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Digital Affective Citizenship: @The nexus of on-line and off-line anti-corruption activism in Banten, Indonesia

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Chapter Two

The History of Anti-corruption Mobilizations in Indonesia

Introduction

In this chapter, I provide a historical account of anti-corruption mobilizations in Indonesia from the New Order, *reformasi*, to the second decade of post-*reformasi* era. The three periods under study are, at best, ideal types and elements of each single period still linger in the next and hence there is some overlap. I will answer the question of what are the characteristics of anti-corruption modes of organizing in Indonesia over time through tracing the evolution of various anti-corruption movements, campaigns, and activism over different periods of time. Which of them are considered to be effective or successful in combating corruption and why?

This chapter, therefore, will provide historical background to the on-line anti-corruption activism and off-line mobilization in Banten that I will detail in the following chapters. It, also, identifies different types (and criteria) of success of anti-corruption modes of organizing that will be compared with those that took take in Banten in the next few chapters.

In this context, I pay attention to anti-corruption movements and activism as a non-state, less-institutionalized, but a nonetheless influential aspect of politics and how it possibly affects public decisions regarding the curtailing of corruption (Della Porta, 2017). Thus, I will look at both the most visible forms of contestation: protests both on the street (off-line) and through social-media platforms (on-line), and the less-visible attempts, such as lobbying by civil society organizations (CSO) keen on curtailing corruption.

Throughout this chapter, I will highlight three distinctive phases in the history of Indonesia's anti-corruption activism: New Order, *Reformasi*, and the 20 years post-*reformasi* era. Each phase is characterized by the features of the predominant form of anti-corruption mobilization: e.g., the student movement, CSO's programmatic actions and on-line activism.

First, during the New Order era anti-corruption activism was mostly undertaken by students. This anti-corruption movement largely relied on students' mass mobilizations and demonstrations. Throughout the 1970s, they had some success in the sense that they were able to push the Soeharto regime to establish anti-corruption committees. Yet, the anti-corruption committees failed and were dissolved owing to Soeharto's government not providing the committees with sufficient political and financial resources (Setiyono and MacLeod, 2010:341 Juwono, 2018:146). Throughout the 1990s, the student movements used the popular slogan of KKN (Korupsi/corruption, Kolusi/collusion, Nepotisme/nepotism) to overthrow Soeharto himself. The student movement, however, was ineffective in pushing the government to truly initiate and implement policies that have had a lasting impact on curtailing the KKN itself.

Secondly, I follow Setiyono and Macleod's (2010) argument that, after *reformasi*, the predominant mode of anti-corruption movements has become more formal and institutionalized and has taken shape as CSOs (Civil Society Organizations). These CSO's include groups such as ICW (Indonesia Corruption Watch), MTI (Masyarakat Transparansi Indonesia, Indonesian Society for Transparency) and IPW (Indonesia Procurement Watch). These CSOs which are assisted by foreign donors, mostly focus on institutional and legal reform by advocating the establishment of a Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and other anti-corruption institutions. These include the Centre for Financial Transactions Reporting and Analysis (PPATK, Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan), the National Ombudsman's Commission, the Judicial Commission, the Attorney General's Commission, and the Indonesian Police

Commission. They also urged the government to ratify the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC).

Thirdly, and somewhat later in the second *reformasi* decade, the anti-corruption movement started to use social media as a means to critique corrupt governmental practices. Some activists, with support from anti-corruption CSOs, used social media to conduct anti-corruption campaigns and mobilize people. On-line anti-corruption campaigns that were considered successful in mobilizing people and shaping political decisions include Gerakan 1,000,000 Facebookers Dukung Chandra Hamzah & Bibit Samad Riyanto (the Movement of 1,000,000 Facebookers to support Chandra Hamzah & Bibit Samad Riyanto) and #SaveKPK (2012, 2015). These movements aim to support KPK officials and free them from criminalization. The on-line campaigns were considerably successful in diffusing its messages into the public sphere, in mobilizing people, and gaining wider political support for the case (Molaei, 2015).

In the following sections, I delve into these three phases of the anti-corruption movement in Indonesia. The conclusion, then, questions the extent to which the strategies that have been developed by each different anti-corruption mode of organizing can be considered successful in curtailing corruption.

The Student Movements

In January 1971, *Mahasiswa Indonesia*, a student newspaper from Bandung, wrote that 1970 was “the year of discontent” (*tahun ketidakpuasan*). The newspaper pointed to the increasingly corrupt Soeharto Government (Abar, 1995). Early that year, students had expressed their discontent by organizing demonstrations under the name of the *Mahasiswa Menggugat* (‘Student Protest’) Movement (Padiatra, 2015: 106). They protested against corruption, which they argued had already become normalized throughout Soeharto’s government (Mackie & McIntyre 1993: 125-126).

In early February 1970, students stopped their protests as, apparently, Soeharto complied with their demand by establishing an anti-corruption commission, called Komisi 4 (‘Commission Four’). Student activists agreed to give the commission a chance to get the job done (Padiatra 2015: 106, Juwono 2018: 131).

The commission, however, proved to be weak since it did not have the authority to prosecute, but only to review government policies and it just could provide recommendations to address corruption (Juwono, 2018:131). Student

activists also considered the commission to be too slow in disclosing the results of its queries (Padiatra, 2015:107). Finally, in July 1970, after having presented seven reports to various public offices, a report on the state administrative reform, and one advising a new method for corruption eradication, the commission was dissolved (Mackie 1970, Setiyoso and McLeod, 2010: 348, Juwono, 2018:132). Despite its comprehensive and high-quality reports advising on governance reform and anti-corruption issues (Juwono, 2018: 133), the efforts of the commission did nothing to fight the prevalence of corruption (Setiyoso and McLeod, 2010: 348).

In this period, the student anti-corruption movement was successful in pushing Soeharto to form an anti-corruption committee. This is because, in the early period of the New Order era, the university students had built a partnership with Soeharto with the expectations that Soeharto would work to restore Indonesia's economy and address corruption in a more systematic way (Juwono, 2018: 127). Later in the process, however, the students could not push the government to give the anti-corruption committee strong authority, a clear mandate, and proper budget to be effectively functional (Setiyono and MacLeod, 2010:341). It shows that the relations between Soeharto and the students were fragile (Juwono, 2018: 139). In other words, their relationship seemed to be a temporary convergence rather than a unifying alliance in addressing the corruption and governance predicament (Juwono, 2018: 127).

In July 1970, and frustrated by this condition, student activists of the Mahasiswa Menggugat movement joined with KAPPI (Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia/Indonesian Student Action Front) established their own anti-corruption committee (Komite Anti-Korupsi/KAK) (Sjahrir, 1983). In Bandung, and for the same purpose, activists of the Student Councils (Dewan Mahasiswa) from different universities, such as Marzuki Darusman, Sjarif Tando, and Boy Musdar Nurmawan, formed a movement called Bandung Bergerak ('Bandung in Motion'). The KAK and Bandung Bergerak held demonstrations in front of some ministries and they demanded to meet with top officials. They demanded that they take responsibility for corruption and inefficiency in the government's budgets. The Bandung Bergerak group, also, came to Jakarta and pinned up some anti-corruption posters at the Pertamina and Attorney General offices. This group then was able to meet with members of DPR-GR (the Indonesian National Parliament) and, even, President Soeharto himself, to whom they gave an open letter addressing corruption cases in Indonesia (Padiatra 2015: 107). In September 1970 and as a response to this students' movement, the Parliament

held meetings to discuss a plan for drafting an anti-corruption law. Student activists felt that their demands were listened to, so they temporarily withdrew their protests (ibid.). As a result, on 12 March 1971, the Indonesian parliament ratified the anti-corruption law that qualified corruption to be legally defined as a crime (Juwono, 2018:134). Despite that it could not be applied retroactively and that it did not subject army personnel to the jurisdiction of the civil administration, this anti-corruption law managed to revive the hope that corruption now could be fought lawfully (ibid.).

Only the next year, however, that hope seemed to vanish. In 1972, students were back in the streets to protest the appropriation of 'people's money' (uang rakyat) in Taman Mini Indonesia Indah (TMII), an entertainment park project of Tien Soeharto, the president's wife. The students accused her of asking for donations from public offices and state enterprises to fund her mega-project. Her effort in collecting money was considered to be prone to corruption and the development of TMII was seen as a waste of money. In Jakarta and Bandung, students formed an ad-hoc movement using different names such as: Penyelamat Uang Rakyat (Peoples Money Saviours), "Gerakan Akal Sehat" (The Good Sense Movement), and "Gerakan Penyelamat Uang Rakyat" (People Money Rescue Movement) (Padiatra 2015: 107-108).

From 1972 onwards, the students intensified their protest as they believed that the Soeharto family became entirely corrupted. During this time, Soeharto's inner circle, referred to as ASPRI (Asisten Pribadi or 'Personal Assistants'), became more powerful in influencing political decisions and policies (Juwono, 2018). For example, In October 1973, students staged a protest against corruption, the abuse of power, unemployment, and illegal activities by the powerful personal assistant of Soeharto (Juwono, 2018:138). On 10th January 1974, students increased their demand, in a petition known as "Tripura Baru 1974" (The New People Demands of 1974. This "new Tritura anti-corruption movement" (Sastramidjaja, 2016:146) was against corruption, price hikes, and calling for the abolition of the President's ASPRI (Padiatra 2015: 113, Juwono, 2018:139. Sastramidjaja, 2016:146). All the protests culminated in a huge demonstration in January 1974, directed against foreign investment as symbolized by the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister. It triggered riots in Jakarta, well-known as "Malari" (Malapetaka 15 January or 15 January Havoc).

As a response to the Malari riots, the Indonesian government took repressive measures which resulted in 820 arrests; including those of 15 university student activists, 83 other students, 4 MPs, and several officers. Eventually, only three

student leaders from the University of Indonesia and Gadjah Mada University were sentenced to jail. This detention did not make the student back down. The students returned to the streets and intensified their protests. Between 1975 to 1977 student movements focused on Soeharto's family, which - they alleged - were engaged in extensive corruption. Students criticized how the Soeharto family was taking advantage of government projects which they used for their own benefit. However, Soeharto's brother, Probosutedjo, and his eldest son, Sigit, in a press conference in October 1976, denied such allegations (Far Eastern Economic Review, 15th October 1976, p. 32.).

In the face of such accusations, Soeharto's Government in September 1977 tried to show that it was serious in combating corruption by launching its own anti-corruption campaign, called Operasi Tertib/OPSTIB (Operation to maintain order). Its mission, according to Presidential Instruction number 9 of 1977, was to reinforce organizational and administrative reform in government agencies as well as to eradicate illegal levies of their services. Despite a promising start, in the end, this initiative was halted as a result of strong resistance from powerful parties with a vested interest (Asiaweek, 27 January 1978). Once again, the Soeharto Government's attempt to restrain corruption among high-level officials failed and corrupt practices continued (Juwono, 2018: 141-142).

In the absence of substantive action, in October 1977 students from all over Indonesia gathered in Bandung, to pledge (*sumpah*)¹ that they were in opposition to the Soeharto Government. This pledge was followed by demonstrations that reached their peak during a January 1978 rally, attended by 3,000 students that gathered to oppose Suharto's re-election. On this occasion, some students also published a 'White Book' containing a critical assessment of the Soeharto Government's policies and they voiced criticism to the usage of state facilities by Soeharto's wife (*White Book of the 1978 Students' Struggle*: Indonesia, no. 25, 1978: 151-182). The latter made Soeharto angry and it eventually led to the detainment of Heri Akhmadi, the demonstration's leader and then chair of the Student Council of ITB (Akhmadi, 1981). He was charged with insulting Suharto himself.

The intensification of student criticism and its targeting of Soeharto and his family directly led in this period to full repression on the protesters by the

1) This 'sumpah' (pledge) was inspired by an important moment in Indonesian history; 'Sumpah Pemuda' (Youth Pledge) made at a congress of nationalist youth organizations at the end of October 1928. Sumpah Pemuda was a declaration of the unity of the nation, homeland, and language that became a unifying pillar of youth movements across the country to win independence (Foulcher, 2000:377).

government. The repression was thorough and effective not just by military takeover of campuses and the arrests of students, but also by implementing a range of policies collectively known as NKK/BKK (Normalization of Campus Life / Bodies for the Coordination of Student Affairs) that, basically, restricted the students' political activities on campus (Aspinall, 2005:120).

This repression and the implementation of NKK/BKK weakened the anti-corruption student movement into the late 70's, and made it difficult to combat the Soeharto family's control on the political and economic life of the country (Juwono, 2018:149). The implementation of the NKK marked an end to student demonstrations and mass mobilization. The repression forced the student movement to change their activist methods by moving underground, until it was resurrected in the 1990's (Aspinall, 2005: 120-121, Lane 2008: 88-92).

From the early 1990s when the repression relatively softened, student movements again began to organize in their criticism of corruption within the government (Setiyono and McLeod, 2010: 349). Students established groups like Yayasan Pijar (Pusat Informasi dan Jaringan Aksi untuk *Reformasi*, the Information Centre and Action Network for Reform), the Cipayang Group,² The People's Democratic Alliance (Aliansi Demokrasi Rakyat, ALDERA) and SMID (Solidaritas Mahasiswa Indonesia untuk Demokrasi, Indonesian Student Solidarity for Democracy) both expressed concern about political leadership and corruption at the federal level (Aspinall 2005: 122-44, 214).

In Yogyakarta, informal groups established by student activists and supported by NGO (non-government organization) workers, artists, and academics, together with older student organizations,³ they demonstrated to demand political reform and the eradication of KKN (Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme / Corruption, Collusion, Nepotism) (Setiyono and McLeod, 2010: 349). While the demonstrations raised banners concerning KKN, these student groups usually avoided to address specific cases of corruption of particular institutions

2) Alliance of extra-campus organizations. Including : HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam/Islamic Student Association), PMKRI (Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Indonesia/Indonesian Catholic Student Association), GMNI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia/Indonesian National Student Movement), GMKI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia/Indonesian Christian Student Movement), PMII (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia/Indonesian Islamic Student Movement).

3) These organizations were including: HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, the Islamic Students Association), GMNI Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia, the Indonesian Nationalist Student Movement), PMKRI (Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia, the Indonesian Catholic Students Association) and PMII (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, the Indonesian Islamic Student Movement).

or individuals, since the basic objective of their demonstrations was to bring Suharto's regime to an end. This was considered as the solution to stop corrupt behaviour by public sector officials (ibid.).

In Jakarta, new student-based organizations together with the established organizations (HMI, PMII, PMKRI, GMNI), and formal university student senates, despite their different political views and strategies, by early May 1998, using the same slogan of KKN in their demonstrations, agreed with one immediate goal: the removal of Soeharto (Aspinall, 2005:227). Their protests, however, were mostly dominated by more moderate groups that adopted the discourse of "moral force" (kekuatan moral) which the 1970s student movements had also used (Aspinall, 2005: 227). This moral tone was reflected in their focus on monitoring and advising the government and their emphasis on the 'purity' (kemurnian) of their movement. Due to this focus on purity, they refused to collaborate with all other political forces (Hadiz, 1999:111-12), or mobilize alongside the urban poor (Aspinall, 2005:227). The students also refused an alliance with "rakyat" (people) on the street, since they were influenced by Soeharto's propaganda saw the 'people' as a 'massa' (mass) that were mobilised from above to create riots (Siegel, 1998: 78-79)

The emphasis on 'moral force' and 'purity of the movement' enabled the success of the *reformasi* - symbolized through the downfall of Soeharto. But it failed in pushing through policies that could curtail the KKN (Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme, corruption). The student did not engage in formulating and campaigning for policies that might serve to impact in eradicating corruption (Juwono, 2018:213). Due to their emphasis on 'purity' of the student movement could not collaborate with other non-student political forces. As a result, the movement lacked broader support from other political forces and parties (Jowono, 2018:123).

Civil Society Organization (CSO) Programmatic Actions

After Soeharto stepped down in May 1998, students continued their anti-corruption demonstrations. They changed their focus and turned towards specific corruption cases; from the case of Soeharto, his family, and business cronies to allegations of local leaders' being involved in corruption. For example, in Jakarta, on 15 June 1998, there was a demonstration demanding the investigation of Soeharto, his family, and their cronies' source of wealth which was held outside the attorney general's office (Republika, 16/6/1998). Also, on the

same day, in other locations, student demonstrations took place that demanded an investigation into local government officials' corruption: from the case of the mayor of Tegal (Merdeka, 16/6/1998), the regent of Cianjur, or the case of illegal charges of provision on public services in Bekasi (Kompas, 16/6/1998). Such demonstrations typically were also aimed at the involvement of parliament's members, government procurement, and illegal levies conducted by officials. These demonstrations continued for several months after Suharto's resignation and in different locations.

According to Setiyono and McLeod (2010:351), these student demonstrations occurred spontaneously, lacking adequate evidence to support the allegations of corruption. Therefore, they did not result in any legal steps against involved officials. In 1999, the activism became broader and more structured since they now gained support from different organizations, lawyers, and academics. The student demonstrations, however, were still fragmented and lacked effective coordination and vision. As a result, the student protests against corruption gradually fizzled out.

In response to this decline of spontaneous and improvised protests, some student leaders were involved in anti-corruption organizations or CSOs (Civil Society Organizations) (Setiyono, et.al, 2017:974). In June 1998, the first of these new anti-corruption organizations saw the light: the Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW). It was next followed by the establishment of other anti-corruption CSOs such as PSHKI (Pusat Studi Hukum Kebijakan Indonesia/Centre of Law and Policy Study, July 1998), Masyarakat Transparansi Indonesia (Indonesian Society of Transparency, in August 1998), IDEA (Ide dan Analitika Indonesia/Idea and Analytic Indonesia, in 1998). Also, a number of district-level organizations were established in the period from 1998 up to the present. In 2000, all of these CSOs formed a membership association called GeRAK (Gerakan Anti-Korupsi/Movement Against Corruption).

The CSOs that mostly consolidated their actions by forming alliances and networks have carried out some activities both in strategic and practical levels. On a strategic level, the coalition of CSOs worked together with policymakers to establish the legal and institutional frameworks in combating corruption (Setiyono and McLeod 2010:355). Their first successful strategic activity was working together with officials from the Department of Law and Human Rights in establishing the Joint Team For Corruption Eradication (Tim Gabungan Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi, TGPTPK) during President Abdurrahman Wahid Era in the early 2000s. The establishment of the team had

been mandated by Law 31/1999 on the Eradication of Corruption (Ibid:357). The next strategic activity, led by ICW, MTI, and PGRI, was advocating for a more permanent anti-corruption institution after the decline of the TGPTPK. These three CSOs conducted public campaigns and urged the government and parliament to establish the KPK (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, Corruption Eradication Commission). The CSOs initially concentrated on the introduction of a law to establish the legal framework for the KPK and a related special court for crimes involving corruption, and they later supported the creation of these institutions by forming an alliance known as Advocacy for a Corruption Eradication Commission (Advokasi untuk Komisi Anti-Korupsi, AKAK) (Ibid:357).

The KPK, Indonesia's most powerful anti-corruption agency, was established under a *lex specialis* (Law 30/2002) to coordinate and supervise anti-graft agencies, examine and prosecute corrupt activities, prevent future corruption, and monitor state officials. Its extraordinary powers include wiretapping, foreclosing assets without court permission, requiring confidential data, investigating elite officials without president's consent, and taking over corruption cases from police and prosecutors. Despite some progress so far, the KPK faces complex factors such as reliance on police and Attorney General Office investigators and variable support from political elites, civil society, and the media. (Khoirul Umam, et.al, 2018:2).

After the KPK had been established, a number of CSOs, including the members of the GeRAK network (which had 30 CSO members organization at the time), and CSOs within the Judicial Watch Coalition (which had 10 members) supported the start-up of the KPK and the selection of its members. After KPK's members were selected, the CSOs - particularly MTI and PGRI - have continued to provide strategic supports. This strategic support included supporting a joint project with international donor agencies to organize training for KPK staff, to set up coordination with other law enforcement agencies, and to help KPK to develop its strategic planning and action plans (Setiyono and McLeod 2010:357-358). The CSOs continued their strategic activities by advocating for the establishment of other anti-corruption institutions, participating in the formulation of the Witness and Victim Protection Act, and endorsing the ratification of the UN Convention Against Corruption that resulted in the enactment of Law 7/2006 (ibid: 359-360).

At a practical level, CSOs were active in reporting cases of alleged corruption, bringing corrupt figures to court, providing anti-corruption awards to ensure that the work of anti-corruption activists is publicly acknowledged, organizing

anti-corruption training, and promoting public awareness (Ibid:361-364). CSOs have been key actors in eradicating corruption by making reports of corruption cases to the KPK. Table 1, below shows examples of corruption cases exposed by CSOs in the first seven years (2000-2007) since KPK was established.

Table 1. Examples of Corruption Cases Exposed By CSO.

Corruption Cases	Year	CSOs Involved in Reporting
National Level		
Bank Indonesia Liquidity Assistance	2000	Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW)
Department of Religious Affairs	2004	Government Watch (GOWA), Forum Indonesia Untuk Transparansi Anggaran (FITRA)
Elections Commission Budget	2005	FITRA and Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (LBH)
Provincial Level		
PT. Bank NTB, West Nusa Tenggara	2001	Solidaritas Masyarakat untuk Transparansi (SOMASI)
Helicopter Procurement in Aceh	2002	Solidaritas Masyarakat Anti Korupsi (SAMAK), Solidaritas Rakyat Aceh Anti Korupsi (SORAK)
Lampung disaster fund	2003	Komite Anti Korupsi (KOAK) Lampung
Misappropriation of provincial budget in West Sumatera	2003	Forum Peduli Sumatera Barat (FPSB)
Misappropriation of provincial budget in South Sumatera	2004	Gerakan Rakyat Palembang (GRP)
Misappropriation of budget of Tadulako University, Palu, Central Sulawesi	2007	Koalisi Mahasiswa Anti Korupsi (KMAK)
Local Level		
Misappropriation of district government budget in Mentawai, West Sumatera	2002	Aliansi Masyarakat Mentawai (AMM)
Embezzlement of subsidy For Bestari Foundation, Pontianak, West Kalimantan	2002	Local NGOs and Traditional Kingdom of Pontianak
Misappropriation of district government budget in Dongala, Central Sulawesi	2003	Koalisi Rakyat Menggugat (KRM)
Misappropriation of district government budget in Malang, East Java	2004	Malang Corruption Watch (MCW)
Forest Resource and Reforestation Fund	2004	Koalisi LSM Untuk Konservasi Hutan (KONSTAN)

Source: (Setiyono and McLeod 2010:363)

Moreover, the CSOs' strategic and practical activities described above, have also successfully pushed the government and parliament to create and implement anti-corruption laws (see above), established the KPK (Corruption Eradication Commission), and imprisoned corrupt government officials (Setiyono and Mcleod, 2010: 368. In other words, the CSOs have effectively influenced the decision-making processes in relation to governmental corruption in Indonesia (Setiyono, et.al, 2017:975). This effectiveness has been determined by the CSOs' ability to form solid coalitions that lead to negotiation with state institutions (ibid.) In this sense, one of the enabling factors of CSOs' success is their 'flexibility and mutability' (Aspinall and Weiss, 2012: 214). This flexibility enables them to build larger networks with various actors and organizations, consisting of artists, religious mass organizations, university alumni, etc. (Widojoko, 2017:263).

Anti-Corruption Social Media Activism

Starting from around the 2000s, Civil Society Organizations, like other organizations in Indonesia, gradually started using the internet and social media technology (Nugroho 2011, Nugroho and Syarief 2012). Anti-corruption CSOs used web-based tools on the internet mostly for transparency, disclosure, dissemination of information, to initiate public participation, and mobilization of online audiences (Setiyono, et.al , 2017:971). One of the most effective social-media usage in anti-corruption campaigning by CSOs was mobilizing on-line and off-line support for the KPK and to challenge the predatory interests of elites to dissolve it (Widojoko, 2017:253).

As mentioned above, one of the success stories of the CSOs anti-corruption movement was the establishment of KPK and its legal punishing of a large number of corrupt perpetrators. This included high-profile figures such as the governor of the Central Bank, cabinet ministers, the Chief of the Constitutional Court, and other heads of state institutions (Bolongaita, 2010; Kuris, 2012a; Schutte, 2012, Widojoko, 2017). This success, however, also triggered resistance from major political powers in Indonesia (Widojoko, 2017: 253). In a response to this resistance, CSOs used social media to mobilize support from citizens for the KPK. This #saveKPK movement is a good example of successful social-media anti-corruption activism in Indonesia.

One of the most well-known cases of social-media anti-corruption campaigns is the 'Gecko versus Crocodile affair' (Cicak versus Buaya). It started in April 2009, when the Police's Chief of Detectives, Susno Duadji found that KPK

had tapped his phones in investigating a bribery case (Kilas Berita 2009). Susno Duadji felt he was attacked by the KPK and, then, expressed his anger during a press conference, stating that KPK was only a *cicak* (house gecko) attempting to fight a mighty *buaya* (crocodile) - the latter referring to the national police services or POLRI (Lim 2013:640). Duadji, in his anger, also attempted to discredit and remove KPK officials by charging them with a bribery case or threatening to bring them to trial (Butt, 2011). In July 2009, two KPK commissioners; Candhra Hamzah and Bibit Samad Riyanto, were arrested by the police due to suspicion of extortion and accepting bribes from a fugitive businessman Anggoro Widjojo. The two men denied these allegations, arguing that they had been framed to weaken the KPK's reputation. Many people shared their views and believed that the charges were fabricated. The case, which appeared in the mainstream media, especially on television, triggered a people's movement organized by civil society organizations, which resulted in both off-line demonstrations and on-line campaigns. The biggest on-line movement was coordinated through and facilitated by the Facebook group of "Gerakan 1.000.000 Facebookers Dukung Chandra Hamzah & Bibit Samad Riyanto" (Movement of 1.000.000 Facebookers Supporting Chandra Hamzah & Bibit Samad Riyanto). The group successfully attracted public attention and easily surpassed its initial goal of 1,000,000 members in just nine days (Lim 2013, Molei, 2015). It then was followed by the going viral of the catchphrase "CICAK", meaning gecko as to symbolize support for KPK and also as an abbreviation of "Cinta Indonesia Cinta KPK" (Love Indonesia Love KPK), everywhere on different on-line media platforms. Similar on-line campaigns in the form of music videos, cartoons, posters, memes with depictions of "gecko vs crocodile" were disseminated through YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter. There was even a Javanese rap song with lyrics which supported the KPK and which could be downloaded as a cellphone ringtone. This on-line movement was covered by mainstream media and was positively represented by them, resulting in the movement gaining wider exposure (Molaei, 2015: 99) and acceptance.

Social media has enabled the more effective dissemination of the movement's messages. It has become a decisive factor in attracting the attention of both the public and politicians (Molaei 2014:100). And, that was possible owing to their narratives, icons, and symbolic representations imitate those that are used in the contemporary culture (Lim 2013:654). In this regard, they produced and disseminated protest content through social media that is much aligned with contemporary consumer culture: it is lightly packaged, it reads like a headline

and tells a sensationalized story (ibid). In the Indonesian social media, the Cicak vs Buaya case was framed as a simple story of a hero fighting against a villain, in which Susno Duajdi clearly acted as the villain and Bibit-Chandra were portrayed as the victimized heroes (ibid:644).

This simple narrative is supported by strong symbolic representations that were vivid and visual in character: a small cicak (house gecko) up against a big buaya (crocodile). The small house gecko easily can be interpreted as representing small, innocent, ordinary people, or the 'us', whereas the crocodile is identical with a beastly powerful and greedy man, or 'them'. This attempt of defining 'who we are' or 'us' versus 'them' provides a ground for members of the movement to act as a collective (Lim, 2013:644). It was this that made the on-line anti-corruption movement successful and helped it transform into successful off-line mobilization, such as the rally on 10 September 2009, in Jakarta, attended by some five thousand people showing support for 'the gecko' (KPK). This rally was, then, followed by demonstrations in several other cities. These huge protests and demonstrations provided public and political pressures that forced the police to drop charges against the KPK's commissioners on 3rd December 2009 (Lim, 2013).

In October 2012, a similar campaign called the "#saveKPK" movement emerged. This online movement was a response to a police attack on the KPK and in relation to the investigation of The Head of Traffic Police General Djoko Susilo. In retaliation, the police investigated and attempted to arrest Novel Baswedan, KPK's head investigator (Setyarso, 2012). As a response, some civil society organizations organized a movement through Twitter and Facebook with the hashtag #saveKPK and #dimanaSBY to stop the arrest of Novel Baswedan (Widjoko, 2017:260). On October 5, 2012, these hashtags soon became a trending topic in Twitter with 39,997 (re)tweets (as recorded by Topsy.com on October 5th, 2012). This buzz on KPK on social media platforms, then, brought around 1,000 activists together who joined in the demonstration in front of the KPK building carrying with them Save KPK banners (Techinasia, 8 October 2012). This demonstration was followed by another coinciding with 'car-free day' and a concert held in the center of Jakarta on a Sunday morning (October, 10th). People gathered around the stage and shouted "Save KPK, save Indonesia!" (Ibid.) The demonstrators demanded that the then-president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (also known as SBY) stop police intimidation of KPK investigators and their families and urged him to remove the head of the National Police (Widjoko, 2017:261).

The #saveKPK movement appeared on both social media platforms and as street protests. Save KPK demonstrations spread across Indonesia: in Bandung, Yogyakarta, Bali, and, geographically distant, Banda Aceh. Meanwhile, on Facebook, the “Save KPK Save Indonesia” fan page has over 15,000 likes (Techinasia, 8 October 2012). The pressure from civil society, facilitated by social media, led the president to finally order police to stop the investigation of Novel Baswedan and let the KPK prosecute General Djoko Susilo (Widojoko, 2017:260).

In 2015, the #saveKPK movement resurfaced as a response to another police attack on the KPK. It began when the Deputy Chairman of the KPK Bambang Widjojanto, was arrested by police after the KPK had raised suspicion over Budi Gunawan, a top candidate for the position of Chief of the Indonesian National Police. KPK suspected him to be involved in a bribery scandal. Activists, again, organized support to ‘Save KPK’ by using Facebook and Twitter to organize a rally at the KPK’s office (Savirani, 2015). The #SaveKPK2015 hashtag was used on Twitter and Facebook to mobilize activists, religious leaders, academics, politicians, citizens, labor organizations, university students, and NGOs to support KPK against the police (Clough,2015, Savirani, 2015, Gabrillin 2015,). Once again, the Save KPK movement was able to grab public attention especially in using social media platforms and the #SaveKPK hashtag become a national trending topic on Twitter in January 2015 (AMR/DOE/SF, 2015; Jakarta Post, 2015; Uqiyanus,2015). In this period the Save KPK 2015 movement was successful in capturing public attention (Suwana, 2020:6). It also proved to be effective in putting pressure on politicians to change policies as it was able to push the now President Joko Widodo to cancel his nomination of General Budi Gunawan while ordering the police and prosecutor to stop the investigation of KPK’s officer Bambang Widjojanto (Widojoko, 2017:261).

From the description above, the ‘Cicak vs Buaya’ (2009) and #SaveKPK (2012, 2015) movements might be considered successful as the protests were able to influence public opinion and succeeded in putting pressure on politicians to change policies (Molaei 2014:100). This was achievable because of the infrastructural affordances provided by social media which enables anti-corruption activists to produce and diffuse compelling protest messages to a large number of people to support their cause to defend KPK from predatory elites’ attack (Lim, 2013, Widojoko, 2017). In this sense, this anti-corruption social media activism can be seen as reactive actions to the anti-corruption institution; KPK, rather than as attempts to directly curtail corruption or corrupt elites themselves.

In September 2019, similar anti-corruption movement buzzing online publics with the hashtag: #ReformasiDikorupsi (#ReformCorrupted). On 23rd, 24th, and 30th September, the call for action was answered by tens of thousands of youths across the country by staging demonstrations to protest against, among others matters, the weakening of the KPK. The protesters, who were mostly students from over 300 universities, demanded President Joko Widodo to undo the revisions to the Law on the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) that significantly weakened its powers. This repertoire of 'connective action', based on digital connectivity' (Sastramidjaja, 2020:1), resulted in the mass participation of students across the country which was depicted as a 'comeback of Indonesia's student movement and revived memories of the role of student protest in ousting President Soeharto in May 1998' (ibid: 2). However, the #ReformasiDikorupsi is different from 1998 student movement for the massive use of social media which engaged many students, youth more generally, and a fluid alliance of non-campus groups who cannot be identified as traditional activist (ibid.). This short-lived movement, was considered successful in gathering the largest mass movement in Indonesia. It was also deemed as a failure, however, based on that none of the protesters' demands were met, including the demand to cancel the revisions of the Law on the corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). But the ephemeral 'failure' of the #ReformasiDikorupsi protest has also had a significant contribution in sowing the seeds for a new generation of civil society in Indonesia (Robet, 2020). The #ReformasiDikorupsi movement revealed the convergence and collaboration between the student movement and civil society that overcome the political polarization emerged from the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections (ibid.).

Conclusion

Following the trajectory of the various anti-corruption modes of organizing in Indonesia from the New Order to *reformasi* and the second *reformasi* decade, I have identified three prominent forms of anti-corruption mobilizations: student movements, CSO programmatic actions, and social-media activism. This does not mean that each mode of organizing only appeared in that specific era. In the second *reformasi* decade, for example, the three types of movement existed and interacted with each other at different levels. In many cases, for example, CSOs used social media in their anti-corruption campaigns while they were joined and supported by student activists.

These three forms of anti-corruption mobilization have been effective in convincing the government to institute new commissions, institutions, and anti-corruption laws while overall these successes have not led to a reduction in levels of corruption. The 1970s student anti-corruption movements were effective in pushing the New Order government to create anti-corruption policies and institutions, but they failed to continue their pressures on the government in actuating the policies and maintaining the institutions. The 1990s student movements were successful in overthrowing Soeharto by addressing issues of corruption, collusion, and nepotism or KKN (Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotism), however, they were not successful in pushing policies to curtail the KKN, involving Soeharto, his family, and cronies, itself. This was caused by the 'moral force' approach used by the students in their movements that only focus on watching, criticizing, and giving advice to the government, and not getting involved in pushing policies to curtail corruption. This was influenced by the student's emphasis on the 'purity' of their movement that was their unwillingness to collaborate with other political forces or parties.

The CSOs' programmatic actions have been successful in influencing the government and parliament to enact anti-corruption laws, establishing the Corruption Eradication Committee (KPK), and reporting corruption cases to the KPK. In this regard, the CSO anti-corruption movement has been effective in influencing the decision-making processes related to corruption eradication. This success was enabled by the power of CSOs' large networks and solid coalitions in running their programmatic actions.

Finally, anti-corruption social media activism, such as #saveKPK campaigns and #ReformasiDikorupsi protest, have been considered successful in terms of getting public attention, raising awareness, gathering the largest mass movement and pushing politicians to change policies to support and save the KPK from the attacks of predatory elites. The open, free, and easy-to-use social media afforded anti-corruption activists to create and spread interesting protest messages to a large number of people and, then, triggered them to join off-line mobilizations in supporting the KPK. The use of social media in anti-corruption protest, such as #ReformasiDikorupsi movement, has also lead to a convergence and collaboration between the student movement and civil society that can be seen as the new generation of civil society in Indonesia.

Besides this social-media activism that mostly works on the national level, there is also online anti-corruption activism conducted at the provincial level. One of them is anti-corruption activism enacted by activist-citizens of Banten

through social media (including those who joined social media from outside Banten's province). Different from those national social-media activisms that constructed corruption as a legal discourse, social media anti-corruption activism in Banten shaped corruption more as a moral discourse. I explore this discourse of corruption analysis in the next chapter.