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Digital Affective Citizenship: @The nexus of on-line and off-line anti-corruption activism in Banten, Indonesia

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
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Muhammad Zamzam Fauzanafi



Digital Affective Citizenship

@The Nexus of On-line and Off-line Anti-Corruption Activism
in Banten, Indonesia



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in Banten, Indonesia**

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List of Abbreviations

| | |
|--------|--|
| AKAK | : Advokasi untuk Komisi Anti-Korupsi ('Advocacy for a Corruption Eradication Commission') |
| AMM | : Aliansi Masyarakat Mentawai ('Mentawai Community Alliance') |
| ALDERA | : Aliansi Demokrasi Rakyat ('The People's Democratic Alliance') |
| APBD | : Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah ('The Regional Budget') |
| ASPRI | : Asisten Pribadi ('Personal Assistants') |
| BCW | : Banten Corruption Watch |
| CSO | : Civil Society Organization |
| DPR | : Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat ('The National Parliament') |
| FBN | : <i>Fesbuk</i> Banten News |
| FITRA | : Forum Indonesia Untuk Transparansi Anggaran ('Indonesian Forum for Budget Transparency') |
| FMPP | : Forum Masyarakat Peduli Pendidikan ('Education Concerned Community Forum') |
| FMPK | : Forum Masyarakat Peduli Kesehatan ('Health Care Community Forum') |
| FOKSAD | : Forum Kajian Sosial dan Budaya ('Forum of Social-Cultural Study') |
| FPSB | : Forum Peduli Sumatera Barat ('West Sumatra Care Forum') |
| FSPP | : Forum Silaturahmi Pondok Pesantren ('Cordiality Forum of Islamic Boarding Schools') |
| FWB | : Forum Warga Banten ('The Citizens Forum of Banten') |
| GeRAK | : Gerakan Anti-Korupsi ('Movement Against Corruption') |
| GMKI | : Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia ('Indonesian Christian Student Movement') |
| GMNI | : Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia ('Indonesian National Student Movement') |
| GOWA | : Government Watch |
| GRP | : Gerakan Rakyat Palembang ('Palembang People's Movement') |

| | |
|---------|---|
| HMI | : Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam ('Islamic Student Association') |
| IAC | : India Against Corruption |
| ICW | : Indonesia Corruption Watch |
| ICT | : Information and Communication Technology |
| IDEA | : Ide dan Analitika Indonesia ('Idea and Analytic Indonesia') |
| IMM | : Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah ('Muhammadiyah Student Association') |
| IPW | : Indonesia Procurement Watch |
| KADIN | : Kamar Dagang dan Indonesia ('Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry') |
| KAK | : Komite Anti-Korupsi ('Anti-Corruption Committee') |
| KAPPI | : Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia ('Indonesian Student Action Front') |
| KMAK | : Koalisi Mahasiswa Anti Korupsi ('Anti-Corruption Student Coalition') |
| KOAK | : Komite Anti Korupsi ('Anti-Corruption Committee') |
| KKN | : Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme ('Corruption, Collusion, Nepotism') |
| KPK | : Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi ('The Corruption Eradication Commission') |
| KRM | : Koalisi Rakyat Menggugat ('The People's Coalition') |
| LAKRI | : Lembaga Anti Korupsi Republik Indonesia ('Anti-Corruption Agency of the Republic of Indonesia') |
| LBH | : Lembaga Bantuan Hukum ('Legal Aid Institute') |
| MCW | : Malang Corruption Watch |
| MTI | : Masyarakat Transparansi Indonesia ('Indonesian Society for Transparency') |
| MUI | : Majelis Ulama Indonesia ('Indonesian Ulama Council') |
| NKK/BKK | : Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/Badan Koordinasi Kemahasiswaan ('Normalization of Campus Life/Bodies for the Coordination of Student Affairs') |
| NU | : Nahdlatul Ulama ('The Renaissance of Ulama') |
| PMII | : Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia ('Indonesian Islamic Student Movement') |
| PMKRI | : Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Indonesia ('Indonesian Catholic Student Association') |
| PPATK | : Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan ('The Centre for Financial Transactions Reporting and Analysis') |
| PPPSBBI | : Persatuan Pendekar Persilatan Seni Budaya Banten Indonesia ('The Indonesian Union of Bantenese Men of Martial Arts, Art, and Culture') |

- PSHKI : Pusat Studi Hukum Kebijakan Indonesia ('Centre of Law and Policy Study')
- RBB : Relawan Banten Bersatu ('Unified Banten Volunteers')
- SMID : Solidaritas Mahasiswa Indonesia untuk Demokrasi ('Indonesian Student Solidarity for Democracy')
- SAMAK : Solidaritas Masyarakat Anti Korupsi ('Anti-Corruption Community Solidarity')
- SORAK : Solidaritas Rakyat Aceh Anti Korupsi ('Acehnese People's Solidarity Against Corruption')
- SOMASI : Solidaritas Masyarakat untuk Transparansi ('Community Solidarity for Transparency')
- TGPTPK : Tim Gabungan Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi ('The Joint Team For Corruption Eradication')
- UNCAC : The United Nations Convention Against Corruption

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Chapter One

Introduction

It was Friday, December 20th, 2013. After seven hours of questioning, The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) officially arrested Banten Governor Ratu Atut Chosiyah for corruption committed during the Lebak Regency election. The arrest was meant to further investigate cases of bribery in the Lebak Regency election dispute also involving Akil Mochtar, the former Constitutional Court Chief Justice, who had been detained earlier. He had allegedly accepted 1 billion rupiah (about 64.000 USD) in bribes from Ratu Atut Chosiyah (Atut) through her younger brother, Tubagus Chaeri Wardana (Wawan), in exchange for a favorable ruling in some regional election disputes. Wawan, - who also happens to be the husband of South Tangerang Mayor Airin Rachmi Diany (Airin), - was already arrested earlier on October 2nd, 2013.

National mainstream media, from national television to national newspapers such as *Kompas* (the biggest and most popular newspaper in Indonesia), and magazines such as *Tempo* (a highly reputable investigative magazine), referred to the event of Ratu Atut and Wawan's detainment as 'the end of the Banten

political dynasty'. Banten political dynasty is a term used to depict the complex network which tied together Ratu Atut's family members who run for the offices and parliaments, businessmen, but also its tie to local strongmen (*jawara*) and other connected political actors.

Meanwhile, In Banten, anti-corruption activist-citizens, who since 2010 had been engaging in anti-corruption campaigns through social-media, shaved their heads as a symbol for 'cleaning up Banten from corruption'. They had been, for more than 10 years, posting and commenting on issues of corruption using mostly harsh, vitriolic, and emotional language through three Facebook page and groups: *Fesbuk Banten News (FBN)*, *Wong Banten* (People of Banten) and *Forum Warga Banten* (Banten Citizens Forum). For several years, corruption allegation cases that they had posted and commented on through these Facebook page and groups included cases of the abuse of social assistance funds (*kasus dana hibah*), inflated or missing funds for medical equipment procurement (*kasus alkes*) and corruption in infrastructure development. Thus, when Ratu Atut and Wawan were arrested for a different case - the bribery case - some of the activist-citizens said that it was more like a 'surprise gift' from the KPK than something they had initially expected or anticipated. This also seems to suggest that the arrests of Ratu Atut and Wawan were not a direct result of those online anti-corruption campaigns. And, in other words, the online campaigns may have been ineffective in curtailing those corrupt leaders of Banten.

The activists, for their part, also did not stop as some may have expected. After Ratu Atut and Wawan were arrested and, in September 2014, sentenced to four years in prison, those same activist-citizens continued to engage in online anti-corruption campaigns calling citizens of Banten not to vote for candidates from Ratu Atut's family in local and national elections. The campaign was vitriolic and highly organized, yet it could not prevent the win of Ratu Atut's family members in those elections. Ratu Atut's sister, brother, and sister-in-law, in 2015, were elected as regents and mayors in some regencies and cities in the province of Banten. At the same time Ratu Atut's husband, stepmother, son, daughter, and daughter-in-law were elected to be parliament members in regency, city, province, and national level.

The election victories of Ratu Atut's family, and the apparent immunity of the dynasty, reflect the problems and challenges faced by activist-citizens engaged in campaigns against corruption. It seems that their campaigns have been able to evoke emotional discourses (such as anger and hatred) online, while these campaigns have failed to generate a strong and sustainable offline political

mobilization. Partly because of this failure, the online activism failed to leave a mark on Banten's politics, as members of Ratu Atut's clan won elections just as easily as before. What this online movement did succeed in doing, however, is helping citizens (*warga*) claim a collective identity by critiquing corrupt leaders (i.e. the Banten political dynasty) through a shared emotional vocabulary and sentiment. This online activism, however, did not produce strong organizations or leaders who could direct the emotional narration of 'not to vote for the dynasty' into actual off-line actions.

This dissertation, prompted by the above observations, studies the characteristics of the online anti-corruption activism in Banten using the theoretical framework of digital citizenship. I study the use of digital-social media in anti-corruption activism as mediators that mobilize and sustain offline political actions and digital-social media as being a site of contest, claim making and formation of particular kinds of citizenship (see Ong 1996, Dahlgren 2009, Isin, 2009, Isin and Ruppert, 2015, McCosker et al., 2016). I explore the interaction between online and offline mobilization, by asking: why did intense online anti-corruption activism in Banten fail to generate effective offline mobilization? This main question is then elaborated into several questions, as follows:

1. What discourses of corruption are constructed through online anti-corruption activism at both local (Banten) and national levels? (Chapter 3)
2. How is anti-corruption activism in Banten being practiced online? (Chapter 4)
3. How is online anti-corruption activism reflective of the character of citizenship in Banten? (Chapter 4)
4. And, to what extent, can this online anti-corruption activism be transformed (or not transformed) into strong off-line mobilization? (Chapter 5)

Digital Citizenship and Social Movements

To address these questions, I will be interpreting the online activism in Banten in relation to the growing literature on digital citizenship (Manuel Castells, 2012, Gerbaudo, 2012, Papa and Milioni, 2013, Postill, 2017), while borrowing terms and concepts from social movement studies. In doing so, I aim to contribute to broader debates within anthropology on anti-corruption movements and on the character of citizenship produced by online activism.

In a discussion of the relationship between citizenship and the role of ICTs, according to Papa and Milioni (2013: 22), Web 2.0 and other social media platforms, like Twitter and Facebook, can provide a variety of forms and chances for citizen participation. Social media platforms, in their view, provide alternative civic resources for citizens' engagement and participation, which in turn can engender new forms of citizenship (Ibid:23). I follow their work by conducting, what Postill (2017:18) defines as 'a non-technocentric research into the novel forms of citizenship [...] that are being constructed within the new (social) movements and the role played by ICTs in such processes'. Here, the term 'new social movements' refers to the emergence of social movements since the 1990s that can be characterized by the intensive use of new information and communication technologies, movements such as the Indignados and Occupy movement (Papa and Milioni, 2013:22).

Joke Hermes argues that the process of construction of new forms of citizenship within the new social movements and through social media involves a great variety of knowledge and activities; including emotions, sensation, and experience of citizens participating in social movements (Hermes, 2006:304). Paulo Gerbaudo calls this involvement of emotions and social media within social movements a 'choreography of the assembly' in which especially social media are used to construct emotional conversations and loose collective identities to transform them into a political passion and collective action (Gerbaudo, 2012:100). The choreography of the assembly, itself, has to be viewed "as a process of the symbolic construction of public space, which revolves around an emotional 'scene-setting and 'scripting' (Alexander et al., 2006: 36) of participants' physical assembling" (Gerbaudo, 2012:12).

Scholars commonly adopt three different approaches to explore the process of social media in facilitating social movement practices. This scholarship can be subdivided into, optimistic, pessimistic and ambivalent or realist approaches where it pertains to the digital affordances in mobilizing citizens and potentially shaping social movements.

The term "techno-optimism" describes strategies that highlight social media's ability to spark the turning point that results in the success of a social movement. In this camp, we can find Manuel Castells (2012), Tufekci and Wilson (2012) and Clay Shirky (2008). Manuel Castell's *Network of Outrage and Hope; Social Movement in The Internet Age* contains one of the strongest arguments for why social media might generate successful social movements. He argues that social media are a kind of multimodal networking that connects between

cyber-space and urban space spontaneously generated by emotions and resulting in leaderless and non-hierarchical organizations (Castells, 2012, Kidd and McIntosh, 2016:786).

Techno-pessimism, conversely, argues that the potential and promises of social media in creating successful social movement are exaggerated, or even, delusional (see Gladwell 2010 and Morozov 2011). For techno-pessimists, social media like Facebook and Twitter are mostly used not for political organizing, but for entertainment and business purposes and they might even create serious risks for activists as social media might be used by state security apparatus to monitor them (see Morozov, 2011)

Techno-ambivalence (or techno-realists) criticizes both techno-optimism and pessimism for their take on the fixed character of social media that is either suitable or unsuitable for citizens' participation and mobilization. Techno-realists see social media as having both the potential and limitations in successfully facilitating social movements. They situate social media in 'specific local geographies of action or to their embeddedness in the culture of the social movements adopting them' (Gerbaudo, 2012:5) Successful online activism are, then, explained as growing from the organic interaction between technology and social, political, and cultural structure and relationships (Lim, 2012).

In this dissertation, I take a techno-realist approach and thus different from interpretations offered by Manuel Castells (2012). He claims that new social movements can be characterized by their cyber and urban space networking and that they are spontaneously generated in moments of outrage. According to Kidd and McIntosh (2016:786), Castells views emotion, especially anger, as the driver of social movement and it goes viral through the network and triggers offline mobilizations without the mediation of leaders or hierarchical organizations. Counter to this position, and following Gerbaudo, I argue that the connection between social media, emotions and social movements does not simply result in a condition of absolute spontaneity and unorganized participation (Gerbaudo 2012:5).

In order to understand how online activism can be successful, it is important to explore how, when, and why online activism can (and cannot) translate into an actual social movement, namely in having a strong offline organization and leadership. I argue, in the same vein as Jasper (2018:149), that online activism can also fail to be transformed into strong offline mobilization because the political organizers were not helping digital citizens to focus their anger, tell stories to explain it and channel it into collective protest rather than individual grievance.

In other words, they did not develop strategic and clear programs grounded in symbols, frames and artifacts (Gerbaudo, 2012:155). At the same time, influential Facebook admins together with digital activists- citizens can, for example, act as ‘soft leaders’ or ‘choreographers’ who help construct an emotional discourse and set the scene that can unfold collective actions (Ibid.5).

Following Gerbaudo and Jasper, I will argue that, within the digital anti-corruption movement of Banten, emotions constructed through Facebook conversations are rarely transformed into strong off-line mobilizations. This is because they are not mediated by solid organizations with strategic and clear programs articulated in various forms of also offline communication.

Meanwhile, in the on-line anti-corruption campaigns in Banten where citizens participation is not expressed through the formal political process and, also, not attached to prior defined formal organizations (Papa and Milioni, 2013:26-27), the Facebook page and groups have been able to ‘facilitate emotional engagement’ (Papacharissi, 2015:18) and create an “affective public” (ibid.) that “invite[s] affective attunement, support affective investment, and propagate affectively charged expression” (Papacharissi, 2016:2). In this sense, digital citizens construct moral-emotional discourses within the public sphere to fight their corrupt and immoral leaders (Lazar 2005). I refer to digitally mediated interaction between citizens and state as ‘digital affective citizenship’.

I define ‘digital affective citizenship’ through elaborating upon the concept of ‘digital act of citizenship’ – i.e., a set of digital acts that designate political subjects emerging from the encounter between citizens and the state (Isin & Ruppert, 2015:). I combine this with ‘affective citizenship’ that focuses on ‘how citizenship ‘takes place’ by emphasizing how it is affective – how it involves emotions, feelings, bodies” (Fortier, 2016: 1040). I define digital affective citizenship as a particular political subjectivity that combines emotions and a sense of powerlessness to affect actual change by criticizing the behaviour of ruling elites. Political subjectivity denotes ‘how a single person or a group of actors is brought into a position to stake claims, to have a voice, and to be recognizable by authorities. (Krause and Schramm, 2011; 130-131).

In the context of Banten, digital affective citizenship is reflected through social media’s distinctive religious or moral emotional discourse constructed by citizens of Banten who have less power and capacity in effectively influencing or taking responsibility for political affairs of their polity, i.e. curtailing corrupt leaders. In this sense, the character of citizenship in Banten is not departing from the formal and normative ideal of citizenship, but coming from digital media

practices, local religious value, and emotional attitude in everyday interactions between citizens and (agent of) state.

Therefore, digital affective citizenship is also a challenge to the predominant normative ethical and rational sense of digital citizenship which Mossberger, Tolbert and McNeal define as 'the ability to participate in society online ... to benefit society as a whole and facilitate the membership and participation of individuals within society' (2008:1). Civic participation in on-line anti-corruption protests in Banten by means of postings and comments that use emotional and vitriolic words do not represent such 'normative', 'ethical', or 'ideal' digital citizenship practiced conceived as rational, impartial, and detached (Mossberger, et, al 2008, Banks, 2008, Hyung, 2010). Digital affective citizenship, in this regard, is not simply a set of rights and responsibilities or appropriate behaviors (Vivianne, et.al 2016:10), but emerges as 'deviant' or 'aberrant' participation (MacCosker 2013: 204) involving the use of passionate, aggressive and vitriolic expression and exchange of sentiments - such as anger, hate, disgust and a sense of injustice.

The Anthropology of Citizenship, Corruption and Anti-corruption movement

The concept of digital affective citizenship is also a contribution to discussions within the anthropology of citizenship which often regards citizenship as bottom-up subject formation (Ong, 1996, Lazar, 2013:2). According to Ong (1996: 737) citizenship is considered as practices and processes of 'self-making or the way citizens make themselves as political subjects (Lazar, 2013, 34, 2013b: 4). As such, anthropological analyses of citizenship depart from more normative definitions of citizenship referring to the legal status of members of a national political community with certain rights and responsibilities (Marshall, 1983). Or those definitions that work toward an analysis of a 'bundle of practices that constitute encounters between the state and citizens' (Lazar, 2008:5). An anthropological analysis of citizenship requires recognition of ordinary people's way of resisting such normative categorizations (Lazar, 2013:5).

Digital affective citizenship, therefore, concerns particular kinds of citizenship produced in the encounter between citizens and the agent of state mediated by digital-social media in emotional anti-corruption campaigns. Here, a discourse of corruption and anti-corruption becomes a key arena for citizens to 'cultivate affectively laden relations to one another and to the state, producing

along the way modes of citizenship [...] and new horizons for collective action' (Muir and Gupta, 2018:510). Hence, affect might be a source of resistance from which posts and comments on social media can be read by researchers as an act of citizenship (Isin, 2008); demand from the citizens to be heard because they have the right to be heard (Di Gregorio and Merolli, 2016:934, 838). Citizens who post and comments about corruption in the three Facebook page and groups in Banten that I have studied are acts and feelings of the affective subject (Fortier, 2010: 25).

Corruption, for the anthropology of citizenship, is a useful analytical category since citizens mobilize the term in various ways to constitute their understanding of the (ab)use of political power (Lazar, 2005:212). By elaborating on local understandings of corruption, we will be able to say something about local understandings of politics and the state (Ibid:213) as well. In Banten, for example, by analyzing conversations in three Facebook page and groups, I found that there is a similarity in how citizens in Banten and those in Bolivia studied by Lazar (2005:213), understand corruption. They similarly perceive corruption as an inclination of those in power to steal public resources for their personal benefit. From that understanding emerges efforts to launch an anti-corruption movement 'in which people assert their collective identity as citizens betrayed by venal politicians who steal public resources' (Lazar, 2005:213).

Moreover, In Indonesia, on the national level, corruption became the main problem to be tackled through the democratization process. In the Soeharto or New Order era (1966-1998), when authoritarian regimes used corruption as one of the ways to maintain power democratization was considered as a panacea (Setiyono et al, 2017: 969). Not surprisingly, the student and people power movement emerged in 1998 to bring down the Soeharto government, using the slogan of 'reformation' (reformasi) and abolish KKN (*korupsi, kolusi dan nepotisme*, corruption, collusion, and nepotism), due to people's dissatisfaction related to chronic and systemic corruption.

Despite the democratic transition that followed Soeharto's stepping-down, however, corruption in various governmental positions and local governments have persisted, if not increased. Indonesia opted to undertake a decentralization policy under Law No. 22, 1999 on "Local Government" after more than 30 years of a highly centralized national administration. According to Usman (2001: ii):

"This law delegated central government powers and responsibilities to local governments in all government administrative sectors except for security

and defence, foreign policy, monetary and fiscal matters, justice and religious affairs. The main objectives of decentralization include promoting the better delivery of government services and the raising of the level of local government accountability.”

The establishment of Banten province in 2000 was part of the decentralization process that unintentionally led to the formation of clientelistic patronage network of local politicians’ family and businessmen and resulted in increasing corruption (Hidayat 2007, Schulte Nordholt and van Klinken, 2007). In this case, democratization may have little impact on corruption eradication, especially while control on officials remains weak. (Robertson-Snape, 1999:601).

Therefore, after the fall of Soeharto, to continue their anti-corruption movement, some student activists decided to form anti-corruption CSOs (Civil Society Organizations) (Setiyono et.al, 2017:974). The anti-corruption movement, in the reformasi era, as it is studied by Setiyono and McLeod (2010), became more formal and organized and focused on legal and institutional reform. They also argue that the CSOs anti-corruption movement, because of its large networks and solid coalitions, has been successful in advocating anti-corruption laws, helping to establish the Corruption Eradication Committee (KPK) and reporting corruption cases to the KPK (see chapter 2).

One decade after the fall of Soeharto, and after the KPK had been established and was working well in identifying corrupt officials, the anti-corruption movement started to use social media in supporting KPK from the attack of predatory elites (Widojoko, 2017). This online anti-corruption movement was well known for its #SaveKPK hashtag which spread through Facebook and Twitter. The first #SaveKPK movement, or ‘Gecko versus Crocodile’ (Cicak versus Buaya) movement, in 2009, was the most popular online anti-corruption movement protecting the KPK from the Police Chief of Detective’s attack. Molaei (2015) argues that this online anti-corruption movement was successful in terms of gaining public attention, raising awareness, and pushing politicians to change policies to support and save the KPK from the attacks of predatory elites. This success was caused by the diffusion of the online movement’s messages into the public sphere and its ability to attract the attention of both public and politicians’ attention (Molaei 2014:100). According to Lim (2013:654), the diffusion and the acceptance of the online anti-corruption movement’s messages were caused by their production and dissemination that aligned with contemporary consumer culture: they were lightly packaged, easily transformed into headlines and had

controversial stories.

An online anti-corruption movement, then, becomes a movement 'from below' addressing corruption as a matter of fighting social injustice and thereby making use of contextual local knowledge. It is organized in horizontal and participatory actions, such as online and street protest, rather than 'top-down' framed in terms of good governance equipped with technical content or implemented from institutions like judiciary authorities, international organizations and programmatic NGOs (Della Porta, 2017:663).

Worldwide, other 'from below' anti-corruption movements have also used on-line strategies. The Arab Spring, in which the role of social media was believed to be prominent, basically was demands for democracy and freedom with the denunciation of corruption of the political elites (Bennet and Segenberg 2013). Inspired by the Arab Spring, The Indignados in Spain and Greece was a reaction against the growing inequalities caused by the corruption of their elected representatives (Della Porta, 2017:677). The use of social media to produce a mass aggregation of individuals protesting corruption also appeared in places as distant and different as Tahrir Square (Cairo), Placa de Catalonia (Barcelona), Syntagma Square (Athens), Zuccotti Park (New York), or Taksim Square (Istanbul) (Bennet and Segenberg 2013).

In Turkey, the Gezi protest of 2013 targeted Erdogan's authoritarian power, which in the protestor's minds, is an imitation of the absolute power of the sultanate (Atak and Della Porta, 2016). In Ukraine, in the same year, the protest at Maidan Square also addressed authoritarian and centralized regimes of power that also enriched oligarchy in the president's circles (Della Porta, 2017:675). In the USA, the Occupy Wall Street protest, which also involved the heavy use of social media has also condemned corruption in terms of collusion of politicians with large corporations (Della Porta, 2007). In Madrid, the Puerto del Sol demonstration included the fight against corruption and demand for political transparency by the creation of a mechanism of control by the citizens (Della Porta, 2017:677). In Malaysia, the Bersih movement, organized by opposition party leaders and NGOs with support by bloggers and citizen journalists online, mobilized 40,000 citizens demanding clean and fair elections (Johns and Cheong, 2019: 1).

One of the anti-corruption movements that important to be discussed here, is Anna Hazare's anti-corruption movement in India. This case is a contribution to the study of transformation of online activism to off-line mobilization and its limitations. Anna Hazare, a social activist, began a hunger strike in 2011 to

demand a strong anti-corruption law and independent ombudsman (Jan Lokpal Bill). This anti-corruption campaign had a significant online presence, which translated into offline activism in the form of sizable protests and open forums in Mumbai and New Delhi (Harindranath and Khorana, 2014:69). In less than four days, Anna Hazare's 'fast unto death' movement had already gained 116,000 fans on Facebook and 5,600 followers on Twitter supporting the movement (Shah, 2011). These social media platforms were managed by a team that self-proclaimed as 'civil society' group of 'Janlokalpal' (after their Jan Lokpal Bill movement) (Harindranath and Khorana, 2014:63).

There were five discursive categories classified from #Janlokalpal twitter posts. These were: first, the discursive construction of Anna Hazare's movement; India Against Corruption (IAC) as "citizen's movement", rather than an NGO or a registered organization, against the villainous enemy, i.e. the nation-state/government (Ibid: 64). Second, condemnation to the government's arms for using violence in dealing with off-line demonstration (ibid). Third, mentions of Gandhian methods of 'peaceful protests/demonstration' as being a fundamental citizen's right, but with the exclusion of rural and lower-class citizens from the protests (Ibid: 64-65). Fourth, mentions of the mainstream media as mediators between the movement and the general public (ibid:65). The fifth point refers to the movement's efforts to set itself apart from any formally formed political or non-governmental organization and to identify itself on social media as a unique civil society movement with a well-known leader (ibid). From these five discursive categories, it can be interpreted that corruption and anti-corruption movement itself was constructed as rational-legal-institutional discourse. Such a kind of discourse was more effectively translated into large off-line political mobilization with the help of strong leadership and effective organizations.

However, in the year since a big protest in Ramlila, Hazare's movement has lost steam (Sengupta, 2014: 407). This floundering of Anna Hazare's movement is, apparently, related to the construction of corruption in term of legal discourse that only become a middle-class citizens' issue. Hazare defined corruption narrowly as 'just a matter of legality, of financial irregularity and bribery', and not as 'the currency of a social transaction in an egregiously unequal society, in which power continues to be concentrated in the hands of a smaller and smaller minority' (Roy, 2011). Hazare ignored the wider social context, so his anti-corruption movement was only targeted 'evil politician and government corruption' (ibid.) Accordingly, Hazare had been silent on issues, like "illegal mining and land acquisition for special economic zones, where marginal

farmers and indigenous communities were hurt by corruption, rather than the urban middle class, which is Hazare's primary base of support" (Sengupta, 2014: 408). Therefore, Anna Hazare anti-corruption's mass mobilizations started to wane, since they were limited and only supported by 'the urban capitalist class' (Harindranath and Khorana, 2014:67).

All of these 'from below anti-corruption movements' have been studied as relatively successful cases of digital activism. From the Arab Spring (M. Lim, 2012; Tufeci & Wilson, 2012) to Occupy (Donovan, 2018), Indignados (Gerbaudo, 2012; Siopera, 2016), to Anna Hazare's anti-corruption movement (Harindranath and Khorana, 2014, Sengupta, 2014), the success of social movements was linked to their capacity to "shape repertoires of contention, frame the issues, propagate unifying symbols, and transform online activism to offline protest" through social media (M. Lim, 2012:231). Conversely, in this dissertation, I will study a less successful case, that is the anti-corruption activism in Banten. Facilitated by social media, the anti-corruption movement in Banten also indicates the notion of such anti-corruption movement 'from below' as it is contextualized in local understandings of corruption. Reflecting on those success stories of anti-corruption movements mentioned above, I study the transformation of online anti-corruption campaigns to offline protests in Banten and the reflection of a characteristic of digital citizenship through that anti-corruption activism.

Method: Doing Social Media Ethnography

The main method used in this study is 'social media ethnography' (Postill and Pink, 2012). Through interviews and participation, it examines the materiality of being online (postings, comments, images, online interviews) in relation to the issues of corruption and anti-corruption campaigns as well as offline contacts with actors (administrators, members, followers).-participation in anti-corruption movements' offline actions (meetings, protests, and marches).

Doing social media ethnography is a way to make connections between online and locality-based realities that enables us to follow the (dis)continuities between social media anti-corruption movement and face-to-face experiences (Postill and Pink, 2012:2). This is part of a process of making 'ethnographic places' (Pink, 2009). Ethnographic places are not 'bounded localities, communities, or territories (although physical localities might be part of or associated with them) but collections and relations between things and processes that become intertwined' (Postill and Pink, 2012:5), and they are clustered or intensities of

things of which both localities and socialities are elements (Ibid: 2) (*see also* Hine, 2015).

In this dissertation, I regard the three Facebook page and groups (Fesbuk Banten News, Wong Banten, and Forum Warga Banten) and the Banten region itself as my 'ethnographic places'. Those three Facebook page and groups are selected because they display intensities of on-line materials (postings and comments) related to anti-corruption campaigns. In September of 2013, when I started to search for postings or conversations with the keyword 'korupsi' (corruption) on the Internet, these three Facebook page and groups stood out in the results. This was happening, also, because at that very same time Ratu Atut and Wawan were arrested by the KPK on allegation of involvement in the aforementioned bribery case. Various national mainstream media made reports about the incident, while social media; like those Facebook page and groups, exchanged political posts and comments that created intensive conversations between, mostly, citizens of Banten. And then, the second 'ethnographic place' is Banten, both at the provincial and district level, where off-line activities of anti-corruption campaigns took place. Banten, here, is not considered as a bounded physical territory or administrative region, but as a place where 'intensities' of anti-corruption campaigns in social media traverse into offline actions or vice-versa.

By doing social media ethnography, In addition to designing the three Facebook page and groups and Banten as "ethnographic places" (Pink, 2009), I am also changing the methodological emphasis from network and community models to one that is centered on routines, mobilities, and socialities. (Pink, 2008, Postill 2008, 2011, Pink and Postill, 2012). In other words, I study the 'intensities' of social media activity and sociality related to the anti-corruption activism in Banten that spans online and offline activities, in order to engage in a nuanced and contextualized ethnography of Banten's anti-corruption activism. This kind of research is an anthropological critique of the works using dominant terms such as 'network' (see Castells, 1996, 2001) and 'online communities' (Kozinets, 2010). In ethnographic research on the Internet and social media, the term network is avoided since it is too dispersed, wide and partial in understanding social media activity and social relation deeply (Miller and Slater 2000, Postill, 2008) and endow too much power to the technological network perse. Social media ethnography also shifts the focus from the study of online communities (Kozinets, 2010), which focus on mere co-presence and membership in a particular category of community, to digital socialities that

'attends to the qualities of social relationship rather than their being part of community (Postill and Pink, 2012: 5)

Using this method, I participate in the three Facebook page and groups mentioned: Fesbuk Banten News, Wong Banten and Forum Warga Banten keeping up-to-date and collaborating in social media discussions. It involves more than just keeping an eye on these social media platforms; it also involves using them as a "ethnographic place of the field site." (Postill and Pink, 2012:6). This method is similar to Hine's ethnography for the Internet (2015) that moved away from studying online presence as the 'virtual' to how the internet has become 'everyday, embodied, and embedded' (E3). This E3 internet involves multi-sited and mobile methods in which the ethnographer follows participants when they move in between online and offline sites (Barendregt, 2017: 310). Accordingly, I study the three Facebook page and groups in Banten in comparison with on-line anti-corruption activism of anti-corruption CSOs at national level and local NGO in Malang; Malang Corruption Watch (MCW).


Social media ethnography consists of overlapping sub-practices that are: catching up, sharing, exploring, interacting and archiving (Postill and Pink, 2012:6). Catching up means joining and following those Facebook pages and groups. For me, it also meant following the links, threads, and other social media sites related to them and to the issue of corruption. Catching-up intertwines with another practice that is 'sharing'. Digital sharing is a research practice that will influence and intensify the socialities of digital ethnographic places that are formed. Interacting with other members of the Facebook group, or followers of Facebook pages, from simply hitting 'like' buttons on others status, comment, posting, or note, to other on-line encounters through discussions on the issues of corruption and how it deals with their subject position as citizens. The last (sub) practice is archiving. Materials or contents resulting from catching up, sharing and interacting process were captured, with help of Ncapture provided by Nvivo 10 qualitative research software, stored and coded. These materials were analyzed for their word frequency (Ryan & Bernard 2003, Cidell, 2010, McNaught and Lam 2010, Baralt et al. 2011, Gardner 2017). This is also facilitated by Nvivo 10 software. Using a word-counting technique postings and comments in Facebook pages and groups are condensed to highlight dominant words and themes in people's statements related to corruption (Ryan & Bernard 2003:06-97). The frequency of words usage in texts are then represented through word cloud visualization providing us with an overview of the dominant themes in the overall discourse (McNaught & Lam 2010:630, Gardner, 2017:5). Moreover,

to understand how those dominant words related to the stem word 'korupsi' (corruption), I make use the word clusters analysis to contextualized and emphasized that the meaning of 'korupsi' is related and connected to certain concepts (Ryan & Bernard 2003).

Furthermore, to make connections between online and offline experiences or to follow the continuities and, also discontinuities, between social media anti-corruption campaigns and locality-based activities, I also did 12 months of fieldwork in Banten divided into two phases. In the first phase, from August 2014 to January 2015, I conducted face to face interviews with the administrators and members of Fesbuk Banten News, Wong Banten, and Forum Warga Banten, who are actively engaged in anti-corruption campaigns to understand their views on corruption and motifs in involving in the campaigns. I also, participated in and observed activities related to anti-corruption initiatives, such as discussions, both formal and informal, on the topic of corruption, meetings and declarations against corruption, and street demonstrations to fight corruption. I also interviewed 'leaders' and some participants of the demonstrations to recall Facebook's members' and administrators' understanding and feelings toward issues of corruption framed in the demonstrations, To cover all these offline encounters, I moved from one place to another in Banten province, including the City of Serang, Serang Regency, City of Cilegon, Pandeglang Regency, Lebak regency, and the City of South Tangerang.

In the second phase, from July 2015 to December 2015, I focused on following the events of local elections in Serang Regency and the city of South Tangerang, where Ratu Atut's sister (Ratu Tatu Chasanah) and sister-in-law (Airin Rachmy Diani) were candidates. In this regard, I followed both the campaigns of Ratu Tatu and Airin and the 'not vote for corrupt/dynasty family' campaigns on Facebook and related offline events. I, also, conducted interviews, both in formal and informal settings, with the candidates themselves, voters, their 'tim sukses' (success teams, or informal non-party organizations of brokers whose job is to mobilize voters), and participants of anti-corrupt/dynasty family campaigns. This way, I could deeply analyze the strategies of both camps in mobilizing the voters and understanding the connection and disconnection between on-line campaigns and offline mobilizations in those local elections.

Additionally, to make a small comparison with an anti-corruption movement that was proven successful, in June 2018 I visited Malang to meet with NGO activists of Malang Corruption Watch (MCW) and citizens who actively participate in the movement.



Map 1. Cities and Regencies in Banten Province, Indonesia

(Sources: <https://peta-hd.com/peta-banten/>)

The Ethnographic Places

They are three categories of ‘ethnographic places’ where this research is conducted. First are social media ‘places’ where ‘citizens’ (*warga*) intensely engage in anti-corruptions campaigns through postings and comments opinions on the issue of corruption in Banten. They are: “Forum Warga Banten Facebook Group”, “Wong Banten Facebook Group”, “Fesbuk Banten News Page”. Secondly, the province of Banten where political dynasty and corruptions are intertwined and have received public attention, particularly on social media. Thirdly, as a place of comparison, Malang Raya where a local anti-corruption non-governmental organization; Malang Corruption Watch (MCW), is actively working and relatively successful in combating corruption.

Fesbuk Banten News, Wong Banten, and Forum Warga Banten

Fesbuk Banten News was founded in 2010 by a freelance journalist, Lulu Jamaludin, a lawyer and politician, Agus Setyawan, and an entrepreneur, Andi

Suhud, without Fesbuk Banten News having any formal or legal status. In 2016, according to its Facebook Insights statistic, Fesbuk Banten News's weekly total reach was more than 100,000 people (the number of people who have seen any content associated with the page), and on average 5,000 people engaged with it per week. Although it is not exclusively dedicated to covering news on corruption and the Banten dynasty, this Facebook account opened a space for citizen journalists,¹ called 'dulur FBN' (friends of FBN) to make postings and comments on the corruption and dynasty's activities and policies. It was also Fesbuk Banten News that posted news that mentioned the words "corruption" and "dynasty" for the first time since Ratu Atut Chosiyah became a vice governor in 2000. This post appeared on December 12, 2010 with the title: "*Banten Corruption Watch: Kebijakan Dinasty Gubernur Banten Mengarah Ke Tindak Korupsi*" (Banten Corruption Watch: The Governor of Banten's Dynasty Policies Lead To Acts of Corruption). This post was a report on an event, a discussion held by Banten Corruption Watch (BCW), featuring opinions from Teguh Iman Prasetya (an anti-corruption activist and coordinator of BCW) and Gandung Ismanto, a scholar from Untirta (the University of Sulta Ageng Tirtayasa, Serang, Banten) who is also well-known for his critical view toward the Banten political dynasty. Although this post was not the most commented on or liked (it got 101 comments and 52 likes), it had the longest time span of any post on Fesbuk Banten News.

Wong Banten is a Facebook group launched in 2010 by a Chinese Muslim entrepreneur, Iwan Subakti, and which has been joined by 14,718 members, most of whom are scholars, journalists, writers, artists, NGO activists, and 'ordinary citizens' of Banten. Most of the active members seem to know each other


1) Citizen journalism, in one of the most oft-cited definitions, is defined as 'the act of a citizen, or group of citizens, playing an active role in the process of collecting, reporting, analyzing and disseminating news and information. The intent of this participation is to provide independent, reliable, accurate, wide-ranging and relevant information that a democracy requires.' (Bowman and C. Willis, 2003, in Isin and Rupert, 2015: 144). The internet and social media now make the participation of audiences becomes part of journalism, in which those audiences become actively participate in news production and they are no longer passive recipients of information (Isin and Rupert; 2015:144). The use of internet and social media in citizens production of knowledge about events, such as Fesbuk Banten News, have shifted professional journalism portrayed as 'a knowing subject that is detached, unemotional, neutral, unbiased, and independent' to citizen journalism that 'passionate, attached, affective, and biased yet fair reporting can result from journalistic subjectivity' (Blaagaard, 2013: 194, in Isin and Ruppert, 2015: 145)

and may have been involved in activities of a literacy organization, *Rumah Dunia*,² Wong Banten was not set up as a formal organization. This Facebook group wasn't exclusively aimed at discussing corruption. It is, rather, intended to be a space for "*all of the Jawara from Banten, those being Jawara in the fields of education, social, cultural, health, environment, technology, and the economy, and all of the Warga (citizens) of Banten who want to participate in the development or follow the progression of Banten,*" as stated in the 'description' section of the Wong Banten Facebook group. *Jawara*, as discussed in the following chapters, has had a variety of connotations throughout history, from their mythical origins as bodyguards of kings and *ulama* (religious leaders), to their mobilization as instigators of rebellions, criminals, and village heads, and as security personnel for political parties and the ruling elite (Pribadi, 2013: 315). "*Wong Banten tries to deconstruct 'jawara' to be a kind of 'ahli' (expert) or somebody who has capabilities in different fields,*" said Gol A Gong, a founder of *Rumah Dunia*, a famous novelist and literacy activist, and one of Wong Banten's most active members. Corruption has always been the primary field in which members of the Wong Banten Facebook group vigorously challenge and discuss it. The anti-corruption campaign usually intensifies during election periods in response to the candidacies of members of the Ratu Atut family (a Banten political dynasty) for regional leadership positions and legislative seats.

Lastly, Forum Warga Banten is a Facebook group founded in 2013 by Sanusi, a former NGO activist and publisher from Ciputat, South Tangerang, Banten. The forum was created as a response to the Ratu Atut and Wawan corruption scandals. As such, most of the postings and comments on Forum Warga Banten enunciate anti-corruption and are part of a wider anti-dynasty campaign. In 2016, Forum Warga Banten had 16,706 members. As stated in its description section, Forum Warga Banten is the one that explicitly uses the term 'warga' or 'citizens' as its name and ideal concept. *Warga* is conceived as not only people who are born and live in Banten, but also "*all people who have concerns and interests in the better future of, dignified, and humanized Banten*", They are also regarded as "*the owner of sovereignty and have the right to speak and assembled in channeling the aspirations and opinions*", and as subjects who "*have the right and obligation to control the government as those who get the mandate to build a life that is prosperous, fair,*

2) *Rumah Dunia* is a literacy organization in a sense that they organize writing and reading activities, such as novel and short story writing workshops, reciting poetry, publishing books, books' bazaar and discussion, and establishing and supporting local community libraries.

Anti- Banten Political Dynasty Facebook (*Fesbuk Banten News*) Fans Geo-visualization



Map 2. Locations and numbers of Fesbuk Banten News, Wong Banten, and Forum Warga Banten ' Active Members.

(Created by author using Nvivo 10 Geovisualization of Social Media Data)

and civilized” (About Forum Warga Banten, March 28, 2013). According to that description, postings and comments in *Forum Warga Banten* are not specific on issues of corruption. However, since its inception shortly after Ratu Atut and Wawan were arrested by KPK as suspects in a bribery case in the Lebak regent’s election in December 2013, the majority of postings and comments in Forum Warga Banten have been about corruption and dynasty issues.

Anti-corruption campaigns through Fesbuk Banten News, Wong Banten, and Forum Warga Banten are mostly participated in by the middle class living in urbanized areas. The map below shows that the capital of Banten province, Serang (21.228), has the highest number of active members on the three Facebook page and groups. Then it follows by Jakarta (10.251), Bekasi (8700), Cilegon (7314), Tangerang (4129), Pandeglang (2283), Bandung (2201), Rangkasbitung (896), Cilegon (449), and Anyer (406). There are almost no active members from the south part of Banten, e.g., Labuhan and Sumur, which are mostly villages with poor people and poor infrastructure. According to Masaaki and Hamid (2008:130), those are the rural poor areas where most of the people vote for Ratu Atut and her family in exchange for money (money politics).

Banten Province: Dynasty, Clientelism, Corruptions

The second category of ethnographic place is Banten Province. Banten was established as a new province in Indonesia on 4th October, 2000. Banten had a long history as an autonomous region during the reign of a Sultanate (1552-1809) with the same name. In 1817, however, Banten lost its autonomy when the Dutch colonial government abolished the sultanate. It became a residency (Khatib Mansur 2001:531). During the Soeharto era, according to Law no.5/1974, Banten was established as one of several regencies under the Province of West Java (Hidayat, 2007:206). Although Banten is situated close to Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia, it was considered a 'backward area' (*daerah tertinggal*), and had West Java's lowest levels of education and public welfare. This situation triggered some elites in Banten to set up a movement for establishing Banten as a separate province. After a long struggle, starting in the late 1950s, and resurrected in early 1999, under the spell of decentralization, on 4th October 2000, the National Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, DPR-RI) passed Law no.23/2000 on Establishment of the Province of Banten. The new province consisted of four regencies: Serang, Pandeglang, Lebak, Tangerang, and two Cities: Tangerang, and Cilegon. In 2007 and 2008 two cities were added to the province - Serang and Tangerang Selatan.

The establishment of Banten Province indicates the flaws inherent in decentralization. The decentralization process in Indonesia led to the establishment of clientelist patronage in a decentralized form, thereby replacing Soeharto's previous centralized patronage networks (Hadiz 2004, Fukuoka 2013). In Banten, decentralization has resulted in the emergence of the so-called "Banten political dynasty". It is a term that refers to the patrimonial and clientelist networks of local political 'strong men' (*jawara*) with business associations (Syarif Hidayat, 2007), which have resulted in increasing corruption among local officials and political transactions (money politics), particularly during the election campaigns (Schulte Nordholt and Van Klinken, 2007:17).

The process of building the dynasty can be traced back to the New Order era, when Chasan Schohib started his local business network using his power and network with the military, a political party (the Golkar Party), and local strongmen (*Jawara*). Ratu Atut Chosiyah, former governor of Banten, and her brother, Wawan, are prominent figures in the dynasty. However, their late father, Chasan Schohib, was actually the one who started to build the 'dynasty' by playing the role of Banten's main businessman who secretly controlled the government and parliament (Syarif Hidayat, *ibid*).

Chasan Shohib managed to 'take care of two organizations of Bantenese informal leaders; *ulama*³ and *jawara*⁴, in line with political and business power. His construction company, PT Sinar Ciomas Raya, established in 1967, frequently wins government contracts without formal tender for road and market construction projects. His business power has led him to positions in associations such as the Regional and Central Chambers of Commerce and Trade (Kamar Dagang dan Industri, Kadin) and the Indonesian National Contractor's Association (*Gabungan Pelaksana Konstruksi Nasional Indonesia*, Gapensi). He also put his men, including some *jawara*, on these associations' executive committees at the local level. Chasan utilized them to oversee projects in the Banten region since Kadin and Gapensi certificates are required for government procurement, which increased his wealth and authority. (Masaaki and Hamid, 2008: 117).

In 2001, when Ratu Atut won the local elections as the vice governor of Banten, Chasan had direct access to intervene in the political decision on local budgeting and was able to compete in obtaining local projects that resulted in advantages for his businesses (Hidayat 2007). This political dynasty became stronger when Ratu Atut was elected as governor of Banten for two periods (2007–2012 and 2012–2017), and the rest of her family members also assumed some important positions in the local government apparatus such as city mayor (his sister-in-law), vice city mayor (his stepbrother), district parliament members (sister, son-in-law, stepmothers), and national parliament members (husband and son). Wawan himself never took up an official position in political or public offices. He rather preferred to focus on developing the 'dynasty's business kingdom' through racketeering government projects. He managed 12 family companies and 24 'network' companies that mostly worked in the fields of infrastructure, education, and medical equipment procurement. In this sense, Ratu Atut and Wawan are continuing their father's legacy to build a patrimonial and clientelist regime in Banten.

The 'Banten political dynasty' has successfully retained the governorship and other public and political positions by 'allowing its members and supporters to consolidate their politico-economic power and sustain their benefit-producing

3) The term "ulama" is used more broadly to describe Islamic intellectuals and religious figures (Masaaki and Hamid, 2008).

4) *Jawara* in Banten have demonstrated a long continuity in the various roles, from their mythical beginnings as the bodyguards of kings and ulama, as rebel leaders, as criminals, as village heads, to their mobilization as security guards for political parties and the ruling elite (Pribadi, 2013: 315). *Jawara* is also identical with *pendekar*, or somebody who masters traditional martial arts.

system by exploiting the provincial budget' (Masaaki and Hamin 2008: 137). That is why Dahnil Anzar, an economist and anti-corruption activist, uses a different term for it, namely "Rent Seeker Dynasty" (Dinasti Rente). According to Anzar (2014:17) the dynasty has three different modes of milking the provincial budget: First, using their own companies to take projects from government budgets by lowering the quality of the tasks, they typically make 20–30% profit. Second, entrusting the project to members of the dynasty's cartels in exchange for a fee equal to 20–30% of the overall project value. Third, with a commitment charge of 1-2 percent and various company names.

Additionally, according to Iman Noer, who has also tried to get projects from the provincial government, the 'dynasty' also has a different method of marking up the price and adding the project to the draft of the provincial budget (RAPBD):

"I was involved in a plan to build a multimedia lab. In my calculations, the price per unit of the lab was 300 to 400 million. When it was sent to Wawan, the price scaled up to \$1.3 billion per unit. And then that number was listed in the government budget. It means that it was approved by the parliament" (Interview, 23 December 2013).

The story of Lulu Kaking is the best illustration of this relationship. He was one of Chasan Sochib's cadre. Lulu Kaking is the son of Kaking, a former regent of Serang in the 1960s, whom Chasan Sochib used to work for. Kaking was also the one who helped Chasan Sochib start his own business. To show his gratitude to the late Kaking, when Chasan Sochib ran his own business, setting up his 'political dynasty', and gaining economic and political power, he gave Kaking's son, Lulu Kaking, a lot of projects. "*There is hearsay spreading that even Chasan Sochib allocated money for Lulu Kaking at 300 million rupiah (about 19,000 USD) per year,*" said Ucu Gabriel, a former journalist at Bantenlik.com. As a return, Lulu Kaking gave his support to Chasan Sochib and his 'dynasty'.

After Chasan Sochib passed away, Lulu Kaking supported Ratu Atut and Wawan. He is the faithful ally of the 'dynasty'. In the beginning of 2000, Chasan Sochib installed Lulu Kaking at KADIN of Banten (the Banten Regional Central Chambers of Commerce and Trade). He even became the caretaker of the head of KADIN when Wawan, who elected to be the head of KADIN and replaced Chasan Sochib, was arrested by the KPK in 2013. Now Lulu Kaking is vice chairman of the organization, membership, and governance of KADIN. Lulu Kaking has his

own company, PT Lulu Kaking. This company acquired some projects from the regional budget of Banten (APBD) through Wawan's connection. As a return, Lulu Kaking gave his support to the 'dynasty'. He was one of the supporters of the Unified Banten Volunteers (Relawan Banten Bersatu, RBB) that played an important role in triumphing Ratu Atut in the election. Ratu Atut and Wawan were banned from going abroad due to the allegation of bribing Akil Muchtar. Lulu Kaking mobilized 'pendekar' (martial art expert) or 'jawara', to visit Chasan Sochib's grave as a symbolic act and showing of their force in supporting Atut and Wawan. Until now, even after Ratu Atut and Wawan were arrested, Lulu Kaking was still loyal to the 'dynasty' and held his position in the RBB, KADIN, and 'pendekar' or 'jawara' organizations.

As a religiously (Islam) associated region, like Aceh and Madura, Banten has many traditions and customs linked with religious leadership, such as *Ulama* and *Jawara* (Pribadi, 2014:314; see above). Chasan Sochib started to build his political dynasty by establishing a clientelistic network with the *Ulama* and *Jawara*. He managed to make himself one of the executive committee members of the *Satkar Ulama* (Ulama Works Squad) and the general chairman of the *Satkar Pendekar/Jawara* (The Martial Artist Work Squad).

Chasan Sochib often called himself a 'jawara', even though he has no affiliation with any martial art school (*perguruan silat*). However, he was the one who used *Jawara* as a part of his strategies for gaining economic and political power. There are many stories told that before Chasan Sochib set up his 'dynasty', he often came to Banten's government office guarded by at least two people dressed in black and armed with *goloks* (a traditional machete-like knife) threatening the government officials in order to get projects. It was also rumored that before 2006 election day, when Ratu Atut was paired with Masduki to be the first vice governor of Banten, *jawara*, as always, dressed in black and armed with *golok*, "secured" the parliament, and two to three *jawara* 'guarded' each parliamentarian's car (Masaaki and Hamid, 2008: 123). They were members of a *jawara* organization, founded by Chasan Sochib, called '*Persatuan Pendekar Persilatan Seni Budaya Banten Indoensia (PPPSBBI)/The Indonesian Union of Bantenese Men of Martial Arts, Art, and Culture*'. Due to its very long name, most people in Banten called it "*Markas Komando (Mako) Pendekar*", or just simply '*pendekar*' (martial art experts). *Jawara* and *Pendekar* then became identical.

PPPSBBI is an affiliation of different martial arts schools (*perguruan silat*). According to Masaaki and Hamid (2008:117), during the election, PPPSBBI mobilized 122 affiliated *silat schools* in Banten to support Golkar alongside the

military and police. Other resources mentioned that PPPSBBI only consisted of 11 *silat* schools.

However, Hidayat (2007, 205) mentioned that “not all *jawara* in Banten are ‘pure *jawara*’ (*jawara murni*). He maintained that some of them are businessmen with a tremendous interest in gaining access to the resources and projects managed by the local government (ibid.). They are so-called ‘*jawara-pengusaha*, or *jawara*-businessman, who make use of their status as *jawara* to exercise force and as businessmen to maximize their financial resources (ibid.

This is a clientelistic relationship between ‘the dynasty’ and *Jawara*, especially with the elites. They are following and supporting ‘the dynasty, and as a return, they get some projects as (sub) contractors, received a share of his profits, or became bureaucrats (Masaaki and Hamid, 2008:188). For example, a former secretary general of PPPSBBI headquarters (2000), Kasmiri Assabudu, owned a construction company that got subcontracts from ‘the dynasty’ companies. Mas Santoso, the 2008 secretary general of PPPSBBI in Serang district, joined the local bureaucracy and later became head of Serang’s district sanitation department (ibid.).

For non-elites *Jawara*, it seems that there are different mechanisms and relations with ‘the dynasty’. As Gandung Ismanto has observed during the elections of 2006 and 2011, RBB (the Unified Banten Volunteers) is basically a network of *jawara* based in city kampongs and villages aimed at supporting candidates from the dynasty. “*They got salaries for their services during the election. And in the ‘normal’ time, they will work to secure projects handled by the dynasty’s companies or its affiliations,*” said Gandung. Ucu Gabriel, a local journalist, also told a similar story: that there are some *jawara* who work with ‘the dynasty’ on a daily basis as a kind of ‘intelligence scouting conditions and potential threats to ‘dynasty’. They get a monthly payment for the job. Others *Jawara* would regularly visit Chasan Sochib, when he was still alive, and hand in ‘proposals’ asking for money to support their activities.

As it was mentioned earlier, Chasan Sochib was a hub for *Golkar* to get support from local leaders and the grassroots. *Ulama* are one of the local leaders that need to be involved to support its power. In 2000, Chasan Sochib was even elected as the general chairman of Satkar Ulama, and in 2011, he was re-elected in the same position. As general chairman, Chasan Sochib was the leader of 29 Satkar Ulama in every province in Indonesia. His son-in-law, or Ratu Atut’s husband, was also elected as his first chief (ketua I).

Despite the fact that Chasan Sochib and his son-in-law were chosen as

leaders of *Satkar Ulama*, the role of ulama in supporting the ‘dynasty’ was not as prominent as that of *jawara*. In the 2006 election, *Satkar Ulama* was involved as part of *the* success team) of Ratu Atut. However, generally, they were more or less placed as figures to grab mass attention and ‘sign’ that the ‘dynasty’ was caring toward ulama and that the ulama also supported them. As noted by Gandung Ismanto, the cholar from UNTIRTA (Tirtayasa University, Banten), *ulama became a source of traditional legitimation for the dynasty*’.

In the 2011 election, According to Gandung Ismanto, the ‘dynasty’ used a different strategy to get support from ulama and their followers by focusing on *ulama* in ‘pengajian’ (Islamic study circles or groups) outside ‘*pesantren*’ (Islamic boarding school). The reason is that ulama in Pegajian have more *jamaah* (followers) who reside in specific areas in Banten and hold the status of ‘*warga*’ (citizens) of Banten, who mostly have a right to vote. While in *pesantren*, most of the students come from outside Banten and have no right to vote.

In addition, the ‘dynasty’ also gave support to formal organizations of ulama by providing them with *dana hibah* (discretionary grants from Banten’s provincial budget). Among many other organizations, NU (*Nahdlatul Ulama*), Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), and Forum *Silaturahmi Pondok Pesantren* (FSPP, or Cordiality Forum of Islamic Boarding Schools) were those that received the grants. In the year 2011, NU was granted 5 billion Rupiah (about 322.000 USD) to build its office. MUI received 8.4 billion rupiah (about 542.000 USD) for the first phase and 770 million rupiah (about 49.000 USD) for the second tranche. Meanwhile, FSPP received the grant amounting to 2.5 billion rupiah (about 161.000 USD).

Eka Setialaksamana, an anti-corruption activist and member of The Election Supervisory Body of Banten (*Bawaslu, Badan Pengawas Pemilu*), said that NU, to show their gratitude to the ‘dynasty’, chose Andika Harzumi, Ratu Atut’s son, to be the head of ANSOR, the youth organization of NU.

Most anti-corruption and anti-dynasty activists, scholars, and journalists believe that awarding *dana hibah* (discretionary grants) to those *ulama* organizations and other institutions is part of the ‘dynasty’ effort to ‘buy’ their support, especially during the elections.

However, as mentioned above, it is also believed that the biggest support in the elections came not from these organizations but from “*warga biasa*” (ordinary citizens) through vote-buying practices.

In the 2006 election, Masaaki and Hamid (2008:130) noted that *Tim Sukses* of Atut relied on 65% of the people in Banten who were considered pragmatic,

or ready to barter their vote for money. Those were the rural poor, who mostly dwelled in the south part of Banten. The Atut team used a system called '*sistem jual beli*' (sell-buy vote-getting system). The team chose five people as vote pollsters for each TPS (Tempat Pemungutan Suara/Polling Station) and provided each with a campaign slush fund according to the number of voters they were expected to buy. If, in a given TPS, the number of votes for Atut exceeded the number that was expected, any leftover money does not need to be returned to the electioneer. Another method of buying votes usually used in every election and practiced by Atut *Tim Sukses* in the 2006 election was '*serangan fajar*' (dawn attack), meaning the buying of votes at the dawn of the day of the election. Atut spent approximately 300 billion rupiah (about 19.4 million USD) in total, of which 70% took the form of provincial projects geared to support Atut (Masaaki and Hamid; *ibid.*).

Eka Satialaksamana, a member of Bawaslu (the election supervisory body) of Banten, found the same method used in the 2011 governor's election in Banten, including the *serangan fajar* (dawn attack) method. "*I woke up in the morning and found money in the envelope with a picture of the candidates in it. They will not be confused about to whom they will give their votes*". However, it was not easy to report money-related politics to the court, he said. It is because money-politics is in the domain of criminal law: "*We have witnesses, or the money, but we do not have people who received it. They will not testify*". Added Eka.

The other method, according to Eka, as has also been mentioned above, was by utilizing meetings, or *pengajian* (Islamic preaching or study circles), where a lot of people gathered and devoted themselves to a figure of an *ulama*, sometimes with the appearance of the candidate. In the end of the *pengajian*, *Jamaah* was provided with '*uang transport*' (transport money) in the envelope with a picture of the candidate dressed in the same attire used in the ballot paper.

Nur Baety, an entrepreneur woman who lives in Serang, also saw this in the 2011 election: "*In my (housing) complex, the one who distributed money from Atut to the voters, in the end of the election, got a new car, while the voters got 50.000 rupiah (about 3 USD)*". The reason why the voter received the money and voted for Atut was because "*Bu Atut is caring to us; when she gave me money, it meant that it was an amanah (trust or mandate)*".

It can be gleaned from the story above that buying votes through practice or money politics creates a clientelistic relationship between a figure of dynasty, namely Ratu Atut, and a patron that cares for their clients. And as a return, the clients vote for the dynasty. However, this relationship is more than just the

rational calculation of exchanging money for votes between the patron and its client; it also involves an emotional, affective, or even 'religious' element. Giving money, considered a form of 'care' and 'trust (or in Islamic terms, *amanah*), is an example of it.

This clientelistic relations as at so many levels upon political affiliation does create incentives to maladministration and to corruption (Lazar, 2004:240). The dynasty and its networks are involved in a list of corruption allegation cases as is shown in a compilation by activists from Banten Corruption Watch. The list of corruption allegations are including land acquisition mark-up for regional police headquarters of Banten (2001), Karangsari land procurement (2002), the abuse of Banten province's emergency budget to purchase Banten parliamentarian's house (2002), the loss in health department according to Audit Reports (LHP) of government financial from The Supreme Audit Agency (2010), indication of corruption in the regional budget of Banten according to Audit Reports (LHP) of government financial from The Supreme Audit Agency (2010), medical equipment procurement in Health Department of Banten Province (2010), house of the governor construction project (2010), the abuse of discretionary grant (Dana Hibah) of Banten Province (2011). From all those cases, however, only two cases since 2013 have been brought to court, by the KPK and High Attorney office of Banten, they are: corruption allegation in the use of discretionary grant (Dana Hibah) of Banten Province and an indication of corruption in medical equipment procurement in Health Department of Banten. Those cases, also, have been posted on Facebook by anti-corruption activists in Banten to attract public attention and as a part of social media practices of online anti-corruption activism.

A Place of Comparison: Malang Raya

As a means of comparison regarding the success or failure of anti-corruption movements in Banten, I have selected the anti-corruption movement in Malang Raya as a comparative case. Specifically, I am referring to the anti-corruption movement led by a local NGO; Malang Corruption Watch (MCW). Malang Raya, where MCW organizes anti-corruption movements, is a term used to refer to a region that comprises the cities of Malang and Batu as well as the Malang Regency.

Malang Corruption Watch has successfully conducted investigations and reported several corruption cases in the Malang Raya region. In the city of Malang alone, there were 9 cases, some of which have already been handled by

the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). Among them were allegations of corruption in the road nail project in Kota Malang, allegations of corruption in the procurement of land for RSUD (the local hospital) in Malang City, and allegations of corruption in the construction project of drainage systems in Tidar and Bondowoso-Kalimetro street. Additionally, there have been several other corruption cases recorded in Malang City, such as the bribery case in the change of the income and expenditure budget of Malang City in 2015, which was committed by the non-active mayor of Malang, Moh Anton. In addition to Moch. Anton, the corruption case also involved 18 members of the Malang City DPRD (local parliament).

In Malang Regency, Malang Corruption Watch has recorded at least 7 cases of corruption, including allegations of maladministration in the issuance of mining permits in Malang Regency, which have been reported to the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) for investigation. Other cases include allegations of corruption in the construction project of Pasar Sumedang and corruption in market levies. Additionally, the gratification case involved the former Regent of Malang, Rendra Krisna.

In the city of Batu, Malang Corruption Watch was focused on the investigation of corruption cases involving the mayor of Malang, Eddy Rumpoko. One of the most infamous cases of corruption in Batu is the bribery case involving Eddy Rumpoko, who received a gift in the amount of Rp. 200,000,000 (about 13 million USD) in his capacity as mayor from a businessman named Filipus Djap. The bribe was given by Filipus Djap as a fee to obtain procurement projects for goods and services in the Batu city government area. As a result of his actions, Eddy Rumpoko was found guilty and sentenced to three months imprisonment, three years imprisonment, a fine of Rp. 300,000,000.00, and other additional punishments on Friday, April 27, 2018. Not satisfied with the verdict of the Surabaya District Court, Eddy Rumpoko's case was appealed to the High Court of Surabaya and the Supreme Court by his legal counsel. However, the Supreme Court rejected the appeal and extended his imprisonment to five and a half years.

According to Artha Musasi, the head of the Political and Policy Corruption Division of Malang Corruption Watch, all these corruption cases indicate the non-accountable and non-transparent condition of the governance in Malang Raya. Therefore, Malang Corruption Watch is highly concerned and consistently monitors corruption cases in Malang Raya.

Outline

This dissertation consists of six chapters. Chapter one is this introduction that provides a background, research questions, theoretical frameworks, methodology, and overview of the locations of this research. Chapter Two provides a historical background of anti-corruption movements in Indonesia. While the remaining chapters provide answers for the four main questions of this dissertation. These are: what discourses of corruption are constructed through online anti-corruption activism in both local (Banten) and national level (Chapter 3)? How is anti-corruption activism in Banten being practiced online (Chapter 4)? How is this online anti-corruption activism reflective of the character of citizenship in Banten? (Chapter 5) And to what extent can this online anti-corruption activism be transformed (or not transformed) into strong off-line mobilization to curtail leaders of Banten that are deemed corrupt (Chapter 5).

Chapter Two traces the evolution and identifies three distinctive phases in the history of Indonesia's anti-corruption activism: the New Order, Reformasi and the second decade after reformasi. Each phase is characterized by the features of the predominant mode of organizing in that phase; e.g., the student movement, Civil Society Organization (CSO) programmatic legal action and on-line activism. The three periods are ideal types and elements of all can be found in each separate period. The student demonstration emerged in the New Order era, CSO's programmatic action started at the beginning of reformasi era, and social media activism mostly first appeared in the second decade of reformasi. Each phase, also, has different success stories of curtailing corruption. Students' demonstrations were able to institute pressure, but they were not effective in actuating and maintaining anti-corruption policies. CSOs programmatic action has been successful in influencing the government and parliament to enact anti-corruption laws, establishing the Corruption Eradication Committee (KPK) and reporting corruption cases to the KPK. Social media activism is considered successful in the further diffusing of the campaign's messages to get public attention and raise awareness, and in putting pressure on politicians to change their policies to save the KPK, but it, again, is not effectively directed to the curtailments of corruption itself.

Chapter Three explores the discourses of corruption that are constructed through online anti-corruption activism at both local (Banten) and national levels. In this chapter, to understand the local discourse of corruption I

made a comparison between the discourse of corruption in social media campaigning anti-corruption in Banten with social media of anti-corruption CSOs (Civil Society Organization) on a national level. At a national level, in social media anti-corruption campaigns that are mostly organized by formal and programmatic CSOs, corruption is dominantly constructed as a legal discourse. Whereas in Banten, corruption in social media anti-corruption campaigns, is predominantly constructed by means of moral emotional discourse. This moral emotional discourse consists of emotional or affective statements and is shaped by activist citizens who are mostly bound to local Islamic expression and values and directed toward 'the moral public sphere' (Lazar 2005:224).

Chapter Five addresses two questions of how anti-corruption activism in Banten is being enacted online. And, I ask, what kind of citizenship does this online anti-corruption activism produce? In this chapter, I delve into what citizen activists actually practiced in the three Facebook page and groups in Banten; Fesbuk Banten News, Wong Banten, and Forum Warga Banten. To do that, I read and analyse Facebook posts and comments as a 'digital act of citizenship' that is all speech acts uttered through the internet that designates political subjects emerging from the encounter between citizens and the state (Isin & Ruppert, 2015:9). There are four dominant digital acts enacted through the three Facebook page and groups, they are digital acts of reporting corruption allegations cases, flaming the dynasty and cronies, sharing news about corruption, and calling citizens to take action. All these digital acts resemble what Alexandrakis (2016) called 'indirect activism' – that is, it is a mode of resistance enacted by actuating other people to undertake resistance of their own. In the case of on-line activism in Banten, digital acts enacted to activate other people's resistance against the corrupt dynasty are mostly expressed through emotional or affective speeches. Therefore, these digital acts reflect a form of citizenship that I call digital affective citizenship.

Chapter Four is an attempt to answer the question of to what extent online anticorruption activism can be transformed into strong off-line mobilization to curtail leaders of Banten that are deemed corrupt? In this chapter, I argue that online anti-corruption activism expressed through emotional languages (as explored in chapters 3 and 4) has failed to move beyond peoples' sentiments of indignation or anger and as such they could not be transformed into strong off-line mobilizations. In the case of anti-corruption demonstrations, activists were not able to mobilize significant numbers of participants from outside their small friendship networks and their protests were not lead to the curtailment

of corrupt officials. Whereas, in the case of 'don't vote for a corrupt family' campaigns during local elections, most of the voters apparently still give their ballots to the candidates from corrupt dynasties. By making a comparison with an anti-corruption movement organized by Malang Corruption Watch in Malang, I found that, in Banten, the lack of an organizing ability and leadership and the unclear repertoires of contention propagated in unifying symbols or frames are the main factors that contribute to unsuccessful off-line mobilizations. In addition, anti-corruption offline mobilizations in Banten were also, hampered by terrors or threats from the dynasty's Jawaara (thugs or local strongmen) and tamed by bribery from the dynasty's businessmen cronies.

In the conclusion to this dissertation, I summarize the findings of each chapter and provide some contributions of this dissertation on the discussion on digital citizenship and the public sphere, and the critical assessment of the role of emotions or affects in the transformation of online activism to offline political mobilizations. Through this dissertation, I extend the concept of digital citizenship beyond rational, ethical, and normative online participation to include 'deviant' or 'aberrant' participation, involving passionate, aggressive, and vitriolic expression. This digital affective citizenship facilitates emotional engagement in an 'affective public', a networked public formation mobilized through sentiment expression. In this sense, this dissertation contributes to recognizing an online alternative public sphere.

Chapter Two

The History of Anti-corruption Mobilizations in Indonesia

Introduction

In this chapter, I provide a historical account of anti-corruption mobilizations in Indonesia from the New Order, *reformasi*, to the second decade of post-*reformasi* era. The three periods under study are, at best, ideal types and elements of each single period still linger in the next and hence there is some overlap. I will answer the question of what are the characteristics of anti-corruption modes of organizing in Indonesia over time through tracing the evolution of various anti-corruption movements, campaigns, and activism over different periods of time. Which of them are considered to be effective or successful in combating corruption and why?

This chapter, therefore, will provide historical background to the on-line anti-corruption activism and off-line mobilization in Banten that I will detail in the following chapters. It, also, identifies different types (and criteria) of success of anti-corruption modes of organizing that will be compared with those that took take in Banten in the next few chapters.

In this context, I pay attention to anti-corruption movements and activism as a non-state, less-institutionalized, but a nonetheless influential aspect of politics and how it possibly affects public decisions regarding the curtailing of corruption (Della Porta, 2017). Thus, I will look at both the most visible forms of contestation: protests both on the street (off-line) and through social-media platforms (on-line), and the less-visible attempts, such as lobbying by civil society organizations (CSO) keen on curtailing corruption.

Throughout this chapter, I will highlight three distinctive phases in the history of Indonesia's anti-corruption activism: New Order, *Reformasi*, and the 20 years post-*reformasi* era. Each phase is characterized by the features of the predominant form of anti-corruption mobilization: e.g., the student movement, CSO's programmatic actions and on-line activism.

First, during the New Order era anti-corruption activism was mostly undertaken by students. This anti-corruption movement largely relied on students' mass mobilizations and demonstrations. Throughout the 1970s, they had some success in the sense that they were able to push the Soeharto regime to establish anti-corruption committees. Yet, the anti-corruption committees failed and were dissolved owing to Soeharto's government not providing the committees with sufficient political and financial resources (Setiyono and MacLeod, 2010:341 Juwono, 2018:146). Throughout the 1990s, the student movements used the popular slogan of KKN (Korupsi/corruption, Kolusi/collusion, Nepotisme/nepotism) to overthrow Soeharto himself. The student movement, however, was ineffective in pushing the government to truly initiate and implement policies that have had a lasting impact on curtailing the KKN itself.

Secondly, I follow Setiyono and Macleod's (2010) argument that, after *reformasi*, the predominant mode of anti-corruption movements has become more formal and institutionalized and has taken shape as CSOs (Civil Society Organizations). These CSO's include groups such as ICW (Indonesia Corruption Watch), MTI (Masyarakat Transparansi Indonesia, Indonesian Society for Transparency) and IPW (Indonesia Procurement Watch). These CSOs which are assisted by foreign donors, mostly focus on institutional and legal reform by advocating the establishment of a Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and other anti-corruption institutions. These include the Centre for Financial Transactions Reporting and Analysis (PPATK, Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan), the National Ombudsman's Commission, the Judicial Commission, the Attorney General's Commission, and the Indonesian Police

Commission. They also urged the government to ratify the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC).

Thirdly, and somewhat later in the second *reformasi* decade, the anti-corruption movement started to use social media as a means to critique corrupt governmental practices. Some activists, with support from anti-corruption CSOs, used social media to conduct anti-corruption campaigns and mobilize people. On-line anti-corruption campaigns that were considered successful in mobilizing people and shaping political decisions include Gerakan 1,000,000 Facebookers Dukung Chandra Hamzah & Bibit Samad Riyanto (the Movement of 1,000,000 Facebookers to support Chandra Hamzah & Bibit Samad Riyanto) and #SaveKPK (2012, 2015). These movements aim to support KPK officials and free them from criminalization. The on-line campaigns were considerably successful in diffusing its messages into the public sphere, in mobilizing people, and gaining wider political support for the case (Molaei, 2015).

In the following sections, I delve into these three phases of the anti-corruption movement in Indonesia. The conclusion, then, questions the extent to which the strategies that have been developed by each different anti-corruption mode of organizing can be considered successful in curtailing corruption.

The Student Movements

In January 1971, *Mahasiswa Indonesia*, a student newspaper from Bandung, wrote that 1970 was “the year of discontent” (*tahun ketidakpuasan*). The newspaper pointed to the increasingly corrupt Soeharto Government (Abar, 1995). Early that year, students had expressed their discontent by organizing demonstrations under the name of the *Mahasiswa Menggugat* (‘Student Protest’) Movement (Padiatra, 2015: 106). They protested against corruption, which they argued had already become normalized throughout Soeharto’s government (Mackie & McIntyre 1993: 125-126).

In early February 1970, students stopped their protests as, apparently, Soeharto complied with their demand by establishing an anti-corruption commission, called Komisi 4 (‘Commission Four’). Student activists agreed to give the commission a chance to get the job done (Padiatra 2015: 106, Juwono 2018: 131).

The commission, however, proved to be weak since it did not have the authority to prosecute, but only to review government policies and it just could provide recommendations to address corruption (Juwono, 2018:131). Student

activists also considered the commission to be too slow in disclosing the results of its queries (Padiatra, 2015:107). Finally, in July 1970, after having presented seven reports to various public offices, a report on the state administrative reform, and one advising a new method for corruption eradication, the commission was dissolved (Mackie 1970, Setiyoso and McLeod, 2010: 348, Juwono, 2018:132). Despite its comprehensive and high-quality reports advising on governance reform and anti-corruption issues (Juwono, 2018: 133), the efforts of the commission did nothing to fight the prevalence of corruption (Setiyoso and McLeod, 2010: 348).

In this period, the student anti-corruption movement was successful in pushing Soeharto to form an anti-corruption committee. This is because, in the early period of the New Order era, the university students had built a partnership with Soeharto with the expectations that Soeharto would work to restore Indonesia's economy and address corruption in a more systematic way (Juwono, 2018: 127). Later in the process, however, the students could not push the government to give the anti-corruption committee strong authority, a clear mandate, and proper budget to be effectively functional (Setiyono and MacLeod, 2010:341). It shows that the relations between Soeharto and the students were fragile (Juwono, 2018: 139). In other words, their relationship seemed to be a temporary convergence rather than a unifying alliance in addressing the corruption and governance predicament (Juwono, 2018: 127).

In July 1970, and frustrated by this condition, student activists of the Mahasiswa Menggugat movement joined with KAPPI (Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia/Indonesian Student Action Front) established their own anti-corruption committee (Komite Anti-Korupsi/KAK) (Sjahrir, 1983). In Bandung, and for the same purpose, activists of the Student Councils (Dewan Mahasiswa) from different universities, such as Marzuki Darusman, Sjarif Tando, and Boy Musdar Nurmawan, formed a movement called Bandung Bergerak ('Bandung in Motion'). The KAK and Bandung Bergerak held demonstrations in front of some ministries and they demanded to meet with top officials. They demanded that they take responsibility for corruption and inefficiency in the government's budgets. The Bandung Bergerak group, also, came to Jakarta and pinned up some anti-corruption posters at the Pertamina and Attorney General offices. This group then was able to meet with members of DPR-GR (the Indonesian National Parliament) and, even, President Soeharto himself, to whom they gave an open letter addressing corruption cases in Indonesia (Padiatra 2015: 107). In September 1970 and as a response to this students' movement, the Parliament

held meetings to discuss a plan for drafting an anti-corruption law. Student activists felt that their demands were listened to, so they temporarily withdrew their protests (ibid.). As a result, on 12 March 1971, the Indonesian parliament ratified the anti-corruption law that qualified corruption to be legally defined as a crime (Juwono, 2018:134). Despite that it could not be applied retroactively and that it did not subject army personnel to the jurisdiction of the civil administration, this anti-corruption law managed to revive the hope that corruption now could be fought lawfully (ibid.).

Only the next year, however, that hope seemed to vanish. In 1972, students were back in the streets to protest the appropriation of 'people's money' (uang rakyat) in Taman Mini Indonesia Indah (TMII), an entertainment park project of Tien Soeharto, the president's wife. The students accused her of asking for donations from public offices and state enterprises to fund her mega-project. Her effort in collecting money was considered to be prone to corruption and the development of TMII was seen as a waste of money. In Jakarta and Bandung, students formed an ad-hoc movement using different names such as: Penyelamat Uang Rakyat (Peoples Money Saviours), "Gerakan Akal Sehat" (The Good Sense Movement), and "Gerakan Penyelamat Uang Rakyat" (People Money Rescue Movement) (Padiatra 2015: 107-108).

From 1972 onwards, the students intensified their protest as they believed that the Soeharto family became entirely corrupted. During this time, Soeharto's inner circle, referred to as ASPRI (Asisten Pribadi or 'Personal Assistants'), became more powerful in influencing political decisions and policies (Juwono, 2018). For example, In October 1973, students staged a protest against corruption, the abuse of power, unemployment, and illegal activities by the powerful personal assistant of Soeharto (Juwono, 2018:138). On 10th January 1974, students increased their demand, in a petition known as "Tripura Baru 1974" (The New People Demands of 1974. This "new Tritura anti-corruption movement" (Sastramidjaja, 2016:146) was against corruption, price hikes, and calling for the abolition of the President's ASPRI (Padiatra 2015: 113, Juwono, 2018:139. Sastramidjaja, 2016:146). All the protests culminated in a huge demonstration in January 1974, directed against foreign investment as symbolized by the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister. It triggered riots in Jakarta, well-known as "Malari" (Malapetaka 15 January or 15 January Havoc).

As a response to the Malari riots, the Indonesian government took repressive measures which resulted in 820 arrests; including those of 15 university student activists, 83 other students, 4 MPs, and several officers. Eventually, only three

student leaders from the University of Indonesia and Gadjah Mada University were sentenced to jail. This detention did not make the student back down. The students returned to the streets and intensified their protests. Between 1975 to 1977 student movements focused on Soeharto's family, which - they alleged - were engaged in extensive corruption. Students criticized how the Soeharto family was taking advantage of government projects which they used for their own benefit. However, Soeharto's brother, Probosutedjo, and his eldest son, Sigit, in a press conference in October 1976, denied such allegations (Far Eastern Economic Review, 15th October 1976, p. 32.).

In the face of such accusations, Soeharto's Government in September 1977 tried to show that it was serious in combating corruption by launching its own anti-corruption campaign, called Operasi Tertib/OPSTIB (Operation to maintain order). Its mission, according to Presidential Instruction number 9 of 1977, was to reinforce organizational and administrative reform in government agencies as well as to eradicate illegal levies of their services. Despite a promising start, in the end, this initiative was halted as a result of strong resistance from powerful parties with a vested interest (Asiaweek, 27 January 1978). Once again, the Soeharto Government's attempt to restrain corruption among high-level officials failed and corrupt practices continued (Juwono, 2018: 141-142).

In the absence of substantive action, in October 1977 students from all over Indonesia gathered in Bandung, to pledge (sumpah)¹ that they were in opposition to the Soeharto Government. This pledge was followed by demonstrations that reached their peak during a January 1978 rally, attended by 3,000 students that gathered to oppose Suharto's re-election. On this occasion, some students also published a 'White Book' containing a critical assessment of the Soeharto Government's policies and they voiced criticism to the usage of state facilities by Soeharto's wife (*White Book of the 1978 Students' Struggle*: Indonesia, no. 25, 1978: 151-182). The latter made Soeharto angry and it eventually led to the detainment of Heri Akhmadi, the demonstration's leader and then chair of the Student Council of ITB (Akhmadi, 1981). He was charged with insulting Suharto himself.

The intensification of student criticism and its targeting of Soeharto and his family directly led in this period to full repression on the protesters by the

1) This 'sumpah' (pledge) was inspired by an important moment in Indonesian history; 'Sumpah Pemuda' (Youth Pledge) made at a congress of nationalist youth organizations at the end of October 1928. Sumpah Pemuda was a declaration of the unity of the nation, homeland, and language that became a unifying pillar of youth movements across the country to win independence (Foulcher, 2000:377).

government. The repression was thorough and effective not just by military takeover of campuses and the arrests of students, but also by implementing a range of policies collectively known as NKK/BKK (Normalization of Campus Life / Bodies for the Coordination of Student Affairs) that, basically, restricted the students' political activities on campus (Aspinall, 2005:120).

This repression and the implementation of NKK/BKK weakened the anti-corruption student movement into the late 70's, and made it difficult to combat the Soeharto family's control on the political and economic life of the country (Juwono, 2018:149). The implementation of the NKK marked an end to student demonstrations and mass mobilization. The repression forced the student movement to change their activist methods by moving underground, until it was resurrected in the 1990's (Aspinall, 2005: 120-121, Lane 2008: 88-92).

From the early 1990s when the repression relatively softened, student movements again began to organize in their criticism of corruption within the government (Setiyono and McLeod, 2010: 349). Students established groups like Yayasan Pijar (Pusat Informasi dan Jaringan Aksi untuk *Reformasi*, the Information Centre and Action Network for Reform), the Cipayang Group,² The People's Democratic Alliance (Aliansi Demokrasi Rakyat, ALDERA) and SMID (Solidaritas Mahasiswa Indonesia untuk Demokrasi, Indonesian Student Solidarity for Democracy) both expressed concern about political leadership and corruption at the federal level (Aspinall 2005: 122-44, 214).

In Yogyakarta, informal groups established by student activists and supported by NGO (non-government organization) workers, artists, and academics, together with older student organizations,³ they demonstrated to demand political reform and the eradication of KKN (Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme / Corruption, Collusion, Nepotism) (Setiyono and McLeod, 2010: 349). While the demonstrations raised banners concerning KKN, these student groups usually avoided to address specific cases of corruption of particular institutions

2) Alliance of extra-campus organizations. Including : HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam/Islamic Student Association), PMKRI (Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Indonesia/Indonesian Catholic Student Association), GMNI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia/Indonesian National Student Movement), GMKI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia/Indonesian Christian Student Movement), PMII (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia/Indonesian Islamic Student Movement).

3) These organizations were including: HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, the Islamic Students Association), GMNI Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia, the Indonesian Nationalist Student Movement), PMKRI (Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia, the Indonesian Catholic Students Association) and PMII (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, the Indonesian Islamic Student Movement).

or individuals, since the basic objective of their demonstrations was to bring Suharto's regime to an end. This was considered as the solution to stop corrupt behaviour by public sector officials (ibid.).

In Jakarta, new student-based organizations together with the established organizations (HMI, PMII, PMKRI, GMNI), and formal university student senates, despite their different political views and strategies, by early May 1998, using the same slogan of KKN in their demonstrations, agreed with one immediate goal: the removal of Soeharto (Aspinall, 2005:227). Their protests, however, were mostly dominated by more moderate groups that adopted the discourse of "moral force" (kekuatan moral) which the 1970s student movements had also used (Aspinall, 2005: 227). This moral tone was reflected in their focus on monitoring and advising the government and their emphasis on the 'purity' (kemurnian) of their movement. Due to this focus on purity, they refused to collaborate with all other political forces (Hadiz, 1999:111-12), or mobilize alongside the urban poor (Aspinall, 2005:227). The students also refused an alliance with "rakyat" (people) on the street, since they were influenced by Soeharto's propaganda saw the 'people' as a 'massa' (mass) that were mobilised from above to create riots (Siegel, 1998: 78-79)

The emphasis on 'moral force' and 'purity of the movement' enabled the success of the *reformasi* - symbolized through the downfall of Soeharto. But it failed in pushing through policies that could curtail the KKN (Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme, corruption). The student did not engage in formulating and campaigning for policies that might serve to impact in eradicating corruption (Juwono, 2018:213). Due to their emphasis on 'purity' of the student movement could not collaborate with other non-student political forces. As a result, the movement lacked broader support from other political forces and parties (Jowono, 2018:123).

Civil Society Organization (CSO) Programmatic Actions

After Soeharto stepped down in May 1998, students continued their anti-corruption demonstrations. They changed their focus and turned towards specific corruption cases; from the case of Soeharto, his family, and business cronies to allegations of local leaders' being involved in corruption. For example, in Jakarta, on 15 June 1998, there was a demonstration demanding the investigation of Soeharto, his family, and their cronies' source of wealth which was held outside the attorney general's office (Republika, 16/6/1998). Also, on the

same day, in other locations, student demonstrations took place that demanded an investigation into local government officials' corruption: from the case of the mayor of Tegal (Merdeka, 16/6/1998), the regent of Cianjur, or the case of illegal charges of provision on public services in Bekasi (Kompas, 16/6/1998). Such demonstrations typically were also aimed at the involvement of parliament's members, government procurement, and illegal levies conducted by officials. These demonstrations continued for several months after Suharto's resignation and in different locations.

According to Setiyono and McLeod (2010:351), these student demonstrations occurred spontaneously, lacking adequate evidence to support the allegations of corruption. Therefore, they did not result in any legal steps against involved officials. In 1999, the activism became broader and more structured since they now gained support from different organizations, lawyers, and academics. The student demonstrations, however, were still fragmented and lacked effective coordination and vision. As a result, the student protests against corruption gradually fizzled out.

In response to this decline of spontaneous and improvised protests, some student leaders were involved in anti-corruption organizations or CSOs (Civil Society Organizations) (Setiyono, et.al, 2017:974). In June 1998, the first of these new anti-corruption organizations saw the light: the Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW). It was next followed by the establishment of other anti-corruption CSOs such as PSHKI (Pusat Studi Hukum Kebijakan Indonesia/Centre of Law and Policy Study, July 1998), Masyarakat Transparansi Indonesia (Indonesian Society of Transparency, in August 1998), IDEA (Ide dan Analitika Indonesia/Idea and Analytic Indonesia, in 1998). Also, a number of district-level organizations were established in the period from 1998 up to the present. In 2000, all of these CSOs formed a membership association called GeRAK (Gerakan Anti-Korupsi/Movement Against Corruption).

The CSOs that mostly consolidated their actions by forming alliances and networks have carried out some activities both in strategic and practical levels. On a strategic level, the coalition of CSOs worked together with policymakers to establish the legal and institutional frameworks in combating corruption (Setiyono and McLeod 2010:355). Their first successful strategic activity was working together with officials from the Department of Law and Human Rights in establishing the Joint Team For Corruption Eradication (Tim Gabungan Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi, TGPTPK) during President Abdurrahman Wahid Era in the early 2000s. The establishment of the team had

been mandated by Law 31/1999 on the Eradication of Corruption (Ibid:357). The next strategic activity, led by ICW, MTI, and PGRI, was advocating for a more permanent anti-corruption institution after the decline of the TGPTPK. These three CSOs conducted public campaigns and urged the government and parliament to establish the KPK (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, Corruption Eradication Commission). The CSOs initially concentrated on the introduction of a law to establish the legal framework for the KPK and a related special court for crimes involving corruption, and they later supported the creation of these institutions by forming an alliance known as Advocacy for a Corruption Eradication Commission (Advokasi untuk Komisi Anti-Korupsi, AKAK) (Ibid:357).

The KPK, Indonesia's most powerful anti-corruption agency, was established under a *lex specialis* (Law 30/2002) to coordinate and supervise anti-graft agencies, examine and prosecute corrupt activities, prevent future corruption, and monitor state officials. Its extraordinary powers include wiretapping, foreclosing assets without court permission, requiring confidential data, investigating elite officials without president's consent, and taking over corruption cases from police and prosecutors. Despite some progress so far, the KPK faces complex factors such as reliance on police and Attorney General Office investigators and variable support from political elites, civil society, and the media. (Khoirul Umam, et.al, 2018:2).

After the KPK had been established, a number of CSOs, including the members of the GeRAK network (which had 30 CSO members organization at the time), and CSOs within the Judicial Watch Coalition (which had 10 members) supported the start-up of the KPK and the selection of its members. After KPK's members were selected, the CSOs - particularly MTI and PGRI - have continued to provide strategic supports. This strategic support included supporting a joint project with international donor agencies to organize training for KPK staff, to set up coordination with other law enforcement agencies, and to help KPK to develop its strategic planning and action plans (Setiyono and McLeod 2010:357-358). The CSOs continued their strategic activities by advocating for the establishment of other anti-corruption institutions, participating in the formulation of the Witness and Victim Protection Act, and endorsing the ratification of the UN Convention Against Corruption that resulted in the enactment of Law 7/2006 (ibid: 359-360).

At a practical level, CSOs were active in reporting cases of alleged corruption, bringing corrupt figures to court, providing anti-corruption awards to ensure that the work of anti-corruption activists is publicly acknowledged, organizing

anti-corruption training, and promoting public awareness (Ibid:361-364). CSOs have been key actors in eradicating corruption by making reports of corruption cases to the KPK. Table 1, below shows examples of corruption cases exposed by CSOs in the first seven years (2000-2007) since KPK was established.

Table 1. Examples of Corruption Cases Exposed By CSO.

| Corruption Cases | Year | CSOs Involved in Reporting |
|---|-------------|---|
| <i>National Level</i> | | |
| Bank Indonesia Liquidity Assistance | 2000 | Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) |
| Department of Religious Affairs | 2004 | Government Watch (GOWA), Forum Indonesia Untuk Transparansi Anggaran (FITRA) |
| Elections Commission Budget | 2005 | FITRA and Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (LBH) |
| <i>Provincial Level</i> | | |
| PT. Bank NTB, West Nusa Tenggara | 2001 | Solidaritas Masyarakat untuk Transparansi (SOMASI) |
| Helicopter Procurement in Aceh | 2002 | Solidaritas Masyarakat Anti Korupsi (SAMAK), Solidaritas Rakyat Aceh Anti Korupsi (SORAK) |
| Lampung disaster fund | 2003 | Komite Anti Korupsi (KOAK) Lampung |
| Misappropriation of provincial budget in West Sumatera | 2003 | Forum Peduli Sumatera Barat (FPSB) |
| Misappropriation of provincial budget in South Sumatera | 2004 | Gerakan Rakyat Palembang (GRP) |
| Misappropriation of budget of Tadulako University, Palu, Central Sulawesi | 2007 | Koalisi Mahasiswa Anti Korupsi (KMAK) |
| <i>Local Level</i> | | |
| Misappropriation of district government budget in Mentawai, West Sumatera | 2002 | Aliansi Masyarakat Mentawai (AMM) |
| Embezzlement of subsidy For Bestari Foundation, Pontianak, West Kalimantan | 2002 | Local NGOs and Traditional Kingdom of Pontianak |
| Misappropriation of district government budget in Dongala, Central Sulawesi | 2003 | Koalisi Rakyat Menggugat (KRM) |
| Misappropriation of district government budget in Malang, East Java | 2004 | Malang Corruption Watch (MCW) |
| Forest Resource and Reforestation Fund | 2004 | Koalisi LSM Untuk Konservasi Hutan (KONSTAN) |

Source: (Setiyono and McLeod 2010:363)

Moreover, the CSOs' strategic and practical activities described above, have also successfully pushed the government and parliament to create and implement anti-corruption laws (see above), established the KPK (Corruption Eradication Commission), and imprisoned corrupt government officials (Setiyono and Mcleod, 2010: 368. In other words, the CSOs have effectively influenced the decision-making processes in relation to governmental corruption in Indonesia (Setiyono, et.al, 2017:975). This effectiveness has been determined by the CSOs' ability to form solid coalitions that lead to negotiation with state institutions (ibid.) In this sense, one of the enabling factors of CSOs' success is their 'flexibility and mutability' (Aspinall and Weiss, 2012: 214). This flexibility enables them to build larger networks with various actors and organizations, consisting of artists, religious mass organizations, university alumni, etc. (Widjoko, 2017:263).

Anti-Corruption Social Media Activism

Starting from around the 2000s, Civil Society Organizations, like other organizations in Indonesia, gradually started using the internet and social media technology (Nugroho 2011, Nugroho and Syarief 2012). Anti-corruption CSOs used web-based tools on the internet mostly for transparency, disclosure, dissemination of information, to initiate public participation, and mobilization of online audiences (Setiyono, et.al , 2017:971). One of the most effective social-media usage in anti-corruption campaigning by CSOs was mobilizing on-line and off-line support for the KPK and to challenge the predatory interests of elites to dissolve it (Widjoko, 2017:253).

As mentioned above, one of the success stories of the CSOs anti-corruption movement was the establishment of KPK and its legal punishing of a large number of corrupt perpetrators. This included high-profile figures such as the governor of the Central Bank, cabinet ministers, the Chief of the Constitutional Court, and other heads of state institutions (Bolongaita, 2010; Kuris, 2012a; Schutte, 2012, Widjoko, 2017). This success, however, also triggered resistance from major political powers in Indonesia (Widjoko, 2017: 253). In a response to this resistance, CSOs used social media to mobilize support from citizens for the KPK. This #saveKPK movement is a good example of successful social-media anti-corruption activism in Indonesia.

One of the most well-known cases of social-media anti-corruption campaigns is the 'Gecko versus Crocodile affair' (Cicak versus Buaya). It started in April 2009, when the Police's Chief of Detectives, Susno Duadji found that KPK

had tapped his phones in investigating a bribery case (Kilas Berita 2009). Susno Duadji felt he was attacked by the KPK and, then, expressed his anger during a press conference, stating that KPK was only a cicak (house gecko) attempting to fight a mighty buaya (crocodile) - the latter referring to the national police services or POLRI (Lim 2013:640). Duadji, in his anger, also attempted to discredit and remove KPK officials by charging them with a bribery case or threatening to bring them to trial (Butt, 2011). In July 2009, two KPK commissioners; Candhra Hamzah and Bibit Samad Riyanto, were arrested by the police due to suspicion of extortion and accepting bribes from a fugitive businessman Anggoro Widjojo. The two men denied these allegations, arguing that they had been framed to weaken the KPK's reputation. Many people shared their views and believed that the charges were fabricated. The case, which appeared in the mainstream media, especially on television, triggered a people's movement organized by civil society organizations, which resulted in both off-line demonstrations and on-line campaigns. The biggest on-line movement was coordinated through and facilitated by the Facebook group of "Gerakan 1.000.000 Facebookers Dukung Chandra Hamzah & Bibit Samad Riyanto" (Movement of 1.000.000 Facebookers Supporting Chandra Hamzah & Bibit Samad Riyanto). The group successfully attracted public attention and easily surpassed its initial goal of 1,000,000 members in just nine days (Lim 2013, Molei, 2015). It then was followed by the going viral of the catchphrase "CICAK", meaning gecko as to symbolize support for KPK and also as an abbreviation of "Cinta Indonesia Cinta KPK" (Love Indonesia Love KPK), everywhere on different on-line media platforms. Similar on-line campaigns in the form of music videos, cartoons, posters, memes with depictions of "gecko vs crocodile" were disseminated through YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter. There was even a Javanese rap song with lyrics which supported the KPK and which could be downloaded as a cellphone ringtone. This on-line movement was covered by mainstream media and was positively represented by them, resulting in the movement gaining wider exposure (Molaei, 2015: 99) and acceptance.

Social media has enabled the more effective dissemination of the movement's messages. It has become a decisive factor in attracting the attention of both the public and politicians (Molaei 2014:100). And, that was possible owing to their narratives, icons, and symbolic representations imitate those that are used in the contemporary culture (Lim 2013:654). In this regard, they produced and disseminated protest content through social media that is much aligned with contemporary consumer culture: it is lightly packaged, it reads like a headline

and tells a sensationalized story (Ibid). In the Indonesian social media, the Cicak vs Buaya case was framed as a simple story of a hero fighting against a villain, in which Susno Duajdi clearly acted as the villain and Bibit-Chandra were portrayed as the victimized heroes (ibid:644).

This simple narrative is supported by strong symbolic representations that were vivid and visual in character: a small cicak (house gecko) up against a big buaya (crocodile). The small house gecko easily can be interpreted as representing small, innocent, ordinary people, or the 'us', whereas the crocodile is identical with a beastly powerful and greedy man, or 'them'. This attempt of defining 'who we are' or 'us' versus 'them' provides a ground for members of the movement to act as a collective (Lim, 2013:644). It was this that made the on-line anti-corruption movement successful and helped it transform into successful off-line mobilization, such as the rally on 10 September 2009, in Jakarta, attended by some five thousand people showing support for 'the gecko' (KPK). This rally was, then, followed by demonstrations in several other cities. These huge protests and demonstrations provided public and political pressures that forced the police to drop charges against the KPK's commissioners on 3rd December 2009 (Lim, 2013).

In October 2012, a similar campaign called the "#saveKPK" movement emerged. This online movement was a response to a police attack on the KPK and in relation to the investigation of The Head of Traffic Police General Djoko Susilo. In retaliation, the police investigated and attempted to arrest Novel Baswedan, KPK's head investigator (Setyarso, 2012). As a response, some civil society organizations organized a movement through Twitter and Facebook with the hashtag #saveKPK and #dimanaSBY to stop the arrest of Novel Baswedan (Widjoko, 2017:260). On October 5, 2012, these hashtags soon became a trending topic in Twitter with 39,997 (re)tweets (as recorded by Topsy.com on October 5th, 2012). This buzz on KPK on social media platforms, then, brought around 1,000 activists together who joined in the demonstration in front of the KPK building carrying with them Save KPK banners (Techinasia, 8 October 2012). This demonstration was followed by another coinciding with 'car-free day' and a concert held in the center of Jakarta on a Sunday morning (October, 10th). People gathered around the stage and shouted "Save KPK, save Indonesia!" (Ibid.) The demonstrators demanded that the then-president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (also known as SBY) stop police intimidation of KPK investigators and their families and urged him to remove the head of the National Police (Widjoko, 2017:261).

The #saveKPK movement appeared on both social media platforms and as street protests. Save KPK demonstrations spread across Indonesia: in Bandung, Yogyakarta, Bali, and, geographically distant, Banda Aceh. Meanwhile, on Facebook, the “Save KPK Save Indonesia” fan page has over 15,000 likes (Techinasia, 8 October 2012). The pressure from civil society, facilitated by social media, led the president to finally order police to stop the investigation of Novel Baswedan and let the KPK prosecute General Djoko Susilo (Widjoko, 2017:260).

In 2015, the #saveKPK movement resurfaced as a response to another police attack on the KPK. It began when the Deputy Chairman of the KPK Bambang Widjojanto, was arrested by police after the KPK had raised suspicion over Budi Gunawan, a top candidate for the position of Chief of the Indonesian National Police. KPK suspected him to be involved in a bribery scandal. Activists, again, organized support to ‘Save KPK’ by using Facebook and Twitter to organize a rally at the KPK’s office (Savirani, 2015). The #SaveKPK2015 hashtag was used on Twitter and Facebook to mobilize activists, religious leaders, academics, politicians, citizens, labor organizations, university students, and NGOs to support KPK against the police (Clough,2015, Savirani, 2015, Gabrillin 2015,). Once again, the Save KPK movement was able to grab public attention especially in using social media platforms and the #SaveKPK hashtag become a national trending topic on Twitter in January 2015 (AMR/DOE/SF, 2015; Jakarta Post, 2015; Uqiyanus,2015). In this period the Save KPK 2015 movement was successful in capturing public attention (Suwana, 2020:6). It also proved to be effective in putting pressure on politicians to change policies as it was able to push the now President Joko Widodo to cancel his nomination of General Budi Gunawan while ordering the police and prosecutor to stop the investigation of KPK’s officer Bambang Widjojanto (Widjoko, 2017:261).

From the description above, the ‘Cicak vs Buaya’ (2009) and #SaveKPK (2012, 2015) movements might be considered successful as the protests were able to influence public opinion and succeeded in putting pressure on politicians to change policies (Molaei 2014:100). This was achievable because of the infrastructural affordances provided by social media which enables anti-corruption activists to produce and diffuse compelling protest messages to a large number of people to support their cause to defend KPK from predatory elites’ attack (Lim, 2013, Widjoko, 2017). In this sense, this anti-corruption social media activism can be seen as reactive actions to the anti-corruption institution; KPK, rather than as attempts to directly curtail corruption or corrupt elites themselves.

In September 2019, similar anti-corruption movement buzzing online publics with the hashtag: #ReformasiDikorupsi (#ReformCorrupted). On 23rd, 24th, and 30th September, the call for action was answered by tens of thousands of youths across the country by staging demonstrations to protest against, among others matters, the weakening of the KPK. The protesters, who were mostly students from over 300 universities, demanded President Joko Widodo to undo the revisions to the Law on the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) that significantly weakened its powers. This repertoire of ‘connective action’, based on digital connectivity’ (Sastramidjaja, 2020:1), resulted in the mass participation of students across the country which was depicted as a ‘comeback of Indonesia’s student movement and revived memories of the role of student protest in ousting President Soeharto in May 1998’ (ibid: 2). However, the #ReformasiDikorupsi is different form 1998 student movement for the massive use of social media which engaged many students, youth more generally, and a fluid alliance of non-campus groups who cannot be identified as traditional activist (ibid.). This short-lived movement, was considered successful in gathering the largest mass movement in Indonesia. It was also deemed as a failure, however, based on that none of the protesters’ demands were met, including the demand to cancel the revisions of the Law on the corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). But the ephemeral ‘failure’ of the #ReformasiDikorupsi protest has also had a significant contribution in sowing the seeds for a new generation of civil society in Indonesia (Robet, 2020). The #ReformasiDikorupsi movement revealed the convergence and collaboration between the student movement and civil society that overcome the political polarization emerged from the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections (ibid.).

Conclusion

Following the trajectory of the various anti-corruption modes of organizing in Indonesia from the New Order to *reformasi* and the second *reformasi* decade, I have identified three prominent forms of anti-corruption mobilizations: student movements, CSO programmatic actions, and social-media activism. This does not mean that each mode of organizing only appeared in that specific era. In the second *reformasi* decade, for example, the three types of movement existed and interacted with each other at different levels. In many cases, for example, CSOs used social media in their anti-corruption campaigns while they were joined and supported by student activists.

These three forms of anti-corruption mobilization have been effective in convincing the government to institute new commissions, institutions, and anti-corruption laws while overall these successes have not led to a reduction in levels of corruption. The 1970s student anti-corruption movements were effective in pushing the New Order government to create anti-corruption policies and institutions, but they failed to continue their pressures on the government in actuating the policies and maintaining the institutions. The 1990s student movements were successful in overthrowing Soeharto by addressing issues of corruption, collusion, and nepotism or KKN (Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotism), however, they were not successful in pushing policies to curtail the KKN, involving Soeharto, his family, and cronies, itself. This was caused by the 'moral force' approach used by the students in their movements that only focus on watching, criticizing, and giving advice to the government, and not getting involved in pushing policies to curtail corruption. This was influenced by the student's emphasis on the 'purity' of their movement that was their unwillingness to collaborate with other political forces or parties.

The CSOs' programmatic actions have been successful in influencing the government and parliament to enact anti-corruption laws, establishing the Corruption Eradication Committee (KPK), and reporting corruption cases to the KPK. In this regard, the CSO anti-corruption movement has been effective in influencing the decision-making processes related to corruption eradication. This success was enabled by the power of CSOs' large networks and solid coalitions in running their programmatic actions.

Finally, anti-corruption social media activism, such as #saveKPK campaigns and #ReformasiDikorupsi protest, have been considered successful in terms of getting public attention, raising awareness, gathering the largest mass movement and pushing politicians to change policies to support and save the KPK from the attacks of predatory elites. The open, free, and easy-to-use social media afforded anti-corruption activists to create and spread interesting protest messages to a large number of people and, then, triggered them to join off-line mobilizations in supporting the KPK. The use of social media in anti-corruption protest, such as #ReformasiDikorupsi movement, has also lead to a convergence and collaboration between the student movement and civil society that can be seen as the new generation of civil society in Indonesia.

Besides this social-media activism that mostly works on the national level, there is also online anti-corruption activism conducted at the provincial level. One of them is anti-corruption activism enacted by activist-citizens of Banten

through social media (including those who joined social media from outside Banten's province). Different from those national social-media activisms that constructed corruption as a legal discourse, social media anti-corruption activism in Banten shaped corruption more as a moral discourse. I explore this discourse of corruption analysis in the next chapter.

Chapter Three

Mapping of The Dominant Online Discourse of Corruption

In the previous chapter I argued that since the second *reformasi* decade, anti-corruption movements in Indonesia have been led mostly by CSOs (Civil Society Organizations) that have started to use digital social media as one of their tools. Meanwhile, at the provincial level of Banten, since 2010, anti-corruption activists have been using Fesbuk Banten News (FBN) and Wong Banten (People of Banten), for anti-corruption campaigns. In addition, in 2013, another Facebook group emerged using the banner Forum Warga Banten (Banten's Citizens Forum).

Using those social-media platforms, these activists make statements in the form of postings, comments, and tweets, against corruption or corrupt officials. In other words, they are shaping discourses of (anti) corruption through social media. Therefore, in this chapter, I would like to answer the question of what discourses of corruption are framed through online anti-corruption campaigns at both local (Banten) and national levels?

Taking my lead from Foucauldian discourse analysis (FDA), I define discourse here as a 'system of statements which construct an object' (Parker, 1989: 61,

Sam, 2019: 3). On social media platforms, in my case Facebook, such a system is more than language. It includes ideas, symbols, images, and special features such as likes, shares, emoticons, and links to other information (Sams, 2019: 9). FDA can chronicle this discourse with the ability to trace emergent trends and ideas and to explore (anti) corruption through the lens of public opinion and belief (Ibid: 5). This approach, also, well-suited to analyzing corruption on social media platforms because it is flexible enough to adjust to new media (Ibid.).

I, also, use the concept of “frame” from social movement scholars in ‘explaining how meaning is constructed to legitimise collective activities and actions (Lim, 2013:643, Gamson 1992). Frames are interpretation schemas that allow individuals to locate, perceive, identify, and label events and experiences. (Snow et al.1986). Following such an analysis in this chapter, I study the discourse of corruption in Banten-based social media platforms in comparison with the discourse of corruption on Civil Society Organizations (CSO) social media platforms at the national level.

Throughout this chapter, I will argue, that corruption in CSOs’ social media anti-corruption campaigns is mostly interpreted in term of a violation of legal discourse. Corruption, in this sense, is a set of legal doctrines under which particular events or practices can be adjudicated’ (Pierce, 2016:7). This domination of legal discourse is due to the fact that those social media anti-corruption campaigns mostly are conducted by formal and institutionalized CSOs, who tend to focus on legal and institutional reform as means to eradicate corruption (see previous chapter). Meanwhile, in social media anti-corruption campaigns in Banten, corruption is, predominantly, framed in terms of moral discourse. Corruption, in this sense, is described in terms of a violation of moral discourse or standards.

This moral discourse of corruption is constructed by informal and less-organized activists-citizens who are driven by religious (Islam) intentions rather than legal framing in their ‘corruption talk’ (Lazar, 2005). I explore the details of this argument in the sub-chapters below.

National Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) Social Media Discourse of Corruption

In order to find what is the dominant discourse of corruption constructed through national CSOs’ social media anti-corruption campaigns, I selected a set of statements in form of postings and comments on anti-corruption CSOs’

Facebook pages and groups . I selected 293,028 postings and comments from the fifty most active national anti-corruption CSOs' Facebook pages and groups (1,683,868 total members). The postings and comments were made by both anti-corruption CSO activists and ordinary citizens who are members of the Facebook pages and groups. They date from between July 2009- to December 2015 and roughly follow three phases of the national anti-corruption struggle, respectively #saveKPK I (2009), #saveKPK II (2012), and #saveKPK III (2015) campaigns (see chapter 2). Included in the Facebook pages are the account of a popular and successful anti-corruption movement named "*Gerakan 1 juta fesbuker dukung Bibit dan Candra*", and a Facebook page of the prominent anti-corruption NGO ICW (Indonesia Corruption Watch) (see chapter 2).

I have used Nvivo 10 software to capture relevant postings and comments, and further assist me in the process of fracturing. 'Fracturing', here, refers to the action of systematically drilling down in Big Data sets in order to establish smaller workable units (van den Berg, 2018:98). Using a word-counting technique those postings and comments were condensed to highlight trending words and topics in people's statements (Ryan & Bernard 2003:06-97). To do so, I have used the Nvivo 10 software to count the most frequent words used in the 293,028 statements. This data is further unpacked and visualized using word cloud presentation. The word cloud visualization is a representation that is capable of revealing the frequency of different words providing us with an overview of the dominant themes (McNaught & Lam 2010:630). Word cloud visualization consists of the frequency of word usage in a particular text(s) being represented by the size of each word in a 'cloud' (Gardner, 2017:5). The size of words in the word cloud represents their relative importance and dominance in the overall discourse (ibid.). The word cloud visualization can be seen in figure 1.

In this visual presentation, the words occurring most often in the postings and comments are indicated prominently by their size. It can be found that the 10 most frequent used words on those CSOs anti-corruption Facebook platform are: 'KPK' / The Corruption Eradication Commission (count: 22,337, weighted percentage :1.71%), 'korupsi'/corruption (18,728, 1.43%), 'Indonesia' (10,723, 0.82%), 'rakyat'/people (7,923, 0.61%) 'koruptor'/corruptor (7,160, weig0.55%), 'kasus'/case (6,781, weig0.52%) hukum ('law') (6,009, 0.44%), 'negara'/state (5,715, 0.46%), and 'ICW' / Indonesia Corruption Watch (co5,539, 0.42%).



Figure 2. Word Cluster analysis diagram of 50 national anti-corruption CSOs' Facebook pages and groups (created by author using Nvivo 10's word frequency query).

Figure 2 shows that words that share a branch or sub branch and color indicate they are connected to each other in their usage. We can infer that the stem word 'korupsi' is closely related to the other top 10 most frequently used words like: 'hukum' (law) and 'Indonesia'. And, another branch of words in the cluster are closely linked to those two words ('hukum' and 'Indonesia'), such as: 'pasal' (article in a law) 'undang' from 'undang-undang' (statute, regulation, act), 'lembaga' (agency, institute), 'lakri' (Lembaga Anti Korupsi Republik Indonesia/ Anti-Corruption Agency of the Republic of Indonesia) 'komisi' (commission), 'publik' (public), 'republik' (republic), 'dasar' from 'undang-undang dasar' (constitution). This word clustering indicates that 'korupsi' (corruption) in the national CSOs' social media anti-corruption campaigns is constructed as a legal discourse.

To illustrate this legal discourse, I discuss a few postings and comments here. This one from a popular Facebook group called "Gerakan 1.000.000 Facebookers Dukung Chandra Hamzah & Bibit Samad Riyanto" (1,000,000 Facebookers Movement Supporting Chandra Hamzah & Bibit Samad Riyanto) that started in 2009 and triggered a big and considered successful movement referred to as "Cicak VS Buaya" 'Gecko versus Crocodile') (See Chapter 2):

Ali Fadila ke Gerakan 1.000.000 Facebookers Dukung Chandra Hamzah & Bibit Samad Riyanto

8 Februari 2010 pukul 16.32

bahwa korupsi sdh makin parah di negara kita karna slama ini hukum kita terlalu memanjakan para koruptor dg asas praduga tak bersalah, dari itu kami mengajak kawan2 utk bergabung dan MENDUKUNG PEMBUKTIAN TERBALIK...karna asas inilah yg paling efektif menjerat koruptor dan paling ditakuti para koruptor, ayo bergabung.

(Ali Fadila to 1.000.000 Facebookers Movement Supporting Chandra Hamzah & Bibit Samad Riyanto

8 Februari 2010 at 16.32

The fact that corruption has worsened in our country is caused, all this time, by [the fact that] our law has been presuming that the corruptors are innocent, therefore we call you to join and SUPPORT SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF... because such a principle is the most effective in arresting corruptors and most feared by corruptors, let's join.)

In this posting, fighting against corruption and corrupt officials is linked to the law in its most practical sense of supporting the implementation of the shifting burden principle.² It is similar to an example from one other posting on the Facebook page of a prominent anti-corruption NGO in Indonesia; Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) (see chapter 2), that also is related to corruption eradication advocating the implementation of certain laws:

Sahabat ICW (Friends of ICW)

1 Juni 2015

Mendesak! MA Harus Keluarkan Hukum Acara Praperadilan

Penerbitan hukum acara praperadilan oleh Mahkamah Agung (MA) menjadi sangat penting pasca putusan Mahkamah Konsistensi yang memperluas ranah praperadilan

2) Since 2010, legal experts have called on the judiciary to use principle of shifting the burden of proof in all courts, especially for trials of corruption and money laundering, meaning that..... Only in 2013, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) shifts the burden of proof in corruption court trials by requiring the defendants prove their innocence rather than solely obligating prosecutors to produce evidence of guilt on the basis of the Corruption Law No.20/2001 and Money Laundering Law No.25/2003. (The Jakarta Post, June 29, 2013).

sampai dengan penetapan tersangka. Akibatnya, gerakan pemberantasan korupsi semakin 'dimatikan'.

#MAHarusBertindak #PraperadilanKacau #KoruptorBebas #SaveKPK #SaveIndonesia

(Urgent! The Supreme Court Must Release the Pretrial Law.

The issuance of the pretrial law by the Supreme Court (MA) is very important after the Constitutional Court's verdict that has broadened the pretrial domain up to the suspect's determination. As a result, the corruption eradication movement is 'weakened'.

#MASHouldact #PretrialMessedup #CorruptorFree #SaveKPK #SaveIndonesia)

Additionally, on the Facebook page of "LAKRI (LEMBAGA ANTI KORUPSI REPUBLIK INDONESIA/REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA ANTI-CORRUPTION INSTITUTION), a relatively large Facebook Group with 14,352 members there are examples of postings and comments that suggest corruption can be curtailed by strong law institutions and experts:

Ardek ke LAKRI (LEMBAGA ANTI KORUPSI REPUBLIK INDONESIA/ REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA ANTI-CORRUPTION INSITUTION)

31 Juli 2014 pukul 01.39

KORUPSI DAPAT DIBERANTAS DENGAN PENEGAKAN HUKUM YANG ADI DAN TEGAS..LEMBAGA KEPOLISIAN ADALAH SENTRAL TARGAT YANG HARUS SEGERA DI SDI STERILKAN DARI PRAKTEK2 KORUPSI.BILA HUKUM DAPAT DINEGO PERTANDA KORUPSI YG SUDAH PARAH

(CORRUPTION CAN BE CURTAILED WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT THAT IS FAIR AND FIRM...THE POLICE AS AN INSTITUTION IS THE MAIN TARGET TO BE CLEANED FROM CORRUPT PRACTICES. LAW THAT CAN BE NEGOTIATED IS A SIGN OF SEVERE CORRUPTION).

Lastly, the examples of conversations on a Facebook page that illustrate the legal discourse of corruption are debates on the implementation of the death sentence (hukuman mati) for corruptors. On the Save KPK Save Indonesia Facebook page, (30,079 followers and 30,258 postings and comments), there is one posting that attracts a lot of engagement (466 likes and 457 comments):

Mbah Saimo ke Save KPK Save Indonesia

10 Oktober 2012

Hukuman mati diperdebatkan apakah adil atau tidak. Kalau koruptor dihukum mati bagaimana? Pasti banyak yg setuju krn koruptor merenggut masa depan rakyat banyak..(The death sentence has been debated, whether it is just or not. What if corruptors are sentenced to death? I am sure that most people will agree with this because such corruptors have taken away people's futures.)

Save KPK Save Indonesia

11 Oktober 2012 ·

Setujukan Anda jika koruptor besar dijatuhi hukuman mati? Sampaikan setuju atau tidak dan berikan alasannya di sini (Do you agree if big corruptors are sentenced to death? Let us know if you agree or not and give your reason here):

Comments (some examples)

Gerendo Sebo *Tegakan dulu uu yg skrng sdh berjalan, agar kelak jika hukuman mati benar2 ada di negri ini tdk dijadikan alat fitnah , yg skrg sedang ngetren di negri Garuda (enforce existing laws first, so that if in the future death sentence is implemented in this country, it won't be misused, like much else of what has been happening in this country)*

Novia Piee Chutheristz *saya sangat setuju koruptor di hukum mati....supaya para calon2 koruptor takut dan jera..(I very much agree with the death sentence for corruptors...so that potential corruptors will be afraid and wary)*

Sahlan Abdul Khalim *asal udah terbukti setuju koruptor dihukum mati..... Biar memberi efek jera.....bg koruptor yg lain (If (s)he is convicted, I agree with the death sentence for corruptors..to give deterrent effects.*

Diana Rahmitha *setuju deh, toh nyatanya hukum indonesia gini gini aja,mungkin itu yang bikin koruptor takut (I agree, since in fact, law enforcement in Indonesia is stagnant, the death sentence may scare the corruptors).*

From the last examples, it can be seen that posts from CSO's activists reflect the legal discourse of corruption influence citizens to make comments using the same frame. In other words, the activists, through their posts, are driving

the discussion on corruption as a legal discourse (Pierce, 2016:7) or discourse of law. Corruption are framed as to be governed and sanctioned by a set of legal doctrines under which particular events or practices can be adjudicated (ibid.), therefore corruption can and should be eradicated if not fought by law enforcement. Anti-corruption campaigns arguing along this vein, then, mostly focus on supporting the implementation of certain laws and bodies that secure such processes and uphold the law.

This legal discourse of corruption is shaped by anti-corruption campaigns practices organized by formal and institutionalized CSO such as ICW (Indonesian Corruption Watch), that reflects what Della Porta (2017:663) call a ‘top down’ framing of corruption in term of “good governance” equipped with legal content or implemented by institutions like judiciary authorities, international organizations, and programmatic CSOs. The CSO programs mostly focus on legal and institutional reforms, such as pushing the government and legislative bodies to formulate and implement anti-corruption laws, supporting KPK by the prosecution of corrupt officials, and saving KPK from the attacks of predatory elites (see chapter 2).

Provincial (Banten) Social Media Discourse of Corruption

Anti-corruption campaigns in Banten province are most conducted by more informal and less-organized activist-citizens. This contrasts with the more formal anti-corruption social media campaigns at the national level, run by programmatic, and institutionalized CSO (Civil Society Organizations) as previously discussed.

The first social media platform that used reports and comments on corruption cases in Banten was Fesbuk Banten News (FBN). It was founded in 2010 by a freelance journalist Lulu Jamaludin, a lawyer and politician Agus Setyawan, and an entrepreneur Andi Suhud, without having any formal or legal status. In 2016, it had reached more than 100,000 readers and on average 5,000 people engaged³ with it per week. Although it is not solely dedicated to covering corruption, FBN has frequently been involved in anti-corruption campaigns in Banten. Lulu Jamaludin, founder, administrator, and also reporter of FBN have taken part in Mata Banten (Masyarakat Transparansi Banten/ Banten Society for

3) Any action someone makes on one of your posts or comments in one of your advertising, groups, or pages is referred to as Facebook engagement. This includes all responses, feedback, shares, and link hits. (<https://databox.com/facebook-engagement-tips>).

Transparency). Mata-Banten is a local anti-corruption NGO that concerns itself with investigating cases of corruption in Banten. They invited FBN to become their 'outlet' of 'news' related to corruption in Banten.

The second forum I studied is *Wong Banten* (People of Banten), a Facebook group launched in 2010 by a Chinese Muslim entrepreneur, Iwan Subakti. It was joined by 14,718 members⁴ many of whom were scholars, journalists, writers, artists, NGO activists, and 'ordinary citizens' of Banten. Many of the active members of this platform seem to have known each other and may have been involved in activities of a literacy organization called Rumah Dunia, however, *Wong Banten* was also not set up as a formal organization. This Facebook group is not exclusively aimed at discussing corruption. However, leading up to elections, both at the national (legislative) and local (governor, mayor) level in which members of the Banten political dynasty were involved (see chapter 1), *Wong Banten* is an important avenue for anti-corruption and anti-dynasty campaigns.

Thirdly, Forum Warga Banten (Citizens of Banten Forum) was a Facebook group founded in 2013 by Sanusi, a former NGO activist and publisher from Ciputat, South Tangerang, Banten. The forum was created as a response to the Ratu Atut and Wawan corruption scandal (see chapter 1). This is one of the reasons many of the posts and comments on Forum Warga Banten relate to anti-corruption and is part of a wider anti-dynasty campaign. Sanusi, however, designed Forum Warga Banten, as stated in its 'about' section, to be a channel for 'citizens of Banten's aspirations and opinions' as they 'have the right and obligation to control the government as who is to get the mandate to build a life that is prosperous, fair and civilized' (About Forum Warga Banten, March 28, 2013). In 2016, Forum Warga Banten had almost 17,000 members.

From the three social media page and groups mentioned above, I captured 1,478 postings, 3,112 comments. Using the same analytical tools explained above, I produced a word cloud reflecting the most frequently used words.

4) Member is someone who has joined the Facebook group. It is no admin approval requirement. Possible exception: if admins turn on participant approval, then members will need to be approved as participants before they can post or comment for the first time. Once someone is approved as a participant, their future posts might still require admin approval. She or he can post and comment. She or he can see group content in their News Feed and other places on Facebook, and can be made an admin or moderator. (Facebook.com)

From the figure 3, it can be seen that the name of ex-governor of Banten; “Atut” is the most frequently used word (count: 2,216 times, weighted percentage: 2.97%) on all of the three Facebook page and groups . It is then followed by the root words “korupsi/corruption” (1,213; 1.68%) and its stemmed words⁵ such as: “KPK/The Corruption Eradication Commission” (1,166; 1.62%), “rakyat/people” (1,091, 1.51%), “uang/money” (574; 0.80%), “warga/citizens” (556; 0.77%), hibah/grant” (376; 0.52%) “dinasti/dynasty” (count: 348; weighted percentage: 0.48%), “negara/state” (241; 0.33%), “jawara/thug” (207; 0.29%).

From the word cluster analysis (Figure 4.), it can be seen that those root and stemmed words are related or often used with others words, such as: “mati/dead” (count: 191; weighted percentage: 0.26%), “maling/thief” (140; 0.19%), “malu/shame” (127; 0.18%), “bodoh/stupid” (95; 0.13%), “buruk/ugly/bad” (70; 0.10%), ‘sampah/social scum’ (70; 0.10%) “haram/forbidden/sinful” (64; 0.09%), “moral” (53; 0.07%), “neraka/hell (38; 0.05%)”, “setan/devil” (34; 0.05%), “edan/crazy” (27; 0.04%).

From the figure above, it can be seen that the root and most frequently used words “Atut” and “korupsi/Corruption” are closely linked with the word “warga/citizens”. How these words are connected in statements can be found in these examples of postings and comments:

Bondan Heri (Fesbuk Banten News)

Seharusnya warga banten pada bangun jangan tidur terus punya pemimpin hanya kejar setoran dan korupsi hampir disemua sektor ...mana pejabat-pejabat penegak hukumnya... apa memang harus rakyat yang gerak.... jalan...serbu....para koruptor... ganyang mereka...

(Citizens of Banten, you have to wake up from your sleep...your leaders are hungry for money and corrupt...in almost every sector...where are the law officers?.....should the people fight?...move..attack..those corruptors...lynch them...)

Pecong Pesa (wong banten)

wakakakak rame, pelacur atut masih aja belain atut, curiga suami mudanya lagi tuh masih mau banten dipegang sama dinasti? Hancurkan!!! Ayo kita sama2 bangkitkan kemarahan warga supaya Ganyang Dinasti & antek2nya sampe ke akar!! Allahuakbar!!

(wakakakak [laughing in cynical tone] it is terrible, atut’s whores still

5) Words associated with the same stem of the basis word (van den Berg, 2018:98).

supporting atut, I feel suspicious that she has a younger husband, do you still want to be ruled by the dynasty? Destroy!!! Let's get together to ignite the anger of the citizens, so they will slaughter the dynasty and its cronies down to their roots!!! God is Great!!!)

Aryo Wisnu (Wong Banten)

Ayo warga Banten ganyang atut!!!.....(Citizens of Banten lets lynch Atut!!!)

Tati Rimbahayati (Forum Warga Banten)

Harapan ku ganyang koruptor !!! (I hope to lynch the corruptors)

In the postings and comments above, the word 'corruption' seems synonymous with 'Atut', 'corruptor' and 'dynasty', and antagonistic with "warga/citizens". In this sense, citizens are subjects to be called upon, by others fellow citizens, mobilized for political actions by igniting their anger (*bangkitan kemarahan warga*). They are triggered by fierce imperative speeches, like: 'serbu /attack', 'bongkar/smashed', 'hancurkan/destory', and especially 'ganyang/crush/lynch'.

The word 'ganyang' has strong emotional roots in Indonesia's political history. Initially, it was used by Soekarno (first president of Indonesia) during the nationalist campaign against the formation of The Federation of Malaysia in 1963. *Ganyang Malaysia* ('Crush Malaysia') was used as popular rhetoric whenever a mass rally expressing anti-Malaysia sentiment broke out (Budiawan, 2017:365). Beyond this, "ganyang", as its meaning is close to 'lynching', has continued to be used as a 'primary signifier of violence in the (counter) revolutionary movement of 1965 and onwards, including the bloody crack-down on the Indonesian Communist's Party (PKI) (Mohammad, 2011, Melvin, 2018:53). In this regard, the usage of the word 'lynching' in the online anti-corruption campaigns of Banten indicates a strong emotional expression of anger (see Sukandar, 2010: 406) by political subjects who refer to themselves as 'warga/citizens' of Banten as opposed towards their leaders.

Another word that is closely related to 'korupsi' is the word "haram/forbidden/sinful" (see figure 4. above). These two words are often used together in statements as can be found in the examples below:

Jun Chie DouLpintz (Fesbuk Banten News)

org yg korup b'ati org mkn dgn uang haram...whai pemimpin ingatlah swtu sat kw psti mati mk dri skglah anda bertobat.

(Corrupt people mean people who eat *haram* money... Oh leaders, remember that one day you will surely die, so from now on you must repent)

Badar Lumut Gemstone (Forum Warga Banten)

Mencuri itu haram dilarang oleh Agama klo Korupsi mencuri Bkn yah..

Seorang Pencuri apabila ingin bertobat dia hrs mendatangi & meminta ma'af kpd org yg pernah d curi nya Serta Memberikan Mal (uang) utk mengganti uang yg pernah d curi nya. Krn Allah tdk akn mengampuni Dosa Seseorang seblum kita Menyelesaikan Permasalahan kita dgn orang terkait (Hablumminannas) setelah itu baru kita bertobat kpd Allah swt (Hablumminallah)...Klo Koruptor Bertobat siapa yg hrs dia datangi Krn uang yg dia makan hak orang byk.

(Stealing is forbidden by religion, is corruption stealing? A thief, if he wants to repent must come and apologize to the person he has stolen from, and give Mal (money) to replace the money he has stolen. Because Allah will not forgive someone's sins before we solve our problems with the affected people (Hablumminannas) after that we will repent to Allah swt (Hablumminallah)... If the corruptor repents, who should he go to? Because the money he steals belongs to a lot of people)

Golagong New (Wong Banten)

#saveBanten

BERSIHKAN BANTEN DARI KORUPSI

Anda berada di lingkaran PLT Gubernur Banten, Rano Karno?

Apa yang Anda cari? Jabatan atau harta? Jika itu proporsional, dan itu hak Anda, tidak apa-apa. Tapi jika Anda mencuri atau korupsi, ingatlah! Itu berbahaya. Jangan beri makan anak Anda dan istri Anda dengan uang haram. Anda sekeluarga akan jadi orang yang hina dan seperti binatang. Korupsi itu sama dengan mencuri. Di dalam agama yang Anda yakini, korupsi iu mencuri dan mencuri itu haram. Tidak sadarkah, jika ada teman-teman Anda yang dijumpi maut, saat masih duduk di kursi panas, yang Anda peroleh dengan menyuap rakyat, itu sebetulnya pertanda Anda diingatkan Tuhan agar segera bertobat? Ayo, kalau tidak kita, siapa lagi? Bersihkan Banten dari korupsi. (Gol A Gong)

CLEAN BANTEN FROM CORRUPTION

Are you in the circle of the Acting Governor of Banten, Rano Karno?

What are you looking for? Position or property? If it's proportionate, and it's your right, that's okay. But if you steal or corrupt, remember! That is dangerous. Do not feed your children and your wife with haram money. You and your family will be despised and like animals. Corruption is the same as stealing. In the religion you believe in, corruption is stealing, and stealing is haram. Don't you realize that if some of your friends are dead while still sitting in the hot seat, which you get by bribing the people, it's actually a sign that you are being reminded by God to quickly repent? Come on, if not us, who else? Clean Banten from corruption.)

Haram, in the postings and comments above, refers to one of Islamic teachings and moralities. In this case, corruption is equated with stealing that is prohibited in the Qur'an or would result in sin when it committed by a Muslim. It is clear that in the three Facebook page and groups in Banten, corruption is constructed in terms of religious morality, especially Islam. This is even more obvious when the word 'korupsi/corruption' is also, in the word cluster analysis above, closely connected with the word 'moral', as this comment shows:

User Laviola Roma (on Fesbuk Banten News)

Sudah ga aneh lagi kalau di provinsi kita,meski dikenal dengan religiusitasnya, moral pemimpinnya nya dah bobrok, ancur, berantakan, pejabatnya korupsi mencuri uang rakyat.

(It is not unusual that in our province, although it is well-known for its religiosity, the morality of our leaders is degraded, shattered, falling apart, government officials are corrupt and stealing people's money).

User Pecong Pesa (on Wong Banten)

Waduh yg ngebela pada dibayar berapa sama keluarga H. Kasan nih? Antek2nya paling juga. Hahaha!! Munafik om namanya kalo belain H.kasan family & antek2nya, mereka cuma aib yg seharusnya tidak dicontoh oleh semua calon generasi pengubah bangsa berikutnya, ga punya ahlak, moral dan etika. cuma bikin warga Banten tambah menderita. Coba om2 pembela lihat permasalahan2 yg ada di Banten, masalah sosial, ketimpangan ekonomi yg luar biasa, kebodohan yg terus dibuat.

(Oh my God...they who defend [the dynasty], how much money they've got from H. Kasan [Ratu Atut's father]? They are just minions. Hahaha !! They are hypocrites. H. Kasan's family's members are a disgrace that must not be respected by the next generation of this nation. They do not perform any good deeds, have no morality, and are not ethical/of noble character. They just make the citizens of Banten suffer. For people who defend them, please take a look at the problems in Banten: social problems, huge economic disparities, ignorance that is always being created)

And, in this comment with more angry tone (also indicated by the use of all capital letters):

Hendra (Forum Warga Banten)

DINASTI ATUT SANGAT MISKIN IMAN, MISKIN AKHLAK..MISKIN AGAMA DAN MISKIN MORAL..DINASTI ATUT TIDAK TAU KALAO HARTA TIDAK BISA DIBAWA MATI...TAPI KITA SEMUA MASIH KAYA DENGAN IMAN, AGAMA, AHLAK, DAN MORAL MESKIPUN MUNGKIN KITA MISKIN HARTA..LEBIH TERHORMAT. DAN DI MATA ALLAH LEBIH MULIA AMIINN

(ATUT'S DYNASTY is POOR IN FAITH, POOR IN GOOD DEEDS...RELIGION AND POOR MORALS...ATUT'S DYNASTY DOESN'T KNOW THAT WEALTH WON'T BE CARRIED WHEN THEY WILL BE DEAD..BUT..THANK GOD..WE ALL ARE RICH WITH FAITH, GOOD DEEDS & MORALITY, EVEN THOUGH WE LACK RICHES...WE HAVE MORE HONOR..AND IN THE EYES OF ALLAH WE ARE MORE HONORABLE)

In this comment, Hendra contrasts 'Atut's dynasty' as the one who has 'poor moral' standards with the 'we', the citizens of Banten, who are 'rich in faith, good deeds, and morality' in religious (Islamic) term. In Banten, social activities such as rituals, religion, and politics, are supported by a moral discourse that is tied to local expression and Islam Ideology (Hamid and Facal 2013: 51). Using this moral discourse, such as "in the eyes of Allah" citizens are portrayed as 'honorable' or good in morality (akhlak yang Baik) and, conversely, Ratu Atut and her dynasty have 'poor morals', or are immoral. In this discursive construction, citizens (warga) are positioned as subjects who speak up to correct their immoral corrupt leaders, as is also suggested in these posts:

Ing S. Wirakusuma (Wong Banten)

Warga jangan takut bicara, dan jangan coba-coba jadi orang bayaran dinasti. Banten saat ini perlu tindakan radikal untuk memperbaiki moral pemimpinnya dan angkat derajat rakyatnya.

(Citizens, do not be afraid to speak up, and don't try to be the one who gets paid by the dynasty. Now, Banten needs radical actions in correcting its leader's morality and honoring its people).

Raga Aquino (Fesbuk Banten News)

Revolusi etika dan moral dari pemimpin adalah hak warga yang harus direbut di bumi Banten...!!! (Ethics and moral revolution of the leaders is a citizens' right to be claimed in Banten)

Merhansyah (Forum Warga Banten)

Kalau Wawan suami Airin tidak korupsi alkes di Tangsel 1000% saya dukung Airin. Ini secara moral Airin sudah cacat dan harus bertanggung jawab atas korupsi ini.

(If Wawan [Ratu Atut's brother], Airin's [major of South Tangerang] husband has not committed corruption in health equipment procurement in South Tangerang, 1000% I will support Airin. This is it; Airin is morally blemished and she must be held responsible for that corruption.)

Moreover, besides the moral discourse of corruption related to religion and expectation of what a 'good leader' should do, there are also statements that are related to greed. It can be seen in the world cluster above in which the word 'korupsi' has a link to the word 'keserakahan' (greed), as exemplified in these statements:

Forum Warga (Forum Warga Banten)

Setelah Korupsi Menjadi Tirani

.....

Begitulah kekuasaan. ia cenderung korup. Menyeleweng dan diselewengkan. Terlebih kekuasaan yang tak terbatas. Kekuasaan yang disangga oleh keserakahan orang-orang besar. "Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men." ungkap Lord Acton (1887). Adagium ini terus menemui pembuktiannya. Orang-orang besar karena kekuasaannya kebelakang banyak yang

bermetamorfosis membentuk gerombolan penjahat. Dari kepompong itu, kekuasaan diubah menjadi milik kelompok. Kekuasaan dibagi-bagi berdasarkan selera dan nafsu kolektif kaum pembesar.

(After Corruption Becomes Tyranny)

That is power. It tends to be corrupt. Diverted and perverted. Particularly, unlimited power. The power is supported by the greed of the great men. "Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men," said Lord Acton (1887). This adage continues to find proof. Many great people because of their power have metamorphosed into gangs of criminals. From the cocoon, power belongs to a special group. Power was divided according to the preferences and collective desires of the dignitaries)

Dede Iding Keneh (Fesbuk Banten News)

korupsi adalah wujud nyata dari keserakahan duniawi...gulung sajah..!!!!!! (Corruption is a real form of worldly greed... just demolish it..!!!!!!)

Thoniar Thoni (Wong Banten)

itulah kl kita slh memilih walikota, hanya karena segerintil uang masyarakat mau aji milih dya, skg masyarakat sendiri yg merasakan penderitaan karena keserakahan walikotanya

(That's why we chose the mayor, just because of a small amount of money. The public voted for him, now the people themselves are suffering because of the mayor's greed)

Judging from the word clouds, following my words cluster analysis, and the examples of postings and comments above, it can be grasped that corruption in social media anti-corruption campaigns in Banten are constructed as moral discourse. Through this moral discourse the anti-corruption campaign in Banten is not set to activate 'policy measures enacted by governments to prevent bribery and punish nepotism', but it is more of a moral force reflecting the indignation among ordinary people and among articulate elites that things are not right' (Sampson, 2005:105). This moral force is reflected in postings and comments such as above which state that the anti-corruption campaign is realized through 'igniting citizen's anger'. The citizens who post or comment about corruption uses fierce and vitriolic words to express their disappointment and anger

toward Ratu Atut's corrupt dynasty. This helps to provoke other citizens' anger. To be able to do that, another moral discourse is constructed in depicting Ratu Atut's dynasty as 'immoral and greedy leaders and as opposed to 'good citizens'. In this sense, following Gupta (2005:175), a discourse of corruption inevitably assumes a standard of morally appropriate behaviour against which 'corrupt' actions are measured. Thus, corruption becomes a site for debates prompted by conflicting systems of moral and ethical behaviour (ibid.) In other words, this moral discourse of corruption is what Sian Lazar (2005:212) seems to be hinting at when she refers to 'corruption talk': talk that is meant to highlight the moral integrity of the teller more than anything else, as citizens accuse their leaders of corruption. In the case of Banten, we see citizens using vitriolic and emotional words as means of constructing public opinion and morality, in the sense that morality is under threat from corruption and immorality of their leaders.

Conclusion

In this chapter, to understand how discourses of corruption are constructed through online anti-corruption campaigns at both local (Banten) and national levels, I made a comparison between the discourse of corruption in social media campaigning anti-corruption in Banten with social-media of anti-corruption CSOs on a national level. This comparative analysis is useful to interpret local understandings of corruption. I did so by looking at an anti-corruption campaign in a specific region of Banten and how Bantenese citizens have engaged in a discourse of corruption and interpret it as citizens' voices resisting their political elite through digital social media. And, by elaborating on local understandings of corruption, I can make a contribution to discussions about understandings of politics and the state-citizens relation or citizenship.

At a national level, in social media anti-corruption campaigns that are mostly organized by formal and programmatic CSOs, corruption is framed as a legal discourse. Whereas in Banten, corruption in social media anti-corruption campaigns, is largely constructed as a moral discourse related to religion and the expectation of what a 'good leader' should do. This moral discourse is shaped by activist citizens who are bound to local Islamic expression and values but not organized into formal and programmatic institutions or organizations. And, what these activist citizens actually do with social media, or their media practices, in anti-corruption campaigns in Banten, will be explored in the next chapter.

Chapter Four

Indirect activism and the Practice of Doing Citizenship

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I analyzed the anti-corruption discourse in social media campaigning in Banten in comparison with the similar use of social media by CSOs on a national level. I also argued that corruption was framed as a moral discourse in social media in Banten. In this chapter, I continue to delve into what activist-citizens in Banten actually do with social media. In other words, I am looking at social media as practices, as ‘something human beings do...a form of action’ (Couldry, 2012:61). Different from the discourse analysis (used in chapter 3) that considered social media as texts or ‘system of statements’ (Parker, 1989:61, Sam, 2019:3, this practice approach to social media frames its questions by reference to ‘what people are doing in relation to media in the context in which they act’ (Couldry, 2012:62).

In this sense, I focus on Facebook posts and comments, which I will read and analyze as an ‘act of citizenship’ (Isin and Nielson, 2008, Isin & Ruppert, 2015, Di Gregorio and Merolli, 2016:934,), i.e. as both institutional and individual

practices of making citizens or citizenship (Fourtier, 2016: 1040). And, since this act of citizenship is conducted on the Internet or social media, it is conceived as a digital act of citizenship that is defined as a set of digital acts that designate political subjects emerging from the encounter between citizens and the state (Isin & Ruppert, 2015:9).

Through following the same three Facebook page and groups: Fesbuk Banten News (FBN), Wong Banten (WB), and Forum Warga Banten (FWB), I ask how anti-corruption activism in Banten is being practiced online? And, what kind of citizenship does this online anti-corruption activism reflect?

I made an open coding of posting and comments related to corruption in the three Facebook page and groups above categorizing those postings and comments into different types of digital acts. Digital acts, here, are conceived as all speech acts uttered through the Internet or social media (Isin and Rupperts, 2015). In this sense, I conducted open coding to examine social media data for concepts or categories, i.e. digital acts, that can explain an observed phenomenon (Gobo, 2008: 227). After initial categories were generated, they were modified, condensed and refined to best reflect the data (Seelig, et.al, 2019: 20).

In this chapter, I argue that online anti-corruption activism in Banten is practiced through the digital acts of reporting and sharing news on corruption and digital acts of flaming toward local leaders who are deemed corrupt. These digital acts, as I further argue, reflect what I call 'online indirect activism'. In this online anti-corruption indirect activism, digital acts enacted by its activist-citizens depict emotions including anger, hate, disgust and also a sense of injustice. The 'online indirect activism' and expression of emotion shapes a type of citizenship that I call as 'digital affective citizenship' reflects the character of citizenship in Banten that , more or less, is 'powerless angry citizens'. This characteristic is resulted from the struggle of emotional citizens who have a desire to curtail corrupt leaders and preventing them to be re-elected in the elections but have less leadership and organizational power which can effectively lead to such curtailment.

Digital Acts of Reporting and Sharing News on Corruption

The first coding categories that I generate to identify online anti-corruption campaign practices in Fesbuk Banten News, Wong Banten, and Forum Warga Banten are digital acts of reporting and sharing news related to corruption.

I have categorized 198 postings in Fesbuk Banten News (FBN), as the first

and most active citizen journalist Facebook page in Banten (see chapter 3), almost all of the postings on FBN can be categorized as digital acts of reporting news on corruption. From 2010 to 2015, there were four categories of reports related to corruption in FBN, they are reports on corruption allegation cases (44 postings, 754 comments), reports on corrupt electoral practices (51 postings, 2614 comments), reports on corruption and infrastructure condition (37 postings, 711 comments), and reports on anti-corruption demonstrations (64 postings, 1205 comments). The remaining postings outside these four categories can be categorized as reports on people with poor health conditions, and calling for help and donations for them (39 postings, 315 comments).

Tabel 1. Coding Categories For Fesbuk Banten News (FBN) of Digital Acts of Reporting.

| Coding Categories | Postings | Comments |
|--|----------|----------|
| Reports on anti-corruption demonstrations | 64 | 1205 |
| Reports on corrupt electoral practices | 51 | 2614 |
| Reports on corruption allegation cases | 44 | 754 |
| Reports on corruption and infrastructure condition | 37 | 711 |
| Reports on people with poor health conditions | 39 | 315 |

The digital act of reporting on corruption allegation cases, according to Uday Suhada, one of the FBN's citizen journalists and who also well known as an anti-corruption activist in Banten from ALIPP (Aliansi Independent Peduli Publik/Independent Alliance for Public Care), is one of his attempts to:

“build public opinion...in this region...because one of the requirements for corruption cases to be handled by KPK is that the case considered [is] making people upset (meresahkan masyarakat) or [that it] has become a public concern of that region...to make the corruption case stink...so KPK will smell it..”. (Interview on 19 September 2014)

One of the corruption cases reported by Uday Suhada on Fesbuk Ban News is *kasus korupsi dana hibah* (social-assistance grants corruption case) in 2011. Money from the social-assistance grant¹ was suspected to be illegally used for funding Ratu Atut's election campaign in her governor candidacy of 2011. Uday posted:

1) A social assistance grant is support given in the form of money, goods, or services from a local government to regional company (BUMD), society organizations (organisasi masyarakat) and the community.

DUGAAN KORUPSI DANA BANTUAN HIBAH DI PROVINSI BANTEN (Oleh : Uday Suhada)

August 16, 2011 at 11:35pm

FESBUK BANTEN News - Agar tidak menjadi fitnah, berikut ini saya ketik ulang Kebijakan Gubernur Banten Ratu Atut Chosiyah mengeluarkan uang rakyat berkedok Dana Bantuan Hibah pada Tahun Anggaran 2011 yang sangat kental berbau Kolusi, Korupsi dan Nepotisme.

Hal ini saya lakukan mengingat Pemprov Banten menutup-nutupi kebijakan yang mengesampingkan asas kepatutan dan kepatantasan ini. Jangankan alamat penerima bantuan, sekedar Surat Keputusan Pembebanan yang ditandatangani Ratu Atut Chosiyah-pun disimpan melebihi pusaka seolah-olah milik probadi. Padahal hal itu adalah mutlak hak publik untuk mengetahuinya, sebab dana yang dikeluarkan berasal dari rakyat melalui APBD.

Corruption allegation of Discretionary Social-Assistance Grant in Banten Province (By Uday Suhada).

FESBUK BANTEN News- In order not to become a false accusation, herewith I retype (my writing) concerning a policy decision made by Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut Chosiyah in spending people money in the name of Discretionary social-assistance grant from the 2011 fiscal year that smells of collusion, corruption, and nepotism.

I do this because the Banten Provincial government is covering up this policy that ignores the fit and proper test. They do not just keep beneficiaries' addresses, but also hide the decision letter signed by Ratu Atut Chosiyah. The public, however, has the absolute right to know about it, since the money comes from the people through regional development budget (APBD).

This post was of one the longest on the Fesbuk Banten News and was divided into two posts, since it was also to uncover the list of discretionary social-assistance grant recipients, organizations, or institutions, including the amount of money they received.

The second category is a report on corrupt electoral practices. During the election time, in Banten, issues and discussions on corruption and dynasty are always at the forefront of debates. This is also a time when, citizen-journalists of Fesbuk Banten News active monitoring elections process, as Lulu Jamaludin, founder, administrator, and also a reporter of Fesbuk Banten News once said:

Since I become part of MATA Banten (Masyarakat Transparansi Banten/ Banten Society for Transparency), I was called to get involved in the monitoring of money politics or unfair campaigns in the elections, by encouraging citizen-journalist of FBN to look for such cases and posts them in FBN (Interview on 3 September 2018)

In most of the postings, citizen-journalists of Fesbuk Banten News search and share their findings on how members of the dynasty, especially Ratu Atut, use underhand campaign strategies including money-politics. For example:



Do you want to have a healthy and fast-growing baby? So he/she can vote for the next local election? Please eat this GOVERNOR branded breast-milk companion biscuit. The biscuit has been circulated in the nearest community health center...(Imar/LLJ)

In this post, Imar, one of the citizen-journalist of Fesbuk Banten News (FBN) reported unfair campaigns strategy namely the use of local government programs, in this case, additional health nutrition programs, by Ratu Atut, as an

incumbent, as a campaign tool for governor election. Different from ‘professional journalism, Imar, used irony and humor in his report, but still provided a photo as factual proof of his report.

In this sense, FBN’s citizens’ journalists’ reporting on corruption, seems to echo what Blaagaard (2013: 194) thinks about citizens’ journalism when they challenge the ostensible objectivity of professional journalism, that is: “detached, unemotional, neutral, unbiased, and independent”. By contrast, citizen journalism a la FBN shows that their reports on corruption are often passionate, engaged, affective and biased, yet also a result of journalistic subjectivity (ibid. 195, Isin and Ruppert, 2015:145).

This type of affective citizens journalism was also conducted by Mang Ripin, an amateur photographer and the most active journalist of FBN, when he makes reports on poor infrastructures condition in Banten. In his postings, Mang Ripin did not directly mention that the poor infrastructures are caused by corruption, as exemplified by these postings:



The shot from Mang Ripin

Saturday (28/12/2013). A swing at the City of Serang’s square broke and collapsed. As the result, children who used to play in the square that is worth 10 billion rupiah (about 645.000 USD) feel disappointed.

Related to his report and shot in FBN, Mang Ripin explained that:

I cannot really say that these poor conditions of roads or public facilities are because of corruption. I just give some hints. Even sometimes I try to criticize using indirect symbols this is a kind of resistance without being rough” (Interview, 05 September 2014)

The notion of reporting using ‘indirect symbol’ also can be found in this posting:



The shot from Mang Ripin

A garbage truck passed on the main street of Serang City. Sunday (4/11/2013) (LLJ)

This photo not only depicts a garbage truck passing on the main street of Serang city, as is written in the posting, but also a puddle on that street, suggesting that the street is damaged, and a reflection of Ratu Atut’s billboard photo on the puddle. “I want to relate the poor condition of the street with the

image of Ratu Atut who at that time still is still in power. But without being direct,” said Mang Ripin.

This kind of act of reporting is coming from Mang Ripin’s passion for photography, as well as empathizing with others and caring about what is going on around him. He states that:

I love to walk around (*keluyuran*) with my camera, in my free time or when I have jobs, I always looking for something interesting to be posted in FBN. I ended up mostly taking photos of problems faced by citizens of Banten. Mostly without any planning,...as a citizen of Banten, even though I am not born in Banten, or at least, I feel (*merasa*) as citizens of Banten, I want to share those problems.. to make other citizens care (*peduli*)...and also to fight (*melawan*) manipulations (*penyelewengan*). like in the case of poor roads or public facilities. (Interview, 05 September 2014)

This act of passionate sharing, in a different way, was also enacted by members of Wong Banten and Forum Warga Banten Facebook group (about these Facebook groups see chapter 3), in the form of sharing news on corruption from mainstream mass media added with provocative statements. It shows how social media operate in ‘the hybrid media system’ (Chadwick, 2017: xi) that: “...is built upon interactions among older and newer media logics in the reflexivity connected social fields of media and politics.

The Wong Banten Facebook group has 59 postings that I have categorized as digital acts of sharing news on corruption. While in Forum Warga Banten there are 75 postings that I coded in the same category. In fact, the members who actively share the news on corruption in the two Facebook groups are often the same person. They have joined both Facebook groups.²

These are the example of postings from Sanusi who are an active member of Wong Banten and also the founder and administrator of Forum Warga Banten (see also chapter 3):

2) Both Wong Banten and Forum Warga Banten are public group. So, both the groups’ members and people from outside the groups can read the news that shared. However, members of Wong Banten and Forum Warga Banten relatively different. Wong Banten has more members and they located mostly in Serang, the capital of Banten Province. Whereas, Forum Warga Banten has less members and most of their location is *Tangerang Selatan* (South Tangerang).

ForumWarga ▸ **Wong Banten**
November 4, 2013 · 🌐

Wow... sekedar untuk nenteng merek, pake ngerampok duit rakyat?
Dijejali asesoris apapun ya tetap aja ATUT juga.. orang pasar RAWU..

Menenteng Tas Ini, Atut Serasa Wanita Berkelas
Harganya Rp 400 - 700 juta?...

[Continue Reading](#)



Menenteng Tas Ini, Atut Serasa Wanita Berkelas | gayahidup | Tempo.co
Di Jakarta para sosialita juga bergegas membeli tas Hermes untuk koleksinya
TEMPO.CO

Like · Comment · Share · 👍 5 🗨️ 7

Forum Warga > Wong Banten

Wow..just to have this branded bag, they from robbing people’s money?
Dressed up with any accessories, she is still ATUT...a lady from RAWU market.

Carrying this bag, Atut feels like a classy woman
The price is 400-700 million?

Carrying this bag, Atut feels like a classy woman I lifestyle I Tempo.co

In Jakarta, socialites also rushed to buy Hermes bags for their collections.

TEMPO.CO

Forum Warga is a pseudonym of Sanusi. He also has another account called “Gabriel Jeka II” which he often uses when he is sharing some news on corruption in Forum Warga Banten. This is seen in the following post:



Gabriel Jeka II

April 16 at 8:28am

Uang Haram hasil menjarah APBD Banten

===

KPK Sita Mobil Airin Terkait Pencucian Uang Wawan

Selasa, 15 April 2014 | 20:08 WIB

JAKARTA, KOMPAS.com - Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK) menyita satu unit Honda CRV bernomor polisi B 1179 NJA atas nama Wali Kota Tangerang Selatan Airin Rachmi Diany. Penyitaan ini dilakukan terkait penyidikan kasus dugaan tindak pidana pencucian uang yang menjerat suami Airin, Tubagus Chaeri Wardana alias Wawan.

Gabriel Jeka II

Illegitimate Money from Robbing APBD (Local Government Budget) of Banten


====

KPK Seized Airin's Car Related to Wawan's Money Laundry

Selasa, 15 April 2014 | 20:08 WIB

JAKARTA, KOMPAS.com - The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) confiscated a Honda CRV with number plate B 1179 NJA belonging to the Mayor of South Tangerang City, Airin Rachmy Diani. This confiscation is related to the investigation of a money laundry allegation case that also involves Airin's husband, Tubagus Chaeru Wardana alias Wawan.

This kind of news sharing combined with a provocative introduction is a typical post in Forum Warga Banten and Wong Banten. In this sense, the act of sharing news is not neutral, but involves the passion of the posters to fight adversaries, i.e. the Banten political dynasty and its cronies. It can also be seen from this news with a provocative introduction from Agus Safari shared in both Wong Banten and Forum Warga Banten:



Agus Safari Gustav shared a link.
June 25, 2015 · BlackBerry Smartphones App

Runtuhkan politik dinasti Atut di Tangsel.
Saatnya Bergerak #TolakPolitikDinasti! Kamis 25 Juni 2015

Jakarta - Politik dinasti selama ini tumbuh subur di seantero negeri. Saatnya bergerak menolak politik dinasti yang telah membunuh sendi-sendi demokrasi.

"Salah satu gerakan yang harus didorong sekuat mungkin oleh LSM dan parpol mulai melihat manusia sebagai manusia. Jadi manusia bukan dilihat dari hubungan biologis atau genetisnya. Jangan biarkan politik dinasti membunuh demokrasi," kata Sekjen Partai Solidaritas Indonesia Raja Juli Antoni, kepada detikcom, Rabu (25/6/2015).

Sebenarnya inti dari demokrasi adalah memberikan ruang seluas-luasnya kepada masyarakat dari latar belakang apa pun untuk menjadi pemimpin. Tidak peduli apakah dia dari kalangan elite atau rakyat biasa, semua mestinya diberi ruang berpartisipasi baik sebagai pemilih maupun orang yang dipilih dalam kontestasi politik.

"Dengan lahirnya politik dinasti itu justru mengingkari makna demokrasi itu sendiri," tegas Mantan Ketua Umum PP Ikatan Pelajar Muhammadiyah (IPM) ini.

Agus Safari Gustav

Bring down Atut's dynasty politics in Tangsel (South Tangerang)

Time to move #RefuseDynastyPolitic Thursday 25th of June 2015

Jakarta. A Political dynasty has been rising throughout the country. This is the time for making a movement against such a political dynasty that has been destroying the foundations of our democracy.

"One of the movements that should strongly be pushed by NGOs and political parties is that which sees human relations as not only biological or genetic relations. Don't let the phenomena of political dynasty kill democracy", said Secretary-General of Indonesia Solidarity Party, Raja Juli Antoni to detikcom, Wednesday (25/8.2015).

The core of democracy, actually, is providing the broadest space for members of society from any background to act as leaders. It is not a matter whether he/she is coming from elite circles or are just ordinary people, everyone should be given space for participation both as voters or as the one who is being voted for in political contestations.

"The emergence of a political dynasty, in fact, means denying the meaning of democracy itself." said this former Chairmen of Muhammadiyah Students Bond (IPM).

Agus Safari is one of the most active members of Forum Warga Banten and Wong Banten and he has, for a long time, been involved in anti-corruption and anti-dynasty campaigns on Facebook. Agus Safari has been involved in South Tangerang City major's election battle since 2010 when he became one of the witnesses in the Constitutional Court for the case made against Airin Rachmy Diany's allegedly fraudulent practices during in the election. At that time he was a Head of Governmental Section in Pamulang Barat Village, one of the village offices in South Tangerang City. Besides that, he was also a supporter of Arsid, Airin's opposition in the local election. Due to his statements, combined with those of others, Airin Rachmy Diany's eventual win in the 2010 elections was canceled and The Constitutional Court (MK) decided to re-hold the election. However, in the re-election, Airin successfully maintained her victory. In the 2015 election he continued to support Arsid, and is thus, again, opposing the incumbent; Airin Rachmy Diani. In his posting above, Agus Safari shared a piece of news from an online news portal detik.com about the rising of a political dynasty in Indonesia and added a provocative and passionate caption: "Bring down Atut's dynasty politics in Tangsel (South Tangerang)". The context of this posting was the election of South Tangerang's Major in 2015 when Airin Rachmy Diani, Ratu Atut's sister-in-law, ran for the mayoral candidate for the second time. It is clear that Agus Safari campaigned against Airin Rachmy Diani whom he called 'Atut's dynasty politic in Tangsel' by sharing news as a piece of evidence that political dynasty bad for democracy. He stated that:

"Just share the news so other citizens will get the factual information..in elections time, as is the case in South Tangerang mayor elections, sharing news about dynasty's corruptions, as I did, is one of the ways to campaign against the dynasty, so they eventually will not win the election" (Interview on 28 April 2014).

In this sense, digital acts of sharing news practiced by Agus Safari and Sanusi are also a call or provocation for other members of Wong Banten and Forum Warga Banten to take action to 'refuse dynasty politic' back to power.

What other members of those Facebook groups and also readers of Fesbuk Banten News respond to the digital acts of sharing and reporting news on corruption will be explored below.

Digital Act of Flaming

Such reports and shared news on corruption cases involving Ratu Atut and her dynasty (about Banten political dynasty, see chapter 1) have attracted the attention of many Fesbuk Banten News (FBN) readers, Wong Banten, and Forum Warga Banten members. Enabled by a social media platform that facilitates the participation of wider audiences, readers and members are no longer passive recipients of information but actively participate in the making of news by adding some reports and information through their comments. Moreover, since the report and the shared news also serves not only as mere news coverage, but also as an anti-corruption or anti-dynasty campaign, the readers' and members' comments appear more as resentment toward the corrupt dynasty and cronies. In this case, I categorized those comments as digital acts of flaming.

I use the definition of flaming from Moor (in McCosker, 2015:205) as a criterion for categorizing those comments that: “displaying hostility by insulting, swearing or using otherwise offensive language, but also for certain extent not intentionally offend others, but they are simply meant to express disagreement or an alternative opinion or humorous play”. Using that criterion, I found 1,141 comments in Fesbuk Banten News, 412 comments in Wong Banten, and 231 comments in Forum Warga Banten, that I coded in the category of digital acts of flaming. This is a table displays coding categories that I applied to postings and comments related to corruptions and Banten political dynasty:

Tabel 2. Coding Categories For Fesbuk Banten News (FBN), Woang Banten, and Forum Warga Banten of Digital Acts of Flaming

| Coding Categories | Postings | Comments |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| <i>Fesbuk Banten News</i> | | |
| Flaming the dynasty | - | 1,141 |
| Criticizing dynasty's supporter | - | 241 |
| Calling for citizens to take actions | - | 113 |
| Hoping for divine interventions | - | 104 |
| <i>Wong Banten</i> | | |
| Flaming the dynasty | - | 412 |
| Calling not to vote for the dynasty | - | 16 |
| Calling for citizens to take actions | - | 13 |
| Criticizing dynasty's supporter | - | 10 |

| Forum Warga Banten | | |
|---|---|-----|
| Flaming the dynasty | - | 231 |
| Claiming citizens identity | - | 11 |
| Criticizing poor infrastructures conditions | - | 8 |
| Calling for citizens to take actions | | 8 |

These are some examples of the comments from Fesbuk Banten News:

Asih Klorophi Thea *ratu korupsi julukan yang cocok buat si anjing* (The queen of corruption is a suitable nickname for the dog) “

Rere Septriachaa *atuutt bisanya Cuma ngurusin muka aja dasar tukang korupp. Ngaca dong tuh muka udah ky muka babiii* (Atuutt is only capable of taking care of her own face You are corruptors. See your own face in the mirror, it looks like the face of pig)”

Windya Aqsanto *dasar manusia rakus eh hh monyong idup lu cuma bentar di dunia dasar katro lu gak ada bedanya lu ma setan* (such a greedy human being, ehh ugly! Your life is short, what a freak, you are not as different as satan)

Farhan Alwaini *Satu keluarga najis semua emanq.... Idih dasar bodoh sampah neraka... ANJINGGGG 'GA PERLU SENSOR* (this one family [Ratu Atut Family] is indeed disgusting..you are all morons..waste of hell)

Blues Yoes *Itu sumpahnya demi Allah loh...goblok amat.buah dari keserakahan... ngakunya mah islam jeh makan darah rakyat..iblis doank* (She took a vow in the name of Allah...very stupid...it was a result of her own greed..she claims herself as Muslim but sucking people's blood... She is a devil)

Blues Yoes, a middle-aged man from Cilegon City, and one of the commentators in the flaming post above, intentionally flames (menghujat) Ratu Atut to express his anger and to provoke other citizens (warga) to resist corruption and the dynasty, as he says:

I see the conditions of Banten...there is no change at all..from when Banten was founded until now. We as citizens (warga) who care about Banten need to just speak up because our representatives do not represent citizens' voices. I am not a member of representatives..what I can do is shout on Facebook..I must speak harshly to get attention..and provoke other citizen's emotions..so

that they will speak up and have their voice to resist corruptions and dynasty (Interview on 22 October 2011).

In this sense, Blues Yoes considers his flaming as a strategic tool to affect other citizens to participate and have a voice against corruption and the dynasty. He believes that harsh, vitriolic and emotional words will provoke other citizens to join him and to behave and many seem to follow in a certain way. That is why the numbers of comments categorized as flaming are dominant in Fesbuk Banten News.

Meanwhile, comments in Wong Banten may not be as hostile as comments in Fesbuk Banten News (FBN), but they still show a flaming element in the form of sarcastic, humorous and even poetic comments. This is an example of such comment from Gol A Gong (Hendrayana Harris), a famous writer and also one of the most active members of Wong Banten:

Gol A Gong

warga banten Sehat, pejabat Banten Maksiat

Warga Banten Eling, Pejabat Banten Maling

(Citizens of Banten are healthy. Banten government officials are immoral.

Citizens of Banten are conscience, Banten government officials are thieves)

This comment is only one example of many sarcastic and poetic comments and postings from Gol A Gong. He explained that writing such comments or postings in Wong Banten as a part of his:

Moral and cultural movement as a citizen of Banten that is not involving direct engagement (*tidak terlibat langsung*) like demonstrations or getting involved in political parties... but affecting other people emotions. Somebody else has taken that part. As a writer and literacy activist, I use my pen, not my muscle to criticize the dynasty in social media, like Wong Banten. (Interview in 16 Agustus 2014)

As a part of this 'cultural movement', another active member of Wong Banten, Nur Baety, an entrepreneur woman, regularly makes postings and comments that criticize the dynasty's leadership and corruption. Interestingly, most of her postings were written in form of 'poetry', with lyrics and rhymes, as follow:

Nur Baety

Ibu Ratu (Mrs. Ratu)

Aku tidak benci kepadamu ,,,(I don't hate you)

Aku tidak dendam kepadamu .. (I don't (need to) revenge (for) you)

Aku cuma tidak simpatik ,,,(I just don't have sympathy for you)

Anti pati terhadap lakumu,, (My antipathy to your deeds)

lakumu sebagai pemimpin (Your acts as a leader)

atas amanah rakyatmu .. (On the trust of your people)

kau senangkan dirimu... (You make yourself happy)

kronimu , keluargamu ... (Your cronies your families)

tp tidak untuk rakyatmu ..(but not your people)

Ibu Ratu (Mrs. Ratu)

*Bagiku engkau perempuan biasa (For me you are just an ordinary woman)
standart saja...(just an average)*

Knowladge mu biasa ,,, (Your knowledge is limited)

prestasimu tanda tanya ...(Your achievements questionable)

karier politikmu seketika ,, (Your political career is instant)

saat tahta dalam genggamannya (Only when you keep the throne)

Ibu Ratu (Mrs. Ratu)

Aku kasian kepadamu...(I pity you)

ketika tahta kau genggam ..(When the throne is in your hand)

dengan segala keterbatasanmu (with all your limitations)

orang2 disekelilingmu (people all around you)

Jika mereka menyayangimu (if they love you why they don't remind you)

kenapa mereka tidak mengingatkanmu ...

akan sebuah konsekwensi (about consequences)

.....

Nur Baety said that she made poetry-like postings to convey messages that are more interesting, relaxed and easy to understand (and memorize):

I want to grab the attention of people or that of members of Wong Banten. To stimulate people feelings... so they will respond and support my criticisms toward the dynasty...Before the issue of corruption and dynasty appear in Wong Banten, I have already felt unsatisfied with Ratu Atut's and her dynasty's

leadership. The leaders must have beyond average abilities...Ratu Atut's and families simply do not have the qualities to be leaders..I feel restless about it.. and start makes postings criticizing Atut and dynasty's leadership.." (Interview on 4 September 2014).

Besides frequently commenting or posting in Wong Banten, Nur Baety also occasionally makes comments in Forum Warga Banten. Most of her and other members' comments in Forum Warga Banten are similar to those in Wong Banten, i.e. humorous and sarcastic. As it can be seen from these comments:

Nur Baety

memilih, daripada di Banten yang legislatut...bulshit semua..nggak mutu kerana rekrutmen asal asalan

(to vote legislatut [a word play of 'legislative' and 'Atut'. it is mean a candidate of legislative members who are Ratu Atut's cronies]...all bullshit..they are not qualified because of bad recruitment)



(**Forum Warga** a witch...hehe hehhe)

Showing a photo of Ratu Atut's face with unnatural make-up.

Khaeril Bowi

Ratu Tubagus, muka atut selalu bagus..Atut Airin jalan butut di biarin wkwkw

(Ratu Tubagus [Banten's nobility title used by Ratu Atut's family], Atut's face is always gorgeous...Atut Airin [Airin is a major of South Tangerang who also Ratu Atut's sister in law] damaged roads are ignored wkwkw [this comment is following the form of traditional humorous poetry rhyme])

Khaeril Bowi is a student activist from Serang who also joined a different Facebook group including Forum Warga Banten, and also Wong Banten. He explained that:

I am joining Facebook groups that have a lot of members...I like to make postings or comments that can make people emotional or angry toward the dynasty...and I believe that Banten people is basically 'keras' (tempered/rough), so they eventually will get angry..."(Interview, 17 September 2014)

This notion echoes what has been done and said by Blues Yoes ('to provoke other citizen's emotions'), Gol A Gong ('to affect other people's emotions') and Nur Baety ('to attract people feelings') above. In this sense, their emotional comments on corruption and dynasty in Fesbuk Banten News, Wong Banten, and Forum Warga Banten that I have categorized as digital acts of flaming can be considered as online indirect activism. And, it is parallels what Alexandrakis, (2016), in the context of the formation of resistant subjectivities among a group of young graffiti writers in Athens, Greece, has referred to as "indirect activism", which is: "the manifestation of a mode of resistance whose critical agents attempt to bring about their ambitions and visions by activating other groups to undertake resistance of their own" (Ibid: 274-275).

This term, online indirect activism, is also accounted for digital acts of reporting and sharing news on corruption described in the first sub-chapter above. The acts of reporting corruption practiced by Uday Suhada in Fesbuk Banten News are attempts to make corruption cases become a public concern and 'make people upset (meresahkan masyarakat)' so they will attract KPK's attention. Mang Ripin conducted different acts of reporting by posting photos as indirect references to some corruption allegation cases, that he believes can trigger people's attention and curiosity. Meanwhile, Sanusi and Agus Safari, through Wong Banten and Fesbuk Banten News, conducted acts of sharing news on corruption with a provocative introduction as attempts to provoke or activate other members to undertake their resistance against the corrupt dynasty.

Digital Affective Citizenship

Digital acts performed on the three Facebook page and groups shown above, such as digital acts of reporting and sharing news on corruption and digital acts of flaming, are central to the constitution of citizenship (Isin and Nielsen, 2008),

or they can be seen as a digital act of citizenship (Isin and Ruppert, 2015). The digital act of citizenship, then, is defined as a set of digital acts that designate political subjects emerging from the encounter between citizens and the state (Isin & Ruppert, 2015). In the three Facebook page and groups studied, the citizen journalists of Fesbuk Banten News and members of Wong Banten and Forum Warga Banten express their sentiments through the digital acts of reporting and sharing news on corruption and finding emotional response from other citizens in the act of flaming. In this way, digital citizenship emerging from those digital acts filled with affects or emotion the encounter between citizens and state (or agent of state) through those three Facebook page and groups can be seen as a form of citizenship, that I called as digital affective citizenship.

The term affect that I use is to refer here to a general category of emotions and sensations, including embodied and sensory feelings that give us our perception of the world and that are used to enact and bring out worlds, subjects, and things. (Fortier, 2016: 1039). Following Sara Ahmed (2014), I consider the affect and emotions that are irreducibly entangled, as she writes that: ‘emotions... involve bodily processes of affecting and being affected’ (2014:208). Continuing from there, affect and emotions are simultaneously deeply felt and embodied as well as public (Ahmed, 2014; Berlant, 2011), and cannot be reduced to the realm of the personal and the subjective (e.g., Massumi, 2022: 28)

Digital affective citizenship represents an “agonistic form[s] of the contest as an alternative model of citizenship” (McCosker and John, 2013:189). Therefore, it does not represent the ‘rational’, ‘detached’ and ‘impartial’ notion of digital citizenship referred to the ability to participate in the everyday online environment effectively with an ethical and normative behavior (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2006: 199, Mossberger, et.al. 2007, McCosker, 2014). From the description above, and in line with studies by Wahl-Jorgensen (2006), Papacharissi (2009), Van Zoonen et.al (2010), Tong, (2015), McCosker and Johns (2014, 2016), I acknowledge that digital affective citizenship does not arise from rational, detached observation, but rather from the asset of shared emotions including anger, hate, disgust, and a sense of injustice. This emotional expression reflects the character of citizens who have less power and organizational/ leadership capacity, that can be seen from their online indirect activism, in effectively influencing or taking responsibility for political affairs of their polity, i.e. preventing the corrupt family form being re-elected.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have asked two main questions: how is anti-corruption activism in Banten being practiced online? And, secondly, what kind of citizenship does this online anti-corruption activism reflect?

The answer to the first question, as I have described above, is that online anti-corruption activism in Banten is practiced through digital acts of reporting and sharing news on corruption, and digital acts of flaming to resist the Banten political dynasty that deemed corrupt. Through these digital acts, activist-citizens of Banten are conducting, what I called: 'online indirect activism', which is a mode of resistance whose activist-citizens of Banten emotionally attempt to activate other citizens to initiate their own resistance.

For the second question, I have argued that the digital acts of reporting and sharing news on corruption have provoked readers and members of the three Facebook page and groups to perform digital acts of flaming toward the Banten political dynasty that regarded corrupt. Through these digital acts, activists-citizens of Banten direct their feelings of anger, hate, passion, and disgust about their corrupt leaders. Therefore, from these digital acts emerge a form of citizenship that I call digital affective citizenship. Digital affective citizenship reflects the characteristic of citizenship in Banten that is powerless angry citizens who lack of power and organizational capacity to curtail corrupt leaders and preventing them to be re-elected in the elections.

Digital affective citizenship, therefore, is about how citizens vent emotions in an 'affective public' (Papacharissi, 2014), and not about participating in or triggering off-line political actions to curtail corrupt leaders. And, the study about how, when, and why this online emotional activism can (and cannot) be transformed into significant off-line political mobilizations will be scrutinized in the next chapter.

Chapter Five

Off-Line Political Mobilizations

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I argued that activist-citizens have engaged in emotional on-line anti-corruption activism by enacting digital acts of reporting and sharing news about corruption, as well as the digital acts of flaming targeted Banten political dynasty and cronies. Contemporary social movement studies scholars have noted that emotions, feelings of approval or disapproval, based on moral intuitions such as indignation and outrage, are relevant to the development of political protest and even social movements (Luker 1984, Flam 1990a, 1990b, Jasper and Poulsen 1995, Jasper 1997, Jasper 2011). They believe that anger can become the basis for mobilization (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001:16-17). Activists attempt to create moral outrage and anger among a larger segment of citizens and to transform them into political passions, driving the process of mobilization or directing people toward specific protest events (Melucci, 1996, Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, 2001, Jasper 2011, and Gerbaudo, 2012).

As I will explore in this chapter, however, this is not the case for Banten.

So far, emotions have here not been transformed into significant and effective mobilizations that could help curtail the allegedly corrupt dynasty. Following three cases of off-line political mobilization, i.e.; the ‘don’t vote for a corrupt dynasty’ off-line mobilization in the elections in Banten, anti-corruption street protests, and as a comparison case, anti-corruption off-line protest and participation organized by MCW (Malang Corruption Watch) in Malang, East Java, I will answer the question of why on-line emotional anti-corruption campaigns have not led towards successful off-line mobilization.

To answer the question, I make use of political and discourse opportunity structures as theoretical frameworks (see below). Looking into political opportunity structures In Banten, I found that off-line mobilizations, in comparison with Malang, were less successful because they were subjugated to the existing clientelistic structure that supports the dynasty. And, from a discourse opportunity structure framework, it can be argued that moral-emotional discourse of corruption in Banten, compare to the legal-material discourse of corruption in Malang, was not diffuse as clear, relevant, and directive messages in the public sphere. The moral-emotional discourse, therefore, could not attract supporters’ attention and trigger significant off-line political mobilization.

Political and Discourse Opportunity Structures

Before delving further into anti-corruption off-line mobilizations cases, I provide some theoretical frameworks. These are the frameworks of political opportunity structure and discourse opportunity structure.

The first refers to ‘the structure of political opportunities and constraints confronting the movement’ (McAdam, et.al, 1996: 2). In this sense, political opportunity structure can also be defined as the external environments in which social movements find themselves. This includes historical socio-political and institutional contexts that enable their mobilization (ibid.). According to this theory, the success of social movements is shaped by the broader set of political constraints and opportunities provided by a specific political system within which they are embedded and work (McAdam, et.al, 1996, Hooghe, 2005).

In Banten, the embedded political system is political clientelism. It refers to ‘the practice of providing personal favors—jobs, contracts, welfare support, money, and so forth—in exchange for electoral Support (Berenschot, 2018: 1564). Since the first direct election, in 2006, that brought Ratu Atut to become

governor of Banten, the family of Chasan Schohib (Ratu Atut's father) has created an organization called: "The Unified Banten Volunteers" (Relawan Banten Bersatu or RBB), which has consisted of the members of the family itself and the network of local businessmen, *jawara* (local strong man/thug), and intellectuals, that work to manage and mobilize provincial bureaucracies and government projects that involved the distribution of goods or foods were attributed to Atut to evoke the sympathy of people (Anzar, 2014, Maasaki and Hamid, 2008:134) (see chapter 1). This political clientelism practice was, then, continued to be used in the following elections in which Ratu Atut and her family ran for election. The elections included the 2011 governor election when Ratu Atut was elected for the second time, the 2011 local election of Serang regency and South Tangerang city that was won by Ratu Tatu (Ratu Atut's sister) and Airin Rachmi Diani (Ratu Atut's sister in law), the 2014 legislative election that brought Ratu Atut's son; Andika Harzumi to be a national parliament member (DPR-RI) and his sister was chosen as Banten's parliament member (DPRD Banten), and his wife became a representative in Serang Regency DPRD, and elections for Major of South Tangerang and Regent of Serang elections in 2015 that won by incumbents; Airin Rachmi Diani and Ratu Tatu.

This long-term domination of a political dynasty or family is related to the concept of subnational authoritarianism (Gibson 2005, Sidel 2014, Berenschot, et.al, 2021: 4). Through this concept it is argued that the concentration of control over economic activities, such as the dependency of local economies on the state, is an important factor to maintain the domination of a political elite (Berenschot, et.al, 2021: 4). There are two key indicators of concentration of political and economic power; state dependency and limited economic diversification. And as Berenschot (2018:1558) explains that:

"A dependency on state budgets fosters concentrated control because it concentrates power in the hands of ruling elites capable of allocating state resources. When economic diversification is limited—as evidenced by, for example, small industry, trade, and services sectors—economic power is generally more concentrated because of a lack of sources of income outside the ambits of (ruling) elites."

In other words, Political clientelism will decrease as a result of the growth of different economies that foster the establishment of a more independent civil society and an open public sphere (ibid: 1565).

Banten is an example of a province with a state-dependent economy where NGOs (Non-Government Organizations) and local newspapers are lacking independent sources of funding outside the orbit of local elites. In Banten, most of the NGOs seek money by practicing what is called as ‘delapan enam-an’ (eighty-six-ish). The number ‘delapan enam’ referred to the ‘code 86’ used by the policemen when they understand orders from their superiors. Politicians, bureaucrats, and activists themselves used this term to call NGOs that threaten to report alleged corruption cases of local officials to the police or attorney if they are not paid off. Conversely, in Malang, Most of the NGOs were likely more independent as they have diverse sources of funds including donations from the management, sympathizers, independent businesses, and external donors from national and international organizations.

Moreover, related to the nature of the public sphere in Banten, I found that local media, like newspapers and radios, are heavily dependent on the advertorial projects controlled by the dynasty and its cronies in the local government agencies (SKPD). According to Aji Setiakarya, a former media campaigner for the dynasty, Wawan (Ratu Atut’s brother) have controlled almost all local radio in Banten and set up ‘collaborations’ (kerjasama) with local newspapers, including Radar Banten (a most prominent local newspaper in Banten, belonging to Jawa Pos group), worth around 25 billion rupiah (about 1.3 million USD). The local newspaper must maintain good relations with the dynasty and mention Wawan’s name in order to get an advertorial ‘package’ (‘paket’) from the local government agencies. *“Since in Banten, there are not so many private companies that put an advertisement in local newspaper or media, we depend on the advertorial package from the government,”* said Amrin, an editor of Radar Banten. Eka Satyalaksamana, a former Radar Banten’s journalist, also stated that *“basically, Radar Banten has been bought (dibeli) by the dynasty...we must support the dynasty in return for money from advertorial package.”* He recounted to me how his editors refused to publish articles criticizing Banten political dynasty out of a fear of losing advertisement revenue.

When most of the local media and newspapers were under control and dependent on the dynasty, social media emerged as platforms that make critical postings and comments on the Banten political dynasty that were deemed corrupt. These social media platforms are Facebook pages and groups called: Fesbuk Banten News (FBN), Wong Banten, and Forum Warga Banten (see chapter 2 and 3). They contributed to diffusing discourse of corruption to the public and to the success or failure of offline political mobilization. To understand

this discursive opportunity provided by social media, I adopted the discourse opportunity structure as one of my conceptual tools.

The discursive opportunity's structure is defined as 'the aspects of the public discourse that determine a message's chances of diffusion in the public sphere' (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004:202 in Molei, 2015:96). According to this theory, the discourse that cannot attract supporters' attention and provoke reactions from other actors in the public sphere is considered to be failed in triggering political mobilizations (Molei, 2015).

In Banten, citizen-activists use social media to disseminate a moral discourse of corruption into the affective public (see chapter 3). Whereas, on social media in Malang, similar to the national CSOs (see chapter 3), corruption is constructed as legal and material discourse. In this chapter, using the concept of discourse opportunity structures, I look into how these two different aspects of discourse can or cannot attract people's attention and provoke offline mobilization.

The “Don't Vote for a Corrupt Dynasty” Off-line Mobilization

In the sub-chapter above, I have mentioned that electoral victories enabled the Banten political dynasty to gain power, largely helped by its clientelistic practices. Ratu Atut's family members and cronies took part in most of the elections instituted after the fall of Suharto – for governor of Banten (in 2006 and 2011), Mayor of Serang City (in 2011), Regent of Serang Regency (in 2011 and 2015), Mayor of South Tangerang (in 2011 and 2015), local parliament [DPRD, in 2009 and 2014), and national parliament (DPR-RI, in 2009 and 2014).¹ Here, I focus on social media campaigns which mobilize voters against not voting for Ratu Atut's family members and cronies in the 2014 national parliament elections, the 2015 regent of Serang, and major or South-Tangerang elections.

As I have mentioned in the previous chapter, campaigns against the candidacy of the Dynasty were initiated by activists, journalists and writers. These campaigns made use of Facebook page and groups discussed in the previous chapter: Fesbuk Banten News (FBN), Wong Banten, and Forum Warga Banten (FWB). Those campaigns emerged in election times only after Ratu Atut

1) They were Ratu Atut's husband (Hikmat Tomet), son (Andhika Harzumy), daughter (Andiara Aprillia Hikmat), daughter in law (Adde Rosi K), son in law (Tanto Warsini A.) and brother inlaw (Aden Abdul Khaliq). In South Tangerang's Mayor elections of 2015, Airin Rachmy Diany, Ratu Atut sister's in law or Wawan's wife, tried to get re-elected. And, in simultaneous local elections of 2015, Ratu Tatu Chasanah (Ratu Atut's sister) also run, for the second time, to be the Regent of Serang.



Pessa Pecong

Do not vote for legislative candidates from Atut Dynasty's family and cronies.

Do you have other names to add to the list of Atut's cronies? please write down here, so all people of Banten will know!

Share!! #JanganCoblosKroniAtut (#Don'tVoteForAtut'sCronies)

@ForosBanten (Front Revolusioner Selamatkan Banten/The Revolutionary Front to Save Banten)

and Wawan were detained by the KPK for bribery case of Constitutional Court Chief Justice (see chapter 1 dan 4). Anti-corruption activists saw Ratu Atut and Wawan's detention by KPK as proof that the dynasty is indeed corrupt, and that has made their power and reputation quickly dwindle.

When Ratu Atut's family members ran for office during the elections after Ratu Atut and Wawan were imprisoned, the activists also saw it as an attempt to take back power from the dynasty and ruin its reputation. Therefore, some activists were campaigning, using Facebook platforms, arguing not to vote for members of the dynasty to prevent their coming back to the offices. They used particular rhetoric for the campaign, including slogans such as "*Jangan coblos kroni Atut*" (Do not vote for Atut's Cronies, see picture below) , "*Tolak keluarga koruptor*" (Say no to corruptors family)", "*Jangan pilih dinasti*" (Do not vote for the dynasty), or using even more vitriolic words such as "*ganyang dynasty*" (destroy the dynasty), in which Ratu Atut and her family are framed as 'devils'. In this sense, those anti-corruption campaigns, as was explored in Chapter 3, are framed as moral-emotional discourses aiming at igniting citizens' anger to mobilize them to not vote for the candidates affiliated with a corrupt dynasty.

The result of the "Don't vote for a Corrupt Dynasty" campaign, however, has been disappointing. All the dynasty's candidates in the 2014 national parliament elections and the 2015 regent of Serang and major or South-Tangerang elections have succeeded to obtain office. This suggests that the online campaigns and framing activity mentioned above did not result in effective off-line mobilizations. Citizens were thus not effectively mobilized to vote against the candidates from a 'corrupt dynasty'. Why was this off-line mobilization unsuccessful?

I asked one of Ratu Atut's family supporters, who is also an active member of the Wong Banten FB group and a reader of Fesbuk Banten News about the "don't vote for the corrupt dynasty" campaigns. Nurjaya Sumanah, a newly graduated student who also is active in *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* (The Muslim Students' Association) of Banten, who told me that:

Somehow, the one that they condemned (Ratu Atut) may not be as bad as we think.. she may be our 'parent', our 'ibu' (mother) who cares for us... and she and her family won big time in the elections. A lot of people voted for them. Just because of a small (bribery) case she is condemned and insulted. And they who criticize her, who do they think they are? They probably just happen to be people who are envious...And, actually the more they speak harshly about

Ratu Atut and her family, the more I feel sympathy for them. (Interview, 10 September 2015)


It can be understood from Nurjaya's point of view that even though Ratu Atut and her family are framed as 'devilish' or 'immoral', for him and others Ratu Atut's supporters, she is still seen as a mother figure who cares for them. The term 'care' here is related to Ratu Atut and her family's 'generosity' in giving "*bantuan*" or support, in these cases channeling government's resources, projects, and money-politic in election times. Therefore, from Nurjaya's perspective, anti-corruption activists who condemn Ratu Atut and her family are seen as 'people who are envious' because they did not get money for projects. And, people who received the "*bantuan*", due to money-politics in election times, relate themselves affectionately to Ratu Atut; a good mother who cares for their children.

A similar view was also applied to the case of the 2015 South Tangerang's Mayor elections that won by Airin Rachmy Diany (Ratu Atut's sister inlaw), a candidate framed by activists and her adversaries as a member of the 'corrupt family'.



Picture 1. Participants of the Arsid rally campaign (kampanye terbuka) in the Alap-Alap Square, Ciputat, South Tangerang, 22 November 2015. The narrative of "TOLAK KELUARGA KORUPTOR" (REJECT THE CORRUPT FAMILY)" was also picked-up by Arsid (Airin's contender in South Tangerang major election 2015) as his campaign tag-line written on t-shirts.

From the perspective of Airin's supporters, the 'don't vote for a corrupt dynasty/family' campaign was only an expression of enviousness and hate from her adversaries. Yandry Roza, one of Airin's supporters and active members of Forum Warga Banten, Yandri Roza wrote in a comment:



Yandry Roza Oh corruptions in Tangsel [South Tangerang] are already out of control yes...so that you [Airin's adversaries] could not get projects [government projects] hahaha...poor you. No wonder that you are full of hatred hahaha)

Yandry Roza, in a conversation with me at his house in Ciputat, South Tangerang, also added that:

They are, as citizens (*warga*), not satisfied (*puas*)..since they could not get projects (*proyek*) or grant (*bantuan*) from the government. Here, in this neighborhood, especially women (*ibu-ibu*), support Airin. Why? I asked them.. they said it is because Airin had already given them a lot of development (*pembangunan*). All the streets and alleys in the kampong are being asphalted or concretized ..Airin also support their *pengajian* (Quran study circle), and if they go to the hospital, they don't need to pay, it's free. ...) (Interview on 15 October 2015)

On the day of voting day on 20th December 2015, at a public counting of votes at a polling station in Ciputat, South Tangerang, I encountered some 'ibu-ibu' (women) mentioned by Yandry Roza. This group of women blatantly shouted: "Ibu..Ibu..Allahu Akbar..ibu.." every time a polling officer announced a vote for Airin Rachmy Diani through the microphone. They had clearly voted for Airin. They said that Airin is a good leader because she has provided citizens (*warga*) in their kampong with good public facilities like asphalt or concrete roads, and also, she gave some grants for their *pengajian* (Quran study circle). "But on Facebook or in the campaigns people said that Airin is part of a corruptor's family (*keluarga koruptor*), what do you think", I asked them. One of the women answered:

No... She is only a victim of Wawan's (her husband) corruption. It is only gossip that she has been involved in corruption herself...She is being slandered (*dihujat*) as a corruptor and being immoral, but she is a good and strong *Ibu* (mother) who cares for us as *warga* (citizens) (interview on 20th December 2015).

This notion of a “*ibu* (mother) who cares for us” through her distributing projects ‘*pembangunan*’ (development), benefits and money in exchange for political support reflects the dynasty’s clientelist practices (see above). The distribution of personal favors-projects, welfare support, money, and so forth was involving the same organization, that is RBB (Relawan Banten Bersatu/ The Unified Banten Volunteers) organizational structure (see above).² Fitnon Nur Ikhsan, a political consultant for Ratu Atut’s Family, explained that “*But, in this campaign (Airin’s campaign for Mayor of South Tangerang) We don’t call this organization RBB anymore. It has no name, but the structure is similar with RBB*”. It consists of the family of Ratu Atut and its networks of *jawara* (local string men), businessmen, plus local/village officers (*perangkat desa/kelurahan*). According to Ansarullah Yasin, a local leader of Ciputat, the place where the polling station mentioned above was located, one of the winning strategies from Airin’s team consisted of mobilization of resources and money through these *perangkat kelurahan*.

In the election for the position of the Regent of Serang, which coincided with South Tangerang’s Mayoral election, Ratu Tatu (Ratu Atut’s sister), the incumbent regent, also involved the ‘*perangkat desa*’ and Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH)³ cadres in her network to mobilize resources and money to the voters.

- 2) “The Unified Banten Volunteers” (*Relawan Banten Bersatu* or RBB) is an organization whose cadres were all recruited from Ratu Atut’s Family, including his sisters (Ratu Tatu Chasanah and Ratu Lilis K.), brothers (Tb. Chaerul Zaman), husband (Hikmat Tomet), and brother-in-law (Aden Lilis K.), and some other members from the extended family. They work as coordinators in provincial and district level, and mostly to control funding for the campaign at the community level (Maasaki and Hamid, 2008:134).
- 3) The first conditional cash transfer program in Indonesia, Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH), was introduced by the Indonesian government in 2007. By requiring households to use certain health and educational services, the program aims to increase the quality of human capital. (Nazara and Rahayu, 2013). The PKH aids in easing the financial strain on very poor households (the immediate consumption effect), while also making an investment in present and future generations by promoting better health and education (the human capital development effect). The government’s plan to permanently pull PKH clients out of poverty combines short- and long-term aid. (*ibid*).

On one occasion, I visited Ratu Tatu's house in the city of Serang to have an interview with her. There was a large gathering being held for her in the pavilion of the backyard of her house. Ratu Tatu was in the gathering, and I was asked to wait for her outside the pavilion, sitting with some men dressed in black. Some of them were equipped with walkie-talkies. I assumed that they are the *jawara* who worked for Ratu Tatu as a kind of 'bodyguards' (*petugas keamanan*). Later, after a couple of conversations, I knew that they indeed were *jawara* that mostly came from '*perguruan silat*' (martial art schools), around Banten. The man who was sitting and smoking beside me also said that he has been working for the Family since Chasan Sohib (Ratu Atut's father) was alive. He continued serving the family as '*petugas keamanan*' for Ratu Atut, and then, at that time, was moved to work for Ratu Tatu.

After talking for a while, I then asked the man what was happening inside the *Pendopo*. "*Ibu (Ratu Tatu/Ratu Atut's sister) is gathering 'perangkat desa' and petugas PKH (program keluarga harapan) ...to discuss the next elections*", he said. I, then, asked whether I could enter the pavilion to see what was happening. Just before he replied, suddenly one of the *jawara* with a walkie talkie in his hand, yelled to his co-workers standing nearby the entrance of the *pendopo*, "*Di dalam ada anggota Bawaslu (The Election Supervisory Board), nyamar..suruh dia keluar.. (There is a member of the election supervisory board inside, he is undercover, drag them out...)*". I stood up and curiously approached the door. But, one of the *jawara* stopped me and asked me, politely, not to enter the pavilion. Minutes later, the *jawara* who entered the pavilion came out with a man. He was then surrounded by four *jawara* and was interrogated. They asked him about his letter of assignment from Bawaslu (The Election Supervisory Board). The man could not provide the letter and argued that it was due to the holidays he had none. He was accused of entering private property without permission and the *jawara* asked him to leave Ratu Tatu's House.

Before he left, the *jawara* also asked him to delete some photos that he apparently had taken in the *Pendopo*. After the man was gone, the *jawara* who had caught and interrogated him said to his colleagues; "*It was crazy, he took pictures when the people were queuing to receive an amplop (money)*". The *Jawara*, who sat with me before, said that they must make contact with the head of Bawaslu of Serang and settle this problem by "*just giving him and other officers some amplop (money), so they will keep quiet*". I understood later that Ratu Tatu had gathered some *perangkat desa* and *petugas PKH* to provide them with money to distribute to the voters in their area.

After the gathering had finished, I met with Ratu Tatu in her large and ornate guest room. I interviewed her about her family's strategies to win the various elections and how to deal with the 'don't vote for the corrupt dynasty' campaigns. She responded by saying that:

My sister (Ratu Atut) and brother (Wawan) are not corrupt in the sense that they stole people's money (*mencuri uang rakyat*). They just made the mistake of bribing...Look, people of Banten still love and respect us... It was proven by the fact that all of our family members won in the previous elections. And I hope I will win in the next elections also...

We have been taught by our late father (Chasan Sochib) that we must care for the people of Banten. Our late father was well-known for his kindness, helping the people. That, also, was the reason why we got involved in politics (by) becoming governor, mayor, regent, or legislative members. We want to continue to help and care for the people of Banten. We don't care if people say that we are a corrupt family because we are not. We do not steal the people's money. We already have money before we joined politics. As you see we have our own business (Interview on 8 November 2015).

The ideas expressed by Ratu Atut's family such as "caring for the people of Banten", intertwined with their clientelist practices - distributing resources, projects, and money in exchange for obtaining political support - all are among the strategies causes that rendered the 'don't vote for corrupt dynasty' mobilization unsuccessful. The harsh and emotional language used in the campaign (see above) failed to provoke the voters to not vote for the dynasty. The voters were instead seduced by, what Lazar (2004), in the context of Bolivia, phrased as: "the affective aspect of clientelism" in which patrons are trying to 'have people' by 'giving 'care' and 'warmth' to the voters. Moreover, as incumbents, Ratu Tatu and Airin also could use state resources-budget and programs - in a clientelistic way - that gave them a big advantage over their opponents. These clientelistic practices, together with 'the affective aspect of clientelism', ensured that votes remained loyal to the candidates from Ratu Atut's dynasty. Thus, the 'don't vote for a corrupt dynasty' off-line mobilization failed.

Anti-corruption Off-line Demonstrations

In Chapter 3, I have argued that corruption in Banten is framed as a moral-emotional discourse and is aimed at igniting citizens' anger. In this sort of framing, there are no strategic accounts or callings of what should be done for the citizens to take action. A lack of clear-cut strategies is what makes there are little anti-corruption mobilization efforts in Banten that also occur off-line and only small numbers of people are commonly seen to join such mobilizations if they occur. It can be seen from one of the examples of a demonstration initiated by the administrator of Fesbuk Banten News (FBN), Lulu Jamaluddin. This demonstration was held on the 9th of December, 2014 in commemoration of the International Volunteers Day that is celebrated every 5th of December.

The campaign started with a posting from Lulu Jamaludin at FBN's wall, as seen here:

FESBUK BANTEN News bersama Alaaw Ekhsan.
5 Desember 2014 · 🌐

Selamat Hari Relawan Sedunia, 5 Desember 2014.(LLJ)

**PEJABAT
KORUPSI
RAKYAT BANTEN BANYAK YANG
MATI**

RELAWAN fesbuk banten MUSA NYATA
www.fesbukbantennews.com

**Hari RELAWAN Sedunia
5 Desember 2014**

Promosi Tidak Tersedia

👍 133 💬 11 Komentar 9 Kali Dibagikan

FESBUK BANTEN News

5 December 2014

Happy International Volunteer Day, 5 December 2014 (LLJ)

Government Officials are corrupt, Many people of Banten have died.

Fesbuk Banten News, From Virtual World with Real Acts.

This posting did not become very popular, it only received likes from 133 people, and was shared by nine people, and commented upon by eleven readers, which included:

Arifin Noer La Galigo *Aksinya dong min. (Let's take an action, Min...)*

Tyar story *Jangan Cuma dimatiin sekalian dimiskinin terus asingkan keluarganya di hutan tanpa dikasih bekal biar diliat semua orang korupsi sama dengan maling sederajat. (Don't just kill them, make them poor, then exile their family to the forest without giving them food, so all people will see them as thieves)*

Reza Jhon Gacon *Haahhh..simbolis doang..Percuma kalau tidak ada ystem pembentukan karakter SDM nya...korupsi itu sudah jadi darah dan daging di Banten... jadi Cuma hukuman mati yang mampu membuat mereka Jera. (Haahhh .. it's just symbolic..It's useless unless there is a system to build good charters of government's human resourcescorruption is embodied in Banten...so only a death sentence that can make them repent.)*



Nanang Agung Pureowo Get Together

Ana Sugiarto *Rakyat susah? EGP (People are suffering? I DON'T CARE)*



Inha Verdy Amoer screw the enemy..I'd rather earn money

Fatah Bowo Pejabat *korupsi harus berani dihukum mati (corruption, [you must] dare to punish it with a death sentence)*

Irwan Surahman Pejabat. Politikus = TIKUS!!! (government officials. Politicians = RAT!!!!)



Omar Albantany Dare to be Honest, Great! (KPK's anti-corruption slogan)

Most of the comments above reflect the moral-emotional discourse on corruption in Banten Facebook page and groups (see Chapter 3). With the exception of two very short comments that were suggested to take further action. One of them is the first comment from Arifin Noer La Galigo who also is a citizen journalist and volunteer of FBN itself. He is well-known to the FBN readers for his photo reports of the poor-infrastructure *conditions* in Banten. His comment above, “Let’s take action, Min”, is directed personally to Lulu Jamaludin being the administrator of FBN who is also a close friend of his. Lulu, himself, did not frame his posting about corrupt officials causing the death of poor people in Banten as a call for action. Lulu, however, then decided to answer the call from Arifin by inviting him and others FBN’s volunteers together with Arif Khirdiyat, a coordinator of “*Relawan Kampung*” (Kampung Volunteer),⁴ to discuss a plan for an ‘aksi’ (action).

On the 8th of December 2014, Lulu Jamaludin, Arifin, and some of the younger FBN’s volunteers - Rully, Wiwit, and Rizal - gathered at Homi café, which is owned by one of FBN’s founders, Andi Suhud (see chapter 3 and 4). Arif Khirdiyat arrived later, alone. They decided to have an ‘aksi’ for the day after afternoon at the Ciceri intersection. This place is considered as an ‘entrance gate’ to Serang City, the capital of Banten. After choosing the location of ‘aksi’, they discussed a division of tasks. Lulu took the task to make a banner and Arif Khirdiyat was assigned to make leaflets to be circulated for the people on the street. Arifin and other FBN’s volunteers had no specific duties. They were, only,

4) *Relawan Kampung* is an initiative by Arif Khirdiyat, a travel and tourist businessman, for collecting donations to build bridges, roads, and school in remote and poor area of Banten.

asked to show up for tomorrow's aksi'.

On the following day, the 9th of December, at 15.30, Lulu, Rully, and Imam (a high school student and the youngest citizen journalist of FBN) arrived at Ciceri Intersection. After parking his motorcycle, Lulu took out a banner showing photos of poor sick people with the same text posted on FBN: “*Pejabat Korupsi, Rakyat Banten Banyak Mati* (Government Officials are corrupt, Many people of Banten Have Died)” (see photo below). Not long after, Arif Khirdiyat arrived and brought two Relawan Kampung's Volunteers. Later, Arifin came with his daughter.



Picture 2. Fesbuk Banten News (FBN) anti-corruption off-line protest at Ciceri junction, City of Serang, Banten.

The protest was conducted in the middle of the Ciceri intersection. Every time the traffic lights turned red and all the vehicles stopped, Rully and Imam hold and spread the banner in front of the vehicles, whereas Lulu started to give an oration. He said:

“Saudara-saudara para pengguna jalan, bapak polisi, mohon maaf kami hadir bukan untuk mengganggu perjalanan anda, tapi hanya mengingatkan tentang Hari Relawan Sedunia yang jatuh pada tanggal 5 Desember 2014. Kami dari Forum Relawan Se-Banten...pada hari relawan sedunia ini kita harus lebih peduli lagi harus lebih rajin membantu masyarakat miskin, karena pemerintah seperti tutup mata pada ribuan

pasien miskin, pada ribuan warga kita yang tidak memiliki rumah, kepada ribuan warga Banten yang tidak memiliki jembatan untuk pergi ke sekolah...kita harus peduli..karena kalau bukan kita siapa lagi, karena saat ini anggaran untuk rakyat ratusan milyar dikorupsi sehingga banyak warga Banten yang mati akibat kelakuan pejabat.”

(Friends, road users, policemen, we are sorry if we disturb your trips. We just want to remind you all about International Volunteer Day commemorated on the 5th of December 2014. We are from Banten Volunteers Forum. In this International Volunteers Day. We must more care and diligently help poor people, because the government seems don't care about thousands of poor patients, thousands of citizens who have no house, thousands of citizens who have no bridges to go the schools...we must care. Because if it is not us who will care, because now hundred billion budgets for the people are corrupted, so a lot of citizens of Banten died because of that)

This protest lasted for more or less one hour. Lulu was the one who did the orations all the time. Rully and Imam held the banner in turn with the two Relawan Kampung's volunteers. Whereas, Arif Khirdiyat and Arifin mostly only watched from the sidewalk or took some photos of the demonstration.

As it can be seen from the description above, Lulu and FBN's volunteers, who were quite spontaneous and have very little time in preparing the demonstration, could not mobilize a lot of people. The participants in the demonstration only consisted of their own inner group of friends. There were, also no clear agendas or demands claimed during the demonstration. It was more like a commemoration of International Volunteers Day by calling people on the street to do voluntary actions in caring and helping poor people, with a little insert of general accusation that “*budget for poor people is corrupted by government officials, and it makes a lot of citizens of Banten dead*”. They did not clearly indicate what the corruptions cases were, who were the government officials suspected of the corruption and what were their own demands.

Similar problems also occurred in a set of anti-corruption demonstrations organized by students covered by, but not choreographed through, Fesbuk Banten News (FBN). These had more participants, compared to FBN's demonstration, but still only limited to the members of those student's organizations. Usep, one of the student activists' leaders from *Keluarga Mahasiswa Sudirman 30 (KMS)*, said that in fact they never use social media platforms for the internal members to

mobilize and to call people to join their actions on the street. He said it was very difficult to call other citizens to join their demonstrations, so he only focuses on organizing his fellow student activists.

Ahmad, a student-activist of IMM (Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah/ Muhammadiyah Students Bond),⁵ who is also one of FBN's volunteers, shares a similar opinion and experience with Usep. He shared with me that:

It is difficult to call citizens of Banten to join our actions, both using direct approaches (*pendekatan langsung*) or using social media. Unless we bring issues to bear on something that they directly see and feel, like issues of poor public facilities or poor conditions, like the damaged roads. Issues of corruption and dynasty are too abstract (*abstrak*) to be understood by ordinary citizens (Interview, 25 Agustus 2015).

Similar to FBN's demonstration, anti-corruption students mobilizations also serve as, more or less, as a response to, certain events, such as elections or inauguration of elected candidates, the Province of Banten establishment commemoration (4th October), International anti-corruption day (9th December), National Hero Day (November 10th), Mother's Day (20th December), the day prior to and on which Ratu Atut became a suspect (17th December, 2013) until the day when she was arrested by KPK (20th December, 2013), and celebration after that. Therefore, like FBN's demonstrations, students' demonstrations, also, have no clear agendas or demands although being related to some real-life corruptions cases. In fact, most of the students' demonstrations held after Ratu Atut and Wawan were being captured publicly appeared or made the impression to be more like a '*syukuran*' (celebration) of their detention by KPK. This made the demonstrations less likely to be subject to threats from the dynasty since Ratu Atut and Wawan had less power after they were arrested by KPK.

5) Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah (IMM) or Muhammadiyah Student Association (founded in 1965) is an exponent of Muhammadiyah in student affairs which basic mission is to realize the real Islamic society as formulated by Persyarikatan Muhammadiyah. As an effort to attain this mission, IMM should provide scrupulous interpretation based on its role as a student organization in the second century of Muhammadiyah movement or "the Enlightenment Movement (*harakah at-tanwir*)" (Widodo, 2017:127)



Picture 3. One of the student demonstrations reported in Fesbuk Banten News. Some student enacted “sujud syukur” (prostration of gratitude) as a celebration for Ratu Atut and Wawan’s detainment by KPK.

Before 2013, when Ratu Atut and Wawan, and with back-up from their father Chasan Sohib, were still in full control, mobilizing people to some anti-corruption demonstrations would be countered by intimidation by their *jawara* or it could be tamed by various kinds of payments (bribery). For example, in 2010, Makky Fatihah, a Fesbuk Banten News volunteer and activist of an NGO called *Foksad* (Forum Kajian Sosial dan Budaya/Forum of Social-Cultural Study), together with his brother; Hafid Asad, initiated some demonstrations in which they demanded an investigation of corruption related to a medical equipment procurement in the Health Department of Banten Province (*Kasus Alkes*). Makky remembers that:

There were only 12 or 15 people who usually joined our demonstrations. Most of them are also student activists...after the demonstration, we always were chased (*dikejar-kejar*) by Ratu Atut’s *jawara*. We would then go into hiding. I fled to Kudus, one of my friends even fled as far as Lampung. Whereas Hafid was interrogated by Wawan’s man (*orangnya Wawan*) Izul Jazuli, a broker that connects Ratu Atut’s family with NGOs, journalists, and even the law enforcement apparatus. Hafid came to Le-Dian hotel, and at its cafe, he

met with Izul and Djaja Buddy, the head of the health office of Banten, who allegedly involved in 'Alkes' corruption case (medical equipment procurement corruption case)..they gave money to Hafid, it was 200 million rupiah (about 13.000 USD). Hafid took the money. After Izul and Djaja left, suddenly there came policemen who arrested Hafid by charging him with blackmail. It was a trap, and Hafid went three years into prison. After all those incidents I am afraid to get involved in demonstrations against the dynasty.

This experience shows how the dynasty uses its power and networks, including policemen, to counter or tame political mobilizations. A scholar-activist, Boyke Pribadi, who had a similar experience of being threatened by Ratu Atut's *jawara* for being critical towards the dynasty, said that the dynasty's network of *jawara* used 'golok' (machete/violence) to spread fear and their business network used 'uang' (money/bribery) to silence activists. Even, Gol A Gong, a writer, and activist, who has been active criticizing the dynasty through the Wong Banten Facebook Group (see Chapter 4), also fled to Sumatra for almost six months out of fear for the dynasty's *jawara* and their terror. Fear is one of the important emotional elements that determine the success and failure of political mobilizations (Flam, 2005:29). And, in the case of anti-corruption mobilizations in Ratu Atut repressive era, before she and her brother were detained by KPK, activists' attempts to mobilize people all failed because they could not manage or counter their fear. The dynasty's repressive system, in this case, works through its clientelistic practices and its *jawara*'s networks in spreading threats ('golok'/machete) or through money politics and businessmen that financially tame the activists.

A little Comparison: Anti Corruptions Mobilizations of Malang Corruption Watch

In this section, in order to understand how an anti-corruption movement may work in mobilizing citizens, I make a small comparison between off-line anti-corruption mobilizations in Banten and a considerably more successful anti-corruption mobilization in Malang, East Java, organized by an NGO called Malang Corruption Watch (MCW).

Malang Corruption Watch (MCW) was founded on May 31st, 2000, with support from LBH (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum), a well-known national NGO that not only provides free legal assistance, advocacy, and consultation but

also engages in anti-corruption activism (see Chapter 2). The establishment of MCW was inspired by the existence of ICW (Indonesian Corruption Watch) (also see Chapter 2). MCW is one of the most active local anti-corruption NGOs in Indonesia, and MCW became the main actor in the anti-corruption movement in the Malang Raya region, including Malang Regency, the City of Malang, and the City of Batu (Latifah and Larasati, 2018).

In combating corruption, Malang Corruption Watch has developed several activities, including; “Pendidikan Politik Rakyat” (Political Education For The People), “Sekolah Rakyat” (People’s School), “Forum Warga” (Citizens Forum), “Kelompok Warga Mengawal Pelayanan Publik” (Citizens Group For Public Services Monitoring), “Kampanye Anti-Korupsi” (Anti-Corruption Campaigns), and “Sekolah Anti-Korupsi” (Anti-Corruption Schools) (Rahmadani and Samsuri, 2019: 55).

Firstly, political education for the people is a process of building critical awareness among the communities in Malang, starting with providing an understanding of rights and obligations as citizens. Secondly, the people’s school, which is a means to transfer knowledge and skills in community organizing and advocacy to actors in communities, Thirdly, the Citizen’s Forums are forums in which communities’ actors from the People’s Schools practice their skills in community organizing and advocacy. Fourthly, these Citizens’ Forums main activities are conducting public service monitoring. The two most active citizen monitoring forums are Forum Masyarakat Peduli Pendidikan (FMPP) and Forum Masyarakat Peduli Kesehatan (FMPK). FMPP focuses on monitoring and advocating for education services in Malang, mostly to encourage schools to be free from corruption and illegal fees (more about FMPK will be explored in detail below). where FMPK works to file complaints against healthcare services that are not pro-people. In 2018, Malang Corruption Watch collaborated with FMPK with a focus on monitoring programs related to the implementation of non-contributory modality (PBI, Penerima Bantuan Iuran) for the poor, advocating for universal health coverage, and changes in the local health regulation (Perda, Peraturan Daerah) in Malang City (Rahmadani and Samsuri, 2019: 56).

Furthermore, Malang Corruption Watch utilized various methods of anti-corruption campaigns, including community cinema, anti-corruption arts and performances, “jagongan” (public discussion), anti-corruption “istighosah” (praying together), and social media campaigns. Community cinema and anti-corruption arts and performances were held to unite community’s perspectives on corruption as a common enemy. *Jangongan* (public discussion) sets out to

facilitate meetings between the public and government officials, as well as academics and activists. For example, a *jagongan* meeting was held to discuss the implementation of local elections in Malang City by inviting the Regional Election Commission (KPUD) and the City Election Supervisory Committee (Panwas) to reach an agreement on the joint monitoring of the implementation of the Malang City local elections with integrity. The anti-corruption *isti ghosah* is organized under the theme “Malang Corruption Emergency” in response to the detention of 41 members of the Malang City DPRD by the KPK in a bribery case. Malang Corruption Watch invited all elements of Malang’s society, including motorcycle taxi drivers, street vendors, housewives, public transportation drivers, teachers, lecturers, students, factory workers, farmers, religious leaders, and members of the Anti-Corruption Society Alliance (AL-MAK). For Malang Corruption Watch, the development of social media is a top priority in carrying out its anti-corruption campaigns. The social media platforms used by MCW include a Facebook page called Malang Corruption Watch, an Instagram account under the name of @mcwngalam, and a Twitter account of @MCWngalam. The availability of social media makes it easier for MCW to conduct its campaign through various content considered relevant, such as infographics on policy analysis and corruption cases and calls for actions or demonstrations. City (Rahmadani and Samsuri, 2019: 57).

It is not surprising that Malang Corruption Watch (MCW) is well known among the citizens of Malang. This was evident when I went to Malang and headed to the MCW office. The motorcycle taxi driver I was riding with immediately recognized the address of the MCW office: “*This is the MCW office, right? They often hold activities and protest about corruption. Continually, they seem to never get tired,*” said the motorcycle taxi driver.

Malang Corruption Watch’s achievements in monitoring, advocacies, and investigation of corruption cases in Malang includes; extortion in the education sector in Malang City, corruption in the procurement of land for the Malang City hospital, delayed completion and overrun budget in the Tidar street drainage dine worth 39 billion rupiah (about 2.5 million USD), alleged corruption in the Kedungkandang bridge project worth 9,7 billion rupiah (about 262.000 USD), alleged corruption in the procurement in the procurement of library books for village offices worth 2,2 billion rupiah, tax evasion in 2012 amounting to 4,6 billion rupiah (about 142.000 USD), illegal levies at SMA 10 (a high school) worth Rp.2.25 billion rupiah (about 145.000 USD) , and also corruption cases that occurred during the local elections (Surabaya Pagi, 2014).

In addition to corruption cases mentioned above, Malang Corruption Watch has also been successful in uncovering “10 corruption cases” in Batu City that allegedly involving (ex) Mayor of Batu; Eddy Rumpoko. Malang Corruption Watch posted the detail of these 10 corruption cases on their social media platforms; Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, as follows:

10

KASUS KOTA BATU

#ERterlibat

- 1

PENUNGGAKAN PAJAK HIBURAN 2010-2014 SEBAGAI DUGAAN MODUS TINDAK PIDANA KORUPSI

telah terjadi penunggakan pajak hiburan oleh JTP 1 dan 2 serta BNS, berpotensi menimbulkan kerugian keuangan negara sebesar Rp. 24 M
- 2

PENGURANGAN PIUTANG PAJAK HIBURAN 2012 SEBAGAI INDIKASI KORUPSI

SK Walikota memberikan keringanan pajak kepada JTP 1, dan dugaan potensi kerugian keuangan negara sebesar RP. 2,2 M
- 3

KORUPSI PT BWR 2014

dana penyertaan modal PT BWR , dipinjamkan kepada orang lain oleh direksi, atas perintah dari pemilik saham penuh.berpotensi menimbulkan kerugian keuangan negara Rp. 1,2 M
- 4

KORUPSI BATU ROADSHOW “BATU SHINING INVESTMENT” 2015

pengadaan jasa EO tidak menggunakan mekanisme pengadaan barang dan jasa dengan benar. berpotensi menimbuka kerugian keuangan negara Rp. 1 M
- 5

DUGAAN KORUPSI PEMBANGUNAN BLOCK OFFICE 2009-2016

pembangunan sempat terhenti beberapa tahun akibat adanya persoalan penganggaran, kontraktor dan proses pengadaan tanah.
- 6

DUGAAN KORUPSI TUKAR GULING DADAP REJO 2011

antara Pemkot Batu dan pihak swasta (terdapat perbedaan harga) yang berpotensi merugikan keuangan negara Rp. 7,5 M
- 7

PEMBANGUNAN TAMAN BLOCK OFFICE “AMONG TANI”

proyek ini di kerjakan oleh PT CA dan beberapa bulan lalu ramai terkait aliran dana kepada beberapa pihak
- 8

PEMBANGUNAN GOR GAJAHMADA 2016

proyek ini di kerjakan oleh PT.CA dan beberapa bulan lalu ramai terkait aliran dana ke beberapa pihak.
- 9

PERIZINAN “PREDATOR FUNPARK” 2014

berdirinya predator funpark di Kota Batu ternyata belum mengantongi izin
- 10

PEMBANGUNAN SEJUMLAH PERUMAHAN/PEMUKIMAN 2017

lahan pertanian berubah menjadi lahan perumahan tanpa pengawasan ketat. ini berpotensi ada proses negosiasi antara pihak pengembang dengan




malang corruption watch


mcwingatan


mcw.malang@gmail.com


@mcwingatan

10 Cases of Batu City

#ERterlibat (Edi Rumpoko involved)

1. The arrears of the 2010-2014 entertainment tax as an alleged mode of corruption.

There have been arrears of entertainment tax by Jatim Park 1 and 2 and Batu Night Spectacular. Potential to cause state financial losses of 24 billion Rupiah (about 1,5 million USD)

2. Reduction of 2012 entertainment tax receivables as an indication of corruption

The mayor's decree provides tax relief to JPT 1, and the alleged potential loss of state finances is RP. 2.2 billion Rupiah (about 142.000 USD)

3. Corruption PT.BWR 2014

Government investment money for PT. BWR is lent to someone else by the board of directors on the orders of the full shareholder, potentially causing state financial losses of 1.2 billion rupiah (about 77.000 USD).

4. Corrupt Batu Roadshow "Batu Shining Investment" 2015

The use of EO services does not use the correct mechanism for the procurement of goods and services, potentially causing financial losses of 1 billion rupiah (about 64.000 USD).

5. Allegations of corruption in the construction of the 2009-2016 block office

Construction had been halted for several years due to problems in budgeting, contractors, and the land acquisition process.

6. Allegations of Corruption in the land exchange of Dadap Reja 2011

Between the Batu City Government and the private sector (there is a price difference) which has the potential to harm the state's finances 7.5 billion rupiah (about 484.000 USD)

7. Construction of the 'Among Tani' block office park

This project is being carried out by PT.GA and a few months ago there is a rumor about the flow of funds to several parties.

8. Construction of the 2016 Gajah Mada GOR

This project is being carried out by PT.GA and a few months ago there is a

rumor about the flow of funds to several parties.

9. 2016 “Predator Fun Park” Licensing

This project is being carried out by PT.GA and a few months ago there is a rumor about the flow of funds to several parties.

10. Construction of housing/settlements 2017

Agricultural land turned into residential land without strict supervision. There is potential collusion in the negotiation process between the developer and the government.

As a result of this long investigation and advocacy, in September 2017, Eddy Rumpoko, the Mayor of Batu City, was arrested by the KPK (Corruption Eradication Commission) in relation to corruption allegation case in tourism business investment of PT Batu Wisata Resource and “Batu Shining Investment” (Number 3 and 4 in the list above).

Different from postings on corruption in social media in Banten, Malang Corruption Watch’s postings, as it can be seen from one of the examples above, most are framed as both legal and as material/financial discourse. Similar to national CSOs’ social media discourse of corruption, Malang Corruption Watch’s social media postings on corruption are described in terms of legal doctrines under which particular events or practices can be adjudicated (see Chapter 3). Whereas as material practices, corruption is framed as monetary abuses by those government officials. Compared to moral-emotional discourse in Banten, this legal and material framing, supported with MCW’s organizing ability, is more effective in directing people towards specific protest events or offline-mobilizations.

There were a variety of off-line anti-corruption events organized by Malang Corruption Watch, including demonstrations, *rembuk warga* (citizens deliberation), *kongres rakyat* (people’s congress), *sekolah anti-korupsi* (school of anti-corruption), *pos pengaduan* (public complaint stations), festivals, art exhibitions, movie screenings, seminars, and discussions. In contrast to anti-corruption online campaigns in Banten (see Chapter 3 and section above), Malang Corruption Watch’s social media campaigns provide potential participants with a clear narration about corruption cases they will deal with and clear agenda of actions or suggestions on how to act. The clear narrations are a result of their legal-material framing of corruption. As it can be seen from several postings on

Malang Corruption Watch's social-media platforms (Facebook page, Twitter, and Instagram)

In relation to the detainment of the Mayor of Batu City due to the corruption in the tourism sector (see above), Malang Corruption Watch continued to post a "seruan aksi" (a call for action) demanding to "stop public deception on corruption and environmental destruction in The City of Batu":



SERUAN AKSI

Salam Anti Korupsi

Korupsi dan Kerusakan lingkungan adalah penyakit yang sedang menular dalam sendi - sendi pemerintahan, khususnya pemerintah Kota Batu. Bagaimana tidak? ditetapkan nya Walikota Batu (ER) sebagai tersangka dalam kasus suap pengadaan menunjukkan bahwa korupsi tubuh pemerintahan Kota Batu sedang mengidap penyakit korupsi. Selain itu, perubahan Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah RTRW) Kota Batu yang berpotensi merusak lingkungan, sangat diresahkan oleh Masyarakat.

Oleh karena itu, Malang corruption watch (MCW) bersama warga Kota Batu mengajak Aksi Bersama dan mengundang rekan-rekan dalam aksi tersebut dengan “Stop Pembodohan Publik atas Korupsi dan Pengrusakan Lingkungan” yang dilakukan pada:

Hari/ jam ; Kamis, 26 April 2018, 13.00 WIB - Selesai

Tempat; Di arena Alun-alun Kota Batu

Demikian dari kami.

Salam Anti Korupsi

(CALL FOR ACTION)

Anti-Corruption Salute!

Corruption and environmental destruction are infectious diseases in the body of the government, especially the government of Batu. When the Mayor of Batu became suspect of a bribery case it shows that corruption is infecting the body of the government of Batu. Moreover, the amendment of the City of Batu’s Regional Spatial Plan potentially will destroy the environment, it is, also, complained by the community.

Therefore, Malang Corruption Watch (MCW) together with the citizens of the City of Batu invite you to join an Action to demand: “stop public deception by corruption and environmental destruction in The City Of Batu”, that will be held in:

Day/time: Thursday, 26 April 2018, 13.00 WIB - end

Location: City of Batu’s public square.

From Us,

Anti-Corruption Salute!

This call for action was a response to the verdict in a bribery case of Batu’s City Mayor; Eddy Rumpoko, announced the next day. Bayu, Malang Corruption Watch’s research division coordinator, said that:

We want to support KPK to reach a fair verdict in the Eddy Rumpoko case, by involving the warga (citizens) of Batu themselves...there were about 30 people who joined the demonstration. In terms of numbers, it was not a lot. However, if we put it in the context of Batu, where Rumpoko’s family have a lot of supporters and ‘spies’ (mata-mata), this number was significant. (Interview on 30 March 2017)

In this case, although Rumpoko's family has a lot of supporters and 'spies', they do not make use of them to intimidate the Malang Corruption Watch activists. Therefore, Malang Corruption Watch was able to mobilize a significant number of people to join their demonstration against Eddy Rumpoko.

Moreover, although the Rumpoko family also practiced political clientelism by creating patronage networks, especially, with politicians and businessmen, their clientelistic strategies seemed less effective in suppressing protests. It is because the activists and NGOs, in this case, Malang Corruption Watch, are more independent from the patronage network of government's resources. Malang Corruption Watch has different funding resources including: donations from the management and supporters, publishing business, cafe business, collaboration with other NGOs (for example with ICW), and external donors from national and international organizations.

In an informal talk with a student from Brawijaya University, Malang, Lutfi J Kurniawan, the founder of Malang Corruption Watch and one of candidates of KPK's chairmen, said that it is forbidden for Malang Corruption Watch to accept money from monitoring objects, namely the government, legislature, or companies. Independence is indeed the most guarded value in MCW. "In the past, we were offered a bundle of money from a head of government's department. If we want, we could take the money. Our self-esteem is not that low. What a mess such people are (if they take the money). How come they are not ashamed of that?" (Informal conversation 3rd February 2011).

In this case, Malang Corruption Watch is not only holds the values of independence, has more sources to support their activities. Compared to the NGOs in Banten which are more dependent on money from the local government as part of the Atut dynasty's political and business networks (see above), Malang Corruption Watch has diverse funding resources, as mentioned above.

Malang Corruption Watch also organized the demonstration by making use of their old network with students and youth organizations, who have been collaborating with MCW advocating against the threats of environmental destruction in Batu. That was why they also brought environmental issues into the demonstration. Fahrudin, Malang Corruption Watch's head coordinator, also noted that:

Environmental problems, like water pollution issue, loss of agricultural land, are something that directly felt and affected the community. Bringing those issues and relating them to corruption practices in a development project

involve government officials and businessmen, is our strategy to attract citizens of Batu joining the action (interview on 30 March 2017)

In terms of citizens' participation, Malang Corruption Watch claims that they are one of the NGOs that still opts for 'pengorganisian warga' (citizen organizing) as their main approach in the anti-corruption struggle. Malang Corruption Watch facilitates citizens to engage in anti-corruption mobilization through 'pos pengaduan' (public complaints station) to collect complaints from citizens about corruption cases in public services. One of the most successful citizens mobilizations facilitated by Malang Corruption Watch is the Forum Masyarakat Peduli Pendidikan (FMPP /Citizens Forum Care For Education) which aims to study policies on education, organize protests against extortion (*pungutan liar*) in the school admission process, and collect complaints about corruption practices in the educational sector.

Malang Corruption Watch and Forum Masyarakat Peduli Pendidikan use social media to spread information about their *pos pengaduan*. For example, the posting below about a *pos pengaduan* set-up for monitoring and reporting every kind of mistreatment in "Penerimaan Peserta Didik Baru" (PPDB/ New Students Admission Process) in elementary schools to high schools in Malang :



Malang Corruption Watch

Halaman Disukai · 27 Juni 2016 ·

AWASI DAN LAPORKAN SEGALA BENTUK
PENYIMPANGAN PPDB 2016/2017.

Malang Corruption Watch dan Forum Masyarakat Peduli Pendidikan membuka posko pengaduan keliling dan pengaduan sms interaktif selama 27 - 30 Juni 2016.

Kirimkan aduan dan keluhan anda di nomor yang tertera di gambar. Mari awasi mari peduli.

Salam.
MCW dan FMPP

...

(Malang Corruption Watch

WATCH AND REPORT ALL TYPES OF
ABUSES IN PPDP 2016/2017

Malang Corruption Watch
and Forum Masyarakat Peduli
Pendidikan open complaint stations
and you can also send complaints
to interactive SMS in the period of
27-30 June 2016.

Send your complaints and
grievances to the phone number in
the poster. Let's keep a watch out
and keep caring.

Greetings,

MCW and FMPP)

AWASI DAN LAPORKAN SEGALA BENTUK PENYIMPANGAN PENERIMAAN PESERTA DIDIK BARU (PPDB) 2016/2017

Penerimaan PPDB tahun ajaran 2016/2017 mulai dari tingkat SD, SMP, SMA/SMK dibuka melalui jalur mandiri maupun online. Namun calon siswa baru berpotensi mengalami pungutan liar dalam bentuk uang pendaftaran, uang gedung, seragam, buku pelajaran, dan lain sebagainya.



POSKO PENGADUAN KELILING

Posko Pengaduan dilakukan di beberapa titik yang sudah ditentukan mulai dari **27 Juni - 30 Juni 2016**

TITIK POSKO PENGADUAN

- ▶ SMPN 17 Malang
- ▶ SMKN 2 Malang
- ▶ SMAN 10 Malang
- ▶ SMPN 6 Malang
- ▶ SMAN 6 Malang



PENGADUAN SMS INTERAKTIF

Pengaduan ini dilakukan berbasis SMS dari pengadu dengan menyebutkan nama, alamat, jenis, aduan, nama sekolah.

Kirim SMS pengaduan anda ke:

0823 3251 5159 (Buyung Jaya) atau
0838 3456 1819 (Suefendi)



MALANG
CORRUPTION
WATCH

Pak Arifin, a civil servant's pensioner and one of the active members of Forum Masyarakat Peduli Pendidikan, claims that hundreds of people that are being mobilized in those monitoring and collecting reports complain about mistreatment in new students' admission procedures. Most of the people file complaints about the illegal payment (*pungli, pungutan liar*, as described above) in the process. These all are complaints brought to a hearing with the local parliament (DPRD). FMPP and MCW also compiled recommendations from those complainers and passed them on to the Regional Office of Education (Dinas Pendidikan). Pak Arifin shared with me that, *"every time we (MCW and FMPP) come to visit Dinas Pendidikan, they will be nervous, and a sense that there must be something wrong with their programs and policies"*. He then added, *"through FMPP, together, we learn about law and policies in the educational sector, monitoring their implementations, and collecting reports from other citizens about some abuses or corrupt practices."*

Fahrudin, the coordinator of Malang Corruption Watch, claimed that they, through FMPP, were successful in mobilizing citizens, in that: *"we did not bring or mobilize a lot of people to DPRD or Dinas Pendidikan, but we mobilized the voices of Malang citizens related with corrupt practices in the field of education in Malang"*. This citizens' participation, I argue, succeeded because they were compelled by Malang Corruption Watch's anti-corruption campaigns that brought issues of corruption relevant to the citizen's everyday life, i.e. education and environmental issues.

From the description above, It can be grasped that Malang Corruption Watch's anti-corruption off-line mobilizations are more successful than their counterparts in Banten for four main reasons: firstly, compared to moral-emotional framing on corruption in social media in Banten, Malang Corruption Watch's legal-material discourse brought a clearer message and call for actions. Secondly, the public sphere in Malang was more conducive to mobilization, because there was less repression. Whereas in Banten, the activists were often threatened by the jawara. Thirdly, compared to Banten in which political clientelism effectively works, In Malang, the clientelistic practices of politicians were less effective in taming the protests. This is caused by the activists' less dependency on the resources provided by the politicians and NGOs in Malang have more diverse economic resources than those in Banten, so economic power is not concentrated in the hand of ruling elites. Lastly, the activists in Malang were able to integrate corruption with other issues, such as environmental and educational issues, that are felt and relevant to the citizens' everyday life, so they stimulated citizens' participation and mobilization. Whereas, in Banten, as

described above, the activists rarely brought corruption issues that concretely 'felt' by ordinary citizens in their protest's repertoire. And, this hindered the activists in mobilizing ordinary citizens, into strong and significant off-line mobilization.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have examined three cases of off-line anti-corruption mobilizations, they are: the 'don't vote for a corrupt dynasty' mobilization in the election time in Banten, anti-corruption demonstrations in Banten, and, as a comparison, the Malang Corruption Watch (MCW) anti-corruption mobilizations.

The mobilization of voters to not vote for the candidates from a corrupt family or dynasty failed. Ratu Atut's family won the elections and maintained their power in Banten. Moral-emotional discourse diffused to the public through social media could not provoke the voters to not vote for the candidates from the dynasty. The voters were, instead, persuaded to support the dynasty as they feel that the dynasty is giving care and warmth to them (the affective aspect of clientelism) by providing them with government resources, projects, and money in exchange for political support (political clientelism).

In the case of anti-corruption demonstration, the attempt to ignite moral outrage and anger by framing corruption as a moral-emotional discourse has made the issue of corruption rather vague. There are no clear demands related to the curtailment of corruption and government officials who were blamed for those problems. Furthermore, the lack of solid organization and leadership on the side of Facebook moderators and activists limited the mobilizations to a small circle of friends. In other demonstration, when the dynasty was repressive, in which activists came out with a clear and specific case of corruption and its alleged perpetrators, more broad and active anti-corruption mobilizations were hampered by intimidation or threats from the dynasty's jawara and tamed by bribery from the dynasty's cronies.

As a comparison, Malang Corruption Watch offers an example of how one successfully can mobilize people or citizens of Malang to participate in different anti-corruption events: from demonstrations to discussions, and collecting citizens' complaints on public mistreatment. Different from the Facebook activists in Banten, Malang Corruption Watch, using their social media platforms, frames corruption in terms of a legal-material category. This framing

provided potential participants with a clear story about corruption cases and their relevance to their everyday life. Enabled by the Malang Corruption Watch's community ability to organize, it also gives the citizens clear suggestions about how to act and what to demand curtailing corruption. This mobilization is also enabled by the public sphere in Malang that is more conducive than Banten. In this sense, different from Banten, political clientelism in Malang is not effective to tame the off-line protests since the activists were less dependent on governmental resources. Finally, off-line mobilizations in Malang were more successful as the activists were able to stimulate citizens' participation by relating issues of corruption in other issues that are relevant to the life of the citizens. Whereas in Banten, the activists have difficulties in mobilizing people outside their circles, i.e ordinary citizens of Banten, because they do not succeed in relating corruption cases to everyday concerns of citizens.

Chapter Six

Conclusion

In this dissertation, I have examined the nexus of on-line and off-line anti-corruption activism in Banten, set against the historical background of anti-corruption activism in Indonesia and in comparison, with the discourse of (anti) corruption of national CSO (Civil Society Organization) and anti-corruption off-line mobilization of Malang Corruption Watch (MCW) in Malang, East Java. To study this nexus, I have asked this main question: why did intense online anti-corruption activism in Banten fail to generate effective offline mobilization? This question was followed by more detailed questions: What discourses of corruption are constructed through online anti-corruption activism at both local (Banten) and national levels? How is anti-corruption activism in Banten being practiced online? How is online anti-corruption activism reflective of the character of citizenship in Banten? And, to what extent, can this online anti-corruption activism be transformed (or not transformed) into strong off-line mobilization?

To provide some historical background, in Chapter 2, I followed the trajectory of the various anti-corruption modes of organizing in Indonesia from the New Order to reformasi and the second reformasi decade. I identified three prominent forms of organizing: student movements, CSO programmatic actions and social-media activism. These three forms of anti-corruption organizing might all be considered effective in pushing the government to set up anti-corruption policies/laws, institutions, and save the new institution (KPK) from the attacks of predatory elites. However, they did not succeed in curtailing corruption itself, that is indicated by Indonesia's levels of corruption that have not changed, or even worst.

In Chapter 3, I sought to answer the first question of this dissertation: what discourses of corruption are constructed through online anti-corruption activism at both provincial (Banten) and national levels? I made a comparison between the discourse of corruption in social media campaigning anti-corruption in Banten with social media of anti-corruption CSOs on a national level. At a national level, in social media anti-corruption campaigns that are mostly organized by formal and programmatic CSOs, corruption is dominantly constructed as a legal discourse. Whereas in Banten, corruption in social media anti-corruption campaigns, it is predominantly constructed by means of a moral emotional discourse related to religion with the expectation of what a 'good leader' should do.

In Chapter 4, I answered the questions of how anti-corruption activism in Banten is being practiced online? I argue that online anti-corruption activism in Banten is practiced through digital acts of reporting and sharing news on corruption and digital acts of flaming to resist the Banten political dynasty that is deemed to be corrupt. Through these digital acts, activist-citizens of Banten are conducting, what I have called: 'online indirect activism'. This is a mode of resistance in which activist-citizens of Banten emotionally attempt to activate other citizens to initiate their own resistance. I argue that the digital acts of reporting and sharing news on corruption have provoked readers and members of the three Facebook page and groups to perform digital acts of flaming toward the Banten political dynasty that regarded corrupt. Through these digital acts, citizens of Banten direct their feelings of anger, hate, passion and disgust about their corrupt leaders. From this encounter between citizens and the (agents of) state by enacting digital acts that are filled with emotions or affect emerged a political subjectivity that I have called "digital affective citizenship".

For the question of how is online anti-corruption activism reflective of

the character of citizenship in Banten? I identified a particular characteristic of digital affective in Banten: “powerless angry citizens”. This characteristic of citizenship reflects the struggle of emotional citizens who have a desire to affect political outcomes through engaging with a crucial political issue (corruption), but who feel they are powerless and lack the necessary capacities in effectively influencing or taking responsibility for political affairs of their polity, i.e. curtailing corrupt leaders.

The powerlessness of angry Banten citizens can be understood as a result of the mismatch between their desire for reigning in their corrupt leaders and the limitations of participatory channels and organizations at their disposal which can effectively lead to such curtailment. Moreover, powerless angry citizens can also be interpreted as a character of citizenship shaped by moral-emotional discourse of corruption inspired by local Islamic value that frame corrupt leaders as sinners who can be only brought down by God’s punishment and not by people or institutional power.

This moral-emotional discourse also constitutes the core characteristic of digital affect culture (Döveling, Harju, & Sommer, 2018). Digital affect culture can be defined as “the assemblage of those discourses within which emotions come to be,” and social sharing is a key element of online discourse that contributes to this (McCarthy, 1994:277). According to Markham (2004), the digital world is a unique discursive space where participation and orientation are determined by emotional interaction chains (see Collins, 1984, 1987) (*ibid.*, 4). This emotional discourse constructs subject positions that invite emotional identification of others to be in alignment or dis-alignment (Harju, 2015, 2016, 2017). However, in Banten, the moral-emotional discourse of corruption only mobilizes and aligns with other subjects in digital or online contexts (see also Kuntsman, 2012). In digital or on-line contexts, according to Harju (2017:75), “alignments are regularly formed around emotional resonance.” In the online context of Banten, alignments are formed around the emotional resonance of anger as an expression of powerlessness. And, when it came to off-line mobilization, this emotional resonance did not align with other subjects, resulting in weak and powerless political mobilizations. This discursively constructed subject position reflects the characteristic of digital affective citizenship in Banten, which is powerless angry citizens.

I found that the characteristics of digital affective citizenship in Banten are, more and less, similar to the affective online political participation of young people in urban China (Fu, 2020, 2021). This characteristic is a combination of

two types of Chinese youth online participation dispositions: ‘angry youth’ and ‘powerless cynics’ (Fu, 2020:6). The first disposition is manifested in the use of aggressive or even excessive language to convey strong ideas regarding political and social topics (ibid.). Their desire for social involvement coincided with easy access to a media platform for self-expression, providing an ideal outlet for expressing their rage (ibid., 7). The second disposition is identified in the youth’s on-line critical comments to the state in an indirect and cynical way (ibid., 8). Based on their evaluation of his relationship with the state, the Chinese youth’s critical and cynical remark indicated their sense of powerlessness in changing political institutions (ibid.). At a practical level, these two characteristics, which I combined as ‘powerless angry citizens’ in Banten, may contribute to the public’s increased awareness of certain social issues, particularly corruption, by keeping them on the public agenda

In this sense, through the concept of “digital affective citizenship”, I make a contribution to the discussion on digital citizenship and the public sphere. I am inclined to extend the notion of digital citizenship (Mossberger, et.al. 2007) beyond the ability to participate in an online environment effectively with a rational, ethical, impartial, and normative behaviours (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2006, Mossberger, et.al. 2007, McCosker, 2014), and broaden it to include ‘deviant’ or ‘aberrant’ participation (MacCosker: 2013: 204) involving the use of passionate, aggressive, and vitriolic expression and exchange of sentiments -such as anger, hate, disgust, and a sense of injustice. It means that digital affective citizenship also facilitates citizens’ emotional engagement in an “affective public” defined as: “networked public formations that are mobilized and connected or disconnected through expressions of sentiment” (Papacharissi, 2015:125). In this sense, this dissertation contributes to recognizing an online alternative public sphere to the idealized Habermasian public sphere where “reason and rationally driven discourse are accentuated as canonical elements of political conversation” (Papacharissi, 2015: 26) as it can be observed in the legal discourse of corruption in national CSO’s social media (chapter 3). In this online affective public sphere, passions, emotions, and hostilities are not eradicated but instead, they become an important and shaping element in it (Mouffe 2000, McCosker, 2013, Tong 2015, McCosker and Johns 2016). In the context of Banten where subnational authoritarianism (Berenschot, et.al, 2021) has existed in the long-term political dynasty’s domination, repression and control of over economic activities, this affective public sphere is important socio-politically. In this sense, the formation of affective public in Banten is comparable to the formation of an

agonistic public sphere in authoritarian China (Tong 2015:9) where “expressing emotions itself is a practice of citizenship and a nurturing of the consciousness of resistance”. However, besides recognizing this important affective public sphere in Banten, this dissertation also make contribution in identifying the limitation of venting emotion in that affective public sphere in creating strong and effective off-line political mobilizations.

In relation to that, in Chapter 5, I have critically assessed the role of emotions or affect in the transformation of online activism to offline political mobilizations. I argue that, in line with Buechler (2000) and Gerbaudo (2012), emotions such as grievance, outrage, or anger alone have not always been able to create spontaneous and unorganized mobilizations. In other words, emotions cannot be transformed into strong and effective political mobilizations without solid organizations and leaderships, as is exemplified by the case of Fesbuk Banten’s News’s anti-corruption demonstration and the “Don’t Vote For a Corrupt Dynasty” off-line mobilization in Banten. In comparison to Malang Corruption Watch’s anti-corruption demonstration, it can be found that solid organizations and leaderships are able to develop strategic and clear programs grounded in symbols, frames and artifacts as well as gain resources that could be used in order to garner support (McAdam, et.al: 1996, Gerbaudo, 2012, Jasper 2018). In this regard, effective organizations, such as Malang Corruption Watch, allows the framing of corruption in a more constructive ‘legal-material discourse’ that provide participants a clear story about corruption cases, clear suggestions about how to act, and what to demand in curtailing corruption. Apart from these discursive problems and effective organizations, there is external factor influencing off-line political mobilization success. The external factor is political opportunity structure, or socio-political and institutional contexts that enable their mobilization (McAdam, et.al: 1996). In Banten, anti-corruption off-line mobilization was hampered by threats and was tamed by bribery from the political dynasty. Whereas in Malang, political clientelism did not work in taming the off-line protests since t the activists were not under threat and less dependent on governmental resources.

This finding leads me to draw a comparison with Anna Hazare’s anti-corruption movement in India, which I have previously mentioned in Chapter 1. I found relatively similar complex relations between how corruption is defined and discursively categorized with the off-line political mobilizations and their limitation. The Anna Hazare movement was notably successful in transforming social media campaigns into off-line demonstrations that were attended by

thousands of people. However, they were unable to sustain the demonstrations and reach beyond the urban middle class citizens. The floundering of this movement is attribute to the discourse on corruption which they construct solely as issues of legality, financial fraud, and bribery, rather than as issues of class and social inequality, where power is only ‘concentrated in the hands of a smaller minority’ (Roy, 2011) (see chapter 1). Similarly, In Banten, the activists have difficulties in mobilizing people outside the circles of the three Facebook page and groups (Fesbuk Banten News, Wong Banten, Forum Warga Banten) and student activists that mostly are urban middle class citizens (see chapter 1 and chapter 5), since they frame corruption as moral-emotional discourse that not related to the rural and urban lower class ordinary citizens. Whereas in Malang, the anti-corruption off-line mobilization were more successful, since the activists were able to stimulate citizens’ mobilizations and participation by relating issues of corruption in other issues, such as land grabbing, environmental issue, and access to educations, that are relevant to the life of the ordinary citizens.

As somebody who also has been involved in an NGO working with participatory visual and digital methods to campaign for youths’ engagement in the socio-political affairs in their community, I feel it is similarly challenging to stimulate youth participation and mobilizations to make changes in their community.

I have been working as a participatory video facilitator for over 20 years. The participatory videos are designed with the following objectives: Firstly, it is meant to serve as a tool for community group development. Secondly, to function as a tactical tool for social change and the realization of social justice. And thirdly, to serve as an empowering tool for building community strength and promoting social change (Milne, Mitchell, Lange; 2023; Alien, Harper; 2013). In other words, I use participatory video to “amplify and reflect processes of social mobilization and people’s identities as citizens within that” (Wheeler, 2011).

In the beginning, I believed that making audiovisual media addressing important issues in youth’s communities using emotional expression would attract youth participation and strong mobilization. However, when I look back at what has happened to my participatory video programs and reflect on the findings from this dissertation, I realize that using media wrapped in emotional expressions does not always produce strong engagements and mobilizations. Then, when I looked back at my programs that succeeded in mobilizing young people in their communities, and through this research, I learned that the

presence of leaders and organizations that can choose and frame relevant issues are crucial factors that make a social mobilization successful.

To conclude, this dissertation is a critical study on how on-line anti-corruption activism reflect characteristics of citizenship and be transformed into off-line political mobilization. Moral emotional discourse of corruption constructed through on-line anti-corruption activism and enacted as digital acts of flaming create a particular kind of citizenship - digital affective citizenship - characterized as “powerless angry citizens”. This moral emotional discourse cannot be transformed into significant off-line political mobilization without effective organizations and strong leaderships.

For future research, I recommend studying how the formation of digital citizenship in broader comparative and historical studies. By looking at different variations and trajectories of online activism and digital citizenship, we will understand whether and to what extent the expression of emotions on-line and the creation of particular kind of citizenship can or cannot lead to a healthy democracy. Today’s Indonesian social media landscape is characterized by ‘the authoritarian turn’ (Power, 2018). The government is increasingly repressing and dis-empowering political oppositions and activists by creating disinformation and pro-government propaganda on the Internet, as well as on-line and technical attacks targeting activists, journalists and civil society. Future research, therefore, must also identify the downsides of online activism and digital citizenship relating to online populism, hate speech, polarization and the emerging of cyber-troopers. To the end, this dissertation is a contribution in pre-signalling those anti-democratic trends in Indonesia’s social media landscape.

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Summary of the Dissertation

Digital Affective Citizenship explores the nexus of online and offline anti-corruption activism in Banten, Indonesia. These explorations include the historical background of anti-corruption activism in Indonesia, the comparison between (anti)corruption discourse framed by national CSO and Banten's local activists, online activism practices' reflection on the characteristics of citizenship in Banten, and its potential transformation into strong or weak offline mobilization.

This dissertation is based on one year fieldwork at three 'ethnographic places' ; First are social media 'places' where 'citizens' (*warga*) intensely engage in anti-corruptions campaigns in Banten: "Forum Warga Banten Facebook Group", "Wong Banten Facebook Group", "Fesbuk Banten News Page". Secondly, the province of Banten where political dynasty and corruptions are intertwined and have received public attention, particularly on social media. Thirdly, as a place of comparison, Malang Raya where a local anti-corruption non-governmental organization; Malang Corruption Watch (MCW), is actively working and relatively successful in combating corruption. The main method

used in this study is 'social media ethnography' (Postill and Pink, 2012). Through interviews and participation, it examines the materiality of being online (postings, comments, images, online interviews) in relation to the issues of corruption and anti-corruption campaigns as well as offline contacts with actors (administrators, members, followers).-participation in anti-corruption movements' offline actions (meetings, protests, and marches).

Results of this research are presented in 4 chapters. I start with a chapter that give some historical context I traced the evolution of Indonesia's anti-corruption organizing strategies from the New Order through reformasi and the second *reformasi* decade. There are three important modes of organizing that I identified include social media activism, programmatic initiatives of CSOs, and student movements. These three anti-corruptions organizing strategies may all be seen as successful in pressuring the government to establish anti-corruption laws and policies, as well as institutions, and in defending the new institution (KPK) against the assaults of rapacious elites. But as evidenced by Indonesia's persistently high or even worse levels of corruption, they were unable to reduce corruption per se.

In the following chapter, I explored online discourse of corruption framed by national civil society organizations (CSOs) in comparison with social media discourse of corruption in provincial level (Banten). At the national level, corruption is mostly built as a legal discourse in social media anti-corruption campaigns, which are primarily run by formal and programmatic CSOs. On the other hand, in Banten, morality and religious discourse are mostly used to create corruption in social media anti-corruption efforts, along with the notion of what a "good leader" ought to accomplish.

I dedicate the next chapter to answered the questions of how anti-corruption activism in Banten is being practiced online. I argue that online anti-corruption activism in Banten is practiced through digital acts of reporting and sharing news on corruption and digital acts of flaming to resist the Banten political dynasty that is deemed to be corrupt. Banten's activist-citizens, through these digital acts, are engaging in what I have called as "online indirect activism", through which citizens emotionally activate others to initiate their own resistance. This approach has led to the development of a political subjectivity called 'digital affective citizenship', in which citizens of Banten expressing anger, hate, passion, and disgust towards corrupt leaders.

In the last chapter of this dissertation, I discussed the characteristic of citizenship in Banten that reflects "powerless angry citizens." These citizens

desire to influence political outcomes through corruption but feel powerless and lack the necessary capacities to do so. This powerlessness can be attributed to the mismatch between their desire to reign in corrupt leaders and the limitations of participatory channels and organizations. The moral-emotional discourse of corruption, inspired by local Islamic values, frames corrupt leaders as sinners who can only be brought down by God's punishment. However, in Banten, the moral-emotional discourse of corruption only mobilizes and aligns with other subjects in digital or online contexts, resulting in weak and powerless political mobilizations.

Toward the end of this chapter, I broaden my argument that digital affective citizenship extends the concept of digital citizenship beyond rational, ethical, and normative online participation. It includes 'deviant' or 'aberrant' participation, involving passionate, aggressive, and vitriolic expression of sentiments. This concept facilitates citizens' emotional engagement in an 'affective public', which is networked public formations mobilized through sentiment expression. This dissertation contributes to recognizing an online alternative public sphere to the idealized Habermasian public sphere, where passions, emotions, and hostilities are not eradicated but become important and shaping elements.

Samenvatting van dit proefschrift

‘Digital Affective Citizenship’ onderzoekt de samenhang tussen online en offline anti-corruptie-activisme in de Indonesische provincie Banten. Dit onderzoek beslaat de historische achtergrond van anti-corruptie-activisme in Indonesië en de vergelijking tussen het (anti-) corruptiediscours van maatschappelijke organisaties en lokale activisten in Banten. Maar ook een reflectie op praktijken van online activisme en wat het doet met noties van burgerschap in Banten, en de potentiële transformatie van dit soort ideeën naargelang offline mobilisatie die er eventueel uit volgt meer of minder succesvol is.

Dit proefschrift is gebaseerd op een jaar veldwerk op drie ‘ethnografische locaties; Een eerste van deze locaties zijn de sociale media waar ‘burgers’ (warga) intensief deelnemen aan anti-corruptiecampagnes in Banten: namelijk de “Forum Warga Banten Facebook Group”, de “Wong Banten Facebook Group”, en de “Fesbuk Banten News Page”. Een tweede locatie is de provincie Banten, waar de politieke dynastie en corruptie met elkaar verweven zijn en deze ook volop publieke aandacht hebben gekregen, vooral op sociale media. Ten derde, en ter vergelijking is er de locatie Malang Raya, een stad waar de lokale niet-

gouvernementele anticorruptie organisatie Malang Corruption Watch (MCW) actief is en relatief succesvol in het bestrijden van corruptie. De voornaamste methode die in dit onderzoek wordt gebruikt is 'social media etnografie' (Postill en Pink, 2012). Door middel van interviews en participatie onderzoek ik de materiële aspecten van het online zijn (in 'posts', commentaren, afbeeldingen, online interviews) meer specifiek in relatie tot kwesties als corruptie en anticorruptie campagnes. Dit soort etnografie omvat tevens offline contacten met relevante actoren (zoals beheerders, leden, volgers), en deelname aan en observatie van offline acties van anticorruptie bewegingen (bijeenkomsten, protesten en marsen).

De resultaten van dit onderzoek worden gepresenteerd in vier hoofdstukken. Ik begin met een hoofdstuk dat een historische context geeft aan het door mij bestudeerde anti-corruptie activisme. Ik volgde de evolutie van de belangrijkste anticorruptie- bewegingen in Indonesië en hun organisatiestrategieën, van de Nieuwe Orde tot het Reformasi tijdperk en het tweede Reformasi-decennium. Er zijn drie belangrijke manieren van organiseren die ik heb weten te identificeren: sociale media-activisme; programmatische initiatieven van maatschappelijke organisaties (CSO); en studentenbewegingen. Deze drie anti-corruptie-organisatiestrategieën zijn allen als succesvol te bestempelen als het aankomt op het onder druk zetten van de regering en instellingen om anti-corruptie -beleid in te voeren, en in het verdedigen van nieuwe instellingen zoals het KPK tegen aanvallen van hebzuchtige elites. Maar zoals wel blijkt uit de aanhoudende of zelfs toenemende mate van corruptie in Indonesië, waren ze niet altijd in staat corruptie ook daadwerkelijk terug te dringen.

In het daaropvolgende hoofdstuk onderzoek ik het online discours over corruptie, zoals dat is vormgegeven door nationale maatschappelijke organisaties (CSO's), in vergelijking met het sociale media-discours omtrent corruptie op meer provinciaal niveau (in de provincie Banten). Op nationaal niveau wordt corruptie vooral opgebouwd als een juridisch discours en anti-corruptiecampagnes op sociale media, worden voornamelijk geleid door formele en programmatische maatschappelijke organisaties. Aan de andere kant worden in Banten moraliteit en religieuze waarden als discours ingezet om corruptie aan te kaarten op sociale media, samen met het idee van wat een 'goede leider' zou moeten zijn.

Het volgende hoofdstuk wijd ik aan het beantwoorden van de vragen over hoe anti-corruptie-activisme in Banten online ook echt wordt gepraktiseerd. Ik betoog dat online anti-corruptie-activisme in Banten wordt beoefend door middel van 'digitale daden van verslaggeving' (digital acts of reporting) en

door het delen van nieuws over corruptie. Maar ook door ‘digitale daden van belediging’ (digital acts of flaming) om zo weerstand te bieden aan de politieke dynastie van Banten die breed als corrupt wordt beschouwd. De activistische burgers van Banten houden zich via dit soort digitale daden bezig met wat ik bestempel als ‘online indirect activisme’, waardoor burgers medeburgers emotioneel aanzetten om hun eigen vorm van verzet te initiëren. Deze aanpak heeft geleid tot de ontwikkeling van een politieke subjectiviteit die wel ‘digitaal affectief burgerschap’ wordt genoemd, waarin burgers van Banten woede, haat, hartstocht en afkeer jegens corrupte leiders openlijk en via sociale media uiten.

In het laatste hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift besprak ik de kenmerken dat dit soort burgerschap in Banten, dat van ‘machteloze boze burgers’ het best weerspiegelt. Deze burgers willen de politieke resultaten beïnvloeden door middel van het adreseren van corruptie, maar voelen zich machteloos en beschikken niet over de noodzakelijke middelen om dat ook te doen. Deze machteloosheid kan worden toegeschreven aan de discrepantie tussen enerzijds hun verlangen om corrupte leiders te kunnen beteugelen en anderzijds de beperkingen van de participatieve kanalen en organisaties waartoe zij zich wenden. Het moreel-emotionele discours omtrent corruptie, geïnspireerd door lokale religieuze waarden, zet corrupte leiders neer als zondaars die alleen door Gods straf ten val kunnen worden gebracht. In Banten mobiliseert een dergelijk moreel-emotionele discours omtrent corruptie echter alleen maar als het ook aam sluit bij andere onderwerpen in digitale of online contexten, wat tot nu toe resulteert in vaak zwakke en machteloze vormen van politieke mobilisaties.

Tegen het einde van dit hoofdstuk verbreed ik mijn betoog en stel dat digitaal affectief burgerschap het reeds bestaand concept van digitaal burgerschap verder uitbreidt door te kijken naar andere dan rationale, ethische en normatieve online participatie. Het omvat ook ‘afwijkende’ of ‘verwerpelijke’ participatie, waarbij hartstochtelijke, agressieve en venijnige uitingen van gevoelens prominent worden ingezet. Dit concept verheldert de emotionele betrokkenheid van burgers bij een wat je kunt bestempelen als een ‘affectief publiek’, dat wil zeggen een doornetwerken ondersteunde publieke formatie die wordt gemobiliseerd door middel van emoties en sentiment. Dit proefschrift draagt zo bij aan de erkenning van een online publieke sfeer die een alternatief vormt ten opzichte van de meer bekende en vaak geïdealiseerde Habermasiaanse publieke sfeer. Een waar passies, emoties en vijandigheden niet worden ontkend of gemarginaliseerd, maar belangrijke en vormgevende elementen zijn die bijdragen tot de publieke sfeer.

Curriculum Vitae

Muhammad Zamzam Fauzanafi was born in 25 Januari 1977, at Tasikmalaya, West Java, Indonesia. He completed his high school (1995) in a state-funded high school in called: SMAN 2Tasikmalaya. From 1995 to 2000 He pursued his Bachelor of Arts in Anthropology at the Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta. He had worked for 2 years in an NGO; Yayasan Pondok Rakyat, focused on urban poor community organizing. While, at the same time, actives at Rumah Sinema; a small organization conducting research on media audiences and literacy. In 2003, he received a scholarship from the Ford Foundation; International Fellowship Program (IFP). The scholarship enabled him to do an MA in Visual Anthropology at the Granada Centre for Visual Anthropology, University of Manchester, United Kingdom. After finished his MA, in 2006, he co-founded Yayasan Kampung Halaman, an NGO working with youth using participatory visual methods as tools for empowerment. For his work with Yayasan Kampung Halaman, in 2011, He received an award from the Committee on Arts and the Humanities USA; National Arts and Humanities Youth Program Awards. From 2009 until now, he has been working as a lecturer and researcher in the field of visual-digital-sensory anthropology at the department of Anthropology at the Gadjah Mada University. In 2013, He started to work on his PhD research on “Digital Affective Citizenship” at the Institute of Cultural Anthropology and Development Sociology, Leiden University. Now he is continuing work as a tenured lecture in the department of Anthropology at the Gadjah Mada University, and appointed as head of Laboratorium Antropologi Untuk Riset dan Aksi (LAURA, Laboratory of Anthropology for Research-Action).

Propositions

1. Digital citizenship is more than rational, ethical, and normative online participation as it is practiced through digital acts that are affective, at times aggressive, and full of vitriolic expression. (this dissertation)
2. An affective public sphere is an (online) public sphere that offers an alternative to the rational and idealized Habermasian public sphere. For the online affective public, passions, emotions, and hostilities are not eradicated but instead, are instrumental in shaping the public sphere. (this dissertation)
3. Emotions alone cannot be transformed into strong and effective political bonds without solid organizations and leadership that enables the developing of strategic and clear programs that are grounded in symbols, frames and artifacts and resources that could be used to garner support. (this dissertation)
4. The phenomenon of powerless angry citizens can be understood as a result of the mismatch between their desire for curtailing corrupt leaders and the limitations of participatory channels and organizations at their disposal to get rid of them. (this dissertation)
5. Off-line political mobilizations might be sustained if one broadens the discourse framing to also include citizens beyond the urban middle class. Such framing must include issues that are relevant to lower class ('ordinary') citizens; e.g. social-economic inequality, environmental issues, and access to education. (this dissertation)
6. For the anthropology of citizenship, corruption is a useful analytical concept since citizens mobilize the term in various ways to constitute their understanding of the (ab)use of political power. By elaborating on local understandings of what the term corruption entails, we will be able to say something about the state of local politics and the state and how they are perceived of. (related to the field)

7. The most productive avenue for the anthropology of citizenship is a combination of ethnographic material from both on-line and off-line realm as it comes closest to the real-life political experiences of the people. (related to the field)
8. For the study of emotions in social movements, affect and emotions cannot be reduced to the realm of just the personal and the subjective. Affect and emotions are irreducibly entangled, simultaneously deeply felt, and embodied as well as always public (Berlant, 2011; Ahmed, 2014). (related to the field)
9. In Indonesia, anti-corruption social media activism has mainly aimed to support the anti-corruption institution KPK, rather than attempt to directly curtail corruption or corrupt elites itself. (related to the field)
10. Doing digital ethnography research involves a complex interaction between online and offline fieldwork (Barendregt, 2017). (candidate's choice)
11. Conducting ethnographic research on emotions, social media, and offline activism is also an affective process involving belonging, loss, and memory of my activism in the past. This process, also, forged affective ties between me and my informants for a very long time. (candidate's choice)