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Digital Affective Citizenship: @The nexus of on-line and off-line anti-corruption activism in Banten, Indonesia

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Chapter One

Introduction

It was Friday, December 20th, 2013. After seven hours of questioning, The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) officially arrested Banten Governor Ratu Atut Chosiyah for corruption committed during the Lebak Regency election. The arrest was meant to further investigate cases of bribery in the Lebak Regency election dispute also involving Akil Mochtar, the former Constitutional Court Chief Justice, who had been detained earlier. He had allegedly accepted 1 billion rupiah (about 64.000 USD) in bribes from Ratu Atut Chosiyah (Atut) through her younger brother, Tubagus Chaeri Wardana (Wawan), in exchange for a favorable ruling in some regional election disputes. Wawan, - who also happens to be the husband of South Tangerang Mayor Airin Rachmi Diany (Airin), - was already arrested earlier on October 2nd, 2013.

National mainstream media, from national television to national newspapers such as *Kompas* (the biggest and most popular newspaper in Indonesia), and magazines such as *Tempo* (a highly reputable investigative magazine), referred to the event of Ratu Atut and Wawan's detainment as 'the end of the Banten

political dynasty'. Banten political dynasty is a term used to depict the complex network which tied together Ratu Atut's family members who run for the offices and parliaments, businessmen, but also its tie to local strongmen (*jawara*) and other connected political actors.

Meanwhile, In Banten, anti-corruption activist-citizens, who since 2010 had been engaging in anti-corruption campaigns through social-media, shaved their heads as a symbol for 'cleaning up Banten from corruption'. They had been, for more than 10 years, posting and commenting on issues of corruption using mostly harsh, vitriolic, and emotional language through three Facebook page and groups: *Fesbuk Banten News (FBN)*, *Wong Banten* (People of Banten) and *Forum Warga Banten* (Banten Citizens Forum). For several years, corruption allegation cases that they had posted and commented on through these Facebook page and groups included cases of the abuse of social assistance funds (*kasus dana hibah*), inflated or missing funds for medical equipment procurement (*kasus alkes*) and corruption in infrastructure development. Thus, when Ratu Atut and Wawan were arrested for a different case - the bribery case - some of the activist-citizens said that it was more like a 'surprise gift' from the KPK than something they had initially expected or anticipated. This also seems to suggest that the arrests of Ratu Atut and Wawan were not a direct result of those online anti-corruption campaigns. And, in other words, the online campaigns may have been ineffective in curtailing those corrupt leaders of Banten.

The activists, for their part, also did not stop as some may have expected. After Ratu Atut and Wawan were arrested and, in September 2014, sentenced to four years in prison, those same activist-citizens continued to engage in online anti-corruption campaigns calling citizens of Banten not to vote for candidates from Ratu Atut's family in local and national elections. The campaign was vitriolic and highly organized, yet it could not prevent the win of Ratu Atut's family members in those elections. Ratu Atut's sister, brother, and sister-in-law, in 2015, were elected as regents and mayors in some regencies and cities in the province of Banten. At the same time Ratu Atut's husband, stepmother, son, daughter, and daughter-in-law were elected to be parliament members in regency, city, province, and national level.

The election victories of Ratu Atut's family, and the apparent immunity of the dynasty, reflect the problems and challenges faced by activist-citizens engaged in campaigns against corruption. It seems that their campaigns have been able to evoke emotional discourses (such as anger and hatred) online, while these campaigns have failed to generate a strong and sustainable offline political

mobilization. Partly because of this failure, the online activism failed to leave a mark on Banten's politics, as members of Ratu Atut's clan won elections just as easily as before. What this online movement did succeed in doing, however, is helping citizens (*warga*) claim a collective identity by critiquing corrupt leaders (i.e. the Banten political dynasty) through a shared emotional vocabulary and sentiment. This online activism, however, did not produce strong organizations or leaders who could direct the emotional narration of 'not to vote for the dynasty' into actual off-line actions.

This dissertation, prompted by the above observations, studies the characteristics of the online anti-corruption activism in Banten using the theoretical framework of digital citizenship. I study the use of digital-social media in anti-corruption activism as mediators that mobilize and sustain offline political actions and digital-social media as being a site of contest, claim making and formation of particular kinds of citizenship (see Ong 1996, Dahlgren 2009, Isin, 2009, Isin and Ruppert, 2015, McCosker et al., 2016). I explore the interaction between online and offline mobilization, by asking: why did intense online anti-corruption activism in Banten fail to generate effective offline mobilization? This main question is then elaborated into several questions, as follows:

1. What discourses of corruption are constructed through online anti-corruption activism at both local (Banten) and national levels? (Chapter 3)
2. How is anti-corruption activism in Banten being practiced online? (Chapter 4)
3. How is online anti-corruption activism reflective of the character of citizenship in Banten? (Chapter 4)
4. And, to what extent, can this online anti-corruption activism be transformed (or not transformed) into strong off-line mobilization? (Chapter 5)

Digital Citizenship and Social Movements

To address these questions, I will be interpreting the online activism in Banten in relation to the growing literature on digital citizenship (Manuel Castells, 2012, Gerbaudo, 2012, Papa and Milioni, 2013, Postill, 2017), while borrowing terms and concepts from social movement studies. In doing so, I aim to contribute to broader debates within anthropology on anti-corruption movements and on the character of citizenship produced by online activism.

In a discussion of the relationship between citizenship and the role of ICTs, according to Papa and Milioni (2013: 22), Web 2.0 and other social media platforms, like Twitter and Facebook, can provide a variety of forms and chances for citizen participation. Social media platforms, in their view, provide alternative civic resources for citizens' engagement and participation, which in turn can engender new forms of citizenship (ibid:23). I follow their work by conducting, what Postill (2017:18) defines as 'a non-technocentric research into the novel forms of citizenship [...] that are being constructed within the new (social) movements and the role played by ICTs in such processes'. Here, the term 'new social movements' refers to the emergence of social movements since the 1990s that can be characterized by the intensive use of new information and communication technologies, movements such as the Indignados and Occupy movement (Papa and Miloni, 2013:22).

Joke Hermes argues that the process of construction of new forms of citizenship within the new social movements and through social media involves a great variety of knowledge and activities; including emotions, sensation, and experience of citizens participating in social movements (Hermes, 2006:304). Paulo Gerbaudo calls this involvement of emotions and social media within social movements a 'choreography of the assembly' in which especially social media are used to construct emotional conversations and loose collective identities to transform them into a political passion and collective action (Gerbaudo, 2012:100). The choreography of the assembly, itself, has to be viewed "as a process of the symbolic construction of public space, which revolves around an emotional 'scene-setting and 'scripting' (Alexander et al., 2006: 36) of participants' physical assembling" (Gerbaudo, 2012:12).

Scholars commonly adopt three different approaches to explore the process of social media in facilitating social movement practices. This scholarship can be subdivided into, optimistic, pessimistic and ambivalent or realist approaches where it pertains to the digital affordances in mobilizing citizens and potentially shaping social movements.

The term "techno-optimism" describes strategies that highlight social media's ability to spark the turning point that results in the success of a social movement. In this camp, we can find Manuel Castells (2012), Tufekci and Wilson (2012) and Clay Shirky (2008). Manuel Castell's *Network of Outrage and Hope; Social Movement in The Internet Age* contains one of the strongest arguments for why social media might generate successful social movements. He argues that social media are a kind of multimodal networking that connects between

cyber-space and urban space spontaneously generated by emotions and resulting in leaderless and non-hierarchical organizations (Castells, 2012, Kidd and McIntosh, 2016:786).

Techno-pessimism, conversely, argues that the potential and promises of social media in creating successful social movement are exaggerated, or even, delusional (see Gladwell 2010 and Morozov 2011). For techno-pessimists, social media like Facebook and Twitter are mostly used not for political organizing, but for entertainment and business purposes and they might even create serious risks for activists as social media might be used by state security apparatus to monitor them (see Morozov, 2011)

Techno-ambivalence (or techno-realists) criticizes both techno-optimism and pessimism for their take on the fixed character of social media that is either suitable or unsuitable for citizens' participation and mobilization. Techno-realists see social media as having both the potential and limitations in successfully facilitating social movements. They situate social media in 'specific local geographies of action or to their embeddedness in the culture of the social movements adopting them' (Gerbaudo, 2012:5) Successful online activism are, then, explained as growing from the organic interaction between technology and social, political, and cultural structure and relationships (Lim, 2012).

In this dissertation, I take a techno-realist approach and thus different from interpretations offered by Manuel Castells (2012). He claims that new social movements can be characterized by their cyber and urban space networking and that they are spontaneously generated in moments of outrage. According to Kidd and McIntosh (2016:786), Castells views emotion, especially anger, as the driver of social movement and it goes viral through the network and triggers offline mobilizations without the mediation of leaders or hierarchical organizations. Counter to this position, and following Gerbaudo, I argue that the connection between social media, emotions and social movements does not simply result in a condition of absolute spontaneity and unorganized participation (Gerbaudo 2012:5).

In order to understand how online activism can be successful, it is important to explore how, when, and why online activism can (and cannot) translate into an actual social movement, namely in having a strong offline organization and leadership. I argue, in the same vein as Jasper (2018:149), that online activism can also fail to be transformed into strong offline mobilization because the political organizers were not helping digital citizens to focus their anger, tell stories to explain it and channel it into collective protest rather than individual grievance.

In other words, they did not develop strategic and clear programs grounded in symbols, frames and artifacts (Gerbaudo, 2012:155). At the same time, influential Facebook admins together with digital activists- citizens can, for example, act as ‘soft leaders’ or ‘choreographers’ who help construct an emotional discourse and set the scene that can unfold collective actions (Ibid.5).

Following Gerbaudo and Jasper, I will argue that, within the digital anti-corruption movement of Banten, emotions constructed through Facebook conversations are rarely transformed into strong off-line mobilizations. This is because they are not mediated by solid organizations with strategic and clear programs articulated in various forms of also offline communication.

Meanwhile, in the on-line anti-corruption campaigns in Banten where citizens participation is not expressed through the formal political process and, also, not attached to prior defined formal organizations (Papa and Milioni, 2013:26-27), the Facebook page and groups have been able to ‘facilitate emotional engagement’ (Papacharissi, 2015:18) and create an “affective public” (ibid.) that “invite[s] affective attunement, support affective investment, and propagate affectively charged expression” (Papacharissi, 2016:2). In this sense, digital citizens construct moral-emotional discourses within the public sphere to fight their corrupt and immoral leaders (Lazar 2005). I refer to digitally mediated interaction between citizens and state as ‘digital affective citizenship’.

I define ‘digital affective citizenship’ through elaborating upon the concept of ‘digital act of citizenship’ – i.e., a set of digital acts that designate political subjects emerging from the encounter between citizens and the state (Isin & Ruppert, 2015:). I combine this with ‘affective citizenship’ that focuses on ‘how citizenship ‘takes place’ by emphasizing how it is affective – how it involves emotions, feelings, bodies” (Fortier, 2016: 1040). I define digital affective citizenship as a particular political subjectivity that combines emotions and a sense of powerlessness to affect actual change by criticizing the behaviour of ruling elites. Political subjectivity denotes ‘how a single person or a group of actors is brought into a position to stake claims, to have a voice, and to be recognizable by authorities. (Krause and Schramm, 2011; 130-131).

In the context of Banten, digital affective citizenship is reflected through social media’s distinctive religious or moral emotional discourse constructed by citizens of Banten who have less power and capacity in effectively influencing or taking responsibility for political affairs of their polity, i.e. curtailing corrupt leaders. In this sense, the character of citizenship in Banten is not departing from the formal and normative ideal of citizenship, but coming from digital media

practices, local religious value, and emotional attitude in everyday interactions between citizens and (agent of) state.

Therefore, digital affective citizenship is also a challenge to the predominant normative ethical and rational sense of digital citizenship which Mossberger, Tolbert and McNeal define as 'the ability to participate in society online ... to benefit society as a whole and facilitate the membership and participation of individuals within society' (2008:1). Civic participation in on-line anti-corruption protests in Banten by means of postings and comments that use emotional and vitriolic words do not represent such 'normative', 'ethical', or 'ideal' digital citizenship practiced conceived as rational, impartial, and detached (Mossberger, et, al 2008, Banks, 2008, Hyung, 2010). Digital affective citizenship, in this regard, is not simply a set of rights and responsibilities or appropriate behaviors (Vivieanne, et.al 2016:10), but emerges as 'deviant' or 'aberrant' participation (MacCosker 2013: 204) involving the use of passionate, aggressive and vitriolic expression and exchange of sentiments - such as anger, hate, disgust and a sense of injustice.

The Anthropology of Citizenship, Corruption and Anti-corruption movement

The concept of digital affective citizenship is also a contribution to discussions within the anthropology of citizenship which often regards citizenship as bottom-up subject formation (Ong, 1996, Lazar, 2013:2). According to Ong (1996: 737) citizenship is considered as practices and processes of 'self-making or the way citizens make themselves as political subjects (Lazar, 2013, 34, 2013b: 4). As such, anthropological analyses of citizenship depart from more normative definitions of citizenship referring to the legal status of members of a national political community with certain rights and responsibilities (Marshall, 1983). Or those definitions that work toward an analysis of a 'bundle of practices that constitute encounters between the state and citizens' (Lazar, 2008:5). An anthropological analysis of citizenship requires recognition of ordinary people's way of resisting such normative categorizations (Lazar, 2013:5).

Digital affective citizenship, therefore, concerns particular kinds of citizenship produced in the encounter between citizens and the agent of state mediated by digital-social media in emotional anti-corruption campaigns. Here, a discourse of corruption and anti-corruption becomes a key arena for citizens to 'cultivate affectively laden relations to one another and to the state, producing

along the way modes of citizenship [...] and new horizons for collective action' (Muir and Gupta, 2018:510). Hence, affect might be a source of resistance from which posts and comments on social media can be read by researchers as an act of citizenship (Isin, 2008); demand from the citizens to be heard because they have the right to be heard (Di Gregorio and Merolli, 2016:934, 838). Citizens who post and comments about corruption in the three Facebook page and groups in Banten that I have studied are acts and feelings of the affective subject (Fortier, 2010: 25).

Corruption, for the anthropology of citizenship, is a useful analytical category since citizens mobilize the term in various ways to constitute their understanding of the (ab)use of political power (Lazar, 2005:212). By elaborating on local understandings of corruption, we will be able to say something about local understandings of politics and the state (Ibid:213) as well. In Banten, for example, by analyzing conversations in three Facebook page and groups, I found that there is a similarity in how citizens in Banten and those in Bolivia studied by Lazar (2005:213), understand corruption. They similarly perceive corruption as an inclination of those in power to steal public resources for their personal benefit. From that understanding emerges efforts to launch an anti-corruption movement 'in which people assert their collective identity as citizens betrayed by venal politicians who steal public resources' (Lazar, 2005:213).

Moreover, In Indonesia, on the national level, corruption became the main problem to be tackled through the democratization process. In the Soeharto or New Order era (1966-1998), when authoritarian regimes used corruption as one of the ways to maintain power democratization was considered as a panacea (Setiyono et al, 2017: 969). Not surprisingly, the student and people power movement emerged in 1998 to bring down the Soeharto government, using the slogan of 'reformation' (reformasi) and abolish KKN (*korupsi, kolusi dan nepotisme*, corruption, collusion, and nepotism), due to people's dissatisfaction related to chronic and systemic corruption.

Despite the democratic transition that followed Soeharto's stepping-down, however, corruption in various governmental positions and local governments have persisted, if not increased. Indonesia opted to undertake a decentralization policy under Law No. 22, 1999 on "Local Government" after more than 30 years of a highly centralized national administration. According to Usman (2001: ii):

"This law delegated central government powers and responsibilities to local governments in all government administrative sectors except for security

and defence, foreign policy, monetary and fiscal matters, justice and religious affairs. The main objectives of decentralization include promoting the better delivery of government services and the raising of the level of local government accountability.”

The establishment of Banten province in 2000 was part of the decentralization process that unintentionally led to the formation of clientelistic patronage network of local politicians’ family and businessmen and resulted in increasing corruption (Hidayat 2007, Schulte Nordholt and van Klinken, 2007). In this case, democratization may have little impact on corruption eradication, especially while control on officials remains weak. (Robertson-Snape, 1999:601).

Therefore, after the fall of Soeharto, to continue their anti-corruption movement, some student activists decided to form anti-corruption CSOs (Civil Society Organizations) (Setiyono et.al, 2017:974). The anti-corruption movement, in the reformasi era, as it is studied by Setiyono and McLeod (2010), became more formal and organized and focused on legal and institutional reform. They also argue that the CSOs anti-corruption movement, because of its large networks and solid coalitions, has been successful in advocating anti-corruption laws, helping to establish the Corruption Eradication Committee (KPK) and reporting corruption cases to the KPK (see chapter 2).

One decade after the fall of Soeharto, and after the KPK had been established and was working well in identifying corrupt officials, the anti-corruption movement started to use social media in supporting KPK from the attack of predatory elites (Widojoko, 2017). This online anti-corruption movement was well known for its #SaveKPK hashtag which spread through Facebook and Twitter. The first #SaveKPK movement, or ‘Gecko versus Crocodile’ (Cicak versus Buaya) movement, in 2009, was the most popular online anti-corruption movement protecting the KPK from the Police Chief of Detective’s attack. Molaei (2015) argues that this online anti-corruption movement was successful in terms of gaining public attention, raising awareness, and pushing politicians to change policies to support and save the KPK from the attacks of predatory elites. This success was caused by the diffusion of the online movement’s messages into the public sphere and its ability to attract the attention of both public and politicians’ attention (Molaei 2014:100). According to Lim (2013:654), the diffusion and the acceptance of the online anti-corruption movement’s messages were caused by their production and dissemination that aligned with contemporary consumer culture: they were lightly packaged, easily transformed into headlines and had

controversial stories.

An online anti-corruption movement, then, becomes a movement ‘from below’ addressing corruption as a matter of fighting social injustice and thereby making use of contextual local knowledge. It is organized in horizontal and participatory actions, such as online and street protest, rather than ‘top-down’ framed in terms of good governance equipped with technical content or implemented from institutions like judiciary authorities, international organizations and programmatic NGOs (Della Porta, 2017:663).

Worldwide, other ‘from below’ anti-corruption movements have also used on-line strategies. The Arab Spring, in which the role of social media was believed to be prominent, basically was demands for democracy and freedom with the denunciation of corruption of the political elites (Bennet and Segenberg 2013). Inspired by the Arab Spring, The Indignados in Spain and Greece was a reaction against the growing inequalities caused by the corruption of their elected representatives (Della Porta, 2017:677). The use of social media to produce a mass aggregation of individuals protesting corruption also appeared in places as distant and different as Tahrir Square (Cairo), Placa de Catalonia (Barcelona), Syntagma Square (Athens), Zuccotti Park (New York), or Taksim Square (Istanbul) (Bennet and Segenberg 2013).

In Turkey, the Gezi protest of 2013 targeted Erdogan’s authoritarian power, which in the protestor’s minds, is an imitation of the absolute power of the sultanate (Atak and Della Porta, 2016). In Ukraine, in the same year, the protest at Maidan Square also addressed authoritarian and centralized regimes of power that also enriched oligarchy in the president’s circles (Della Porta, 2017:675). In the USA, the Occupy Wall Street protest, which also involved the heavy use of social media has also condemned corruption in terms of collusion of politicians with large corporations (Della Porta, 2007). In Madrid, the Puerto del Sol demonstration included the fight against corruption and demand for political transparency by the creation of a mechanism of control by the citizens (Della Porta, 2017:677). In Malaysia, the Bersih movement, organized by opposition party leaders and NGOs with support by bloggers and citizen journalists online, mobilized 40,000 citizens demanding clean and fair elections (Johns and Cheong, 2019: 1).

One of the anti-corruption movements that important to be discussed here, is Anna Hazare’s anti-corruption movement in India. This case is a contribution to the study of transformation of online activism to off-line mobilization and its limitations. Anna Hazare, a social activist, began a hunger strike in 2011 to

demand a strong anti-corruption law and independent ombudsman (Jan Lokpal Bill). This anti-corruption campaign had a significant online presence, which translated into offline activism in the form of sizable protests and open forums in Mumbai and New Delhi (Harindranath and Khorana, 2014:69). In less than four days, Anna Hazare's 'fast unto death' movement had already gained 116,000 fans on Facebook and 5,600 followers on Twitter supporting the movement (Shah, 2011). These social media platforms were managed by a team that self-proclaimed as 'civil society' group of 'Janlokalpal' (after their Jan Lokpal Bill movement) (Harindranath and Khorana, 2014:63).

There were five discursive categories classified from #Janlokalpal twitter posts. These were: first, the discursive construction of Anna Hazare's movement; India Against Corruption (IAC) as "citizen's movement", rather than an NGO or a registered organization, against the villainous enemy, i.e. the nation-state/government (Ibid: 64). Second, condemnation to the government's arms for using violence in dealing with off-line demonstration (ibid). Third, mentions of Gandhian methods of 'peaceful protests/demonstration' as being a fundamental citizen's right, but with the exclusion of rural and lower-class citizens from the protests (Ibid: 64-65). Fourth, mentions of the mainstream media as mediators between the movement and the general public (ibid:65). The fifth point refers to the movement's efforts to set itself apart from any formally formed political or non-governmental organization and to identify itself on social media as a unique civil society movement with a well-known leader (ibid). From these five discursive categories, it can be interpreted that corruption and anti-corruption movement itself was constructed as rational-legal-institutional discourse. Such a kind of discourse was more effectively translated into large off-line political mobilization with the help of strong leadership and effective organizations.

However, in the year since a big protest in Ramlila, Hazare's movement has lost steam (Sengupta, 2014: 407). This floundering of Anna Hazare's movement is, apparently, related to the construction of corruption in term of legal discourse that only become a middle-class citizens' issue. Hazare defined corruption narrowly as 'just a matter of legality, of financial irregularity and bribery', and not as 'the currency of a social transaction in an egregiously unequal society, in which power continues to be concentrated in the hands of a smaller and smaller minority' (Roy, 2011). Hazare ignored the wider social context, so his anti-corruption movement was only targeted 'evil politician and government corruption' (ibid.) Accordingly, Hazare had been silent on issues, like "illegal mining and land acquisition for special economic zones, where marginal

farmers and indigenous communities were hurt by corruption, rather than the urban middle class, which is Hazare's primary base of support" (Sengupta, 2014: 408). Therefore, Anna Hazare anti-corruption's mass mobilizations started to wane, since they were limited and only supported by 'the urban capitalist class' (Harindranath and Khorana, 2014:67).

All of these 'from below anti-corruption movements' have been studied as relatively successful cases of digital activism. From the Arab Spring (M. Lim, 2012; Tufekci & Wilson, 2012) to Occupy (Donovan, 2018), Indignados (Gerbaudo, 2012; Siapera, 2016), to Anna Hazare's anti-corruption movement (Harindranath and Khorana, 2014, Sengupta, 2014), the success of social movements was linked to their capacity to "shape repertoires of contention, frame the issues, propagate unifying symbols, and transform online activism to offline protest" through social media (M. Lim, 2012:231). Conversely, in this dissertation, I will study a less successful case, that is the anti-corruption activism in Banten. Facilitated by social media, the anti-corruption movement in Banten also indicates the notion of such anti-corruption movement 'from below' as it is contextualized in local understandings of corruption. Reflecting on those success stories of anti-corruption movements mentioned above, I study the transformation of online anti-corruption campaigns to offline protests in Banten and the reflection of a characteristic of digital citizenship through that anti-corruption activism.

Method: Doing Social Media Ethnography

The main method used in this study is 'social media ethnography' (Postill and Pink, 2012). Through interviews and participation, it examines the materiality of being online (postings, comments, images, online interviews) in relation to the issues of corruption and anti-corruption campaigns as well as offline contacts with actors (administrators, members, followers).-participation in anti-corruption movements' offline actions (meetings, protests, and marches).

Doing social media ethnography is a way to make connections between online and locality-based realities that enables us to follow the (dis)continuities between social media anti-corruption movement and face-to-face experiences (Postill and Pink, 2012:2). This is part of a process of making 'ethnographic places' (Pink, 2009). Ethnographic places are not 'bounded localities, communities, or territories (although physical localities might be part of or associated with them) but collections and relations between things and processes that become intertwined' (Postill and Pink, 2012:5), and they are clustered or intensities of

things of which both localities and socialities are elements (Ibid: 2) (*see also* Hine, 2015).

In this dissertation, I regard the three Facebook page and groups (Fesbuk Banten News, Wong Banten, and Forum Warga Banten) and the Banten region itself as my 'ethnographic places'. Those three Facebook page and groups are selected because they display intensities of on-line materials (postings and comments) related to anti-corruption campaigns. In September of 2013, when I started to search for postings or conversations with the keyword 'korupsi' (corruption) on the Internet, these three Facebook page and groups stood out in the results. This was happening, also, because at that very same time Ratu Atut and Wawan were arrested by the KPK on allegation of involvement in the aforementioned bribery case. Various national mainstream media made reports about the incident, while social media; like those Facebook page and groups, exchanged political posts and comments that created intensive conversations between, mostly, citizens of Banten. And then, the second 'ethnographic place' is Banten, both at the provincial and district level, where off-line activities of anti-corruption campaigns took place. Banten, here, is not considered as a bounded physical territory or administrative region, but as a place where 'intensities' of anti-corruption campaigns in social media traverse into offline actions or vice-versa.

By doing social media ethnography, In addition to designing the three Facebook page and groups and Banten as "ethnographic places" (Pink, 2009), I am also changing the methodological emphasis from network and community models to one that is centered on routines, mobilities, and socialities. (Pink, 2008, Postill 2008, 2011, Pink and Postill, 2012). In other words, I study the 'intensities' of social media activity and sociality related to the anti-corruption activism in Banten that spans online and offline activities, in order to engage in a nuanced and contextualized ethnography of Banten's anti-corruption activism. This kind of research is an anthropological critique of the works using dominant terms such as 'network' (see Castells, 1996, 2001) and 'online communities' (Kozinets, 2010). In ethnographic research on the Internet and social media, the term network is avoided since it is too dispersed, wide and partial in understanding social media activity and social relation deeply (Miller and Slater 2000, Postill, 2008) and endow too much power to the technological network perse. Social media ethnography also shifts the focus from the study of online communities (Kozinets, 2010), which focus on mere co-presence and membership in a particular category of community, to digital socialities that

'attends to the qualities of social relationship rather than their being part of community (Postill and Pink, 2012: 5)

Using this method, I participate in the three Facebook page and groups mentioned: Fesbuk Banten News, Wong Banten and Forum Warga Banten keeping up-to-date and collaborating in social media discussions. It involves more than just keeping an eye on these social media platforms; it also involves using them as a "ethnographic place of the field site." (Postill and Pink, 2012:6). This method is similar to Hine's ethnography for the Internet (2015) that moved away from studying online presence as the 'virtual' to how the internet has become 'everyday, embodied, and embedded' (E3). This E3 internet involves multi-sited and mobile methods in which the ethnographer follows participants when they move in between online and offline sites (Barendregt, 2017: 310). Accordingly, I study the three Facebook page and groups in Banten in comparison with on-line anti-corruption activism of anti-corruption CSOs at national level and local NGO in Malang; Malang Corruption Watch (MCW).

Social media ethnography consists of overlapping sub-practices that are: catching up, sharing, exploring, interacting and archiving (Postill and Pink, 2012:6). Catching up means joining and following those Facebook pages and groups. For me, it also meant following the links, threads, and other social media sites related to them and to the issue of corruption. Catching-up intertwines with another practice that is 'sharing'. Digital sharing is a research practice that will influence and intensify the socialities of digital ethnographic places that are formed. Interacting with other members of the Facebook group, or followers of Facebook pages, from simply hitting 'like' buttons on others status, comment, posting, or note, to other on-line encounters through discussions on the issues of corruption and how it deals with their subject position as citizens. The last (sub) practice is archiving. Materials or contents resulting from catching up, sharing and interacting process were captured, with help of Ncapture provided by Nvivo 10 qualitative research software, stored and coded. These materials were analyzed for their word frequency (Ryan & Bernard 2003, Cidell, 2010, McNaught and Lam 2010, Baralt et al. 2011, Gardner 2017). This is also facilitated by Nvivo 10 software. Using a word-counting technique postings and comments in Facebook pages and groups are condensed to highlight dominant words and themes in people's statements related to corruption (Ryan & Bernard 2003:06-97). The frequency of words usage in texts are then represented through word cloud visualization providing us with an overview of the dominant themes in the overall discourse (McNaught & Lam 2010:630, Gardner, 2017:5). Moreover,

to understand how those dominant words related to the stem word 'korupsi' (corruption), I make use the word clusters analysis to contextualized and emphasized that the meaning of 'korupsi' is related and connected to certain concepts (Ryan & Bernard 2003).

Furthermore, to make connections between online and offline experiences or to follow the continuities and, also discontinuities, between social media anti-corruption campaigns and locality-based activities, I also did 12 months of fieldwork in Banten divided into two phases. In the first phase, from August 2014 to January 2015, I conducted face to face interviews with the administrators and members of Fesbuk Banten News, Wong Banten, and Forum Warga Banten, who are actively engaged in anti-corruption campaigns to understand their views on corruption and motifs in involving in the campaigns. I also, participated in and observed activities related to anti-corruption initiatives, such as discussions, both formal and informal, on the topic of corruption, meetings and declarations against corruption, and street demonstrations to fight corruption. I also interviewed 'leaders' and some participants of the demonstrations to recall Facebook's members' and administrators' understanding and feelings toward issues of corruption framed in the demonstrations, To cover all these offline encounters, I moved from one place to another in Banten province, including the City of Serang, Serang Regency, City of Cilegon, Pandeglang Regency, Lebak regency, and the City of South Tangerang.

In the second phase, from July 2015 to December 2015, I focused on following the events of local elections in Serang Regency and the city of South Tangerang, where Ratu Atut's sister (Ratu Tatu Chasanah) and sister-in-law (Airin Rachmy Diani) were candidates. In this regard, I followed both the campaigns of Ratu Tatu and Airin and the 'not vote for corrupt/dynasty family' campaigns on Facebook and related offline events. I, also, conducted interviews, both in formal and informal settings, with the candidates themselves, voters, their 'tim sukses' (success teams, or informal non-party organizations of brokers whose job is to mobilize voters), and participants of anti-corrupt/dynasty family campaigns. This way, I could deeply analyze the strategies of both camps in mobilizing the voters and understanding the connection and disconnection between on-line campaigns and offline mobilizations in those local elections.

Additionally, to make a small comparison with an anti-corruption movement that was proven successful, in June 2018 I visited Malang to meet with NGO activists of Malang Corruption Watch (MCW) and citizens who actively participate in the movement.

Suhud, without Fesbuk Banten News having any formal or legal status. In 2016, according to its Facebook Insights statistic, Fesbuk Banten News's weekly total reach was more than 100,000 people (the number of people who have seen any content associated with the page), and on average 5,000 people engaged with it per week. Although it is not exclusively dedicated to covering news on corruption and the Banten dynasty, this Facebook account opened a space for citizen journalists,¹ called 'dulur FBN' (friends of FBN) to make postings and comments on the corruption and dynasty's activities and policies. It was also Fesbuk Banten News that posted news that mentioned the words "corruption" and "dynasty" for the first time since Ratu Atut Chosiyah became a vice governor in 2000. This post appeared on December 12, 2010 with the title: "*Banten Corruption Watch: Kebijakan Dinasty Gubernur Banten Mengarah Ke Tindak Korupsi*" (Banten Corruption Watch: The Governor of Banten's Dynasty Policies Lead To Acts of Corruption). This post was a report on an event, a discussion held by Banten Corruption Watch (BCW), featuring opinions from Teguh Iman Prasetya (an anti-corruption activist and coordinator of BCW) and Gandung Ismanto, a scholar from Untirta (the University of Sulta Ageng Tirtayasa, Serang, Banten) who is also well-known for his critical view toward the Banten political dynasty. Although this post was not the most commented on or liked (it got 101 comments and 52 likes), it had the longest time span of any post on Fesbuk Banten News.


Wong Banten is a Facebook group launched in 2010 by a Chinese Muslim entrepreneur, Iwan Subakti, and which has been joined by 14,718 members, most of whom are scholars, journalists, writers, artists, NGO activists, and 'ordinary citizens' of Banten. Most of the active members seem to know each other

1) Citizen journalism, in one of the most oft-cited definitions, is defined as 'the act of a citizen, or group of citizens, playing an active role in the process of collecting, reporting, analyzing and disseminating news and information. The intent of this participation is to provide independent, reliable, accurate, wide-ranging and relevant information that a democracy requires.' (Bowman and C. Willis, 2003, in Isin and Rupert, 2015: 144). The internet and social media now make the participation of audiences becomes part of journalism, in which those audiences become actively participate in news production and they are no longer passive recipients of information (Isin and Rupert; 2015:144). The use of internet and social media in citizens production of knowledge about events, such as Fesbuk Banten News, have shifted professional journalism portrayed as 'a knowing subject that is detached, unemotional, neutral, unbiased, and independent' to citizen journalism that 'passionate, attached, affective, and biased yet fair reporting can result from journalistic subjectivity' (Blaagaard, 2013: 194, in Isin and Ruppert, 2015: 145)

and may have been involved in activities of a literacy organization, *Rumah Dunia*,² Wong Banten was not set up as a formal organization. This Facebook group wasn't exclusively aimed at discussing corruption. It is, rather, intended to be a space for *"all of the Jawara from Banten, those being Jawara in the fields of education, social, cultural, health, environment, technology, and the economy, and all of the Warga (citizens) of Banten who want to participate in the development or follow the progression of Banten,"* as stated in the 'description' section of the Wong Banten Facebook group. *Jawara*, as discussed in the following chapters, has had a variety of connotations throughout history, from their mythical origins as bodyguards of kings and *ulama* (religious leaders), to their mobilization as instigators of rebellions, criminals, and village heads, and as security personnel for political parties and the ruling elite (Pribadi, 2013: 315). *"Wong Banten tries to deconstruct 'jawara' to be a kind of 'ahli' (expert) or somebody who has capabilities in different fields,"* said Gol A Gong, a founder of *Rumah Dunia*, a famous novelist and literacy activist, and one of Wong Banten's most active members. Corruption has always been the primary field in which members of the Wong Banten Facebook group vigorously challenge and discuss it. The anti-corruption campaign usually intensifies during election periods in response to the candidacies of members of the Ratu Atut family (a Banten political dynasty) for regional leadership positions and legislative seats.

Lastly, Forum Warga Banten is a Facebook group founded in 2013 by Sanusi, a former NGO activist and publisher from Ciputat, South Tangerang, Banten. The forum was created as a response to the Ratu Atut and Wawan corruption scandals. As such, most of the postings and comments on Forum Warga Banten enunciate anti-corruption and are part of a wider anti-dynasty campaign. In 2016, Forum Warga Banten had 16,706 members. As stated in its description section, Forum Warga Banten is the one that explicitly uses the term 'warga' or 'citizens' as its name and ideal concept. *Warga* is conceived as not only people who are born and live in Banten, but also *"all people who have concerns and interests in the better future of, dignified, and humanized Banten"*. They are also regarded as *"the owner of sovereignty and have the right to speak and assembled in channeling the aspirations and opinions"*, and as subjects who *"have the right and obligation to control the government as those who get the mandate to build a life that is prosperous, fair,*

2) *Rumah Dunia* is a literacy organization in a sense that they organize writing and reading activities, such as novel and short story writing workshops, reciting poetry, publishing books, books' bazaar and discussion, and establishing and supporting local community libraries.

Anti- Banten Political Dynasty Facebook (*Fesbuk Banten News*) Fans Geo-visualization

Map 2. Locations and numbers of Fesbuk Banten News, Wong Banten, and Forum Warga Banten ' Active Members.

(Created by author using Nvivo 10 Geovisualization of Social Media Data)

and civilized” (About *Forum Warga Banten*, March 28, 2013). According to that description, postings and comments in *Forum Warga Banten* are not specific on issues of corruption. However, since its inception shortly after Ratu Atut and Wawan were arrested by KPK as suspects in a bribery case in the Lebak regent’s election in December 2013, the majority of postings and comments in *Forum Warga Banten* have been about corruption and dynasty issues.

Anti-corruption campaigns through *Fesbuk Banten News*, *Wong Banten*, and *Forum Warga Banten* are mostly participated in by the middle class living in urbanized areas. The map below shows that the capital of Banten province, Serang (21.228), has the highest number of active members on the three Facebook page and groups. Then it follows by Jakarta (10.251), Bekasi (8700), Cilegon (7314), Tangerang (4129), Pandeglang (2283), Bandung (2201), Rangkasbitung (896), Cilegon (449), and Anyer (406). There are almost no active members from the south part of Banten, e.g., Labuhan and Sumur, which are mostly villages with poor people and poor infrastructure. According to Masaaki and Hamid (2008:130), those are the rural poor areas where most of the people vote for Ratu Atut and her family in exchange for money (money politics).

Banten Province: Dynasty, Clientelism, Corruptions

The second category of ethnographic place is Banten Province. Banten was established as a new province in Indonesia on 4th October, 2000. Banten had a long history as an autonomous region during the reign of a Sultanate (1552-1809) with the same name. In 1817, however, Banten lost its autonomy when the Dutch colonial government abolished the sultanate. It became a residency (Khatib Mansur 2001:531). During the Soeharto era, according to Law no.5/1974, Banten was established as one of several regencies under the Province of West Java (Hidayat, 2007:206). Although Banten is situated close to Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia, it was considered a 'backward area' (*daerah tertinggal*), and had West Java's lowest levels of education and public welfare. This situation triggered some elites in Banten to set up a movement for establishing Banten as a separate province. After a long struggle, starting in the late 1950s, and resurrected in early 1999, under the spell of decentralization, on 4th October 2000, the National Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, DPR-RI) passed Law no.23/2000 on Establishment of the Province of Banten. The new province consisted of four regencies: Serang, Pandeglang, Lebak, Tangerang, and two Cities: Tangerang, and Cilegon. In 2007 and 2008 two cities were added to the province - Serang and Tangerang Selatan.

The establishment of Banten Province indicates the flaws inherent in decentralization. The decentralization process in Indonesia led to the establishment of clientelist patronage in a decentralized form, thereby replacing Soeharto's previous centralized patronage networks (Hadiz 2004, Fukuoka 2013). In Banten, decentralization has resulted in the emergence of the so-called "Banten political dynasty". It is a term that refers to the patrimonial and clientelist networks of local political 'strong men' (*jawara*) with business associations (Syarif Hidayat, 2007), which have resulted in increasing corruption among local officials and political transactions (money politics), particularly during the election campaigns (Schulte Nordholt and Van Klinken, 2007:17).

The process of building the dynasty can be traced back to the New Order era, when Chasan Schohib started his local business network using his power and network with the military, a political party (the Golkar Party), and local strongmen (*Jawara*). Ratu Atut Chosiyah, former governor of Banten, and her brother, Wawan, are prominent figures in the dynasty. However, their late father, Chasan Schohib, was actually the one who started to build the 'dynasty' by playing the role of Banten's main businessman who secretly controlled the government and parliament (Syarif Hidayat, *ibid*).

Chasan Shohib managed to 'take care of two organizations of Bantenese informal leaders; *ulama*³ and *jawara*⁴, in line with political and business power. His construction company, PT Sinar Ciomas Raya, established in 1967, frequently wins government contracts without formal tender for road and market construction projects. His business power has led him to positions in associations such as the Regional and Central Chambers of Commerce and Trade (Kamar Dagang dan Industri, Kadin) and the Indonesian National Contractor's Association (*Gabungan Pelaksana Konstruksi Nasional Indonesia*, Gapensi). He also put his men, including some *jawara*, on these associations' executive committees at the local level. Chasan utilized them to oversee projects in the Banten region since Kadin and Gapensi certificates are required for government procurement, which increased his wealth and authority. (Masaaki and Hamid, 2008: 117).

In 2001, when Ratu Atut won the local elections as the vice governor of Banten, Chasan had direct access to intervene in the political decision on local budgeting and was able to compete in obtaining local projects that resulted in advantages for his businesses (Hidayat 2007). This political dynasty became stronger when Ratu Atut was elected as governor of Banten for two periods (2007–2012 and 2012–2017), and the rest of her family members also assumed some important positions in the local government apparatus such as city mayor (his sister-in-law), vice city mayor (his stepbrother), district parliament members (sister, son-in-law, stepmothers), and national parliament members (husband and son). Wawan himself never took up an official position in political or public offices. He rather preferred to focus on developing the 'dynasty's business kingdom' through racketeering government projects. He managed 12 family companies and 24 'network' companies that mostly worked in the fields of infrastructure, education, and medical equipment procurement. In this sense, Ratu Atut and Wawan are continuing their father's legacy to build a patrimonial and clientelist regime in Banten.

The 'Banten political dynasty' has successfully retained the governorship and other public and political positions by 'allowing its members and supporters to consolidate their politico-economic power and sustain their benefit-producing

3) The term "ulama" is used more broadly to describe Islamic intellectuals and religious figures (Masaaki and Hamid, 2008).

4) *Jawara* in Banten have demonstrated a long continuity in the various roles, from their mythical beginnings as the bodyguards of kings and ulama, as rebel leaders, as criminals, as village heads, to their mobilization as security guards for political parties and the ruling elite (Pribadi, 2013: 315). *Jawara* is also identical with *pendekar*, or somebody who masters traditional martial arts.

system by exploiting the provincial budget' (Masaaki and Hamin 2008: 137). That is why Dahnil Anzar, an economist and anti-corruption activist, uses a different term for it, namely "Rent Seeker Dynasty" (Dinasti Rente). According to Anzar (2014:17) the dynasty has three different modes of milking the provincial budget: First, using their own companies to take projects from government budgets by lowering the quality of the tasks, they typically make 20–30% profit. Second, entrusting the project to members of the dynasty's cartels in exchange for a fee equal to 20–30% of the overall project value. Third, with a commitment charge of 1–2 percent and various company names.

Additionally, according to Iman Noer, who has also tried to get projects from the provincial government, the 'dynasty' also has a different method of marking up the price and adding the project to the draft of the provincial budget (RAPBD):

"I was involved in a plan to build a multimedia lab. In my calculations, the price per unit of the lab was 300 to 400 million. When it was sent to Wawan, the price scaled up to \$1.3 billion per unit. And then that number was listed in the government budget. It means that it was approved by the parliament" (Interview, 23 December 2013).

The story of Lulu Kaking is the best illustration of this relationship. He was one of Chasan Sochib's cadre. Lulu Kaking is the son of Kaking, a former regent of Serang in the 1960s, whom Chasan Sochib used to work for. Kaking was also the one who helped Chasan Sochib start his own business. To show his gratitude to the late Kaking, when Chasan Sochib ran his own business, setting up his 'political dynasty', and gaining economic and political power, he gave Kaking's son, Lulu Kaking, a lot of projects. *"There is hearsay spreading that even Chasan Sochib allocated money for Lulu Kaking at 300 million rupiah (about 19,000 USD) per year,"* said Ucu Gabriel, a former journalist at Bantenlik.com. As a return, Lulu Kaking gave his support to Chasan Sochib and his 'dynasty'.

After Chasan Sochib passed away, Lulu Kaking supported Ratu Atut and Wawan. He is the faithful ally of the 'dynasty'. In the beginning of 2000, Chasan Sochib installed Lulu Kaking at KADIN of Banten (the Banten Regional Central Chambers of Commerce and Trade). He even became the caretaker of the head of KADIN when Wawan, who elected to be the head of KADIN and replaced Chasan Sochib, was arrested by the KPK in 2013. Now Lulu Kaking is vice chairman of the organization, membership, and governance of KADIN. Lulu Kaking has his

own company, PT Lulu Kaking. This company acquired some projects from the regional budget of Banten (APBD) through Wawan's connection. As a return, Lulu Kaking gave his support to the 'dynasty'. He was one of the supporters of the Unified Banten Volunteers (Relawan Banten Bersatu, RBB) that played an important role in triumphing Ratu Atut in the election. Ratu Atut and Wawan were banned from going abroad due to the allegation of bribing Akil Muchtar. Lulu Kaking mobilized 'pendekar' (martial art expert) or 'jawara', to visit Chasan Sochib's grave as a symbolic act and showing of their force in supporting Atut and Wawan. Until now, even after Ratu Atut and Wawan were arrested, Lulu Kaking was still loyal to the 'dynasty' and held his position in the RBB, KADIN, and 'pendekar' or 'jawara' organizations.

As a religiously (Islam) associated region, like Aceh and Madura, Banten has many traditions and customs linked with religious leadership, such as *Ulama* and *Jawara* (Pribadi, 2014:314; see above). Chasan Sochib started to build his political dynasty by establishing a clientelistic network with the *Ulama* and *Jawara*. He managed to make himself one of the executive committee members of the *Satkar Ulama* (Ulama Works Squad) and the general chairman of the *Satkar Pendekar/Jawara* (The Martial Artist Work Squad).

Chasan Sochib often called himself a 'jawara', even though he has no affiliation with any martial art school (*perguruan silat*). However, he was the one who used *Jawara* as a part of his strategies for gaining economic and political power. There are many stories told that before Chasan Sochib set up his 'dynasty', he often came to Banten's government office guarded by at least two people dressed in black and armed with *goloks* (a traditional machete-like knife) threatening the government officials in order to get projects. It was also rumored that before 2006 election day, when Ratu Atut was paired with Masduki to be the first vice governor of Banten, *jawara*, as always, dressed in black and armed with *golok*, "secured" the parliament, and two to three *jawara* 'guarded' each parliamentarian's car (Masaaki and Hamid, 2008: 123). They were members of a *jawara* organization, founded by Chasan Sochib, called '*Persatuan Pendekar Persilatan Seni Budaya Banten Indoensia (PPPSBBI)/The Indonesian Union of Bantenese Men of Martial Arts, Art, and Culture*'. Due to its very long name, most people in Banten called it "*Markas Komando (Mako) Pendekar*", or just simply '*pendekar*' (martial art experts). *Jawara* and *Pendekar* then became identical.

PPPSBBI is an affiliation of different martial arts schools (*perguruan silat*). According to Masaaki and Hamid (2008:117), during the election, PPPSBBI mobilized 122 affiliated *silat schools* in Banten to support Golkar alongside the

military and police. Other resources mentioned that PPPSBBI only consisted of 11 *silat* schools.

However, Hidayat (2007, 205) mentioned that “not all *jawara* in Banten are ‘pure *jawara*’ (*jawara murni*). He maintained that some of them are businessmen with a tremendous interest in gaining access to the resources and projects managed by the local government (ibid.). They are so-called ‘*jawara-pengusaha*, or *jawara*-businessman, who make use of their status as *jawara* to exercise force and as businessmen to maximize their financial resources (ibid.

This is a clientelistic relationship between ‘the dynasty’ and *Jawara*, especially with the elites. They are following and supporting ‘the dynasty, and as a return, they get some projects as (sub) contractors, received a share of his profits, or became bureaucrats (Masaaki and Hamid, 2008:188). For example, a former secretary general of PPPSBBI headquarters (2000), Kasmiri Assabudu, owned a construction company that got subcontracts from ‘the dynasty’ companies. Mas Santoso, the 2008 secretary general of PPPSBBI in Serang district, joined the local bureaucracy and later became head of Serang’s district sanitation department (ibid.).

For non-elites *Jawara*, it seems that there are different mechanisms and relations with ‘the dynasty’. As Gandung Ismanto has observed during the elections of 2006 and 2011, RBB (the Unified Banten Volunteers) is basically a network of *jawara* based in city kampongs and villages aimed at supporting candidates from the dynasty. “*They got salaries for their services during the election. And in the ‘normal’ time, they will work to secure projects handled by the dynasty’s companies or its affiliations,*” said Gandung. Ucu Gabriel, a local journalist, also told a similar story: that there are some *jawara* who work with ‘the dynasty’ on a daily basis as a kind of ‘intelligence scouting conditions and potential threats to ‘dynasty’. They get a monthly payment for the job. Others *Jawara* would regularly visit Chasan Sochib, when he was still alive, and hand in ‘proposals’ asking for money to support their activities.

As it was mentioned earlier, Chasan Sochib was a hub for *Golkar* to get support from local leaders and the grassroots. *Ulama* are one of the local leaders that need to be involved to support its power. In 2000, Chasan Sochib was even elected as the general chairman of Satkar Ulama, and in 2011, he was re-elected in the same position. As general chairman, Chasan Sochib was the leader of 29 Satkar Ulama in every province in Indonesia. His son-in-law, or Ratu Atut’s husband, was also elected as his first chief (ketua I).

Despite the fact that Chasan Sochib and his son-in-law were chosen as

leaders of *Satkar Ulama*, the role of ulama in supporting the ‘dynasty’ was not as prominent as that of *jawara*. In the 2006 election, *Satkar Ulama* was involved as part of the success team) of Ratu Atut. However, generally, they were more or less placed as figures to grab mass attention and ‘sign’ that the ‘dynasty’ was caring toward ulama and that the ulama also supported them. As noted by Gandung Ismanto, the cholar from UNTIRTA (Tirtayasa University, Banten), *ulama became a source of traditional legitimation for the dynasty*’.

In the 2011 election, According to Gandung Ismanto, the ‘dynasty’ used a different strategy to get support from ulama and their followers by focusing on *ulama* in ‘pengajian’ (Islamic study circles or groups) outside ‘*pesantren*’ (Islamic boarding school). The reason is that ulama in Pegajian have more *jamaah* (followers) who reside in specific areas in Banten and hold the status of ‘*warga*’ (citizens) of Banten, who mostly have a right to vote. While in *pesantren*, most of the students come from outside Banten and have no right to vote.

In addition, the ‘dynasty’ also gave support to formal organizations of ulama by providing them with *dana hibah* (discretionary grants from Banten’s provincial budget). Among many other organizations, NU (*Nahdlatul Ulama*), Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), and Forum *Silaturahmi Pondok Pesantren* (FSPP, or Cordiality Forum of Islamic Boarding Schools) were those that received the grants. In the year 2011, NU was granted 5 billion Rupiah (about 322.000 USD) to build its office. MUI received 8.4 billion rupiah (about 542.000 USD) for the first phase and 770 million rupiah (about 49.000 USD) for the second tranche. Meanwhile, FSPP received the grant amounting to 2.5 billion rupiah (about 161.000 USD).

Eka Setialaksamana, an anti-corruption activist and member of The Election Supervisory Body of Banten (*Bawaslu, Badan Pengawas Pemilu*), said that NU, to show their gratitude to the ‘dynasty’, chose Andika Harzumi, Ratu Atut’s son, to be the head of ANSOR, the youth organization of NU.

Most anti-corruption and anti-dynasty activists, scholars, and journalists believe that awarding *dana hibah* (discretionary grants) to those *ulama* organizations and other institutions is part of the ‘dynasty’ effort to ‘buy’ their support, especially during the elections.

However, as mentioned above, it is also believed that the biggest support in the elections came not from these organizations but from “*warga biasa*” (ordinary citizens) through vote-buying practices.

In the 2006 election, Masaaki and Hamid (2008:130) noted that *Tim Sukses* of Atut relied on 65% of the people in Banten who were considered pragmatic,

or ready to barter their vote for money. Those were the rural poor, who mostly dwelled in the south part of Banten. The Atut team used a system called '*sistem jual beli*' (sell-buy vote-getting system). The team chose five people as vote pollsters for each TPS (Tempat Pemungutan Suara/Polling Station) and provided each with a campaign slush fund according to the number of voters they were expected to buy. If, in a given TPS, the number of votes for Atut exceeded the number that was expected, any leftover money does not need to be returned to the electioneer. Another method of buying votes usually used in every election and practiced by Atut *Tim Sukses* in the 2006 election was '*serangan fajar*' (dawn attack), meaning the buying of votes at the dawn of the day of the election. Atut spent approximately 300 billion rupiah (about 19.4 million USD) in total, of which 70% took the form of provincial projects geared to support Atut (Masaaki and Hamid; *ibid.*).

Eka Satialaksamana, a member of Bawaslu (the election supervisory body) of Banten, found the same method used in the 2011 governor's election in Banten, including the *serangan fajar* (dawn attack) method. "*I woke up in the morning and found money in the envelope with a picture of the candidates in it. They will not be confused about to whom they will give their votes*". However, it was not easy to report money-related politics to the court, he said. It is because money-politics is in the domain of criminal law: '*We have witnesses, or the money, but we do not have people who received it. They will not testify*'. Added Eka.

The other method, according to Eka, as has also been mentioned above, was by utilizing meetings, or *pengajian* (Islamic preaching or study circles), where a lot of people gathered and devoted themselves to a figure of an *ulama*, sometimes with the appearance of the candidate. In the end of the *pengajian*, Jamaah was provided with '*uang transport*' (transport money) in the envelope with a picture of the candidate dressed in the same attire used in the ballot paper.

Nur Baety, an entrepreneur woman who lives in Serang, also saw this in the 2011 election: "*In my (housing) complex, the one who distributed money from Atut to the voters, in the end of the election, got a new car, while the voters got 50.000 rupiah (about 3 USD)*". The reason why the voter received the money and voted for Atut was because "*Bu Atut is caring to us; when she gave me money, it meant that it was an amanah (trust or mandate)*".

It can be gleaned from the story above that buying votes through practice or money politics creates a clientelistic relationship between a figure of dynasty, namely Ratu Atut, and a patron that cares for their clients. And as a return, the clients vote for the dynasty. However, this relationship is more than just the

rational calculation of exchanging money for votes between the patron and its client; it also involves an emotional, affective, or even 'religious' element. Giving money, considered a form of 'care' and 'trust (or in Islamic terms, *amanah*), is an example of it.

This clientelistic relations as at so many levels upon political affiliation does create incentives to maladministration and to corruption (Lazar, 2004:240). The dynasty and its networks are involved in a list of corruption allegation cases as is shown in a compilation by activists from Banten Corruption Watch. The list of corruption allegations are including land acquisition mark-up for regional police headquarters of Banten (2001), Karangsari land procurement (2002), the abuse of Banten province's emergency budget to purchase Banten parliamentarian's house (2002), the loss in health department according to Audit Reports (LHP) of government financial from The Supreme Audit Agency (2010), indication of corruption in the regional budget of Banten according to Audit Reports (LHP) of government financial from The Supreme Audit Agency (2010), medical equipment procurement in Health Department of Banten Province (2010), house of the governor construction project (2010), the abuse of discretionary grant (Dana Hibah) of Banten Province (2011). From all those cases, however, only two cases since 2013 have been brought to court, by the KPK and High Attorney office of Banten, they are: corruption allegation in the use of discretionary grant (Dana Hibah) of Banten Province and an indication of corruption in medical equipment procurement in Health Department of Banten. Those cases, also, have been posted on Facebook by anti-corruption activists in Banten to attract public attention and as a part of social media practices of online anti-corruption activism.

A Place of Comparison: Malang Raya

As a means of comparison regarding the success or failure of anti-corruption movements in Banten, I have selected the anti-corruption movement in Malang Raya as a comparative case. Specifically, I am referring to the anti-corruption movement led by a local NGO; Malang Corruption Watch (MCW). Malang Raya, where MCW organizes anti-corruption movements, is a term used to refer to a region that comprises the cities of Malang and Batu as well as the Malang Regency.

Malang Corruption Watch has successfully conducted investigations and reported several corruption cases in the Malang Raya region. In the city of Malang alone, there were 9 cases, some of which have already been handled by

the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). Among them were allegations of corruption in the road nail project in Kota Malang, allegations of corruption in the procurement of land for RSUD (the local hospital) in Malang City, and allegations of corruption in the construction project of drainage systems in Tidar and Bondowoso-Kalimetro street. Additionally, there have been several other corruption cases recorded in Malang City, such as the bribery case in the change of the income and expenditure budget of Malang City in 2015, which was committed by the non-active mayor of Malang, Moh Anton. In addition to Moch. Anton, the corruption case also involved 18 members of the Malang City DPRD (local parliament).

In Malang Regency, Malang Corruption Watch has recorded at least 7 cases of corruption, including allegations of maladministration in the issuance of mining permits in Malang Regency, which have been reported to the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) for investigation. Other cases include allegations of corruption in the construction project of Pasar Sumedang and corruption in market levies. Additionally, the gratification case involved the former Regent of Malang, Rendra Krisna.

In the city of Batu, Malang Corruption Watch was focused on the investigation of corruption cases involving the mayor of Malang, Eddy Rumpoko. One of the most infamous cases of corruption in Batu is the bribery case involving Eddy Rumpoko, who received a gift in the amount of Rp. 200,000,000 (about 13 million USD) in his capacity as mayor from a businessman named Filipus Djab. The bribe was given by Filipus Djab as a fee to obtain procurement projects for goods and services in the Batu city government area. As a result of his actions, Eddy Rumpoko was found guilty and sentenced to three months imprisonment, three years imprisonment, a fine of Rp. 300,000,000.00, and other additional punishments on Friday, April 27, 2018. Not satisfied with the verdict of the Surabaya District Court, Eddy Rumpoko's case was appealed to the High Court of Surabaya and the Supreme Court by his legal counsel. However, the Supreme Court rejected the appeal and extended his imprisonment to five and a half years.

According to Artha Musasi, the head of the Political and Policy Corruption Division of Malang Corruption Watch, all these corruption cases indicate the non-accountable and non-transparent condition of the governance in Malang Raya. Therefore, Malang Corruption Watch is highly concerned and consistently monitors corruption cases in Malang Raya.

Outline

This dissertation consists of six chapters. Chapter one is this introduction that provides a background, research questions, theoretical frameworks, methodology, and overview of the locations of this research. Chapter Two provides a historical background of anti-corruption movements in Indonesia. While the remaining chapters provide answers for the four main questions of this dissertation. These are: what discourses of corruption are constructed through online anti-corruption activism in both local (Banten) and national level (Chapter 3)? How is anti-corruption activism in Banten being practiced online (Chapter 4)? How is this online anti-corruption activism reflective of the character of citizenship in Banten? (Chapter 5) And to what extent can this online anti-corruption activism be transformed (or not transformed) into strong off-line mobilization to curtail leaders of Banten that are deemed corrupt (Chapter 5).

Chapter Two traces the evolution and identifies three distinctive phases in the history of Indonesia's anti-corruption activism: the New Order, Reformasi and the second decade after reformasi. Each phase is characterized by the features of the predominant mode of organizing in that phase; e.g., the student movement, Civil Society Organization (CSO) programmatic legal action and on-line activism. The three periods are ideal types and elements of all can be found in each separate period. The student demonstration emerged in the New Order era, CSO's programmatic action started at the beginning of reformasi era, and social media activism mostly first appeared in the second decade of reformasi. Each phase, also, has different success stories of curtailing corruption. Students' demonstrations were able to institute pressure, but they were not effective in actuating and maintaining anti-corruption policies. CSOs programmatic action has been successful in influencing the government and parliament to enact anti-corruption laws, establishing the Corruption Eradication Committee (KPK) and reporting corruption cases to the KPK. Social media activism is considered successful in the further diffusing of the campaign's messages to get public attention and raise awareness, and in putting pressure on politicians to change their policies to save the KPK, but it, again, is not effectively directed to the curtailments of corruption itself.

Chapter Three explores the discourses of corruption that are constructed through online anti-corruption activism at both local (Banten) and national levels. In this chapter, to understand the local discourse of corruption I

made a comparison between the discourse of corruption in social media campaigning anti-corruption in Banten with social media of anti-corruption CSOs (Civil Society Organization) on a national level. At a national level, in social media anti-corruption campaigns that are mostly organized by formal and programmatic CSOs, corruption is dominantly constructed as a legal discourse. Whereas in Banten, corruption in social media anti-corruption campaigns, is predominantly constructed by means of moral emotional discourse. This moral emotional discourse consists of emotional or affective statements and is shaped by activist citizens who are mostly bound to local Islamic expression and values and directed toward 'the moral public sphere' (Lazar 2005:224).

Chapter Five addresses two questions of how anti-corruption activism in Banten is being enacted online. And, I ask, what kind of citizenship does this online anti-corruption activism produce? In this chapter, I delve into what citizen activists actually practiced in the three Facebook page and groups in Banten; Fesbuk Banten News, Wong Banten, and Forum Warga Banten. To do that, I read and analyse Facebook posts and comments as a 'digital act of citizenship' that is all speech acts uttered through the internet that designates political subjects emerging from the encounter between citizens and the state (Isin & Ruppert, 2015:9). There are four dominant digital acts enacted through the three Facebook page and groups, they are digital acts of reporting corruption allegations cases, flaming the dynasty and cronies, sharing news about corruption, and calling citizens to take action. All these digital acts resemble what Alexandrakis (2016) called 'indirect activism' – that is, it is a mode of resistance enacted by actuating other people to undertake resistance of their own. In the case of on-line activism in Banten, digital acts enacted to activate other people's resistance against the corrupt dynasty are mostly expressed through emotional or affective speeches. Therefore, these digital acts reflect a form of citizenship that I call digital affective citizenship.

Chapter Four is an attempt to answer the question of to what extent online anticorruption activism can be transformed into strong off-line mobilization to curtail leaders of Banten that are deemed corrupt? In this chapter, I argue that online anti-corruption activism expressed through emotional languages (as explored in chapters 3 and 4) has failed to move beyond peoples' sentiments of indignation or anger and as such they could not be transformed into strong off-line mobilizations. In the case of anti-corruption demonstrations, activists were not able to mobilize significant numbers of participants from outside their small friendship networks and their protests were not lead to the curtailment

of corrupt officials. Whereas, in the case of ‘don’t vote for a corrupt family’ campaigns during local elections, most of the voters apparently still give their ballots to the candidates from corrupt dynasties. By making a comparison with an anti-corruption movement organized by Malang Corruption Watch in Malang, I found that, in Banten, the lack of an organizing ability and leadership and the unclear repertoires of contention propagated in unifying symbols or frames are the main factors that contribute to unsuccessful off-line mobilizations. In addition, anti-corruption offline mobilizations in Banten were also, hampered by terrors or threats from the dynasty’s Jawara (thugs or local strongmen) and tamed by bribery from the dynasty’s businessmen cronies.

In the conclusion to this dissertation, I summarize the findings of each chapter and provide some contributions of this dissertation on the discussion on digital citizenship and the public sphere, and the critical assessment of the role of emotions or affects in the transformation of online activism to offline political mobilizations. Through this dissertation, I extend the concept of digital citizenship beyond rational, ethical, and normative online participation to include ‘deviant’ or ‘aberrant’ participation, involving passionate, aggressive, and vitriolic expression. This digital affective citizenship facilitates emotional engagement in an ‘affective public’, a networked public formation mobilized through sentiment expression. In this sense, this dissertation contributes to recognizing an online alternative public sphere.