world had its eyes on their work. However, the Soviet Foreign Minister echoed the call for peace; he also bitterly denounced Israel's "intolerable" policy and reminded the delegates that a large portion of the UN Member States –including the entire Arab world– shares this view.

Kissinger, who had been working for months to reach this point, delivered a more subtle statement. Of course, he reiterated the overarching need for peaceful coexistence in the

[58] The Secretariat delegation: Roberto Guyer, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, Brian Urquhart, Assistant-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, James Jonah, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Vittorio Winspeare-Giucciardi, Director-General of the UN Office at Geneva among others.

[59] In the end, the co-chairs agreed on the sitting a few minutes before the conference was due to start. The Secretary-General sat at the head of the table. Based on a suggestion Urquhart, the co-chairs sat in the middle as "buffers". On one side: Egypt, United States and Jordan. On the other side: Israel, Soviet Union and Syria (who was absent but asked to have an empty chair signalling that it may or may not join the conference at a later stage).

region. He emphasised adopting confidence-building measures and setting achievable objectives to achieve this goal. The first among them was military disengagement.

> Serious discussions have already occurred between Egypt and Israel's military representatives at km 101. It is essential to build promptly on the progress achieved there. And on the Jordanian and Syrian fronts, a comparable base for lessening the tensions and negotiating further steps towards peace must be found. Progress towards peace should include all parties involved (UNA, 1973, p. 12)

This passage summarises his view on the conference and the overarching process. Kissinger knew the first conference was not the time to aim for peace; his goal was to ensure the absence of war. In addition, he used the success as an example for further discussions between Israel and Syria. The last sentence is a nod towards Syria and even the PLO, the two absent actors on the table.

The rest of the first and second meetings revolved around airing grievances. All three countries made politically charged speeches aimed at the table and their domestic audiences equally. In the third meeting, the conference agreed to establish a Military Working Group (MWG) to advance the disengagement of military forces. This was the fundamental objective of the conference.

From the Secretariat's perspective, Urquhart (1987) provided a poignant, somewhat disappointed analysis of the event. His words frame the first conference not as a standalone effort but yet another stepping-stone towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The event, he reflects, did not produce a political outcome. However, it provided political cover for the participants to engage in substantive discussions at the MWG and gave Kissinger a framework to continue his shuttle diplomacy for a few more months. The MWG was pivotal in outlining the mandate AO for UNEF II and UNDOF.

On the other hand, he noted the small political role Kissinger allowed Waldheim to play. Indeed, he laments that Kissinger reduced the Secretary-General to an “adjunct to his brilliant bilateral diplomacy” (p. 246). The trend of the Secretariat’s dwindling political agency continued.

In the field, Siilasvuo went to Cairo to meet the Egyptian Foreign Minister before going to Geneva. The Minister humorously invited the General to join him, as his presence would be required. Siilasvuo remarked that he would only travel at the request of the Secretary-General. Siilasvuo boarded a plane to Geneva to lead the MWG discussions three days later.

The Military Working Group: Exchanging a Tent for a Palace

The UN team who hosted the km 101 negotiations reunited in Geneva, under the supervision of Guyer –whom the Secretary-General appointed as his representative in Geneva after he left on 23 Dec. Siilasvuo (aided by Cap Fallon and Jonah) started their work as the UN Team at the MWG.

The first two issues on the UN team's agenda dealt with the direct Soviet and American participation and the issue of the leadership. The day before the group held its first official meeting, Siilasvuo had bilateral meetings with every country to get a sense of the political mood of the participants. Israel said it would not participate in the group unless the Soviet Union did not. The general proposed a compromise whereby he would brief the Americans and the Soviets after every meeting. The Egyptians enthusiastically suggested Siilasvuo to serve as the chair.

At the onset, Siilasvuo expressed concern that the grandiose diplomatic rooms of the *Palais des Nations* would harm the friendly environment created in the close and simple quarters of the tent. However, his concern proved to be unfounded. The negotiators quickly built a similar friendly rapport, and while the negotiations were tough and the parties rejected each other's proposals routinely, the talks were diplomatic.

In theory, the conference mandated the working group to focus exclusively on military matters. After all, the negotiators (and the UN Chair) were all generals. However, a long-term military disengagement needed to include political considerations. Siilasvuo expressed that "when one party conceded in a certain matter, the other should give a similar concession in some other matter. […] A military concession could be matched by a political one" (1992, p. 225). In a meeting with the Soviet Ambassador, the general stressed that the MWG could not separate political and military matters.

Kissinger continued to shuttle between Cairo and Jerusalem whilst the MWG met in Geneva. This multi-level framework was uncoordinated at best and worked as independent siloes at worst. A key example came when the Israeli delegation showed the MWG an early version of Dayan's disengagement plan. Kissinger protested because he wanted to show the same plan to Sadat but frame it as a joint Israeli-United States initiative. There were cracks in the communication channels; sometimes, things moved faster at the military than at the political level. The generals' approach was more pragmatic and did not take all the political considerations their superiors did.

Not everything at the MWG worked smoothly; there was still distrust. Regarding the Dayan Plan, Siilasvuo expressed that the UN team "were probably the only ones who did not know anything about this plan" (p. 226). Ultimately, the political discussion did not include anybody from the Secretariat. Headquarters briefed Siilasvuo on the negotiation's outcome and instructed him to arrange for the signing ceremony, which was due to take place at km 101.

Since 1957, Israel has agreed to withdraw from territory obtained through war for the first time. Moreover, it did so while technically at war (Bar-Siman Tov, 1998). The terms of the agreement saw Israel withdraw from areas it conquered in both the Six-Day War *and* the Yom Kippur War (United Nations Security Council , 1973). The agreement placed UNEF II as a buffer between the countries (Akehurst, 1981). This document is praiseworthy. The disengagement was the first time Israel and one of her neighbours took a decisive move towards peace. An important detail that adds to the document's political cunning is that this was not a non-belligerence declaration; the political price of such a statement was too high for Sadat, who had to keep the hardliners in his country in check. Kissinger packaged the document to be purely military. However, it was another stepping-stone on the road towards peace (Gat, 2016).

As we see in Chapter 3, Siilasvuo chaired several meetings at the tent through which the countries and UNEF II agreed on the implementation. The process was much smoother and more effective because this was the first time the generals only had to discuss military affairs. The politics were, for the time being, out of the way. Given how tense the situation in the

Sinai had been ever since the war ended, all parties concerned had a genuine interest in lowering the tensions. UNEF II and UNTSO proved fundamental in ensuring the absence of war in the Sinai Peninsula.

Israel – Syria Disengagement: A Herculean Task

The following section will provide a brief overview of the three stages of the process. The first is the substantive talks led by Kissinger through shuttle diplomacy between January and May 1974. The second stage occurred over five days between 31 May and 5 June at Geneva's Military Working Group level. The third stage is the implementation of the MWG's decisions by way of establishing and deploying UNDOF. Like the Sinai disengagement process, the Secretariat –via Guyer and Siilasvuo– had a much more impactful role after Kissinger convinced the parties to sign the disengagement plan.

Everything up until this point was difficult. The cease-fire negotiations, the conference preparations, the negotiation between Israel and Egypt and UNEF's deployment took much painstaking diplomacy. Why was this disengagement so difficult? There are two crucial reasons: geography and politics.

The Sinai Peninsula is an invaluable geopolitical and economic asset to Egypt due to the Suez Canal, the vast mineral wealth, and the buffer between mainland Egypt and Israel. Cairo understood that it was unable to reclaim the peninsula by force, which is why it was willing to engage in a step-by-step negotiation to ensure its return. Sadat understood Kissinger's approach and decided to follow his lead. Chapter 5 highlights Egypt's evolution in its approach to Israel and how Cairo 'sacrificed' the Palestinian question in order to get the peninsula back.

On the other hand, the Golan Heights are a geopolitical critical piece of land, and both sides saw controlling it as an existential foreign policy goal. They provide Israel with "invaluable defensive advantages because of its topography in terms of observation and fire control while simultaneously protecting Israeli land from possible Syrian attacks" (Walter, 2019, p. 21)**.** In addition, Israel obtains the most valuable commodity from the Heights: water. Indeed, 30% of Israel's water supply comes from Lake Kinneret in southern Heights (Kumaraswamy, 1999). For Syria, losing the Golan Heights put them in a dire situation. Apart from the

Heights, Syria does not have any natural borders with Israel. The IDF is less than 50 km away from Damascus and, because of Israel's military might, the two factors leave Syria entirely exposed (Muslih, 1993).

Israel certainly enjoyed the economic and political benefits of occupying the Sinai Peninsula; however, it never made it an existential issue for its survival. In contrast, from the onset, Jerusalem built a political narrative that stressed that the Heights play a vital role in ensuring the country's survival. On the other hand, Syria packaged the loss of the Golan as the result of a foreign invasion that robbed them. The government always highlighted that to restore national pride. The country would only make peace with Israel if it withdrew to 5 June 1967 borders (Ben-Meir, 1997).

As stated earlier, to top of this already difficult situation, the Yom Kippur war left several outstanding issues between the countries. While the Geneva peace conference proved to be an essential stepping-stone from managing the Sinai sector, the conditions were not ripe to discuss the Golan Heights in Geneva. For Kissinger to start tackling the situation in the Heights, he needed the political momentum gained for successfully lowering the temperatures in the south. In addition, as we will see in the next section, Kissinger was required to reduce the temperatures in the Golan to move forward with the second Sinai disengagement plan and, a few years later, the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. All of these talks fit within Kissinger's grand plan (Shlomo, 2015).

The disengagement negotiations required Kissinger's direct involvement in every single issue. Indeed, he "has devoted more of his time and craft to the consequences of that conflict than to any other issue of foreign policy" (Sheehan, 1976, p. 4). Throughout the process, they micromanaged every single detail. Chief among them, the prisoner exchange, the demarcation of the disengagement zone (about the Syrian city of Quneitra[60] and in general)

[60] The two parties fought over control of the city between 1967 and 1973. Israel captured the city on the last day of the Six-Day War and occupied it. The war destroyed a large portion of the city. The Syrian military routinely shelled IDF's positions in the city, which contributed to the city's further destruction. At the onset of the Yom Kippur War, the Syrians recaptured briefly, before it fell again to the IDF when Israel launched a counter-offensive. The city remained under Israeli control until the disengagement plan placed in inside UNDOF's Area of Operation. Before the IDF left the city, it systematically destroyed its infrastructure in order to leave it in ruins. The Syrian government left it as is and built memorials to display Israel's destruction. For more see Zisser (2017) & Kapusňak (2014).

and the mandate and composition of UNDOF (Safran, 1974). Kissinger visited the region a dozen times, hosted meetings in Washington with diplomats from both sides and dealt with their heads of government directly.

Through his direct involvement with Assad, Kissinger built a solid bilateral relationship and moved Syria away from the Soviet influence as much as possible. Bakke & Waag (2017) argue that while this growing relationship improved Assad's stance in the West, Kissinger took advantage of Syria's weak political and military position and managed to get them to agree to disengage despite not getting what they needed. While Assad resisted the terms and put plenty of roadblocks to the process, Kissinger struggled more with Israel. The Meir premiership was, politically, over. Her party already elected Yitzhak Rabin to replace her. However, he delayed taking office until the agreement with Syria was finalised. With this in mind and staring at the end of her political career, Prime Minister Meir felt her government had to be extremely tough to "compensate for the debacle of the war" (Bar-Siman Tov, 1998, p. 10). Even though the United States was a crucial supporter of the Israeli war effort, the government was not ready to placate Kissinger's demands without putting up a fight.

Kissinger moved back and forth between Jerusalem and Damascus and discussed multiple proposals. In the end, the agreement stipulated that Syria regained a portion of the Heights occupied by Israel after the last two wars, including the city of Quneitra. Both parties wanted to keep control of the town, albeit for very different reasons. Israel did not want to set a precedent of "land for peace", and for Syria, regaining control of the city was an issue of national pride. In the end, Israel agreed to withdraw as long as the city fell into the demilitarized zone between them. Another critical issue in the negotiations was Israel's requirement that Syria gives public assurances that it would prevent any Palestinian activities in the demilitarized zone. The issue proved to be highly complicated because this type of declaration had enormous political costs for Assad both internally and in the Arab World. In the end, Syria sent Kissinger (and therefore, Israel) a letter stating, "There will be no firing across the lines by anyone. There [will be] no possibility for organized armed bands to cross into Israel" (Shlomo, 2015, p. 646). At Kissinger's behest, Israel agreed to this arrangement.

UNDOF: Taking a Leaf of Dag's Book

The negotiations proved challenging, and they took months; however, the parties wanted to see the plan implemented in *days*. Therefore, as soon as the political discussion was finished, the Secretariat embarked on a two-level approach to ensure UNDOF's smooth and efficient deployment. This sub-section drew information from Siilasvuo's memoirs, the reports he sent to the Secretary-General (UNA, 1975) and a Working Paper[61] drafted by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in 1977 which provides an in-depth report on the establishment of all operations up until that point (UNA, 1977).

The first level was the reconvening of the MWG. On 31 May, Siilasvuo chaired a signing ceremony and immediately chaired meetings where the parties discussed the technical details. Siilasvuo, once again, played a pivotal role in the discussions, which proved considerably more difficult. The negotiations required much more diplomacy and, at the same time, pragmatism for a few reasons. First, Syria did not want to give the public impression they were negotiating with the Israelis directly. Instead, they "joined" the Egyptian delegation, who publicly was the party dealing with Israel. Of course, in reality, Syria sent a delegation who had their mandate and their voice. The items the MWG met included inter alia: the disengagement schedule and the supervision of its continuous enforcement thereafter. The discussions moved at a very brisk pace, and while there were a few disagreements, the days were productive.

Even with such a narrow mandate, the conference was profoundly political. This created an issue for the Syrians, who agreed on the importance of these issues; however, they did not want them to be inside the disengagement protocol. To solve this, Siilasvuo proposed a separate paper titled *Statement of the Chairman*. The document served as an outlet because it contains the details of the disengagement plan and serves as the military framework for the political disengagement plan. The parties agreed that both the disengagement agreement and the statement of the chair are equally binding to the parties

The General highlights that his job was easier because, by the time the MWG met, the parties had already signed the political agreement (Siilasvuo, 1992). This sequential approach was

[61] This paper is also cited in Chapter 1

far more efficient than the one employed in the Sinai when the km 101 negotiations took place simultaneously as Kissinger negotiated the preparations of the peace conference.

The MWG agreed that the disengagement would start 24 hours after their meeting adjourned. Therefore, Siilasvuo had to change his diplomat hat for UNEF's Force Commander and rush back to the field where a daunting task awaited him. Urquhart and the Secretariat in New York now took up the political functions of UNDOF's deployment.

The Secretariat now had to move quickly. While implementing an already signed political and military document might seem that all left to do is administrative work, setting up a peacekeeping operation is a delicate political affair. The Secretariat had the following tasks: discuss with Israel and Syria UNDOF's composition; approach the TCCs who already have troops in the region; appoint a Force Commander; and coordinate the interim arrangements with UNEF and UNTSO (Urquhart, 1987).

The next day, the Secretary-General and Urquhart travelled to Washington to meet with Kissinger and discuss UNDOF. The meeting minutes reflect that Kissinger gave them a few valuable suggestions regarding the operation (UNA, 1974). First, Kissinger emphasized that the Secretariat must ensure that UNDOF has the necessary liberty to do its job. He urged them to be very strict "and avoid as far as possible being pushed around" (UNA, 1974, p. 2). It was imperative to prevent Syria to establish military positions in the demilitarized zone. Kissinger felt that Syria would exploit any loophole it could and that the UN had to resist this at all costs. Second, Kissinger remarked that while the Secretariat is free to redeploy troops from UNTSO and UNEF (as we see in Chapter 3), they must fall under UNDOF's banner when working in Syria. This means that UNTSO must no longer work in Syria and that the operation needs to have a Force Commander of its own. Fourth, he declared that the United States would "receive favourably any request for assistance" (p. 3). Fifth, he reminded the Secretary-General that Assad personally and the Syrian government, in general, were "extremely sensitive" over the AO and the mandate's duration; he urged them to be firm but treat carefully.

With these recommendations in mind, they moved quickly. The Secretariat requested Austria, Peru, Canada and Poland[62] (the latter two would be providing logistical support) permission to redeploy some of their contingents to UNDOF. The Secretary-General appointed Brig Gen Gonzalo Briceno of Peru as interim Force Commander. The Secretariat had swift and productive discussions with all these countries who stood ready to collaborate (Houghton & Trinka, 1984).

The Secretary-General and Urquhart visited the region to visit the three operations and meet with their hosts. Overall, both Jerusalem and Damascus were relieved UNDOF was on the ground because it reduced their pressure. Of course, the operation encountered many issues. The parties continued to argue over maps. The Syrians bitterly protested when UNDOF destroyed new military posts within its area of operation. That said, UNDOF performed its duties admirably and kept the Israel-Syria sector quiet for many years.

The Second Sinai Disengagement Plan 1975

Kissinger moved quickly to solidify the Israel-Egypt disengagement and started trilateral negotiations to that effect. The political establishment in Egypt was ripe for this change. Sadat wanted to cement Egypt's alliance with the United States and was willing to continue reducing and then wholly eradicate the chance for war with Israel (Brooks, 2008). In addition, the political climate domestically shifted, and the population was far less inclined to endure a protracted stalemate. In 1973 going to war solidified the government's position domestically, whereas, in 1975, it did the opposite (Karawan, 2005). Therefore, negotiating the second disengagement had both internal and external components.

Getting Israel to agree to the second disengagement was a tough challenge. Newly minted Prime Minister Rabin and his government thoroughly used the geopolitical situation they found themselves in due to the war. While they still relied on American military support, they did not face an immediate threat from any of her neighbours; not even Egypt had the economic or military assets to declare war again. Therefore, the prime minister rejected Kissinger's initial efforts in early 1975 and, more structurally, expressed no interest in

[62] At the time, Israel and Poland did not have diplomatic relations. Israel had a firm policy of refusing entry to peacekeepers from countries with whom she had no ties. Kissinger requested Israel to make an exception for the Polish contingent to move from the Sinai through Israel on their way to Syria.

attending a second peace conference in Geneva. Adopting an extraordinarily blunt approach with its greatest ally, Israel used Kissinger's efforts to leverage a large-scale military aid from the Americans to guarantee long-term security needs (Wheelock, 1978).

Rabin's hard stance in the negotiations created significant tension between Israel and the United States. Kissinger nearly reached his breaking point in dealings with Rabin and his cabinet. The White House was extremely angry at Israel's refusal to sit down with the Egyptians, leading Kissinger to threaten Rabin with less political and military aid. On March 22, Kissinger met with Prime Minister Rabin, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and others and pleaded his case. However, the Israelis did not give an inch, and the negotiations temporarily collapsed (Sheehan, 1976). President Ford announced that the United States declared it would "reassess" its Israel policy. The decision paved the way for a genuine political confrontation between the allies. The American government began exploring options such as reconvening the Geneva peace conference and publishing a comprehensive plan calling Israel to withdraw to 1967 borders.

However, two significant factors prevented this from happening. First, the US Presidential election was looming. This limited President Ford's room for manoeuvre. Second, there was considerable pushback from the US Senate. On 21 May 1975, 76 members of the Senate sent the White House a letter urging them to stop the reassessment and normalise the relationship. Jackson (2015) concludes that the reassessment did not go through partially because of domestic constraints. However, the author remarks that Ford and Kissinger could have overcome this if they wanted to torpedo the bilateral relations. The White House could have mobilised public support domestically for their position and built a narrative where peace failed because of Israel. In the end, they did not go as far as they could have, which saved the disengagement plan and the bilateral relationship.

Prime Minister Rabin's gamble paid off. His political position improved considerably inside the country. Moreover, because the Americans blinked, they motivated Israel to negotiate through inducements. In June, the prime minister visited Washington and expressed his willingness to finalise an agreement to lower the tensions.

Once the Israelis started to act constructively, they negotiated in good faith for issues they wanted to see enshrined in the agreement. The second disengagement agreement stipulated the Israeli withdrawal of two passes and the oil fields. In addition, "the front line of the new buffer zone was twice as long as the first, and its area was four times as large" (Stjernfelt, 1992, p. 103). Similarly, to the Israel-Syria disengagement, the countries agreed to 'cushion' UNEF with areas where they would have limited armament. The document reaffirmed UNEF's position and endorsed the importance of its work. The most important aspect of this document was the declaration of their intent to solve this conflict by peaceful means (Podeh, 2015). Even if Israel and Egypt were not ready to sign a comprehensive peace treaty, the two disengagement agreements paved the way to the goal. For the first time, Israel was close to signing a peace treaty with one of its neighbours.

The Fourth Meeting of the Military Working Group

As usual, once the parties finalised their work, they dispatched their generals to Geneva to reconvene the MWG. Siilasvuo, now the Chief-Coordinator of UN Peacekeeping in the Middle East with the rank of Under-Secretary-General travelled to Geneva for the group's last meeting. On Thursday, 4 September 1975, the parties signed the agreement, which gave the MWG two weeks to finalise their work.

Siilasvuo took a more proactive role in the discussions. Together with Jonah and Cap Fallon, they met the Israeli and Egyptian delegations separately. The talks dealt with the agenda, the schedule and the sequence they proposed to address the various issues. The UN Team then wrote a road map for the coming two weeks and submitted it to the parties on Saturday evening. Siilasvuo knew this round of discussions was going to be difficult. "Kissinger had left many more open questions than in previous disengagement agreements. Our competence and negotiation skills would be put to a hard test" (Siilasvuo, 1992, p. 310). That said, the UN was not the only third party in Geneva. For the first time, the United States sent a representative, Harold Saunders, a senior official of the National Security Council and aide to Kissinger. Saunders did not sit in the discussions, but he had an office next door. He met with the parties to whom he gave suggestions throughout the process. Moreover, he had an excellent working relationship with the UN Team, and Siilasvuo claims his role in the process was "invaluable".

The MWG met 21 times over 15 days. Siilasvuo's report to the Secretary-General shows that the first seven cordial and constructive meetings were very slow (UNA, 1975). The parties discussed UNEF's core functions in the new buffer zone. The operation will establish multiple checkpoints, including sea approaches, staff multiple OPs and regularly patrol the area. On 12 September, Siilasvuo reported a "complete agreement reached on UNEF" (UNA, 1975, p. 2). The outstanding issues are the deployment of forces, transfer of oil fields, number of civilians living in the north, and the Joint Commission's setup.

Despite the UNEF's functions being out of the way, all parties expressed concern and exasperation on the discussions' pace. To meet the deadline, Siilasvuo decided to speed things up and make the meetings last longer than initially planned. At the second to last meeting, the parties agreed that Egypt would have 700 police officers in the Peninsula.

Concerning the population, the agreement proved to be more complicated. Israel saw the return of the civilian population to the Peninsula as a security threat. Egypt saw the issue of civilian movement within national borders purely as a domestic concern, and they did not want to appear to negotiate this matter with foreign powers. Siilasvuo came up with a creative proposal through which the Egyptian Liaison Officer to UNEF –who happened to be Egypt's chief negotiator in Geneva– would write a letter to the Chief Coordinator stating that to facilitate UNEF's smooth operations, Egypt was going to give the mission information on the people living in its area of operation. The government gave the civilians identity cards that UNEF certified. This mechanism gave Israel sufficient information, so they agreed.

The third issue revolved around the Joint Commission. Israel proposed a permanent commission to serve as the dispute settlement mechanism. This forum would help build trust and a working relationship between the militaries. The General explains that while everyone agreed this was a helpful idea, Egypt was reluctant to agree to anything 'permanent' because Cairo was not politically ready to signal its intent to reach a peace agreement. Once again, Siilasvuo came up with a compromise. However, the Joint Commission would not have a permanent headquarters; they would meet whenever the Chief Coordinator or the parties requested it (Siilasvuo, 1992).

With the agreement signed, the responsibilities moved from Geneva back to the Sinai. UNEF, with the cooperation of UNTSO, began to assist the parties in the withdrawal of forces, facilitated the return of the oil fields to Egypt, and provided buffers between the parties as they withdrew. UNEF's role as an interlocutor between the parties was a fundamental part of the disengagement's success.

From a political standpoint, this was as far as Kissinger's 'step-by-step' diplomacy could take the Israel-Arab conflict. By the time spring of 1976, when the disengagement was completed, US President Ford was in the middle of a heated election, which he ended up losing to Jimmy Carter. The newly elected President decided to dismiss Kissinger from government. Therefore, peace between Israel and Egypt had to wait until the new administration settled into the role.

The Soviet Union and the Arab world in particular did not feel the bilateral approach, which bypassed the Palestinian question, was productive. This sentiment was prophetic to their eventual reaction to the Camp David Accords and UNIFIL's deployment. They found a place to express these grievances in the UN General Assembly

Winds of Change: The General Assembly v The West

The latter half of the 1970s was full of political change and turmoil for the United Nations and the international system, which had a direct impact into the Secretariat's role in the conflict. In the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, the General Assembly started to take a more active and partisan approach vis-à-vis the conflict. On 22 November 1974, the General Assembly adopted resolution 3236. The document stressed the importance of placing the Palestinian question at the centre of the Israel-Arab conflict is paramount to achieving a full solution. Furthermore, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to establish contact with the PLO to discuss any matters related to the Palestinian people. The resolution came as close as possible to granting observer status to PLO without actually doing so. The resolution gave the PLO enormous political agency and a ringing endorsement to their activities (Irfan, 2020).

Therefore, the study of the subsequent bilateral agreements between Israel and Egypt and the Secretariat's role (and agency) as a policy broker require us to look beyond the actual negotiations between the countries to include the mood in New York and across the region.

The General Assembly gradually became a forum whereby the Global South expressed its discontent with the West. Indeed, because they are the overwhelming majority and the Assembly's resolutions are non-binding, the Global South used the body to signal their views. The Assembly, at the behest of the Soviet Union, started to take notice of the Israel-Arab conflict and discussions on Zionism as racism began (Fishman, 2011).

Ever since the Yom Kippur War, the PLO successfully lobbied the General Assembly and started to build momentum towards a condemnation of Zionism (Lewis, 1976). Arafat skilfully took advantage of the Soviet-Arab antagonism towards Israel and the Global South's antagonism against the United States. After all, in their view, attacking one was attacking the other (Troy, 2013).

They succeeded. On 10 November 1975, the General Assembly adopted resolution 3379 declared, "Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination" (1975). Urquhart saw the resolution as a "mindless and counterproductive provocation which was a turning point in United Nations affairs, especially in the United States, without in any way helping the Palestinians" (1987, p. 264). His assessment was purely pragmatic. The resolution was bitterly condemned in Jerusalem, arguing that anti-Zionism is a thinly veiled form of anti-Semitism. Moreover, it crystalized the Israeli notion that the United Nations cannot be trusted to be impartial.

In Washington, the Administration bitterly rejected the resolution and, more importantly, so did Congress. The Ford Administration denounced the resolution and vehemently declared its opposition. Kissinger labelled it as "extremely unhelpful and highly irresponsible". At Capitol Hill, the resolution proved to be very useful for the anti-UN wings of both parties and by some long-term UN supporters as well. The UN System ended up paying for the General Assembly's resolution because the American government became less prone to contribute to the organisation. In the next ten years after the resolution, the US cut its contributions to the UN by approx. 40%, which put the UN System in a severe financial crisis (Luck, 1987).

Policymakers in Jerusalem and Washington understood that the Secretariat has no power over the General Assembly and that the latter does not necessarily represent the opinions of the former. However, their constituencies and even members of Congress and the Knesset were unwilling to distinguish between the UN as an organization and the UN as a forum for inter-governmental debate. Therefore, the resolution made it even more difficult for the Secretariat to play a leading role in future political discussion on the Israel-Arab conflict.

The Secretariat started the second half of the 1970s facing a difficult political climate vis-à-vis the conflict. As time passed from the second disengagement agreement, the Secretary-General pushed for a second meeting of the Geneva Peace Conference, which did not materialise. Instead, the Israelis and Egyptians decided to, once again, meet bilaterally – under US auspices– to sign the Camp David Accords. Because this agreement signals an important milestone for the Secretariat's role in the conflict (due to UNEF's withdrawal), this issue is discussed in Chapter 5 as one of the two ending points of this dissertation.

In 1978, the situation in Southern Lebanon reached a boiling point and the Secretariat had to design and manage a peacekeeping operation in an inhospitable environment with no rule of law.

Lebanon

Throughout its existence, Lebanon faced enormous socio-political challenges. The country was one of the most diverse in the region, and it did not have a clear ethnoreligious majority as every other Middle Eastern state had (Sroby, 2000). This multi-ethnicity led to constant power struggles and violent conflict. In 1958, Lebanon fought a civil war, culminating in a delicate power-sharing agreement between Christian and Muslim factions. Over the next two decades, both sides constantly stressed this fragile social contract; the different factions did not seek to build a State but consolidate their power (Azar & Haddad, 1986). To make matters even more complicated, Lebanon also had to deal with the consequences of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

From a political and military point of view, Lebanon played a minor role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. After the 1949 Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon, the sector was relatively quiet. However, the situation started to change when approximately 300,000

Palestinian refugees moved to Southern Lebanon in the 1970s. "The Palestinians are not voluntary refugees in Lebanon. Nor did the Lebanese actively seek to deal with them, either initially as refugees, (or) a few years later as enemies (at the time of the PLO guerrillas)" (El Khazen, 1997, p. 276). Their presence played a destabilising role for two main reasons. First, the PLO became an active player in Lebanese politics by forming alliances with left-wing Muslim factions. Second, their constant guerrilla attacks on Israel, who then retaliated, put Lebanese people in harm's way and, more critical, turned Southern Lebanon into an active war front. The Lebanese government did not have the economic or military capacity to control the area. The PLO created a state within a state in Southern Lebanon (Waage & Huse, 2019).

In 1975, another civil war broke out in the country, and this time, Syria decided to intervene in the conflict with boots on the ground. In June 1976, Syria deployed naval and land forces to engage the PLO coalition. As a result, the Christian faction controlled East Beirut and Northern Lebanon; the PLO controlled West Beirut and Southern Lebanon (Hinnebusch, 1998). Syrian forces did not enter Southern Lebanon to avoid risking another direct conflict with Israel.

When Israel deployed Operation Litani (see Chapter 3), the Security Council met immediately to discuss the matter. For the Lebanese government, Israel's invasion presented an opportunity. They could renew their request to the Security Council to deploy a peacekeeping operation. An international force could help them start reclaiming their territory and fend off both the PLO and its allies. However, unlike in 1973, the Soviet Union was initially opposed to the idea. Moreover, within the Secretariat, many senior staffers, including Urquhart and Siilasvuo, were adamantly against the proposal of sending peacekeepers to Southern Lebanon (Gööksel, 2007; Urquhart, 1987). They argued that peacekeeping was not suited to keep the peace amidst a civil war, especially in an area with no absolute authority; Southern Lebanon was a state within a state, primarily controlled by the PLO.

A controversial, rushed deployment

While Chapter 5 reviews the Camp David Accords, it is important to stress that they played a decisive role in establishing UNIFIL. Operation Litani created a political problem that went beyond the Israel-PLO conflict. A few months prior, Egyptian President Sadat visited Jerusalem and spoke at the Knesset of peace between the countries. From the onset, the rest of the Arab World was as adamant about rejecting this prospect, as Sadat was to achieve it; the Arab League denounced the possibility. Therefore, from a political perspective, "it was imperative for Israel to not antagonise its neighbours […] to do so would make Sadat's peace initiative extremely difficult" (Erskine, 1989, p. 11). Israel's invasion of Southern Lebanon did precisely this and jeopardised the prospects for peace.

The United States embraced Lebanon's request to host a peacekeeping operation and started to lobby partners in the Council to agree. The Carter Administration's main objective was to keep the Israel-Egypt peace process alive. Proposing to deploy UNIFIL gave Israel a dignified way to pull back the IDF; it sent a signal to the Arab World that the United States would not give Israel *carte blanche* to invade its neighbours. Washington strongly condemned the terrorist attack *and* Israel's response (Yorke, 1978). This balance helped keep the impression that President Carter was an honest broker.

As laudable as Carter's quest for peace was, the American decision-making process concerning Lebanon was, at best, flawed and, at worst, negligent. They sponsored the idea of a peacekeeping operation with no intent to tackle the systemic issues facing Southern Lebanon (Makdisi, 2014). Therefore, they gave UNIFIL a rather bland and vague mandate to deal with the conflict. UNIFIL did not have the necessary tools to keep the peace because there was no peace or interest in achieving it. The PLO and Israel wanted to neutralise each other as much as possible; the Lebanese government wanted to use its proxy to attack the PLO. The Security Council deployed UNIFIL to ensure Israel's withdrawal of Southern Lebanon and assist the Lebanese authorities in restoring peace and security. However, its area of operation was "contested not just by these two states but also by several Lebanese and non-Lebanese forces. These included the PLO and an Israeli-supported Christian Lebanese militia led by Major Saad Haddad" (Findlay, 2002, p. 103). UNIFIL was not prepared to tackle this challenge.

The Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council outlining UNIFIL's terms of reference (1978). The Secretariat designed UNIFIL in UNEF's image; the force had the same conditions related to force, freedom of movement, and the Secretary-General's authority over the Force Commander. However, two crucial elements warrant discussion.

First, the Secretary-General stresses that UNIFIL, much like any other peacekeeping operation, "cannot and must not take on responsibilities which fall under the government […] it is assumed that the Lebanese government will take the necessary measures to cooperate with UNIFIL in this regard (United Nations Security Council, 1978, p. 2). The Secretariat knew this was not possible. They added this clause as political insurance. They knew that it was a matter of time before UNIFIL started to face systemic challenges. While their operations had the necessary mandate and equipment to facilitate Israel's withdrawal, they did not have any chance to assist the Lebanese government to restore control over the area. When UNIFIL started to receive complaints, one of the Secretariat's main arguments to defend its record was that the expectations did not match the resources or political capital it had to deal with the issue.

The United States did not give the Secretariat much room to weigh in; the Security Council adopted the resolution a few days after the Americans introduced it. Probably the Americans knew the Secretariat did not want to manage a peacekeeping operation in Southern Lebanon. Urquhart summarises the Secretariat's views on the matter succinctly

> I explained my concerns that once the Security Council, under American pressure, had decided to send a force to Southern Lebanon, the United States and others would rapidly lose interest, ignore the problems, which our soldiers would inevitably face, and leave us and the troop-contributing countries without the necessary political support to do the job. Subsequent events amply justified this pessimistic evaluation (1987, p. 288).

Second, the Secretary-General informs the Council that he instructed Siilasvuo to engage with the governments of Israel and Lebanon to discuss the IDF's withdrawal from the area. The report does not mention potential meetings with the PLO. As Chapter 3 showed, the UNIFIL Force Commander, Erskine, and Siilasvuo himself regularly met with the PLO. Of

course, the report does not mention this, mentioning the PLO in a report of the Secretary-General in the same way Lebanon and Israel itself would have elevated the PLO to *de facto* UN Member State, something Israel was aggressively fighting. The following sub-section discusses the political role the Chief-Coordinator, the Force Commander, and their staff played at the political level, engaging with Israel, Lebanon, the PLO, and the South Lebanon Army (SLA).

Every Force Commander had to deal with politics. As we saw throughout chapters three and four, it is impossible to have a strict separation of military and political affairs. The Secretary-General designed the role of Chief Coordinator to support the Force Commanders in their political dealings with officials from their host countries. Until UNIFIL started its mission, Siilasvuo and his Force Commanders from the other operations interacted with military and civilian officers from UN Member States. The conflict cease-fire and disengagement agreement they monitored came from a conventional war between states. UNIFIL deviated from the mould; the operations had to build political relationships with non-state actors to perform its mandated duties and, at times, even guarantee the safety of its officials.

While UNIFIL began to receive its first contingent, redeployed from UNEF and UNTSO, the Force Commander and the Chief Coordinator started their meetings. Siilasvuo led the discussions with the Israeli government. In these meetings, Siilasvuo gauged their views on UNIFIL's AO; both countries wanted UNIFIL to have a broader presence to stop further PLO attacks. Therefore, the Secretariat's, and therefore UNIFIL's, relationship with Israel was complicated. Lebanon's position was the most straightforward of the conflict. The government gave UNIFIL green light to move anywhere within their country; however, they controlled roughly half of it, which meant the operation needed to talk to the people who controlled the other half.

The first challenge facing UNIFIL was the dire need to establish an AO. In 1973-4, the Military Working Group met in Geneva to agree on UNEF and UNDOF's areas of operation. Under Siilasvuo's watchful eye, the two parties negotiated over every single detail. Once they agreed, the Secretariat consolidated the operations. In UNIFIL's case, the operation itself had to negotiate the AO *after* they arrived. The United States was in such a rush to find a dignified

way out for Israel that they did not direct the parties to discuss this before the deployment (Erskine, 1989).

Together with Jonah, Erskine met with Arafat to secure the PLO's respect for UNIFIL. Arafat assured them the PLO would comply with resolution 425 and welcome the operation. In exchange, he requested UNIFIL to exclude the city of Tyre from its AO claiming the PLO would not use them to attack Israel. Arafat lied. The PLO continued to attack Israel because the real price for not attacking Israel from the Tyre area was still to come: Arafat wanted the UN to acknowledge the PLO as one of the key parties to the conflict (Makdisi, 2014). The Secretary-General met with Arafat in April 1978, which paved the way for the PLO's acceptance of UNIFIL's AO. However, he never intended to keep his political promises.

The Secretariat's negotiations with the three parties led to an agreement UNIFIL's AO "should consist of all areas the IDF physically used or held: this meant the whole area south of the Litani" (Erskine, 1989, p. 37). UNIFIL began the first phase, ensuring Israel's withdrawal from Southern Lebanon shortly thereafter. In June 1978, the IDF vacated its positions from the area; however, instead of handing over control to the UNIFIL, as per the agreement, Israel decided to deliver control to the South Lebanon Army (SLA), a Christian militia, led by Major Saad Haddad (Makdisi, Goksel, Hauck, & Reigeluth, 2009). The SLA was an Israeli proxy; it relied exclusively on Israeli support to operate. Haddad believed his militia had the mandate to protect the people of Southern Lebanon; however; the real interest was to establish a 'security area' between Northern Israel and the PLO-controlled Southern Lebanon; Haddad, in a quest to enlarge the SLA's domain, repeatedly attacked UNIFIL positions, harassed its soldiers and the SLA shelled the operation's headquarters (Weinberger, 1983).

Furthermore, the Council invited the Lebanese government to co-create a programme to increase governmental control over the area with the Secretariat. In his third political report, Holger stressed that the Lebanese military was in no condition to deploy a substantial contingent to the south because it could not guarantee their safety (UNA, 1979).

However, a month later, the Lebanese military deployed a battalion to UNIFIL's area of operation. The Secretary-General got personally involved in this initiative. He exchanged

letters and held meetings with the Israeli Prime Minister and Israel's permanent representative in New York, respectively, to request Israel's support in this endeavour. The objective was to get Israel to convince Haddad to refrain from attacking UNIFIL. Haddad reacted very badly to the initial deployment. 18 April proved to be a tragic day. Early in the morning, the SLA shelled an advance UNIFIL team. Things got even worse when a helicopter suffered a shot trying to land in Naqoura. The *coup de grace* came when UNIFIL's headquarters came under attack. The peacekeepers fought back and killed one SLA militant. Despite Haddad's best efforts to spoil the redeployment, UNIFIL and the Lebanese military stood firm. Unfortunately, this was one of the few tangible successes of UNIFIL's task to restore government presence in the area (Novosseloff, 2015a).

In addition to Haddad's dealings, UNIFIL also had another adversary: the PLO. UNIFIL had two fundamental problems in its dealings with PLO. First, Arafat did not keep any of the promises he made to the Secretary-General himself. Second, guerrilla movements do not always follow orders. The PLO also had serious encounters with UNIFIL. On 1 May, Palestinian militants attacked an observation post staffed by French soldiers; they defended themselves and killed two of the attackers. The PLO exacted revenge a few days later, killing three UNIFIL soldiers (Erskine, 1989).

Siilasvuo saw other issues with the PLO. After Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon, around 300-armed Palestinian militants remained inside UNIFIL's AO. Both Siilasvuo and Erskine adamantly proposed to remove them. The Secretary-General disagreed. Instead, he dispatched a negotiator. Arafat offered to avoid attacking Israel from UNIFIL's position in exchange for the fighters to remain in place. The generals believed this decision cost UNIFIL "its neutral status and credibility" (Siilasvuo, 1992, p. 347). The Secretary-General's decision to allow Arafat was purely political and completely disregarded UNIFIL's operational requirements. Waldheim's decision to appease Arafat's demands revolved around his desire to lead a second iteration of the Geneva Peace Conference. Since his re-election in 1976, he pushed to revitalise the process; however, he never got anything off the ground. Israel and Egypt (and the United States) moved quickly and signed the Camp David Accords.

As a result of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty, the PLO adopted a dual strategy. On the one hand they embarked on an effective diplomatic campaign to gain wider recognition; Arafat met with senior officials from several European countries. On the other hand, they increased their military efforts against Israel. The PLO needed to show strength on the ground to solidify its claim that it was fighting a legitimate war, which deserved international support. This made things even more complicated for UNIFIL (UNA, 1979).

The Chief Coordinator and UNIFIL worked very hard to make the operation work. Security Council resolutions 425 and 426 are vague; the United States pushed them through without thinking of what would happen after the operation raised the UN flag in Naqoura. The Generals in the field had an enormous responsibility. However, they struggled to assert themselves. Almost every single actor on the ground distrusted UNIFIL and worked to undermine it. The operation suffered repeated attacks, casualties, damages to equipment and constant harassment. Despite the fact the two generals regularly engaged with the PLO, the SLA, Lebanon and Israel, they failed to move the political needle. As chapter 5 shows, UNIFIL was undermined even more when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982. Overall, UNIFIL worked as best it could to implement its mandate. However, this experience clearly showed that if the Security Council does not provide robust political support to the operation, the operation could not succeed.

Conclusion

This chapter critically assesses how the Secretariat played a proactive role in the Israel-Arab conflict. Because this chapter looked at the *Secretariat* rather than just the Secretary-General, the answer to our research question must be as holistic as the question. Therefore, the following sub-sections will cover the Secretary-General and the Office for Special Political Affairs. The Chief Coordinator of Peacekeeping in the Middle East reported to Urquhart and Guyer; however, his contributions are analysed separately because of his unique role.

The findings reveal that the Secretariat's endeavours were deeply embedded within a broader, interdependent architecture of peacekeeping operations, which collectively aimed to address the conflict's evolving dynamics. This approach, characterized by a strategic

balance between autonomy and collaboration among the operations, was critical in facilitating the UN's political and diplomatic interventions.

The utilization of Complexity Theory to analyse the Secretariat's role in the Israel-Arab conflict between 1973 and 1982 has provided significant insights into the multifaceted nature of UN peacekeeping operations and their political engagements. This theoretical perspective underscores the interconnectedness and dynamism inherent in the UN's efforts to navigate and influence the political landscape of the conflict, highlighting the holistic approach required to manage such complex international situations effectively.

The Secretary-General

On the one hand, the UN Chief failed or made mistakes when it could influence the conflict. First, U Thant's rushed decision to agree to withdraw UNEF showed that the Secretariat was not ready to stand up to a Member State the way Hammarskjöld did ten years before. This does not mean UNEF would have been able to stay; however, Thant knew the operation would leave; therefore, he could have managed the timing of its exit and engaged in a direct diplomatic push to force the Security Council to make a decision formally. The Secretary-General was not ready to deal with the crisis.

Second, the Secretariat never recovered from the Jarring Mission. This was an instance where Thant had the chance to make significant progress. While, of course, it would be unfair to put the blame entirely on Thant or Jarring, they are not blameless either. Jarring's approach was excessively timid. He failed to be more than a moderator and did not fully use the Secretary-General's mandate to engage in good offices. After the next war, the Secretariat did not get the opportunity to lead the post-war negotiations and, more importantly, it did not seek it either.

Kurt Waldheim explicitly told Henry Kissinger he "did not want to interfere"; he just wanted to ensure the UN had a seat at the table. This was a surprisingly self-aware statement. Waldheim knew Kissinger had the power and the strategy to deal with the conflict. In addition, he was willing to spend countless hours tackling the issue. When the world's most powerful country takes over a problem, there is very little the Secretary-General could do

except find ways to remain as visible and relevant as possible. Kissinger was the absolute protagonist of the post-Yom Kippur negotiations.

When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1978, Kissinger was gone. However, once again, the Americans pushed forward with UNIFIL to save the Camp David Accords. The Secretary-General himself did not influence the Security Council decision and simply instructed his team to prepare to deploy UNIFIL.

Waldheim remained engaged in the conflict. Throughout his second term, he tried to kick-start the Geneva Peace Conference; however, he could not solve the issue of Palestinian representation. The Secretary-General did not have Kissinger's resources to influence Israel and Egypt to abandon the bilateral discussions favour a regional solution. The Secretary-General has limited political agency. He works for the Security Council –who decide to (re) elect him. Therefore, it would be unfair to say that their secondary role in the Israel-Arab conflict was entirely their fault. This paper showed there is more nuance to it. Whenever the Secretariat saw an opening to play a role, they did their best. However, they could not resist whenever the United States pushed them around.

The Secretary-General did not work alone. Throughout their time in office, both Thant and Waldheim had gifted civil servants working alongside him to implement whatever the Security Council dictated as efficiently as possible.

The Office of Special Political Affairs

It is worthwhile to remember that the Secretariat split the work of this office into multiple *departments*. A dozen or so UN staffers ran the Secretariat's political affairs, which, at that time, included *all* peacekeeping operations. Under the leadership of Urquhart and Guyer, the office played a vital role. All three Security Council resolutions, which adopted UNEF, UNDOF and UNIFIL, are vague. The Council relied entirely on the reports of the Secretary-General, which outlined the operation's terms of reference. The Office of Special Political Affairs negotiated with the TCCs, and the host countries designed the mandate to arrange logistics and personnel.

The principle of inter-operation collaboration came from their conclusion that the most efficient way to fill in the post-conflict vacuum was to pool and share resources. While the

office did not do as much planning as Siilasvuo would have liked (see chapter 3), they did have vital institutional memory, which facilitated the deployments of all three operations. After the initial deployment, the Under-Secretaries-General remained deeply committed to the conflict. While they had other issues to worry about, the Middle East dominated their agenda.

Before discussing the role of the Office of Chief Coordinator, it is essential to insert a caveat. The Chief Coordinator and the Office of Special Political Affairs worked extremely close together. The UN team at the tent and in Geneva comprised people from both.

The Chief Coordinator

Siilasvuo played a decisive role in the region. His leadership of the km 101 negotiations and the Military Working Group deserve praise. He was there to moderate (not lead) the discussions on paper. Evidence from the Archives and the literature demonstrates he was a much-needed interlocutor.

Siilasvuo was involved in the disengagement processes at the military level (the Secretariat as a whole was missing from Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy); however, any military decision they made had political ramifications for either side. The km 101 and the Israel-Egypt meeting of the Military Working Group were a fundamental political and military stepping-stone for the eventual peace. The talks allowed the two parties to air their grievances, sort out immediate needs and get used to the idea of discussing structural issues face-to-face.

Regarding the Israel-Syria disengagement, Siilasvuo also played a positive role because implementing the agreement in the Golan Heights was far more complex than in the Sinai Peninsula. The general had to find compromises in terms of the composition and size of the force's AO and agree on a framework for inspections. All of this required political acumen and creative leadership.

The General's political role in Lebanon was entirely field-based. Unlike previous operations, he did not have the time or space to influence the initial report of the Secretary-General. One of the few concrete requests was that Siilasvuo serves as the primary liaison between the Secretariat and the governments of Israel and Lebanon to implement the resolution. Of course, the resolution did not mention that the Secretariat had to negotiate with non-state

actors, who would attack UNIFIL constantly. UNIFIL was so poorly conceived that Siilasvuo's achievement could not be compared to his role in UNEF and UNDOF. The fact he (together with Erskine) managed to get all parties to agree to the terms of reference in the first place was challenging.

By shifting the focus from the military and operational activities detailed in the previous chapter to the political discussions and negotiations facilitated by the Secretariat, this chapter covers the second half of the security and diplomatic landscape, providing a comprehensive view of the UN's multifaceted approach to peacekeeping.

Through the analysis of the Secretariat's actions and strategies, this chapter has highlighted both the limitations and opportunities that defined the UN's role in the conflict. The nuanced understanding gained from this exploration not only contributes to the academic discourse on peacekeeping and international diplomacy but also offers valuable theoretical and policy insights into the effectiveness of the UN's peacekeeping architecture in complex conflict environments. This foundation sets the stage for a deeper investigation into how these collective efforts have influenced the broader diplomatic and security dimensions of the Israel-Arab conflict, moving the discourse forward toward a holistic understanding of the UN's impact on peace and security in the region.

The Secretariat's role in the conflict drastically changed in two moments. First, the Camp David Accords and UNEF's subsequent departure transformed peacekeeping in the Middle East. Second, Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 rendered UNIFIL redundant. These two landmarks are the subject of this dissertation's fifth chapter

Chapter 5

Stress testing the peacekeeping architecture in the Middle East

The Breakdown of the Architecture

Thus far, this dissertation highlighted the building and consolidation of the UN Architecture in the Middle East. Chapters 3 and 4 showed the two pillars which comprise it: security and diplomacy. This chapter explores how the Peacekeeping Architecture, conceptualized as a complex adaptive system, responded to the loss of integral components and the diminution of agency among its remaining parts due to external political pressures. The chapter provides a real-life illustration of how a complex system like the UN's peacekeeping operations in the Middle East navigated the challenges of adaptation and continuity in the face of significant disruptions.

The analysis will focus on understanding the mechanisms through which the system attempted to adapt and overcome the challenges posed by losing parts of its structure—namely, the withdrawal of UNEF II and the abandonment of the Chief Coordinator post together with the side-lining of UNIFIL—and how the remaining components' ability to influence the conflict's course was impacted by superpower politics and shifting regional dynamics. This exploration will shed light on the resilience and limitations of the UN Peacekeeping Architecture when confronted with the dual challenge of operational discontinuity and diminished political leverage. By employing Complexity Theory as the theoretical backdrop for this investigation, the chapter aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the dynamics at play within the UN Peacekeeping Architecture during one of the most tumultuous periods in the history of the Israel-Arab conflict. This approach will enable a nuanced analysis of the system's capacity for adaptation and the factors that influence its resilience in the face of external shocks and internal transformations.

The Security Council spent most of the 1970s building a peacekeeping architecture in the Middle East to deal with the Israel-Arab conflict holistically. The decade started with one operation, UNTSO, which stretched almost to the point of breaking; a few hundred of its observers worked around every single one of Israel’s borders. Observers faced different terrain and different challenges. In the Sinai Peninsula, Israel and Egypt continuously fought

a war of attrition (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1984). Up north, in the Golan Heights and the shores of the Litani River, UNTSO constantly faced and witnessed skirmishes and tensions grew by the day; the wounds of 1967 were still open. UNTSO "was unable to do more than observe and report and/or limit the intensity of the ongoing hostilities" (Wiseman, 1983, p. 46). While UNTSO's presence and service provided significant value to the Security Council and, to a lesser extent, the parties, it did not have the tools, resources or mandate to prevent another war. By 1970, UNTSO was alone and under stress.

However, the Yom Kippur War changed the UN peacekeeping architecture, as it changed everything else. The Security Council reacted quite differently to the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War. On the former, they agreed to engage politically through the Jarring Mission and maintained the status quo vis-à-vis peacekeeping. However, because the Yom Kippur War left too many issues to deal with *after* the fighting stopped the Council decided to deploy a robust military response and, at the same time, begin an incremental political process that started at the tent and concluded in Geneva. The Council worked with such an uncharacteristic unanimity[63] that it amounted to a *consensus.* The Security Council agreed that UN Peacekeeping Operations would constitute the default *modus operandi* to deal with the conflict; at the same time, the Secretary-General had to fight to have a seat at the political table, the Council agreed that the Secretariat was the best –and perhaps only– entity to run the operations.

In the field, the Council empowered Siilasvuo to act not only as a Force Commander but also as the *de facto* Representative of the Secretary-General[64]. He had a broad political and military mandate as Chief Coordinator of Peacekeeping in the Middle East. For the first time in history, the head of a peacekeeping operation was involved in diplomatic work at the regional level. While the Military Working Group discussed military affairs primarily, chapter 4 demonstrates that the separation between short-term military disengagement and

[63] Unanimity only in so far as peacekeeping. The P5 maintained significant political differences concerning the overarching conflict however; they agreed that peacekeeping was the only concrete way they had to keep the tensions low on the ground.

[64] Siilasvuo did not have the title of *Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)*, which did not exist back then. However, if we compare his mandate with current SRSGs working in peace operations, who have a diplomatic and political role to play we can see he indeed was a proto-SRSG. For a complete analysis of Siilasvuo's mandate, see Chapter 1.

long-term political agreements was, at best, dubious. The former profoundly impacted the latter, and discussing military issues was never outside of the political. The Security Council empowered Siilasvuo to play an active role in the process. The Secretary-General recognised the importance of the role by elevating it to the rank of Under-Secretary-General. From 1974 until 1978, the Secretariat built an impressive peacekeeping architecture with four concurrent operations plus Siilasvuo's office. While the Council, as this chapter shows, had tremendous differences in their interests and views vis-à-vis the conflict, they wholeheartedly endorsed the architecture.

Moreover, because the region was so important geopolitically, the Council spent a significant portion of its time trying to manage the conflict (Saikal, 1998). Of course, this was only partially an exercise in preserving the peace, security and principles of the UN Charter. The Council members had individual and conflicting interests. The superpowers actively worked towards ensuring that peace came under *their* auspices; they wanted to become the indispensable country to deal with the conflict. Moscow and Washington had a direct economic and political interest in the region, which meant they were deeply involved (Yaqub, 2013). This meant their relationship with the Secretariat and reliance on the UN as an organisation was fluid. Whenever they felt they needed a neutral actor to deal with an element of the conflict, they allowed the Secretary-General and his team to get involved. Two clear examples were the negotiations at the tent at km 101 and the chairing of the Geneva Peace Conference. However, whenever Moscow and Washington felt the Secretariat worked across their national interests, they tended to sideline the Secretary-General and the UN as an organisation (Citino, 2019). This chapter deals with two instances where the superpowers imposed their view on the conflict and undermined the peacekeeping architecture.

National interests and *realpolitik* notwithstanding, the Council was relatively efficient whenever they focused on "acute crisis management issues that are but facets or sub-dimensions of the overall Arab-Israel conflict as well as the definition and implementation of temporary stop-gap measures" (Bouillon, 2015, p. 527). The Security Council wholeheartedly (and relatively harmoniously) believed that UN peacekeeping was its only collective tool to deal with this never-ending conflict. However, this chapter discusses two

instances, which shifted the paradigm. Indeed, the parties and the superpowers decided to pursue their vision for peace, which effectively broke down the consensus that tackling the conflict required a baseline agreement at the Council that the UN was the best vessel through which they could keep tensions lower and enforce the cease-fires and peace agreements. In the Sinai Peninsula, the Soviet Union sacrificed UNEF II to make a political point. In Lebanon, the United States agreed to deploy its version of 'peacekeeping'[65], which they could directly controlled and was outside the oversight of the Security Council. Moreover, a non-UN operation does not have to comply with or adhere to the principles of UN peacekeeping.

The Secretariat spent an enormous amount of time and effort managing this conflict. Through the Office of Special Political Affairs, the Secretary-General focused on two main issues: politics and the management of peacekeeping operations. From a purely political standpoint, the Secretary-General had two overarching objectives. First, to the best of his abilities and capabilities, he sought to bring the parties to settle their differences peacefully and end the conflict. However, the first and more pressing challenge for the Secretary-General was (and continues to be) ensuring the parties and the Council include his office in any political process and use the UN's tools, such as peacekeeping. Because the Security Council had a vested interest in the conflict and the superpowers saw the Middle East as a critical battlefield of the Cold War, it was not a given that they would require or even want the Secretary-General to play a role (Gilmour, 2017). The Americans proved this when Kissinger effectively took over from Jarring and paved the way for disengagement. Chapter 4 highlights how in one of Waldheim's letters to Kissinger, he pleaded to the Americans to keep the Secretariat involved. He wielded the political argument that bringing the UN to the Geneva Peace Conference was a much-needed vote of confidence since they, up to that point, executed the Council's decisions and peacekeeping operations. However, he was also mindful that his office was not in a position to *demand* a seat; therefore, he stated that he "did not wish to interfere" (UNA, 1973). After the Yom Kippur War, Kissinger did bring Waldheim into the fold and allowed the Secretariat to play an active role in paving the road towards Israel's disengagements with Syria and Egypt. The Secretariat had the agency to

[65] While theoretically, the US-led Multinational Force in Lebanon was a peacekeeping operation, it quickly became closer to a contemporary operation with a mandate grounded in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Its mandate and the way the local population perceived it was drastically different from UNIFIL.

think[66] alongside the parties and co-created UNEF and UNDOF's terms of reference. In 1978 however, things started to change. The United States aggressively forced the Secretariat to deploy UNIFIL and did not leave any room for the Secretariat to have any input into the reasoning behind this decision (Nachmias, 1999). This began a pattern where the superpowers pushed the UN aside; and while their approaches and objectives greatly differed, the goal of ensuring their own political supremacy in the region and bypassing the Secretariat was, broadly speaking, the same.

The Secretary-General was mindful of the region's political developments and the Security Council's politics. Through this decade, the Secretariat still had few staff members working in the Office of Special Political Affairs[67] (Ramcharan, 1990). Urquhart, Guyer and their team constantly travelled to the region to meet with Siilasvuo, the Force Commanders, and government officials of every country. In addition, as chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate, the small supporting bureaucracy in New York meant that the abovementioned players had to be heavily involved in almost every operational decision taken in the field. Managing three peacekeeping operations (as of 1973) and chairing the Military Working Group in Geneva was challenging and time-consuming. In 1978, deploying UNIFIL was downright difficult and risky. The Council authorised the deployment of an operation with no overarching legitimacy on the ground and failed to provide it with a robust mandate. The Secretariat needed to invest even more time than it did in UNDOF and UNEF; the Security Council deployed peacekeeping operations to an area without an iota of peace to keep. In other words, UNIFIL was *another* enormous challenge before the Special but tiny Office for Special Political Affairs.

[66] The post-Yom Kippur War political and military process placed the UN at the epicentre. Siilasvuo chaired all meetings at the tent and in Geneva. As chapter 4 illustrates, the UN's presence and chair was not window-dressing rather, played a constructive albeit understated role.

[67] The Secretary-General created the Senior Planning and Monitoring Group for Peacekeeping Operations only in 1990. This coordination mechanism included two Under-Secretaries-General, two Assistant-Secretaries-General alongside the Military Advisor. In addition, the group had sub-groups on logistics and planning. Among the key terms of reference, this group prepared contingency plans, monitored existing operations advised the Secretary-General on budgetary matters. For more see the Memorandum to the Staff: ST/SGB/233 (1990). These terms of reference are interesting because they show everything the Secretariat did not have during the 1970s. They also highlight why Siilasvuo had so much room to manoeuvre; he was doing the work, which was, after 1990, done in New York. More on this in chapter 1.

Chapters 3 and 4 highlight that the setup of this multi-operation architecture resulted from an arduous process through which the Secretariat dealt with the conflict *and* learned how to deal with a regional conflict as complex as the one in the region. There was no blueprint; they needed to create a *modus operandi*. Yet, the Secretariat reacted quite well to the Yom Kippur War. UNTSO proved it was (and continues to be) an vital asset when it comes to crisis management and becomes an important partner for UNEF; within 72 hours of the Security Council's resolution, UNTSO was already reporting from the Sinai Peninsula while Siilasvuo began preparing for the first meetings at the tent. A few weeks after, as the Military Working Group began its substantive work in Geneva, UNTSO and UNEF started to prepare for UNDOF's forthcoming arrival. Fast-forward to 1978, UNTSO once again provided invaluable, time-sensitive assistance to UNIFIL (Erskine, 1989). The Secretariat –through the work of Urquhart in New York and Siilasvuo in Jerusalem– positioned UN peacekeeping operations as the most practical tool in the Security Council's conflict management activities in the region.

Between 1973 and 1977, the conflict dynamics followed a relatively linear evolution. Kissinger implemented his 'step-by-step' strategy to solve the conflict gradually (Stein, 1985). The American high-level political engagement and peacekeeping operations monitoring and preventing further escalations significantly reduced tensions in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. While Kissinger's approach did facilitate the disengagement plans, the Geneva Peace Conference failed to facilitate a comprehensive solution. Indeed, as Chapter 4 discusses, the absence of the PLO set the precedent that the Americans were more interested in solving the conflict's inter-state aspects and did not see the Palestinian issue as equally important (Stocker, 2017) . Moreover, the disengagements did not fully address the issue of sovereignty of the Sinai Peninsula –an existential issue for Sadat. Furthermore, Southern Lebanon's situation was a continuously exploding powder keg. So many different actors were acting within Lebanon that its political system was near pure anarchy. By the time Kissinger left office in January 1977, the dynamics were tense, and the agenda was full of unresolved issues.

By the end of the 1970s, the peacekeeping architecture was delivering mixed results. On the one hand, UNDOF and UNEF II performed well. The former received very few complaints,

and no situation ever rose to the level of a crisis. Israel and Syria left each other significant breathing room, meaning UNDOF moved within its AO freely with little to no risk (James, 1987). Similarly, UNEF II faced a few challenges; the km 101 negotiations proved remarkably successful at reducing the chance of another round. The operation itself was large enough to deter the parties from attempting to carve through it. Given the superpower's unequivocal endorsement and support, the parties knew that breaking the peace would have severe political consequences (Diehl, 2015b).

Overall, the success of UNEF II and UNDOF was an early indication of two critical ways the overall conflict was evolving. First, the prospect of another large-scale regional war faded into the background. At the political level, while the Arab League (and the Soviet Union to a lesser extent) continued to denounce Israel's occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank; there was no serious intention of attacking Israel again. At the same time, the result of the Yom Kippur War had a profound effect on Israel, which embarked on "the biggest and most expensive military build-up in Israeli history" (Bar-Joseph, 2008, p. 76). The defence establishment sought to crystallise the IDF's military superiority and create enough deterrence. Furthermore, Egypt's position on Israel became more fluid for two main reasons. First, Cairo realised that it could not solve its differences (i.e. the return of the Sinai Peninsula) with Israel militarily. Therefore, it started softening its position regarding engaging Israel. Second, Egypt's top foreign policy priority was establishing a long-term partnership with the United States to access American-made weapons. Kissinger used this to pressure Egypt to sit down and talk to Israel. Egypt started to follow a different route than the rest of the Arab League, which deprived them of a key player; an Arab coalition without Egypt could have never won a war against Israel. Of course, Israel and her neighbours were still at odds, and the animosity never entirely left. However, the dynamics were changing, and Israel never saw another simultaneous attack against her borders, similar to 1973 and 1982. The period of state-to-state conflict was over.

Second, whereas the chance of conventional warfare started to dwindle, the conflict's epicentre began to move to Southern Lebanon, an almost lawless area that neither the government nor the military entirely controlled. The different Lebanese factions continuously fought against each other and the government. At the same time, the PLO's

increasing political and military power in Southern Lebanon made the situation even more complicated (Gil Guerrero, 2016). In 1978, the Security Council hastily and without much consideration for the long-term strategy deployed UNIFIL to do the impossible.

With such a significant architecture in place with decades of institutional memory and a vast network on both sides, it would appear as self-evident that the Security Council would use it whenever a new development occurred. However, the evolution of the conflict leads to the parties breaking away politically and militarily. On the former, the Soviet rejection of the Camp David Accords prevented the Chief Coordinator's Office from assisting in the treaty's implementation. The Secretariat's agency vis-à-vis the conflict dwindled and eventually fell dormant for the next decade. On the military side, two non-UN operations arrived in the region. In 1981, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) took over from UNEF II and monitored the implementation of the Camp David Accords –a task it continues to perform today. From August 1982 to March 1984, the Multinational Force in Lebanon (MNF) deployed to Southern Lebanon to supervise a cease-fire between the PLO and Israel and supervise the former's departure from Lebanon to Tunisia. UNIFIL stayed on the ground; however, it was unable to perform its duties because the Council never provided the necessary political support.

These two developments shocked the post-1973 peacekeeping architecture in the region. The first continued a never-ending political push and pull, and the second truly shocked the peacekeeping paradigm in the Middle East. On the political front, the fact that Cold War politics within the Security Council reduced the Secretariat's ability to work in the region was unfortunate; however, not surprising. After all, the Council's willingness to tolerate the Secretariat's activism vis-à-vis the conflict was very fluid. After the Six-Day War, the Jarring mission had a wholehearted endorsement to find lasting peace; however, after the Yom Kippur War, the Council benched Jarring, and Kissinger took the reins. However, what was significantly different after the Camp David Accords was that the Council reduced the Secretariat's room for manoeuvring, *and* nobody took it over for the next decade.

On the military side, however, the developments broke from the existing consensus at the Council. For the first time since 1948, the Council decided to bench the peacekeepers despite

having such a robust presence on the ground. Moreover, in the case of the Camp David Accords, the UN entirely withdrew; however, in Southern Lebanon, UNIFIL remained, albeit it as a lame duck. This chapter discusses how the conflict reached this point and its impact on the UN's involvement in the Israel-Arab conflict and for UN peacekeeping. This chapter will critically answer the following question:

To what extent did the Camp David Accords and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon affect the ability of the UN Peacekeeping Architecture to perform its duties?

War & Peace: A Tale of Two Shocks

Before going forward, it is critical to discuss why this study treats the peace treaty as a *shock* rather than an accomplishment. As the chapter will note, the peace treaty did not call for UNEF's withdrawal—quite the opposite. The parties involved in Camp David agreed they needed a verification mechanism; Israel and Egypt did not trust each other enough to go on their honour. Yet, UNEF withdrew. The treaty's implementation required a workaround outside the UN's peacekeeping framework. Instead of using all the tools at their disposal, the parties had to go outside the system. The Soviet Union believed the Camp David Accords were nothing more than the consolidation of American hegemony in the region, and they bitterly rejected the manner in which the agreement came about. Therefore, they decided to try to spoil its implementation and they used UNEF to do so. This chapter discusses this shock and sheds light on UNEF's final act in the Sinai Peninsula.

The second shock is, in a manner of speaking, more 'conventional' since it was the escalation of an existing conflict. In June of 1982, after years of skirmishes, failed cease-fire agreements and rising tensions, Israel launched Operation Peace for the Galilee, through which the IDF invaded Southern Lebanon. Between Operation Litani in 1978 and 1982, the situation on the Israel-Lebanon border was very tense.

These two instances are fundamental pieces of this study's research question because the management of both these situations *required* the work, which, in previous years, fell to UNEF II and UNIFIL. In 1973, the Security Council swiftly authorised UNEF II's deployment, coordinated with the Secretariat to plan and recruit TCCs, and instructed UNTSO to lay the foundations for the new operation. In addition, the Council anticipated that Syria and Israel

would eventually reach some disengagement plan, which would naturally require a peacekeeping operation. In short, UN peacekeeping operations were the only game in town. However, these two shocks changed the status quo.

Due to reasons entirely exogenous to the operations, the parties bypassed the existing architecture already in place –which had decades of first-hand experience in crisis management and observation– and the United Nations altogether. This chapter analyses the rationale behind these decisions, the Secretariat's response, and the results.

While these two events profoundly affected UN Peacekeeping in the Middle East, it is essential to state that they were not equally profound. The Camp David Accords produced two pieces of collateral damage. Due to the ardent opposition of the Soviet Union and the Arab World –including the PLO– the Secretariat could not assist in implementing the Egypt-Israel peace treaty. UNEF II's mandate was not renewed, and the operation withdrew despite the peace treaty specifically requesting UN participation in the post-peace security arrangements.

Second, the treaty also envisioned a role for Siilasvuo, who needed the authorisation to perform these tasks. Because everybody else in the region opposed the treaty, the Arab League's collective policy was to refrain from engaging Israel in peace negotiations until they recognised the claims of Palestinian statehood. In other words, there was not an iota of political will to move beyond the status quo. Therefore, the Secretary-General saw no need for a Chief Coordinator, and he let the post elapse in 1979 when Siilasvuo retired. For 20 years, the Secretary-General did not have a representative[68] who engaged with the parties and coordinated the work of the remaining peacekeeping operations (Hylton, 2013).

The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon was tragic and produced an enormous loss of life and devastation. In terms of UN Peacekeeping, it crystallised two critical issues. First, the Security Council did not think this through; it sent UNIFIL to the field with a weak mandate, which it did not have a real chance to achieve. Second, the operation never had the trust of the parties

[68] Between 1979 and 1992, the most senior UN Staff Members were UNTSO Chief of Staff, UNDOF, and UNIFIL Force Commanders. During this period, there was no coordination mechanism in the field, which aligned the work of the operations and the different agencies, funds and programmes of the UN System.

on the ground. Every party to the conflict, at one point or another attacked the operation politically and even militarily (Urquhart, 1983; Wisenman, 1983; Orion, 2016). The operation was rendered so irrelevant that when the United States spearheaded a deployment of a non-UN peacekeeping operation, they did not even bother to withdraw UNIFIL; they left it to witness the atrocities going around as they fought for their survival.

This chapter discusses the political evolution of the Israel-Arab conflict and the impact this had on the peacekeeping architecture. In addition, the Chapter analyses how the Secretariat, the Chief Coordinator and the operations reacted to the evolution. The first section discusses the road to Camp David, and the second addresses the road to the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

The United Nations and the Soviet Union: From Conveners to Bystanders

By 1976, the Security Council re-elected[69] Waldheim for a second term. One of his main priorities was to tackle the conflict and reconvene a Geneva Peace Conference to bring all relevant parties to the table. Waldheim engaged in an aggressive media campaign where he gave extensive interviews discussing how he perceived his role within the conflict; he publicly expressed that the Superpowers empowered him to "run with the Middle East settlement ball" (Urquhart, 1987, p. 268). While both Washington and Moscow rejected the implication that they had 'delegated' the issue to Waldheim, it was clear that his agenda for the second term had the Israel-Arab conflict at the forefront. Waldheim wanted to secure his legacy as a successful peacemaker; he genuinely wanted to tackle the Israel-Arab conflict and get the credit for doing so (Urquhart, n.d). Soon after he started his second term, the UN's host country had a profound political shift that saw Jimmy Carter become the newest tenant of the Oval Office.

Waldheim saw Carter's election as an opportunity. After years of acting as Kissinger's understudy, Waldheim believed Carter would be much more willing to see him (and the entire UN System) as a partner rather than the executor of Washington's grand strategy. Waldheim's read was correct. The incoming administration planned to be "far more open

[69] As a symbolic gesture, the People's Republic of China abstained in the first round of voting signalling their view that the next Secretary-General ought to come from the Global South. Afterwards, they abstained.

and democratised, and less imperial, than the Nixon Administration" (Jones, 1996, p. 11). Concerning the Israel-Arab conflict, the administration stated that the best way to deal with "regional conflicts is by addressing their fundamental causes, rather than seeing them in east-west terms and treating the symptoms by relying on containment and force" (Rosati, 1993, p. 464). Carter believed in the importance of multilateralism and structured his foreign policy around it.

Carter and Waldheim saw the conflict and, more importantly, the path to its solution very similarly. Both men believed in bringing all parties to the table and engaging in a regional dialogue to prevent another Yom Kippur War. Moreover, they agreed that the lack of progress was due to the systematic undermining of the Palestinian question at the first Geneva Peace Conference and after that. While both supported Israel's right to exist, they thought it should withdraw to pre-1967 borders; in other words, in their view, the best formula to go forward was 'land for peace'. Furthermore, the Secretariat and the White House agreed that the time to kick-start the process was imminent. Initially, Carter and Waldheim were in lockstep. Unfortunately, this political alignment did not stand the test of time and new developments, and Carter had no choice but to revert to old practices and take what he could get in brokering peace.

By December 1976, when the Carter administration began the transition, Waldheim started his initiative to bring peace to the Middle East. The first step of this new diplomatic push required the Secretariat to get the political endorsement. However, going to the Security Council was a gamble; the Ford Administration was still in charge, albeit as a 'lame duck'; therefore, that would risk a veto. In a move that would have made Hammarskjöld proud, Waldheim took his request somewhere much more willing to listen: the General Assembly.

In December 1976, the General Assembly adopted two resolutions addressing the Israel-Arab conflict and demanding a concrete way forward. Resolution 31/61[70] started by denouncing the lack of progress. Moreover, the Assembly condemned Israel's occupation of post-1967 territories and reaffirmed its collective position that Palestinian people had

[70] The resolution passed with 91 votes in favour, 11 against and 29 abstentions. The United States voted against, France abstained.

"inalienable rights". The resolution stated that reconvening the Geneva Peace Conference was "essential for realising a just and lasting settlement in the region" (1976). A supplementary resolution, 31/62 (1976) (adopted on the same day), addressed the Secretary-General. The Assembly requested that Waldheim resume direct negotiations with both the United States and the Soviet Union to reconvene the conference, and they gave him a deadline. The Assembly wanted the meeting to occur "no later than March 1977".

Furthermore, the Assembly requested Waldheim to submit a report within two months, giving an update on the situation. These two resolutions warrant analysis because they sent a few critical messages. First, the Assembly wanted to show the Security Council that most UN Member States wanted the peace process to move forward and denounced the Council's usual paralysis. Second, the resolutions gave Waldheim the legitimacy to embark on a comprehensive diplomatic initiative. The answers gave Waldheim more power than he had the first time. Unlike then, where he had to plead with Kissinger to 'allow' him to join the meeting, this time, he had the backing of the Assembly to be proactive. In addition, the resolution *requested* Waldheim to engage with the co-chairs to convene the conference "in accordance with his initiative" (Para 1(a)). Waldheim succeeded in reclaiming the political role he had lost to Kissinger. Of course, General Assembly resolutions are not in and of themselves sufficiently powerful to accomplish this; however, the timing of the resolutions, coupled with the political shift in Washington, opened the door for a multilateral approach. Third, the Assembly reaffirmed[71] the importance of inviting the PLO as a standalone delegation at the Conference. The resolution went as far as possible to ensure the conference setup would not torpedo the conference in the same way it did in 1973. While the Assembly never questioned the importance of protecting Israel's integrity as a legitimate Member State, the resolution once again rejected the notion that its post-1967 borders were a legitimate basis for the start of the negotiations.

Waldheim quickly embraced this political capital and embarked on a ten-day mission to the region. He visited Israel, all immediate neighbours and Saudi Arabia. He also met Arafat in Damascus. In addition, he held high-level talks with both Moscow and Washington. After he

[71] The General Assembly adopted Resolution 3375 (1975) which called for the PLO to "participate in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on Middle East […] on equal footing with other parties.

left the region, it became apparent that the critical structural issues that torpedoed the first meeting in 1973 were still there. First, the PLO understandably demanded a standalone invitation and, more problematically, they rejected Israel's request that Resolution 338[72] serve as the basis for the meeting. Second, Israel refused to negotiate with the PLO even if it embraced Resolution 338 and amended its charter. Israel's policy rejected "the political autonomy or sovereignty of the Palestinians in the West Bank or elsewhere in western Palestine" (Perlmutter, 1978, p. 365). This obstacle made it impossible for Waldheim to make any substantive progress. Therefore, the Secretary-General went back to New York empty-handed.

On 28 February, Waldheim submitted his report (1977). The document outlines the main challenges to the prospect of reconvening the conference; the issue of Palestinian representation was the most difficult of all. Waldheim floated a few procedural ideas to surpass the challenge; however, neither side was ready to move an inch. Waldheim's report touches on a critical element of the process, namely the positions of the superpowers. The Soviet Union expressed to Waldheim their unequivocal belief that the conflict required a holistic solution constructed in a multilateral forum. While Moscow was willing to translate the idea of one conference into a more prolonged framework with multiple meetings at various levels, Soviet officials stressed their commitment to moving things forward as long as the framework was multilateral. The Soviet Union was unwilling to relinquish its role as conference co-chair (Gupta, 2023). This was an early warning against adopting bilateral agreements and creating a process that excluded their direct participation. Because the Camp David Accords did precisely that, Moscow denounced them and punished UNEF II.

The incoming Carter Administration kept close contact with Waldheim and endorsed his efforts to reconvene the conference. Cyrus Vance, the new US Secretary of State, travelled to the region almost immediately after Waldheim to build momentum around the idea of having a conference (Male, 1979). The American government showed its deep commitment to the region and supporting Waldheim; however, "Amidst Israeli, Syrian, and Palestinian intransigence, Washington could not get the parties to agree to a set of principles for

[72] The resolution treated Palestinian as 'refugees' and did not grant them legal agency to negotiate on their own behalf.

reconvening the Geneva Conference" (Nemchenok, 2009, p. 606). Vance, same as Waldheim, came home empty-handed.

Carter was undeterred by early setbacks. The Administration worked on a few potential ideas to bypass the issue. The most plausible –albeit highly unlikely– was to fold the PLO *within* the Jordanian delegation. Predictably, however, Arafat rejected the idea from the onset because it had a prohibitive political cost for the PLO, which needed to guard its position as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

The Soviet Union was adamantly opposed to the Camp David Accords for three fundamental reasons. First, Moscow understood that the trilateral peace conference would further erode its influence. Egypt's rebuke of Soviet participation was a significant setback for them since it had been a key ally during the Nasser years. Having two of the most powerful countries in the region squarely inside Washington's sphere of influence was a heavy blow to Soviet foreign policy. Second, the Soviet Union wanted a multilateral process not just for its own sake but also to protect the interests of its remaining allies. The Soviets knew that the peace process would ignore their interests unless they had a seat at the table. The trilateral agreement did not even include the Golan Heights. Third, they believed that Sadat was so desperate to reclaim the Sinai Peninsula that he was willing to sacrifice the Palestinian issues; they were correct.

After Sadat and Begin exchanged visits and Carter reluctantly accepted to act as the direct mediator, the Soviet Union became mainly irrelevant to the process. In retaliation to the developments, Moscow took an aggressive stance against the process and aligned with Arab hardliners (Rubinstein, 1985). The Soviet Union's policy of choice to show its displeasure with the peace process was to prevent the UN from actively implementing all future agreements. Therefore, it adopted a policy of vetoing any resolutions at the Security Council, which would task the Secretariat to assist the parties. UNEF II's days were counted.

As soon as the Camp David Summit concluded, Moscow denounced the process as an imperialist move and accused Sadat of betraying the Arab League and the Palestinian people (Gupta, 2023). In addition, they bitterly denounced the Carter Administration for betraying the commitment it made when they issued the joint communique.

The Camp David Accords

The Camp David Accords were a historic achievement on the road towards peace in the Middle East. It goes beyond this study to discuss the process and outcomes of this historic summit. For clarity, however, it is essential to outline the main outcomes. The trilateral negotiations produced two agreements: the Framework for Peace in the Middle East and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty.

The former established a mechanism for negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbours. It addressed issues such as the status of the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinian autonomy, and the rights of Palestinian refugees. The parties agreed to a five-year transitional period during which Palestinians would have limited autonomy, followed by negotiations to determine the final status of these territories. However, the framework was a significant victory for Israel for two main reasons. First, the framework did not deal with the Palestinian question. "Israel had not committed to eventual withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza; nothing was said about Jerusalem; and settlements in the Palestinian Occupied Territories were nowhere mentioned" (Quandt, 1986, p. 255). Furthermore, the framework did not request Israel to withdraw from anywhere except the Sinai Peninsula, which, while very valuable economically and militarily, was not part of what Begin saw as rightful Israeli clay (Kuruvilla, 2022). Israeli returned something it never rightfully owned in exchange for preserving what it perceived as its own by right.

On the bilateral front, the Accords laid the groundwork for signing the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, which the parties signed in March 1979. This treaty led to the establishment of diplomatic relations[73] between the two countries. Egypt became the first Arab state to recognise Israel. Critically important, Israel agreed to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula in exchange for Egypt's pledge to demilitarise the area.

An extensive body of literature covers every aspect of the process and negotiation (Quandt, 1986; Rubinstein, 1985; Gupta, 2023; Naidu, 1992; Akehurst, 1981). The next section

[73] Egypt and Israel agreed to exchange Ambassadors one month after Israeli withdrawal to the interim line, provided by the Camp David Accords.

discusses the Accords' impact on peacekeeping architecture in the Middle East, especially UNEF II and UNTSO.

UNEF II, Siilasvuo and the Camp David Accords: Collateral Damage

Israel agreed to withdraw the IDF from the Peninsula if there were sufficient security guarantees. While Israel has significant misgivings about peacekeeping, it supported including it in the peace treaty (Comay, 1983).

Therefore, the Peace Treaty envisioned including UN Peacekeeping as a critical element. Article IV (2) states:

> The Parties agree to the stationing of United Nations personnel in areas described in Annex I. The Parties agree not to request the withdrawal of the United Nations personnel and that this person will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations, with the affirmative vote of the five Permanent Members, unless the Parties otherwise agree (1979)

A few necessary details vis-à-vis UN Peacekeeping warrant analysis. First, the clause demonstrates that neither party was interested in withdrawing UNEF II from the area. However, when Waldheim discovered their intentions, he explained that any change to UNEF II's mandate required Security Council approval (Nelson, 1984). Therefore, the parties decided to keep the article as vague as possible. The Treaty does not mention UNEF II or UNTSO by name; it refers to them as '*The United Nations Force and Observers*'[74]. Furthermore, the title of Article VI of Annex I, which outlines the mandate, is '*United Nations Operations*'. In addition to the Secretariat's requirement for a Security Council resolution to amend UNEF II's mandate, the treaty kept things vague for four additional reasons. First, the treaty mentions both 'Forces' and 'Observers'. The parties wanted the verification mechanism to have armed military soldiers (presumably those already deployed to the Sinai) and UNTSO officers to staff the observation posts and prepare reports to the Council and the parties.

[74] The term appears 8 times in Annex I.

Second, the provisions of the Peace Treaty are more specific than the mandates of UNEF II and UNTSO. Article VI of Annex I states, "The parties will request the United Nations to provide forces". This acknowledgement involving UN Peacekeeping required a *new* Security Council resolution (Akehurst, 1981). The Article requested UN Peacekeeping to staff checkpoints and observation posts along the different lines, provide verification reports and ensure freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran. While UNEF II and UNTSO already performed some of these tasks, complying with all the requirements the treaty envisioned required either enhancing UNEF II's mandate significantly or, possibly, requesting the TCC to deploy additional battalions and/or redeploy more observers from UNTSO (Mackinlay, 1989).

Third, the spirit of this clause wanted to prevent UNEF II from suffering the same fate as UNEF I–which Nasser expelled in 1967 without consultation with the Council– the parties committed to keeping their consent consistent until the P5 unanimously said otherwise. The parties wanted a stable verification mechanism that did not depend on the political mood of the day in either Jerusalem, Cairo or New York. Withdrawing the operation would require a significant policy shift across the board, an improbable scenario (Elaraby, 1983).

Fourth, Article VI of the Annex established a Joint Commission to troubleshoot any problems during the treaty's implementation and serve as a support system to UNEF II. The parties wanted the Commission to serve as a framework through which Israel presented her withdrawal plans. The parties requested that the Chief Coordinator of UN Peacekeeping in the Middle East review these plans work with the Joint Commission (Bar-Yaacov, 1980). Including Siilasvuo made sense. He was the most experienced peacekeeper in the region (and perhaps the world). He had broad respect from both sides and his military and diplomatic roles up until that point prepared him well for the task.

The treaty earnestly sought to involve the UN, which was a testament to the UN's credibility on the ground. For five years, things remained quiet in the Peninsula, and while the operation could not get all the credit for this, its presence helped keep tensions from boiling over (Diehl, 2015b). Moreover, both sides trusted that Siilasvuo was an honest broker who could discuss problems with both sides.

While the Treaty did codify precisely what they expected the UN to do, the parties knew that their decision to ignore the Soviet Union was going to have consequences. Therefore, they jointly decided to prepare for an eventual Security Council veto. The Soviet Union started to signal informally to the Council that it was unwilling to renew UNEF II's mandate. In October 1978, the Council discussed the operation's renewal, and the Soviet Union started making roadblocks. Moscow was under considerable pressure from its Arab allies to block the renewal; however, at this point, Moscow remained on the fence (Elaraby, 1983). The Council passed resolution 438, which prolonged UNEF II's stay on the ground for nine months[75]; the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia abstained. This was a troublesome development because Israel made their presence a core requirement to withdraw its forces from the Peninsula. Israel[76] requested that the United States ensure it was ready to fill the vacuum (Tabory, 1986). On the other hand, Egypt was keen to keep the operation on the ground because it performed well and wanted to have as much international legitimacy as possible.

The Carter Administration quickly complied. On 26 March 1979, it sent identical letters to Cairo and Jerusalem, assuring them of the commitment to continue to keep UNEF II on the ground and designing an alternative if the need arose.

> The United States believes the Treaty provides for the permanent stationing of United Nations personnel in the designated limited force zone can and should be implemented by the United Nations Security Council. The United States will exert its utmost efforts to obtain the requisite action from the Security Council. If the Security Council fails to establish and maintain the arrangements called for in the Treaty, the President will be prepared to take those steps necessary to ensure the establishment and maintenance of an acceptable alternative multinational force (1979)

By the summer of 1979, the Soviet Union decided it would veto any draft resolution that sought to renew UNEF II. Therefore, to avoid a political showdown, the Council agreed to refrain from putting the issue up for a vote; they agreed to let the mandate elapse. On 24 July

[75] The Council renewed UNEF II's mandate for one year. However, on this occasion nine months was the longest they could without risking a Soviet veto.

[76] Israel always saw peacekeeping with a degree of apprehension. Begin saw UNEF II's troubles as an opportunity to have a non-UN peacekeeping operation, led by the Americans who they believed were more reliable and trustworthy.

(1979), the Secretary-General sent a letter to the Council stating his intention to begin the operation's departure. However, while the Soviet Union wanted to remove UNEF II, they did not discuss UNTSO's future. Moscow agreed to allow UNTSO observers to take on the essential duties of UNEF II left vacant (Nelson, 1984). UNTSO was critical in keeping things quiet in the Sinai in the period between UNEF II's withdrawal and the deployment of the non-UN-MFO. Once again, the operation proved its value in times of vacuum and at the start-up phase of an incoming operation. UNTSO stayed in the Peninsula, and its liaison offices in Cairo and Ismailia continued their work.

The Secretary-General stressed that UNEF II's withdrawal "is without prejudice to the presence of UNTSO observers in the area. Therefore, it is my intention to make the necessary arrangements to ensure the further functioning of UNTSO" (1979). Once again, UNTSO proved impervious to the political strifes at the Security Council. Because UNTSO is based in Jerusalem and has a regional mandate, it did not make sense for the Soviet Union[77] to sabotage it. By 1979, UNTSO observers worked closely with UNDOF and UNIFIL by way of dispatching Observer Groups to support them. Furthermore, the operation has liaison offices in every capital and is an interlocutor whenever the parties need to talk. UNEF II became the latest collateral damage of Cold War politics. The operation performed its duties well and left its AO stable (Diehl, 1988; 2015b; Elaraby, 1980; Urquhart, 1980; Sommereyns, 1980).

The second collateral damage was the Office of Chief Coordinator. By the autumn of 1978, Siilasvuo announced his intentions to retire from active duty and agreed with the Secretariat that he would relinquish his UN post in December 1979. The Secretary-General decided against appointing a replacement, and thus, the office disappeared. The Secretariat went about this significant policy change quietly. In fact, the public reasoning behind this was that "the post lapsed with the withdrawal of UNEF in July 1979" (UN Chronicle, 1980, p. 31). Siilasvuo became the first and last Chief Coordinator of UN Peacekeeping in the Middle East.

[77] On 24 July 1979, the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations, who was a non-permanent member of the Security Council at the time, sent a letter to the Secretary-General denouncing UNTSO's presence in the Israel-Egypt Area of Operations. The letter states that UNTSO's presence was the UN's de facto recognition of the validity of the Peace Treaty. On 31 July, Kuwait sent a subsequent letter expressing that the views expressed on the former represented that of the entre Arab Group. The Arab world's objection to UNTSO was, at most, a symbolic gesture. The Council never called into question UNTSO's legitimacy and relevance and the General Assembly continuously voted to keep the operation funded.

While the Secretariat never gave a comprehensive explanation, there are a few reasons why they took this decision. First, the Soviet's bitter objection against UN involvement in the Egypt-Israel treaty made the role untenable. With the loss of the largest of the operations and the absence from the only political process, which was moving forward, the Chief Coordinator had not much left to do. Second, the Chief Coordinator was, by design, a military officer tasked with liaising with diplomats and military officers. By 1980, with UNDOF already in place, there was no chance Israel and Syria would engage in meaningful discussion. In Lebanon, UNIFIL worked in a quasi-anarchic area which neither Israel nor Lebanon controlled. The operation's greatest care became not the achievement of its mandate but the survival of its troops. While Siilasvuo was instrumental at UNIFIL's –within the realm of the possible– there was no further need to have a figure above the Force Commander.

Third, UNTSO had continued to provide invaluable support to the parties when it came to liaising, lowering tensions and reviewing complaints, its Chief of Staff had sufficient gravitas to perform these duties on his own. In addition, even without the office of Chief Coordinator, UNTSO continued to collaborate with UNDOF and UNIFIL through the UN Observer Groups it sent to both.

The office's closure also signalled that, for the Secretariat, the Israel-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts were frozen; there was no chance for progress, and therefore the Secretariat decided to reduce its involvement. During the 1980s, no relevant peace initiatives occurred; the Secretariat confined itself to ensuring UNDOF, UNIFIL, and UNTSO performed their duties to the best of their abilities. Throughout the entire tenure of Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, the Secretariat did not engage with the conflict in any meaningful way.

Siilasvuo's role and tasks stayed vacant until the early 1990s. In January 1993, the Secretary-General appointed Chinmaya Gharekhan as Special Envoy to the Middle East process and granted him the rank of Under-Secretary-General. In 1994, because of the Oslo Accords, the Secretariat established the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO), which serves as the UN's focal point vis-à-vis the conflict and

peace process. In 1999, because of the Madrid Conference, Secretary-General Kofi Annan enhanced UNSCO's mandate to establish "a unified structure with a clear and recognisable focal point for the organisation" (1999). Furthermore, UNSCO's head became the Secretary-General's Personal Representative to the PLO and the Palestinian Authority.

The difference between these roles and Siilasvuo's are significant. While the former was a General on active duty, UNSCO's head is a civilian –usually a former diplomat– who coordinates the work of the entire UN System on the ground[78]. While UNSCO coordinates the work of the UN System, it does not have direct oversight authority over the operations. The Secretary-General intended to create a regional unified coordination mechanism; Member States, particularly the Arab League, and TCCs rejected this idea and requested to keep the traditional model whereby the operations have a unified command (Hylton, 2013). In other words, the Secretary-General was unable to recreate Siilasvuo's role.

While Chapter 6 provides an in-depth analysis of Siilasvuo's record as Chief Coordinator, it must stress a few preliminary conclusions. From a practical and budget perspective, closing the office of the Chief Coordinator made sense. This tactical retreat acknowledged that Siilasvuo's replacement would have had a much narrower mandate and scope. It is senseless to having an Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations who could not visit one of the most critical areas within his mandate. Moreover, the Secretary-General lowered the pressure on his office because if he had kept the role, the Council would have scrutinised its achievements –or lack thereof.

The Camp David Accords finally ended the Israel-Egypt war. For three long decades, the two countries fought a war, which did not seem to end. Without a doubt, this was a triumph for peace and security. Unfortunately, the Middle East was one of the most prominent battlefields of the Cold War. The Accords were also a significant triumph for the United States, establishing itself as Egypt and Israel's most important ally and protector. Therefore, the Soviet Union reacted in a short-sighted and vindictive manner by 'punishing' the parties and forcing them to design a new peacekeeping operation without UN support.

[78] The Deputy Special Coordinator is also *ex officio* the UN Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator for the Palestinian Territories.

In the end, the MFO proved to be a successful operation, Israel withdrew from the Sinai, and the border remained quiet (Mackinlay, 1989; Nelson, 1984). The MFO's success, however, rests on UNEF II's shoulders. For six years, UNEF II was an integral part of the Israel-Egypt disengagement negotiations; it provided assurances to both sides and kept the Security Council informed. UNEF II kept the peace.

While things in the Sinai Peninsula gradually stabilised and Israel performed an orderly withdrawal of civilians and military personnel, in Southern Lebanon, things moved from bad to worse. While UNEF II departed the region, UNIFIL was fighting for its life within a lawless area where nobody wanted them there.

Lebanon: A Multi-Dimensional Conflict

While all four operations worked within *one* overarching conflict and Siilasvuo coordinated their activities, UNIFIL's situation was exponentially more precarious. The operation was facing an inferno, which was unprecedented in the history of UN peacekeeping. UNIFIL worked in "a sea of instability with more than 50 military factions fighting over the territory in and around Beirut, with 30,000 Syrian troops in partial occupation of Lebanon and the constant danger of Israeli threats to attack […] Syrian positions and PLO forces" (Wiseman, 1983, pp. 52-53). The Security Council did not equip UNIFIL to handle such a challenging environment (Mackinlay, 1989).

One of UNIFIL's few positive things was that it could always rely on the architecture operations for operational and political support. UNTSO and UNEF II provided experienced troops and observers to UNIFIL, UNEF II and UNTSO redeployed part of its logistic battalions, to set up the different bases and headquarters. Furthermore, UNTSO Observer Group Lebanon became the last resort for the Secretary-General to employ after the 1982 invasion. On the political front, Siilasvuo was firmly in place as Chief Coordinator and provided significant assistance to Erskine when dealing with the Israeli and Lebanese governments and the PLO. This section discusses why the United States and the Lebanese government decided to deploy a non-UN operation *alongside* UNIFIL. Why did they choose to deliver such an explicit vote of no confidence to UNIFIL? This is ironic since the United States forcefully pushed the Security Council to deploy it in the first place.

While UNEF II and UNIFIL were neutralised, the processes leading to this point and the aftermath differed. UNEF II's destiny was entirely outside of its hands. The Secretariat was not involved in the Camp David Summit. The parties did not consult Siilasvuo or the Force Commander, even though they expected both to play a significant role in the implementation process. After signing the Peace Treaty, the Secretary-General announced to the Council its intention to withdraw UNEF II without putting the issue up for a vote.

However, in the case of UNIFIL, the political evolution was a result of developments in the field. Moreover, the United States and Lebanon decided to push for the MNF because of the challenges facing UNIFIL. In light of the Israeli invasion of 1982, Washington knew that it could not rely on a UN peacekeeping operation. UNIFIL's ill-conceived mandate and inability to secure its own AO became the definitive factor that led to the MNF. Unlike UNEF II which was not part of the Camp David equation, UNIFIL was the decisive variable. Therefore, while the road of Camp David does not include an in-depth analysis of UNEF II and its record, the study of the 1982 Israel invasion is UNIFIL-centric because the operation was a witness (and sometimes even a casualty) of the conflict around it. Shedding light into UNIFIL's initial three years provides the necessary context for the 1982 Israeli invasion and the subsequent deployment of the MNF.

Every peacekeeping operation has to deal with politics. As we saw throughout chapters three and four, it is impossible to have a strict separation of military and political affairs. The Secretary-General created the role of Chief Coordinator to support the Force Commanders in their political dealings with officials from their host countries. Until UNIFIL started its mission, Siilasvuo and his Force Commanders from the other operations interacted with military and civilian government officials. The operations facilitated the implementation of the Israel-Egypt and Israel-Syria disengagements and the latter the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty. These instruments and the operations dealt with the conventional war between Israel and her neighbouring states.

UNIFIL deviated from the mould; the operation had to build political relationships with state and non-state actors to perform its mandated duties and, at times, even guarantee the safety of its troops. Siilasvuo and the Force Commander needed an experienced civilian political

officer ready to who could support them in building relationships, report to New York and act as the operation's political voice. Luckily, Urquhart found the ideal candidate to fill that role in Tokyo.

Ambassador James Holger[79] of Chile was a diplomat with ample experience in his country's most important embassies. He served *inter alia* as Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations. After leaving the Foreign Service in 1973, Holger became a UN Staff Member. Between 1977 and 1978, he worked as Executive Assistant to the Rector of the United Nations University (Valverde, Castillo, & Rivas, 2021). Urquhart recruited him to serve as UNIFIL's Senior Political Affairs Officer. His terms of reference included: reporting to Urquhart on Lebanon's political developments, attending sensitive political meetings, and assisting the Force Commander in his political dealings with all relevant actors. Throughout his time at UNIFIL, he communicated with Urquhart directly. Between 15 January 1979 and 14 January 1981, Holger sent 11 confidential monthly political reports. These documents are extraordinary because of their detail, clear understanding of the conflict's dynamics, and honesty. In addition, Holger and Urquhart sent each other multiple letters to discuss UNIFIL's position and the broader conflict. These documents serve as the basis for this analysis of UNIFIL's performance and constraints between its arrival and the 1982 Israeli invasion.

On 15 January, a month after his arrival, Holger sent his first political report summarising the core challenges.

> Israel's unwillingness and Lebanon's inability to implement Security Council resolutions are further compounded by the *de facto* forced restrictions on UNIFIL's freedom of movement […] a reactivation of PLO militancy is also to be expected […] this will place UNIFIL more and more on the defensive, with the possibility of its credibility may deteriorate […] The Security Council may have to display greater resolve and imagination in coping with the situation (UNA, 1979, p. 4)

[79] After his time at UNIFIL, Holger worked as Head of the Middle East desk at the Office for Special Political Affairs in New York (1981-1982). He served in Cyprus as Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (1982-1984) and later as Special Representative (1984-1988). Afterwards, Holger worked as Director of the United Nations Information Centre in Washington DC (1988-1990).

Holger highlighted that every side was blocking UNIFIL's progress; however, he identified Israel's support of the SLA as the most difficult challenge. The report concludes with a warning: either the United States pressures Israel to support UNIFIL, or the operation will fail. Holger was right. By the time he drafted Report #1, the Lebanese military was on the verge of deploying to Southern Lebanon to attempt to regain control of the area. The Security Council supported this decision. On 19 January, it adopted resolution 444 (1979). The Council renewed UNIFIL's mandate for another six months and appreciated the Lebanese efforts to deploy their forces to the south. However, the resolution bitterly criticises Israel's actions vis-à-vis UNIFIL, mainly because it supports "irregular armed groups" (the SLA). However, while the decision had significant support in New York, the reality was different on the ground. Report #2 (UNA, 1979) stresses that Beirut's decision may become counterproductive due to the risk of retaliation from the SLA. Moreover, the report correctly concluded that unless the situation in the whole country improves, peace in the South would be impossible. UNIFIL's situation deteriorated by the day. Report #3 explains that Israel was not complying with resolution 444 hence "UNIFIL's inability to effect any further development in the south" (UNA, 1979, p. 1). Israel's relationship with UNIFIL was full of tension and, ultimately, mistrust. While the IDF did withdraw from the South in 1978, it never vacated its 'security zone', which was very close to UNIFIL's AO. In addition, Israel's unwavering support for Haddad placed it squarely against the spirit of the operation's mandate: restore state control over Southern Lebanon.

By the summer of 1979, Holger raised the possibility of another war. Report #5 explains that the PLO's rejection of the Camp David Accords was fierce and led to increased attacks against Israeli civilians. Furthermore, Syria's decision to place surface-to-air missiles close to the Israeli border was an apparent provocation. Holger also discusses the other dynamics shaping the region. First, Syria had an enormous military presence in Lebanon, which sometimes conflicted with the PLO. Arafat saw the Syrians as threatening his *de facto* control over Southern Lebanon. The IDF attacked Syrian-controlled areas, which heightened the tensions further. Holger warned that both Israel and Syria made on the record statements warning each other that they were ready to retaliate if attacked. The report concludes that

the chances of an Israel-Syria war in Lebanon were high; however, UNIFIL was not in a position to keep the peace (UNA, 1979)

Holger's Report #8 from 3 June 1980 summarised the root problem succinctly

> The present international, regional, and Lebanese environments do not appear conducive to a lasting solution to the Lebanese problem. This is a multidimensional problem, one that has intra-Lebanese, Lebanese-Palestinian, inter-Arab, Israel-Arab, intra-Palestinian, and US-Soviet connections. It is a problem where religion, politics and energy are intertwined in a divisive as well as an integrative manner (UNA, 1979, p. 16)

UNIFIL was a one-dimensional operation trying to solve a multi-dimensional problem. Holger's reports stress that while UNIFIL performed admirably, it was not a match for this conflict. The operation's mandate was unrealistic and inadequate (Urquhart, 1983; James, 1983). Between 1978 and 1982, UNIFIL struggled to secure its own AO and keep parties from having daily skirmishes. In addition, while external factors complicated the situation, as Chapter 3 highlights, the operation and New York also made critical mistakes during the start-up phase regarding preparation, initial deployment of battalions and logistics (Mackinlay, 1989).

Erskine dispatched Holger to meet with the PLO numerous times to obtain assurances that their forces would not attack UNIFIL's battalions. However, the efforts were mostly futile. On March 1979, Holger sent a letter to Urquhart reporting on a meeting at PLO headquarters in Beirut. Erskine dispatched Holger to Beirut to ensure the safety of a Dutch Battalion due to deploy imminently. UNIFIL had to negotiate access to its own AO and request the parties to refrain from attacking its peacekeepers. The PLO's assurances were, at best, unreliable and, at worst, lies (UNA, 1979). Holger reported to Urquhart that both sides were re-arming[80] and warned that a new round of confrontation was looming.

By 1981, the situation got worse with the "rocket crisis". This was a significant escalation in the low-level war the IDF and the PLO started waging after Israel's Operation Litani. In May,

[80] Holger noted that Israel was increasing its military support to the SLA.

the PLO began to fire rockets in northern Israel while the IDF bombed PLO positions in Lebanon. The situation escalated even further in July. The IDF launched a significant operation against the PLO, which included destroying the PLO's headquarters in Beirut. The PLO sent a large number of rockets to Israel. The parties were on the brink of an all-out war (Kaufman, 2010). The United States decided to intervene in the conflict by sending Philip Habib, a Special Envoy, to broker a cease-fire. Habib's good offices were up to the challenge, and he managed to halt the conflict (Esber, 2016).

In early 1982, the Security Council adopted Resolution 501, which increased UNIFIL's troops from 6,000 to 7,000[81]. In April, the Secretary-General reported to the Council that tensions remained high while the cease-fire was holding. Moreover, the report stressed that UNIFIL remained unable to perform its duties, so the quest to achieve peace in Southern Lebanon remained elusive. The Secretary-General remarked that it instructed the UNTSO Chief of Staff to discuss with Israel and Lebanon the possibility of reactivating the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission (United Nations Security Council, 1982)

This action is gripping because it reflects two critical issues. First, after Siilasvuo's departure, UNTSO became the primary interlocutor between the Secretariat and the AO countries. Second, the Secretary-General and the Security Council wanted to try everything possible to avert another war; however, they knew the prospect of reactivating the commission was almost none. Moreover, even if UNTSO managed to start the process, the Lebanese government did not have control over Southern Lebanon. Therefore, the commission's decisions would be, at most, a symbolic gesture.

Unfortunately, the cease-fire was not comprehensive enough to halt the skirmishes, and the Security Council's resolutions did not strengthen UNIFIL's hand. Unlike Egypt in 1967, when Egypt expelled UNEF I before invading its AO, Israel did not even bother to request UNIFIL to withdraw; Jerusalem treated the operation as a non-issue and invaded Lebanon regardless

[81] The report indicates, "Ghana, Ireland, Nepal and Norway have agreed to increase their contingents by 221, 70, 30 and 20 men, respectively" (p.2). In addition, the French government pledged a 600-strong battalion. The troops arrived in the spring, 1982.

of its presence. The IDF called for a meeting with the UNIFIL Force Commander[82] on the morning of the invasion and informed him after the troop movement began (Erskine, 1989).

UNIFIL was not in a position where it could do something about it. By the time the rocket crisis started, UNIFIL had been on the ground for three years and had a mixed record. The operation's most pressing activity during this period was defending itself from heavy attacks from both sides (Parker, 1986). UNIFIL did not count with the protection, let alone the trust of anybody on the ground. While the Security Council continued to renew UNIFIL's mandate and even sent 1,000 more troops, the operation faced an impossible mission (Houghton & Trinka, 1984). Understanding UNIFIL's weak performance requires revisiting the way and reasons the Security Council deployed it in the first place. Establishing a large operation in Southern Lebanon was not a well-thought idea with the support of the entire Security Council or the Secretariat. The United States forced the Security Council to adopt a resolution after a single day of discussions and completely ignored the Secretariat's profound opposition to the prospects of sending peacekeepers to such a hostile AO (Nachmias, 1996).

By 1982, the status quo was horrendous. Holger communicated to Urquhart that an Israeli offensive was imminent. On 5 June 1982, Israel launched *Operation Peace for Galilee.* The Operation had multiple objectives. First, expelling the PLO from Southern Lebanon; second, neutralising the Syrian[83] threat from Lebanon. Israel sought to eliminate all threats coming from Lebanon with one operation. The reasons the Israeli government engaged in such a large-scale action are threefold. First, the PLO's military capability was significant and therefore, preventing them from attacking Israel's northern border required the IDF to keep the PLO at least 50 km away. The PLO was transforming into a conventional military with enhanced training and capabilities. Second, securing the border required clashing with Syria,

[82] On February 1981, Lt Gen William O'Callaghan of Ireland succeeded Erskine as Force Commander. He remained on his post until 1986, making him the longest-serving Force Commander in UNIFIL's history. Erskine returned to the post of UNTSO Chief of Staff, which he held until 1986. This continued the trend of moving leadership between the operations. Reappointing Erskine was a sensible and practical choice; after Siilasvuo's retirement, he became the most experienced peacekeeper in the Middle East.
For more details about the Chiefs of Staff and Force Commanders in the region, see Chapter 2.

[83] While Syria and Israel attacked each other from the Israel-Lebanon border, the Golan Heights remained quiet. Due to the Heights' proximity to Damascus, if Syria would have attacked Israel from that sector, the IDF had the advantage if could use artillery against the Syrian capital. It was less risky for Syria to engage Israel from outside its borders.

which directed the IDF to prepare to fight two enemies at the same time. Syria and the PLO, while different entities, coordinated their military actions (Yaniv & Lieber, 1983). The Israeli Cabinet committed around 90,000 troops, 800 tanks and hundreds of aircraft. After the Camp David Accords, the Israel-Lebanon border became the epicentre of the conflict (Freilich, 2012).

UNIFIL tried to stop the IDF advance; however, they only managed to slow them down briefly (Erskine, 1989; Göoksel, 2007). The invasion had profound consequences for UNIFIL. The operation's *de facto* AO became much smaller. UNIFIL lost its freedom of movement and dealt with militias who constantly harassed and attacked the soldiers. Furthermore, "the civilian population in the UNIFIL area, which had increased by over 200,000 in the period before the second invasion, was now bolstered by a further 150,000" (Parker, 1986, p. 70). Such a drastic increase in the refugee population put a strain on UNIFIL and the entire UN System; the invasion created a large-scale humanitarian crisis.

For the duration of the invasion, UNIFIL played a minimal role. The operation focused on providing humanitarian assistance and protecting of civilians, and ensuring the protection of its own troops. In addition, UNIFIL –with the assistance of UNTSO Observers– continued to report violations within its AO. In other words, UNIFIL became a glorified bystander with no power to do anything other than watch (Murphy, 2012).

Newly elected Secretary-General[84], Javier Perez de Cuellar, decided to be as active as he could in the quest for peace. During the entire invasion, the UN Chief criticised the Security Council for their unwillingness to prevent the violence (De Soto, 2018). Moreover, while he understood the Secretariat was not in a position to stop the invasion, he believed the organization had to exhaust every possible option. Therefore, Perez de Cuellar, as all his predecessors before him, reached out to one of the UN's most reliable actors: UNTSO

UNTSO in Lebanon: the UN's last resort

The invasion paralysed UNIFIL. A peacekeeping operation whose AO is invaded by a foreign military cannot be effective. The IDF took control over Southern Lebanon with

[84] On 1 January 1982, Javier Perez de Cuellar of Peru replaced Waldheim as Secretary-General.

overwhelming power. After quickly overpowering the South, the IDF moved to take the capital. A decisive moment in the invasion was the siege of Beirut. The IDF encircled the Lebanese capital from June to August. Heavy fighting, significant civilian casualties, and widespread destruction of infrastructure characterised the siege. The Siege of Beirut prompted international outcry and increased diplomatic efforts to end the war.

While UNIFIL remained sidelined, the Secretariat had another card it could play: UNTSO. Indeed, its observers had ample experience supporting UNIFIL by staffing OPs across the border (Myers & Dorn, 2022). Therefore, the Secretary-General began negotiations for the observers to be more active. Initially, Israel was adamantly against authorising UN Observers to enter Beirut; the IDF did not want them to report on their activities (Comay, 1983). The Lebanese government, however, formally requested the Council to authorise their deployment.

After weeks of intense negotiations, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 516 (1982). The resolution authorised the Secretary-General to deploy UNTSO to "monitor the situation in and around Beirut". UNTSO, true to form, could react within a matter of hours. Erskine redeployed 28 observers to Beirut. However, the IDF informed UNTSO "that until so ordered by [the] government, 'no cooperation will be extended to UNTSO personnel'" (Nelson, 1984, p. 72). Israel took the opportunity to continue its policy of undermining the operations. Jerusalem saw an opportunity to dwindle the UN's relevance in the region by opposing its presence. While they kept their consent to UNTSO and UNIFIL's mandates and presence, they did not want them in Beirut.

The Secretary-General submitted a Special Report to the Security Council (1982) informing them that the UNTSO Chief of Staff had high-level discussions with Israel and Lebanon to discuss the cease-fire. Erskine visited the Israeli Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem, where he learned that the issue of UN Observers was on the cabinet's agenda and that they would communicate Israel's decision shortly. Later, he met with the Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, who stressed his country's willingness to engage with UNTSO. Erskine tried to meet Arafat. However, he was unable to secure a meeting. The PLO informed the Secretary-General directly of their willingness to cooperate with UNTSO.

As the summer passed, the IDF kept control of Beirut, and in September, one of the darkest moments of the entire campaign took place: the Sabra and Shatila massacre. Between 16 and 18 September, Israeli-allied Lebanese Christian Falange militia members entered the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila in Beirut. They killed hundreds, if not thousands, of civilians, including women and children. The massacre occurred in the aftermath of the assassination of Lebanese President-elect Bashir Gemayel, a leader of the Falange party. The Falangists blamed the Palestinian factions for his death and sought revenge. The IDF, which had encircled Beirut during the invasion, allowed the Falangists to enter the camps. While the IDF did not directly participate in the killings, the Israeli government –namely the Minister of Defence, the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Prime Minister– had the responsibility of failing to prevent or stop the massacres (Temkin, 1987)

The Security Council, once again, adopted a resolution to address the developments. Resolution 520 took note of Gemayel's assassination, requested the IDF to retreat to the position it held until 15 September –a day before the massacre– and requested the Secretary-General to deliver a briefing on the situation within 24 hours.

On 18 September, he submitted a Report to the Council (1982). The document shares the initial reports submitted by the observers. The Secretary-General took the opportunity to remind the Council that he had requested to increase UN Observers' presence since June. Furthermore, the also reminded the Council that while it endorsed his recommendation to enhance the number of observers and widen their duties–through resolution 516– nothing changed on the ground. The report also stresses that the ten observers in Beirut were doing their best to keep the Council appraised of the situation. The report contained strong language from an assertive Secretary-General. The United States decided to answer his call for peace, albeit in a very American way.

The United States, led by special envoy Philip Habib, was crucial in mediating between the various parties and negotiating a ceasefire (Eisenberg, 2009). After weeks of negotiations, the PLO and Israel reached an agreement. The PLO agreed to leave Southern Lebanon, and the IDF agreed to allow them to do so safely. The United States decided against enhancing UNIFIL's mandate and opted to deploy a non-UN operation. Together with the United

Kingdom, France, and Italy, they deployed the MNF and mandated it to ensure the safe evacuation of the PLO fighters and to help restore stability in Beirut (Nelson, 1984). The MNF's presence aimed to prevent further violence and protect the civilian population. The ceasefire agreement also provided a framework for the IDF's staggered withdrawal from Beirut and Lebanon.

It is essential to clarify that the MNF did not replace UNIFIL. The operations had different mandates. The former sought to support the Lebanese government in establishing Beirut, facilitate the PLO's evacuation from Beirut, and protect the civilian population. UNIFIL, at least on paper, continued to work towards ensuring the IDF's withdrawal from *Southern* Lebanon and aid the Lebanese government in gaining control of the area (Weinberger, 1983).

The United States pushed the Security Council and the Secretariat to deploy UNIFIL to save the Camp David Accords. UNIFIL did not achieve its goals because the Council needed to give it the necessary support to do so. A few years later, the United States pushed for a non-UN operation because it did not trust UNIFIL (Mackinlay, 1989). While the MNF did not have the same mandate as UNIFIL, the Council could have enhanced UNIFIL's mandate[85] instead of dispatching an entirely new operation. The United States decided to refrain from forcing the Council to re-invigorate UNIFIL's mandate because it did not see the UN's involvement as essential.

While the MNF showed early success, it ran into significant challenges. After facilitating the PLO's departure and stabilising Beirut, the situation in Lebanon worsened (Robinson, 2022). The MNF increasingly became a target of attacks by various factions, including radical Shiite groups such as Hezbollah. These attacks led to significant casualties among the MNF troops, including the devastating Beirut barracks bombings in October 1983, which killed 241 U.S. service members and 58 French paratroopers.

The MNF was unable to maintain its neutrality. Lebanon's political system remained unstable while the United States wanted Beirut to have peace; it also had a specific

[85] In response to the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War, the Security Council significantly enhanced UNIFIL's mandate and size. For more see Novosseloff (2015a).

preference for whom it wanted to see in power. Therefore, the MNF was as a partisan foreign operation with a pro-western agenda. By 1984, the United States and allies ran out from political will to keep the MNF and withdrew.

Lebanon's political, security and economic challenges only increased after the MNF's withdrawal. The Security Council, despite all these difficulties did not adopt UNFIL's mandate. The operation remained frozen in time. UNIFIL faced numerous obstacles in, such as limited resources, hostility from all the parties involved, and the complex nature of the conflict. Nevertheless, to this day, UNIFIL continues to work in a hostile environment trying to keep stability in one of the world's most sensitive political landscapes.

Conclusion

Incorporating Complexity Theory into our understanding of the UN Peacekeeping Architecture's response to the shocks of the Camp David Accords and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon provides a nuanced perspective on the system's resilience and adaptability. This approach allows us to dissect the architecture's internal coherence and robustness, alongside its vulnerabilities in the face of superpower dynamics during the Cold War era.

The significant shocks to the peacekeeping architecture underscored a critical limitation in the UN system's ability to influence the conflict independently of the geopolitical currents shaped by the Cold War. Despite the internal coherence and the operational coordination mechanisms that defined the interdependent actors within the UN's peacekeeping efforts, the architecture found itself particularly vulnerable to the overarching influence of superpower politics. The withdrawal of UNEF II following the Camp David Accords and the side-lining of UNIFIL during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon highlight how the sustainability and success of a system orchestrated by the United Nations hinge on robust support from the Security Council, especially from its permanent members. This evidences that while a complex system like the Architecture possesses inherent strengths in terms of adaptability and coordination, its resilience is significantly compromised in the absence of unified backing from the global powers that dictate the Security Council's dynamics.

Despite these shocks, the remaining components of the peacekeeping architecture did not succumb to a complete breakdown. Instead, they maintained and adapted the coordination mechanisms established by Siilasvuo, demonstrating the system's inherent capacity for adaptation. Operations such as UNTSO, UNDOF, and UNIFIL continued to support each other, with UNTSO, for instance, persisting in its role of providing observers to the other operations. This enduring coordination underscores that even when a complex system experiences significant external shocks, it does not necessarily entail the disintegration of connections between its parts. Instead, the system adapts, striving to preserve its operational coherence and maintain open lines of communication and support among its components. This adaptability is indicative of the resilience embedded within complex systems, which, even in the face of severe challenges, seek to sustain their core functions and collaborative dynamics.

By applying Complexity Theory to analyze the UN Peacekeeping Architecture's response to these critical events, we gain insights into the dual nature of complex systems: their vulnerability to external pressures and their inherent capacity for resilience and adaptation. This analysis not only enriches our understanding of the UN's role in international peacekeeping but also highlights the importance of strategic backing from the Security Council and the international community to bolster the efficacy and sustainability of peacekeeping

The Camp David Accords: The End of Conventional War

The Camp David Accords are a historic step in the path towards peace. However, the parties did not reach this milestone because of multilateralism and the United Nations; they did so in spite of them. While the accords were successful in establishing peace between Israel and Egypt, they also led to a more fragmented approach to the peace process. Without Egypt, the rest of the region was unable to continue to speak with one voice opposing Israel’s occupation and demanding the return to the 1967 borders. The region bitterly rejected Egypt’s decision, which led to Egypt's temporary expulsion from the Arab League and Sadat’s assassination.

The Soviet Union, a close ally of the Arab States and the PLO in the Israel-Arab conflict, expressed its anger at the Accords by withholding its support to UNEF II. While their opposition had legitimate reasons such as the undermining of the Palestinian question, their anger stemmed from the fact the United States went back on its word and undermined their shared objective of reconvening Geneva. This would subsequently influence their decision increase its support of Syria, and the PLO, thereby complicating the dynamics of the conflict further.

For the Secretariat, the Camp David Accords had a significant negative effect as they lost two critical pieces of the architecture. While the literature covered UNEF II's withdrawal in depth, the loss of the Office of Chief Coordinator remains understudied. While the post existed only for a few years, it was a critical part of the UN's strategy to manage the conflict.

The Israel Invasion of Lebanon: A Shift in the Narrative

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 had a profound impact in the dynamics of the Israel-Arab conflict as it pushed the issue of Palestinian Statehood to the epicentre. Between the mid-1970s until the invasion, the PLO had a state within a state in Southern Lebanon. They controlled most of the area and acted with complete impunity. The PLO used the region's proximity to Israel to, continuously, attack both civilian and military targets. Furthermore, the invasion and subsequent occupation led to a high number of casualties and displacement of people, creating a humanitarian crisis.

While Israel achieved its initial objective of expelling the PLO from its northern border, the IDF did not destroy the PLO. In fact, it gave it significant political capital across the region and worldwide. Arafat used this as an opportunity to cement the support of over half the UN Member States to the cause of Palestinian statehood. In addition, the invasion fostered the creation of radical Islamist movements such as Hamas and Hezbollah. In addition, the Sabra and Shatila massacre, an act for which the IDF was indirectly responsible, increased the international support for the Palestinian strife and placed their quest at the centre of the conflict. By the time Israel laid siege to Beirut, the conflict's most pressing issue was not an inter-state competition but an asymmetrical war between a State and a non-state actor. Of

course, the invasion did not create the Israel-Palestinian conflict however, it displayed that unless this issue is resolved, and the chances of peace in the region are futile.

For the UN Peacekeeping architecture in the Middle East, the invasion displayed that the UN was not equipped to deal with the Israel-Palestine conflict. UNEF II and UNDOF partially succeeded in achieving their mandates only because the chances of another Yom Kippur-style war rapidly dwindled after 1974. Their mandates were clear; the parties consented to have the operations and, to a certain extent, cooperated with them. UNIFIL did not have the consent or legitimacy from the key stakeholders in Southern Lebanon.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

The United Nations' engagement with the Israel-Arab conflict from 1967 to 1982 represents a significant period of concerted effort, spanning political mediation to peacekeeping initiatives. This dissertation has navigated through the complex roles played by the Office of Special Political Affairs in New York, the Office of the Chief Coordinator in Jerusalem, and the deployment of four pivotal peacekeeping operations across the conflict's landscape. Employing an archival research methodology, this study has meticulously analysed primary source materials to unearth the nuanced contributions and challenges of these UN entities within the broader Israel-Arab conflict framework. This concluding chapter seeks to integrate the research findings, highlight the dissertation's contributions, and outline avenues for future investigation.

The selected timeframe marks a tumultuous chapter in UN history, underscored by the Six-Day War's dramatic reshaping of the geopolitical and social terrain. Israel's territorial acquisitions intensified its discord with the Arab world and provoked widespread condemnation from the international community. The Yom Kippur War further tested the region's fragile equilibrium, challenging the perceived invincibility of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and leaving the spectre of renewed conflict ever-present. In response, the UN's deployment of peacekeeping forces aimed to stabilize the volatile situation, culminating in the establishment of UNIFIL amidst escalating tensions in Lebanon.

A central thesis of this dissertation is the holistic treatment of the UN's architectural framework within the Israel-Arab conflict, a perspective that affords a deeper understanding of the UN's multifaceted involvement. By examining the collective operations and strategies of these entities, this study provides critical insights into the UN's historical role and the complex dynamics at play.

This chapter is structured into four sections, starting with theoretical reflections that position this research within the broader academic discourse on UN peacekeeping in the

Israel-Arab conflict. Subsequent sections address the supplementary research questions outlined in chapters 3-5, each dedicated to exploring specific aspects of the UN's peacekeeping efforts and their impact on the diplomatic and security landscape of the conflict.

By synthesizing the key findings and theoretical contributions of this research, this concluding chapter aims to offer a comprehensive assessment of the UN's endeavors to navigate and mitigate one of the most enduring conflicts of the twentieth century. In doing so, it sheds light on the successes and limitations of the UN's approach, providing a foundation for future scholarship on international peacekeeping and the ongoing pursuit of stability and peace in the Middle East.

Theoretical Reflections and Insights: Embracing Complexity in the UN's Peacekeeping Efforts

Reflecting on the theoretical underpinnings of this dissertation, it becomes evident that Complexity Theory provides a profound and innovative lens through which to analyse the Architecture in the Middle East. This dissertation advances the discourse by conceptualizing the myriad actors involved in the UN's peacekeeping endeavours not as isolated units but as integral components of a cohesive, interconnected architecture. This holistic approach, inspired by the principles of Complexity Theory, reveals the nuanced and often obscured dynamics of interdependence and emergent behaviour within the UN's operational framework.

At its essence, Complexity Theory elucidates the intricate interactions and dependencies among components within a system, uncovering the subtle yet pivotal relationships that influence collective outcomes. When applied to the UN's peacekeeping operations, Complexity Theory unveils a rich tapestry of interconnected actions and reactions, where the distinct mandates and operations of UN entities converge to shape the overall response to conflict situations. This paradigm shift from viewing entities in isolation to recognizing them as parts of a larger, dynamic system offers a fresh perspective on the operational complexities of peacekeeping efforts

Central to Complexity Theory are the concepts of interconnectedness and emergent behaviour—principles that are vividly demonstrated in the UN's approach to managing the Israel-Arab conflict. Traditional analyses might compartmentalize entities such as the Office of Special Political Affairs, the Office of the Chief Coordinator, and the various peacekeeping operations. However, such a segmented view overlooks the depth of collaborative and sometimes unexpected interactions that characterize the UN's strategy. This dissertation challenges conventional narratives by depicting these entities as facets of an elaborate "architecture" of peacekeeping, thereby embracing the operational intricacies inherent in the UN's engagements in conflict zones.

Viewing the UN's peacekeeping operations through the lens of a complex system reveals the dynamic collaboration and coordination that underpin the UN's efforts. Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation, for example, highlight the encouraged and emergent cooperation among operations, as well as the seamless integration of political and military work by key figures like Siilasvuo and Urquhart. This systemic approach underscores how the actions of one entity can significantly impact, and be impacted by, the actions of others within the architecture, demonstrating the vital dependencies and synergies that exist. The dissertation further illuminates how the UN peacekeeping architecture exhibits the hallmarks of complex adaptive systems, especially in response to acute crises. The inventive solutions and strategic adaptations that emerged in the aftermath of major conflicts throughout the studied period are testament to the UN system's capacity for resilience and innovation. Such adaptability is crucial for navigating the unpredictable and evolving landscape of international peacekeeping.

Reflecting on the theoretical underpinnings of this dissertation, it becomes evident that Complexity Theory provides a profound and innovative lens through which to analyse the United Nations' peacekeeping efforts in the Middle East. This dissertation advances the discourse by conceptualizing the myriad actors involved in the UN's peacekeeping endeavours not as isolated units but as integral components of a cohesive, interconnected architecture. This holistic approach, inspired by the principles of Complexity Theory, reveals the nuanced and often obscured dynamics of interdependence and emergent behaviour within the UN's operational framework. At its essence, Complexity Theory elucidates the

intricate interactions and dependencies among components within a system, uncovering the subtle yet pivotal relationships that influence collective outcomes. When applied to the UN's peacekeeping operations, Complexity Theory unveils a rich tapestry of interconnected actions and reactions, where the distinct mandates and operations of UN entities converge to shape the overall response to conflict situations. This paradigm shift from viewing entities in isolation to recognizing them as parts of a larger, dynamic system offers a fresh perspective on the operational complexities of peacekeeping efforts.

Central to Complexity Theory are the concepts of interconnectedness and emergent behaviour—principles that are vividly demonstrated in the UN's approach to managing the Israel-Arab conflict. Traditional analyses might compartmentalize entities such as the Office of Special Political Affairs, the Office of the Chief Coordinator, and the various peacekeeping operations. However, such a segmented view overlooks the depth of collaborative and sometimes unexpected interactions that characterize the UN's strategy. This dissertation challenges conventional narratives by depicting these entities as facets of an elaborate "architecture" of peacekeeping, thereby embracing the operational intricacies inherent in the UN's engagements in conflict zones.

Viewing the UN's peacekeeping operations through the lens of a complex system reveals the dynamic collaboration and coordination that underpin the UN's efforts. Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation, for example, highlight the encouraged and emergent cooperation among operations, as well as the seamless integration of political and military work by key figures like Siilasvuo and Urquhart. This systemic approach underscores how the actions of one entity can significantly impact, and be impacted by, the actions of others within the architecture, demonstrating the vital dependencies and synergies that exist. The dissertation further illuminates how the UN peacekeeping architecture exhibits the hallmarks of complex adaptive systems, especially in response to acute crises. The inventive solutions and strategic adaptations that emerged in the aftermath of major conflicts throughout the studied period are testament to the UN system's capacity for resilience and innovation. Such adaptability is crucial for navigating the unpredictable and evolving landscape of international peacekeeping.

In conclusion, Complexity Theory not only enriches our understanding of the UN's peacekeeping operations in the Middle East but also offers valuable theoretical contributions to the study of international relations and conflict resolution. By framing the UN's peacekeeping efforts within a complex systems paradigm, this dissertation provides deep insights into the multifaceted dynamics of cooperation, adaptation, and emergent strategy that define effective conflict management and peacebuilding endeavours.

Implications and Future Directions for Research

The application of complexity to UN peacekeeping in the Israel-Arab conflict offers profound insights and explains the dynamics of the conflict and the history of the UN's work. Furthermore, the holistic, architectural approach introduced by the study can serve as a prototype for analysing other multifaceted international operations, whether they be a peace operation or a special political mission. Complexity theory might shed light onto the relationship between a peace operation and special political mission with the rest of the UN system deployed on the ground. By transcending the limitations of segmented analysis and embracing the interconnectedness and dynamism inherent in global operations, future research can glean deeper insights, leading to more informed and effective interventions.

This study offers a new perspective on UN peacekeeping operations during a specific period. However, it also suggests a paradigm shift in the theoretical underpinnings of the study of peacekeeping and the study of cooperation between UN entities. By introducing and aptly applying the concept of complexity, it illuminates the rich tapestry of interactions, collaborations, and emergent behaviours that characterize global peacekeeping efforts. This innovative journey through the maze of UN operations, guided by the torch of complexity, has undoubtedly enriched the annals of peacekeeping literature and paved the way for future explorations.

Inter-Operation Collaboration: The Key to Success

Chapter 3 presents a groundbreaking exploration into the dynamics of collaboration among the United Nations' peacekeeping operations in the Middle East, spanning from 1973 to 1982. This inquiry transcends the conventional academic approach by integrating UNTSO, UNEF II, UNDOF, and UNIFIL into a cohesive analysis, moving beyond the perception of these

operations as isolated units. This section of the dissertation critically illuminates the interconnectedness of these operations within the broader UN peacekeeping architecture, emphasizing their collective impact on the security landscape of the Israel-Arab conflict.

Understanding Inter-Operation Collaboration (IOC) emerges as a critical lens through which to examine the security dimensions of the research question. By delineating how the UN's peacekeeping architecture maneuverer within military affairs, this chapter enriches our comprehension of the UN's role in influencing the conflict's security dynamics. This perspective reveals that while each operation was established with distinct mandates and operational frameworks, their de facto collaboration significantly enhanced their collective effectiveness.

The dissertation pioneers in advancing the discourse on IOC by treating these operations as integral components of a single, interconnected network. This approach is substantiated by historical instances where UNTSO's resources and expertise were leveraged to support the successive operations of UNEF II, UNDOF, and eventually UNIFIL. Such strategic collaboration, enduring to this day with UNTSO's continued support to UNDOF and UNIFIL, underscores the evolving nature of IOC within UN peacekeeping efforts. This nuanced understanding of IOC, largely overlooked in existing literature focused on peacekeeping outside the Middle East, positions this dissertation as both a historical account and a conceptual framework for future studies.

Furthermore, the dissertation reveals that IOC served as a critical instrument for crisis management within the Secretariat's toolkit. The archival findings highlight how Siilasvuo's critiques of bureaucratic inefficiencies led to the pragmatic adoption of IOC as a solution to operational challenges. This pragmatic collaboration, born out of necessity during times of crisis, eventually transitioned into standardized operational procedures, thereby institutionalizing coordination among the operations.

In conclusion, the genesis and evolution of IOC, as detailed in this dissertation, reflect the broader narrative of UN peacekeeping's development. The innate cooperation among peacekeeping operations, catalysed by urgent mandates and constrained timelines, became a cornerstone of operational success. Through a comprehensive examination of these

collaborative dynamics, this chapter not only provides a detailed account of IOC's critical role but also offers a usable framework for understanding the complexities of managing international peace and security. As such, the dissertation underscores the importance of viewing the UN's peacekeeping efforts in the Israel-Arab conflict through a lens of complexity, highlighting the interconnectedness and adaptability that are essential for navigating the multifaceted challenges of maintaining peace in volatile regions.While all parts of the architecture contributed to the success of the whole, it is critical to discuss the most important actor: UNTSO

UNTSO: The Pillar of the Architecture

The longevity and regional mandate undoubtedly render UNTSO a unique operation in the global history of UN peacekeeping. Its vastness, encompassing the entire Middle Eastern region, is not just a geographical footprint but also a strategic advantage. By establishing offices in all pivotal capitals, UNTSO strategically positions itself to build rapport and trust with key regional stakeholders. This privileged access does not just foster relationships; it enables UNTSO to step in as a mediator, diffusing tensions across its sectors, often even before they escalate into full-blown crises.

UNTSO's reputation in fostering elite UNMOs is unparalleled across the peacekeeping landscape. This prowess was distinctly evident during the 1967–1973 period when UNTSO's footprint spanned the entire Middle East, shouldering immense responsibilities. UNTSO's crucial role did not wane with the advent of new operations; in 1973, it played a pivotal role in bolstering UNEF during the start-up phase. Come 1978, UNTSO emerged, in the words of Erskine, as “UNIFIL’s rear HQ,” expediting its deployment with precision and efficiency.

More than its strategic roles, UNTSO became the leadership academy for future leaders. The complexities, nuances, and political intricacies embedded within the operation's mandate provide its staff with experience in one of the most sensitive conflicts in the world. UNTSO became a stepping-stone for many to ascend to prominent roles in other regional operations. Erskine and Siilasvuo stand out in this regard, with UNTSO's experiences being instrumental

in shaping their leadership approaches, ensuring that they were well prepared for the multifaceted challenges that awaited them.

Beyond its day-to-day activities, UNTSO's real strength lies in its quasi-permanent presence within the UN Architecture. By serving as a constant reservoir of adept officers, familiar with the intricacies of the entire region, UNTSO ensures that UN peacekeeping in the Middle East is never rudderless. This enduring presence not only provides continuity amidst the ever-evolving geopolitical landscape but also offers the reassurance of a deep-rooted understanding of the region's past, present and potential futures (Howard, 2019).

UNTSO is more than just a peacekeeping operation; it is the keystone upon which the Secretariat built the entire architecture. Through mediation, training officers, nurturing future leaders, or ensuring a sustained presence, UNTSO continues to prove its indispensable value in the intricate web of peacekeeping. UNTSO is not vested with the mandate to broker peace, evaluating UNTSO's efficacy against this criterion is unjust.

The Jarring Mission & Geneva Peace Conference: A Tale Changing Political Agency

Chapter 4 takes a step back from the operations' day-to-day work and reviews the Secretariat's political role. The chapter studies to what extent the Secretariat successfully acted as a policy broker in the political negotiations in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War and Operation Litani River. The role of the UN Secretariat as a policy broker in the aftermath of the Six-Day War (1967), the Yom Kippur War (1973) and Operation Litani River (1978) varied in its effectiveness, as the political context and the interests of the key parties involved in the conflict determined its influence. This section has two parts: The first covers the high-level diplomatic engagements – led by the Secretary-General and the Office of Special Political Affairs – while the second covers the work of the Chief Coordinator.

The Jarring Mission, led by Swedish diplomat Gunnar Jarring, was a political initiative through which the Secretariat hoped to broker a peace process in the aftermath of the Six-Day War. As the Secretary-General's Special Envoy, Jarring's mandate stemmed from Security Council Resolution 242. The Jarring Mission faced numerous obstacles. First, Israel and its neighbours had vastly different interpretations of Resolution 242 (Goldberg, 1973 &

1988; McDowall, 2014; Schaeftler, 1974) and Jarring did not have the political influence to foster a similar interpretation of such a controversial document. Second, Jarring had to shuttle between Israel and all her neighbours because the sides were unwilling to meet. Travelling and passing messages from one side to the other was time-consuming and inefficient. Moreover, unlike Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy, Jarring did not have strong government backing. Instead, all he had was the backing of the Secretary-General. Second, Jarring was unable to set the groundwork for potential negotiations. The parties' positions were too different. The Arab world bitterly denounced and rejected Israel's territorial gains and demanded a complete withdrawal. On the other hand, Israel claimed it would not negotiate with countries that did not recognise its right to exist. Moreover, Israel was unwilling to return any of the territory gained. Third, the superpowers influenced the mission because they cared more about Cold War politics than achieving long-lasting peace.

Despite its enormous efforts, the Jarring Mission could not secure a comprehensive peace agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours. The region went back to war. Jarring's failure had a profound impact on the Secretariat's political agency. The Security Council did not give the Secretariat another chance to spearhead a peace process.

The Geneva Peace Conference stands as a testament to the tumultuous era of Cold War politics and divergent national interests. With the backdrop of the Six-Day War, the Secretariat, with Waldheim at the helm, endeavoured to curate a balanced approach toward peace. However, the Geneva Peace Conference, despite its significant build-up, fell short of expectations. Nevertheless, it set the foundation for the Military Working Group, suggesting that even in perceived failures; there lay the seeds of future diplomacy.

After the Yom Kippur War, the U.S. took the lead in the peace process. Kissinger built and implemented an incremental approach through which the parties adopted confidence-building measures aimed at lowering the tensions. However, communication between Kissinger and Waldheim showed that the UN Chief was on the back foot. While the U.S. wanted the conference to take place under the auspices of the UN, they were unwilling to relinquish their position as the primary convener and guarantor of peace in the Middle East.

Waldheim expressed to Kissinger that he "did not wish to interfere" (UNA, 1973) with his strategy; however, he believed that the UN should have a substantive role to ensure the outcome has legitimacy. Moreover, Waldheim reminded Kissinger that the Secretariat had over a quarter of a century working in the region. Waldheim's argument worked only partially. Kissinger agreed to let Waldheim participate, however, with minimal agency. In the end, the Geneva Peace Conference did not meet the expectations. However, it created a framework for further incremental negotiations in the Military Working Group.

The Triumphs of "Middle-Management" Diplomacy

In contrast to high-level diplomatic endeavours, the Secretariat's mid-level engagement displayed commendable successes. The period under scrutiny undeniably marks the zenith of the UN staff's accomplishments, often referred to as the 'golden age'. During the UN's first three decades, both the Member States and the Secretariat were navigating and shaping the intricate balance between the independence of the UN and the oversight of the Member States. They built that dynamic in real time, with the Member States granting the UN remarkable leeway to execute their decisions. The era was graced by the likes of Bunche, Urquhart, Guyer, and Siilasvuo. These distinguished individuals not only built and governed the Secretariat but also managed multiple crises at the same time. Their roles were administrative and diplomatic in equal measure.

At this stage it is, once again, critical to discuss the importance of Siilasvuo's role. His appointment was a confluence of several factors aligning perfectly. The Secretariat was in dire need of a military intermediary who could seamlessly bridge the chasm between divergent parties. Siilasvuo, with his vast experience at the helm of UNTSO and UNEF, and the respect he garnered from both sides, emerged as the ideal candidate. Furthermore, the geopolitical landscape post the Yom Kippur War was ripe for negotiations. The parties needed a framework for disengagement and recognized the instrumental role the Secretariat could play in facilitating this process. His personal adeptness in chairing the Km 101 negotiations after the Yom Kippur War exemplifies this. Acting as a neutral mediator, he bridged trust deficits, enabling Israel and Egypt to forge the Six-Point Agreement, which lowered the tensions and gave both parties sufficient political capital to keep the conversation going and attend the Geneva Peace Conference. While it is true that Israel

protested that Siilasvuo overreached and tried to steer the negotiations, it is clear that both sides appreciated Siilasvuo's style, patience and skills. Even more impressive, the General chaired the negotiations whilst his team deployed UNEF II. During those days Siilasvuo had to split his time and focus.

Furthermore, when the MWG began to work, the General already had sufficient political rapport to assist the parties to negotiate the disengagement agreements. In addition, during this time, Siilasvuo was instrumental in the Secretariat's preparations for UNDOF's arrival. Chapter 3 highlights that the operation's terms of reference, composition, and even the name of the first Force Commander that came from Siilasvuo and his team.

It is critical to stress, however, that while Siilasvuo was far more successful in political terms than his supervisors, this was not entirely due to his skills. The Security Council "delegated" the operational part of the negotiations to the UN; Kissinger understood that the parties needed to meet at Km 101 without any other country. However, in order to keep things moving, a UN mediator was also necessary. Furthermore, at the Geneva Peace Conference, one of the only things on which all participants agreed was that the UN had an important role to play in the implementation of subsequent disengagement agreements through chairing the MWG and managing the peacekeeping operations. In other words, Siilasvuo had significantly more latitude than Waldheim, who had to plead the case of UN involvement to Kissinger at every turn.

The Secretariat's political role in the Israel-Arab conflict from 1967 to 1973 serves as a lesson in diplomacy's ebbs and flows. U Thant had significant latitude, which, unfortunately, resulted in failure. Waldheim, on the contrary, was supporting cast in Kissinger's grand-strategy. However, it is notable that the Secretariat had palpable and positive contributions in mid-level engagements. The politics of the Cold War and the evolving dynamics of the Middle East shaped the Secretariat's political role. Yet, amidst these oscillations of influence, figures like Siilasvuo stand out, exemplifying the potential of middle-management diplomacy in navigating complex geopolitical terrains. The peacekeeping architecture in the Middle East suffered two severe shocks, which transformed it. The next section discusses the ramification of each shock and its aftermath.

The Shocks to the Architecture

Chapter 5 reviews the two developments that significantly undermined the UN peacekeeping architecture and, at the same time, transformed the conflict once again. The Chapter analyses the following question: To what extent did the Camp David Accords and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon affect the ability of the UN Peacekeeping Architecture to perform its duties?

The Camp David Accords: An Attack against Multilateralism

The Camp David Accords achieved what seemed impossible five years prior: peace between Israel and Egypt. However, for the purposes of multilateralism and the objectives of the UN, how the parties came together proved to be a past success, which all but guaranteed Israel would not sign another peace treaty for years to come.

The Secretary-General wanted the Israel-Arab conflict to be the crowning achievement of his second term. He made a very public and ambitious diplomatic offensive to reconvene the Geneva Peace Process to tackle the conflict holistically. To that end, he gained the wholehearted endorsement of the General Assembly, which mandated that he reconvene the conference. He simultaneously reiterated its wish that the PLO participate as a delegation in its own right. The Soviet Union and the U.S. fully supported Waldheim's view, and they even released a joint statement calling for the parties to meet in Geneva. However, neither Waldheim nor the Soviets convinced the Israelis to attend the conference with the Palestinians. The issue was a poison pill for Israel. Moreover, the Israelis and Egyptians wanted to engage in peace talks *without* the Soviet Union. Therefore, they negotiated secretly in Morocco without telling the U.S. In the end, President Sadat decided to do the unthinkable and visited Jerusalem to announce that the two countries were embarking on an unstoppable march towards peace.

The Israel-Egypt rapprochement bypassed all multilateral initiatives. It quickly became apparent that Sadat was only interested in securing the return of the Sinai Peninsula and was willing to sacrifice the Palestinian quest for statehood in the process. Israel, which knew it had to return the Peninsula sooner rather than later, decided to negotiate the issue without discussing the control over the West Bank and Gaza. Israel returned something never theirs

in exchange for what they believed was theirs by right. While the process was bilateral and became trilateral when the Carter Administration joined, they did envision a role for the UN.

Israel and Egypt explicitly mention in the Peace Treaty that they wished to have UN 'personnel and observers' on the ground to verify the treaty's implementation. Moreover, they also mention their wish to have the Chief Coordinator participate in the dispute settlement mechanism. While the parties knew neither of the operations had the mandate to support the implementation, they hoped the Security Council would adopt UNEF II and UNTSO's mandates and the terms of reference of the Chief Coordinator. However, they also anticipated a potential Soviet veto, so they requested assurances that the U.S. would assist in case the UN was unable or unwilling to do so. They turned out to be correct.

The Soviet Union and the Arab world bitterly denounced how the parties came together and ignored the Palestinian question. Therefore, they decided to prevent the UN from playing an active role in the Israel-Egypt border. This decision neutralised two critical players in the architecture. First, the Soviet Union intended to veto a proposal to extend UNEF II's mandate. The U.S. decided to avoid a political showdown and did not table a draft resolution to that effect. Therefore, the Secretary-General announced his plans to arrange an orderly withdrawal of the operation.

UNEF II was a successful peacekeeping operation on several accounts. First, it achieved its mandate of creating a full buffer between Israel and Egypt. Second, its presence assured that tensions would remain calm while the parties negotiated the disengagement agreements at the tent and in Geneva. Third, Siilasvuo's dual negotiator and Force Commander Role allowed the UN to be proactive. Moreover, UNEF II's success also meant that UNDOF had a smooth start.

Of course, UNEF II's success was also due to external factors. The operation was as successful as its host countries wanted it to be. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss why Israel and Egypt decided to put down their weapons and make peace. If they wanted to fight another war, there was little UNEF II could have done to stop them. The overall framework created through the painstaking process from the tent at Km 101 to the second disengagement agreement paved the way for a one-way trip to peace. UNEF II was a critical facilitator of the implementation;

however, UNEF II highlights that second-generation peacekeeping can work if and only if the parties support it. In the end, a non-UN peace operation substituted UNEF II; however, the operation is an example of success.

However, the UN did not cease *all* its operations in the Sinai Peninsula. The Secretary-General stated that he would continue to rely on UNTSO to provide UNMOs to monitor the Peninsula and the Israeli withdrawal. UNTSO had the mandate and expertise to cover the vacuum UNEF II left immediately. Moreover, the Council never put into question either amending UNTSO's mandate to prevent it from working in the Peninsula or withdrawing from the operation altogether. UNTSO is impervious to the political dynamics at the Council because they continue to rely on its work.

The Chief Coordinator: The Demise of a Very Good Idea

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union's objection to the UN's involvement in the Israel-Egypt Peace talks did not end at UNEF II. Indeed, the operation's architect suffered the same fate. The Soviet Union also barred the Chief Coordinator from playing the role the parties envisioned for this office. In late 1978, Siilasvuo announced his intentions to retire from active duty and return to Finland. The Secretary-General let the post elapse without hiring a replacement; therefore, Siilasvuo became the first and last Chief Coordinator of Peacekeeping in the Middle East.

Siilasvuo served the UN exemplarily well. When he took over the UNTSO Chief of Staff role, the operation worked in a very hostile environment with extremely high tensions. Siilasvuo understood the importance of building relationships on both sides. He gained the reputation of a fair and seasoned officer the parties could trust. He had a very fruitful relationship with Headquarters because he was always frank and direct with them. As Chapter 3 highlights, Siilasvuo was fearless in challenging the Secretariat and complaining about its shortcomings in terms of planning. However, Siilasvuo consistently implemented his mandate to the best of his abilities. When he became UNEF II Force Commander, he had to step away from his traditional military role and become a quasi-diplomat. Siilasvuo's involvement at the operational level lowered the tensions and paved the way for high-level negotiations. While Kissinger usually gets all the credit for the Sinai and Syria disengagement plans, his strategy

of incremental progress was only achievable because the UN Team worked well on the ground.

Siilasvuo understood that the high degree of operational concentration required coordination. Therefore, he took the initiative to create a new job and stated that the Secretary-General should appoint him. Enhancing cooperation among the operations was critical for the achievement of their mandates. The Chief Coordinator's accomplishments revolved around two main issues. First, he streamlined the management of the operations. Siilasvuo arranged the operations to engage in systematic dialogue in programme management, logistics and military affairs. He chaired multiple meetings where the operations sent people with the same job function to Jerusalem to standardise their practices and support each other. Moreover, Siilasvuo travelled to each operation often to meet with the teams and support their work. While the Force Commanders remained accountable to the Secretary-General (through the Office of Special Political Affairs), Siilasvuo was the focal point for New York. He liaised with Urquhart and Guyer on strategic matters and ensured that all operations had the same information simultaneously. While it would appear self-evident, it is critical to highlight how groundbreaking this position and his duties were for the UN. The Secretariat created a middle-management role as a conduit between the operations and headquarters.

Second, this office supported the Force Commanders when dealing with sensitive issues in their respective AOs. Because Siilasvuo was Under-Secretary-General, his natural counterparts were Foreign Ministers and Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces. He was able to bring sensitive issues to the highest levels of government. The Chief Coordinator engaged in high-level diplomacy, unprecedented in the history of UN peacekeeping. Throughout his tenure, Siilasvuo built up the credibility of the UN across the board, even in Israel. Siilasvuo established respectful and efficient relationships with vital Israeli stakeholders, such as General Yaariv at the Km 101 tent and later with people such as Yitzhak Rabin and Moshe Dayan. Siilasvuo's tenure as Chief Coordinator was, by all accounts, successful. This begs the question: Why did the UN abandon the post?

The Camp David Accords changed the region, and UNEF II's withdrawal dwindled the active engagement of the UN. The reaction to the trilateral agreement was so bitter that it torpedoed any chance of Israel having peace talks with anybody in the region. The fact that the Palestinian question was not central to the discussions meant its plight remained unresolved. Israel took advantage of Egypt's desire to reclaim the Sinai Peninsula and used the "land for peace" formula with land that never belonged to them. The reaction was so drastic that the Secretariat could not justify their active participation in any part of this process to the General Assembly.

Moreover, there was much less need for a Coordinator for two main reasons. First, the *modus operandi* whereby the operations pool and share resources with each other was fully functional and became routine. Second, there was no real chance of making any type of progress. Therefore, the operations could only observe and try to prevent further escalation of violence. For UNDOF, while the Golan Heights remained contested, the chance of an Israel-Syria war was virtually non-existent. UNDOF had a very traditional peacekeeping role whereby their observers and soldiers patrolled its AO and reported any violations. The status quo from the Israel-Syria disengagement agreement of 1974 stayed in place, and there was almost no chance of moving the needle. Therefore, UNDOF did not need to rely on the Chief Coordinator for political support because the operation had no political tasks. UNTSO continued to carry out its duties across the region, served as an effective yet underrated liaison mechanism between the parties, and supplied UNMOs to UNDOF and UNIFIL. The Chief of Staff took over most of the high-level liaison duties from the Chief Coordinator however, unlike Siilasvuo, UNTSO did not have to embark on many high-level sensitive negotiations.

The case of UNIFIL was, as always, different. The operation faced enormous challenges; the operation did not have the means to prevent further violence; and the Chief Coordinator could not help them very much. Chapter 3 highlights that while Siilasvuo was instrumental at the onset, his ability to assist UNIFIL dwindled after its deployment.

The Camp David Accords transformed the dynamics of the Israel-Arab conflict, and the UN peacekeeping architecture was no exception. While the parties hoped to have UNEF II and

the Chief Coordinator as a partner in the treaty's implementation, they ended up leaving the region. The moment Israel, Egypt and the U.S. decided to embark on a trilateral process without the Soviet Union with an agenda that did not include the Palestinian question, they sabotaged the opportunity to have the UN support them. The Secretary-General could not go against a Soviet veto. In the end, the parties went outside the UN and deployed the MFO. As the Golan Heights and Sinai Peninsula situation remained quiet, Southern Lebanon was a powder keg that exploded in 1982.

The Israel Invasion of Lebanon

As Chapter 5 illustrates, UNIFIL never had the necessary backing from the Council or legitimacy from the actors on the ground. Everyone in Southern Lebanon, at one time or another, conspired and attacked UNIFIL positions. While the Chief Coordinator helped set up the operation, the UN did not have the mandate or resources to bring peace to Southern Lebanon. Therefore, the Chief Coordinator could only do a little to support the operation. While the early 1970s saw significant involvement of the UN in the conflict, the progress towards peace stagnated by the end of the decade, and the Secretariat did not have the necessary agency to fix it.

The invasion displayed that UNIFIL was unable to prevent Israel from deploying a large-scale military action. While UNIFIL tried to slow down the Israeli invasion, its efforts were futile. Regardless of its size, an operation with a weak mandate cannot keep the peace. The Security Council never gave UNIFIL the right tools to achieve its mandate; however; the Council kept them it the ground.

The invasion led to the deployment of a U.S.-led non-UN operation. The MNF deployed to Beirut at the request of the Lebanese government to monitor and facilitate the PLO's withdrawal from Lebanon. The MNF did not replace UNIFIL; however, it showed that the UN operation was unable to adapt its work in a time of acute crisis. The Security Council could have amended UNIFIL's mandate to extend its AO to Beirut and create a strong buffer between the IDF and the PLO as the Palestinians left the country. However, the Lebanese government requested Washington to get directly involved, bypassing the Security Council and ignoring UNIFIL. The Lebanese believed that due to the heightened tensions and risk to

the soldiers on the ground that the U.S. military had much more resilience and tolerance for potential casualties than UNIFIL's TCCs had. Lebanon was right, the TCCs would not agree to expose their soldiers and had they experienced casualties, their resilience would drop. In the end, the MNF left for that specific reason. After multiple attacks against their positions and suffering heavy casualties, the MNF withdrew in 1984. While the MNF did facilitate the PLO's withdrawal from Lebanon, it did not foster peace; it did not even manage to have an absence of war.

A Legacy of Persistence and Mixed Record: The UN's Contributions and Trials in the Israel-Arab Conflict

As this dissertation draws to a close, it is imperative to reflect on the emblematic nature of the UN's engagement with the Israel-Arab conflict, a saga that mirrors the broader history, challenges, and triumphs of the United Nations as an intergovernmental body and as an organisation. This conflict, as old as the UN itself, stands as a testament to the organization's enduring commitment to international peace, security, and sustainable development. The period under review reveals the UN's nuanced role in a conflict it never had the political leverage to resolve independently but where it proved indispensable in moderating tensions and preventing regional escalations.

The UN's efforts through UNEF, UNDOF, and UNTSO were instrumental in maintaining a relative peace, demonstrating the organization's capacity to act as a critical buffer in times of heightened geopolitical stakes. These operations underscore the UN's value not when it seeks to unilaterally 'solve' conflicts but as a tool for peace when the international community, particularly the superpowers, commits to such an end. Despite criticisms and perceived failures, the tangible achievements of these missions in preventing further wars cannot be overlooked.

The Secretariat's role during this period highlighted its potential for strategic agency and execution, albeit with mixed outcomes. The Jarring mission's shortcomings and Waldheim's constrained political stance underscore the limitations faced by the Secretary-General in the shadow of dominant superpowers. Yet, these challenges also illustrate the potential for the

Secretariat to serve as a mediator and a strategic partner, even in the face of overwhelming geopolitical dynamics.

Conversely, figures like Siilasvuo, Urquhart, and Guyer exemplify the positive impact of strong leadership and effective planning in peacekeeping efforts. Siilasvuo's adeptness as an honest broker and the strategic foresight of Urquhart and Guyer in deploying UNEF and UNDOF, as well as managing the crisis that necessitated UNIFIL's immediate deployment, highlight the importance of nuanced, informed approaches to peacekeeping and conflict resolution.

The UN's history within the Israel-Arab conflict underscores the double-edged sword of multilateralism. It showcases the organization's capacity for significant contributions to peacekeeping and conflict management, while also revealing the limitations imposed by the political will of its member states and the geopolitical interests of superpowers. This nuanced understanding is crucial, not only for appreciating the UN's past roles but also for informing its future strategies. As the conflict continues to evolve, the UN must reassess and redesign its approach to address today's challenges, drawing on lessons from its historical engagements to navigate the complex landscape of modern peacekeeping and diplomacy.

In conclusion, the UN's involvement in the Israel-Arab conflict offers valuable insights into the broader efficacy and challenges of international peacekeeping efforts. By acknowledging both the successes and shortcomings of the UN's role in this protracted conflict, we gain a deeper appreciation for the organization's potential to contribute to global peace and security. Moving forward, it is imperative that the UN leverages its historical experiences to adapt and innovate, ensuring it remains a vital force for peace in an ever-changing world.

Archival Sources

UNA. (1967). *S-0865-0002-05-00001. File 3. Telegram from the Secretary-General to the King of Jordan. 5 June 1967.*

UNA. (1973). *Folder S-0899- 0001-10. File 1, Coded Cable from Guyer to The Secretary-General, 16 November 1973.*

UNA. (1973). *S-0899- 0001-10, File 2. Coded Cable from Guyer to The Secretary-General 15 December, 1973.*

UNA. (1973). *S-0899- 0001-10, File 3. Coded cable from Siilasvuo to Guyer/Urquhart, 19 November 1973.*

UNA. (1973). *S-0899- 0001-10, File 5. Coded Cable from Guyer to The Secretary-General 15 December, 1973.*

UNA. (1973). *S-0899- 0001-10. File 4. Coded Cable from Siilasvuo to Guyer/Urquhart. 20 November 1973.*

UNA. (1973). *S-0899- 0012-01, File 1, Meeting between the US Secretary of State and the Secretary-General in Washington on 23 November.*

UNA. (1973). *S-0899- 0012-01, File 2, Meeting in the Secretary-General's Office on September 24, 1973.*

UNA. (1973). *S-0899- 0012-01. File 3. Letter from Kurt Waldheim to Henrry Kissinger. 14 November 1973.*

UNA. (1973). *S-0899- 0015-09. File 1. Verbatim Record of the Geneva Conference. December 1973.*

UNA. (1973). *UNA, Folder S-0899- 0003-04, File 3, 15 November 1973, Letter from B. Urquhart to Col. R.W Bunworth.*

UNA. (1974). *S-0899- 0004-15. File 1. Notes on talk with Dr Kissinger. 1 June 1974.*

UNA. (1974). *S-1783- 0000- 0035, File 2, 24 July 1974, Col. Kuosa, UNEF Interoffice Memorandum, Integration of UNMOs serving in UNDOF.*

UNA. (1974). *S-1783- 0000- 0035, File 3. The Integration of Military Observers Within UNDOF, A Working Paper preapred by UNTSO Senior Staff. 18 December 1974.*

UNA. (1974). *S-1783- 0000- 0035. File 2. UNEF Interoffice Memorandum from Col Kuosa to Gen Siilasvuo "Integration of UNMOs serving in UNDOF". 24 July 1974.*

UNA. (1974). *S-1786- 0000- 0019. File 1. Memorandum from Erskine to Siilasvuo ''Integration of UNTSO Observers with UNDOF -some thoughts''. 9 July 1974.*

UNA. (1974). *UNA, S-0899- 0004-12, File 1. Note Verbale from the Secretary-General to the Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations. 27 June 1974.*

UNA. (1974). *UNA, S-1783- 0000- 0030, File 2, 14 March 1974, The Secretary-General, Administrative Support for UNEF.*

UNA. (1975). *S-0899- 0002-03. Siilasvuo's reports on the Military Working Group. 9 September 1975.*

UNA. (1975). *UNA, S-0899- 0004-03 File 1, 6 June 1975, Erik Suy "Proposed unified command for UN Peace-keeping Forces in the Middle East".* New York: United Nations Archives.

UNA. (1977). *S-1783- 0000- 0030. Folder 1. File 1. Letters from the Secretary-General to the Security Council on UNTSO in the ILMAC sector. 15 June 1976 & 15 November 1977.*

UNA. (1977). *S-1783- 0000- 0031. File 5. Material on United Nations Observer Missions and Peacekeeping Forces Authorised by the Security Council. Working File #2. 11 April 1977.*

UNA. (1979). *S-1066- 0058-12. File 1. Political Report #1 from James Holger to Brian Urquhart. 19 January 1979.*

UNA. (1979). *S-1066- 0058-12. File 13. Memorandum from James Holger to Brian Urquhart. 17 August 1979.*

UNA. (1979). S-1066- 0058-12. File 14. Letter from Holger to Urquhart. 10 March 1979.

UNA. (1979). *S-1066- 0058-12. File 2. Political Report #2 from James Holger to Brian Urquhart. 23 February 1979.*

UNA. (1979). *S-1066- 0058-12. File 3. Political Report #3 from James Holger to Brian Urquhart. 23 March 1979.*

UNA. (1979). *S-1066- 0058-12. File 4. Political Report #4 from James Holger to Brian Urquhart. 1 May 1979.*

UNA. (1979). *S-1066- 0058-12. File 5. Political Report #5 from James Holger to Brian Urquhart. 29 June 1979.*

UNA. (1979). *S-1066- 0058-12. File 6. Political Report #6 from James Holger to Brian Urquhart. 11 August 1979.*

UNA. (1979). *S-1066- 0058-12. File 7. Political Report #7 from James Holger to Brian Urquhart. 22 September 1979.*

UNA. (1979). *S-1066- 0058-12. File 8. Political Report #8 from James Holger to Brian Urquhart. 22 October 1979.*

UNA. (1980). *S-1066- 0058-12. File 10. Political Report #10 from James Holger to Brian Urquhart. 3 November 1980.*

UNA. (1980). *S-1066- 0058-12. File 9. Political Report #9 from James Holger to Brian Urquhart. 26 May 1980.*

UNA. (1981). *S-1066- 0058-12. File 11. Political Report #11 from James Holger to Brian Urquhart. 14 January 1981.*

UNA. (n.d.). *UN. Office for Special Political Affairs.* Retrieved from Archives and Records Management Section: https://search.archives.un.org/un-office-for-special-political-affairs

Primary Sources

UN Chronicle. (1980). Political and Security - Call for Comprehensive Solution of Middle East Question Renewed. *UN Monthly Chronicle*.

United Nations Department of Peace Operations. (n.d). *How are we Funded*. Retrieved October 24, 2021, from https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/how-we-are-funded#gadocs2

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (2008). *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines.* Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training. New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

United Nations General Assembly. (1947). *Resolution 106 (S-1) Special Committee on Palestine. A/RES/106.*

United Nations General Assembly. (1949). *Resolution 273. A/RES/273 (III).*

United Nations General Assembly. (1956). *First report of the Secretary-General on the plan for an emergency international United Nations force requested in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 4 November 1956 (A/3289).*

United Nations General Assembly. (1958). *Report of the Secretary-General: UNEF: Summary Study of the Experience derived from the Establishment and Operation of the Force, A/3943.*

United Nations General Assembly. (1967). *Report of the Secretary-General on the withdrawal, A/6730 & Add.1-3 & A/6730/Add.3/Corr.1.* New York: United Nations.

United Nations General Assembly. (1967). *Report of the Secretary-General: United Nations Emergency Force, A/6669.*

United Nations General Assembly. (1973). *Resolution 3101. A/Res/3101(XXVIII).*

United Nations General Assembly. (1974). *Resolution 3236. A/RES/3236 (XXIX).*

United Nations General Assembly. (1975). *Resolution 3375 (XXX). Invitation to the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the efforts for peace in the Middle East.*

United Nations General Assembly. (1975). *Resolution 3379. A/RES/3379.*

United Nations General Assembly. (1976). *Resolution 31/61.*

United Nations General Assembly. (1976). *Resolution 31/62.*

United Nations Secretariat. (1990). *Establishment of a Senior Planning and Monitoring Group for Peacekeeping Operations. ST/SGB/233.*

United Nations Security Council . (1971). *Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Special Representative To The Middle East, S/10070.*

United Nations Security Council . (1973). *Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 340, S/11052.*

United Nations Security Council. (1949). *Resolution 69. S/1277.*

United Nations Security Council. (1967). *Official records, 22nd year, 1366th meeting.*

United Nations Security Council. (1967). *Report by The Secretary-General, S/7896.*

United Nations Security Council. (1967). *Report of the Secretary-General, S/7930.*

United Nations Security Council. (1967). *Resolution 236.*

United Nations Security Council. (1967). *Supplemental Information - Interim Report on Government House. S/7930/Add. 27.*

United Nations Security Council. (1973). *Resolution 338, S/RES/338.*

United Nations Security Council. (1973). *Resolution 341, S/Res/341.*

United Nations Security Council. (1973). The Search for Peace in the Middle East: The Waldheim Report. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 181-205.

United Nations Security Council. (1974). *Further Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force. S/11310/Add.3.*

United Nations Security Council. (1974). *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Oberserver Force, S/11310.*

United Nations Security Council. (1974). *Resolution 350. S/Res/350.*

United Nations Security Council. (1977). *Report of the Secretary-General Submitted Under General Assembly Resolution 31/62 Concerning the Peace Conference in the Middle East. S/12290.*

United Nations Security Council. (1978). *Further report on the status of the cease-fire in the Israel.-Lebanon sector. S/11663/Add.51.*

United Nations Security Council. (1978). *Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425. S/12611.*

United Nations Security Council. (1978). *Resolution 425.*

United Nations Security Council. (1979). Letter Dated 24 July 1979 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/13468.

United Nations Security Council. (1979). Letter Dated 9 November 1999 From the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council. S/1999/1226.

United Nations Security Council. (1979). *Resolution 444. S/Res/444.*

United Nations Security Council. (1982). *Report of the Secretary-General in Pursuance of Security Council Resolutin 520. S/15400.*

United Nations Security Council. (1982). *Report of the Secretary-General in Pursuance of Security Council Resolution 516. S/15334.*

United Nations Security Council. (1982). Resolution 516.

United Nations Security Council. (1982). Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. S/14996.

Secondary Sources

Abrams, E. (2018, August 30). *What is the Role of UNIFIL?* Retrieved from The Council on Foreign Relations : https://www.cfr.org/blog/what-role-unifil

Akehurst, M. (1981). The Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel. *International Relations*, 1035-1052.

Alexandrowicz, C. H. (1962). The Secretary-General of the United Nations. *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 1109-1130.

Angelo, V. (2011). *Inter-mission Cooperation: Reflecting on Sudan and Central Africa Experiences.* Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

Ashton, N. (2016). Searching for a Just and Lasting Peace? Anglo-American Relations and the Road to United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. *International history review*, 24-44.

Atherton, J. A. (1992). The Shifting Sands of Middle East Peace. *Foreign Policy*, 114-133.

Aubyn, F. K. (2015). Assessing the Relevance and Challenges of Inter-Mission Cooperation in Africa. *ACUNS-ASIL 2015 Summer Workshop on International Organization Studies.* Oslo. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/317105920_Assessing_the_Relevance_and_Challenges_of_Inter-Mission_Cooperation_in_Africa

Aviel, D. (1980). Economic Implications of the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*, 57-76.

Bailey, S. D. (1985). *The Making of Resolution 242.* Dordrecht: Nijhoff Publishers.

Bakke, L. H., & Waag, H. H. (2017). Facing Assad. American Diplomacy Toward Syria,1973–1977. *The International History Review*, 1-28.

Balding, C., & Wehrenfennig., D. (2011). Theorizing International Organizations: An Organizational Theory of International Institutions. *Journal of International Organizations Studies*, 7-27.

Barabási, A.-L. (2002). *Linked: The New Science of Networks.* Perseus Books Group.

Bar-Joseph, U. (2008). Lessons not Learned: Israel in the Post-Yom Kippur War Era. *Israel Affairs*, 70-83 .

Barnett, M. N., & Finnemore, M. (1999). The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations. *International Organization*, 699-732.

Barnett, M., & Finnemore, M. (2004). *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Barnett, M., & Finnemore, M. (2007). Political Approaches. In T. G. Weiss, & S. Daws, *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations* (pp. 41-58). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bar-On, M. (2012). The Generals' 'Revolt': Civil–Military Relations in Israel on the Eve of the Six Day War. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 33-50.

Bar-Siman Tov, Y. (1998). Peace Policy as Domestic and as Foreign Policy: The Israeli Case. *Davis Occasional Papers*, 1-42.

Bar-Siman-Tov, Y. (1984). The Myth of Strategic Bombing: Israeli Deep-Penetration Air Raids in the War of Attrition, 1969-70. *Journal of Contemporary History*, 549-570.

Bar-Siman-Tov, Y. (1998). The United States and Israel since 1948: A "Special Relationship"? *Diplomatic History*, 231-262.

Bar-Yaacov, N. (1980). Keeping the Peace Between Egypt and Israel 1973-1980. *Israel Law Review*, 197-268.

Becker, R. N., Hillman, A. L., Potrafke, N., & Schwemmer, A. (2015). The preoccupation of the United Nations with Israel: Evidence and theory. *The Review of International Organizations*, 413-437.

Bellamy, A. J., & Williams, P. D. (2015). Trends in Peace Operations. In J. A. Koops, N. Macqueen, T. Tardy, & P. D. Williams, *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (pp. 13-43). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ben-Dror, E. (2007). How the United Nations intended to implement the partition plan: The handbook drawn up by the secretariat for the members of the United Nations Palestine commission. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 997-1008.

Ben-Dror, E. (2014). The success of the Zionist strategy vis-à-vis UNSCOP. *Israel Affairs*, 19-39.

Ben-Dror, E. (2016). *Ralph Bunche and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Mediation and the UN, 1947-1949.* New York: Routledge.

Ben-Meir, A. (1981). Israel in the War's Long Aftermath. *Current History*, 23-26, 40.

Ben-Meir, A. (1997). Why Syria must regain the Golan to make peace. *Middle East Policy*, 92-112.

Bennis, P. (1997). The United Nations and Palestine: Partition and Aftermath. *Arab Studies Quarterly, Summer*, 47-76.

Ben-Yehuda, H. (1997). Attitude change and policy transformation: Yitzhak Rabin and the Palestinian question, 1967–95. *Israel Affairs*, 201-224.

Berenji, S. (2020). Sadat and the Road to Jerusalem: Bold Gestures and Risk Acceptance in the Search for Peace. *International Security*, 127-163.

Berridge, G. R. (2022). *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice.* (6th ed.). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bickerton, I. J., & Klausner, C. L. (2017). *A History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (8th ed.). New York: Routledge.

Blaikie, N. (2010). *Designing Social Research.* Cambridge: Polity.

Bligh, A. (2014). (2014). The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), 1956–67: Past Experience, Current Lessons. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 796–809.

Boerma, M. (1979). The United Nations Interim Force in the Lebanon Peacekeeping in a Domestic Conflict. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 51-63.

Bouillon, M. E. (2015). The Arab-Israeli Conflict. In D. Malone, B. S. Ugarte, & S. Von Einsiedel, *The United Nations Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century* (pp. 529-550). Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

Bousquet, A. &. (2011). Beyond Models and Metaphors: Complexity Theory, Systems Thinking and International Relations. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 43-62.

Bratt, D. (2007). Assessing the success of UN peacekeeping operations. *International Peacekeeping*, 64-81.

Brooks, R. (2008). *Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Broome, A., & Seabrooke, L. (2012). Seeing like an International Organisation. *New Political Economy*, 1-16.

Burns, E. L. (1968). The Withdrawal of UNEF and the Future of Peacekeeping. *International Journal*, 1-17.

Buzan, B. (1991). *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. .* Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Campbell, J. C. (1978). The Middle East: The Burdens of Empire . *Foreign Affairs*, 613-633.

Cheyre, J. E. (2013). Defence Diplomacy. In A. F. Cooper, J. Heine, & R. Thakur, *The Oxford Hanbook of Modern Diplomacy.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Citino, N. J. (2019). The Middle East and the Cold War. *Cold War History*, 441-456.

Clarke, T. (1981). *By Blood and Fire: July 22, 1946: The Attack On Jerusalem's King David Hotel.* New York City: G. P. Putnam's Sons.

Cohen, M. (1968). The Demise of UNEF. *International Journal*, 18-51.

Cohn, L. B. (1974). Demilitarization as an Instrument for Middle East Peace. *Virginia Journal of International Law*, 267-300.

Comay, M. (1983). UN Peacekeeping: The israeli Experience. In H. Wisenman, *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals* (pp. 93-117). Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Copelovitch, M. S. (2010). Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending. *International Studies Quarterly*, 49–77.

Crichlow, S. (1998). Idealism or Pragmatism? An Operational Code Analysis of Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres . *Political Psychology*, 683-706.

Cunliffe, P. (2009). The Politics of Global Governance in UN Peacekeeping. *International Peacekeeping*, 323-336.

Cunliffe, P. (2020). Realism. In K. Oksamytna, & J. Karlsrud, *United Nations peace operations and International Relations theory* (pp. 31-47). Machester: Machester University Press.

Daigle, C. (2018). Beyond Camp David: Jimmy Carter, Palestinian Self-Determination, and Human Rights. *Diplomatic History*, 2-29.

Daigle, C. (2019). Sadat's African dilemma: Libya, Ethiopia, and the making of the Camp David Accords. *Cold War History*, 2-19.

Dajani, O. M. (2007). Forty Years without Resolve: Tracing the Influence of Security Council Resolution 242 on the Middle East. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 24-38.

Day, A., & Hunt, C. T. (2023). A Perturbed Peace: Applying Complexity Theory to UN Peacekeeping. *International Peacekeeping*, 1-23.

Day, A., Gorur, A., Holt, V. K., & Hunt, C. T. (2020). *The Political Practice of Peacekeeping: How Strategies For Peace Operations are Developed and Implemented.* New York: United Nations University - The Stimson Center.

De Coning, C. (2016). From Peacebuilding to Sustaining Peace: Implications of Complexity for Resilience and Sustainability. *Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses*, 166-181.

De Soto, A. (2018). Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, 1982–1991. In M. Fröhlich (ed.), & A. Williams (ed.), *The UN Secretary-General and the Security Council: A Dynamic Relationship* (pp. 116-137). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dettke, D. (2008). The scholar statesman: Henry Kissinger. *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 246-262.

Diehl, P. F. (2015). First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I). In J. Koops, N. MacQueen, T. Tardy, & P. D. Williams, *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (pp. 144-152). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Diehl, P. F. (2015b). Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II). In J. Koops, N. MacQueen, T. Tardy, & P. D. Williams, *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (pp. 229-237). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Doss, A. (2020). *A Peacekeeper in Africa: Learning from UN Interventions in Other People's Wars.* Boulder: Lynne Rienne.

Doyle, M. W., & Higgins, R. (1995). Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law). *Structures of World Order*, 275-279.

Doyle, M. W., & Sambanis, N. (2007). Peacekeeping Operations. In T. G. Weiss, & S. Daws, *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations* (pp. 322-348). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Drab, L. (2018). Defence diplomacy – an important tool for the implementation of foreign policy and security of the state. *Security and Defence Quarterly*, 57-71.

Durch, W. J. (1993). *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis.* St. Martin's Press.

Eisenberg, L. (2009). History Revisited or Revamped? The Maronite Factor in Israel's 1982 Invasion of Lebanon. *Israel Affairs*, 37-41.

Elaraby, N. (1968). United Nations Peacekeeping by Consent: A Case Study of the Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force. *New York Journal of International Law and Politics*, 149-177.

Elaraby, N. A. (1983). UN Peacekeeping: The Egyptian Experience. In H. Wisenman, *Peacekeeping – Appraisals & Proposals* (pp. 65-92). Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Erskine, E. A. (1989). *Mission with Unifil: An African Soldier's Reflections.* London: Hurst & Company.

Esber, F. (2016). The United States and the 1981 Lebanese Missile Crisis. *Middle East Journal*, 439-456.

Falk, R. (2007). Forty Years after 242: A "Canonical" Text in Disrepute? *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 39-48.

Feldman, J., & Barromi, C. (1974). Latin American Voting on Israeli Issues in the U.N. General Assembly, 1947-1968. *Jewish Social Studies*, 142-165.

Fetterly, E. R. (2003). UNDOF: The Catalyst for Peace Building on the Golan Heights. In D. F. Davis, & A. E. Woodcock, *Cornwallis Group VII: Analysis for Compliance and Peace Building* (pp. 83-98).

Findlay, T. (2002). *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Firestone, B. (2019). The Removal of UNEF and the Limits of UN Diplomacy. *Diplomatic History*, 517-543.

Fischer, L. (2014). Turning Point on the Road to Peace: he Government of Yitzhak Rabin and the Interim Agreement with Egypt (Sinai II). *Israel Studies*, 55-80.

Fishman, J. (2011). A Disaster of Another Kind": Zionism=Racism, Its Beginning, and the War of Delegitimization against Israel. *Israel Journal of foreign Affairs*, 75-92.

Fleitz Jr, F. H. (2002). *Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and U.S. Interests.* Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.

Freilich, C. D. (2012). Israel in Lebanon—Getting It Wrong:The 1982 Invasion, 2000 Withdrawal,and 2006 War. *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs*, 41-75.

Fröhlich, M. (2021). World Organization Epitomized: The Life and Legacy of Sir Brian Urquhart. *Global Governance*, 167–177.

Garvey, J. I. (1970). United Nations Peacekeeping and Host State Consent. *American Journal of International Law*, 241-269.

Gat, M. (2016). Kissinger, the Architect of Sinai-2 Agreement between Israel and Egypt, September 1975. *Athens Journal of History*, 239-248.

Gehring, T., & Oberthür, S. (2011). Conceptual Foundations of Institutional Interaction. In T. Gehring, & S. Oberthür, *Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance: Synergy and Conflict among International and EU Policies.* Cambridge: MIT Press.

Ghariani, J. (2021). Israel and Morocco: From Clandestine Partnership to the Abraham Accords . *Occasional Papers - Azrieli Institute of Israel Studies*, 1-27.

Giegerich, B. (2012). NATO's Smart Defence: Who's Buying? *Survival*, 69-77.

Gil Guerrero, J. (2016). Overshadowed Crisis: The Carter Administration and the Conflict in Southern Lebanon. *Middle East Critique*, 401-421.

Gilmour, A. (2017). The Role of the UN Secretary-General: A Historical Assessment. In K. Makdisi, & V. Prashad, *Land of Blue Helmets : The United Nations and the Arab World* (pp. 21-57). Oakland: University of California Press.

Golan, G. (1999). The Soviet Union and the Yom Kippur War. *Israel Affairs*, 127-152.

Golan, G. (2006). The Soviet Union and the Outbreak of the June 1967 Six-Day wAR. *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 3-19.

Golani, M. (1995). Zionism without Zion: The Jerusalem question, 1947–1949. *Journal of Israeli Histor*, 39–52.

Golani, M. (2001). The 'Haifa Turning Point': The British Administration and the Civil War in Palestine, December 1947-May 1948. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 93-130.

Goldberg, A. J. (1973). United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and the Prospects for Peace in the Middle East,. *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*, 187-195.

Goldberg, A. J. (1988). What Resolution 242 Really Said. *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 41–46.

Goldman, O. S. (2013). Between self-interest and international norms: legitimizing the PLO. *Israel Affairs*, 364-378.

Goldstein, J. (1999). Emergence as a Construct: History and Issues. *Emergence*, 49-72. .

Goldstein, Y. (2018). The Six Day War: the war that no one wanted. *Israel Affairs*, 767-784.

Goodrich, L. M. (1947). From League of Nations to United Nations. *International Organization, 1*(1), 3-21.

Gööksel, T. (2007). ""Mr. UNIFIL"" Reflects on a Quarter Century of Peacekeeping in South Lebanon. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 50-77.

Goulding, M. (1993). The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping . *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 69*(3), 451-464.

Gowan, R. (2016). The Security Council and Peacekeeping. In (. S. Einsiedel, D. Malone, & B. S. Ugarte, *The UN Security Council in the 21st Century* (pp. 749-771). London: Lynne Rienner Publishers .

Gupta, A. K. (2023). Moscow and the Egyptian-Israeli Camp David. *Israel Affairs*, 2-10.

Gutner, T. (2005). Explaining the Gaps between Mandate and Performance: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform. *Global Environmental Politics*, 10-37.

Guyer, R. (1990, November 1). Interview with Ambassador Roberto Guyer. (J. S. Sutterlin, Interviewer) United Nations Oral History Project . Retrieved December 26, 2021, from http://dag.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/89634/Guyer1Nov90TRANS.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y

Guzansky, Y., & Marshall, Z. A. (2020). The Abraham Accords: Immediate significance and long-term implications. *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs*, 379-389.

Habermann-Box, S. (2014). From the League of Nations to the United Nations: The Continuing Preservation and Development of the Geneva Archives. In M. Herren (ed), *Networking the International System Global: HistoriesofInternational Organizations* (pp. 15-30). Heidelberg : Springer.

Hall, N. (2013). Moving beyond its mandate? UNHCR and climate change displacement. *Journal of International Organizations Studies*, 91-108.

Handel, M. I. (1977). The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise. *International Studies Quarterly*, 461-502.

Handoussa, H., & Shafik, N. (1994). The Economics of Peace: The Egyptian Case. In S. Fischer, D. Rodrik, & E. H. Tuma, *The Economics of Middle East Peace: Views from the Region* (pp. 19-54). Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

Harbottle, M. (1974). UNEF II—A Step Forward in Peacekeeping. *The RUSI Journal*, 18-22.

Harkavy, R. E., & Neuman, S. G. (2001). *The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World: Approaches and Case Studies. .* Lexington Books.

Hawkins, D. G., Lake, D. A., Nielson, D. L., & Tierney, M. J. (2006). Delegation under anarchy: states, international organisations, and principal-agent theory. In (. D. Hawkins, D. A. Lake, D. L. Nielson, & M. J. Tierney, *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations* (pp. 1-3). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Heiberg, M. (1991). *Peacekeeping in Southern Lebanon: Past Present and Future? NUPI Paper no. 453.* Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

Heller, P. B. (2001). *The United Nations under Dag Hammarskjold, 1953-1961.* Kent : Scarecrow Press, Inc.

Higgins, R. (1968). The June War: The United Nations and Legal Background. *Journal of Contemporary History*, 253-273.

Higgins, R. (1970). *United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967 Documents and Commentary.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Higgins, R. (1995). Peace and Security Achievements and Failures. *European Journal of International Law*, 445-460.

Hoffman, B. (2020). The bombing of The King David Hotel, July 1946. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 594-611.

Hogan, M. (2001). The 1948 Massacre at Deir Yassin Revisited. *The Historian (Kingston)*, 309-334.

Houghton, R. B., & Trinka, F. G. (1984). *Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East.* Washington, DC: U. S. Department of State Foreign Service Institute .

Howard, L. M. (2019). *Power in Peacekeeping.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hunt, C. T. (2020). Complexity. In J. Karlsrud, & K. Oksamytna, *United Nations peace operations and International Relations theory* (pp. 195 -216). Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Hylton, J. (2013). Middle East Peacekeeping Operations after Peace Accords on the Syria and Lebanon Tracks. *Journal of International Peacekeeping* , 1–45.

Ikenberry, G. J. (2009). Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order. *Perspectives on Politics*, 71-87.

Inkeles, A. (1964). *What Is Sociology? An Introduction to the Discipline and Profession.* Prentice-Hall.

Irfan, A. (2020). Palestine at the UN: The PLO and UNRWA in the 1970s. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 26-47.

Jackson, G. (2015). The Showdown That Wasn't: U.S.-Israeli Relations and American Domestic Politics, 1973–75. *International Security*, 130-169.

Jackson, W. D. (1978). The Political role of the Secretary-General Under U Thant and Kurt Waldheim: Development of Decline. *World Affairs*, 230-244 .

James, A. (1983). Painful Peacekeeping: The UN in Lebanon, 1978-1982. *International Journal*, 613-634.

James, A. (1987). The United Nations On Golan: Peacekeeping Paradox? *International Relations*, 64-84.

Jensehaugen, J. (2014). Blueprint for Arab–Israeli Peace? President Carter and the Brookings Report. *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 492-508.

Johnstone, I. (2003). The role of the UN secretary-general: The power of persuasion based on law. *Global Governance*, 441-458.

Jonah, J. O. (1975). Peacekeeping in the Middle East. *International Journal*, 100-122.

Jonah, J. O. (1990). The Military Talks at Kilometer 101: The UN's Effectiveness as a Third Party. *Negotiation Journal*, 53-70.

Jonah, J. O. (1991). The Management of UN Peacekeeping. In I. J. Rikhye, & K. Skjelsbaek, *The United Nations and Peacekeeping* (pp. 75-90). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Jonah, J. O. (1992). The United Nations and International Conflict: The Military Talks at Kilometre Marker 101. In N. Bercovitch, & J. Z. Rubin, *Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Managemen.* New York: St Martin's Press.

Jonah, J. O. (2014). Ralph Bunche: The Scholar-Diplomat. In A. Adebajo, *Africa's Peacemakers: Nobel Peace Laureates of African Descent* (pp. 79-99). New York City: Zed Books.

Jones, B. C. (1996). *Flawed Triumphs: Andy Young at the United Nations.* Lanham: University Press of America.

Kahana, E. (2002). Early warning versus concept: the case of the Yom Kippur War 1973. *Intelligence and National Security*, 81-104.

Kahana, E., & Stivi-Kerbis, S. (2013). The Assassination of Anwar al-Sadat: An Intelligence Failure. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 178-192.

Kapusňak, J. (2014). Israeli Response to the Syrian Crisis and New Security Environment on the Israel-Syria Border. In P. Bátor, & R. Ondrejcsák, *Panorama of Global Security*

Environment (pp. 207-218). Bratislava: Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs.

Karawan, I. (2005). Foreign Policy Restructuring: Egypt's Disengagement from the Arab–Israeli Conflict Revisited. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 325-338.

Karawan, I. A. (1994). Sadat and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Revisited. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 249-267.

Karlsrud, J. (2013). Special Representatives of the Secretary-General as Norm Arbitrators: Understanding Bottom-up Authority in UN Peacekeeping. *Global Governance*, 525-544.

Karlsrud, J. (2013). Special representatives of the Secretary-General as norm arbitrators? Understanding bottom-up authority in UN peacekeeping. *Global Governance*, 525-544.

Karlsrud, J. (2016). *Norm Change in International Relations: Linked Ecologies in UN Peacekeeping Operations.* New York: Routledge .

Kauffman, S. A. (1993). *The Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution.* Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Kaufman, A. (2010). From the Litani to Beirut – Israel's invasions of Lebanon, 1978–85. In C. Jones, & S. Catignani, *Israel and Hizbollah : An Asymmetric Conflict in Historical and Comparative Perspective* (pp. 25-38). Oxford: Routledge.

Keesing's Record of World Events. (1979). Jun 1979 - Israeli Invasion of Southern Lebanon, March 1978 -Deployment of UN Peace-keeping Force -Israeli Withdrawal. *Keesing's Record of World Events*, 29648 . Retrieved from http://web.stanford.edu/group/tomzgroup/pmwiki/uploads/3994-1979-06-KS-A-AMS.pdf

Keohane, R. O. (1989). Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics. In R. O. Keohane, *International Institutions And State Power* (pp. 1-20). New York: Routledge.

Keohane, R. O. (2002). Introduction: From Interdependence and Institutions to Globalization and Governance. In R. O. Keohane, *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World* (pp. 1-25). New York: Routledge.

Khalidi, A. S. (1973). The War of Attrition. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 60-87.

Khouri, F. J. (1977). UN Peacekeeping in the Middle East. *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 97-117.

Kissinger, H. (1982a). *Crisis: The Anatomy Of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises.* New York: Simon & Schuster.

Kissinger, H. (1982b). *Years of Upheaval.* New York: Little Brown & Co.

Kohavi, D. (1980). *The United Nations' Peacekeeping Operations in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: 1973-1979 (Doctoral dissertation).* Claremont: ProQuest Dissertations and Theses; 1980; ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global.

Koops, J. A., & Biermann, R. (2017). Studying Relations Among International Organizations in World Politics: Core Concepts and Challenges. In J. A. Koops, & R. Biermann, *Palgrave Handbook of Inter-Organizational Relations in World Politics* (pp. 1-46). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Korn, D. A. (1992). *Stalemate: The War Of Attrition And Great Power Diplomacy In The Middle East, 1967-1970.* New York: Routledge.

Kramer, M. (2017). Sadat and Begin – the Peacemakers . *BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 645*, 1-7.

Kumaraswamy, P. (1999). The Golan Heights: Israel's predicaments. *Strategic Analysis* , 1155-1175.

Kuruvilla, S. J. (2022). The Camp David Accords: A Revisit in 2022. *Journal of Polity and Society*, 1-9.

Lal, N. (1970). India and the Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force, 1967. *International Studies*, 309-323.

Langton, C. G. (1990). Computation at the edge of chaos: Phase transitions and emergent computation. *Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena*, 12-37.

Lapidoth, R. (1992). Security Control Resolution 242 at Twenty Five. *Israel Law Review*, 295-318.

Laron, G. (2017). *The Six Day War: The Breaking of the Middle East.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Laskier, M. M. (2011). Israeli–Moroccan Relations and the Arab–Israeli Conflict,1977-2002. *Israel Affairs*, 41–73.

Leci, C. L. (2017, June 12). *The Government House Complex in Jerusalem - whose is it?* Retrieved from Israel National News: https://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/349208

Leonard, L. L. (1949). The United Nations and Palestine. *International Conciliation*, 607-790.

Levitt, M. (1997). Kilometer 101: Oasis or mirage? An analysis of third-party self-interest in international mediation. *Mediation Quarterly*, 155-176.

Lewis, B. (1976). The Anti-Zionist Resolution. *Foreign Affairs*, 54-64.

Lindley, D. (2010). UNDOF: operational analysis and lessons learned. *Defense & Security Analysis*, 153-164 .

Loiselle, M.-E. (2019). The penholder system and the rule of law in the Security Council decision-making: Setback or improvement? *Leiden Journal of International Law*, 139-156.

Londey, P., Crawley, R., & Horner, D. (2020). *The Long Search for Peace: Observer Missions and Beyond, 1947–2006.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lorenz, E. N. (1963). Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow. *Journal of Atmospheric Sciences*, 130-141.

Louis, W. R. (2012). Britain: The Ghost of Suez and Resolution 242. In W. R. Louis, & A. Shlaim, *The 1967 Arab-Israeli War : Origins and Consequences* (pp. 218-246). Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.

Luck, E. C. (1987). The Impact of the Zionism-Racism Resolution on the Standing of the United Nations in the United States. *Israel Yearbook on Human Rights*, 95-119 .

Luiijf, E., & Healey, J. (2012). Organisational Structures & Considerations. In A. (. Klimburg, *National Cyber Security: Framework Manual* (pp. 108-140). Tallinn: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence .

Lyman, P. N. (2004). Ralph Bunche's International Legacy: The Middle East, Congo, and United Nations Peacekeeping. *The Journal of Negro Education*, 159-170.

Lynk, M. (2007). Conceived in Law: The Legal Foundations of Resolution 242. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 7-23.

Machairas, D. (2017). The strategic and political consequences of the June 1967 war. *Cogent Social Sciences*.

Macintyre, R. R. (1975). The Palestine Liberation Organization: Tactics, Strategies and Options towards the Geneva Peace Conference. *Journal of Palestine Studies* , 65-89.

Mackinlay, J. (1989). *The Peacekeepers: An Assessment of Peace Keeping Operations at the Arab-Israel Interface.* London: Unwyn Hyman.

Mahmood, Z. (1985). Sadat and Camp David Reappraised . *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 62-87.

Makdisi, K. (2014). Reconsidering the Struggle over UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 24-41.

Makdisi, K., Goksel, T., Hauck, H. B., & Reigeluth, S. (2009). *UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East. EuroMeSCo Paper #76.* EuroMeSCo .

Malawer, S. S. (1970). The Withdrawal of UNEF and a New Notion of Consent. *Cornell International Law Journal*, 25-36.

Male, B. M. (1979). The Egypt-Israel Rapprochment: Its implications for peace in the middle east. *Australian Outlook*, 45-59.

Mandell, B. S. (1990). Anatomy of a Confidence-Building Régime: Egyptian-Israeli Security Co-operation, 1973-1979 . *International Journal,*, 202-223.

Mcdermott, A. (1996). The Arab-Israeli mixed armistice commissions of yore. Relevant today? *Geopolitics and International Boundaries93-114*, 93-114.

McDonald, D. J. (2015). Blessed are the Policy Makers: Jimmy Carter's Faith-Based Approach to the Arab–Israeli Conflict. *Diplomatic History*, 452-476.

McDowall, D. (2014). Clarity or ambiguity? The withdrawal clause of UN Security Council Resolution 242. *International Affairs*, 1367-1381.

Mearsheimer, J. J. (1994). The False Promise of International Institutions. *International Security*, 5-49.

Mearsheimer, J. J., & Walt, S. M. (2013). Leaving theory behind: Why simplistic hypothesis testing is bad for International. *European Journal of International Relations Relations*, 427-457.

Mitchell, M. (2009). *Complexity: A Guided Tour.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Moghalu, K. (1997). The Legacy of Ralph Bunche. *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 165-178.

Moghalu, K. (1997). The Legacy of Ralph Bunche. *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 165-178.

Monteleone, C., & Oksamytna, K. (2020). Liberal Institutionalism. In J. Karslrud, & K. Oksamytna, *United Nations peace operations and International Relations theory* (pp. 48-69). Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Moran, M. (2006, July 24). *Multilateral Intervention in the Middle East: An Uninspiring Legacy*. Retrieved June 12, 2018, from The Council on Foreign Relations:

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/multilateral-intervention-middle-east-uninspiring-legacy

Morgenthau, H. J. (1948). *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.* New Yori: McGraw-Hill.

Mørk, H. K. (2007). The Jarring Mission: A Study of the UN Peace Effort in the Middle East, 1967-1971. *Unpublished Graduate Thesis, University of Oslo*, 1-135.

Morris, B. (2005). The Historiography of Deir Yassin. *Journal of Israeli History*, 79-107.

Morris, B. (2009). *1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War.* New Haven: Yale University Press .

Murphy, R. (2012). Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Civilian Protection. *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, 373-402.

Muslih, M. (1993). The Golan: Israel, Syria, and Strategic Calculations. *Middle East Journal*, 611-632.

Myers, Z., & Dorn, W. (2022). UN Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East: A Twenty-First Century Review. *International Peacekeeping*, 1-23.

Nachmias, N. (1996). UNTSO: Obsolte peacekeeping? *Peacekeeping & International Relations*, 1-6.

Nachmias, N. (1999). UNIFIL: When peace is non-existent, peacekeeping is impossible. *International Peacekeeping*, 95-112.

Nelson, R. W. (1984). Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East and the United Nations Model. *International Affairs* , 67-89.

Nemchenok, V. V. (2009). “These People Have an Irrevocable Right to Self-Government”: United States Policy and the Palestinian Question, 1977–1979. *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 595-618.

Nielson, D. L., & Tierney, M. J. (2003). Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform . *International Organization*, 241-276 .

Novosseloff, A. (2015a). United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. In J. A. Koops, T. Tardy, N. MacQueen, & P. D. Williams, *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (pp. 247-258). Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Novosseloff, A. (2022). *A Comprehensive Study of Older One-Dimensional UN Peace Operations.* Friedrich-Eber-Stiftung -The Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network.

Nye, J. S. (2007, November 12). *The Soft Power of the United Nations.* Retrieved December 25, 2017, from Project Syndicate: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-soft-power-of-the-united-nations?barrier=accessreg

Odeh, A. A. (1977). Bridging the Peace Gap in the Middle East. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 53-65.

Oksamytna, K., & Karlsrud, J. (2020). *United Nations peace operations and International Relations theory.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Olejarz, T. (2015). Participation of the Polish Army in the United Nations mission in the region of the Golan heights - United Nations Disengagement Observer Force. *Humanities and Social Sciences*, 141-157.

Omer-Man, M. (2011, March 11). *This Week in History: Israel's deadliest terror attack.* Retrieved January 10, 2020, from The Jerusalem Post: https://www.jpost.com/Features/In-Thespotlight/This-Week-in-History-Israels-deadliest-terror-attack

Oren, M. (2002). *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East.* New York: Presidio Press .

Oren, M. B. (1992). Ambivalent Adversaries: David Ben-Gurion and Israel vs. the United Nations and Dag Hammarskjold, 1956-57. *Journal of Contemporary History*, 89-127.

Orion, A. (2016). UNIFIL II, Ten Years On: Strong Force, Weak Mandate. *INSS Insight No. 844*, 1-6.

Parker, J. (1986). UNIFIL and Peacekeeping the Defence Forces Experience. *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, 63-77.

Parker, R. B. (1992). The June 1967 War: Some Mysteries Explored. *Middle East Journal*, 177-197.

Pearlman, W. (2008). Spoiling Inside and out: Internal Political Contestation and the Middle East Peace Process. *International Security*.

Pedatzur, R. (2010, September 22). Seeds of Peace. *Haaretz*. Retrieved June 12, 2020, from Haaretz: https://www.haaretz.com/1.5116487?v=1615579971191

Perlmutter, A. (1978). Begin's Strategy and Dayan's Tactics: The Conduct of Israeli Foreign Policy. *Foreign Affairs*, 357-372.

Peters, J., & Gal, O. (2009). Israel, UNRWA and the Palestinian Refugee Issue. *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, 588-606.

Podeh, E. (2015). *Chances for Peace : Missed Opportunities in the Arab-Israeli Conflict.* Austin: University of Texas Press.

Pollack, K. M. (2005). Air Power in the Six-Day War. *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 471 – 503.

Pressman, J. (2013). Explaining the Carter Administration's Israeli–Palestinian Solutuion. *Diplomatic History*, 1117-1147.

Quandt, W. B. (1971). The Middle East Conflict in US Strategy, 1970-71. *Journal of Palestine Studies* ,, 39-52.

Quandt, W. B. (1986). Camp David and Peacemaking in the Middle East. *Political Science Quarterly*, 357-377 .

Quigley, J. (2013). *Cover-up in the General Assembly.* Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.

Rabinovich, A. (2004). *The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle Eas.* New York: Schocken Books.

Ramalingam, B. &. (2008). Exploring the Science of Complexity: Ideas and Implications for Development and Humanitarian Efforts. *Overseas Development Institute Working Papers, 285.*

Ramcharan, B. B. (1990). The Office of the United Nations Secretary-General. *Dalhousie Law Journal*, 742-757.

Rikhye, I. J. (1980). *The Sinai Blunder: Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967.* London: Frank Cass and Company Limited.

Robinson, K. (2022, May 25). *What Is Hezbollah.* Retrieved from Council on Foreign Relations: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah

Rolef, S. H. (1999). The domestic fallout of the Yom Kippur War. *Israel Affairs*, 177-194.

Rosati, J. A. (1993). Jimmy Carter, a Man before His Time? The Emergence and Collapse of the First PostCold War Presidency. *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 459-476.

Rostow, E. V. (1993). The Drafting of Security Council Resolution 242: The Role of the Non-Regional Actors. *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, 489-504.

Rubinstein, A. Z. (1985). The Soviet Union and the Peace Process since Camp David. *The Washington Quarterly*, 37-41.

Rudloff, P., & Diehl, P. F. (2015). United Nations Disengagement Oberver Force (UNDOF). In J. Koops, N. MacQueen, T. Tardy, & P. D. Williams, *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (pp. 238-247). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ruggie, J. G. (1985). The United States and the United Nations: toward a new realism . *International Organization*, 343-356.

Safran, N. (1974). Engagement in the Middle East. *Foreign Affairs*, 45-63.

Safran, N. (1977). Trial by Ordeal: The Yom Kippur War, October 1973. *International Security*, 133-170.

Saikal, A. (1998). The Role of the United Nations in the Middle East. In T. Woodhouse, R. Bruce, & M. Dando, *Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Towards Effective Interventions in Post-Cold War Conflicts* (pp. 133-145). New York: Palgrave.

Salama, D. (2023). UNTSO: The Future of UN Peacekeeping in the Middle East. In A. Gilder, D. Curran, G. Holmes, & F. Edu-Afful, *Multidisciplinary Futures of UN Peace Operations* (pp. 113-128). Palgrave Macmillan Cham.

Sandler, T. (2017). International peacekeeping operations: Burden sharing and effectiveness. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1875-1897.

Schaeftler, M. A. (1974). The Legal Meaning and Implications of Security Council Resolution 242. *Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa* , 53-83.

Schein, A. (2017). The economic consequences of wars in the land of Israel in the last hundred years, 1914–2014. *Israel Affairs*, 650–668.

Scherer, J. L. (1978). Soviet and American Behavior During the Yom Kippur War. *World Affairs*, 3-23.

Schmitz, D. F., & Walker, V. (2004). Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights: The Development of a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy. *Diplomatic History*, 113-144.

Schori, P. (2013). UN Peacekeeping. In A. F. Cooper, J. Heine, & R. Thakur, *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schwartz, T. A. (2011). Henry Kissinger: Realism, Domestic Politics, and the Struggle Against Exceptionalism in American Foreign Policy. *Diplomacy & Statecraft* , 121-141.

Segev, S., & Shumacher, Y. (2008). Israel—Morocco Relations From Hassan II to Muhammad VI. *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs*, 49-60.

Shapira, A. (1971). The six-day war and the right of self-defence. *Israel Law Review*, 65-80.

Sharon, A., Morrison, M., & Weiner, R. J. (2010). *Who Will Keep the Peace? The Role of Peacekeeping in a Future Israeli-Palestinian Peace Accord.* Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. Retrieved January 1, 2020, from https://www.jcpa.org/text/peacekeeping.pdf

Shattan, J. J. (1981). Israel, the United States, and the United Nations. *World Affairs*, 335-345.

Sheehan, E. R. (1976). How Kissinger Did It: Step by Step in the Middle East. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 3-53.

Sherman, N. (1982). From Government to Opposition: The Rural Settlement Movements of the Israel Labor Party in the Wake of the Election of 1977. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 53-69.

Shlaim, A. (1976). Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War. *World Politics*, 348-380.

Shlomo, Y. (2015). The Israeli–Syrian Disengagement Negotiations of 1973-1974. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 636-648.

Shlomo, Y. (2017). The Israeli–Egyptian talks at kilometer 101. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 44*(3), 447-463.

Siilasvuo, E. (1981). United nations peace-keeping in the middle east: Lessons and prospects. *The RUSI Journal*, 1-6.

Siilasvuo, E. (1992). *In the Service of Peace in the Middle East, 1967-1979.* London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd.

Simpson, D. J. (1976). Israel's Year of Decision. *Current History*, 10-13.

Sobin, J. M. (1991). The China-Israel Connection: New Motivations for Rappochemen. *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 111-126.

Sommereyns, R. (1980). United Nations Peace-Keeping Forces in the Middle East. *Brooklyn Journal of International Law*, 1-53.

Stanger, C. D. (1988). A Haunting Legacy: The Assassination of Count Bernadotte . *Middle East Journal*, 260-272.

Stein, J. G. (1985). Structures, Strategies, and Tactics of Mediation: Kissinger and Carter in the Middle East. *Negotiation Journal*, 331-348 .

Stein, K. (2010, January). *Joint U.S.-Soviet Statement of the Middle East*. Retrieved October 12, 2022, from Center for Israel Education: https://israeled.org/resources/documents/joint-u-s-soviet-statement-middle-east/

Stein, K. W. (1999). *Heroic Diplomacy : Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace.* New York : Routledge.

Stjernfelt, B. (1992). *The Sinai Peace Front: UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Middle East, 1973-1980.* London: Hurts & Company.

Stocker, J. R. (2017). A Historical Inevitability?: Kissinger and US Contacts with the Palestinians (1973–76). *The International History Review*, 316-337.

Stojek, S. M., & Tir, J. (2014). The supply side of United Nations peacekeeping operations: Trade ties and United Nations-led deployments to civil war states. *European Journal of International Relations*, 1-24.

Swistek, G. (2012). The Nexus Between Public Diplomacy and Military Diplomacy in Foreign Affairs and Defense Policy. *Connections*, 79-86.

Tabory, M. (1986). *The Multinational Force And Observers In The Sinai: Organization, Structure, and Function.* New York: Routledge.

Tandon, Y. (1968). UNEF, the Secretary-General, and International Diplomacy in the Third Arab-Israeli War. *International Organization*, 529-556.

Temkin, B. (1987). Attitude Change, Dogmatism, and Ascription of Responsibility: The Case of the State Commission of Inquiry on the Massacres at Sabra and Shatila. *Political Psychology*, 21-33.

Tessler, M. (2009). *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Second Edition.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Thakur, R. (1981). International peacekeeping: The UN interim force. *Australian Outlook*, 181-190.

Thakur, R. (2006). *The United Nations, Peace and Security.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thakur, R. (2008). Peacekeeping in the middle east from United Nations. *Australian Outlook, 38*(2), 81-89.

The United Nations and International Conflict: The Military Talks at Kilometre Marker 101. (1992). In n. J. Bercovitch, & J. Z. Rubin, *Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Managemen.* New York: St Martin's Press.

Theobald, A. (2009). *Watching the War and Keeping the Peace: The United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in the Middle East: 1949-1956.* Kingston: A Thesis Submitted to the Department of History of Queens University.

Theobald, A. (2015). The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). In A. Theobald, *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (pp. 121-132). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Touval, S. (1987). Frameworks for Arab-Israeli Negotiations-What Difference Do They Make? . *Negotiation journal*, 37-52.

Traub, J. (2007). The Secretary-General's political space. In S. Chesterman, *Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics* (pp. 185-202). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Treaty of Peace Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel. (1979). United Nations - Treaty Series. Retrieved from https://peacemaker.un.org/egyptisrael-peacetreaty79

Troy, G. (2013). *Moynihan's Moment: America's Fight Against Zionism as Racism.* New York: Oxford University Press.

UN Chronicle. (1980). Political and Security - Call for Comprehensive Solution of Middle East Question Renewed. *UN Monthly Chronicle*.

United States & Soviet Union. (1977). *Joint U.S.-Soviet Statement of the Middle East.*

United States Department of State. (1979). *Letters from President Carter to President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin.* Retrieved from https://mfo.org/origins

Uola, M. (n.d.). *National Biography of Finland.* Retrieved from Siilasvuo, Ensio (1922 - 2003): https://kansallisbiografia.fi/english/person/7599

Urquhart, B. (1980). United Nations peace-keeping in the Middle East. *World Today*, 88-93.

Urquhart, B. (1981). International Peace and Security: Thoughts on the Twentieth Anniversary of Dag Hammarskjold's Death. *Foreign Affairs*, 1-16.

Urquhart, B. (1983). Peacekeeping: A View from the Operational Centre. In H. Wisenman, *Peacekeeping: Appraisals & Proposals* (pp. 161-172). Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Urquhart, B. (1987). *A Life in Peace and War.* New York: W.W. Norton.

Urquhart, B. (1994). *Hammarskjold.* New York: W. W. Norton & Company .

Urquhart, B. (n.d). *Character Sketches: Kurt Waldheim.* Retrieved December 24, 2020, from UN News: https://news.un.org/en/spotlight/character-sketches-kurt-waldheim-brian-urquhart

Urry, J. (2003). *Global Complexity.* Polity.

US Department of State. (1974). *Buletin.*

Valverde, C. M., Castillo, E. U., & Rivas, Á. S. (2021). James Holger Blair un coetáneo de los grandes procesos de Chile y el mundo [James Holger-Blair, contemporary of the great processes of the great processes of Chile and the world]. *Revista de Historia [Journal of History]*, 449-481. doi:https://doi.org/10.29393/RH28-17VICM30017

Waage, H. H. (2011). The Winner Takes All: The 1949 Island of Rhodes Armistice Negotiations Revisited. *The Middle East Journal*, 279–304.

Waage, H. H., & Mørk, H. K. (2015). Mission Impossible: UN Special Representative Gunnar Jarring and His Quest for Peace in the Middle East. *International History Review*, 1-24.

Walker, H. (1996). The United Nations: peacekeeping and the Middle East. *Asian Affairs*, 13-19.

Walter, A. T. (2019). The Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights: Their Political, Geographic, and Security Value, and Cruciality to Israeli Security. *Scripta Judaica Cracoviensia*, 15-26.

Walter, B. F., Howard, L. M., & Fortna, V. (2021). The Extraordinary Relationship between Peacekeeping and Peace. *British Journal of Political Science*, 1705–1722.

Weinberger, N. J. (1983). Peacekeeping Options in Lebanon. *Middle East Journal*, 341-369.

Weinberger, N. J. (1983). Peacekeeping Options in Lebanon. *Middle East Journal*, 341-355.

Weiss, T. G., & Thakur, R. (2010). *Global Governance and the UN: An Unfinished Journey.* Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.

Wheelock, T. R. (1978). Arms for Israel: The Limit of Leverage. *International Security*, 123-137.

White, N. (2015). Peacekeeping and International Law. In J. A. Koops, T. Tardy, N. MacQueen, & P. D. Williams, *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Williams, P. D. (2015). *Enhancing U.S. Support for Peace Operations in Africa.* Center for Preventive Action. Council on Foreign Relations Press.

Winokur, T. (2009). "The Soviets were just an excuse": why Israel did not destroy the Egyptian Third Army. *Cold War History*, 59–78.

Winokur, T. (2009). "The Soviets were just an excuse": why Israel did not destroy the Egyptian Third Army. . *Cold War History*, 59–78.

Wiseman, H. (1976). United Nations and UNEF II: A Basis for a New Approach to Future Operations. *International Journal*, 123-145.

Wiseman, H. (1983). United Nations Peacekeeping: An Historical Overview. In H. Wiseman, *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals* (pp. 19--64). Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Wiseman, H. (1983). United Nations Peacekeeping: An Historical Overview. In H. Wisenman, *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals* (pp. 19--64). Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Wisenman, H. (1976). United Nations and UNEF II: A Basis for a New Approach to Future Operations. *International Journal*, 123-145.

Yaniv, A., & Lieber, R. J. (1983). Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative?: The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon . *International Security*, 117-142.

Yaqub, S. (2013). The Cold War and the Middle East. In R. H. Immerman, & P. Goedde, *The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War* (pp. 246–264). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Yorke, V. (1978). Retaliation and International peace-keeping in Lebanon. *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 194-202.

Zisser, E. (2017). Syria – from the six day war to the Syrian civil war. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 545-558.

CV

Diego Salama, born in Cochabamba, Bolivia in 1989 has a Master of Arts in International Relations (cum laude) from Leiden University and a Bachelor of Arts in Liberal Arts from University College Maastricht. In 2017 he started as an external PhD Candidate at Leiden University working on his dissertation part-time.

Diego has been working at the United Nations University (UNU-MERIT) since 2013 in various capacities within the Education, Communications and Programme Management. He currently works as Partnerships & Liaison Specialist with responsibilities encompassing strategic partnerships, programme and project management, liaising with UN System, institutional governance and reporting to the UNU Council and the host country.

Simultaneously, Diego has been an active part of the academic community at Leiden University, where he has served as a lecturer and tutor for both undergraduate and graduate on *History of the United Nations* & *Challenges to Internationalism.*

Samenvatting

In dit proefschrift wordt gepoogd om het wetenschappelijk inzicht te vergroten in de multidimensionale benadering van de Verenigde Naties in het Israëlisch-Arabische conflict van 1967 tot 1982. Het proefschrift levert twee cruciale bijdragen aan de wetenschappelijke discussie. Ten eerste daagt het onderzoek het traditionele paradigma uit om vredesoperaties als op zichzelf staande inspanningen te onderzoeken, waarbij in plaats daarvan wordt gekozen voor een holistische benadering die de onderlinge afhankelijkheid en collectieve strategie van de betrokken VN-entiteiten samenbrengt. Ten tweede wordt de analyse verrijkt door het betrekken in de studie van het Bureau voor Speciale Politieke Zaken en, cruciaal, het Bureau van de Hoofdcoördinator van de Vredeshandhaving in het Midden-Oosten, een onderbelicht figuur.

Het proefschrift stelt dat hoewel de mandaten van individuele vredesoperaties op papier ogenschijnlijk onveranderd bleven, het VN-secretariaat ze feitelijk behandelde als componenten van een alomvattende vredesarchitectuur. Bovendien analyseert het proefschrift de mate waarin het Secretariaat een regionale strategie ontwikkelde en de mate waarin het daarin is geslaagd.

Het proefschrift beslaat zes hoofdstukken en begint met een kritisch historisch overzicht, waarin het ontstaan en de evolutie van het raamwerk van VN-vredeshandhaving van 1948 tot 1967 wordt gevolgd. Dit vormt de basis voor een genuanceerd begrip van het Israëlisch-Arabische conflict en introduceert belangrijke vredeshandhavingsorganisaties en hun rol tot aan 1967.

Hoofdstuk 3 gaat dieper in op het concept van Inter-Operation Collaboration (IOC), een relatief onderontwikkeld aspect in de bestaande literatuur, en het biedt zo een nieuw perspectief op de operationele dynamiek van deze vredeshandhavingsmissies.

Hoofdstuk 4 verlegt de focus naar de politieke sfeer en onderzoekt de rol van het Secretariaat als beleidsbemiddelaar en zijn interacties met gastlanden en supermachten, binnen de context van de Koude Oorlog.

Hoofdstuk 5 bespreekt cruciale gebeurtenissen – de Camp David-akkoorden en de Israëlische invasie van Libanon in 1982 – en hun diepgaande invloed op de vredeshandhavingsinspanningen van de VN en op het bredere vredesproces. Het benadrukt hoe deze gebeurtenissen het epicentrum van het conflict verschoven van een op staten gericht naar een Israëlisch-Palestijns focus, waardoor de invloed van de VN effectief werd beperkt.

Ten slotte vat Hoofdstuk 6 de bevindingen samen, waarbij de centrale onderzoeksvraag wordt beantwoord: in welke mate hebben de VN-vredeshandhavingsoperaties het diplomatieke en veiligheidslandschap van het Israëlisch-Arabische conflict tussen 1967 en 1982 gevormd? De analyse concludeert dat, ondanks verschillende uitdagingen en beperkingen, de vredeshandhavingsarchitectuur van de VN een cruciale rol heeft gespeeld in het streven naar regionale vrede en stabiliteit.

Dit onderzoek draagt bij tot een dieper inzicht in de VN-vredeshandhaving in complexe regionale conflicten en het biedt inzicht in de successen, beperkingen en evolutie van deze missies in een uiterst controversieel geopolitiek landschap.