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## **An ontology for physical necessity**

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# **An Ontology for Physical Necessity**

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# Content

<b>Chapter 1 Introduction</b> .....	4
1.1 Context and motivation of the thesis .....	4
1.2 Central question of the thesis .....	5
1.3 Overview of the thesis .....	6
1.4 Additional elucidation of the approach of the thesis.....	13
<b>Chapter 2 Can Physical Necessary Relations be Denied?—a Discussion of David Lewis's Humean Ontology</b> .....	17
2.1 Introduction.....	17
2.2 Quidditism of properties .....	19
2.3 Quidditistic natural properties have no content-based distinctions .....	21
2.3.1 The reason why natural properties in Lewis's ontology have no content-based distinctions.....	22
2.3.2 The natural properties cannot be categorical properties .....	24
2.3.3 Either the contents of particulars are just the contents of the natural properties which they instantiate, or the particulars are contentless.....	28
2.4 The categorisation of natural properties cannot be accommodated in Lewis's ontology .....	32
2.4.1 The categorisation of natural properties .....	33
2.4.2 The lack of categorisation of natural properties in Lewis' ontology as a consequence of natural properties' lack of content-based distinctions .....	34
2.5 Further discussions.....	39
2.5.1 Denying the uniqueness of categorisation .....	40
2.5.2 Can the categorisation be primitive?.....	43
2.5.3 Constraint of overlapping of properties of the same category .....	45
2.5.4 Extending the arguments to other standard ontologies .....	47
2.6 Conclusion .....	49
<b>Chapter 3 How the individuation regress of dispositionalism makes it identical to OSR</b> .....	52
3.1 Introduction.....	52
3.2 Dispositionalism and ontological structural realism (OSR) .....	54
3.2.1 Dispositionalism .....	54
3.2.2 Ontological structural realism (OSR) .....	55
3.3 The regress problems for dispositionalism .....	58
3.4 The attempt to avoid the regress of individuation .....	60
3.4.1 The solution within pan-dispositionalism: Bird's holistic graph.....	60
3.4.2 The solution outside of pan-dispositionalism: The categorical-dispositional-dual/mixed views .....	74
3.5 The attempt to fix the regress of actualisation .....	86

3.6 Scientific facts for OSR and against dispositionalism .....	87
3.7 Conclusion .....	90
<b>Chapter 4 The difficulty for OSR to distinguish between mathematical and physical structures .....</b>	<b>90</b>
4.1 Introduction.....	91
4.2 The mathematical representation of laws, physical system, properties, and objects ..	93
Appendix: the equations, the groups and the state space.....	94
4.3 OSR is incapable of distinguishing between mathematical structure and physical structure.....	97
4.4 OSR's incapacity of accounting for causal relations.....	105
Appendix. The mathematical universe hypothesis .....	109
Appendix. Spatiotemporal structure collapses to mathematical structure .....	112
4.5 OSRers' theory of necessity and the conflation of mathematical necessity and physical necessity .....	116
4.5.1 Physical necessity and metaphysical dependence.....	117
4.5.2 Physical necessity and shared structure .....	119
4.6 Physical possibility .....	123
4.7 Conclusion .....	125
<b>Chapter 5 An Answer to the Question of What Relations are—the LCE System.....</b>	<b>127</b>
5.1 Introduction.....	127
5.2 What are relations? .....	129
5.2.1 Anti-quidditism in the most general sense .....	129
5.2.2 Anti-quidditism of relations implies that there need to be rudimentary relations .....	135
5.3 The rudimentary relation and how it constitutes other relations and structures .....	137
5.3.1 The coexistence relation as the rudimentary relation.....	138
5.3.2 The structures generated by CE's relating .....	145
5.3.3 Modality arises in the relating by the CE and LCE relation .....	161
5.4 Conclusion .....	168
<b>Chapter 6 The mathematical and physical structures as structures in the LCE system .....</b>	<b>170</b>
6.1 Introduction.....	170
6.2 Mathematical structure constructed as LCE-BIW structure .....	171
6.2.1 The LCE-BIW system contains all structures that satisfy ZF set theory .....	173
6.2.2 Mathematical structures constructed as sets or set-theoretic relations .....	197
6.2.3 The LCE construction of the basic concepts in category theory .....	207
6.2.4 The mathematical structures in any reductionist program can have isomorphic counterparts in the LCE system .....	213
6.3 Physics constructed in LCE-BIW system via the method of reverse engineering ...	214
6.3.1 The method of reverse engineering.....	215
6.3.2 Some discussion.....	227

6.4 Necessity and possibility in mathematics and physics .....	243
6.4.1 Ontological necessity and possibility in LCE system.....	243
6.4.2 Necessities in mathematics .....	246
6.4.3 The infinite number of possible mathematical structure.....	247
6.4.4 Necessities and possibility in physics .....	248
6.5 The LCE system solves the problem faced by relationalism .....	250
6.5.1 From relation-derivativism to relationalism .....	250
6.5.2 The rationale against relation-derivativism.....	251
6.5.3 Problems faced by relationalism .....	252
6.5.4 Response to the criticism of relationalism .....	255
6.6 Conclusion .....	259
<b>Chapter 7 Conclusions</b> .....	<b>260</b>
<b>Bibliography</b> .....	<b>264</b>
<b>Pictures</b> .....	<b>271</b>
<b>Nederlandse samenvatting</b> .....	<b>295</b>
<b>Curriculum Vitae</b> .....	<b>297</b>
<b>Acknowledgments</b> .....	<b>298</b>