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**Swiss mercenaries in the Dutch East Indies: a
transimperial history of military labour, 1848-1914**

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Swiss Mercenaries in the Dutch East Indies

*A Transimperial History
of Military Labour, 1848–1914*



PHILIPP KRAUER

Swiss Mercenaries in the Dutch East Indies

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SWISS MERCENARIES IN THE DUTCH EAST INDIES

A Transimperial History of Military Labour,
1848–1914

Philipp Krauer

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A Note on Spelling, Translation and Currencies

This book is based mainly on sources in German, French and Dutch. Occasionally, sources in Italian or Indonesian were also consulted. However, to share this work with a broad audience, this story is told exclusively in English, and all quotes from other languages are translated. Nonetheless, for the sake of historical accuracy, all quotes are included in the footnotes in the original language.

Another decision had to be made with regard to geographical names. Writing the history of colonised places is challenging since the orthography of place names varies over time. The European naming of indigenous places was imbricated within the power structures undergirding colonial rule. To illuminate these dynamics, the present text employs historical place names from the Dutch Empire, supplementing them with their contemporary postcolonial identifiers in brackets when they are first mentioned within a chapter. For instance, by referring to “Batavia (Jakarta)”, this work reminds us of the colonial structures that pervaded this social space during the period under scrutiny.

Lastly, as this work examines, among other things, the transimperial flows of finance, various currencies are mentioned. The main currencies are Dutch guilders and Swiss francs (exchange rate: 1 guilder = approx. 2.07 Swiss francs).

Introduction: Swiss Tools of Empire

This book tells the story of about 5,800 Swiss mercenaries who served in the Dutch colonial army between 1848 and 1914—the period when the Dutch Empire eventually established a vast colonial state within the far-flung Malay Archipelago.¹ These mercenaries did not build the colonial empire on their own, but they made an essential contribution to its violent expansion and maintenance. At times, every tenth European in the ranks of the *Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger* (Dutch colonial army; henceforth KNIL)² was Swiss. Considering this extensive commitment, the question arises as to why so many citizens of a small central European country engaged in establishing the Dutch colonial empire.

Drawing on Daniel Headrick's widely received *Tools of Empire*, Dutch historian Martin Bossenbroek emphasised in 1992 that the most crucial tools of nineteenth-century Dutch expansion were the “living tools”, i.e. the colonial soldiers. However, recruiting these forces posed a significant challenge for a relatively small country with limited demographic resources like the Netherlands.³ To fill their ranks with a sufficient number of soldiers, the KNIL, therefore, had to resort to two options. On the one hand, they raised non-European troops from their own colonies, mainly in the areas of present-day Indonesia, but partly also in West Africa.⁴ However, racial prejudices, cultural differences and, not least, the fear of rebellion, as occurred in British India in 1857 when Indian soldiers of the English East India Company's army almost drove the British from the subcontinent, prompted them to pursue a second option at the same time. In addition to non-Europeans, they looked out for young men from other European countries who were willing to offer their military labour in exchange for money in what can be characterised as a transimperial military labour market. In other words: they recruited mercenaries.⁵

In doing so, the KNIL continued a strategy that had previously been followed by the Dutch government, the Dutch East India Company (*Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*, henceforth VOC) and most other charter companies. From the sixteenth century onwards, Dutch rulers had been employing Swiss mercenary regiments to fight wars in Europe, and the VOC recruited c. 700,000 employees from all over Europe, including Switzerland, to build, manage and expand their merchant empire.⁶ Nonetheless, it was only at the beginning of the twentieth century when the military penetration of the archipelago largely came to an end, and the KNIL command changed its tactics from large combat units to small mobile columns consisting of Javanese and “Ambonese” soldiers led by European officers, that the

recruitment of European mercenaries became less important. In the previous hundred years, however, non-Dutch European “foreigners” made up roughly 40 per cent of the KNIL’s European troops. In absolute numbers, this amounted to 70,000 mercenaries from the territories of present-day Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland who were recruited between 1816 and 1909.⁷

Whereas a few scholars have already scrutinised the role of Dutch and non-European (“indigenous”) soldiers in the nineteenth-century KNIL,⁸ this is the first large-scale study to shed light on the hitherto broadly neglected category of European “foreigners” by taking a sample of approximately 5,800 Swiss mercenaries as a case in point,⁹ with the aim of examining mercenaries as agents of historical entanglements and to address a wide range of questions: How did the Swiss mercenaries support the Dutch authorities in maintaining and enforcing their colonial power? In what ways did they interact with the local population and their comrades? To what extent did they contribute to constructing transregional or transimperial networks and infrastructures, which allowed the Dutch to recruit men from large parts of Europe continuously or to provide veterans with pensions? Furthermore, how did these military careers shape modern Switzerland’s economic, social and cultural history?

Although the spotlight on Swiss mercenaries in the Dutch East Indies excludes the vast majority of colonial mercenaries from other European countries and leaves out the West Indies as an equally important space in the history of Dutch colonialism, the focus on these “Swiss Tools of Empire” in the Malay Archipelago nevertheless serves particularly well for a more thorough investigation for several reasons.¹⁰ To begin with, highlighting the role of colonial mercenaries takes us beyond the immediate confines of the Dutch colonial empire and helps shed light on its broader pan-European aspects. In recent years, such an approach, which takes empires as a starting point but consciously transcends their boundaries, has been labelled “transimperial”, distinguishing it from transnational or translocational approaches that rely on the nation-state or other historical political entities. As pointed out by Bernhard C. Schär, such a transimperial approach helps us to recognise that the European hinterland served as “multi-imperial service and resource zones” for colonial powers since service providers such as bankers, politicians, lawyers, doctors, sailors, and merchants from other European countries significantly facilitated the expansion of the Dutch colonial empire.¹¹ The KNIL ultimately benefitted in recruiting mercenaries from being embedded within the centuries-old transimperial military labour market structures.

Secondly, it enables us to enhance our knowledge of the Dutch Empire’s colonial repercussions on other European nations without formal colonial possessions. While some recent works have shed light on several such transimperial

connections, they have primarily been limited to agents who belong to a “global bourgeoisie” or religious circles: scientists, merchants, missionaries, travellers and other members from Europe’s globally connected (semi-)urban middle- and upper-class societies.¹² However, since the majority of the mercenaries originated from poorer urban and rural backgrounds, their examination, in contrast, allows us to gain a broader understanding of colonialism and its impact on micro-social communities beyond the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie classes.

Thirdly, by limiting the scope to the second half of the nineteenth century up to World War I, attention is given not only to the phase of expansive military developments in the Dutch East Indies as highlighted at the outset but also to the early years of the nascent Swiss federal state founded in 1848. In doing so, it sheds new light on the connection between colonialism and nation-states without formal colonial possessions since modern Switzerland was built through its profound social, economic, and epistemic involvements in the broader phenomenon of European colonialism even though it never possessed any colonies of its own. Finally, while research on “Swiss colonial history” has so far focused mainly on economic and cultural entanglements, this book further demonstrates that acts of extreme violence, sexual exploitation and colonial racism should also be part of the national historiography.

Examining these Swiss mercenaries, therefore, allows us to better understand the larger European dimension of colonialism, beyond the dichotomy of metropolis and colony and beyond imperial borders.

State of Research

This study draws on and contributes to three overlapping fields of research, attempting to connect different historiographies from the Netherlands, Indonesia and Switzerland, namely *New Military History*, *New Imperial History* and *History of Migration*.¹³

New Military History

As a history of mercenaries, the present inquiry ties in with the broad field of military history, or more precisely, with the subfield of *New Military History*. While this current is no longer quite as “new” as its name suggests—it already took roots in the 1960s—it still helps distinguish itself from a supposedly “old” or “traditional” military history, whose main subjects are primarily great commanders, weaponry, battles, tactics, and logistics. However, since *New Military History* defines itself mainly by what it is not, it lacks a clear identity, subsuming a “hotchpotch” of the

most diverse topics.¹⁴ What most of the works that label themselves as *New Military History* have in common, though, is their openness to approaches grounded in social and cultural history. Taken together, they opt for a “bottom-up perspective”, addressing questions about the social, cultural, and economic dimensions of warfare and violence, gender-specific implications of the military milieu, and the sexuality and everyday life of soldiers and their social environment.¹⁵

This approach is also echoed in two bodies of literature that are of particular relevance to this inquiry. The first concerns the historiography of Swiss mercenaries. Hundreds of thousands of Swiss soldiers served foreign European monarchs from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century.¹⁶ This intense involvement had a decisive influence on Switzerland’s political, economic and social history. Until the 1970s, however, research primarily focused on heroic deeds, acts of bravery or their importance in the process of forging a national identity.¹⁷ It was not until the last quarter of the twentieth century that an increasing number of works addressed economic and social dimensions. They examined, for example, not only how pensions allowed individual families to accumulate enormous wealth, hold high office for generations and forego collecting taxes but also the crucial role of women within “family military enterprises” as managing directors and head recruiters.¹⁸ In addition to these works focusing on local elites, further studies have elucidated the rank-and-file mercenaries of such regiments.¹⁹ Ultimately, following an international historiographical trend towards the “transnationalisation” of national narratives, there have also been increasing efforts to synthesise the numerous case studies and to analyse how Switzerland was involved in transregional European “markets of violence”, and to what extent this position, surrounded by monarchs, shaped the loose structure of the Old Confederation on the territory of present-day Switzerland.²⁰

Despite the broad scope and undisputable originality of these recent works, it is striking that this body of literature suffers from two fundamental conceptual limitations. Firstly, it confines the analytical framework of Swiss mercenary historiography temporally almost exclusively to the period prior to 1800. Secondly, it remains Eurocentric: it neither takes into account the colonial rivalries of the European powers in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans, which shaped the demand for Swiss mercenaries in the European mainland, nor does it examine the extra-European theatres of war where numerous Swiss fought for colonial powers.

In their seminal contributions on the French Foreign Legion, however, Peter Huber and Christian Koller proved that Swiss mercenaryism was a “mass phenomenon” well into the twentieth century.²¹ Even if exact figures on national affiliation cannot be determined due to the anonymous entry into the Legion as well as the restrictive access to archives, Koller estimates that 30,000 to 40,000 Swiss served as legionaries for the French Empire in Africa, Asia, Europe and Mexico from 1831 to 1962.²² Moreover, Koller’s research also provides valuable insights into the

self-image of these mercenaries. Focusing on the legionaries' self-testimonies, Koller convincingly demonstrates that they developed a shared sense of camaraderie that blurred the social and cultural differences within the Legion. This collective identity was soaked in an attitude of "European superiority", which was both formed and challenged in demarcation from an extra-European "Other".²³

With their works, Koller and Huber stand at the threshold of the second body of literature, namely that of the historiography of the colonial armies. In recent years, numerous publications have appeared that take a closer look at the colonial armies of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Michelle Moyd, for example, has made an essential contribution to the history of the so-called "Askaris" in the German *Schutztruppe*, which also provides a critical theoretical foundation for the analysis of colonial armies in general.²⁴ Additionally, Erica Wald offers a substantial social examination of the life of British colonial soldiers in the barracks of South Asia.²⁵ Kate Imy's detailed exploration of the British Indian Army highlights how the army enforced religious and racial divisions; and Heather Streets-Salter, a few years prior, released an extensive work on martial races, masculinity, and imperial culture in the British Indian Army.²⁶ The anthology by Tanja Bühner, Christian Stachelbeck, and Dierk Walter, focusing on imperial wars from 1500 to the present, is equally vital for understanding colonial military forces.²⁷

With regard to the KNIL, Martin Bossenbroek's comprehensive work forms an important reference point for this book because it extrapolates the recruited nations and its thorough depiction of the motives, fears and concerns of the Dutch recruiting authorities.²⁸ Another significant source is a recently published book called *Krijgsgeweld en kolonie*, in which Petra Groen, Anita van Dissel, Mark Loderichs, Rémy Limpach, and Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, for the first time, provide a comprehensive analysis of the KNIL in the Dutch East and West Indies.²⁹ In this respect, their work represents the culmination of almost forty years of critical engagement with the history of the KNIL, building on contributions on African, Javanese or "Ambonese" soldiers,³⁰ colonial warfare,³¹ barracks concubinage³² and military administration.³³

Despite the diversity of the scholarship on the KNIL, a comprehensive account of the actions, experiences and perceptions of non-Dutch European soldiers is still lacking. In analysing micro-historical cases of single mercenaries, however, several articles have already indicated that such an investigation could provide valuable insights. Thomas Bürgisser, for example, tells the story of the farmer's son Arnold Egloff, who succumbed to his wanderlust in 1889 and enlisted with the KNIL to travel to Java, from where he regularly reported on his life in the barracks in letters to his parents.³⁴ Following the traces of Swiss mercenary Louis Wyrsh, Bernhard C. Schär discusses the influence Wyrsh's Asian concubine Silla had on Swiss history and why such subaltern voices have hardly been heard until now.³⁵ Andreas Zangger, to name another example, reconstructs what motivated the offspring of

a wealthy Swiss family to join the KNIL in 1858 and how he tried in vain to escape from there again.³⁶

Furthermore, an extensive examination of nineteenth-century colonial mercenaries provides new impulses to the discussion revolving around the various facets of (non-)physical colonial violence in recent years. Only recently, for example, a project group consisting of researchers from the three Dutch institutes KITLV, NIMH and NIOD published their first findings concerning the question of the extent to which the KNIL systematically used acts of “extreme violence”.³⁷ By using the concept of extreme violence, the authors refer, on the one hand, to acts violating the core of international humanitarian law, which was already common at the time; on the other hand, to acts of violence carried out beyond direct combat operations without military necessity against the civilian population or fighters of the Indonesian army.³⁸ Undoubtedly, this concept has its shortcomings—Roel Frakking and Anne van Mourik, for instance, rightly warned that it could evoke the idea that, alongside extreme transgressive violence, there is also its twin “accepted violence”.³⁹ Notwithstanding, authors such as Petra Groen, Tom Menger, Michelle Gordon and Susanne Kuss demonstrated that it is yielding to extend the time period of this concept to the *fin de siècle*, as it allows for an analytical grasp of physical acts of violence considered controversial even in the eyes of contemporaries when they were directed against “white” people.⁴⁰ Ultimately, one must bear in mind that colonial violence was more than the mere exercise of extreme physical force; it shaped everyday colonial life in manifold ways—be it as threats of violence, the exercise of coercion or in the form of epistemic violence.⁴¹ Drawing on these discussions, the present book highlights the hitherto neglected transimperial dimension of these acts of colonial violence from a bottom-up perspective.

New Imperial History

By elucidating global entanglements reaching from the Dutch East Indies to the European hinterland, this study also can be placed in the realm of *New Imperial History*. Whilst the definition of what *New Imperial History* stands for is extensive, the bulk of these works share the approach of conceiving colonial empires as a multitude of networks between the colonies and metropolises in which people, objects and ideas circulated. In this respect, cultural history is given a higher priority than conventional narratives of political or economic history.⁴² Furthermore, through placing the metropole and the colonies in the same analytical field, as Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper have famously called for,⁴³ these approaches seek to overcome conventional narratives according to which history unfolded in “national containers”, as well as Eurocentric beliefs that ideas, knowledge and culture diffused from Europe to the world.⁴⁴ Embracing these assumptions, in the past two decades, a rich body of literature has provided fruitful insights into the British, Belgian, French,

German, and Japanese Empires.⁴⁵ In the Netherlands, this new imperial paradigm was also reflected in various works that located Dutch society in multiple global networks and examined the manifold colonial repercussions on the metropolis.⁴⁶

However, several scholars have recently warned that it is insufficient to merely broaden the field of analyses from a national framework to an imperial one while continuing to treat colonial history as a “national affair”. Sebastian Conrad, for example, bemoaned in 2018 that only “in the past few years have scholars seriously taken up the challenge of recreating a fuller, more comprehensive picture of the transborder interactions and global structures that shaped the colonial era”.⁴⁷ In a similar vein, Daniel Hedinger and Nadin Heé criticise Stoler and Cooper’s methodological approach, saying that although it is highly innovative, it still revolves solely around “intra-imperial processes”. As a paradoxical result, national history has been transnationalised, whereas the history of Empires has been nationalised.⁴⁸

How yielding it is to look beyond imperial borders has recently been shown by various studies on different colonial empires—be it in South Asia, the Caribbean or the Pacific.⁴⁹ David Arnold, for instance, reminds us that British colonial endeavours were rarely “purely” British but transimperial, involving the expertise and resources of outsiders from multiple nations.⁵⁰ Similarly, a number of scholars such as Marieke Bloembergen and Martijn Eickhoff, Karwan Fatah-Black, Francisca Hoyer, Jos Gommans, Susan Legêne, Monique Ligtenberg, Tom Menger and Bernhard C. Schär, have transgressed the spatial and lingual boundaries of the Dutch Empire.⁵¹

This book likewise aims to provide an example of how the Dutch Empire spread beyond its imperial borders into the European hinterland. By shedding light on these transimperial connections, it ties in with the recent historiography on “colonialism from the margins”, a field of research that has been distinctively influenced by *Postcolonial Studies*, *New Imperial History* and *Global History*.⁵² Taking Switzerland as a case in point, numerous scholars have not only illuminated the role of Swiss actors and institutions as plantation owners,⁵³ settlers,⁵⁴ soldiers,⁵⁵ missionaries,⁵⁶ colonial merchants⁵⁷ or natural scientists⁵⁸ in colonial settings around the world but also the economic and cultural repercussions of these colonial entanglements on financiers of the slave trade,⁵⁹ visitors to ethnological shows,⁶⁰ professors of “racial science”,⁶¹ readers of children’s books,⁶² or recipients of commodity racism in Switzerland.⁶³ With regard to the Dutch East Indies, Andreas Zangger’s pioneering book *Koloniale Schweiz* deserves special mention, as it provides an important basis for further research into relations between the Dutch East Indies and Switzerland. Examining the social and economic history of Swiss merchants and plantation owners in Sumatra and Singapore, he reconstructs global networks of the Swiss bourgeois elite and illustrates how, on the one hand, they fitted in as part of the colonial elite, and on the other hand, they continuously sought to preserve an “authentic Swiss identity”.⁶⁴

History of Labour Migration

In between these two fields of research—and in many ways overlapping with them—lies the historiography of labour migration. It is debatable whether soldiering should be classified as labour since it involves killing or the exercise of other types of extreme violence.⁶⁵ According to Erik-Jan Zürcher, however, two relevant reasons exist for considering the soldiers' activity as work. Firstly, soldiers spent much more time in barracks than on campaigns, where they also carried out other tasks, such as building infrastructure. Secondly, if war is waged successfully, surplus value is created for states and their elites through territorial gains or economic advantages.⁶⁶ Even more than regular professional soldiers, mercenaries embodied job seekers in a labour market.⁶⁷ They weighed different options against each other and signed up where the overall offer of pay, lodging and conditions of service was most attractive.⁶⁸

To this end, soldiers and mercenaries had to travel to where the work needed to be done. While there were still numerous job opportunities in Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century, they increasingly shifted to extra-European spaces in the second half of the century.⁶⁹ Dutch historian Ulbe Bosma estimates that around 6.5 million colonial soldiers left Europe in the period from 1846 to 1940. Surprisingly, however, these migration flows did not find their way into the European migration statistics of the nineteenth century.⁷⁰

This also holds true for Switzerland.⁷¹ A major reason for this lacuna lies in an overly narrow and linear concept of migration, which only focuses on one-sided and permanent settlement emigration without considering alternative forms of migration, such as circular migration or temporary sojourns abroad.⁷² Recent approaches to Swiss migration research operate with a broader concept of migration and shed light on circulatory movements. Nevertheless, even these works fail to describe Swiss migration to the Dutch East Indies adequately. Pointing out this shortcoming, Andreas Zangger contends that Swiss migration to Asia has often been conceptualised rather “unfortunately” as “*Handelsmigration*” (“trade migration”), “*Einzelauswanderung*” (“individual emigration”) or “*Elitewanderung*” (“elite migration”). By focusing on single individuals, these terms obscure the fact that their migration was part of a mass phenomenon and took place within dense and far-reaching networks of relationships.⁷³ This finding can also be extended to the mercenaries. Even if their networks differed from those of the merchants, their emigration would have been inconceivable without the existence of networks that operated partly officially and partly illegally.⁷⁴

As this research will illustrate, the majority of Swiss military migrants regarded mercenary service as a life cycle. After its expiration, they intended to return to Europe. Some of them, however, remained in the Dutch Indies, where they found civilian employment and sometimes lived together with an Indo-European or Asian

woman and their joint children in petit-bourgeois households. Drawing from the groundbreaking studies on concubines and social and cultural “creolization” in South East Asia, this investigation aims to explore Swiss aspects of this migration history.⁷⁵

Aims and Scope of This Study

This study pursues three main objectives. Its first and most obvious one is to rectify the temporal and spatial shortcomings of the historiography on Swiss military labour outlined above. It follows the mercenaries’ trajectories on their way from Switzerland to the Dutch East Indies, determining their motives and social backgrounds, illuminating their daily lives in the barracks, examining friendly, sexual or hostile relations and tensions with other humans in the colonial contact zone, and tentatively reconstructing their life after service (at least for those who had one). Through such an analysis, the present book argues that the history of Swiss mercenaries did not end with the founding of modern Switzerland, nor did it stop at the borders of continental Europe. This spatial and temporal expansion ultimately allows us to comprehend colonialism, violence, and racism as formative components of modern Switzerland’s social, economic, and cultural history.

Secondly, the Swiss mercenaries serve as a case in point to unveil the symbiotic—and sometimes toxic—relationship of the Dutch Empire with the European hinterland. The Dutch demand for military labour proved to be a unique opportunity for many young Swiss men to bridge periods of economic crisis or explore the other side of the world at no cost. Comparable to natural scientists who used research in colonial spaces to boost their careers while providing helpful knowledge to colonial administrations, the mercenaries’ enlistment with the KNIL was also a case of “mutual instrumentalization”. They could close the labour shortage and contribute to the military expansion of the Dutch Empire.⁷⁶ However, it must be added that this mutual instrumentalisation was not as balanced as with the scientists since almost 50 per cent of the mercenaries paid for their commitment with their lives. To uphold this—albeit unequal—mutual instrumentalisation, a wide variety of formal and informal networks transcending regional, national, and imperial borders were essential. This work, therefore, asks which actors, institutions, and administrations forged these networks and sheds light on the money, knowledge and patterns of thought that circulated within them. As shall be demonstrated, these economic, social and cultural ties reached the very bottom of Switzerland’s rural and urban strata. Through letters, for example, mercenaries spread among their relatives and friends racist beliefs that were shaped by colonial discourses. Many families were torn apart, while numerous were founded across

cultural barriers. Returning veterans received quarterly pensions that contributed significantly to their income as bakers, farmers, or factory workers. Thus, the present examination probes the potential for what further research might yield on the remaining approximately 60,000 mercenaries from present-day Germany, Belgium, France, Poland, or Denmark.

On a more abstract level, this book thirdly seeks to marry *New Military History* with *New Imperial History*. In 2006, Historian Joanna Bourke concisely stated that the success of *New Military History* was due to its openness towards constantly integrating new approaches from related research fields such as social or cultural history.⁷⁷ Traditionally located in social history, this also concerns the *history of labour migration*. As explained above, numerous studies regard soldiers as workers who constantly had to relocate their centre of life. The approaches of *New Imperial History*, on the other hand, have received much less attention from military historians so far. Although numerous academics have looked into colonial armies, the colony and the metropolis have rarely been grasped within the same analytical framework, focusing often merely on non-European theatres of war.⁷⁸ As this research intends to prove, however, the “concubinage” between these fields allows us to address new questions at a theoretical level. Beyond the transregional and transimperial military connections, continuities and ruptures, intersectional approaches, in particular, gain relevance.⁷⁹ For example, to what extent is it still appropriate to refer to a “bottom-up” approach in military history if we put the spotlight on those men who—although they belonged to the underdogs in Europe—occupied more privileged positions within the racial hierarchy in colonial settings? Furthermore, where did the “racial dividend”, as Harald Fischer-Tiné has called it,⁸⁰ of these “white subalterns” end? In answering these questions, this book also hopes to appeal to an audience whose interests lie outside Southeast Asia.

Sources, Structure & Methodology

Sources

Before getting to the sources, a critical remark needs to be prefaced beforehand: conspicuous by its absence, Indonesian archives could not be consulted. Although an archival trip of several months to Indonesia was planned—in particular, to consult the holdings in the National Archives of Indonesia (Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia), the surprising outbreak of COVID-19 made any on-site research impossible, necessitating a shift in research strategy. Despite these constraints, this study draws on a broad set of diverse private and public sources from Switzerland, the Netherlands and Indonesia.

The first set of sources encompasses official documents of the Dutch administration that are kept in the Dutch National Archives. Two stocks are of particular relevance here. The first entails the *stamboeken* (registers of soldiers) of the KNIL.⁸¹ Browsing the register concerning the period from 1848 to 1885, the “Swiss Tools of Empire” project team singled out 5,352 Swiss and fed them into a database.⁸² The *stamboeken* usually contain not only the mercenary’s name and date of birth but also information about his parents, date of recruitment and embarkation, place and date of death, as well as mentions of promotions. On the one hand, the data obtained from these registers allows us to conduct quantitative analyses about recruitment patterns, length of service or death rates. On the other hand, it serves as a tool to track down individual mercenaries mentioned in other sources. In addition to the *stamboeken*, the Dutch National Archives also houses the documents of the Ministry of Colonies and the correspondence of the Dutch authorities in The Hague with their diplomatic representatives in Switzerland. These provide another indispensable set of sources containing detailed information on the fate of individual mercenaries, payment receipts for pensions, reports on political events in Switzerland, government decrees, and countless requests from young Swiss men who wanted to join the KNIL.⁸³

The second set of sources comprises administrative documents in Switzerland. The Swiss Federal Chancellery, whose holdings are nowadays stored in the Swiss Federal Archives, occupied a central position within the international correspondence between the Dutch East Indies and the Netherlands.⁸⁴ All kinds of official requests and replies from the Dutch envoys, as well as reports from the Swiss consulates based in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Batavia (Jakarta), flowed through this eye of the needle and were transmitted to the Swiss Federal Council. Following these paper trails, the present investigation also draws on documents from fifteen Swiss state archives. In addition to communicating with the federal state, these archives yield insights into direct enquiries from mercenaries, their family members or municipal authorities.⁸⁵

Providing vital information on public discourses or specific events, newspaper articles constitute a further elementary set of sources for this study. Thanks to the advanced digitalisation of various providers, it is possible to search specifically for such information in newspapers from the Dutch East Indies, the Netherlands and Switzerland. In this way, it was possible to reconstruct different perspectives from the peripheries of both the colonies and the European hinterland.⁸⁶ Furthermore, additional periodicals, such as the *Indisch Militair Tijdschrift* or the *Koloniaal Verslag*, offer essential background information to complete the picture.⁸⁷

Lastly, to write a mercenary history from below, self-testimonies are fundamental. First of all, this includes published memoirs. As Matilda Greig recently has reminded us, this type of source carries the attributes of being “unreliable” and “unrepresentative”, since they were often biased, embellishing, exaggerating,

omitting or even fabricating events.⁸⁸ To make matters even more challenging, there is usually a gap of several years between the narrated event itself and the moment of writing it down. This is also true of the five published memoirs written by Swiss KNIL mercenaries. Those of Carl August Haab were published in 1916, roughly 50 years after the end of his service.⁸⁹ Not quite so extreme is the case with the other memoirs. Reporting on the 1880s and 1890s, Karl Schmid's contribution did not appear until 1912.⁹⁰ Augustin Zehnders' *Unter Hollands Flagge in Ost-Indien* appeared in 1924, twelve years after his return and Edwin Eckert's *Erlebnisse in der holländischen Kolonialarmee* in 1912 seven years after his desertion.⁹¹ Unfortunately, we do not know the exact dates of Ernst Hauser's service, but based on his book's content, his term must have happened before the outbreak of World War I.⁹² Notwithstanding these challenges, however, numerous work in the field of cultural studies over the past three decades has proven that an in-depth examination of memoirs provides valuable insights into the perception of wars, the construction of the "Other" or the author's own identity.⁹³

Similarly instructive are unpublished sources such as memoirs, diaries and letters. For instance, the diary of Jean Aimé Theodore Humberstet, edited and published in 1998, vividly records the hardships and horrors during the Borneo War in the early 1860s.⁹⁴ The following sources proved to be a stroke of luck, as they were previously in private hands but have since been donated to the Swiss *Sozialarchiv* in Zurich for further processing.⁹⁵ This concerns, first of all, the unpublished memoirs of the former KNIL mercenary Anton Camenzind, in which he revealed intimate views on his relationship with his Indo-European wife, Maria Narbertina Wullschleger.⁹⁶ The letters and postcards that Heinrich Brandenberger exchanged with his family from 1902 to 1919 bear witness to a similar intimacy. Their correspondence depicts how Brandenberger's "domestic employee", a Javanese Muslim woman called Sampet, transformed into his Christian wife Lina over the course of the years. Furthermore, they impressively portray everyday military life from the Swiss perspective of a white subaltern. The third noteworthy collection handed over to the *Sozialarchiv* comprises the letters that Josef Arnold Egloff exchanged with his family from 1889 to 1894. In these letters, he told of his daily life in the barracks on Java. However, his accounts were not always entirely truthful. For example, he announced that he would send one of his pay cheques home or that he would soon be promoted. Nonetheless, neither of these things happened.⁹⁷ Even if these self-testimonies deliberately portrayed some matters differently or omitted them, they are still exceptionally revealing. For the fact that the mercenaries conceal certain aspects of their service and exaggerate others tells us a lot about the cultural habitus and social norms that were at play.

Finally, it must be added that, unfortunately, hardly any self-testimonies of Javanese or Ambonese soldiers could be consulted. Testimonies of men from the

European lower classes are rare, and the situation is even more precarious for those of Javanese and Ambonese. The same is true with regard to gender. While sporadic, the voices of European women do appear in this book, although those of colonised women are unfortunately under-documented. This lack of documentation is all the more regrettable because, as we shall see, these women occupied a prominent role within the military structure of the Dutch East Indies. Thus, research and gathering of rare sources and compiling their perspectives remain an important desideratum.

Chapter Outline

Rather than presenting the history of Swiss mercenaries in a strictly chronological manner, this book takes a thematic approach to examine their experiences from three distinct perspectives: social, economic, and cultural. Given this approach, cross references and repetitions cannot be avoided; on the contrary, they constitute an elementary part of the analysis, as they each provide unique insights into different aspects of the same phenomenon that would have otherwise remained unexplored if only a single approach were employed.⁹⁸

However, before turning to these three parts, chapter 2 provides an overview of the dynamics and transformations of the transimperial military labour market during the long nineteenth century. Comparing the colonial armies of different European powers, this chapter explores when and why so many Swiss joined the KNIL. First, it argues that the military labour market changed fundamentally so that in the second half of the nineteenth century, only the French and Dutch Empires employed Swiss mercenaries in large numbers. The chapter then focuses on the Dutch demand for mercenaries, which developed against the backdrop of their violent colonial expansion in the Malay Archipelago. Finally, by shifting its focus to the supply side, it analyses from a structural-historical perspective why Switzerland was able to serve as such a reservoir of “living tools of empire”.

Building upon this overview, chapter 3 zooms in on the Swiss mercenaries and follows their footsteps from their emigration, through their sojourn in the Dutch East Indies, to their lives as veterans. The first section seeks to highlight their social background, their motives, and how they became aware of the job opportunities within the KNIL. The second section examines various aspects of military life in the Dutch East Indies, such as the hierarchies within the military, the daily routine between boredom and drill or disappointment and insubordination. Beyond these facets, a large section is also devoted to analysing the exercise of colonial violence and intimate relationships with so-called housekeepers of Indo-European or Asian origin. Finally, the last part of the chapter traces the disparate life trajectories of surviving Swiss mercenaries.

Chapter 4 shifts its focus from the individuals to the financial aspects of the mercenaries' journeys, tracing the flow of money between the Dutch East Indies, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. It examines the crucial role of signature premiums, pay, and the promise of lifelong pensions in attracting young Swiss men to colonial service. Additionally, it investigates how these pensions affected the daily lives of veterans and their families, despite typically being modest in comparison to the significant colonial profits generated by trading companies. The chapter also explores the institutionalisation of the bureaucracies responsible for handling these payments, involving numerous Swiss municipal, cantonal, and federal employees who collaborated with their Dutch counterparts. In some instances, these individuals benefitted from the transimperial networks established by repatriated mercenaries or merchants.

By reconstructing the colonial gaze of the Swiss mercenaries, chapter 5 deals with the representation of the colonial "Other". Through letters, picture postcards, memoirs, or oral narratives, it attempts to trace the mercenaries' memory and discusses their influence on an imperial reservoir of knowledge. As a country without formal colonial possessions, the opinion has long prevailed in Switzerland that colonialism and the accompanying cultural thought patterns had no or only a marginal influence on the local population. Based on various self-testimonies, however, this chapter shows that mercenaries absorbed existing colonial stereotypes and transmitted them to people from the rural as well as urban classes who moved beyond the dominant colonial discourses of scholars and merchants.

Finally, a brief conclusion discusses the main findings and the extent to which the methodological approach chosen here can build a bridge between economic, social and cultural historical approaches to examine the phenomenon of colonialism without colonies. Moreover, it highlights the limitations of this study and sketches out possible future research avenues.

Swiss Supplies for Dutch Demands: Transformations in a Military Labour Market

Abstract

Europe's violent overseas expansion created an enormous demand for military personnel. This chapter offers, first, a comparative analysis of European colonial armies, arguing that the French and Dutch colonial empires, in particular, benefitted from the continuities and discontinuities of a centuries-old transimperial military labour market during the long nineteenth century. Second, it focuses on Dutch expansion in the Malay Archipelago and the associated demand for European mercenaries. Third, it examines the extent to which Switzerland, as a relatively sparsely populated country with no official colonial ambitions, could meet this demand.

Keywords: military labour markets, history of mercenaries, colonial armies, European colonialism

Since their inception in the seventeenth century, the global expansion efforts of European trading companies have been inextricably linked to military supremacy. The pivotal role of soldiers was evident in their contributions to the subjugation of new territories, the elimination of rival competitors, the establishment of coercive mercantile footholds, the construction of essential infrastructure, and the protection of enslaved or indentured populations on plantations. This “war capitalism”—as historian Sven Beckert has termed this phenomenon of colonial expropriation and subjugation—required a lot of military personnel.¹ This demand, however, could seldom be met by individuals from within the imperial borders alone; consequently, complementary mercenaries were always recruited from the wider European military labour market, whose roots date back to the thirteenth century.²

This chapter sets out to shed light on the continuities of this transimperial military labour market until the turn of the twentieth century, and to locate Dutch demand and Swiss supply within it. First, it will examine the most significant competitors of the Dutch, which included France, Britain, the Italian peninsula, and newer colonial entrants, all of whom vied for the loyalty of mercenaries. Second, it will contextualise the Dutch Empire within the overarching transimperial structures of this labour market, shedding light on the Dutch Empire's demand for mercenaries in the context of its colonial state formation. Third, by shifting the perspective from demand to supply, and by delving into the heterogeneous

attitudes prevalent in Swiss society, it aims to clarify the motivations and timing behind the departure of significant numbers of Swiss mercenaries to the Dutch East Indies. In doing so, colonial mercenaries become palpable as an essential category of transimperial actors in European colonialism.

Global Demand for Mercenaries

While at the dawn of the nineteenth century numerous states still made use of paid services of foreign military regiments, shifting moral norms and burgeoning nationalism gave the impetus to replace these “soldiers of fortune” with citizens eventually.³ Opposed to this trend, however, was the growth in the importance of colonial mercenaries (see *figure 1*). Elaborating on the imperial demand of foreign military migrants by different empires, this section shall highlight the structural continuities, contingencies, and transformations in the transimperial military labour market.




Figure 1: Forces comprising European mercenaries, 1815–1915.⁴

French Empire

In classical narratives of military historiography, the French Revolution is often considered a turning point in the transformation from armies consisting of foreigners to national armies. Since the seventeenth century, the French kings had

engaged entire foreign regiments—especially from Swiss cantons.⁵ However, these foreign soldiers were hardly welcome among the French population as criticism of their deployment grew during the Enlightenment. They were believed to foster despotism and—compared to patriotic citizens—to have little ambition to fight as they would desert whenever the opportunity arose. Thus, the military reform in 1793 following the French Revolution introduced a citizens' army. It was declared that every French citizen—including women and older men—ought to support war efforts. Military service became a citizen's duty.⁶

Notwithstanding, recent research has shown that the idea of only citizens fighting in the National Army of the French Revolution was relatively short-lived. Because of numerous desertions, the revolutionary army shrank, and France was forced to conscript foreign soldiers.⁷ These troops were not only deployed in Europe and in the Russian campaign but also overseas in Egypt and the Caribbean. For example, around 5,000 Poles and 635 Swiss had been sent to Haiti alongside French soldiers, where they vainly tried to suppress the Haitian Revolution.⁸ Even more decidedly, French King Louis XVIII relied on the help of mercenaries. After his accession in 1814, the Swiss royal guard was reinstated, six additional Swiss regiments, and the multinational Hohenlohe Regiment, known as the *Légion royale étrangère*, were drafted. Among the French population, the Swiss mercenaries became the epitome of the repressive Bourbon system again, and consequently, it is hardly surprising that they were disbanded after the July Revolution of 1830.⁹

Nevertheless, this was not the end of French mercenary service. On the contrary, the French Foreign Legion was created just one year later. Although there was a continuity of Swiss military labour in this new unit (in particular, former officers from the disbanded Swiss regiments were recruited to fill the upper ranks), its creation was less a reflection of France's confidence in its long mercenary tradition and long-term geostrategic considerations than a domestic measure to cope with the massive influx of political refugees in 1830 and 1831. As historian Douglas Porch has convincingly argued, the Foreign Legion enabled the French government to move unemployed mercenaries and these numerous European refugees out of the country.¹⁰

As part of the *Armée d'Afrique*, the Foreign Legion functioned as an imperial army from its early days on. Its first task was to continue the contested conquest of Algeria initiated by Charles X in 1830. The fact that the gaps in the colonial troops were closed by foreigners from then on dampened domestic opposition back in France towards the imperial project. In the following decades, it was deployed in the Carlist War (1835–1839), the Crimean War (1854–1856), the Mexican Campaign (1863–1867) and the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871).¹¹

Although officially all men could apply regardless of their nationality, religion or "race", as long as they were between 18 and 40 years old, at least 1.55 metres

tall, and healthy, the legion consisted (almost) entirely of Europeans. Until 1864, volunteers could commit themselves for either three or five years; after that, the minimum commitment was five years. No passports or similar documents were required for enlistment. The customary law of the so-called “*Anonymat*” permitted entry by using a false identity. Therefore—and because access to the archives of the French Foreign Legion is highly restrictive—it is difficult to determine precisely the mercenaries’ geographical and social origins. Current research assumes that from 1831 to 1962, about one-third of the total 340,000 legionnaires came from Germany, that is 125,000. From 1831 until today, an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 Swiss and nearly as many Italians, Belgians and Spaniards had joined the legion. With regard to their social backgrounds, the majority of mercenaries belonged to both the rural and the urban underclass of Europe and were poorly integrated into family networks.¹²

These legionnaires, however, formed solely one part of the military forces that violently advanced the colonial expansion of France. The *Armée d’Afrique* comprised additional regiments, consisting of North African subjects who were clustered in specific units such as *Spahis*, *Tirailleurs*, or *Goums*. In addition, the French maintained a third army, the *Troupes Coloniales* (until 1900 and after 1957 called *Troupes de Marines*), for which they recruited or indentured soldiers from colonised Senegalese, Indochinese and Pacific communities as well as French citizens.¹³ The recruitment of colonised subjects offered several advantages: they were cheaper, better adapted to the climate, and through contact with French institutions, their alleged savagery would be reduced. Furthermore, some French military theorists like Charles Mangin (*La force noire*, published in 1910) saw African soldiers as the solution to compensate for the demographic deficit with regard to an adversarial Germany. Thus, in the nineteenth century, these troops were constantly expanded. While in 1827, for instance, the number of *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* solely amounted to 200, it steadily increased to 17,356 by 1914. Ultimately, in World War I, the French deployed some 600,000 subjects to defend their empire.¹⁴

British Empire

Compared to the French and Dutch Empires, the British hardly relied on the support of continental European mercenaries after the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815).¹⁵ Only twice did they deviate from this stand. First, in 1835, the British Crown recruited a minor number of Europeans, especially exiled Poles, for its auxiliary troops in the Carlist War (1833–1840). Nonetheless, the majority of the 10,000 forces comprised British and Irish volunteers from the lower social echelons.¹⁶ The second time was more significant: in 1855, the British government decided to send continental European mercenaries to the Crimea. The reasons for this were threefold. First, when the British, the Kingdom of Sardinia and the French entered the Crimean

War alongside the Ottoman Empire against the Russian Empire at the beginning of 1854, they hoped in vain for support from other European states such as Prussia and Austria. Secondly, Britain had a relatively small professional army stationed in Europe and, unlike France, did not practise conscription. Volunteers, therefore, had to be recruited, which proved more difficult than expected. Secondly, a booming agricultural sector, adverse press reports from the front and poor army employment conditions proved counterproductive. Finally, Parliament was forced to act when the harsh winter of 1854/1855 and a cholera outbreak caused many deaths in the British camp. At the end of 1854, British officials began to recruit mercenaries in several German territories, the Kingdom of Sardinia and Switzerland. They aimed to recruit 15,000 volunteers, divided into British Italian, British German and British Swiss legions. The troops were assembled and trained in Dover until parts of them were stationed in various parts of the Ottoman Empire in the autumn of 1855. Yet, as the French had already taken Sebastopol in September, the British mercenary legions were never deployed.¹⁷

After the war ended, there was no longer any urgent need for these mercenaries. However, whereas the Italian and Swiss legions were completely disbanded under aggravating circumstances, around 2,400 German mercenaries continued their service for the British Crown as military settlers in South Africa, where they were allowed to immigrate with their families.¹⁸ In 1857, this move was to prove utterly fortunate, as 1,058 German soldiers were sent from there to India to repress the Great Rebellion.¹⁹

Apart from these two episodes, both the British Crown and the East India Company (hereafter EIC) refrained from recruiting soldiers from continental Europe. This was in stark contrast to British practice in the eighteenth century, when continental European mercenaries fought under British command throughout the world. Chen Tzoref-Ashkenazi, for example, points out that the EIC's victory at the Battle of Plassey (Palashi) in 1757—often regarded as the founding moment of British India—was not as British as it might first appear: not only because the battle was won through a conspiracy by the Nawab of Bengal's chief officer, but also because the majority of the troops were made up of sepoys (i.e. South Asian soldiers) and a large number of European soldiers from Germany, Switzerland and Scandinavia. Outside India, the British also used continental European soldiers in other theatres of war, such as the American Revolutionary War (1775–1783).²⁰

The British recruited these mercenaries out of necessity rather than conviction, considering continental European troops less trustworthy. Still, since the EIC was not allowed to compete with the Royal Army when recruiting troops, they had to hire Europeans to prevent staffing shortages.²¹ Occasionally, the EIC even recruited Catholic Irishmen as early as the 1760s, but this often led to conflicts with the British army. It was not until 1799 that the EIC was officially allowed to gather and exercise

soldiers in Ireland and Britain. For this purpose, it stationed two full-time recruitment agents in Dublin and Belfast.²² After the victory over Napoleon, the relationship between the EIC and the British military eased, and the EIC was able to fill its contingents with soldiers from Anglo-Irish society.²³ In particular, the Irish were recruited in substantial numbers. Between 1813 and 1857, the EIC recruited almost half of its European troops in Ireland, and it is estimated that 43 per cent of the European forces deployed during the Great Rebellion were Irish.²⁴ This ratio decreased steadily from 1870 onwards, primarily because the sizeable Irish emigration flows drastically reduced their share of the total population of the United Kingdom.²⁵

Another reason why the British could avoid continental European mercenaries was that they could tap into the reservoir of soldiers from South Asia, so-called sepoy, and integrate them successfully into their armies. In 1756, there were roughly 9,000 sepoys; by 1808, this number had risen to 155,000, and in 1856 it was about 200,000.²⁶ Their recruitment proceeded without significant resistance since the EIC benefitted from the firm structures of a pre-colonial military labour market and offered reasonable salaries. Moreover, apart from a few collective insubordinations, the sepoys had a reputation for being more disciplined than their fellow European combatants.²⁷ The distrust of the British, however, grew after the Great Rebellion of 1857. Thus, the ratio of Europeans to sepoys was increased from about 20 per cent to 50 per cent, and the sepoy units were correspondingly reduced.

Moreover, the rebellion prompted a shift in recruitment policy. Until 1857, the sepoys of the Bengal Army were mainly drawn from higher Brahmin and Rajput castes in Awadh (Oudh) and Bihar. However, because of their involvement in the rebellion, their reputation sharply declined in the eyes of the British. In the years after the mutiny, the military authorities first began to pay attention to a more balanced composition of the troops before the strategy of recruiting the so-called martial races such as “Sikhs” and “Gurkhas” prevailed from the mid-1880s onwards. Despite these alterations, the number of sepoys still ranged between 120,000 and 140,000 men.²⁸ The size of the army allowed them to deploy individual units outside South Asia as well, for example, in Aden (1839), Arabia (1843), China (1860), Abyssinia (1868), Egypt (1882), Sudan (1885), Somaliland (1890; 1903–1904), East Africa (1896–1898), and Tibet (1903).²⁹

Furthermore, the British recruited non-Europeans not only on the Indian subcontinent but also in other parts of the Empire. In the turbulent war years of the last quarter of the eighteenth century, enslaved or liberated African men were used to counter the shortage of troops. In the American War of Independence, the Carolina Corps formed a “black” unit of the British Army, and at the outbreak of the Anglo-French War in 1793, slaves were enlisted for the 12 “black” West Indian regiments. Roger Norman Buckley estimates that the Crown had bought about

13,400 enslaved people by 1807, equivalent to 7 per cent of British West Indian slave exports. These West Indian regiments continued to exist after the Abolition, and their ranks were replenished until 1844, with formerly enslaved people freed from British Navy patrols.³⁰ In colonial Africa, too, the involvement of local actors played an important role. As Timothy Parsons argues, British subjugation of African territories could not have taken place without the support of African soldiers. Indigenous auxiliaries were mobilised against their local enemies. In Kenya, for example, the *Maasai moran* (young fighters) were formed, in West Africa the West African Frontier Force, and in East Africa the King's African Rifle.³¹

Italian Peninsula

The Italian peninsula, too, had been deeply embedded in the transimperial military labour market for centuries and thus was home to several significant demanders for foreign military labour. Domiciled in Naples, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, for example, had relied on the services of Swiss mercenaries since the eighteenth century. After a hiatus due to the Napoleonic Wars, the Bourbon King Ferdinand I. revived this tradition in 1824 and engaged four Swiss regiments, which in total numbered between 6,000 and 7,000 men. In the service of the Pope, too, the overwhelming majority were Swiss. They made up two-thirds of the army and served alongside Italian, German, and Irish soldiers. When the Papal States were dissolved, these regiments were finally disbanded in 1870.³² Moreover, during the *Risorgimento* ("Resurgence", i.e. the period of Italian unification from 1848 to 1870), mercenaries, as well as political volunteers from Switzerland, France, and Germany, fought on both sides.³³

However, it is striking that despite this longstanding connectivity to the transimperial military labour market, the young Italian national state did not draw on European mercenaries during its colonial expansion in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Presumably, because the European mercenaries were associated with absolutism and contradicted emerging Italian nationalism, the Italian national army chose a different path. It progressed with Italian conscripts assisted by numerous East African *Askaris* instead. Of the 20,000 soldiers fighting in the decisive Battle of Adwa (1896) on the Italian side, half were Italian conscripts and half Eritrean and Tygrian *Askaris*. However, these units had little to oppose troops of the Ethiopian Neguse Negest ("King of Kings") Menelik II who were equipped with French machine guns. Thus, the Italians were the first modern European power to suffer a severe defeat inflicted by an African army. This incident sparked a domestic political crisis in Rome and temporarily halted the expansive colonial strategy. Only in 1911 did Italy resume it when it invaded Tripoli.³⁴

Colonial Latecomers

Comparable to the Italian colonial expansion, European mercenaries played a marginal or no role at all in the expansion of the colonial latecomers Germany and the Belgian Monarch. In the case of the German Empire, there were sufficient German soldiers who wanted to serve voluntarily in the so-called *Schutztruppe* (“Protection Forces”) in Cameroon, South-West and East Africa. Furthermore, they too relied on the assistance of *Askaris* recruited in a transimperial East African space. However, it was not until 1898 that African soldiers made up the majority of the approximately 1,500 soldiers.³⁵ Also, in the other colonies outside of Africa, the German authorities counted on extra-European support: in the colony of Qingdao in China, for instance, the German Navy was supplemented by a Chinese unit and in the South Sea territories “native” police units performed police duties.³⁶

In a similar vein, the Belgian King Leopold II resorted to a mix of Belgian volunteers and African soldiers for the exploitation of the Congo Free State. Although the *Force Publique*, as it was officially called, was also open to other Europeans, only a few entered its service. From 1889 to 1908, most of the officers originated from Belgium, but 226 Italians, 151 Scandinavians and 15 Swiss also found their way to the Congo. The African troops initially consisted of mercenaries from Zanzibar, Liberia and Nigeria. With time, more and more Congolese soldiers were enrolled. In 1889, for instance, there were 1,500; in 1904 already 17,000.³⁷

Even though the Portuguese Empire had existed for centuries, a new tide of imperialism rose in the 1870s. Pursuing the dream of a “third Portuguese Empire”, whose main objective was primarily the exploitation of Angola and Mozambique, it assembled an army from a combination of Portuguese and Africans, Macanese and Goanese recruited in its colonies. However, this army was not practical, so in case of war, it had to count on the support of indigenous troops.³⁸

Furthermore, the extra-European empires U.S.A. and Japan, which entered the imperial race at the end of the nineteenth century, required neither European mercenaries nor troops recruited in the colonies. The former because a broad field of American men, called “jingoes” by their contemporaries, were enthusiastic about fighting in overseas wars.³⁹ And Japan did not start recruiting troops from the colonised territories until after World War I.⁴⁰

In summary, Germany, Italy, and the Congo Free State too had a sufficiently large reservoir of potential volunteers to complement their respective national armies. Likewise, the British had plenty of troops of their own from the Anglo-Irish, African, and South Asian regions. Thus, if the KNIL wanted to recruit mercenaries in a transimperial military labour market, it had to compete primarily against the offers of the French Foreign Legion, the mercenary regiments in Italy and—for a

short period—the British Crimean Legion. The following section elaborates on how exactly it accomplished this endeavour despite the stiff competition.

The Dutch Demand for Mercenaries

In his thorough study *Volk voor Indië*, Dutch historian Martin Bossenbroek estimated that 72,000 non-Dutch European soldiers, i.e. 40 per cent of the European contingent, enlisted with the KNIL from 1814–1909. Fourteen per cent of them originated from Belgium, thirteen from Germany, and four per cent each from Switzerland and France.⁴¹ It is to Bossenbroek's merit that he highlighted that the recruitment of these mercenaries took place in three waves (see *figure 2*): from 1814 to 1843, from 1844 to 1872, and finally from 1873 to 1909, respectively 1914.⁴²




Figure 2: Annual average of recruitment of non-Dutch European colonial soldiers.

Source: Bossenbroek, *Volk voor Indië*, 278.

The First Wave, 1814–1843

The first wave from 1814 to 1843 was characterised by the return of the Dutch to their former possessions of the VOC and the exhausting conquest of Java. Initially, the aim was to establish the Colonial Army, which turned out to be a tenacious process. It was not until 1818 that the Dutch reached the intended formation strength of 5,125 European military personnel and 5,350 Southeast Asian soldiers. Already in the following year, the target number was increased, but the colonial army could not meet these new objectives. Mainly due to the high mortality rate

among Europeans—around 10 per cent annually from 1816 to 1820 and 20 per cent from 1820 to 1824—this goal turned out to be too ambitious. It could only have been achieved with enormous additional financial efforts. The situation exacerbated the KNIL's reputation as a catch-all for criminals and deserters. Many Dutch citizens, therefore, preferred service in the National Army or the Navy. Facing these obstacles, the KNIL thus resumed the recruitment strategies of the pre-revolutionary period and hired foreign soldiers. During the first few years, this went remarkably smoothly, as thousands of discharged European soldiers flooded the European labour market after the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815. Accordingly, a large number of volunteers already had prior military experience.⁴³

When the Java War broke out between the Dutch and the troops of the Javanese Prince Pangeran Diponegoro (also: *Dipanagara*) in 1825, the KNIL doubled its contingents within five years to 10,700 Europeans, 9,000 Southeast Asians and 17,500 auxiliary troops. Given the high loss figures amounting to 45 per cent, this raise required constant reinforcement from Europe. For this reason, the Dutch intensified their recruitment amidst the lower Dutch strata as well as in several German cities such as Bremen, Hamburg and Frankfurt. Additionally, towards the end of the decade, the KNIL also benefitted from the dissolution of four Swiss regiments that the Dutch King Willem I had employed in 1814. In June 1829, for example, a transport of troops left for the Dutch East Indies loaded exclusively with 170 Swiss soldiers, who had previously served in the Netherlands. However, when these Swiss arrived in Java, the war was already in its final phase. Based on their once-established *benteng* fortification system, the Dutch had little by little driven Diponegoro and his troops into a tight corner. When the latter agreed to negotiate, he was—contrary to promises given beforehand—deceitfully arrested by the Dutch general Hendrik Merkus de Kock and exiled to Celebes (Sulawesi). His imprisonment finally enabled the Dutch to prevail.⁴⁴

The Java War caused significant losses in several respects: an estimated 200,000 Javanese, on the one hand, and 8,000 Europeans and 7,000 Southeast Asians, on the other, died by the end of the war in 1830.⁴⁵ Moreover, the war was also a burden in financial terms weighing heavily on the military budget. This burden was all the more severe because Belgium's independence in 1830 additionally exacerbated the economic situation, as the Dutch population shrank from 6 to 2.5 million and the National Army was kept at fighting strength for nine years. Because of these financial constraints, the Ministry of Colonies officially imposed a policy of *onthouding* (abstention). Dutch interest ought to be concentrated primarily on Java, where the notorious cultivation system was implemented and maintained from 1830 to 1870, as well as on particular parts of Sumatra and Borneo (Kalimantan). Apart from that, military control should not be expanded to the archipelago's so-called *buitengewesten* (Outer Regions). From a Dutch vantage point, they should be kept in a sphere of influence.⁴⁶

Furthermore, the KNIL also underwent a major restructuring. Previously considered as part of the National Army, it was now institutionally separated from the Ministry of War and as *Nederlandsch-Oost-Indisch Leger* (Dutch East Indies Army) exclusively subordinated to the Ministry of Colonies. As a result, its peacetime stock should be reduced again to 649 officers, 5,789 European non-commissioned officers and personnel and 7,117 Southeast Asian soldiers. Due to both the new colonial policy and the reduced stock, the demand for supplies from Europe declined in the 1830s.⁴⁷

Another—though not primary—reason for the flattening demand for Europeans in the (late) 1830s was the recruitment of West African soldiers from present-day Ghana and Burkina Faso. To have a powerful army that depended neither on expensive European mercenaries nor the mistrusted Javanese soldiers, the KNIL started a recruitment project in the Dutch West African colony on the Gold Coast. From 1831 until 1842, more than 2,100 West Africans were shipped to the Dutch East Indies. After that, however, recruitment stagnated for two reasons: first, the British objected that several enslaved people were traded under the guise of military recruitment and urged the Dutch to stop recruiting. Secondly, several West African units mutinied, damaging their reputation.⁴⁸

The Second Wave, 1844–1872

Although the policy of abstention officially prevailed throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, it was not a peaceful era. On the contrary, numerous “military expeditions” and wars were waged in the colonial periphery from the 1840s onwards, correlating with the second wave of foreign recruitment.⁴⁹ These violent efforts were driven by a combination of fear of rival imperial powers and the colonial ambitions of local officials who promoted frontier imperialism.⁵⁰ The first delicate matter that led to a temporary adjustment of the policy of abstention took place in the early 1840s, when the British citizen James Brooke was first appointed as “Raja” (governor) of Sarawak in Northern Borneo (Kalimantan) and shortly after that extorted Sarawak’s independence from the Sultanate of Brunei. Since the British government supported Brooke, the Dutch authorities worried they might lose additional parts of Borneo to the British. Thus, the Dutch Minister of Colonies, Jean Chrétien Baud, instructed the colonial administration in Batavia (Jakarta) to seize measures securing territorial sovereignty. Following this, they agreed on numerous new treaties with local leaders in the Outer Regions.⁵¹

However, this strategy proved to be only partially successful because it was based on a Eurocentric concept of treaties. For instance, a number of Balinese leaders signed such treaties. Still, when the Dutch withdrew their envoys immediately thereafter, the Balinese considered them obsolete and ignored the Dutch claim to sovereignty. Thus, the Dutch felt that their reputation had been insulted and

subsequently waged three wars against these Balinese leaders in 1846, 1848 and 1849, in which they repeatedly suffered severe setbacks.⁵² Likewise, the campaigns against the Chinese *Kongsis* (cooperative mining companies) in southwestern Borneo from 1850 to 1854 were accompanied by several failures and excessive use of violence. Although the *Kongsis* were finally defeated in 1854, conditions of uninterrupted warfare prevailed in the interior of Borneo throughout the following decades until the turn of the century.⁵³ For the next five years, the situation remained relatively peaceful. In 1859, however, two major armed conflicts erupted that claimed considerable financial and human resources: the Banjarmasin War (1859–1863) in the south of Borneo and the war against the Bugi Sultanate of Bone in southwest Celebes.⁵⁴

Most of these wars followed more or less the same pattern: steam-driven Dutch warships bombarded adversarial coastal defence. Subsequently, they sent off mobile columns that advanced to the presumed centre of power and sought to subjugate the ruling elite. The aim was less to establish direct rule than to recognise Dutch sovereignty by treaties. Nevertheless, this tactic did not succeed in many cases, primarily because the Dutch were unfamiliar with local conditions and customs. Moreover, the military technological means proved reasonably modest apart from the steamboats. Until 1867, the colonial army still operated with the cumbersome muzzleloader and these rifles were often distributed among the troops shortly before war was to be waged. Likewise, medical treatment and logistical supply chains continuously posed severe problems.⁵⁵ Thus, a constant flow of reinforcement proved to be crucial.

Concurrently with this aggressive and decentralised frontier imperialism, the Dutch intensified the recruitment of foreigners from the mid-1850s onwards, culminating in an over-completion a decade later. Instead of 10,000 soldiers and non-commissioned officers, the KNIL commanded approximately 12,000—a fifth more than initially envisaged.⁵⁶ This over-completion was also achieved because the Dutch benefitted from three events: First, the disbanding of the British Foreign Legions in 1856. The Dutch took their chance and sent a retired veteran to Portsmouth to recruit 240 Swiss and an unknown number of Germans.⁵⁷ Secondly, the tense economic situation at the time, and thirdly, the foreseeable dissolution of the Swiss regiments in Naples prompted about 1,200 Swiss to swap their Neapolitan uniform for that of the KNIL from 1856 to 1859. To intercept the numerous unemployed, roaming civilians and mercenaries, the Dutch opened several recruitment bureaus, but due to international pressure, they had to change their location again and again. For example, the bureau in Lörrach, located in the Grand Duchy of Baden next to the Swiss and French border, had already shut down in October 1858 after only twenty months. The responsible recruiters initially moved up north along the Rhine to Mannheim (also Grand Duchy of Baden) before they installed themselves in Biebrich in the Duchy of Nassau at the beginning of 1859.⁵⁸

The following decade was comparatively quiet. Firstly, the Dutch authorities restricted recruitment abroad for the following five years because of some turmoil among foreign mercenaries in 1860 (see chapter 3). Consequently, the bureau in Biebrich was closed in October 1860. Secondly, the political leadership in The Hague changed. The Liberals took over power from the Conservatives and tightened the reins of the policy of abstention. This also included the factual over-completion and the proportion between Dutch and non-Dutch soldiers. While an average of 1,808 Dutch and 1,440 non-Dutch men enrolled each year from 1856 to 1860, the figures for 1861 to 1869 were 1,389 and 266, respectively. Accounting for only 15 per cent of foreigners in the European quota, this period, Bossenbroek argues, was the most “national”. This trend towards a nationalised colonial army culminated in September 1870, when the recruitment of foreign volunteers was officially suspended.⁵⁹

The Third Wave, 1873–1914

Nevertheless, it did not take long for the KNIL to start recruiting foreigners again. By 1873, it changed its guidelines due to the war’s outbreak against Aceh’s independent Sultanate on the northwestern tip of Sumatra. The strategic significance of Aceh had already captured Dutch attention towards the end of the 1860s, owing to its abundant natural resources and the inauguration of the Suez Canal. The latter development had shifted the primary maritime trade route to the coastal regions of Aceh, thereby bestowing upon it considerable geopolitical importance. Officially, the British had prohibited the Dutch from annexing the Sultanate of Aceh through the London Treaty of 1824. In 1871, however, the British withdrew from this commitment and lifted the ban on interference in exchange for the Dutch Gold Coast, changing the diplomatic landscape of the region. To enforce control in the newly annexed territory, the Dutch Governor-General initiated a confrontation with Sultan Mahmud Shah, demanding him to subject to Dutch sovereignty.⁶⁰ The Acehnese leaders ignored this demand. Instead, they tried to obtain protection from the Ottoman Empire. As further rumours were circulating that the Acehnese also attempted to draw the Americans and Italians to their side, the Dutch Governor-General decided to act and issued an ultimatum. Once the Acehnese had let it pass, the Dutch declared war on 26 March, 1873. In April, around 3,000 soldiers embarked on the coast of Aceh, aiming to conquer the *kraton* (the Sultan’s Palace) and force the Sultan to surrender. However, the Dutch did not know where it was located nor expected such fierce resistance. After three weeks of gruelling combat, they were forced to retreat.⁶¹ In December of the same year, the Dutch started their second attempt. This time the army amounted to 8,500 soldiers and 3,500 “coolies” and was equipped with both better weapons and information. Although they could

not capture the Sultan—he passed away from cholera—the Dutch considered the second expedition a success since they could seize the *kraton* within two months and declared Atjeh (Aceh) as conquered.

Nonetheless, to the dismay of the Dutch, the resistance was far from broken. The reasons for the fatal misjudgement by the Dutch were based on their ignorance of the local political organisation. They mistakenly believed that all power converged in the person of the Sultan. Yet, his influence was merely symbolic as the Acehnese society was structured into small independent communities led by leaders of the *ulèëbalang* (local nobility) or *ulama* (Muslim scholars). Most of these Acehnese leaders would rather fight against the Dutch than subjugate themselves. Thus, the seizure of the *kraton* constituted the prelude to a war that was to last almost 40 years and cost the lives of an estimated 75,000 Acehnese and 25,000 colonial troops, “coolies”, and forced labourers in the service of the KNIL.⁶²

The tenacious course of the Aceh War (1873–1912), which tied up the bulk of the military resources and was responsible for heavy losses (alone in 1876, 1,400 soldiers and 1,500 forced labourers died on the Dutch side due to violence and diseases), led to the most extensive recruitment drive since the Java War of both European and Southeast Asian soldiers.⁶³ Thus, the KNIL accepted foreigners again from 1873 onwards, increasing the signature premiums (see chapter 4). The Ministry of Colonies used the Dutch consular network to promote this recruitment and urged Dutch Consuls abroad to act on its behalf. (Especially the Dutch envoy in Brussels fulfilled the instructions above expectations.) Furthermore, the global economic crisis in the 1870s boosted the recruiting process substantially. As a result, hundreds of young volunteers flocked to Harderwijk, especially from Belgium, France, Germany, and Switzerland. However, the influx of French-speaking volunteers only lasted until 1877. From then on, the Dutch authorities excluded the French and Walloons because of their alleged lack of language skills and racial prejudices.⁶⁴

From the 1880s onwards, the recruitment of European foreigners never again reached the levels of the previous decade. This was for several different reasons: first, because of growing resistance from other European states, which did not want to let their citizens serve another country. As we shall see below with the example of Switzerland, diplomatic incidents repeatedly occurred because of Dutch promotion on German, Swiss or Belgian territory. Public and large-scale advertising relying on recruiting offices like in the 1850s was no longer a feasible option.⁶⁵

Secondly, medical advances helped to reduce the mortality rate of soldiers continuously. While in the 1840s, it was still at 5 per cent; it dropped to 3 per cent in the 1870s and 2 per cent in the 1890s.⁶⁶ In accordance with this, more than twice as many soldiers decided to enrol for a second term of service of four to six years during the 1870s than in the decade before.⁶⁷ After having peaked in 1877 at 16,396

soldiers, the troop strength of the European contingent hovered around the high level of 14,217 Europeans on average until 1893—despite declining recruitment.⁶⁸ The following year the contingent was increased again. However, non-Dutch Europeans then accounted for only 15 to 20 per cent of the newly recruited troops. This enlargement was mainly due to the numerous Dutch who volunteered out of nationalist conviction seeking revenge after the—as they called it—“*verraad van Lombok*” (betrayal of Lombok).⁶⁹

Thirdly, the cry for military labour during and after the Aceh War increasingly forced the army command to involve Southeast Asian troops. As *table 1* reveals, the KNIL comprised about 16,000 Southeast Asian soldiers in 1873; by 1878, already 20,300, and after a short decline at the beginning of the 1880s, the number increased significantly to 26,324 by 1898, and 28,484 by 1914. However, Europeans occupied the officers’ ranks entirely since no “*inlanders*” had been admitted to the officers’ examination from 1872 onwards.⁷⁰

Year	Total	“European”	%	“Non-European”	%
1868	25,256	10,608	42%	14,648	58%
1873	29,254	13,245	45%	16,009	55%
1878	36,640	16,266	44%	20,374	56%
1883	29,276	13,093	45%	16,183	55%
1888	33,169	14,984	45%	18,185	55%
1893	33,273	13,383	40%	19,890	60%
1898	42,235	15,911	38%	26,324	62%
1903	36,539	12,845	35%	23,694	65%
1908	33,860	10,688	32%	23,172	68%
1913	32,512	9,127	28%	23,385	72%
1914	37,031	8,547	23%	28,484	77%

Table 1: Non-commissioned officers and personnel of the KNIL.

As *table 1* also indicates, after the 1890s, the proportion of non-European forces grew proportionately faster than that of European forces. This altered ratio reflects a change in strategy that was launched in Aceh. The Dutch resorted to an infamous counter-guerrilla unit called “*Marechaussee*” to operate with increased agility and speed in rival territories. The novel feature of this unit was that a few European officers commanded a small group composed entirely of Southeast Asian soldiers.⁷¹ In theory, they adhered to an approach refraining from “unnecessary” violence. In small columns, they had to pursue the enemy while the benevolent civilian

population was to be spared. Moreover, to ensure that the conquered territories remained under Dutch control, the defeated leaders were forced to sign a *korte verklaring* (brief declaration), according to which they would be subject to Dutch rule and refrain from foreign contacts.⁷² Nevertheless, the obligation to refrain from unnecessary violence was rather a theoretical argument advanced in ethical debates in the Netherlands than an adequate portrayal of colonial reality. On the contrary, systematic devastation of infrastructure essential for survival, *tuchtiging* (punishment), and random shootings were still prevalent in Aceh during the first decade of the twentieth century.⁷³

After this strategy had proved to be an effective means of conquering large parts of Aceh, it was also deployed to subjugate other territories in the archipelago to Dutch sovereignty: in Jambi, Sumatra (1901–1907), in southeastern Borneo (1904) on Ceram (Seram, 1905–1912), in South and Central Celebes (1905–1907), and on the small Sunda Islands, such as Soemba (Sumba, 1906–07), Soembawa (Sumbawa, 1908) and Flores (1907–11).⁷⁴ The only exception to this approach was the renewed offensive in Bali in 1906. After three days of heavy bombardment of the city of Denpasar, about 2,000 KNIL soldiers entered the town equipped with state-of-the-art firepower. The Balinese, unwilling to surrender, practised a *puputan* in their misery: dressed in ritual white clothes, they fought the troops of the KNIL until they committed suicide. As a result, an estimated 1,200 Balinese lost their lives.⁷⁵

It may seem paradoxical at first sight that these aggressive conquests took place at the very time when Queen Wilhelmina, in her speech to the throne in 1901, proclaimed the *ethische politiek* (ethical policy) as the official colonial doctrine. Comparable to the French “*mission civilisatrice*” and the British “civilising mission”, Wilhelmina invoked a moral duty towards the people of the colonies to raise them to a higher level of civilisation. However, as Elsbeth Locher-Scholten has compellingly expounded, imperialism and the Ethical Policy were not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, it was particularly ethical motives that were used to legitimise the military actions to the Dutch public. Dutch colonial authorities, for instance, deemed it their duty to free oppressed subjects from the allegedly oppressive yoke of their indigenous rulers.

Moreover, implementing “*rust en ordre*” (peace and order) through the army seemed to provide the necessary preconditions so that a colonial state could launch welfare programs. From a Dutch perspective, military operations were, therefore, a regrettable but necessary means.⁷⁶ As the military subjugation of the archipelago was by and large completed by 1910, the need for additional European mercenaries was relatively moderate.⁷⁷ While from then until 1914, 4,529 Dutch volunteers joined the KNIL, and only 550 foreigners found their way into it. World War I finally put an end to the recruitment of non-Dutch nationals.⁷⁸

Swiss Supply: Continuities and Contradictions

Having examined the transimperial military labour market and the multi-ethnic composition of the KNIL, it is worth zooming in on a relatively small but significant category of soldiers who were active alongside the countless European, African and Asian colonial soldiers: the Swiss mercenaries. From the vantage point of a Swiss mercenary, the transimperial military labour market represented both horizontal and vertical opportunities. Countless Swiss climbed the military hierarchy or changed uniforms at the end of their service for foreign empires (or earlier in the case of desertion). However, this market was subject to significant fluctuations because of various political, economic, and social factors. This becomes particularly apparent when one compares the number of Swiss who left for the Dutch East Indies each year. According to *figure 3*, recruitment occurred in three significant waves since the foundation of modern Switzerland in 1848: the first and highest one lasted from 1856 to 1860. In 1866, the second recruitment wave started, culminating in 1869 and 1870. Finally, the outbreak of the Aceh War launched a third wave which, although not as high, persisted much longer than the first two. From the 1880s onwards, the number of yearly admissions declined and never rose above 60 again. This section attempts to shed light on the causes and reasons for these waves, arguing that the demand for mercenaries presented both opportunities and challenges for the Swiss authorities.




Figure 3: Swiss Mercenaries shipped to the Dutch East Indies 1855–1893.

*Source: Krusinga, *Geschiedenis van het “koloniaal werfdepot” naar aanleiding van het 50-jarig bestaan van dat korps.*⁷⁹*

Transformations of a Military Labour Market

The first wave of recruitment was marked by a profound change in the military labour market, mirrored by the disbandment of the British Swiss Legion and the

Swiss regiments in Naples in 1856 and 1859, respectively. Since the early modern period, tens of thousands of Swiss mercenaries served the monarchs of France, Spain, Piedmont, Great Britain and Austria. Thus, these courts had continuously offered a possible chance of escaping poverty to thousands of Swiss—not only for men but also indirectly for women. Many Swiss families accumulated considerable wealth by setting up their own military enterprises and assembling entire regiments of mercenaries. In some of these cases, women ran these enterprises while their husbands, brothers and cousins commanded the military units abroad. As broadly elaborated above, there were still numerous Swiss regiments even in the first half of the nineteenth century. Their nominal holdings included 14,000 men in France (until 1830), 12,000 in Spain (until 1823), 10,000 in the Netherlands (until 1829), 8,000 in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, 3,000 in the Papal States (until 1859) and 3,000 in the British Swiss Legion (1855–1856).⁸⁰

Nevertheless, criticism of mercenary service grew in the course of the Enlightenment. An increasing number of intellectuals condemned it because they considered the service for foreign absolutist monarchs unethical and politically reprehensible. And beyond them, clerical circles rejected it on the grounds of religious conviction. Furthermore, dubious recruiting methods and harrowing tales of returning soldiers about the conditions and customs in foreign regiments resulted in a broader public objection to mercenaries. In line with public opinion, a number of cantons successively forbade the conclusion of new military treaties in the 1830s and 1840s. This tendency finally culminated in the first constitution of the newly founded Swiss federal state in 1848, when liberal currents pushed through a constitution based on their principles. Accordingly, the ban on new military treaties was extended to the entire territory of Switzerland. The existing treaties, however, were not touched.⁸¹

How inconsistent the discourse on liberal principles regarding foreign military service was, became apparent only two years later, when the disbandment of the Swiss regiments in Naples was debated in concrete terms. Contrary to their liberal convictions, the seven Swiss Federal Council members opposed the treaty's dissolution with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. On the one hand, they were afraid of the high compensation claims; on the other, they expressed some Malthusian concerns:

It may be seriously considered whether it is well done and in the interest of our country at a time when there are complaints about all too great competition for labour, overpopulation and an increasing proletariat when efforts are being made to organise and promote emigration, to call home thousands of nationals by means of extraordinary measures, many of whom are likely to find it challenging to gain a tolerable position in civic life.⁸²

The fear of overpopulation and potential troublemakers, which could unhinge the bourgeois order, outweighed the liberal ideals of freedom and nationalism. From

1815 onwards, local authorities conceived emigration as a tried and tested means to dispose of deprived or undesirable individuals.⁸³ The ubiquity of emigration in the middle of the century is illustrated by these figures: between 1849 and 1863, some 80,100 Swiss emigrated overseas. For a resident population of around 2.4 million, this was a considerable number.⁸⁴ Thus, numerous municipalities and cantons subsidised overseas emigration not only of homeless people and the mentally and physically disabled but also of entire families living in poor conditions.⁸⁵

As archival sources reveal, for instance, the government of Bern secretly investigated in 1854 whether it could deport convicted offenders utilising the Dutch colonial army to save costs. The Dutch answer did not turn out quite as hoped, but at least it offered reference points. For instance, although the Dutch colonial military did not accept men convicted of theft or comparable offences, it did accept those who could only be accused of vagrancy and who were placed in welfare institutions. The envoy from Bern, who was sent to The Hague, therefore emphasised a unique opportunity offered by the KNIL:

Since among these people, there are also displaced persons, and since among this class of people, there are many who are fit and happy to seek their fortune abroad, if only they had the means to get there, this might perhaps become a drainage channel for people who are already a great burden to the state or the municipalities.⁸⁶

Moreover, the envoy pointed out that the government had repeatedly shipped inmates of the Bernese prison Thorberg to America at its own expense.⁸⁷ In his view, the KNIL provided a unique opportunity to get rid of inmates at a low cost “because some people prefer a certain existence in India to an uncertain one in America”.⁸⁸ The extent to which the Bernese Government pursued this project is not apparent from the files. We know from other sources that the Swiss authorities were not alone in thinking so. The administration in some German territories also regarded the KNIL as a convenient way of getting rid of “useless subjects” in the middle of the century. Wolfenbüttel, for example, deported an unknown number of convicts to Harderwijk in 1847 and guaranteed them immunity from prosecution if they did not return, and the Duchy of Brunswick let the Dutch advertising agents pursue their profession without hindrance.⁸⁹

In the view of the Swiss government, however, mercenary armies should take in not only impoverished Swiss but also the numerous refugees of the 1848 movements who resided in Switzerland. At the beginning of 1850, the Swiss Federal Council, therefore, inquired with the French government whether these refugees would be accepted by the Foreign Legion.⁹⁰ The French agreed, as long as the persons concerned were fit for service. The Federal Council thereupon told the cantons and encouraged them to inform the exiled people, stating the reason:

You will agree with us, loyal, dear Confederates, that it is important to seize this opportunity to open up a career for foreigners who are too engraved [sic!] to return to their homeland and cannot find employment in Switzerland.⁹¹

The idea that refugees could be deported through the French Foreign Legion was by no means a specifically Swiss one. As Christian Koller has argued, the founding of the *Légion étrangère* not only helped to divert demographic refugee flows from France but also served to populate the French colonies with Europeans.⁹² Thus, it is not surprising that various political actors at a local and national level in Switzerland, too, regarded military emigration as a suitable “technology of governance” in the broader Foucauldian sense.⁹³ From their stance, demographic issues could have been regulated, the social order maintained, and it appeared to be less risky and expensive than Swiss emigration to North America.

In the meantime, the laws on entry into and advertising for foreign services were tightened at the federal level. From 1851 onwards, no Swiss was allowed to be recruited if he was listed on cantonal or federal military troop registers. In 1853, activities that promoted foreign military labour were prohibited throughout Switzerland. However, these bans had one major shortcoming: they aimed solely at recruiting agents and activities but not prospective mercenaries. Thus, individual service in foreign armies continued to be legal. Moreover, a number of cantons showed little interest in enforcing this legislation, as a complaint by the federal government reveals.⁹⁴

A series of incidents involving Swiss mercenaries in Italy in 1859 finally led to additional heated discussions in the parliament about foreign military service. The debate was triggered by articles from liberal Italian newspapers reporting that Swiss regiments in papal service had looted during the conquest of Perugia. Afraid of the damage to Switzerland’s reputation at an international level, the Swiss Federal Council banned Swiss insignia on the flags of Swiss regiments in papal and Neapolitan service. Unwilling to accept this, a number of Swiss mercenaries in Naples revolted, and their regiments, comprising almost 10,000 mercenaries, were dissolved. Thereupon the Swiss Federal Council drafted a bill prohibiting Swiss nationals from performing all sorts of military labour in foreign armies without official permission. Parliament, however, toned down this draft. Its intention was, first and foremost, to ban Swiss military labour for catholic monarchs such as Francis II of the Two Sicilies and the Pope, as it was detrimental to Switzerland’s international reputation and its associated nimbus of alleged neutrality. Mercenaryism, however, ought not to be monopolised by the state but rather remain accessible under the liberal premise of individual liberty. Thus, the national parliament amended the original draft to prohibit only unauthorised entry into so-called “*nicht-nationale Truppen*” (“non-national troops”).⁹⁵ As we shall see below, even contemporaries were not fully aware of what was meant by this term. In the early years, however,

the ban applied not only to Swiss regiments in Italy and the French Foreign Legion, but also explicitly to the KNIL.⁹⁶

In any case, a significant number of released mercenaries of the Swiss regiments in Naples did not seem impressed by the new law, or at least they had not heard of it. Faced with their sudden unemployment, they signed up with the KNIL; others joined the French Foreign Legion, the Papal troops, or even the former adversarial forces of the Italian *Risorgimento* nationalist Giuseppe Garibaldi.⁹⁷ At least with regard to the KNIL, the problem seemed to solve itself. After several Swiss and French mercenaries mutinied on Java in January and August 1860 (see chapter 3), the Dutch Ministry of War refrained from recruiting Swiss citizens until further notice.⁹⁸

Back to Business

The second wave slowly took off in 1866, when concerns about Swiss mercenaries had been dispelled. The recently appointed Dutch Consul General in Bern, J.G. Suter-Vermeulen, asked the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs for guidance on dealing with the numerous oral and written requests from volunteers intending to serve in the KNIL. After consultation with the Ministry of Colonies, the Minister informed him that Swiss citizens were allowed to enlist again. Nevertheless, it was in the government's interest to avoid Italian-speaking Swiss, and even among the German- and French-speaking ones, to enlist solely those whose identity and moral integrity could be assured without any doubt.⁹⁹

Yet, it was not only the Dutch who revised their position. The Swiss government also changed its interpretation of the law passed in 1859 to prohibit service in “non-national troops”. This change of mind was prompted by an inquiry from the canton of Bern, which did not know whether it should apply the law to a vagrant Swiss KNIL veteran.¹⁰⁰ The question that had to be clarified was whether the KNIL was a national army or not. Since the Federal Government could not provide any information, it forwarded the Bernese inquiry directly to the Dutch Consul General, who consulted with the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs. Knowing that the KNIL had no longer been part of the National Army since 1830 and that Swiss citizens were—strictly speaking—therefore only allowed to join with official permission, the Dutch diplomats resorted to an argumentative detour. They replied that—although the KNIL was not part of the National Army stationed in the motherland—it was nevertheless a national force since the recruited foreigners were assigned to the same units as Dutch soldiers and did not form “a so-called Foreign Legion”.¹⁰¹

The Swiss Federal Council took note of this without objection.¹⁰² Considering the fact that the KNIL had explicitly been listed among the banned troops seven years earlier, this seemed somewhat surprising. Nevertheless, from its perspective,

there were sufficient grounds for a new interpretation of the law. Firstly, after the turbulent year 1859, the issue of mercenaries largely vanished from the public spotlight again. Back then, the criticism was primarily directed at Swiss mercenaries, who supported Catholic and anti-republican rulers in Italy while flying the Swiss flag. If individual Swiss mercenaries were subsequently serving in remote colonial armies without a direct link to the official government of Switzerland, this contained little diplomatic or political dynamite. In this respect, there was no incentive for official intervention. Secondly, as explained above, the authorities were not opposed to impoverished Swiss people emigrating quietly and unnoticed. Thirdly, perhaps one did not want to put an unnecessary strain on diplomatic relations with the Netherlands. According to the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, the two countries maintained a friendship of a “very amicable nature”,¹⁰³ as it called it, referring to the Netherlands supporting Swiss access to the Japanese market in 1864.¹⁰⁴

While entry into the KNIL was officially allowed again, and no further permission was required, advertising for it remained prohibited. It was not as actively pursued as before when the Netherlands had operated recruitment stations near the Swiss border from 1857 to 1860.¹⁰⁵ Nonetheless, the absence of such stations only briefly left a gap soon filled by numerous illicitly and privately operating Swiss agents.¹⁰⁶ They promised young Swiss people willing to emigrate that they would find their fortune in the Dutch East Indies. Organised in transimperial networks, they approached potential mercenaries in Swiss inns and on the streets and arranged their transport to the Dutch village of Harderwijk, where the colonial army’s troop depot was located. An essential part of their business was also to forge required documents, such as papers documenting that the recruit had no criminal record and a decent reputation.¹⁰⁷ However, these illegally operating agents did not prevent the demise of the military labour market. The ban on promoting foreign mercenary services, broadly supported by public opinion, prevented recruitment activities on a grand scale. Thus, the number of recruited Swiss did not reach the size of the 1850s when thousands of dismissed mercenaries enlisted. Nevertheless, it is estimated that 889 Swiss nationals (375 in 1869 alone) joined the KNIL between 1866 and 1870.¹⁰⁸ The bulk of them had no military experience. In 1871, the KNIL stopped the recruitment of foreigners. As we have seen, however, this halt lasted a mere two years when the Aceh War demanded more troops.

Last Glow

During the first years of the Aceh War, the number of Swiss recruits (863) reached almost the same level as in the late 1860s.¹⁰⁹ There were two reasons for this rebound. On the one hand, the long depression of the 1870s also impacted Switzerland since its economy was highly integrated into the world markets. Simultaneously, the

agricultural sector recorded a decline in employment figures forcing countless Swiss to look for jobs in other branches or even to emigrate.¹¹⁰ On the other hand, the Dutch pushed again to recruit foreigners. They increased the signature premium for foreigners, improved the terms of service and instructed the consulates in Brussels, Paris and Bern to make this known as far as possible.¹¹¹ Suter-Vermeulen was also reminded in a confidential letter by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Louis Gericke van Herwijnen that the Ministry of Colonies would like to see more Swiss mercenaries and that he should “promote the recruitment of Swiss as much as possible”.¹¹² Accordingly, Suter-Vermeulen did not hesitate to provide all interested parties with written information on the admission procedures.¹¹³

The measures quickly proved to be effective. While in 1871 and 1872, a mere eight Swiss enlisted, in 1873, their numbers rose to 88, and in 1874 it went up to 251. The Swiss Consul in Batavia noticed this increase too. In a telegram sent to the Swiss Federal Council on 18 July 1874, he warned that Dutch recruitment would again be carried out on a larger scale. He added that it was difficult for the Swiss to comprehend

how so many can forget themselves so far as to sell with inexplicable carelessness in a moment of excitement their freedom against an almost certain death or against a physical and moral wasting away. There is no other lot waiting for the one recruited for here; among the many hundreds of rental soldiers, only a few can maintain a good character through great willpower; the remaining 99 per cent are lost to human society.¹¹⁴

Given this urgent warning against the physical and moral decay of Swiss citizens, who served in the disreputable and unhealthy environment of the colonial military, Federal President Carl Schenk issued a circular to all cantons stating that increased attention should be paid by the police to combat recruiting agents.¹¹⁵

As it soon turned out, Schenk’s warning was utterly hypocritical. However, the authorities of the canton of Bern took his orders seriously and paid more attention to offences against the 1859 law. They intercepted a letter containing a leaflet about admission to the KNIL. Nevertheless, the explosive thing about the letter was less the content and more the sender: a stamp in the lower left corner pointed to the Dutch Consul General Suter-Vermeulen, based in Bern. This seemingly confirmed the previous rumours, which claimed that Suter-Vermeulen was directly involved in or at least familiar with the illicit recruitment. Still, the Bernese could not take action because the Dutch ambassador was protected by international law.¹¹⁶ Schenk confronted Suter-Vermeulen with the accusations, which the latter rejected, as this would have constituted a blatant violation of the 1859 law. Suter-Vermeulen officially stated that he did not recruit Swiss individuals, and it was in his interest to keep the number of Swiss mercenaries as low as possible, as most of the unpleasant

consular business concerned these mercenaries. Only non-Swiss people were given information on the conditions of admission. The letter in question, he assured, must therefore have been based on a misunderstanding. As far as the rumours were concerned, they might have been deliberately spread by individuals he had rejected.¹¹⁷

Nonetheless, Suter-Vermeulen's answer was a lie, as was President Schenk's indignation.¹¹⁸ The two had been friends for some time, and they had confidentially discussed Suter-Vermeulen's recruitment activities in 1873 as a classified letter from the Consul General to the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Baron Gericke van Herwijnen reveals.¹¹⁹ The reason for the conversation back then was Suter-Vermeulen's discomfort with the recruitment. During the Aceh War, the Dutch Consuls in Belgium, France and Switzerland were urged to do their utmost to promote the recruitment of local volunteers.¹²⁰ To fulfil this task, Suter-Vermeulen had consciously crossed the border of illegality several times and was afraid of being discovered. He, therefore, sought advice from several members of the Swiss Federal Council on how he could proceed unnoticed.¹²¹ In 1874, the matter finally became too explosive for Schenk as well. In a classified letter, he asked Suter-Vermeulen to "double his caution in this recruitment process" and to stop providing information about the KNIL.¹²² The fact that, unlike the rest of the correspondence between Suter-Vermeulen with members of the Federal Council, this letter is to be found exclusively in the Dutch National Archives and that it was written in an unusually amicable tone without a formal address suggests that Schenk wanted to keep the Dutch operations hidden from other Swiss authorities. Why Schenk played this double game remains in the realm of speculation. Perhaps he attached more importance to good diplomatic relations with the Netherlands as they represented a gateway to Asian markets, which the Swiss export industry increasingly aimed to penetrate at the end of the nineteenth century.¹²³

At any rate, Suter-Vermeulen was under pressure. The government in The Hague wanted to recruit more Swiss men because of the Aceh War. Suter-Vermeulen attempted his best to do so without being caught. He generously gave information to all potential recruits who either wrote to him by letter or visited him at home. His commitment even went so far as suggesting to the Dutch Foreign Minister to set up a registration office near the German town of Friedrichshafen and transport the volunteers by steamboat from Mannheim to the Netherlands, all under the guise of a removal company. He developed these ideas in consultation with several recruiting agents who had visited him personally. Additionally, in order to escort volunteers from Switzerland quickly across the border, he proposed paying the recruiters in advance.¹²⁴ After the incident of 1874, however, Suter-Vermeulen changed his attitude towards the recruitment question. From then on, he reacted dismissively to questions concerning the KNIL.¹²⁵

Nevertheless, it was not only the Dutch Consul General and scattered recruiters who pitched the KNIL to the young Swiss in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The aforementioned Bernese idea of using the colonial army to rid itself of unwanted individuals reappeared elsewhere at a municipal level. In 1886, for example, the mayor of Hauenstein tried to deport a local citizen to the KNIL because he was reluctant to work. Yet, before he could implement his plan, he was arrested.¹²⁶ In another case, a convicted recruiter defended himself in court, arguing that the local police knew about his business. Apparently, they had assured him that they would not interfere since, in their view, the deportation of such people would only benefit the country.¹²⁷ Unfortunately, both cases are only known because they were part of criminal investigations. Therefore, it is difficult to determine how often other local community officials tried to resort to deportation.

Overall, however, few of these initiatives are likely to have been successful, as recruitment had been at a low level for the last thirty years of the period under review. An estimated 475 Swiss joined the KNIL in total. Accordingly, the number serving in the Dutch East Indies also declined. Whereas in 1880, the KNIL still comprised 702 Swiss NCOs and soldiers, by 1914, this number had dropped continuously to 47.¹²⁸ This development is due to several reasons. As explained above, the Dutch generally recruited fewer non-Dutch foreigners in the last decade of the nineteenth century since they profited from both a wave of Dutch nationalism and the increased number of Javanese and “Amobeneses” troops. At the same time, the military labour market in Switzerland also lost importance. The Swiss economy of the late nineteenth century grew at an above-average rate in international comparison. While Switzerland was still one of Europe’s poorhouses at the beginning of the century, it became one of the most industrialised societies in Europe by the turn of the century. As Béatrice Veyrassat points out, this was also reflected in the rise in purchasing power and real wages in several branches.¹²⁹ New employment opportunities offered lucrative alternatives for Swiss workers and attracted a growing number of foreign workers. From 1888 onwards, Switzerland turned from a country of emigration into one of immigration.¹³⁰

Finally, the question arises of the extent to which the French Foreign Legion and the KNIL competed for the remaining Swiss willing to emigrate. As Christian Koller has shown, the Foreign Legion was increasingly in the media spotlight of a transimperial public sphere from 1880 to 1918. While about a dozen actual or alleged accounts of former legionnaires’ experiences appeared during this period, only three were about the KNIL.¹³¹ It is fair to assume that the Foreign Legion—at least in Switzerland—was far better known than the KNIL towards the end of the nineteenth century and attracted more mercenaries.

Conclusion

When twenty-six-year-old Swiss August Vollenweider walked through the gates of the KNIL recruiting station in Harderwijk in November 1887, he probably had a premonition of what to expect. Until March of that year, he had served for the French Foreign Legion in North Africa and Tonkin (present-day North Vietnam). Why he opted for service in the KNIL after four years under the French flag remains unknown. Both personal and financial reasons could have been decisive. In any case, he remained loyal to the KNIL for twelve years until he was released and returned to Switzerland in 1899, highly decorated with the fourth Class Willems Order and endowed with an annual pension of 400 guilders.¹³²

Vollenweider's biography exemplifies the careers of thousands of Swiss and highlights three arguments raised in this chapter. Firstly, it demonstrates that the military labour market lasted longer than the bulk of previous scholarship had claimed. According to these accounts, the military labour market experienced its so-called golden age between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries before losing importance and finally drying up towards the middle of the nineteenth century. However, such a narrative is geographically too limited to Europe and ignores the agency of European mercenaries like Vollenweider in extra-European theatres of war. By expanding the spatial focus to the areas affected by European expansion, it becomes apparent that the history of the transimperial military labour market endured for a more extended period.¹³³

Starting as early as the seventeenth century, various West- and East-Indian trading companies endowed with state privileges increasingly recruited Swiss mercenaries—whether as part of regiments levied by Swiss officers or on an individual basis. For instance, Swiss mercenaries patrolled the sugar plantations of Martinique, fought the slave revolt in Surinam or were involved in the sacking of Seringapatam (present-day Srirangapatna). At the height of imperial state formation in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, especially French and Dutch recruitment of colonial mercenaries finally reached new dimensions.¹³⁴

Secondly, Vollenweider's biography reminds us that imperial expansion in the nineteenth century was not a purely "national" project but an endeavour shared across European national borders. Given its limited demographic resources, a small state like the Netherlands could hardly have brought such large parts of the Malay Archipelago under its military and political influence with only its own forces. The supply of mercenaries regularly arriving from Europe, especially in the second half of the nineteenth century, was primarily responsible for the Dutch command being able to repeat failed expeditions a second or even third time until the declared goal was achieved—usually with still worshipping consequences for the local population. In filling their ranks, the KNIL benefitted from the dissolution

of the traditional mercenary market. For example, numerous Swiss joined the KNIL after the four Swiss regiments stationed in the Netherlands were discharged in 1829, and many Swiss who were stationed in the regiments in Naples or the barracks of the British Swiss Legion travelled more or less directly to the Dutch East Indies after their discharge in the late 1850s. It was not until the 1890s, when the command's appreciation of the soldiers of Java, Madura and Ambon grew, leading to their recruitment on a larger scale, that the relevance of the European mercenaries began to wane.

Thirdly, Vollenweider's example highlights how Swiss men perceived European colonies as a space of opportunities. Long after other important military employers, such as the Swiss regiments in Paris or Naples, had been disbanded, the French and Dutch colonial army offered a secure job opportunity that guaranteed room and board as well as a regular income. It is hardly surprising, then, that the recruitment of Swiss men correlated, at least in broad strokes, anti-cyclically with the course of the national economy. Thus some Swiss men joined the KNIL towards the end of the 1850s when the Swiss economy was in crisis. And the above-average economic solid growth towards the end of the nineteenth century (along with other factors such as the reduced recruitment efforts of the Netherlands) probably contributed to young men finding jobs and staying in Switzerland.

Apart from the mercenaries, a handful of national and local politicians also conceived of the colonies as a space of opportunities. Admittedly, foreign mercenary services were no longer held in high esteem in public discourse as they were considered an outdated phenomenon inconsistent with the ideals of the liberal federal state. And as a result, the parliament passed a series of laws hindering entry into foreign armies. But even if foreign mercenary service was intellectually and legally discredited, some politicians still perceived the French Foreign Legion and the KNIL as valid means of eliminating vagrants or political troublemakers. Moreover, the Swiss government maintained diplomatic relations with the Netherlands by not further impeding Dutch demand.

To sum up, the Swiss mercenaries were important agents in a rapidly changing transimperial military labour market. Several empires hired them to control and expand their (colonial) territories. Recruitment was distinguished by both competition and connectivity. On the one hand, the Dutch needed more mercenaries to defend their colonial empire against possible attacks from other empires, such as the British, Italian, American or Japanese. On the other hand, they benefitted from recruitment offensives by other empires. When, for instance, the Swiss regiments in Naples were disbanded, more than a thousand Swiss flooded the military labour market. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the transimperial military labour market finally lost importance for several reasons. Nationalistic tendencies made cross-border recruitment more difficult, industrial growth provided

alternative employment opportunities, and the British, French and Dutch increasingly appreciated the potential of indigenous soldiers.

As the following chapter will show, however, the reasons for military service are not only to be found on a structural but also on a personal level. Sad individual fates, ideological convictions or a thirst for adventure were thus decisive. This is also evident, for example, when the Boer Wars raged in South Africa. The Boers enjoyed broad sympathy in Swiss society, and their struggle against the British was stylised as a fight for freedom. Between 1899 and 1902, for instance, there were numerous requests from Swiss citizens to the Dutch consuls to join the Boer army.¹³⁵

Follow the Men: The Many Lives of Swiss Mercenaries

Abstract

Zooming in on the individual trajectories of the mercenaries, this chapter illustrates that they were far more than objects moved around between supply and demand. It highlights the stages from recruitment, joining the KNIL, and crossing to the Dutch East Indies, through their daily lives and martial activities in the colonies to their lives after service (if there was one). Special attention is paid to the aspects of violence and the sphere of intimacy.

Keywords: social history, colonial violence, concubines, intimacy, colonial army

“Now a great moment came—we were clothed,” Augustin Zehnder recalled, describing the instant when he put on his uniform for the first time in January 1911 at the troop depot in Nijmegen. “What this means,” he continued, “can only be understood by those who have experienced it themselves. One has a feeling like someone who has won the big lottery and is not yet allowed to believe in it until the money is actually counted out to him.”¹

Zehnder’s testimonies indicate that becoming a colonial soldier was more than a geographical journey. Passing through different socio-cultural contexts, from recruitment to life as a veteran, these men changed physically and mentally. Recent studies in the field of *new military history* have increasingly focused on this transformation taking place at a micro level and have gained valuable insights. In her widely acclaimed work on *askari* in German East Africa, for example, historian Michelle R. Moyd conceives military training as a socialisation process producing new meanings for African soldiers and those around them.² In a similar vein, Christian Koller divides the process of becoming a member of the French Foreign Legion into three stages. Phase one involves the detachment from one’s former environment, phase two the physical and psychological transformation into a colonial soldier as well as the journey into the colonial space, and phase three the integration into the military society.³

Following these insights into historiographies on colonial soldiers, this chapter zooms in on a micro level attempting to render a more comprehensive picture of the Swiss mercenaries’ social lives. Split into three sections, it first explores the

geographical and social transition of young Swiss men into colonial mercenaries by scrutinising their social backgrounds, their motives, and their voyage to the Dutch East Indies. The second—and most comprehensive—section provides a kaleidoscopic analysis of their lives in the KNIL by focusing on different characteristics such as social hierarchies, daily routines, discipline, diseases, insubordination and physical violence. Moreover, since numerous Asian and Indo-European women lived in the cantonments, cross-cultural sexual relationships played a vital role in everyday military life. This chapter therefore also scrutinises these forms of social interaction. Finally, the third section shall discuss a vast spectrum of opportunities and obstacles that a mercenary encountered when transitioning back into civilian society either in the colonies or in Europe. Underlying this analysis is a combination of a holistic approach to recent migration history that acknowledges the agency of actors on a micro level, with the trends mentioned above in the field of *new military history*.⁴

Separation & Transition: Motives, Recruitment & Emigration

Social Background

Principally, the KNIL was open to all Swiss men between the ages of 18 and 40, provided they were 1.59 m tall, physically fit and could present several documents, including a birth certificate, a discharge certificate from their former military employer, if any, to prove that they were not deserters, a character reference, written consent from their parents, if they were still minors under current cantonal law (in certain cantons, men did not reach the age of majority until they were 24), and, if married, the written consent of their wife.⁵ So what kind of Swiss men signed up for the KNIL? What social milieu did they come from, and why did they want to enlist with the KNIL?

In a data sample containing 5,352 Swiss mercenaries, approximately 71 per cent (3,780) of the Swiss mercenaries were between twenty and thirty years old at the time of enlistment; 6 per cent were younger, and 23 per cent were more aged. Moreover, 25 Swiss volunteers were younger than the minimum age of 18 and 65 were older than the maximum age of 40.⁶ Although the Dutch authorities registered the place of birth alongside the date of birth in the *stamboeken*, no reliable findings can be drawn about the geographical origin of the Swiss since the Dutch authorities did not know the distinction between the place of birth and the so-called *Bürgerort* (“place of citizenship”) practised by the Swiss authorities. In official Swiss documents, only the latter is recorded, and as this is a genealogical designation of origin accompanied by certain political rights, in countless cases it differs from the place

of birth.⁷ However, even if we cannot say whether there were regional clusters, we can at least state that the mercenaries came from all four linguistic regions of Switzerland, partially from urban centres and partially from rural areas.⁸

Another point which emerges from the *stamboeken* relates to the parents. Approximately 5 per cent (n=5,352) list either *onbekend* (unknown) or no name at all under the entry for the father's first name. These mercenaries were likely born out of wedlock and thus often socially stigmatised. Nonetheless, there is no evidence that an above-average number of them entered military service, as the proportion of illegitimate children throughout Switzerland averaged around 5 per cent in the second half of the nineteenth century.⁹

Ultimately, the *stamboeken* also provides information on whether a soldier had served in another army. Of the approximately 3,267 Swiss who joined between 1848 and 1860, around 39 per cent pursued a horizontal military career. They had been previously employed in another mercenary unit (this does not include the Swiss militia army). With the disappearance of numerous mercenary armies by 1860, this rate fell rapidly. For the cohort from 1861 to 1870, it was 14 per cent and 6 per cent in the following decade.

A glimpse at different European mercenary regiments reveals that most Swiss mercenaries originated from the working class. For instance, the recruiting officers of the British-Swiss Legion described the social background of the Swiss mercenaries, stating laconically that these mercenaries had “little if anything to lose at home”.¹⁰ This also applied to numerous mercenaries of the Swiss regiments in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, as Johann Jakob Keller's memoirs illustrate. In it, he describes how his parents gave him into the guardianship of another family in 1833 at the age of nine, because they could no longer afford to take care of him. At this family's place, he worked as a weaver for a measly wage until he decided to change his fate by emigrating to Naples at age twenty.¹¹ Furthermore, concerning the French Foreign Legion, historian Douglas Porch argues that the history of the French Foreign Legion was “a history of a portion of the European working class of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, one which a Marxist historian might claim had slipped through the fingers of the ‘capitalist revolution’”.¹²

Scattered sources on the Swiss KNIL mercenaries' social backgrounds partially reinforce these findings. They depict a broad spectrum of professions, including bookbinders,¹³ cabinet makers,¹⁴ horologists,¹⁵ factory workers,¹⁶ farmers,¹⁷ painters,¹⁸ and tailors.¹⁹ In addition to these professions, it can be assumed that some former *Verdingkinder* (“indentured child labourers”)²⁰, such as Rudolf Schüpbach and his brother,²¹ entered colonial service. However, we cannot say how many of these children joined a mercenary army, as they left fewer sources due to their marginalised social position. Furthermore, there were also a few young men from the aristocratic or bourgeois upper classes, but they tended to be the exception for

two reasons. First, all foreigners were merely admitted as soldiers.²² (In earlier mercenary regiments, aristocrats often joined directly as officers.) Second, the colonial army did not enjoy the best reputation and only promised social prestige in the event of promotion.²³ By and large, these findings coincide with those of Ulbe Bosma and Thomas Kolnberger. Having analysed the social background of Dutch and Luxembourg KNIL soldiers, they concluded that the majority of the soldiers originated “from a poor, but not the poorest, strata of society”.²⁴

Knowledge & Motives

Within the transimperial military labour market’s structural framework, the Swiss weighed various reasons for whether they should emigrate. A disparate body of knowledge flowing back from the colonies through multiple channels influenced their decision. Returned veterans, in particular, provided an essential source of information. In 1908, for instance, the Dutch Consul in Zurich reported to his colleague in Bern that young Swiss wanting to enlist with the KNIL overran his consulate since they apparently were encouraged to do so by pensioned ex-mercenaries in their municipalities.²⁵ Swiss hairdresser Edwin Eckert, for example, met a compatriot in a Strasbourg inn who had just returned from the Dutch East Indies. The man’s account fascinated Eckert so profoundly that he felt the insatiable desire to do the same.

Furthermore, several veterans operated as illicit recruiting agents, convincing young Swiss to enlist.²⁶ Family and neighbourhood networks constituted another vital channel, as exemplified by the enquiry of a young Swiss man in 1881. Therein, he notified the Dutch ambassador that he intended to join the KNIL since his older brother was already serving in Samarang (Semarang).²⁷ The 21-year-old volunteer Carl Appel learned about the life of the Swiss colonial soldiers through the letters of his former neighbour, who was serving in the Dutch East Indies.²⁸

In addition to these oral and private forms of knowledge circulation, newspapers and books conveyed certain information on the Dutch East Indies in general and the place of enlistment in particular.²⁹ Additionally, some newspapers printed entire letters sent from mercenaries based in the Dutch East Indies or reviewed public talks given by returned veterans. While some reports glorified colonial military labour and praised, for example, the high signature premiums, career opportunities or pensions, others explicitly warned against it.³⁰ Nevertheless, even if some of these articles were intended as a warning, they could have the opposite effect, as they implicitly promised thrills and adventure. Moreover, adverse reporting could simply lead to a preference for one colonial army over another. Augustin Zehnder, for example, explained his decision to join the KNIL in 1911 by saying that he had only ever heard “the most unpleasant things” about the French Foreign Legion.³¹

This more or less accurate knowledge about the Dutch East Indies nourished specific ideas and hopes of young Swiss men. Moreover, it provided the basis for diverse, partly overlapping motives for emigration. For instance, some hoped to find better economic conditions in the KNIL than in Switzerland, as exemplified by Swiss bookbinder Carl August Haab. After roaming vast parts of Switzerland and Baden-Württemberg in search of a job in 1859, he claimed that he faced only two options: “start begging or go to the East Indies”.³² In a similar vein, Eduard Rellstab apologised to his parents for joining the KNIL. Apparently, he had tried to find work in Geneva for almost two weeks in 1859 when he ran out of money and therefore turned to a recruiting agent.³³ Notably, however, both Haab and Rellstab could count on a family that would have continued to support them despite their lack of income. Haab’s parents urged him to come home by telegram, but he refused as he assumed he would be a financial burden.³⁴ Rellstab stressed that he did not want to abuse his parents’ kindness once again and was too “proud” to ask other people for support.³⁵ In these cases, it was not so much acute poverty that triggered emigration as a lack of prospects to prevent social decline and the associated loss of (male) prestige.

For others, the KNIL offered the opportunity to escape social obligations quickly and at a low cost. In 1900, for instance, Lithographer Karl Schneider justified his interest in the KNIL by referring to his broken relationship with his family and his dislike of his profession.³⁶ Similarly, Friedrich Abderhalden ran away from home and joined the Swiss regiments in Naples in 1858 because his father had forced him to apprentice as a cabinetmaker. Even when these regiments were disbanded in the subsequent year, he did not dare to return home, as he feared his father would force him to work as a cabinetmaker again.³⁷ In 1868, to provide another example, Heinrich Dürrenberg left his wife and children and travelled to Harderwijk under a false name. His fraud, however, was discovered, and he ended up in prison.³⁸ In a similar case, Jacob Bächtold ran away from his wife and children “out of a mood”. Regretting his step, he begged his mother to organise his return home in 1859.³⁹ Still, a sense of family duty and solidarity could also be a motive that fuelled emigration, as seen in the case of ex-military Hans Honegger. According to his sisters, he intended to stay in the service for about twelve years to obtain a lifelong pension allowing him to support them financially.⁴⁰

Other Swiss mercenaries might also have emigrated to escape conviction like murderers or fraudsters.⁴¹ However, since the KNIL demanded a certificate of good character upon entry, the criminals would have to enter with forged documents. Usually, private recruiting agents extensively provided forged passports, as the German author and colonial mercenary Karl Heinzen reported, who joined the KNIL in the 1830s.⁴² Likewise, Jean Aimé Humberset wrote in his diary that, before 1860, many Swiss had entered with forged papers and that the Dutch government had known about it.⁴³ And even into the 1870s, their craft was still widespread.

Bossenbroek estimates that in 1875 alone, more than 500 volunteers were provided with forged papers in Brussels to enlist with the KNIL. Judicial records from Switzerland show that Swiss recruiting agents were busy forging documents.⁴⁴ However, this became more difficult after the turn of the century, as the Dutch authorities sent the documents to the home parish with a photograph of the recruit to be verified there.⁴⁵ Moreover, it was undoubtedly easier for criminals to join the French Foreign Legion because they could enrol anonymously.⁴⁶

Beyond economic, social or legal reasons, wanderlust and a thirst for adventure drew the European mercenaries to the Dutch East Indies. The most famous example was arguably the French poet Arthur Rimbaud.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, this also applied to less prominent Swiss mercenaries. Arnold Egloff, for instance, defended his furtive departure in 1889 to his parents by arguing that he did not enjoy his job as a tinsmith and wanted to see “how things are in another part of the world”.⁴⁸ The earlier-mentioned Appel confessed in 1904 that it had long been his desire to discover customs and traditions in another part of the world but that he lacked the necessary means to do so.⁴⁹ Likewise, Swiss mercenary Anton Camenzind expressed his desire to explore the world. In his unpublished memoirs, he described how he tried to work in his village, but he longed to travel every time the railway passed through.⁵⁰

Such a desire for adventure and journeys was by no means atypical for young men in the second half of the nineteenth century. In particular, the ample media coverage of the French Foreign Legion spread “exoticised” images of tropical regions from the 1880s onwards, which motivated numerous men to join foreign services.⁵¹ Even literary stories, such as the novella cycle *Die Leute von Seldwyla* (*The People of Seldwyla*), published in 1856 by the internationally renowned Swiss writer Gottfried Keller, disseminated fictionalised and exoticised male fantasies of colonial militarism.⁵² In this anthology, Keller tells the story—delivered with an ironic undertone—of a young Swiss man named Pankraz who breaks out of poverty to serve as a soldier with the British East India Company. Following “civilisational” colonial discourses of the time, Keller placed his character on the borders of British India, where he was supposed to take action against the indigenous practice of *Sati* (widow burning). Pankraz then joined the French Foreign Legion and advanced to the rank of colonel. After several years of service, he returned home as a rich man.⁵³ In his most successful novel, *Der grüne Heinrich* (*The Green Henry*), Keller covers the story of the fictional character Albertus Zwiehan, who was born in an “Asiatic colony”. After the death of his parents, Zwiehan illegally seized his brother’s inheritance and travelled to his father’s homeland, Switzerland. Soon after his arrival there, the rumour of his wealth spread.⁵⁴ Thus, Keller’s stories indicate that even a country without formal colonial possessions like Switzerland was firmly embedded in the nineteenth century’s European colonial discourses and fantasies.

Furthermore, the KNIL attracted a number of young Swiss who fancied a military lifestyle, as exemplified by Konrad Reutlinger, an employee of the Lake Lucerne shipping company. Writing to the Dutch Consul in 1888, he emphasised that he did not want to join the KNIL to have a better life than in Switzerland, “for a soldierly life, which virtues every good Swiss has and as they are known in all countries for loyal and brave men”.⁵⁵ Such references to a masculine soldierly image did not emerge by chance. Even more than in neighbouring countries, armed civilian organisations such as rifle clubs shaped Swiss nationalism in the nineteenth century by proliferating the image of the vigorous republican citizen-soldier.⁵⁶ Accordingly, political participation was firmly tied to male military service, thus excluding women from the political sphere.⁵⁷ (Ironically, men who were unfit for military service were not.)⁵⁸

The soldierly experience, as historian Rudolf Jaun argues, appeared to be essential for the male identity of the citizen.⁵⁹ This ideology, however, posed a problem: unlike its immediate neighbours Italy, Germany or France, neutral Switzerland lacked actual military victories or defeats that could be employed for the discursive construction of an imagined community. To fill this void and still foster the image of a martial nation, nationalist discourses referred to the battles fought by Swiss mercenaries from the sixteenth to the early nineteenth century.⁶⁰ (Battles in which Swiss mercenaries were involved in the second half of the nineteenth century, on the other hand, were not mentioned because they were not compatible with the liberal convictions of the ruling political classes.)⁶¹ For some Swiss citizens who saw themselves in the tradition of their bellicose ancestors, the KNIL thus offered a unique opportunity to prove their martial skills—and therefore their manliness—in colonial wars. Explaining his motive to join the KNIL in the 1880s, a Vaudois, for example, constructed such continuity to the myth of the Swiss mercenaries by referring to his ancestors who allegedly had fought “under foreign flags”.⁶²

To summarise, despite the long study period of sixty-six years, certain motives shaped by various constructions of masculinities such as a thirst for adventure, a lack of prospects, the fear of social standstill or even relegation, escape from social obligations, or references to bellicose ancestors appear repeatedly. Moreover, these motives emerged against a partly factual, partly imagined knowledge of the colonies and the hegemonic discourse of nation-state formation about the militant Swiss citizen.

Transition: Entering the Military Sphere

Once the Swiss had decided to join the KNIL, they had to make their way to the colonial troop depot in the Netherlands. From 1857 to 1860, this was a relatively simple task, as the Dutch authorities ran official recruitment offices near the Swiss border and reimbursed travel costs within Switzerland. In addition, a first cursory check of health and documents took place so that as few as possible travelled to

the Netherlands in vain.⁶³ Around 3,000 Swiss were recruited through these offices, sending them to the Dutch city of Harderwijk, where the colonial troop depot was located until 1909. After the closure of the offices in 1860, the size of the travel groups was substantially smaller, as the volunteers had to travel the 600-kilometre journey from the Swiss border to Harderwijk either on their own or through the guidance of recruiting agents.⁶⁴

Harderwijk—and its successor Nijmegen—marked the first pinnacle on their way to becoming colonial mercenaries, as a unique atmosphere welcomed them upon arrival. Since the opening of the troop depot in 1815, thousands of soldiers and numerous innkeepers, veterans, prostitutes, and swindlers flocked to the small city on the Zuiderzee. It quickly gained an infamous reputation because of the hustle and bustle there. Recounting his experiences in the KNIL, for instance, the German writer Karl Heinzen describes Harderwijk as “the sewer of Europe [...] through which the rubbish and refuse from all ends of our continent force their way to swim across the sea to Batavia and fertilise the Javanese soil!”⁶⁵ Even though the KNIL gradually tightened its admission conditions in the second half of the nineteenth century, this trope persisted until the barracks were relocated to Nijmegen in 1909.⁶⁶

The Swiss, too, did their bit by contributing to the town’s notorious reputation. According to a series of newspaper articles published in the Bernese daily *Der Bund* in 1857, the Swiss had already ostentatiously displayed national pride on their journey through the Netherlands by waving Swiss flags and singing Swiss songs.⁶⁷ In Harderwijk, too, nationality was the common point of reference, so the Swiss supposedly stuck together—especially in fights that occasionally erupted between the different nationalities. Proudly, the anonymous author added: “Since we Swiss are always together and far more hammer than an anvil, others feared us quite a bit.”⁶⁸ Likewise, another anonymous Swiss correspondent wrote in 1857 that the Dutch “have often felt their [the Swiss’] hard fists”.⁶⁹ Moreover, he added that a group of Swiss stormed a prison to free a compatriot who had allegedly been unjustly arrested. The commander of the barracks at the time, Colonel König from Switzerland, finally managed to settle the uproar by speaking to his fellow citizens.⁷⁰

Such conflicts frequently erupted, as other sources testify. Writing to his parents in 1860, Eduard Rellstab confessed that his cousin had interfered in a brawl between Dutch and Swiss soldiers in the barracks’ yard.⁷¹ In the same year, the *krijgsraad* (war council) condemned another Swiss, Johann Jakob Damur, to six months in prison for “the infliction of injuries or beatings”.⁷² Such national frictions were still swelling in the mid-1880s. Anton Camenzind recounted, for instance, that the recruits threw potatoes at each other: on one side, the Dutch who “hate everything that speaks German”, and on the other, the “*buitenlanders*” (foreigners).⁷³ Nevertheless, expressions of displeasure with foreigners were not

confined to the Dutch recruits. In 1902, Heinrich Brandenberger complained to his parents that the “almost exclusively Dutch population had a bad attitude towards foreigners, especially the fishermen”.⁷⁴

Despite such national tensions, quite a few Swiss described their stay in Harderwijk as comfortable. Waiting several days for his documents to arrive from Switzerland, Camenzind described how he went for walks during the day. In the evening, he met Swiss recruits and civilians in the pub of a certain Schmid to drink and sing Swiss songs. Mainly, the initiation into the military was celebrated. As Camenzind explained, one or two citizens went into the barracks almost daily. Then, two days later, they came out as soldiers and headed straight to the pub, where they had to buy everyone a beer. Even after Camenzind’s admission, this routine did not change. Although he lived in the cantonment from then on and had to exercise daily, he could move freely within the city walls from 5.00 to 9.30 in the evening. Thus, he continued regularly meeting with other Swiss at Schmid’s place.⁷⁵

Unlike Camenzind, Zehnder could not celebrate his enrolment with compatriots, as he was the only Swiss in the troop depot in 1911.⁷⁶ He, therefore, had to come to terms with other non-Dutch Europeans. Their shared intention to serve as foreigners in the Dutch East Indies had a homogenising effect on the group spirit—or, as he put it:

In general, we got along well with each other, having all learned that the plane of fate makes everything the same and that there was no point in causing each other any more unpleasantness.⁷⁷

Although signing the engagement contract marked the first step towards becoming a colonial soldier, months passed before the freshly recruited soldiers could serve in the colonies. To begin with, they had to wait four to six weeks until enough men were gathered to fill a ship to the Indies.⁷⁸ During this period, several recruits had second thoughts about their engagement. Camenzind mentioned that twenty-four Swiss attempted to desert, but merely two of them succeeded; the others ended up behind Dutch prison bars.⁷⁹ Since desertion was unlikely to succeed, several Swiss tried to revoke their decision through official channels. Regretting his enlistment in 1871, Christian Jost, for instance, asked his mother for help explaining to her that he could only join the KNIL because he had submitted forged documents—among other things, a forged letter of consent from her. Despite this betrayal of trust, his mother sought out the Dutch Consul General in Bern, who initiated Jost’s release.⁸⁰ Besides those who regretted their move, some were pulled back by their civilian past. For example, the government of the canton of Vaud lobbied for the release of Alfred Maurer, who was staying in Harderwijk because he had left his wife and children at home in 1874.⁸¹ Similarly, the parents of nineteen-year-old Ulrich

Langenegger requested the release of their son in 1879 by telegraph. Although he protested vehemently against this, it was to no avail, as he was still a minor according to the law of the canton of St. Gallen.⁸²

For those remaining in the KNIL, the final and longest part of the transition began. They travelled by train or ship to the nearest major overseas port.⁸³ On the way, the military ensured that none of the newly recruited soldiers could desert. From the outside, this gave the impression of a prisoner transport. The German geologist Emil Carthaus, who witnessed such embarkation in Amsterdam, said it looked more like “animals being led to the slaughterhouse than soldiers on their way to battle and victory”.⁸⁴ However, there is no record of Swiss mercenaries complaining about the nature of their transport. Conversely, Arnold Egloff reported that each soldier had been given a glass of wine before boarding the ship.⁸⁵

Aboard the ship, the soldiers had to make themselves as comfortable as possible so that the following hundred days—or fifty days after the opening of the Suez Canal—would pass pleasantly.⁸⁶ This was easier said than done for a number of reasons. First, it was very crowded on board. An anonymous author complained in the *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië* that the soldiers were crammed together like living cattle.⁸⁷ Second, seasickness and sleeping in hammocks threatened to



Figure 4: The soldiers on the ship did not always behave as harmoniously toward each other as this group photo suggests. Nevertheless, the ship was an important space in which collective identity was forged. Unknown shooting date, presumably on the S.S. *Koningin Wilhelmina* c. 1903. SSA, Ar 201.303 (Original privately owned by the Brandenberger family, Switzerland).

spoil the voyage.⁸⁸ In addition, both Egloff and Rellstab experienced violent storms during which they thought they would never see daylight again.⁸⁹ Humberst lamented the harsh maritime discipline that prevailed on the boat also exacerbated the situation.⁹⁰ Finally, similar to the atmosphere in Harderwijk, tensions between different nationalities occurred frequently on the vessel. Zehnder explained that he and four Germans installed their hammocks close to each other, “because we could not yet communicate with the Dutch and most of them regarded us as intruders anyway, we had joined together for the purpose of entertainment and possible protection”.⁹¹

According to Eckert, friction arose between the Dutch and foreigners while peeling potatoes.⁹² Furthermore, Schmid recounted how a Dutchman called him a “stupid Swiss cow”, to which he responded with a fist punch.⁹³ Camenzind, on the other hand, reported that the tensions vanished when the Germans and Dutch began to sing together. Delighted, Camenzind added: “there was no more hatred, and the whole journey went well, and there was never any quarrelling”.⁹⁴ The journey thus welded the heterogeneous troops together—and from most sources, it seems this was often the case, as none of the sources examined here mention brawls between Europeans. Nonetheless, as we shall see in the following part, nationality remained an essential point of reference, even if it was overlaid by a European sense of community forged in the colonial contact zone.⁹⁵

A mercenary's life in the Dutch East Indies

Upon their arrival in the Dutch East Indies, the mercenaries initiated a distinct chapter in their lives. The subsequent section shall comprehensively examine diverse dimensions of their experiences, namely their daily routines, discipline and instances of disobedience, the application and potential use of military force, and their interactions within the social and intimate realms, particularly with women. Before delving into an exploration of these multifaceted aspects, it is instructive to conduct a meticulous examination of the intricate social and racial hierarchies that governed the Dutch colonial space.

Social and Racial Hierarchies

Having arrived in the Dutch East Indies, European soldiers and non-commissioned officers quickly realised that the European civilian society in the colonies considered them outcasts.⁹⁶ Augustin Zehnder, too, experienced this exclusion and noted: “No citizen invites a military man into his home; like a leper, he is avoided on the street and in public places.”⁹⁷ Accordingly, the social barriers between the

European soldiers and civilians were rigid, and the soldiers' social life outside the barracks was usually limited to commercial exchanges with Chinese traders and visits to restaurants or former colleagues who had settled in the Dutch East Indies. However, even patriotic feelings could only tear down this class barrier to a limited extent, as historian Andreas Zangger elaborates. Referring to a group of Swiss merchants in Riau, Sumatra, he analyses how they initially intended to visit a few Swiss mercenaries in a nearby fort. When the merchants could not find their compatriots immediately, they became concerned that they might be under arrest. Consequently, they abandoned their plan.⁹⁸

Nevertheless, within the military compound's walls, the mercenaries were anything but marginalised. On the contrary, "white" subaltern European soldiers were on the top rung of the racial hierarchy amidst the colonial force. Drawing on Robert W. Connel's concept of the patriarchal dividend, which describes the advantage that all men gain from the oppression of women despite their multiple masculinities, Harald Fischer-Tiné has described this phenomenon in the context of British India as a "racial dividend". Thus, "white" subalterns benefitted from the racialised regime, even though they did not conform to the hegemonic whiteness embodied by the European bourgeois society.⁹⁹

Dutch and non-Dutch nationals were officially on an equal footing at this level. Nonetheless, the prospects of promotion for non-Dutch troops worsened as the century progressed and mortality decreased. While in 1832, the former Swiss mercenary Josef Jakob Xaver Pfyffer zu Neueck mentioned that promotions happened much faster than in Europe, "since Father Death does his utmost" to create vacancies,¹⁰⁰ a French-speaking Swiss complained to his parents in 1859 as follows: "but as for advancement there is little chance here. You have to know Dutch to be a corporal, and it is a hellish language for us French to learn; Javanese is easier for us."¹⁰¹ Compared to the French- and Italian-speaking Swiss, those with German as their mother tongue certainly enjoyed an advantage since German and Dutch are closely related languages.

Nonetheless, the Swiss hardly ever became officers in the course of the second half of the nineteenth, as the *koloniale verslagen* (colonial reports) reveal. According to the statistics listed there, the Dutch were overrepresented among the officers. In 1870, for example, out of 1,264 officers, 89 per cent were Dutch or so-called "*blanken*" ("whites" who were born in the Dutch East Indies). Among the regular troops, their share was only 69 per cent. By comparison, in the same year, the Swiss made up about 11 per cent of the rank-and-file soldiers but only 0.004 per cent (n=5) of officers.¹⁰² Although some Swiss had themselves naturalised as Dutch when they were appointed officers (between 1872 and 1874, this was even compulsory),¹⁰³ this hardly explains the discrepancy. Besides the language barrier, nationalistic preferences probably also played a role in filling vacant posts.

On the second-highest level of the hierarchy were the African troops, who were initially called—among other names—“*onze Zwitsers uit Ashanti*” (our Swiss from Ashanti) or “*belanda hitam*” (Black Dutch).¹⁰⁴ That category involved people recruited or abducted from the former Dutch colonies in Africa and their descendants born out of relationships with Asian women. Officially, they had the same legal status as Europeans but were provided with inferior equipment. In addition, it is questionable whether their legal status protected them from racial discrimination.¹⁰⁵ For instance, in various narratives, Swiss mercenaries portrayed them using stereotypical attributes such as vigorous fighters.¹⁰⁶

In third place ranked the so-called “*Amboinezen*” (Ambonese). Since the island of Ambon was already Christianised during the VOC period, Ambonese soldiers were considered more loyal and better educated than the mostly Muslim Javanese. Furthermore, following transimperial colonial military discourses of the nineteenth century, such as the “martial race” of the Sikh, European officers increasingly emphasised the Ambonenses’ alleged “martial skills”. Thus, they enjoyed higher remuneration and additional privileges. Nevertheless, this category was entirely artificial. In practice, it was a multi-ethnic category, including soldiers from other regions such as Menado (northern Sulawesi), Ternate, Timor or the Kei Islands. Moreover, the “Ambonese” played a numerically marginal role until 1872. By then, only 848 men were assigned to this category. The onset of the Aceh War, however, intensified recruitment on the Moluccas and Celebes (Sulawesi), leading to an increase to 4,249 by 1904. This equated to almost 12 per cent of the total strength of the army.¹⁰⁷

At the bottom of the hierarchy were the so-called “*Andere Inlanders*” (“other indigenous”), of which the majority originated from the densely populated and poor areas of Central Java.¹⁰⁸ The spectrum of reactions from Swiss mercenaries who encountered them ranged from pity to contempt drenched in racism. Mercenary Rellstab, for instance, told his parents that the Javanese soldiers were “treated as miserable slaves”.¹⁰⁹ In an impudent manner, Edwin Eckert, on the other hand, described to his audience how he refused the order of a Javanese Corporal “since a native is not at all authorised to command a European soldier”.¹¹⁰ And with regard to the revolt of Bantem in 1888, mercenary Schmid initially doubted that the Javanese soldiers would side with the Dutch in case of emergency. Nevertheless, when it came to a battle, they fought faithfully shoulder to shoulder.¹¹¹ Such racist scepticism was not atypical at the time, as officers had systematically spread it since the 1840s. It was not until the military successes of the mixed unit called *Mareechausee*, composed mainly of Javanese and “Ambonese” soldiers, that their reputation rose again at the turn of the century.¹¹²

In addition to these troops, non-combatant units primarily comprised of Javanese or Chinese indentured labourers existed. They were deployed for the

construction and maintenance of roads, kitchen service and material transport—they had to carry loads between 20 and 25 kilos. Overall, they faced a brutal fate: strenuous work, inadequate medical care, and draconian punishments. Paul van t’Veer estimates that 25,000 “coolies” died in the Aceh War. Nevertheless, they were not always entirely at the mercy of the colonial authorities; there were also forms of resistance, such as desertion. In the Bali War of 1868, for example, approximately 1,500 porters fled.¹¹³ In the Swiss sources, they rarely appear, and when they do, they are mentioned only marginally, for instance, as porters. Humberstet, for example, noted how 51 out of 175 “coolies” had already fled after the first day of an expedition during the Borneo War in 1861.¹¹⁴ Sometimes, however, “coolies” voluntarily sought proximity to the military to earn money. Their presence triggered different reactions. In 1909, for example, Brandenberger was not delighted that his comrades on a manoeuvre had their luggage carried by “coolies” who came along for 15 cents per day. In his opinion, not carrying his luggage was unmilitary, as military skills could not be thoroughly practised, and it also annoyed those soldiers who did not hire indigenous workers.¹¹⁵ Furthermore, the Swiss came into contact with “coolies” during infrastructure work. Recounting his career as a painter for the *genie corps* in the 1890s, Camenzind states that he sometimes had to supervise 100–200 “coolies”.¹¹⁶

Daily Routine: Monotony, Discipline, and Diseases

Coming from Europe, the troops disembarked in Batavia (Jakarta), later also in Padang, where they attended two months of the military training school and were “acclimatised”.¹¹⁷ After being distributed to the garrisons throughout the archipelago, they quickly became acquainted with the barracks’ monotonous and disciplinary daily routine.¹¹⁸ Duty usually commenced at six and lasted until ten or twelve o’clock. A break followed lunch until four o’clock. The recruits then exercised for another hour and a half, whereas the others had the rest of the day off. Finally, they all had to rejoin the dormitories at eight or half past nine in the evening.¹¹⁹ As a result, the soldiers had a lot of leisure time. However, because they were isolated from civilian society, they had few opportunities to distract themselves. For example, some mercenaries, such as Brandenberger or Egloff, used their free time writing letters and reading Swiss newspapers sent to them by their families. Nonetheless, Brandenberger also struggled with boredom, and he once apologised to his parents for not having written for a long time: “Not for lack of time, but for lack of news,” as he explained.¹²⁰ Similarly, Egloff confessed to his parents that he “cannot write anything exciting”.¹²¹

Besides writing letters, Egloff used his leisure time to hone the artistic career denied to him in Switzerland, creating several booklets and drawings. Although




Figure 5: A pencil drawing of the barracks in Malang by Arnold Egloff, 1893. SSA, Ar 201.303.

his superiors forbade him to draw plans and views of the compound, he continued working on them secretly and sent them to Switzerland, as exemplified by *figure 5*.¹²² The barracks are depicted from a bird's eye in the middle of the drawing. Referring to the typical *additive veduta-design* of tourism postcards at the time, twelve smaller close-ups are arranged around the oval section. The close-ups depict dormitories, washrooms, music halls, canteens, combat exercises, and Egloff's self-portrait.¹²³

Indeed, Brandenberger and Egloff were exceptions. Most of the colonial soldiers hardly knew how to occupy themselves,¹²⁴ and according to Zehnder, apart from the canteen, there was no entertainment, "with which one could have scared away the dull thoughts".¹²⁵ Consequently, the majority of Europeans preferred to relieve their sadness and boredom with *jenever* (Dutch Gin).¹²⁶ Although this drink had the reputation of being much more "toxic" than beer or wine, it was nevertheless their most popular drink, as the soldiers simply could not afford the latter.¹²⁷ In 1850, Dutch medical doctor P. Bleeker estimated that European colonial soldiers drank, on average, a quarter of a litre of this spirit per day.¹²⁸

The soldiers' intemperance worried the army leadership, primarily because they feared it would diminish their fighting strength and Dutch prestige in the eyes of the indigenous population.¹²⁹ So why did the army command tolerate it? A glimpse at British India may shed light on this issue. Historian Erica Wald contends that for most contemporary British officials, drunkenness was not considered a problem of the individual soldier but of soldiery in general. In doing so, the officials denied soldiers their agency to actively choose to drink. Drunkenness was thus a "natural" vice of military masculinity that had to be given some leeway within an orderly framework.¹³⁰

In the Dutch East Indies, too, the disciplinary framework was firmly delineated, and even minor transgressions were severely sanctioned.¹³¹ Zehnder, for instance, had to march back and forth for an hour in the barracks yard because he did not understand the orders his superior gave in Dutch.¹³² Eckert was detained for three days for asking a Swiss mercenary, who had been arrested three days earlier, if he needed fresh laundry.¹³³ Schmid also lists several other minor offences, including failing to attend roll call, sleeping on guard in peacetime, fighting, and drunkenness. The soldiers were punished with four to fourteen days of "*provoost*" (military jail) for these offences. This involved confinement to a cell, where the soldiers were given only tiny portions of rice and water to torment them through near-starvation. In some cases, their hands and feet were tied with a short chain for twenty-four hours, so they could not stand upright.¹³⁴

Even illness did not protect against punishment, as Humberstet experienced first-hand in 1862. Plagued by fever, he marched four to five minutes behind his squad. The day after, he received orders to march back and forth in front of the *Benteng* (fortified village) for seven hours as a penalty for his delay. When he

objected that this was unjust, he was punished with four days *provoost*. While Humberst survived the punishment, his compatriot Bollinger, who was also sentenced to *provoost* for being late, suffered a different fate and starved to death in a chicken coop that had been turned into a prison cell.¹³⁵

This disciplinary practice of depriving imprisoned soldiers of food was still used in the first decade of the twentieth century, as a letter from Brandenberger attests. Still, according to his description, *provoost* was only the fourth most severe of seven types of punishment. It was followed by eight days of solitary confinement in chains, called *cachot*, and then demotion to second-class soldier. This demotion lasted four months, which did not count as time served and would start all over again in the event of a repeat offence. The harshest punishment, however, included the transfer to the penal detachment in Klatten (Java), which “very few survived”, as Brandenberger claimed.¹³⁶ Schmid, too, asserted that he could understand those soldiers “who put a bullet through their heads before being transferred”, as corporal punishment was common practice in these places.¹³⁷ Friedrich Wilhelm Dutoit’s case proves that these depictions were not exaggerated. Having served his sentence for repeated drunkenness and misbehaviour in the 1880s, Dutoit returned from Klatten with a “battered eardrum”.¹³⁸

Wilhelm Eberle provides another sad example of the vicious circle of disciplinary measures into which some soldiers were drawn. In 1882, he, too, was sent to Klatten for persistent indiscipline. When the captain there ordered to cane him twenty times for disrespect, Eberle punched him in the face. From the military authorities’ vantage point, attacking a commanding officer was a serious offence. They thus sentenced Eberle to death. However, to the officer ranks’ astonishment, the Governor-General pardoned Eberle and converted his sentence to ten years of forced labour.¹³⁹

In addition to boredom and strict discipline, a series of diseases further exacerbated colonial service. Although some soldiers developed resistance to some illnesses over time, dysentery, typhoid, cholera, and beriberi remained a threat throughout their entire sojourn.¹⁴⁰ Shortly after his arrival, Egloff had to spend five months in a hospital, where the caretakers carried him around “like a dead body”, and later on, he suffered repeated bouts of fever.¹⁴¹ Schmid was also hospitalised for six months, as was Camenzind, who even had to be transferred to the military hospital for the seriously ill in Oenarang (Ungaran) because of dysentery. He oscillated between life and death for ten weeks and lost 20 kg of body weight. There, former European soldiers who were considered unfit for active service took care of him, and Camenzind believed he would have died if it had not been for a male Swiss nurse who took great care of him.¹⁴²

In general, it seems that male nurses were far more popular with the soldiers than doctors were. Humberst, for instance, was enraged that his health was

entrusted to a young doctor who had no medical knowledge at all.¹⁴³ Brandenberger railed against the doctors' abilities in several letters, comparing them to barbers and opining that they could not treat sick people.¹⁴⁴ Similarly, Schmid mentioned the doctors' helplessness in curing high fevers by putting the patient in a bathtub filled with icy water. Apparently, a few patients had died during this procedure.¹⁴⁵ Schmid also remarked that he was only cured of beriberi because a Javanese nurse, who had previously served as a sergeant in the same garrison as Schmid, secretly gave him "petroleum" to drink. The doctors were not supposed to know about this treatment, since "they would have made fun of it".¹⁴⁶ This illustrates the distrust prevailing between an ordinary mercenary and his doctors.¹⁴⁷ This lack of trust was by no means specific to the KNIL. Similarly, European soldiers in British India at the time tried to evade European surgeons, preferring to seek advice from local medical practitioners.¹⁴⁸

Although various medical innovations such as quinine led to a significant decrease in mortality for military personnel in the second half of the nineteenth century,¹⁴⁹ thousands of Swiss lost their lives in the Dutch East Indies. Referring to fever and diseases in the colonies, Rellstab told his parents in 1860 that "out of a transport of 100 men leaving Europe, at most 10 were counted returning to Europe".¹⁵⁰ There is no doubt that this statement was grossly exaggerated. Of the 3,267 Swiss who joined the KNIL between 1848 and 1860, 1,581 passed away (= 48 per cent), and in the following decade, 487 out of 1,056 (= 46 per cent) perished. In total, of the 5,352 Swiss mercenaries who enlisted with the KNIL from 1848 to 1885, 2488 (= 46 per cent) died.¹⁵¹

Disappointment and Insubordination

Many mercenaries' erstwhile ideas, dreams, and expectations evaporated against this backdrop of boredom, discipline, and diseases.¹⁵² Physically and psychologically shaken by his time in Borneo (Kalimantan), Humberset jotted in his diary: "Five years since the embarkation! What suffering, what humiliation! One more year. Courage!"¹⁵³ Maria Hänni-Rhyn approached the Bernese authorities seeking help, as her son had already written to her twice from the Dutch East Indies, asking her to arrange his release.¹⁵⁴ Johann Gottfried Gerber, to give another example, bitterly regretted "the step he took out of recklessness" and wished to return. However, this was only possible if the soldiers bought themselves out of their contract for the vast fee of about 1,400 guilders and—in addition to that—provided a substitute who would have served out the rest of his term. An acquaintance of the family had even agreed to bear the buyout costs, but the offer came too late. Gerber died in Weltevreden (nowadays Jakarta Pusat) before his journey back home could be organised.¹⁵⁵ According to the Swiss Consul in Batavia, these were not isolated

cases. Reporting to the Federal Council in 1871, he remarked that he had met only a few Swiss soldiers who did not regret their decision.¹⁵⁶ Likewise, Swiss doctor Elias Hafer reported that the Swiss soldiers he had encountered during a stopover in Java gave him the impression of being “unfortunately sold”, fraught with “bitter disappointment” and “painful remorse”.¹⁵⁷

Admittedly, there were also some Swiss who raved to their relatives about the advantages of the service. For example, Schmid reported from the front line in Aceh how he enjoyed a happy and carefree camp life with many Swiss people, playing cards, listening to music and drinking. Nevertheless, this account seems more intended to impress his readers in Switzerland than to reflect everyday life, as he added in a wildly exaggerated tone: “Sporadically, scattered bullets flew overhead, but they were just about as unnoticed as, say, the buzzing of a mosquito.”¹⁵⁸ In a similar vein, Egloff enthused his parents: “I cannot really complain about the service because I have it as nice as a prince.”¹⁵⁹ Likewise, Rellstab told his parents he and his friend Haab could “lead a splendid life, better than that of the labourers in Europe” after joining the military administration as a bookbinder.¹⁶⁰ Whether Egloff and Rellstab did this to calm their relatives, who had expressed their concerns and fears based on various rumours and news, or whether they really thought this way could not be determined from the letters.

In any case, there is much to suggest that plenty of the Swiss were discontent. A considerable number of Swiss mercenaries—scattered references in the *stamboeken* point to 20—felt so lost, lonely or depressed that they committed suicide. Louis Fridolin Weber, for example, shot himself in the head.¹⁶¹ Albert Schär, whose corpse was found in the forest of Weltevreden, is said to have told his comrade before his disappearance that if he died, he would die as an adjutant sergeant. Due to debts and alcohol abuse, Schär was threatened with demotion, which he allegedly did not want to accept.¹⁶² Furthermore, Humberstet noted briefly in his diary under the entry for July 1860: “Suicide of Martin, [from the canton of] Vaud.”¹⁶³

Those who did not commit suicide despite depression and dissatisfaction resorted to different coping strategies, such as excessive drinking. The exchange with compatriots provided further consolation against homesickness. For instance, a Swiss mercenary vividly recounted how he and a dozen other French-speaking Swiss toasted their parents’ health with *arak* and chanted patriotic songs after receiving mail from Switzerland.¹⁶⁴

Since such entertainment was relatively short-lived, a few mercenaries tried to escape their misery through desertion. However, that was easier said than done. Stuck on an island far from Europe, one could not walk home, such as from Harderwijk. Thus, more creative solutions were required. Eckert and three of his comrades succeeded by hiding on a German steamer that made a stopover on the northwest coast of Sumatra on its way to Saigon.¹⁶⁵ Another Swiss mercenary,

J. Schreier from Bern, evaded Dutch control by switching sides during the Aceh War.¹⁶⁶ He was not the only one. As a commentary in the *Indisch Militair Tijdschrift* noted, the Acehnese were able to recruit at least 38 Europeans from the KNIL. According to the author, however, their fate was terrible. Many died of disease or were recaptured and executed by Dutch troops.¹⁶⁷ Nonetheless, most attempts at desertion failed. Convinced that he could escape to Australia, Zehnder embarked on the wrong boat, which called at other Dutch ports instead. The crew immediately handed him back to the Dutch authorities, and he was punished for his short excursion with five months of detention.¹⁶⁸ Zehnder got off comparatively lightly, as illustrated by the fate of two Swiss, Johann Pfister and Gustav Schmidt, who were sentenced to two years of forced labour for participating in a plot to desert.¹⁶⁹

Occasionally, tensions erupted directly between the soldiers and their superiors. The Luxembourger August Kohl, for example, recounted that a Swiss soldier complained loudly to his captain about the reduced food rations and the low pay. When his superior replied that he had no right to complain, the Swiss threw a pot of soup at the captain's feet so that the soup splashed all over his face.¹⁷⁰ One of the few Swiss officers, Captain Georg Vogel, died because a soldier shot him in the back during a roll call. The soldier mentioned two "corrections" that Vogel had inflicted on him due to drunkenness as a motive for his crime.¹⁷¹

Alongside these uncoordinated outbreaks of disobedience, collective insubordination also emerged. In 1860, in particular, dissatisfaction among the thousands of Swiss who had joined the KNIL in the previous five years grew to such an extent that they plotted several mutinies.¹⁷² Headed by the Swiss mercenary Jean Samuel Borgeaud—a disappointed scion of a noble family who had hoped in vain to advance quickly in the KNIL¹⁷³—around 50 soldiers attempted a rebellion in January at the Vredeburg barracks near Yogyakarta. However, the mutiny failed before it had begun, as a Swiss named Landry had warned his superiors. The troublemakers were arrested and interrogated. During the interrogations, they claimed different goals. Some wanted to make their way to the coast and escape to Australia on the next ship. Others said they tried to contact France and England so that one of these colonial powers would take control of the colony. Still others apparently intended to free the penal detachment in Klatten and join a Javanese prince. This rumour was fuelled by Borgeaud being arrested at the home of a noble Javanese near Soerakarta (Surakarta).¹⁷⁴

The next serious incident occurred in June of the same year. When five Swiss deserters from the barracks of Weltevreden were stopped at a police checkpoint, they shot two police officers and a civilian. Their escape subsequently ended with their arrest in Batavia.¹⁷⁵ These outbreaks of resistance, however, were only a foretaste of what was to follow, for the army command failed to interpret them as a sign of discontent and to do anything to improve service conditions.

As Andreas Zangger has shown, a few Swiss mercenaries founded a singing club in Fort Willem I, Java, in the same year, which they named Grütli in allusion to Switzerland's alleged mediaeval founding place. The club—that, according to Dutch officers, consisted of awful singers—served merely as a cover for conspiratorial meetings. However, here, too, the superiors noticed the activities before the mutineers could strike, and twenty Europeans were arrested. To calm the situation, four companies were transferred to Willem I. Three of these companies arrived from Samarang, where the subsequent uprising was already brewing. Although an insider once again was able to inform the army command in advance, a shootout occurred in the barracks during the night of 17 to 18 August, 1860, between Swiss, French, Belgian and German insurgents and mostly “Ambonese” soldiers, who were supported by a militia. According to official statements, the uprising resulted in six dead and eleven wounded. The loyal troops were able to overwhelm the mostly Swiss revolutionaries, and the rebellion had been suppressed by the following morning.¹⁷⁶

Haab, who—although in the barracks at the time—was as surprised by the mutiny as the Dutch, reported how the European soldiers had to remain unarmed in their rooms for the following two weeks. On 1 September, 1860, they had to march under the strict guard of four “Ambonese” companies to the place of execution, where the sentences were pronounced and carried out. In addition to several minor sentences, two Swiss were condemned to ten years of forced labour. Seven Swiss and two French were sentenced to death on the gallows. In front of everyone present, Javanese executioners immediately carried out the death sentences.¹⁷⁷ For the Swiss, this was a shocking sight. Writing to his parents just a few days after the execution, Rellstab remarked: “To see nine men hanged next to each other like that is a terribly frightening example for the rest of us.”¹⁷⁸ Looking back on the event more than fifty years later, Haab stated that he would never forget the sight for the rest of his life.¹⁷⁹

The mutinies had the potential to damage Dutch prestige severely and significantly alter the further course of the colony.¹⁸⁰ Accordingly, the Dutch authorities drew consequences. To the chagrin of the Swiss mercenaries, they distributed the Swiss who had already been recruited among various garrisons across the archipelago and refrained from taking on new Swiss volunteers. Although rumours of Swiss plots continued to circulate in the following decades, mutinies on this scale did not occur again.¹⁸¹ Nonetheless, the history of the insurgencies reveals another vital point. In this crisis, the Dutch authorities were forced to suspend the principle of the racial dividend for a short time. The mutineers no longer benefitted from their “white” status, since they were captured and executed by the indigenous troops commanded by the Dutch officers.¹⁸² However, as the following section will show, the Swiss mercenaries were not only victims of military discipline but also promoted the expansion of a violent colonial state.

Military Violence

Throughout the nineteenth century, Dutch colonial expansion in the Malay Archipelago was characterised by the application of military violence—or at least the threat thereof—aiming to establish a “state of violence”, as Dutch Historian Henk Schulte Nordholt has called it.¹⁸³ According to rough estimates, this colonial state formation cost the lives of around 375,000 Southeast Asians in the course of the nineteenth century.¹⁸⁴ Even if the military tactics changed in the course of the colonial conquests from attacks in large units to counter-insurgency operations in small mobile columns, military campaigns were always accompanied by “extreme violence” such as atrocities against the civilian population, executions of prisoners or torching of entire fields and villages.¹⁸⁵ At first glance, this may seem to contrast with the discourses on “humanitarian warfare” conducted in Europe at the time. Still, it followed the colonial logic of European colonial powers such as Britain, Germany and France. For most Europeans, it was apparent that these debates only related to wars between “civilised nations” and not colonial wars against supposedly “savage peoples”. This racial discrepancy can be partly traced to the colonial armies’ incapacity to distinguish civilians from enemy resistance fighters.¹⁸⁶ Moreover, the fact that thousands of women also fought as an integral part of the resistance in the Dutch East Indies additionally challenged male European concepts of warfare, according to which war was only fought among men.¹⁸⁷

Admittedly, this violence was never “purely” Dutch since—as already mentioned above—the majority of the KNIL consisted of “*Inlanders*” and non-Dutch European mercenaries.¹⁸⁸ Thus, it goes without saying that Swiss mercenaries contributed in various manners to the maintenance and proliferation of a colonial regime of awe, fear, and violence. Jean Aimé Theodore Humberstet, for example, mentioned in his diary how his unit burned down several villages during the war against the sultanate of Banjarmasin in southern Borneo, between 1859 and 1863.¹⁸⁹ And reporting on the battles in the Aceh War, Karl Schmid states the following in his memoirs: “Having reached the first hill, we were confronted with a sad scenery. As far as the eye could see, all the *kampongs* (villages) were in flames.”¹⁹⁰ Whether Schmid was sincerely sad or whether it was merely a rhetorical element cannot be judged from today’s point of view. Doubts remain, however, since only a few pages earlier, he praised the courage of a compatriot who sneaked behind enemy lines and set fire to a village.¹⁹¹

In addition to these arsons, the sources also mention other forms of physical violence. Publishing an anonymous letter written by a mercenary from western Switzerland in 1859, the *Gazette de Lausanne* provided an insight into a battle during the Second Bone War (1859–1860) in southern Celebes as follows:

There, it was a real butchery: we walked in blood and corpses up to our knees. In this melee, my two Baudet countrymen were killed on the spot. As for me, I have already told you about this rage that carries me away like a furious tiger: all that is in front of me falls under my blows.¹⁹²

In the eyes of the mercenary, there was no place for mercy. Thus, he went on to describe how they attacked an enemy camp a few days later and burned everything to the ground, sparing no one. He justified these violent excesses by referring to the ferocity of the “savages”. For example, the enemy forces kidnapped a corporal, killed him, and impaled his head on a bamboo stick. Appalled, the author stated: “the pen refuses to recount what they do to a European who is found in their hands.”¹⁹³ As mentioned earlier, such justification strategies were by no means unique. Instead, they followed the legitimization discourses of the time, according to which so-called “humanitarian warfare” was only possible between “civilised” nations, not with “savage” peoples.¹⁹⁴ As Humberst’s diary proves, the KNIL resorted to comparable forms of retaliation. Capturing his experiences of the Borneo War (1859–1863), Humberst noted how a KNIL patrol decapitated the enemies’ dead bodies and impaled their heads on bamboo.¹⁹⁵ Swiss mercenary Emil Häfeli provides additional insight into Swiss excesses of violence. Writing to the parents of his comrade who had been fatally wounded during the Lombok War (1894), he assured them:

Many of our comrades died or were wounded, but I assure you that our comrades who died in the raid, as well as those who died an honourable death on the battlefield in the ensuing battles, have been bloodily avenged. Thousands of enemies have been killed, their houses and other possessions have gone up in flames, the Rajah of Lombok has been captured, and most of the enemy leaders have been transported to another world. To your question about whether many Swiss were involved in the war, I must answer affirmatively, and as far as I know, 2 fell, about 5 were wounded, and some died of diseases of the Indian kind.¹⁹⁶

Häfeli’s blunt portrayal of violence not only represents the single view of an ordinary soldier but reflects a common conviction among the KNIL military. For instance, the later Minister of the Colonies and Governor-General Hendrik Colijn, who took part in this campaign as an officer, also openly described the excesses of violence to his wife:

The enemy now, since they did not see any escape, devoted itself to death. Up till eight times, they attacked my company with lances lowered down. Even young beautiful women with infants on the arm joined in the battle [...] after the eight attacks, only few remained, who asked for mercy, I believe thirteen. The soldiers looked at me requesting for permission [...] I turned around to light a cigar. A few heartbreaking cries sounded and when I turned around again the thirteen were also dead.¹⁹⁷

According to historian Vincent Houben, several points emerge from Colijn's letter. Firstly, he highlighted the contrast between the peaceful life at home and the dangerous colonial frontier. Secondly, he implied that there was no alternative to the execution of the thirteen Balinese since the campaign was carried out to avenge the defeat known as the Lombok Betrayal, which had caused a storm of indignation in the Netherlands, and to restore Dutch prestige through military prowess. During this campaign, about 2,000 Balinese died, a large part of them because they committed *puputan*, a decisive battle resulting in ritual mass suicide.¹⁹⁸

Excessive military violence was an integral part of warfare. Against this background one Swiss mercenary gained a particularly notorious reputation that needs to be addressed in depth: Hans Christoffel (1865–1962). During the 1904 campaigns in Sumatra's mountainous hinterland, in which the KNIL killed an estimated 5–12 per cent of the indigenous Gajo and 20 per cent of the Alas population,¹⁹⁹ Christoffel distinguished himself in the eyes of his superiors to such an extent that he was appointed captain of a special unit in 1905, called "*colon matjan*" ("tiger column"). Composed of indigenous soldiers and European officers, this unit was deployed whenever a local community in the Malay Archipelago refused to accept the formal Dutch claim to sovereignty. Christoffel and his men pursued these groups in small, mobile units—until their surrender or death.²⁰⁰ These campaigns thus bore witness to rigorous violence. For instance, on a three-month expedition to the island of Flores in 1907, his troops killed 795 people.²⁰¹

Yet, as historian Marie Muschalek convincingly argues, colonial state violence was more than just warfare and excessive force; but also included "unspectacular" forms of violence that were an inherent part of the quotidian governing practice and, therefore, can hardly be found in the archives.²⁰² Policing actions are a prime example of such violence. Camenzind, for instance, remarked that European plantation owners were very pleased every time the military passed by, as the "coolies" were then "much more willing to work".²⁰³ These "coolies" were usually indentured labourers hired in China or Java. Once they arrived on the plantations, they had to refund the travel expenses, but this was often not possible because of harsh working conditions, unfair pay, and the poverty-inducing habits of gambling and opium consumption. Consequently, many of them ended up in a web of financial dependencies, exploited and objectified by the plantation owners.²⁰⁴ Thus, widespread knowledge of the military and police presence was most of the time sufficient to keep the exploitative plantations going. However, if the indentured labourers ever openly resisted, the Dutch colonial authorities quickly deployed troops to restore colonial order—by force of arms if necessary, as they feared that a riot could spread to other plantations and undermine the power of the colonial state.²⁰⁵ Witnessing such violent repression, Camenzind reported that entire companies were sent out to the plantations "to restore order and take the troublemakers to prison".²⁰⁶ We do

not know precisely what Camenzind thought of such repression. Nevertheless, we can assume that he shared the European understanding of violence of his time and thus had little empathy for contractors, whose situation he did not discuss further. Instead, he focused on the plantation owners, “who are all rich Europeans and have large factories and extensive estates and many coolies” and thanked the European soldiers by serving them free *genever*.²⁰⁷

Thus, many men of the European underclass, who had often been victims of violence and oppression at home, transformed into violent perpetrators—or at least into their facilitators—within this colonial setting. Finally, it must be mentioned that military life, beyond violence and discipline, was marked by intimacy and sexuality, as the following section illustrates.

Intimacy & Sexuality in the Barracks

To the astonishment of many European mercenaries, the barracks accommodated not only men but also women and children.²⁰⁸ The reasons for this unfamiliar sight were twofold. First, indigenous soldiers could usually solely be recruited on the condition that they were allowed to start a family. The second reason—which is more notable against the backdrop of Swiss mercenaries—was that the army headquarters also allowed European non-commissioned officers and soldiers to live with a female “housekeeper” of Asian or Indo-European descent, known as *nyai*, who cooked, cleaned and served sexually for unmarried Europeans.²⁰⁹

Even though many contemporary observers condemned such extramarital relationships, the barracks were not a place beyond sexual norms. On the contrary, like in the British Empire, sex was a significant political issue that recurrently aroused colonial anxieties and needed regulating and managing.²¹⁰ Thus, as Ulbe Bosma and Remco Raben have argued, the practice of concubinage spread in the Malay Archipelago from the seventeenth century onwards, not because it was a cultural practice but rather because marriage was subject to stricter legal obligations.²¹¹ This also applied to the military sphere, where a soldier needed the permission of his superiors to marry. Concubinage, on the other hand, was officially tolerated from 1836 onwards without any significant restrictions—and was therefore also practised on a large scale, as several inquiries among European military personnel regularly commissioned by the colonial government from the late 1880s onwards reveal. In 1888, for instance, out of 13,000 European soldiers, 2,930 were cohabitating, and 147 were married.²¹²

Although Christian and socialist circles repeatedly condemned barracks concubinage—they considered cohabitation immoral or a source of poverty in the colonies—the KNIL headquarters staff was convinced of its benefits for a long time.²¹³ From the command’s vantage point, *nyais* substantially contributed to the

Dutch fighting strength. They provided companionship for socially isolated soldiers while helping them avoid venereal disease, drunkenness and inter-male sexual relations.²¹⁴ In addition, the concubines cost the army much less than wives since married couples had to be provided with their dwelling and the wife received financial compensation in the event of the husband's death. Unmarried women, on the other hand, had no rights at all. From one day to the next, the soldiers could expel them along with their joint children from the cantonments, or if they returned to Europe, they could do so without providing any financial support for the *nyais* and their offspring. However, as the importance of the KNIL diminished with the completion of the so-called *afroding* (see chapter 2), these arguments concerning the fighting strength became less relevant, and barrack concubinage was finally abolished in 1913.²¹⁵

Unfortunately, we are unaware of any sources written by a *nyai* providing insight into their thoughts, motives and emotional life.²¹⁶ The fact, however, that the *nyais* submitted to these forms of exploitation highlights their socially deprived background. In all likelihood, the vast majority of these women entered the military sphere at the age of twelve or fourteen for lack of alternatives. Most originated from the impoverished Javanese lower strata or had grown up as children of soldiers and concubines in the barracks.²¹⁷ To ensure their economic survival, they pursued various strategies within their limited scope of agency, such as expressing or withholding affection towards the soldiers. Needless to say, many members of the KNIL did not appreciate such autonomous action. Brandenberger, for example, was upset that the *nyais* in his garrison kept up to six men at a time.²¹⁸ In a similar vein, Arnold Egloff complained that a *nyai* was “like a cat” as she “did not remain faithful” and “only loved money, but not the man who would give it”.²¹⁹ And Augustin Zehnder noted that the mothers taught their daughters “all secrets of women’s virtues and sometimes also vices”.²²⁰

Despite these pejorative portrayals of *nyais* addressed to a European audience, several Swiss entered into a transcultural relationship with them. Reminiscing about his time in the Dutch East Indies, Carl August Haab, for instance, mentioned that he bought a house and that a Javanese woman cooked for him. Only a short time later, however, he sold the house again because “the maid was dirty and the food was not good”.²²¹ Haab’s account does not reveal the precise nature of the relationship with this anonymous woman. However, some clues suggest that there was more to it than that. For one, as we know from other colonial contexts, it was common to refer to the concubine merely as a “housekeeper”.²²² For another, considering the conservative moral ideas circulating within his village community, where concubinage had been banned until the 1970s, it seems obvious why Haab did not want to dwell on this point.²²³ Conversely, the aforementioned Heinrich Brandenberger was surprisingly candid about his sexual relationships. Writing to

his family in Switzerland, he stated that he had been “married” to four different “Indian women” within seven weeks.

After these brief and disappointing relationships, Brandenberger finally met the Javanese *nyai* Sampet, whom he married in 1911 (in order for them to marry, she was christened Lina).²²⁴ In 1920, they moved to Switzerland, where they lived together until Lina Sampet Brandenberger died in 1960. Anton Camenzind, who worked as a painter with the *Genie Corps*, provides another vivid example. In the 1890s, he met his wife Maria Narbertina Wullschleger through a Swiss connection: her father was a retired Swiss mercenary who settled in Tana-Nojah with a Javanese woman. Camenzind visited the Wullschleger family regularly and “felt attracted to the daughter”.²²⁵ Although many colleagues allegedly advised him against entering into a serious relationship with a “*nona*” (“half-European”), he married her when she was fifteen—the usual marriage age at the time.²²⁶ According to Camenzind’s account, the marriage was peaceful at first, but soon they started to quarrel frequently, and Maria Narbertina once even went after him with a dagger. Her father subsequently had to mediate between the two, so their marriage continued. After two years, the marriage ultimately came to an unfortunate end: Maria Narbertina died after giving birth to their second child.²²⁷ Camenzind’s and Brandenberger’s marriages were rather an exception, as usually only those soldiers with additional income could afford to live with a *nyai*. The less well-off soldiers had to satisfy their sexual desire by visiting a brothel.²²⁸

Even though the line between concubinage and professional prostitution was blurred in certain accounts, the two should not be equated.²²⁹ Whereas concubines lived within the cantonments, where they performed essential tasks beyond sexual services, prostitutes worked in specific brothels in the vicinity of the garrisons. To prevent the spread of venereal diseases, these brothels were reserved for military personnel, and the prostitutes had to be regularly examined by a doctor.²³⁰ As is often the case when it comes to the history of prostitution, the majority of sources come from official agencies. Thus, there are hardly any references to brothels in the reports of the Swiss mercenaries. Solely Brandenberger described how a brothel close to the garrison in Willem I went up in flames in 1906.²³¹ However, there are no mentions of the inner life of such a house.

One consequence of transcultural relations, which also repeatedly attracted the concern of political actors, was the large number of children. Since both father and mother were usually at the bottom of the hierarchy of the Dutch East Indies’ society, the children were subject to constant discrimination from birth. However, as Hanneke Ming elaborates, this group was not homogeneous at all, but divided along axes of differentiation such as legal status or gender. Children legally acknowledged by their fathers were assigned the status of European citizens, which ensured them at least a small degree of attention from European colonial society and additional

privileges such as attending European schools. This also meant that they were separated from their indigenous mother and placed in an orphanage for care if the father shirked his educational duties or died. However, as the 1901 inquiry exposed, around two-thirds of 1,237 children fathered by a European belonged to the group of unacknowledged offspring. These so-called “half-castes” were not recognised as full members of either the indigenous community or European society and remained marginalised.²³²

Another central axis of differentiation was gender. While many of the acknowledged sons were able to go to the *pupilen school* in Gombong, where they were prepared for a life as soldiers, the daughters, after having also received a small amount of schooling, worked like their mothers as domestic staff in the barracks or tried to make a living through prostitution.²³³ When bourgeois moral and civilisational ideals became increasingly influential towards the end of the nineteenth century, the fate of the barrack children not only caused resentment in Dutch circles but was also condemned by a number of Swiss mercenaries such as the deserter Edwin Eckert. Worried about the children’s social environment amidst soldiers, he doubted in 1912 whether they were receiving a proper moral and religious education. In his view, the Dutch colonial state was solely concerned with profit and exploitation and did nothing “for the upliftment of the culture and civilisation of the country”.²³⁴ Augustin Zehnder expressed a similar opinion in 1924, stating that he was shocked “by the crudeness and total indifference of the state authorities” he had encountered in the 1910s.²³⁵

As mentioned above, the army command endorsed concubinage and prostitution, despite strong criticism. One of these reasons hardly mentioned so far was the fear of same-sex liaisons. However, what this category of homosexuality entailed was very confusing for contemporaries.²³⁶ As Robert Aldrich has contended, colonial settings facilitated a vast spectrum of homosocial and homosexual relationships. According to Aldrich, some men were pushed into “situational” homosexuality by gender imbalance. Others probably hoped to live out their homosexuality under less repressive conditions by emigrating to the colonies. An unknown number, including heterosexuals, found emotional satisfaction in inter-male relationships.²³⁷ In line with Aldrich, Christian Koller assumes that this broad spectrum also existed in the French Foreign Legion—although there are hardly any sources addressing this issue openly.²³⁸ Nevertheless, it seems plausible to extend these assumptions to the KNIL, as there are occasional references in the *stamboeken* to convictions for so-called “unnatural fornication”. On 19 August, 1859, for example, the Samarang War Council sentenced the two Swiss Jacob Ingold and Hans Urech to five years “*kruiwagen*” (wheelbarrow; i.e. forced labour) each on charges of “*tegenatuurlijke ontucht*” (unnatural fornication). Unfortunately, we do not know what exactly happened. However, it must have been serious enough for the Dutch

king to reject a petition for pardon submitted by Ingold's father three years later.²³⁹ Nonetheless, inter-male relationships were not always as reciprocal as the case of Ingold and Urech might suggest. François Berard from Geneva, for example, was sentenced to three years "*kruiwagen*" for inciting "unnatural fornication".²⁴⁰ Whether the recipient of Berard's advances reported him or another person cannot be said at this point. Overall, there are few references to homosexual intimacy in the sources. For example, it remains unclear whether such relationships were also secretly fostered across racial boundaries. It, therefore, remains a desideratum to investigate this in depth.

Should One Stay or Should One Go: Life after Service

If the mercenaries had survived their term of six years more or less unscathed, they could apply for another six years (in some cases, an extension of shorter duration was also possible). In 1908, approaching the end of his first term of service, Brandenberger wrestled with his decision for a long time. Finally, he extended his contract because his relatives in Switzerland could not promise him any job prospects and he did not want to burden his parents.²⁴¹ The data collected show that Brandenberger was no exception. Out of 3,072 Swiss who left the colonial service alive, 42 per cent served longer than the initially agreed six years.²⁴² Nonetheless, the proportion of those willing to do a second term increased significantly over the course of the century. Of those mercenaries who joined the KNIL between 1848 and 1860, only 36 per cent of the 1641 Swiss mercenaries re-enlisted. In comparison, the percentage of the cohort that joined between 1871 and 1880 and survived the service (507 mercenaries) was 51 per cent. Several reasons were probably decisive for an extension: lower mortality and morbidity, better service conditions, and the pension reform of 1878, which lowered the retirement age from twenty to twelve years of service.²⁴³ Moreover, specific individuals, such as Humberstet, were in the middle of a campaign at the time when their contracts expired and were therefore forced to stay longer.²⁴⁴ Others took the opportunity to visit relatives in Europe before returning to the KNIL. They had one year if they wanted to re-enlist before their years of service, which entitled them to a pension, expired.

Those who turned their backs on the military for good either led a civilian life in the Dutch East Indies or returned to Europe. Ulbe Bosma estimates that between 1850 and 1919, 24 to 36 per cent of colonial soldiers who survived service remained in the Dutch East Indies.²⁴⁵ Extrapolated to the Swiss, this would mean that of the approximately 2,468 surviving mercenaries, between 480 and 1,000 remained in the Dutch East Indies. Nevertheless, although we do not have concrete figures on the Swiss, it does not seem reasonable to transfer Bosma's figures to the Swiss cohort

for several reasons. First, until 1860 foreign military personnel could only obtain a residence permit under strict conditions (if they had already served for ten years or reached the rank of officer). From 1860 onwards, this regulation was loosened until it was finally abolished altogether in 1871.²⁴⁶ During this period, 47 discharged Swiss mercenaries applied for a residence permit. All were approved (45 permanent, 2 temporary).²⁴⁷ Second, the number of Swiss civilians remained modest even after these easements, as documented by the *koloniaal verslag* (colonial report) of 1891. According to this report, around 183 Swiss men lived in the Dutch East Indies in 1890, including a few merchants or plantation managers without a military background.²⁴⁸ Third, one should bear in mind that the majority of Swiss mercenaries understood themselves as life-cycle migrants. Their sojourn in the Dutch East Indies was supposed to be limited in time, followed by a return to Europe.

Civilian Life in the Indies

Most veterans who settled in the Dutch East Indies were likely to have led rather humble lives since various reports indicate that ex-military lived in poor conditions.²⁴⁹ One reason why some still favoured life in the colonies over a return to Europe may have been that no better fate awaited them in Switzerland; another is that they had already started a family during their service and did not intend to leave it. Sergeant-Major Johann Ludwig Krauer, for example, renounced his journey home in 1889 after fifteen years of service and remained in Batavia supposedly because he had married a widow named Johanna Hup ten years earlier.²⁵⁰ However, it is unknown whether the 340 guilders he received annually as a pension were sufficient to cover his daily expenses or whether he pursued a new occupation.

Gottlieb Wullschleger, the above mentioned Anton Camenzind's father-in-law, provides another example of a Swiss remaining in the Dutch East Indies. After fifteen years of service, in 1889, he settled in Tana Njonja, close to Jatinegara, working as a blacksmith with an annual pension of 238 guilders.²⁵¹ Camenzind mentioned how he coincidentally met Wullschleger, who immediately invited him to his home. Having visited Wullschleger, Camenzind noted that the veteran lived with a Muslim Javanese woman and two children, a son and a daughter, in a small house made of wood and bamboo, surrounded by many trees and beautiful plants. Their son attended a Catholic convent school, and their daughter joined a "working school".²⁵²

Without the benefit of a pension reimbursed by the KNIL, Peter Limacher settled in Batavia in 1856 after merely six years of duty. Why he stayed there and how he initially earned his living is unknown. What is certain, however, is that by the end of 1863, at the latest, he was working at the "General Secretariat", where he earned 150 guilders a month. From this money, he transferred 25 guilders a year to his mother living in the canton of Lucerne.²⁵³ He subsequently changed his

job two more times: in April 1865, he was dismissed as “*onderkommies der eerste klasse*” in Soerabaja (Surabaya) due to illness, but only two months later, he found employment as “*kommies-visitateur bij de recherche en kontrôle*” in Samarang.²⁵⁴ However, as seen from an enquiry sent by his sister to the Swiss federal authorities in 1874, Limacher had already retired in 1872 and withdrawn to Soerabaja “into private life” without informing his siblings in Switzerland.²⁵⁵

Johannes Meyer, too, left the army to work in an office. After the Dutch authorities had enquired about his previous life in Switzerland, he transferred to the colonial administration in 1864.²⁵⁶ (The fact that his father had been a local politician and judge was probably construed to his advantage). Twelve years later, he was living again in his birthplace of Pratteln, canton of Basel-Landschaft. His career as a colonial civil servant paid off. At 472.5 guilders, his annual pension was almost double that of an ordinary mercenary.²⁵⁷

Swiss veteran Heinrich Wieland pursued an even more extraordinary career. Having worked as a mercenary for almost twenty years (three of them in Naples), he was released in 1876 and soon commenced to manage a *pasanggrahan* (government guest house) in the Dieng Plateau, Central Java. In addition to his work as a hotel manager, he introduced new agricultural products earning him a considerable degree of local influence and wealth. The fact that his children married into the Javanese upper class reflects the strength of his local ties. One of his grandsons, Wilhelm Wieland, even became President Soekarno’s technical advisor.²⁵⁸

These individual cases show that Swiss veterans settled in the Dutch East Indies. However, it is difficult to ascertain how many in total and what exactly they did. In most cases, they continued to move on the fringes of bourgeois society, which is why detailed sources on their post-war lives have only survived in exceptional circumstances.

Back to Switzerland

The majority of the surviving Swiss returned to Europe. We know little about what they did after their discharge. Most of them probably obtained a passport from the Swiss Consul in Amsterdam and then disappeared into the anonymous strata of the European working class.²⁵⁹ Although we do not know the exact number, sources from various Swiss archives indicate that countless mercenaries returned to Switzerland,²⁶⁰ where their paths took the most diverse directions. For instance, Camenzind had an offer to supervise the construction of a factory in Batavia at the end of his term, and he considered accepting it because he was apprehensive about travelling to Europe with his two-year-old daughter. (As mentioned above, his wife, Maria Narbertina Wullschleger, had died after giving birth to their second child. The child also passed away shortly after that.) However, as the start of construction

was delayed, he decided to go to Switzerland—much to the regret of his parents-in-law. The latter were infuriated that he did not leave the daughter with them in the *kampong*. Camenzind's daughter “got another and better mother” in Switzerland and attended school.²⁶¹ After the World War I turmoil, Brandenberger, too, eventually returned in 1920 with his wife and three children to reunite with his parents and siblings and provide his children with a better education. Until his retirement in 1947, he worked at a hardware store. Together with Lina Sampet, he lived in a small typical Swiss flat in an urban conurbation, as is apparent from the small balcony and the sun blinds in *figure 7*. His marriage to Lina Sampet lasted until she died in 1960.²⁶² As her obituary reveals, this relocation was the beginning of

a series of long-lasting trials and psychological stresses, as it was necessary to put down new roots in a world that was completely different in terms of climate, culture and society, to overcome linguistic difficulties and, last but not least, to overcome the prejudices of a harsh environment.²⁶³

Unfortunately, we do not know Lina Sampet's experience first-hand. Generally, we know very little about how women and children from the Dutch East Indies coped after resettling with the mercenaries in Switzerland. Chapter 5 shall revisit how such colonialist racist thought patterns circulated and led to discriminatory everyday structures even in a country without formal colonial possessions. However, for now, it will suffice to refer to this obituary, which reveals that Lina Sampet had to struggle with such prejudices on the part of Swiss society.

In any case, most mercenaries returned to Switzerland without families like Haab. His goal of avoiding an economic crisis as a life cycle migrant worked out seamlessly for him. Immediately after he arrived in Switzerland, he found a job as a bookbinder. Two years later, he established his bookbinding and printing business, which still exists today as a stationery store.²⁶⁴ Humberst became an accountant and ran an investment agency. Furthermore, he married three times, leaving all these marriages as a widower.²⁶⁵ Schmid lived as a “humble labourer” in his home town Olten.²⁶⁶ Due to his experience as a nurse in the military hospital, Hans Adolf von Känel got a job at the surgical clinic in Bern. However, his new position aroused the covetousness of his relatives. Dismayed, he addressed the Dutch Consul with the following words:

Since I have been occupying a rather lucrative position here in Bern, my mother and brothers, and sisters have been giving me no peace and trying to squeeze everything out of me as much as possible. Last winter, I was still quite strongly fooled by my brother, so that I see that I am getting nowhere here in spite of all the work I do and have therefore decided, if it were possible, to enlist in the Dutch army again as an orderly, or operations and section officer.²⁶⁷

Whether his request was granted is not known. In any case, this example shows that von Känel, in contrast to his siblings, moved up the social ladder leaving behind the precariat. Likewise, after six years of service, former *Verdingkind* (“indentured child labourer”) Rudolf Schüpbach signed up with the Bern city police, remaining there until his retirement. According to his grandson, the police initially had reservations about hiring a former mercenary because they had gained terrible experience with these men. Finally, however, they were convinced by the excellent discharge certificate.²⁶⁸

The scepticism of the police reveals that not all mercenaries reintegrated as smoothly into Swiss civil society as the examples listed here. For instance, ex-military Friedrich Wüthrich, who had fought at the front line of the Borneo War, was sentenced for seriously threatening a fellow citizen in 1866.²⁶⁹ Veteran Christian Michel had to spend a year in prison.²⁷⁰ Not knowing where to go, Friedrich Dähler apparently “strayed” around, first to his sister, then he tried in vain to be admitted to the hospital in Bern. After that, his trail was lost.²⁷¹

There are different reasons why some veterans lived on the margins of society. After their service, many found themselves re-exposed to the structural poverty they had once sought to escape. Others may have voluntarily chosen the life of an outsider. For some, however, service in the KNIL also proved to be a burden in physical and psychological terms. As the following chapter will elaborate, many veterans suffered from physical infirmities that made it impossible for them to pursue a regular occupation, like Johann Dürr, who had lost his sight due to his service.²⁷² Another example is provided by Johannes Haller, who was discredited as being stupid due to his hearing loss suffered in the line of duty. As a result, his municipality classified him as wholly incapacitated to work in 1866.²⁷³

Apart from such physical infirmities, there were also a few veterans who—according to contemporary testimonials—suffered from psychological ailments. For example, Rudolf Hauri was released in 1883 because of *beginnende vervolgingswaanzin* (incipient persecution mania) and admitted to the Utrecht “asylum for the insane” after that. From there, he was to be sent on to Switzerland. However, his condition was so severe that he could not be left alone. Therefore, in cooperation with his home municipality, the Dutch authorities had to arrange his transport.

Furthermore, the trial of ex-military Bernhard Jeker generated national headlines. In 1896, Jeker shot his landlord, his wife and their 18-year-old daughter because, according to his statement, they had laughed “maliciously in his face”. During interrogation, he told the police that out of his thirteen years with KNIL, he spent four on the battlefield of Aceh, where he frequently had to shoot at the enemy.²⁷⁴ From today’s point of view, it is impossible to assess the extent to which such war experiences left traumatising traces in his psyche. However, we know from other colonial contexts, such as British India, that even trivial reasons could trigger an outbreak of

excessive violence.²⁷⁵ This may well have been the case in Jeker's situation,²⁷⁶ since the director of a psychiatric clinic certified that he had diminished responsibility.²⁷⁷

Ultimately, a number of Swiss veterans took the opportunity of the farewell to service to open an entirely new chapter. Wüthrich, for example, opened the Hotel Helvetia in Harderwijk, from where he operated secret recruiting networks.²⁷⁸ As Egloff confirmed to his parents in a letter, Wüthrich was not the only Swiss to settle in Harderwijk. According to his information, around 20 retired Swiss citizens lived in the small town.²⁷⁹ In addition, an indeterminable number probably settled in other European countries, such as former KNIL-mercenary Johann Heinrich Rüegg from the canton of Zurich. According to his great-grandson, Rüegg met his wife in Arnhem and moved to Duisburg.²⁸⁰ Finally, a few veterans who had exceeded fifty-five years of age and suffered from physical infirmities claimed their right to take up residence in the *Tehuis* (asylum) in Bronbeek, which had been established in 1859.²⁸¹ However, not everyone liked it equally. While some spent the last years of their lives there, others left after only a few weeks.²⁸²

Conclusion

This part followed the movements of thousands of Swiss mercenaries between 1848 and 1914 to learn more about their origins, motives, military activities, social and sexual relations, violent acts, and perspectives after their service ended. The result is a colourful mosaic of thousands of different life stories from which three synthesising conclusions can be drawn. The first point worth noting is that many Swiss from poorer backgrounds also perceived the Dutch colonial empire as a space of opportunity. Bernhard C. Schär and Andreas Zangger have already pointed out how Swiss scientists and merchants travelled to the Malay Archipelago to accumulate symbolic, social and economic capital.²⁸³ In addition to these primarily urban or semi-urban elites, however, thousands of artisans, farmers, unemployed people, professional soldiers and factory workers too migrated from Switzerland to the Dutch East Indies. The fact that the Dutch Empire's appeal stretched over several decades through all strata of society, even into remote Swiss Alpine valleys, has hardly been researched so far and proves how strongly even countries without formal colonial possessions, such as Switzerland, were embedded in imperial formations.

Second, the close look at the mercenaries' lives provides insights into globally shaped European concepts of masculinities from the nineteenth century's lower classes. The pursuit of masculine ideals runs like a *leitmotif* through their biographies appearing at various stages; for example, the mercenaries' decision to emigrate coupled with fear of social decline and the associated loss of prestige or the inability to support a family, even if poverty was arguably the main reason. Another recurrent



Figure 6: Undated photo of Heinrich Brandenberger (on the left) at his workplace at the Pestalozzi hardware store. Photo SSA, Ar 201.303 (Original privately owned by the Brandenberger family, Switzerland).

ideal of masculinity in terms of motives was that of the colonial adventurer, as propagated by veterans who returned home or numerous tales circulating across Switzerland. Furthermore, the KNIL offered the possibility of a “proxy heroism”. Since—unlike Switzerland, which had not had any warlike conflicts with its neighbouring states since the middle of the century—the KNIL was constantly involved in colonial wars, some Swiss men saw a welcome opportunity to put into practice the mythologised image of the militarily adept Swiss citizen and to prove their manliness. Besides the emigration motives, masculinity ideals and male habitus played a vital role in daily military life in the European recruitment centres and the colonies.

Thirdly, this chapter sheds light on a set of tensions within the Dutch Empire. For instance, it first shows the ambivalence of mercenaries as perpetrators and targets. While mercenaries were aggressors against the local population or plantation workers, many suffered under the strict military disciplinary regime. To what extent this exercised and self-experienced violence created a spiral of violence remains to be explored. However, it is clear that resentment among the mercenaries at times led to undermining the racial order that was supposed to legitimise the colonial rule of the Europeans. Mutinous, drunken, or subversive mercenaries challenged the prestige of the white colonial power—especially when the army command needed Javanese or “Ambonese” troops to discipline them. Similar observations can be made with regard to the sexuality of mercenaries. Inter-male relationships or relationships with concubines that crossed racialised and religious boundaries

also challenged the racist structures. They challenged a supposedly “natural order” and forced the colonial authorities to introduce new regulations to control these relationships constantly. Only in terms of a commonly perceived European identity among European soldiers did the colonial contact zone seem to ease rather than increase tensions. While there were numerous clashes in the barracks in the Netherlands due to national animosities between Dutch, Germans, Swiss and French, the colonial experience seemed to exert a homogenising influence.



Figure 7: Undated photo of Lina Sampet Brandenberger and Heinrich Brandenberger playing “Eile mit Weile” (Haste makes Waste). Photo SSA, Ar 201.303 (Original privately owned by the Brandenberger family, Switzerland).

Follow the Money: Colonial Cash Flows and Interlocking Bureaucracies

Abstract

Mercenaries and money are closely intertwined. This chapter follows the global flow of money, showing that even small sums from the colonies could make a significant difference to families in the European hinterland. The focus is on signature premiums, pay, estate payments and regular pensions paid to veterans and those who became disabled due to military service.

Keywords: economic history, history of welfare, colonial cash flows, transimperial bureaucratic networks

Much to the dismay of the acting Dutch Consul General at the time, a former Swiss KNIL mercenary stormed his apartment in Bern in October 1868. Hans Caspar Albrecht, as the mercenary was called, begged the Consul General to disburse his pension of around 200 Swiss francs granted to him by the Dutch colonial administration in Batavia (Jakarta). Coming from an impoverished working-class background and having a daily income of a mere two Swiss francs, Albrecht depended on this subsistence pension. However, when the Consul General informed him that he was no longer responsible for paying such pensions, Albrecht reacted—according to the Consul General’s report—“extremely improperly and impudently”.¹

The Consul General’s indignation aside, this incident reveals an important but hitherto neglected aspect of European colonialism. Namely, it indicates how the colonial bureaucracies of the time linked the social micro-economies of the working class in the European hinterland to colonial expansion.² To explore this nexus in more detail, this chapter follows the money that found its way from the colonies into the pockets of mercenaries, veterans, or their relatives in multiple ways. First, it will focus on signature premiums—i.e. one-off payments that each mercenary received when he joined the KNIL or prolonged his contract. Signature premiums were a vital stimulus, not so much for the mercenaries, but for the recruiting agents and inn-owners who organised their journey until the definitive entry into the military world. Second, it will analyse the mercenaries’ pay and—legal and illegal—opportunities to earn additional money during their colonial military service. However, as will become apparent, there was usually not much left of the salary at

the end of service. More important in this respect was the regularity with which it was paid. Third, life-long pension payments and so-called gratifications—allowance payments for veterans discharged from service due to health problems—shall be scrutinised. By zooming in on a micro level and shedding light on the agency of the individual protagonists and the impact of colonial money on their everyday lives, this chapter shall point out the role of various bureaucracies and private “service providers” within a transregional network connecting the Dutch East Indies with the Netherlands and Switzerland.³ Ultimately, the significance of inheritance payments shall be assessed by outlining their amount and reconstructing their impact on inheritors such as widows, siblings, children and welfare institutions.

In doing so, this chapter pursues two main arguments. First, it contends that even small sums of colonial money could significantly improve young men’s and their relatives’ living conditions from the poorer strata in European countries without formal colonial possessions. Second, this chapter argues that to process these payments across the borders of various European empires and states, a vast network of well-oiled interlocking bureaucracies—which was informed and heavily influenced by the nineteenth century’s main intersecting hierarchies between class, gender, and race—was essential on multiple levels.

Signature Premiums

Not only did signature premiums within the KNIL differ for the Dutch and for foreigners—the former usually received more—but they also varied over time, as they were constantly adapted to meet staffing needs as well as to compete in the military labour market. While in 1848, the premium for foreigners who signed up for six years amounted to a mere 8 guilders, it was constantly increased during the recruitment offensive in the 1850s. In 1854 foreigners received 40 guilders; from 1857 onwards, 60, 80 from 1858, and 120 from 1859.⁴

Nevertheless, the first rupture in this continuous rise occurred in 1860, after several mutinies among foreign mercenaries on Java had taken place. From then on, only Scandinavians and Dutchmen received a signature premium. When the KNIL returned to recruiting more foreigners again in 1866, it reintroduced a premium of 160 guilders. From 1870 onwards, no more foreigners were to be actively recruited, and the premium was abolished. However, the outbreak of the Aceh War in 1873 and the urgent need for military personnel led to the premiums reaching record levels: from 1874 onwards, a mercenary received 200 guilders if he signed up for four years and 300 if he committed himself for six years.⁵ In the Dutch context, this was a substantial sum, considering that a reasonably skilled worker earned between 300 and 400 guilders a year, and with regard to the average nominal

wages of Swiss bricklayers, the latter premium was almost back to the level of 1859, at around 114 working days.⁶ In 1878, however, the premiums were finally reduced again to 200 guilders remaining at this level for almost thirty years.⁷ In a similar vein, the premiums paid out in the event of a re-engagement were increased. In 1867, for example, a soldier received 40 guilders for two additional years, 100 for four and 160 for six, compared to the previous 40, 80, and 120. Moreover, one received a slight pay rise.⁸

Whilst the effectiveness of signature premiums in recruiting a large number of soldiers was largely undisputed among contemporary military commentators, doubts prevailed as to whether such financial incentives would also attract morally impeccable people. From their stance, high one-off payments tended to appeal particularly to so-called “underdeveloped” people, who allegedly value daily benefits above future well-being.⁹ One author even considered high premiums and reenlistment payments to be the reason for overcrowded detention cells in the Dutch East Indies because—according to him—ordinary soldiers were not accustomed to handling such amounts of money. Polemically, he argued:

A man who is not used to calling his property 600 cents is once given 600 guilders! Where does that money go in the Indies? Partly in the canteen, but for the most part in the quiet pubs and brothels. That money itches the man in the hand; it has to go, otherwise he is not called a good comrade; and, it goes, in unbelievable short time it goes, mostly drowned and squandered.¹⁰

Indeed, the signature premium was a considerable sum for the bulk of the soldiers. (A Swiss bricklayer in the 1870s earned about 4 Swiss Francs, respectively 2 guilders per day.)¹¹ It is, therefore, not surprising that a few Swiss went to the colonial troop depot solely for the premium and immediately disappeared as soon as they received it.¹² However, concerning Swiss mercenaries staying in Harderwijk, one should note that from the 1860s at the latest, most of them had already spent their premium before leaving Europe. The reasons for this were twofold. Firstly, since the abolition of recruiting offices in 1860, the journey from Switzerland to the Colonial Army’s troop depot in Harderwijk became more expensive as they were no longer organised through the Dutch authorities but had to be paid for by the volunteers. Moreover, the Dutch Consul General in Bern refused to pay individual travel advances for Swiss citizens, as can be seen from the many rejected enquiries in his correspondence.¹³ Illegally operating recruitment agents, usually former Swiss mercenaries, filled the gap and led young volunteers to the Netherlands, charging them 75 guilders.¹⁴

Of what was left of the premium after the deduction of travel and brokerage costs, the prospective colonial soldiers, secondly, spent most of it in the bars, hotels

and brothels of Harderwijk.¹⁵ The innkeepers and storeowners were well aware that the soldiers had received a high signature premium and adjusted their prices accordingly, as a published letter from a Swiss recruit in 1857 attests: “Terrible food, terrible drink, and on top of that, everything is terribly expensive. The whole town lives only off the soldiers. When one of them enters a shop, the prices suddenly rise by a hundred per cent.”¹⁶

Among the innkeepers were not only Dutchmen but also citizens of other nationalities. For instance, the landlord of the Hotel Helvetia, Friedrich Wüthrich, was a Swiss KNIL veteran who lured recruits from Switzerland through an illicit recruiting network to host them in his hotel. When he was arrested for these illegal recruiting activities during a visit to Switzerland, a police inspector raised further allegations and stated:

He had run his business in Holland in a rather dishonest way & tried to exploit the young people in all ways. For example, he was involved in the watch trade & sold watches to the recruits at high prices; if the people then had no more money, he bought the watches back at a cheap price.¹⁷

Wüthrich admitted to having traded in watches but rejected the accusation of using predatory and usurious practices. Be that as it may, the mercenaries spent a lot of money in Harderwijk. Anton Camenzind, another Swiss recruit who joined the KNIL in 1885, reported in his unpublished memoirs that a foreigner usually had only 10 of the 200 guilders left when he embarked on the ship to Java. He himself had even less. After nine weeks in the Netherlands and countless visits to local pubs and bars, he ended up possessing only 7.5 guilders.¹⁸ In view of these conditions, the retired military J. D. Sybrandi criticised in his widely discussed pamphlet of 1869 that the signature premiums primarily served the brothel and pub owners in Harderwijk.¹⁹

Although the money boosted the local economy, there was opposition in Harderwijk to the recruits’ debaucheries. In 1890, brothels were banned, and in 1909 the troop depot was finally moved to Nijmegen.²⁰ Nevertheless, there as well, most of the premiums ended up in the pockets of local innkeepers, photographers and tobacco vendors, as Augustin Zehnder, recruited in 1911, conveyed. Apparently, the local business people allowed payment until departure using the signature premiums as a deposit. Only rarely did these bills remain unpaid. Thus, Zehnder stated: “Thanks to the ‘colonials’, many of these traders have become hotel and even villa owners.”²¹ In sum, it is no exaggeration to state that signature premiums were essential for quite a number of people earning money in the surroundings of recruitment centres, thus sustaining an entire industry preoccupied with facilitating entry into the KNIL. The recruits were usually satisfied that travel costs, food

and lodging were covered by the advances from agents and innkeepers and that no additional expenses were incurred.

Typically, they received the money when they were accepted at the colonial troop depot. In some cases, however, when recruitment still took place in Lörrach, the mercenaries firmly demanded at least part of it beforehand, as an unknown mercenary reported to the Swiss newspaper *Der Bund* in 1857. According to him, a group of Swiss recruited in Lörrach received a part of their premium shortly before crossing the Dutch border after they had exerted pressure on their Dutch guide:

The transport guide was forced to pay, because according to the proverb: ‘no money, no Swiss’, many people did not want to set foot on Dutch soil until a part of the signature premium was paid out.²²

So far, only one case is known in which a recruited Swiss refused the premium. Balthasar von Jecklin, who was born into a wealthy aristocratic background and through family connections acquainted with the Swiss commander of the colonial troop depot, could afford to decline it upon his recruitment in 1858. According to historian Andreas Zangger, this allowed von Jecklin a little more freedom than ordinary soldiers enjoyed at the time.²³

Pay

The pay did not promise wealth either. For European soldiers, it was a low income or, as the *Bataviaasche Handelsblad* succinctly put it in 1860: “The soldier is poor, and remains poor; and while he is insured against *infirmity*, the prospect of *fortune* is closed to him.”²⁴ Eduard Rellstab told his parents in 1860 that he received one guilder every five days.²⁵ Over the years, this sum was only minimally increased. In 1867, it amounted to 1.65 guilders and remained at the same level even after the turn of the century.²⁶ Depending on the soldier’s function or rank, the pay could be higher.

Furthermore, it was decisive whether peace or war prevailed at the time—at least in official terms.²⁷ Even though they earned little, their pay was higher than that of non-European troops. In line with the racist stratification of the KNIL that is outlined extensively in chapter 3, the Javanese soldiers figured at the bottom of the pay scale. In between were the so-declared “African” and “Ambonese” soldiers, who received the same pay as the Europeans but had to cope with inferior equipment.²⁸ In the eyes of the Europeans, however, this was not the benchmark. Instead, they compared themselves with the officers, as can be seen from Heinrich Brandenberger’s letter. Full of indignation, he wrote to his parents: “Furthermore,

there is a vast number of officers here, all of whom receive a very high salary and live like gods in France, a stark contrast to the soldiers.”²⁹ In fact, officers of a specific grade earned as much per month as a Dutch worker earned in a whole year.³⁰

Brandenberger’s letters shed further light on the mercenaries’ view of their wages. For example, he reported elsewhere that soldiers earned less when they were hospitalised due to illness. This was one of the main reasons why, despite a high fever, he stayed on guard duty until he collapsed. (The other two are an exaggerated attitude of honour and poor medical care at the hospital.)³¹ Brandenberger also had a clear opinion regarding the meal allowance. In general, the soldiers were required to contribute a significant share of their already modest wages to the kitchen.³² According to Brandenberger, 16 cents a day were deducted from his pay for board. However, he did not believe the money was actually used to improve the alimentation. Annoyed, he wrote to his parents:

For the 16 Ct. that each soldier puts into the kitchen per day, he is completely deprived. While at the 15th Battalion, which is stationed 4 km from our barracks, one receives a decent quantity of meat at 11 o’clock in the morning [...] and at half past four in the evening, from the money collected (16 cents per man), 4–6 supplements, consisting of an egg, 1 piece of meat, liver, chopped meat formed into a ball; [...] at 11 o’clock we, on the other hand, receive a tiny piece of meat, in the evening ½ egg, very little meat, instead of the chopped round meat balls, potatoes are chopped; and in order to manage to hold them together, they are mixed with flour.³³

Brandenberger’s comparison with the other battalion shows that the question of how the food allowance was to be used was not a general matter but rather a specific problem within his battalion. Nonetheless, what was a source of offence for one Swiss was a welcome opportunity for another to line his own pockets, as Brandenberger went on to describe: “Of course, the fourier is also involved in this fraud, and on top of that, he is a Zurich citizen with the name Schatzmann.”³⁴ The Swiss fourier was by no means the only one to improve his pay at the expense of his comrades. At least 25 Swiss are known to have been sentenced for theft between 1857 and 1868—the number of unsolved offences was presumably much higher.³⁵

Apart from these controversial ways of personal enrichment, there were other ways within the military to supplement one’s salary. Carl August Haab, for example, was appointed company barber by a sergeant, although he had never shaved a man in his life. Fortunately for him, a proficient barber from another company taught him the art of shaving and sold him scissors and razors. For Haab, the new task paid off: “My pay now amounted to 1 guilder, 20 cents in five days, plus 1 guilder, 80 cents for shaving, a total of 6 Fr. and less duty.”³⁶ Moreover, things were soon to get even more lucrative for him. When Haab was finally employed as a bookbinder—the

same profession he had practised prior to his military engagement—his monthly salary rose to 33 guilders. With this, he bought a tiny house that he later sold again for a profit of 2 guilders.³⁷

The above-mentioned Camenzind, too, was able to improve his meagre pay by offering the KNIL the skills he had learned in civilian life. The qualifying examination to become a painter for the *Genie Corps* posed no difficulties for the trained carriage painter. The examiners judged him to be “exceptionally good”, and from then on, he received 65 instead of 25 cents a day.³⁸ In addition to these cases described in detail, there are other indications that Swiss individuals earned extra money by carrying out various functions, such as rifle manufacturers or stockroom managers.³⁹

Nevertheless, even those who did not earn extra money through such special tasks had a modest budget, which was usually invested directly in alcohol on payday. According to Eckert’s account, a heap of soldiers rushed to the military canteen as soon as they had received their pay.⁴⁰ It is impossible to determine whether these were alcohol addicts who could not choose freely, or merely bored mercenaries indulging in a change of pace. Eckert, however, insinuates that the canteen was actually there “to recoup the soldiers’ hard-earned wages, as they like to visit this pub because they get the cheapest liquor there and entry is only allowed for the military.”⁴¹ However, once again, it is complicated to assess whether this was indeed the intention of the military command.

In any case, very few soldiers were able to put any of their wages aside, as a glance at the inheritance payment of Swiss mercenaries who died in service confirms. By the time of their death, about 78 per cent of them possessed less than 10 guilders.⁴² Occasional references in the archives provide further clues that it was no different for those who returned home alive. In 1869, for example, the Swiss police arrested the former KNIL-mercenary Friedrich Dähler, who had just returned from the Dutch East Indies, for vagrancy. The police eventually transferred him to his *Bürgerort*, which had to provide him with money and clothes.⁴³

Impoverished returnees aside, numerous soldiers who remained in the Dutch East Indies after their service also lived in poor conditions. According to the report of a committee appointed to inquire into poverty in Batavia in 1872, the KNIL veterans constituted the bulk of the pool of “poor Europeans”. As Ulbe Bosma and Remco Raben have pointed out, this constellation was not limited to Batavia but applied to all of Java. Around 1901 in Samarang (Semarang), for example, of 652 so-called European “indigent” heads of families or single persons (“indigent” referred to a monthly income less than 100 guilders, respectively less than 50 in the case of singles), about 40 per cent were ex-servicemen. Moreover, there were many neglected children whose fathers were European soldiers.⁴⁴ From Swiss KNIL-deserter Edwin Eckert’s point of view, the reason European soldiers abandoned their children was

primarily financial. He summed up: “rarely does a soldier have so much money that he could return home with his family.”⁴⁵ At the same time, however, he added that it did not work out only because of the money but also because of racial prejudices raised against the mercenaries’ wives, who were usually of Javanese or Indo-European descent: “But if this were the case, his home community would, in any case, be little amused to be visited by such a mixed race.”⁴⁶

Such racial prejudices will be discussed in greater depth in chapter 5. For now, it shall suffice to conclude that, even though the signature premiums were usually quickly squandered and the pay was too low to make any savings, both provided a crucial immediate financial incentive since they enabled the mercenaries to bypass an (individual) economic crisis at home. After completing their service, the mercenaries returned home, hoping to find better conditions than when they left. In Haab’s case, the plan worked out: he came back, immediately found a job, and eventually launched his own bookbinding shop.⁴⁷

Pensions & Gratification Payments

In contrast to Haab, many mercenaries received money from the Ministry of Colonies after finishing their term, as they were eligible for pensions or gratifications (i.e. temporary allowances). The prospect of such payments provided an additional incentive to join the KNIL, not least because they might facilitate later reintegration into civilian life. Although this reintegration did not necessarily occur in their home country—some remained in the Dutch East Indies, others emigrated to Australia or North America, or settled in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, or France—the majority of the Swiss KNIL veterans returned to Switzerland.⁴⁸ The following section focuses primarily on the pension payments that flowed to Switzerland.

Transimperial Administrative, Financial & Military Networks

The KNIL’s pension payments to retired Swiss mercenaries tied in with a centuries-old practice of the European military labour market. As historian Valentin Groebner expounds, a pension originally entitled a cleric to receive an income without any service in return.⁴⁹ From the middle of the fifteenth century onwards, its usage was extended to the secular sphere referring to regular and contractually stipulated payments, which lay people and clerics received from sovereigns in addition to their regular wages. Foreign military employers, such as the King of France, used public or private pension payments to influence political decisions and secure access to the reservoir of Swiss mercenaries. Numerous regions of the

Old Swiss Confederacy—especially the Catholic cantons—were so heavily dependent on these money flows that it is not an exaggeration to claim that it had a lasting impact on their political landscape. At a foreign policy level, for instance, pension payments reinforced asymmetrical relations with powerful European allies. On the domestic front, they helped numerous patrician families to achieve lasting political and economic hegemony since these families controlled the allocation of pension payments. Moreover, as political offices typically came without remuneration, aspiring politicians needed a stable income from other sources. Pension payments linked to mercenary services often constituted such a notable source of income. Consequently, these pension disbursements were contentious from their inception.⁵⁰

Nevertheless, as shall be illustrated further down the line, the KNIL pension payments were disputed only in a few cases where they concerned senior Swiss politicians. Moreover, in contrast to the political powers of the *Ancien Régime*, the KNIL was not so much aiming to exert political influence but rather to offer attractive conditions of service to European military migrants. Thus, Swiss local administrations did not object to pension payments but willingly supported their handling. (In addition to the Dutch colonial pensions, this also applied to those paid by France, the USA and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.)⁵¹ In this respect, both the Dutch and Swiss bureaucracies could draw on a cross-border payment network that had already been established alongside the recruitment of four Swiss regiments from 1814 to 1829.

Initially, the Consul General of the Netherlands in Bern, Heinrich Faesy, managed the quarterly pension payments for KNIL veterans who had returned to Switzerland. Even though Faesy was Swiss, he was entitled to represent Dutch interests. He commenced his diplomatic career as an adjutant at the side of A. L. W. Seyffardt, who was sent to Switzerland in 1814 by the Dutch king Willem I to supervise the recruitment of the Swiss regiments stationed in the Netherlands. Seyffardt carried out this task until the disbandment of the regiments at the end of 1829. In 1832, Faesy was finally appointed Consul General.⁵² Thus, Faesy was well acquainted with the customs of the international military labour market and fully aware of both the Dutch and the Swiss expectations.

By the middle of the century, the pension payments did not yet require a great deal of effort on the part of the Dutch Consul General. Although approximately 2,100 Swiss mercenaries had joined the KNIL prior to 1848, merely fifteen pensioners residing in Switzerland applied for a pension.⁵³ The reason for this was the strict criteria that had to be met to be eligible for a pension: twenty years of service were required, which appeared to be half an eternity considering the high mortality rate of 55 per cent amidst European troops in the tropics at the time. Moreover, the entitlement to a pension was withdrawn if one was dishonourably discharged,

condemned to a disgraceful sentence (“*veroordeeld tot lijf- en onteerende straf*”), or entered the service of another power without asking the Dutch government for permission.⁵⁴

In 1860, these regulations were slightly relaxed, and the offer of a pension was extended to soldiers discharged due to mental or physical infirmity. Furthermore, a critical differentiation was established between injuries and mutilations sustained in combat or during prescribed duty and those arising under different circumstances. In instances of the former, individuals were entitled to a lifelong pension, whereas in the latter case, eligibility hinged upon the duration of one’s service. If it was less than eight years, one only received a temporary allowance (*tijdelijke pensioen* or *gratificatie*) which had to be renewed annually.⁵⁵ Due to these new regulations and the thousands of Swiss mercenaries who joined the KNIL in the mid-1850s, the group of pensioners living in Switzerland grew during the 1860s. According to the life certificates that Consul Faesy forwarded to The Hague in 1864, at least 28 veterans drew a pension. However, this only includes those whose annual pension was less than 300 guilders. (Those entitled to more than 300 had to appear personally to the Consul General, which is why their correspondence was handled differently and was not recorded with the sources outlined above).⁵⁶

At the same time, the administrative workload increased, causing a lot of effort for the Dutch consuls abroad. Hence, the Dutch Ministry of Colonies relieved them of their duties in 1868 and partially privatised those payments concerning lifelong pensions. (Pensions, or gratifications, which were limited in time, remained the responsibility of the Consul General.) From then on, eligible veterans drawing a pension of less than 300 guilders had to send a life certificate, officially confirmed by the mayor of their place of residence, to a private company in the Netherlands every three months. In return, they received their pension after the deduction of a commission. Since very few Swiss mercenaries had the necessary contacts to a Dutch company, the Dutch Ministry of Colonies recommended three offices in The Hague as potential representations: J. van Daehne & Co. (in 1877 replaced by W. C. de Wetstein Pfister), Furnée & Co., and C. J. Stutterheim.⁵⁷

In conducting their business, these Dutch companies were locally supported by Swiss service providers. At least from 1851 onwards, for example, former politician Rudolf Rüttimann managed, in cooperation with J. van Daehne & Co., the pensions of several mercenaries originating from the canton of Lucerne who had served either in the KNIL or in the aforementioned Swiss regiments. His engagement was far from coincidental. Like Faesy, he had also gained military experience abroad since he had served as a Major in a Swiss regiment in the Netherlands from 1814 to 1829. Following Rudolf Rüttimann’s passing in 1873, his business operations underwent institutionalisation, with the Lucerne Bank Crivelli & Co. assuming responsibility for managing his clientele.⁵⁸ Unsurprisingly, a Swiss bank remained at the forefront

of managing the transimperial financial transactions, given that numerous Swiss cities had been intricately connected to the global financial networks since the seventeenth century.⁵⁹ Accordingly, a bank managed the payments and associated administrative requirements in the canton of Bern. From the mid-1870s at the latest, the banking house Marquard & Cie. had been the prime address for colonial pensioners, as the Dutch Consul General's correspondence with the Swiss Federal Chancellery reveals.

In contrast to these private actors, in Basel, the official bureau of the cantonal war commissioner supported a handful of veterans in collecting their money from 1872 onwards. Until 1883, this post was filled by Lieutenant Colonel Achilles Herzog (who also held the position of Argentinian Consul in Switzerland), thereafter by the former Naples mercenary Colonel Hans von Mechel. Given his father was a general in Naples and his brothers had worked in Deli, Sumatra, since the late 1870s, he was thoroughly familiar with mercenaryism and colonialism. Thus, he willingly supported both Swiss and Dutch interests.⁶⁰

The even deeper involvement of Swiss bureaucracies and agents in processing colonial cash flows emerged in the cases of gratification payments. Unlike regular pensions, most gratifications were limited to one year. (As explained above, this applied to mercenaries dismissed due to illness before completing eight years of service.) Thus, the applicants had to prove their entitlement to it anew every year by submitting a dossier that consisted of three documents: their discharge papers, a certificate of good character issued by the authorities in their place of residence and a doctor's certificate proving "that they are still not able to earn a living with their own hands due to their state of health".⁶¹

The applicant handed this dossier to the local municipality, which forwarded it to the cantonal authorities. From there, it was passed through the Swiss Federal Chancellery to the Dutch Consul, who forwarded it to the Ministry of Colonies in The Hague. After a thorough examination, the latter sent the money and the certificates back along the same channels, with each step having to be receipted. As a result, countless boxes in the Dutch National Archives, as well as in the Swiss Federal Archives and several cantonal archives, still bear witness today to the immense piles of papers that have thus been accumulated over the decades. As it will be argued below, there were sound reasons—especially financial ones—why the Swiss authorities took this effort upon themselves, even though mercenaryism enjoyed a dubious reputation. However, for the time being, suffice it to say that from the official side, help was freely given at all levels of governance.⁶²

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, this dense network of authorities, diplomats, banks, and former officers was confronted with a growing number of requests for pensions and gratifications as the Ministry of Colonies loosened pension regulations against the backdrop of the Aceh War in 1877. From then on,

12 years of service or a previously sustained injury resulting in discharge entitled the receipt of a pension, respectively gratification. Accordingly, almost 600 veterans claimed a pension in Switzerland in 1900.⁶³ However, until 1909, no further adjustments were made. This could be related to the previously mentioned fact that from the 1880s onwards, the KNIL relied increasingly on Javanese and “Ambonese” troops. Therefore, the recruitment of European mercenaries was no longer seen as a priority, and no additional incentives were provided to attract them.

To sum up, by facilitating the procurement of pensions, both private and official Swiss service providers played an essential role in the transimperial military labour market. Thanks to their often overlapping connections to Dutch military and financial circles, they made certain regions of Switzerland accessible to the Dutch colonial bureaucracy. In so doing, they ensured that the KNIL could meet its contractual obligations. As a result, the KNIL continued to enjoy a reputation as a reliable and attractive military employer—though not in terms of salaries, but at least in terms of pensions. This proved to be an indispensable condition for a continuous influx of additional mercenaries. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the procedures of pension payments became increasingly institutionalised. Private and public institutions successively replaced individuals who were particularly predestined due to their personal biography, such as Rüttimann.

Zooming in on Colonial Cash Flows

Concerning the period examined in this book, it emerges that these pensions and gratification payments varied between 72 (only for gratifications until 1870) and 1,400 guilders, depending on the length of service and the military rank (see *table 2*).

It is impossible to precisely calculate the total amount of gratification and pension payments that flowed from the colonies to Switzerland. Nevertheless, dispersed archival information provides specific key parameters that allow for an adequate extrapolation at least until 1904. (1904 marks the end of the last systematic recording of cash flows to Switzerland.) For instance, the Dutch Consul General in Bern systematically kept records of the pension payments, which concerned non-commissioned officers and were disbursed in Switzerland from 1864 to 1868. Likewise, the lists of pensions compiled by the Dutch Consulate in Geneva for the period 1891 to 1904 have been preserved. Also documented are the quarterly payments from 1884 to 1914, which the canton of Thurgau arranged for its local KNIL veterans. In Basel, the office of the war commissioner registered the pension payments it handled from 1872 to 1895. In addition, some payment details on individual cases have also been retained in the National Archives of Switzerland and the Netherlands, as well as in several cantonal archives.⁶⁴

1850–1860 (20 years)	soldier	108
	corporal	144
	sergeant	180
1860–1866 (20 years)	soldier	144
	corporal	180
	sergeant	216
1866–1877 (20 years)	soldier	200
	corporal	240
	sergeant	300
1877–1909 (12 years/20 years)	soldier	200/320
	corporal	220/380
	sergeant	260/420

Table 2: Annual pension per person according to rank.⁶⁵

Based on this data, it can be stated with certainty that the Dutch Ministry of Colonies paid at least 984,145 guilders in pension and gratification to 799 former KNIL mercenaries residing in Switzerland between 1848 and 1914. If one combines this figure with the dates indicated on the veterans' pension titles and their dates of death, which are known in a few cases, the estimated sum amounts to 1.5 Mio guilders. In today's terms, this corresponds to about 123 million Swiss francs.⁶⁶

In comparison to the revenues derived from the global colonial trade, this sum might give the impression of being relatively negligible. For example, the value of goods exported from the Dutch East Indies in 1870 amounted to more than 107 million guilders.⁶⁷ Even compared to the profits earned by Swiss merchants in colonial settings, whether on plantations or in transit trade, the figure appears insignificant. However, if we change the scale from a macro to a micro perspective, it becomes apparent that these payments had a substantial impact on the lives of individual mercenaries and their families. Amidst the Swiss pensioners known to us so far, Franz Josef Michael Letter received the highest pension amounting to an annual payment of 1,400 guilders after 1848.⁶⁸ Before returning to his place of birth in the canton of Zug in 1847, he had served for 28 years in various Dutch army units, nine of them as members of the KNIL on Java and Sumatra. Ultimately, he was promoted to the rank of Major. As Michiel van Gulpen outlines, the pension paradoxically both enabled and prevented Letter's political career in his post-military life. On the one hand, the regular substantial payments allowed him to take on leading political offices in the canton of Zug, as these were poorly paid. From 1853 to 1867, he was

a colonel in the general staff of Switzerland, and from 1859 to 1871, he served as member of the governing council of the canton of Zug.⁶⁹

On the other hand, he had to ask for permission from the Dutch authorities for every political office he intended to exercise in Switzerland. This was more than a mere formality, as the Dutch government kept a close eye on what Letter was doing and even threatened to withdraw his pension on one occasion.⁷⁰ And ultimately, the colonial money blocked Letter's access to the stage of national politics since a law forbade recipients of foreign military pensions from holding national office. As he was unwilling to give up his pension, Letter had to decline election to the *Nationalrat* (National Council) and the *Ständerat* (Council of States) of the Swiss Confederation.⁷¹ Obviously, Letter was an exception. There were only a handful of mercenaries who, after their return in the mid-nineteenth century, received a similarly large pension and had a comparable career.⁷² The proportion of non-Dutch officers in the KNIL, as Gerke Teitler has pointed out, was 8 per cent in 1861, halved to 4 by 1871, and fell further in the following decades oscillating between 1 and 3 per cent.⁷³

Nevertheless, even though pension and gratification payments were in most cases significantly lower, the latter substantially facilitated reintegration at home, at least financially. To get an impression of how such a return could take place, it is worth taking a closer look at an exemplary case: in February 1873, the welfare office (*Armenbehörde*) of the municipality of Eglisau, a small Swiss village on the Rhine, turned to the Military Department of the canton of Zurich with a particular request. One of their residents, 37-year-old Johann Jakob Fischer, had joined the KNIL in March 1870 to serve for six years. During his service, however, he fell so severely ill that his leg and arm were "paralysed". After merely two years of service, he was thus released from duty and returned to Europe.⁷⁴ Back in Switzerland, he first sought medical advice in the hospital in Zurich. Yet, not even the renowned German Professor Anton Biermer could cure him. Still paralysed in arm and leg, he returned to Eglisau.⁷⁵

Unable to work and without any assets, it was left to the municipality's welfare office to provide for Fisher's subsistence. Since poverty relief was provided locally at the time and not through the Federal Government, such cases placed a significant financial strain on small villages. In this respect, Eglisau was the rule rather than the exception, as it was a deprived municipality in the late nineteenth century. Business with freight traffic on the Rhine was in crisis, as was viticulture, and unlike other places in the canton of Zurich, industrialisation bypassed the village. Between 1830 and 1890, the number of people who could survive thanks solely to the community's support oscillated between 3.5 and 5.5 per cent.⁷⁶ However, only citizens of Eglisau were entitled to the village's poverty relief funds; thus, the authorities tried to deport all other poor people—this included people who were

born in Eglisau and spent their entire lives there but were not citizens. They were shuffled off to their *Bürgerort*—villages they were citizens of, although most of them had never lived there.⁷⁷

Fischer's return seemed, therefore, not to have pleased the local village authorities. At any rate, they immediately envisaged that the Dutch government should support Fischer by paying an annual pension.⁷⁸ However, their concerns were quickly calmed when the cantonal military department of Zurich sent them the Dutch Consul's answer to the abovementioned inquiry. According to the latter, there was a good chance that Fischer could receive a so-called gratification of 100 guilders. This sum corresponded to approximately 209 Swiss francs, and although it was lower than the 300 Swiss francs paid by the Swiss military to its soldiers, who were discharged due to physical ailments, it was still a handsome sum of money.⁷⁹

To obtain the money, Fischer would have to submit an application and three certificates about one year after his release: his discharge papers, a certificate of good repute issued by the authorities in his place of residence and a doctor's certificate proving that he was unable to earn a living with his hands.⁸⁰ Fischer duly sent a request with the necessary documents to the Military Department of the canton of Zurich on 29 July, which forwarded it to the Swiss Federal Chancellery on 4 August. From there, it was delivered to the Dutch Consul General, J. G. Suter-Vermeulen, on 6 August, who posted it to the Ministry of Colonies in The Hague on 7 August. The latter approved the application on 25 August. On 28 August, Suter-Vermeulen informed the Federal Chancellery of the decision and demanded a receipt for the 100 guilders. The next day, the Swiss Federal Chancellery again wrote to the Military Department of the canton of Zurich, emphasising that a receipt should be issued. On 9 September, the Federal Chancellery forwarded this receipt to Suter-Vermeulen, who subsequently instructed the *Berner Handelsbank* to transfer 209 Swiss francs to the Federal Chancellery. On the following day, the Federal Chancellery conveyed this amount to the cantonal military department, which handed over the money to Fischer. To finalise the transaction, Suter-Vermeulen had to forward the receipt to the Ministry of Colonies in The Hague. Yet, this was not the end of the story. What resembled an administrative marathon had to be undergone every year until Fischer either passed away or was able to earn his living again. This procedure was repeated another 18 times; Fischer received an annual subsidy of 100 guilders until 1891.⁸¹ From then on, his traces are lost, and it is not known whether he then died or merely no longer applied for support.

It is astounding how many people were involved in this annual process of gratification payments. Starting with the local authorities and doctors, the cantonal departments, the Federal Chancellery, the Dutch ambassador and ultimately, the Dutch Ministry of Colonies. Nevertheless, the effort was worthwhile for the welfare authorities in Eglisau. As a letter from the local welfare office in 1876

reveals, Fischer received no further financial support from them since he could carry out minor work and had cheap accommodation.⁸² Together with the 209 francs that corresponded to sixty daily wages of a bricklayer, this was enough to cover his everyday expenses.⁸³ This case highlights that even modest payments from the Dutch East Indies could be crucial for individual former Swiss colonial mercenaries and/or their municipalities responsible for them. Moreover, Fischer was not a unique case, as a glimpse into the archives unveils: for the year 1880, in addition to Fischer, eighteen other former Swiss mercenaries received a gratification of 100 guilders.⁸⁴ In 1880, the Dutch government thus spent 1,900 guilders (or about 3,950 Swiss francs) on gratifications for colonial mercenaries who returned to Switzerland and could not work. In comparison, the Swiss government paid 17,685 Swiss francs in the same year to soldiers who had injured themselves during Swiss military service.⁸⁵

To provide another example, one of these incapacitated veterans was Emil von Arx, a 19-year-old from Solothurn. In May 1869, he joined the KNIL without the consent of his parents but with the permission of a local government official. Although he had committed himself for six years, his service, too, was short-lived. As early as February 1871, he was released from the army because—according to his own statements—he had unintentionally shot himself in the left hand while guarding a prison. Whether this was an accident or rather an intentional move to be dismissed from service remains unknown.⁸⁶ In any case, von Arx was released with a one-time compensation of 100 guilders and returned to his hometown Solothurn, where he helped in his parents' bakery as best as possible. However, his mutilated hand severely handicapped him, and he could not perform any heavy work. Since his parents were themselves impoverished, the Solothurn government turned to the Swiss Federal Council with the request that they should seek a pension for von Arx from the Dutch administration. In a manner similar to the Fischer case, an arduous bureaucratic process was initiated on an annual basis. Consequently, von Arx received an annual gratuity of 100 guilders, a practice that continued at least until 1905.⁸⁷ The example of von Arx illustrates vividly that the amount of his gratification was not adjusted for inflation. In 1873, for example, 100 guilders corresponded to about 10,000 Swiss francs according to the present-day monetary value. In 1904, this was only equivalent to 8,500.⁸⁸

In contrast to the veterans applying for gratifications, the pensioners did not have to send an annual request for substantiation to the Consul General in Bern. Sources concerning their lives after service are, therefore, less abundant. Occasional incidents, however, provide insights into who these pension recipients were, how they lived and what role colonial money played in their life. Of the former colonial mercenary Johann Joseph Eng, for example, we know that he worked in the shoe factory of C. F. Bally after his return in 1873.⁸⁹ In that year, the

factory owner personally approached the Dutch Consul in Bern to obtain the life certificates necessary so that Eng could obtain his pension. In all likelihood, Eng received 140 guilders (approximately 290 Swiss Francs) *per annum* for the ensuing 30 years.⁹⁰ This was a significant supplement for a factory worker who earned on average between 3 and 5 francs a day in the 1870s.⁹¹

Likewise, the fate of Friedrich Stalder, who was dismissed in 1886 with an annual pension of 400 guilders due to a gunshot wound, also reveals the significance of colonial money in an ex-mercenary's civilian life. In a letter to the Ministry of Colonies, he asked to waive the legalisation costs of life certificates in the future, stating: "as I cannot earn anything, I have no money until my pension arrives, which I can use to pay my debts."⁹²

Even though pensions and allowances enabled veterans to lead a more independent life, they also had a disciplinary effect. As mentioned above, applicants for gratifications had to submit a certificate of good repute to obtain money. Moreover, the veterans forfeited their pensions during the period of a prison sentence. This occurred to Bernard Koller, for example, "because he has been sentenced to a dishonourable punishment and has not yet been rehabilitated", as Consul-General Suter-Vermeulen explained to the mayor of Elay, canton of Bern, in 1872.⁹³ How exactly a "dishonourable punishment" was defined was at the discretion of the Dutch Ministry of Colonies. In Koller's case, the offence was theft, fraud and mistreatment.⁹⁴ Former mercenary Johannes Schärer, on the other hand, was more fortunate. Although he was sentenced to seven months' imprisonment in 1866 for physically resisting a police officer's orders, he was allowed to keep his pension as his sentence was considered to be "correctional" and not "criminal".⁹⁵ Furthermore, despite being convicted of a triple murder in 1896, the Dutch authorities also refrained from suspending Bernard Jeker's pension payments. Whether he received the money is not known. It is more likely that the Dutch followed the request of the municipality of Bärschwil, canton of Solothurn, and the pension was bequeathed to the local orphanage authority. The latter argued that due to Jeker's imprisonment, his wife and six-year-old son would impose a burden on them.⁹⁶

As the case of Jeker's family indicates, pension and gratification payments were not only vital for veterans. Several inquiries sent to the Dutch Consul came from widows or siblings requesting to continue the pension payments after their husband's or brother's death. In 1900, for example, the welfare office of Rüslikon, canton of Zurich, wrote to the Dutch Consul asking whether Elisabeth Schwarzenbach-Staubli, the widow of the former colonial mercenary Jakob Gottlieb Schwarzenbach, could continue to receive his annual pension of 760 Swiss francs. Despite her precarious situation, the Dutch Consul's answer was negative. A widow's pension was solely granted if the husband died during his service. Consequently, Mrs Schwarzenbach lost not only her husband but also her modest income.⁹⁷ Likewise, the widow of

Johann Ulrich Studach (she is not mentioned by name) also requested at least half of the gratification that her late husband would have been entitled to for the current year. As she lived in poor circumstances, “which [...] was mainly caused by the prolonged illness of her husband,” both the cantonal and federal governments supported her—but to no avail. The Dutch authorities rejected her request.⁹⁸ Moreover, Johann Hunziker’s parents also hoped in vain that they would obtain their deceased son’s allowance. Hunziker had returned from the Dutch East Indies in 1865 “in a paralysed condition” and died five years later after “a serious and protracted illness”. The government of the canton of Aargau then lobbied the Dutch Ministry of Colonies to issue a one-off gratification of 72 guilders to the “deprived parents burdened with the arduous task of nursing”.⁹⁹ The latter replied tersely that requests of this kind could not be accommodated.¹⁰⁰

Inheritance Payments

Since the turn of the nineteenth century, European states have shown a growing interest in collecting data on wounded and fallen soldiers. Decisive for this trend, as historian Svenja Goltermann has pointed out, was less a sense of moral obligation to honour the fallen soldiers than the desire to eliminate uncertainties among their bereaved relatives. Without this, questions about property relations and inheritances would have remained unanswered, as did those about the marital status of women married to missing soldiers. For these women, their spouses in particular needed to be officially listed as deceased so that they could secure their financial existence through another marriage.¹⁰¹

To achieve their purpose, these lists—or “abridged protocols of the suffering and death of soldiers”, as Goltermann calls them—had to be widely published.¹⁰² The Dutch authorities proved no exception to this. They regularly issued an overview of perished European KNIL soldiers in the *Nederlandsche Staats-Courant*, providing information that (supposedly) allowed their unambiguous identification. (Including name, date of birth, place of birth, name of parents, day and ship of departure as well as place and date of death, rank and amount of money left behind.)¹⁰³ This information formed the starting point for the inheritance payments transferred to Switzerland. At first, the Dutch Consul General in Switzerland and the Swiss Consul in Amsterdam compiled lists by browsing through the *Nederlandsche Staats-Courant* four times a year and sending them to the Swiss Federal Chancellery.¹⁰⁴ (From 1875 onwards, the Swiss consulates on Java primarily took over this task.)¹⁰⁵ The Federal Chancellery then transmitted the information to the various cantonal authorities, who subsequently forwarded them to the administration of local municipalities.

Finally, they had the tedious task of checking whether the dead person in question indeed came from their community and, if so, contacting the relatives.¹⁰⁶

Overall Assessment of the Inheritances

Through the transimperial bureaucratic channels mentioned above, documents from 1,490 reported cases of an estimated total of 2,500 Swiss mercenaries who died in active service between 1848 and 1914 found their way into the Swiss and Dutch archives.¹⁰⁷ However, as these documents reveal, the bureaucratic procedure did not run smoothly at all. Time and again, it occurred that the names or places of birth on the Dutch lists did not coincide. Either because the Dutch officials unwittingly mistyped the German, French or Italian names of the Swiss during recruitment or because the mercenaries entered the service with forged documents. Another source of irritation arose from the divergent conceptions of the category “place of origin”. While the Dutch considered this to be the place of birth, Swiss authorities referred to it as *Bürgerort*. For the latter, merely the place where the mercenaries were citizens was relevant, as it was for this place to account for any welfare costs. The following figures show that these two places often do not coincide: in 1860, only 59 per cent of Swiss citizens still lived in their home communities; in 1910, it was a mere third of the population (34 per cent).¹⁰⁸ Thus, it was likely that a family had moved to another municipality generations ago, but their place of citizenship did not change. To make matters worse, the administrative work became particularly cumbersome if the deceased’s mother or sisters married (again) in the meantime and adopted both the family name and the place of citizenship of their newly wedded spouses. Enquiries about possible heirs thus regularly ended up in the wrong municipality and did not yield any results.¹⁰⁹

In the event that eligible heirs could be located, however, the procedure was further complicated by both the numerous receipts and inheritance certificates, which Swiss municipal administrations had to issue to each claimant complying with Dutch requirements. This included, among other things, that the inheritance beneficiaries signed the certificates, respectively their legal guardians, and two legally recognised witnesses. For the Dutch Consul, the administrative burden was—once again—so disproportionate to the meagre sums eventually paid that he requested a new procedure from the Swiss Federal Council in 1876. From then on, the Dutch Ministry of Colonies disbursed inheritances of up to 250 guilders directly to the Swiss Consuls in Rotterdam or Amsterdam and waived the requirement to present inheritance certificates. Sums exceeding 250 guilders had to be obtained through the Swiss Consulate in Batavia (Jakarta) from the local *Weeskamer* (orphans’ chamber).¹¹⁰

Nevertheless, it was sporadic that the figure actually exceeded 250 guilders. *Table 3* indicates that out of the 1,490 known cases of deceased Swiss mercenaries' inheritances, this only applied to 15. The highest amount totalled 6,547.97 guilders and belonged to Hans Konrad Keller, who died as "*Chef der Militaire administratie bij de Expeditie tegen Boni*" in 1859 after almost 20 years of service.¹¹¹ However, since the bulk of the Swiss mercenaries did not advance to these upper echelons, they could hardly save anything prior to their death. Accordingly, the total sum of inheritances reported to Swiss administration is also relatively low: it amounts to roughly 32,325 guilders.

Inheritance (in guilders)	Persons	% out of 1,490
0 - 5	1011	67.8%
5.1 - 10	148	9.9%
10.1 - 20	141	9.5%
20.1 - 30	47	3.2%
30.1 - 50	44	3.0%
50.1 - 100	45	3.0%
100 - 249	39	2.6%
250 - 500	7	0.5%
500 - 1000	6	0.4%
1000+	2	0.1%

Table 3: Inheritances of Swiss mercenaries, 1848–1914.

Who Got the Money—And Who Did Not?

It is unknown how much of the 32,325 guilders was transferred to Switzerland, especially since, for some, the administrative effort did not seem worthwhile given the often modest amount. At least 63 cases are recorded in which the heirs explicitly disclaimed the inheritance. For instance, given the small sum of 3.22 guilders, Carl Gottlieb Baumgartner's mother made no effort to gather the necessary documents, so the authorities had to assume that she lacked interest in the inheritance.¹¹² Similarly, the brother of the deceased mercenary Henri Blanc waived "the small sum" of 3.48 guilders, and the heirs of Johann Jakob Näf renounced "the insignificant estate" of 4.97 guilders.¹¹³ The guardianship authority of Bellmund, canton of Bern, to name another example, rejected 31.18 guilders of the deceased mercenary Rudolf Hauser, although it had to cover the care of his two children.¹¹⁴

On occasion, the relatives of mercenaries would put forth supplementary requests. For instance, in the case of the deceased mercenary Jakob Speck from Zug, his father consented to relinquish his son's inheritance in exchange for receiving more comprehensive information concerning the circumstances of his illness and the precise cause of death.¹¹⁵ Compared to the body of correspondence concerning inheritance payments, such requests were seldomly made. The scarcity of these enquiries might be explained by the fact that the relatives did not have the money to conduct further investigations. Speck's father also specified his request and stated that it could only be carried out if the costs would not exceed the inheritance "because his circumstances do not allow for the assessment of further costs."¹¹⁶

Beyond the rejection of inheritances, there were other reasons why colonial money did not end up in Switzerland. Sometimes, the inheritance—or at least a part—remained with the mercenaries' spouses and children in the Dutch East Indies, as was the case for Heinrich Furrer's estate. In 1862, as an ordinary colonial soldier, Furrer married the 22-year-old Johanna Engelina Heim in Soerakarta (Surakarta), with whom he had fathered a son out of wedlock two years earlier.¹¹⁷ Presumably, Heim was a *nyai* (that is a colonised woman, primarily of Javanese, Chinese or Indo-European descent, living as a concubine of a European man), as European women from the colonial upper class did not usually consort with rank and file soldiers.¹¹⁸ Her marriage to Furrer endowed her with additional rights so that she and her child were entitled to receive half of the inheritance, 109 guilders. The *Weeskamer* held the other half back until eligible relatives in Switzerland could be found. Whether it could identify anyone is not documented further. If not, the two heirs would ultimately have been awarded the entire inheritance according to the law of the Dutch East Indies.¹¹⁹

However, as pointed out in chapter 3, it was rather unusual for a European soldier to marry a *nyai*. On the one hand, the lower ranks were only allowed to marry with a special permit from the Dutch East Indies' government, and they could hardly cover the high costs of processing the legal recognition of their relationship. On the other hand, it seems that several soldiers also refrained from marrying so that the *nyais* could not raise any legal claims against them. As long as they were not married, a soldier could expel "his" *nyai* and their child from the barracks at any time, and he had no financial obligations once he returned to Europe without them at the end of his service.¹²⁰ What further consequences this could have for a *nyai* is shown by the case of the perished mercenary Friedrich Schärer. While his minor, legally recognised daughter, who was living in the Dutch East Indies, obtained half of the estate of 205.68 guilders, her mother is not mentioned in the probate proceedings. Either she had already passed away before Schärer, or she was—what appears to be more likely—not married to him. Anyhow, the other half of the inheritance was sent to Schärer's mother, who dwelt in the canton of Bern in Switzerland.¹²¹

At the same time, however, numerous cases are documented in which the heirs withdrew even the smallest sum. Johannes and Maria Ritschard, for example, demanded the payment of 6 guilders belonging to their son, who died in Sumatra in 1890, since they were—as the local police stated—“impecunious and old”.¹²² Jules Vuilleumier, to give another example, asked the government of the canton of Neuchâtel to initiate the procurement of 2.81 guilders belonging to his brother, who had passed away in Samarang.¹²³ Apart from 6.53 guilders, mercenary Karl Schmid also left behind six siblings, and “a destitute mother who will be grateful for the sending of the bequest” as the State Chancellery of the canton of Zurich assumed in 1881.¹²⁴ Overall, poverty seemed to be the most urgent reason to take action, as the following issue highlights: in 1885, Jakob Peyer’s father sought the support of the Swiss authorities so that the *Weeskamer* in Batavia would disburse his son’s inheritance to him after only two years instead of three. (According to the law of the Dutch East Indies, soldiers’ estates were withheld for three years to pay off eventual debts.) The local council supported Peyer’s request,

since the aforementioned—an old man who, as a grandfather, still bears obligations towards his grandchildren, he from his earnings as a silk weaver—has to live so miserably [...].¹²⁵

Moreover, especially when the bereaved relatives were firmly dependent on the welfare support of their municipality, the local authorities insisted on the acquisition of the inheritance. The case of the bricklayer Caspar Odermatt provides a vivid example of this: without informing anyone, he disappeared in 1858, leaving behind his wife and two children in Stans, canton of Nidwalden, to join the KNIL. Whether the highest politician of the canton at the time, *Landammann* Louis Wyrsh, who lived off a lucrative Dutch pension and was popularly referred to as “Borneo Louis” because of his long-standing employment in the KNIL, inspired him to seek glory and money in the colonies remains unknown.¹²⁶ However, we may assume that Odermatt concealed his civilian status when he was recruited, as a married man was only eligible for enlistment with the written consent of his spouse.¹²⁷ On February 19, 1860, he died on Java, and it took eight years for the news of his death to reach his relatives. However, his estate of 3.33 guilders did not flow straight to the widow and their children. On the contrary, the poor relief administration of Stans, which mediated for the family in this matter, claimed the right to pocket the money since it had financially supported the widow and her children beforehand.¹²⁸

This is just one example of how local authorities tried to seize one of their deceased citizens’ estates. Another is that of Fidel Camenzind, who served twice in the KNIL: from 1868 to 1874 and from 1885 until he died in 1888. Between his assignments, he returned to Europe and presumably started a family. When he ultimately passed away in Sumatra in 1888, the authorities of the city of Lucerne

claimed his inheritance (twelve guilders) for themselves, “as the deceased left us an impoverished family”.¹²⁹ Likewise, the authorities of the canton of Zurich claimed the 5.55 guilders of Albert Sutz, who died in Soerabaja (Surabaya) in 1875, on the grounds,

that both the deceased and his parents had received support from the local welfare office [in the municipality of Sternenbergl]; in particular, that his father was very deprived.¹³⁰

Even in cases where no heirs could be identified, local authorities seized the money, as exemplified by the poor relief department of the municipality of Wigoltingen, canton of Thurgau. It claimed the small sum of 2.32 guilders of the mercenary Johann Menzi, as he had allegedly caused them “considerable” costs.¹³¹ Similarly, the poor relief fund of Rottenschwil, canton of Aargau, collected the estate of Heinrich Steiner (12.75 guilders), as he had also received poor relief before his service.¹³² Nevertheless, even if it was not completely clear whether the poor relief fund had supported the mercenary in question, demands for the inheritances arose, such as those made by the municipality of Russwil, canton of Lucerne. Although it could not locate any relatives of the deceased Anton Meyer, it intended to confiscate his estate (52.17 guilders) without further substantiating its claim. In support of its request, the State Chancellery of the canton of Lucerne justified its claim to the Federal Chancellery with the following conjecture:

We note in passing that the deceased was an illegitimate son, whose mother may well have died, who also left hardly any descendants, but for whom the Heimathgemeinderath may have provided orphan support in early years, without reimbursement he would now be entitled to claim from the estate according to our Poor Law.¹³³

The indication that Meyer was an illegitimate child was ultimately sufficient for the federal administration to authorise the money transfer from the Swiss Consul in Rotterdam to the municipality of Russwil.¹³⁴ In general, such interventions of local (welfare) authorities reflected not least their growing overstraining. Still based on practices dating back to the sixteenth century, they struggled to keep pace with the new forms of poverty brought about by industrialisation.¹³⁵ As the above examples amply demonstrate, more than one local welfare authority was grateful for every cent they could obtain. Nevertheless, it should be added that in rare cases, money from relatives who died in Switzerland also flowed in reverse to the Dutch East Indies. Thanks to the mediation of the Swiss Consul in Batavia, the soldier Johann Jakob Gottschall received an inheritance from both his father and his uncle.¹³⁶

However, the aspect of cash flow is only one salient component in the analysis of inheritance payments. Another aspect concerns the question of who was entitled

as heir in the first place. The inheritance rights of wives, concubines and children residing in the Dutch East Indies have already been discussed, emphasising the importance of legal recognition through the father, respectively through the husband. At this point, the social status of the sisters and mothers of the mercenaries shall be elucidated. As the following incident illustrates, a gender-specific, bourgeois worldview was disseminated among the lower classes through interlocking bureaucracies. In 1869, the mercenary Johann Bollinger passed away in Samarang. One year later, his brother and sister, who lived in Switzerland, were identified as his legitimate heirs. Gottfried Keller, who was not only a renowned writer, famous for his novels such as *Der grüne Heinrich* but also the canton's highest civil servant at the time, advanced 57 guilders to the deceased's brother out of his pocket as the latter was in financial difficulties and sought to emigrate to Italy. In doing so, Keller indulged in the false belief that the Dutch authorities would soon reimburse him. However, the latter classified the papers submitted as insufficient "because a *married* woman is listed as a co-heiress and therefore the co-signature of her husband is indispensable".¹³⁷ Eventually, Keller was able to obtain the husband's signature and thus received his money after all. Whether the brother who had emigrated to Italy gave his sister, Anna Katharina Winz-Bollinger, her share of the money is unknown.¹³⁸ Maria Elisabeth Plüss had to endure similar bureaucratic chicanery. Although the Dutch authorities paid her the 3.59 guilders left by her deceased son in Samarang, they rejected her receipt since her current husband had not co-signed it. Therefore, she had to resubmit the documents.¹³⁹

In this sense, these transregional bureaucratic networks reflected and perpetuated the patriarchal and bourgeois logic at the time, according to which the husband was considered the sole breadwinner and "head of the family" (a condition in Switzerland that was only abolished in 1988 with the revision of matrimonial law). Since this argument is further set out in chapter 5, it suffices to say that this ideal of a gender-specific division of labour remained an illusion among the working class in Switzerland until the 1930s because many families simply could not afford to live without women's income.¹⁴⁰

Conclusion

It is a trivial insight that money constituted a fundamental factor in creating and maintaining a mercenary army. Nevertheless, the role that money played for colonial rank-and-file mercenaries has hardly been examined in detail so far. This chapter set out to follow money transactions across transimperial borders. In doing so, it has discerned four strands. The first was signature premiums, offering aspirants a lucrative financial incentive, often equivalent to several months' wages.

Even though most Swiss mercenaries had already spent this money when they left for the Dutch East Indies, it served an additional purpose. With the abolition of the recruiting offices near the Swiss border, the signature premiums served as collateral for recruiting agents and hotel owners to lure young men from Switzerland to Harderwijk.

The second strand concerned salaries. Although European rank-and-file soldiers earned more—or at least received better equipment—than the non-European soldiers, their pay was still relatively modest. Moreover, the little money they were able to set aside was usually immediately reinvested in alcohol. Besides the regular payday, however, there were other ways to supplement one's budget, for example, through specific additional jobs such as barber, painter, bookbinder or rifle craftsman, or through unlawful acts such as theft or embezzlement.

Overall, signature premiums and salaries facilitated entry into the military sphere and helped bypass a period of personal economic precariousness. However, in contrast to pension and gratification payments, their economic effect was rather ephemeral. Although pensions and gratification payments too remained comparatively small in absolute terms, they provided considerable relief in countless cases over several years, not only for the veterans but also for their families and local authorities.

Similar observations can be made about the fourth strand, the inheritance payments. Even though these were usually extremely modest, the bereaved families and local authorities made considerable administrative efforts to receive them. As was shown in the numerous examples, even the most minuscule sums represented a financial relief in the precarious everyday life of the relatives.

Following these colonial cash flows finally allowed a reconstruction of a hitherto unseen transimperial network of private service providers and interlocking bureaucracies that connected the Dutch colonial empire with the remotest Alpine valleys in the European hinterland. This hinterland was a vital reservoir of personnel in the military labour market. Money had to flow in the other direction to ensure a steady influx of mercenaries from this area. In cooperation with local authorities, individual actors with a transimperial military past, or later increasingly private companies such as law firms or banks, guaranteed the smooth flow of payments. Especially in cases of gratification and pension payments, but also in bequests, the Dutch colonial state thus advanced to become an important welfare provider beyond its own imperial borders.

These are preliminary indications that future research will benefit from contextualising the genesis of the European welfare state in a transimperial context.¹⁴¹ For the network reconstructed here can be extended not only to the other countries from which the KNIL drew its mercenaries, such as Belgium or Germany but also in a similar way to the transimperial network of the French

Foreign Legion. For example, in the mid-1880s, the Swiss ambassador based in Paris sent lists of names of Swiss mercenaries who were deceased in the French Foreign Legion's ranks during the conquest of Tonkin (present-day North Vietnam) to the Federal Chancellery. Moreover, pension matters of Foreign Legion veterans were also partly settled through this channel.¹⁴² These insights ultimately reveal how important it is to understand European colonialism not only beyond national, but also beyond imperial borders.

Trace the Memory: Relics and Representation in the Transimperial Cultural Archive

Abstract

Through the mercenaries' networks, specific ideas and colonial stereotypes spread across the borders of the Dutch Empire into the European hinterland. Before delving into the Swiss mercenaries' "colonial gaze", this chapter examines these thought patterns' materiality (e.g., letters, narratives, postcards or collector's items). In doing so, it becomes apparent that even in a country without formal colonial possessions, both rural and urban milieus were tangentially affected by this colonial experience throughout all social classes.

Keywords: cultural history, cultural archive, collective memory, racism, colonialism without colonies

In her critically acclaimed book *White Innocence: Paradoxes of Colonialism and Race*, Dutch anthropologist Gloria Wekker contends that "an unacknowledged reservoir of knowledge and feelings based on four hundred years of imperial rule have played a vital but unacknowledged part in the dominant meaning-making processes taking place in Dutch society, until now".¹ Following Edward Said, who has underscored the impact of imperialism on historical configurations in "Western culture", Wekker conceptualises this reservoir as a "cultural archive". This archive, she elaborates, "is located in many things, in the way we think, do things, and look at the world, in what we find (sexually) attractive, in how our affective and rational economies are organised and intertwined". Thus, Wekker's concept refers neither to a set of documents nor to the institution that houses them, "but to a 'repository of memory' [...], in the heads and hearts of people in the metropole".²

This chapter takes Wekker's argument as a starting point and pushes it beyond the borders of the Dutch Empire. It explores how the Dutch imperial experience took root in the Swiss mercenaries' hearts and minds and how they subsequently fed a transimperial "repository of memory" towards the end of the nineteenth century.³ However, unlike Wekker, whose analysis is more concerned with present-day effects, this chapter is interested in tracing how this cultural archive was forged at the time of imperial rule. Based on letters, postcards, published memoirs, diaries and newspaper articles, it shall therefore reconstruct bits and pieces of

the mercenaries' "colonial gaze" and its proliferation throughout Switzerland, allowing for adequate access to the cultural archive. A rich body of literature has already addressed the colonial gaze of European actors, arguing that the gaze with which European colonising subjects looked at non-European peoples was shaped by different racist and hierarchising ideologies such as social Darwinism or the "civilising mission", serving to construct a supposedly deficient "Other" and legitimising European domination.⁴ However, the bulk of these studies engaged with sources manufactured by middle and upper-class clerks, cosmopolites, merchants, scientists or missionaries. Taking this into account, Christian Koller has recently argued that self-testimonies authored by mercenaries from the French Foreign Legion provide an exciting testing ground for the social reach of the colonial gaze beyond elitist discourses.⁵

Thus, this chapter extends Wekker's spatial framework that is confined to the Dutch metropole and its colonies and adds to a growing amount of literature pointing out that European colonialism was in many respects a shared project since structures and actors from both within and beyond colonial Empires contributed to their imperial trajectories.⁶ This is not to say, however, that European colonialism should be seen as a homogeneous and monolithic entity, but rather that a shared imperial reservoir of knowledge was built up and drawn upon by means of transregional or transimperial actors and processes, whereby the individual contribution to and sourcing of this reservoir differed regionally.⁷

To retrace the mercenaries' colonial memories, this chapter starts with an outline of the means and scope of its dissemination. It will examine in which social milieus colonial imaginaries circulated in Switzerland and to what extent they fed an imperial reservoir of knowledge.⁸ Having elucidated the role of letters, picture postcards, memoirs, spoken words and objects as vehicles of the colonial gaze, it will then turn to its content, discussing the construction of clichéd group images in both the civilian and the military spheres.

Sharing the Mercenary Experience

To explore the colonial gaze's social reach, combining Wekker's cultural archive with Aleida and Jan Assmann's conception of the collective memory is helpful. According to the latter, the collective memory comprises two segments, a communicative and a cultural memory. The communicative memory is adjacent to everyday life experience and includes memories from the recent past that a person shares with a social group as part of daily communication. Thus, its lifespan is relatively brief, encompassing three to four generations. On the other hand, the cultural memory is characterised by ritualised and organised communication through

which the past is permanently fixed.⁹ As Christof Dejung points out, one difference between these two forms of memory is the power imbalance of transmission, meaning that specific communicative memories do not become known to a wider public because they contain the memories of marginalised groups for which there is no interest in the media public sphere.¹⁰

Given that the commemoration of mediaeval and early modern Swiss mercenary regiments was a constitutive element for the “imagined community” of the modern Swiss federal state,¹¹ one might expect colonial mercenaries to appear in the cultural archive as well. However, as outlined in chapter 2, colonial mercenary services of the nineteenth century were met with widespread criticism because they no longer corresponded to the enlightened, nationalist and liberal ideals that prevailed among the ruling classes at the time. Moreover, mercenarism was no longer organised in regiments and controlled by a few rich and influential families but was based on the individual decision of men willing to emigrate, most of whom hailed from the lower middle or lower classes. Colonial mercenaries thus belonged to those marginalised groups whose memories were primarily confined to the realm of the communicative memory. Unlike the private sources of men from the upper class, their self-testimonies usually never made it into public archives. Fortunately, this book draws on two hitherto unknown private archives offering, in addition to the published memoirs, an insight into the communicative memory of nineteenth-century mercenaries. Thus, the following section will discuss the various media used to enlarge disparate communicative memories.

Letters

Through different media, the mercenaries transmitted their experiences to a heterogeneous Swiss audience from all social strata of rural and urban society. Looking at specific correspondences, such as those from Arnold Egloff or Heinrich Brandenberger,¹² it seems plausible to assume that letters played an important role in granting a constant flow of information between the European mercenaries in the colonies and their extended families in the European hinterland. For example, Egloff grew up in a debt-ridden Catholic farming family of eight in Niederrohrdorf, a small farming village in the canton of Aargau with a population of 631 around 1900.¹³ In a mixture of poor High German, Swiss dialect and occasional Dutch words, he wrote home regularly about his service, colonial subjects or sites, such as the Borobudur, from 1889 until his violent death in 1894. At times, there was little to tell, and the letters served rather as a means to maintain contact with his loved ones than to convey information. This pattern resonates with that of field post letters written by soldiers from European frontlines in the nineteenth century.¹⁴ Appreciating this correspondence, Egloff’s parents and sibling responded jointly in

long letters, reporting on local events in Switzerland and asking about life, food and compatriots in the Dutch East Indies or whether “he, too, had to hunt savages”.¹⁵ Sometimes they, too, hardly shared anything at all, like Egloff’s brother in 1890, who just noted: “Dear brother, since your father has written all the news, I do not know much to write to you, except to repeat that you will write again as soon as possible about what your food is like, your work, the climate and what kind of trade and commerce is going on there.”¹⁶ Moreover, this quote shows the family’s curiosity and their insufficient knowledge of the Dutch East Indies. In line with that, Egloff’s father stated elsewhere that he had already “rummaged through all the papers but read little about India”.¹⁷

Comparable to Egloff, Brandenberger grew up in a farming family in a rural region in the 1880s but moved to Zurich for professional reasons at the age of seventeen.¹⁸ As the letters show, his parents, too, migrated to the city, where his father worked as a porter (see *figure 8*). Between 1902 and 1919, Heinrich wrote around 60 letters to his parents and three siblings, in which he reported on everyday life in the colonies, his worries, his relationship with his concubine and later wife Lina (or Sampet, as she was called before her baptism), reflected on the trade in Swiss watches or commented on the political landscape in Switzerland.¹⁹ In this case, too, the family appreciated the exchange of information and regularly replied in long letters.



Figure 8: Verso of a picture postcard sent by Heinrich Brandenberger, 13 March, 1907, addressed to his father, the porter of the Magneta watch factory in Zurich. Postcard SSA, Ar 201.303 (Original privately owned by the Brandenberger family, Switzerland).

Picture postcards

However, Brandenberger did not only communicate by letter. He also sent around 160 picture postcards because they were cheaper than the constant exchange of letters, as he explained to his parents in 1903.²⁰ Most likely, Brandenberger was not alone in sending postcards home. Many of his motifs can also be found in the KITLV digital collection.²¹ It can therefore be assumed that other colonial soldiers also regularly sent postcards. According to historian Jens Jäger, the analysis of such picture postcards can be revealing since they had to compete in a market and were developed in the process of adjustment between producer and consumer, reflecting contemporary currents and moods.²² In a similar vein, art historian Sophie Junge has recently expounded that they “helped shape an overall image of foreign cultures and territories that would otherwise have not been comprehensible nor visible to the so-called ‘armchair-traveller’”.²³ Nevertheless, it must be emphasised that images develop a life of their own and, as John Tagg put it, only unfold their meaning in the context of their reception.²⁴ Unfortunately, we do not know how Brandenberger’s family interpreted the picture postcards. As members of the urban lower class, however, they were also familiar with colonial representation. We can therefore assume that they interpreted postcards within the framework of colonial discourses of alterity.

Memoirs

In her work on memoirs written by Napoleonic War veterans, historian Matilda Greig has shown that the genre of war memoirs was popular throughout Europe in the nineteenth century, leading many authors to design their books as commercial objects to satisfy the demands of a literary “industry”.²⁵ From the 1880s onwards, veterans from the French Foreign Legion increasingly entered this literary industry with their own publications. They were usually fully aware of their target audience and drew on common colonial and exoticising discourses to monetise their experiences in the Legion.²⁶ Likewise, a few Swiss KNIL veterans also took their chances in this industry after the turn of the century. Their memoirs were aimed at a variety of audiences and were received in different circles. Anton Camenzind’s memoirs, for example, never progressed beyond the stage of a manuscript and circulated only within his family. Carl August Haab published his memoirs in his print shop about fifty years after his return home, for whom and how many samples is not documented. Edwin Eckert, Ernst Hauser, Karl Schmid and Augustin Zehnder, on the other hand, had their memoirs published professionally, thus ensuring them a wider reach.²⁷ For instance, Augustin Zehnder’s KNIL-memoirs were reviewed in the *Walliser Volksfreund*, a weekly newspaper for catholic farmers and labourers

in the mountainous southwestern part of Switzerland, and Edwin Eckert's account of his time in Java was partially reprinted in the local newspaper of Steckborn, another rural and relatively peripheral region bordering Germany in the canton of Thurgau—as a warning against colonial mercenary services.²⁸

Spoken Words

As already explained in chapter 3, returnees played a vital role in disseminating colonial knowledge. It can be assumed that many veterans perpetuated colonial thought patterns in their narratives, but this cannot be said with certainty, given the fleeting nature of the spoken word. From individual sources, however, we know that former mercenaries also gave public talks, the contents of which have been handed down in a rudimentary form. Captain von Ernst, for example, gave a lecture to the Geographical Society of Bern in 1883, which was later published in their journal. Well aware that this was a scientific audience, von Ernst emphasised that they could not expect a scientific lecture from a soldier.²⁹ It is unclear how many public talks were given by veterans. Nonetheless, various hints suggest that this was not limited to geographical societies. In 1903, the Dutch Vice-Consul, for example, sneaked “without the speaker's knowledge” into a lecture by a former KNIL mercenary to the workers' association in Davos (a Swiss village in the canton of Graubünden).³⁰ According to the newspaper *Davoser Zeitung*, the event that took place in the “*Hotel Bahnhof*” (“Hotel Railway station”) was “relatively well attended”.³¹ To give another example, the former colonial soldier R. Jucker held a lecture wearing an “Indian uniform” at the Hotel “Emmenthal” in Thun, canton of Bern, in 1901. As can be seen from the Gazette *Täglicher Anzeiger für Thun und das Berner Oberland*, the audience could listen to his tale of a “massacre of a 50-man troop at Tonkop” and “a battle at Edi”, as well as an “admonition to the youth” for an entrance fee of 40 cents.³²

Objects

Like in other European countries, numerous ethnographic collections sprouted up in Switzerland in the second half of the nineteenth century. These collections transmitted both colonial knowledge and fantasies, serving a number of purposes: to present visitors with a comparative picture of different civilisations usually staged as becoming extinct or underdeveloped, to bring colonial spaces closer to the European metropole, to impart scientific knowledge, to express criticism of industrialised modernity or to prepare merchants for their deployment in non-European territories.³³

To guarantee constant growth, ethnographic collections depended on a global network of anthropologists, travellers, or merchants who either sold or

even donated ethnographic objects to them. The donors included scientists, merchants, plantation managers and medical doctors, all of whom had roamed colonial spaces.³⁴ Even Swiss physicians of the KNIL, such as Conrad Kläsi, who had served in the Aceh War from 1879 to 1885, contributed to the enlargement of Swiss collections.³⁵

Interestingly, KNIL mercenaries hardly figured among the donors, although they were far superior in numbers in the colonies. The only exceptions known so far are some objects in the *Nidwalden Museum*, collected by KNIL officer Louis Wyrsh from 1816 to 1832, and some pieces at the *Burgmuseum Zug*, which were acquired by KNIL major Franz Josef Michael Letter.³⁶ However, it is unclear when these objects were made publicly accessible. In Letter's case, for example, there are indications that he gifted some weapons to the *Zuger Zeughaus* (Zug Armoury) during his lifetime.³⁷ Still, a large part of the collection was only donated to the *Burgmuseum* by a private donor in the 1990s.³⁸

There is a simple explanation for the absence of mercenaries among public donors. Drawing on Philipp Sarasin, Andreas Zangger has argued that collecting and donating ethnographica were part of a specific habitus of the European bourgeoisie, allowing them to display their cosmopolitanism publicly.³⁹ Especially from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards, men from the lower classes who were subject to different social norms predominantly joined the Dutch colonial army. Within this context, mercenaries collected objects mostly for private, rarely also for commercial use, as the example of Schmid vividly illustrates. Schmid reported in 1912, how he looted two notebooks containing Arabic verses from the Koran from a killed "priest" after he had stormed a mosque in Aceh.⁴⁰ Elsewhere he mentioned how he had "in a short time built up a considerable collection of butterflies, beetles, scorpions, large poisonous spiders, [...] even flying lizards, snakes" and preserved them by placing them in spirit.⁴¹ Finally, medals and war badges also served him as souvenirs of his time in service. But, unfortunately, he lost them with his diary in a fire in Bern in 1908.⁴²

Like Schmid, Brandenberger, too, told his parents in 1911 how he had amassed a collection of "pretty stones, corals, teeth of crocodiles, wild pigs, deer horns etc., washed up pieces of sponges etc.," and added that this would be a "pretty memory" for them.⁴³ The deer horns, he was convinced, would make an excellent addition to the living room.⁴⁴ He also sent a snakeskin for his brother to sell in Switzerland. However, he found no takers, and Brandenberger advised him to make slippers out of it.⁴⁵

These two examples show that the mercenaries did collect "exotic" animals and plants but that they rather tended to keep them together with their military medals and certificates as personal mementos and less as a public or even "scientific" object of prestige. To the historians' chagrin, it is, therefore, challenging to trace their ascribed meaning and its circulation within the boundaries of a communicative memory.

The Colonial Gaze of Swiss Mercenaries

Having discussed the different types of media with which the colonial gaze was conveyed, the subsequent section attempts to outline its content. First of all, however, an important point ought to be addressed. From the outset, the colonial gaze of the mercenaries was permeated by a colonial logic that was either reinforced or overturned in the encounter with non-European subjects. Some scholars, such as Eva Bischoff, have thus warned against conceptualising a static distinction between the “European self” and the “extra-European other”, assigning the latter only a passive and objectified role. Drawing on Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Bischoff argues instead for understanding the subject’s identity not as an inner essence but as an ongoing process of becoming, composed of a multiplicity of relations arranged in the form of a rhizome. In her work on cannibalism, she understands neither the white male identity nor cannibal alterity as independent identities but rather as a complex network of relations from which both positions unfolded in a reciprocal process.⁴⁶

The same applies to the colonial space of the Dutch East Indies. The extra-European “Other” described by the mercenaries was by no means a passive object. On the contrary, strong resistance from enemy troops, different combat behaviour from “Javanese” or “Ambonese” comrades, as well as the diverse strategies with which the *nyais* manoeuvred through the misogynous and racialised environment of the barracks, meant that the Europeans’ concepts were bound to be challenged and the “grammar of difference” had to be renegotiated time and again.⁴⁷ Bearing this in mind, the following section examines—as far as the available source fragments allow—recurrent components of the Swiss mercenaries’ colonial gazes that were shaped by resistance, demarcation and exchange in the colonial contact zone, and thereby attempts to draw conclusions about their identity formation as male, Christian, European and Swiss subjects.

Colonised Subjects

When Swiss mercenaries portrayed the civilian population of the Malay archipelago, they tied in with popular colonial and exotic discourses of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, referring to supposedly homogeneous ethnic groups that could be clearly demarcated from each other. As this section will show, this categorisation occurred along four strands.

“Javanese” & “Malayans”

The first strand concerns the representation of the “Javanese” and “Malayans”. Although scattered references to highly respected wealthy Javanese princes

circulate in the narratives of the mercenaries—for instance, ex-mercenary von Ernst praised their dignified appearance and excellent manners in 1883⁴⁸—negative and generalising portrayals of the broader population generally prevailed. In a letter published in the *Revue Militaire Suisse* in 1859, to give one example, an anonymous French-speaking Swiss mercenary mocked the “ugly figure” of the “indigenous people” living in Batavia (Jakarta) and compared their manners to those of monkeys, as they “picked up objects from the ground with their feet”.⁴⁹ Furthermore, he feminised Javanese men by emphasising that they have the same hairstyle as Javanese women, which apparently often leads to misunderstandings among newcomers.⁵⁰ In a similar vein, a German-speaking colleague commented in the daily *Der Bund* in 1860 that the local population was “stupid and ignorant and very poorly dressed” and that men and women did not differ in their costumes any more than they differed in their hairstyle.⁵¹ Both local clothing and gender-fluid hairstyles function as recurrent markers of difference in numerous narratives. Recounting his time in Java in the 1860s, Carl August Haab, for instance, emphasised that “Javanese clothing” was “very simple” and that men’s hair was “as long as that of women”.⁵² Around sixty years later, the clothing of the Javanese still served as an important marker of difference, as the following excerpt from a letter by Brandenberger illustrates. Writing to his parents in 1909, he highlights that

as can be seen from the picture postcards sent, the clothing of the Jav.[anese; P.K.] people is very simple. The fact that cleanliness is not a priority for the Javanese can best be seen in their clothes, which are nice only once and that is just when they are new. It is better with the people who are forced by their earnings to deal with the European element.⁵³

Figure 9 may well be one of those monochrome picture postcards to which Brandenberger alluded. The card he had already sent to his father in 1907 bears the caption “*Kampong Gezicht*” (village view). The omission of the actual village name suggests to the European viewer that this was an exemplary Javanese village. The picture shows a few people standing on a street next to wooden houses and looking into the camera. The person in the middle of the group stands out because of his dark European clothes. In contrast, the people surrounding him wear bright skirts, and some have no shirts at all. Along with the explanations in the letter, this arrangement highlights the cultural differences between Europeans and Javanese and implicitly provides them with a hierarchical order. According to these worldviews, the Javanese were conceived as a less civilised and less masculine group than the Europeans.

Apart from clothing and external features, the supposedly self-sufficient character of the Javanese played a vital role in the European representation of the colonised subjects. For instance, Haab narrated how easily pleased the Javanese were: “The Javanese household was very simple and cheap. With black coffee with



Figure 9: Postcard “Kampong Gezicht”. Sent by Heinrich Brandenberger to his father, 13 March, 1907. SSA, Ar 201.303 (Original privately owned by the Brandenberger family, Switzerland).

sugar, rice with sambalgori [sambal goreng, P.K.], some fish or ding-ding (sun-dried buffalo meat), people were happy and content.”⁵⁴ Former Captain Ferdinand von Ernst provides a further example of recycling this topos of the alleged self-sufficient Javanese. Reporting to the Geographical Society of Bern on his experience in the service of the KNIL, he described “the Javanese” in 1883 as follows:

Generally speaking, the Javanese is quiet, serious-minded, hard-working and unpretentious. He is a born farmer and nobleman. [...] At the same time, however, he has an incredible phlegm, does not understand why people torment themselves with superfluous work.⁵⁵

The European depictions of the Javanese as supposedly backward, self-indulgent peasants resonated with both the expression of a European sense of superiority and romanticised admiration for their way of life, which was in touch with nature and not yet corrupted by the process of industrialisation. For instance, the anonymous non-commissioned officer mentioned above, who regularly reported from Java for the daily *Der Bund*, stated in 1861:

The Javanese, this simple child of nature, has a peaceful character and lives perhaps more happily than many Europeans. A small hut, shaded by coconut trees, pisang trees and other fruit trees, together with a rice sack, which he tends with his faithful kurbo, buffalo, make him happy. Under his mild sky, he has few needs.⁵⁶



Figure 10: Mercenary Arnold Egloff also told his parents about an ancient civilisation, using Borobudur as an example, and even sketched it in a small booklet in 1892. SSA, Ar 201.303.




Figure 11: Excerpt of a letter from Egloff illustrating the ploughs. Source: Egloff to his parents and siblings, 28 March, 1891, SSA, Ar 201.303.

It is noteworthy that in these depictions, the Javanese were not understood as savages, despite their life with nature, but as farmers. According to Augustin Zehnder's memoirs published in 1924, it is even a "grave error" to regard the "Javanese as savages".⁵⁷ For example, the splendid temple ruins in the interior of Java would testify to the highly developed Javanese culture during Hindu times. Given this once blossoming culture, Zehnder elaborated that "educated Javanese voiced the justified complaint that the rule of the '*Blandas*' (Dutch) had not been beneficial to them, in that they had been culturally higher in the past than they are now".⁵⁸ Likewise, Brandenberger argued in a letter of 1909, referring to a polyglot Javanese named Mangon who had worked on French and English ships: "a new proof that the disgusting stupidity of his compatriots is not to be found in their lack of comprehension but in their lack of education."⁵⁹ Both Zehnder and Brandenberger, whose period of service coincided with the *ethische politiek* (see chapter 2), consequently attributed the alleged lack of the Javanese civilisation to the failure of the Dutch colonial government.

In contrast to his portrayal of the Javanese, Zehnder wrote less favourably about the "Malay", a trading "people" that had spread throughout the archipelago over the century. The Malays, as he stated, were "extremely intelligent, cunning and treacherous and only honest as long as it is profitable". Furthermore, he added that they are "more docile than the Javanese, but not as reliable".⁶⁰ Nonetheless, he concluded that the differences between these two groups were relatively marginal.

The Malay, Mohammedans as well as the Javanese, have pretty much the same habits in everything, and are hardly distinguishable from them in shape, except that the Malay wears his hair as long as the women, but under a turban-like headscarf.⁶¹

This quote shows the socially constructed boundaries between Malays and Javanese were porous. Finally, it must be mentioned that not all reports were limited to common colonial stereotypes. Egloff's colonial gaze, for instance, was mingled with a farmer's one since he was a farmer's son. Telling in detail to his parents how the Javanese cultivated their fields in 1891, he illustrated his account with small sketches of a plough (see *figure 11*).⁶²

"Foreign Orientals"

The colonial stereotype of the "Javanese" or "Malay" is often juxtaposed with that of the so-called "*Vreemde Oosterlingen*" ("foreign orientals"), mainly diasporic Chinese and Arabs.⁶³ For instance, talking about his time in the Ambarawa Valley, Brandenberger wrote in 1909 that "the Javanese" knew nothing about trade, "so that 90 per cent of it rests in the hands of the Chinese. In Ambarawa, for example, there is not a single Javanese who has a decent 'warong' (restaurant); one is completely



Figure 12: Postcard "Chinesische Kamp Losarie" sent by Heinrich Brandenberger to his Parents, 18 September, 1906. SSA, Ar 201.303 (Original privately owned by the Brandenberger family, Switzerland).



Figure 13: Postcard "Chinesische Kamp. Malang" sent by Heinrich Brandenberger to his parents, 2 June, 1910. SSA, Ar 201.303 (Original privately owned by the Brandenberger family, Switzerland).

dependent on the Chinese who sell the always good ‘bahmi’ in their krotten[?] at 10 and 20 Rp. a portion.”⁶⁴ Six picture postcards of Chinese quarters of Brebes, Magelang, Malang, Ambarawa and Makassar seem to corroborate Brandenberger’s statements. For example, a card sent in 1906 shows several stalls along the street and a shop in a stone house. Another postcard of the “*Chineesche Kamp, Malang*”, mailed in 1910, enforces the impression of the mercantile Chinese. Here, too, various shops and their owners are portrayed, arranged in stone houses along the street.

In contrast to these postcards, which convey a particular order and safety on the streets, other mercenaries pointed out the dangers and vices of such neighbourhoods in their reports. Schmid, for example, wrote in his 1912 memoir that Semarang (Semarang) was home to 30,000 Chinese “who had gambling dens, opium houses and other dangerous stalls in their filthy streets. The Arab quarter was even more notorious.”⁶⁵ Thus, Swiss mercenaries were rather sceptical about the Chinese and Arabs. Camenzind, for example, approached their shops with a certain level of distrust. After having received what he considered an unjustifiably high bill in a restaurant at the beginning of his career during the 1880s, he noted: “the Chinese know how to fool someone.”⁶⁶ To give a further example, Haab described both Chinese and Arabs as traders, comparing them to Jews in Europe. He succinctly stated: “In trade, the Chinese and Arabs are like the Jews: they sell at all prices.”⁶⁷

For the Swiss audience in Haab’s time, it was immediately clear what was meant by this comparison. In the nineteenth century, broad segments of the Swiss population considered Swiss Jews as an “alien body of the nation” and frequently associated them with deceitful dealers.⁶⁸ This anti-Semitic view manifested itself, among other things, in various discriminatory laws. For example, Jews in Switzerland were not allowed to freely choose their place of residence until 1866, and it was not until 1874 that they obtained the freedom of worship.⁶⁹

In the sources presented above, the Swiss authors willingly neglect the centuries of exchange and mingling between Arabic, Chinese and Asian communities,⁷⁰ depicting both Arabs and Chinese as homogeneous diasporic groups who, although they were represented as “oriental”, lived as foreigners in the Dutch colonial empire. According to these representations, they belong neither to the colonisers nor the colonised. Consequently, these representations aim less to emphasise alleged backwardness and more to highlight exoticising aspects of life in the Dutch East Indies.

“Savages”

In addition to the portrayals of the previous groups, a third narrative strand deals with the colonial representation of various ethnicities in the Outer Islands’ colonial frontier as allegedly “savage”, “primitive” or even “anthropophagic”. Although the descriptions written by the mercenaries were not as systematic and meticulous as those of European natural scientists, they nevertheless loosely tied in with the

scientific taxonomic phenomena of the time and the accompanying discussion of the evolutionary developmental stages of human beings.⁷¹ Zehnder, for example, referred to the “*Völker*” (peoples) on “Celebes, Borneo, Sumatra and some other islands [...] whose main occupation is to exterminate each other, to cause difficulties for the government, and who, at times, do not disdain a piece of human flesh at all”.⁷² Likewise, Schmid articulated in 1912 that he was looking forward to his military campaign in Borneo (Kalimantan), “the land of the jungles, the abode of the orang-utang, the gorilla [sic!], the boa constrictor and the home of the Tayakes [Dayak; P.K.], the notorious man-eating people”.⁷³ Already thirty years before Schmid’s memoirs appeared, von Ernst had reported that among the “Bataks” on Sumatra, “there are still anthropophagi, although it is claimed that since the missionaries have penetrated more among them, this abominable custom has disappeared”.⁷⁴ The image of cannibalistic Bataks also figured prominently in Ernst Hauser’s account published in 1927, in which he recounts a missionary telling him how his predecessors had been eaten. Hauser’s vivid description of the scene that is said to have taken place in the hut of the local “chief” Banggalamei in 1834 claims that:

Dammer torches light up the hut. Bloodstained faces and the fumes of boiling cauldrons fill the room. Black, decaying teeth greedily tear the cooked flesh from the bones. Nothing remains of the two missionaries but the bones and skulls claimed by Banggalamei [...].⁷⁵

It is hardly a coincidence that cannibals featured prominently in those accounts that were intended for a wider audience—three of them are published memoirs to entertain their readers. Whether such descriptions corresponded to reality or not is of little interest. Much more compelling is the question of why the idea of cannibals held such fascination for Europeans. Since the early modern period, the figure of the cannibal has played a prominent role in the description of indigenous societies, representing an emblematic barbaric “Other” of extra-European societies.⁷⁶ For example, the famous Austrian travel writer Ida Pfeiffer spread the clichés of the man-eating “Bataks” in her book *Meine zweite Weltreise (My Second World Trip)*, published in 1856. Her descriptions seemed so exciting that the Swiss daily *Die Neue Zürcher Zeitung* did not want to withhold the relevant passage from its readers and printed a lengthy excerpt over four issues.⁷⁷

In Brandenberger’s letters, by contrast, there are no references to anthropophagy. Yet he, too, assesses the population according to their degree of civility. About his stay in Timor in 1917, he commented:

I am still too fresh to pass judgement. However, the well-known fact that everything becomes more primitive the further east you go is striking. Education, housing, clothing reach the lowest conceivable level, until you are lodging in the trees on Guinea.⁷⁸

As Brandenberger points out, it was an unquestioned “fact” that the Papuans of New Guinea were considered the supposedly most primitive people. Against the backdrop of the civilising mission, this reputation would cling to them for a long time to come.⁷⁹

“(Indo-)Europeans”

As described in chapter 3, European civilians rarely socialised with colonial soldiers. They thus appear only marginally in the accounts of the mercenaries. If the latter mentioned them, they usually conveyed the image of the wealthy and privileged European upper class who had a much easier life than they would have had in Europe. Referring to his time in the Dutch East Indies in the 1910s, Zehnder stated that life there was expensive but that wages were high and career opportunities were better than in Europe. According to Zehnder, an ordinary commercial employee received “a salary like that of a Federal Councillor”. “Good craftsmen”, he added, quickly found a well-paid job in which they only had to supervise “because the actual work is done by the natives”.⁸⁰ Although a significant class divide separated the Swiss mercenaries from the European civilians, hardly any disparaging references can be found. Only Zehnder complained that against the background of the outbreak of World War I, the Europeans “suddenly” acted friendly towards the soldiers, an attitude that disgusted him.⁸¹

Besides the European upper class, two additional groups are conspicuous by their absence: first, the impoverished European lower class. This is all the more remarkable because a considerable proportion of them were former colonial soldiers and the Swiss mercenaries were presumably aware of their fate.⁸² One explanation for their absence could be that they conveyed a poor image of colonial service to the readership of the Swiss mercenaries’ self-testimonies, which contradicted that of the successful virile adventurer.

The second group, which is hardly referred to, is that of the Indo-Europeans. This seems noteworthy because other popular accounts on Asia, like *Briefe aus dem fernen Osten* (*Letters from the Far East*), first published in 1885 by the Swiss medical doctor Elias Haffter, discussed—and often mocked—hybrid Eurasian identities.⁸³ This could be, as we shall see below because the mercenaries permanently lived in the colonies and were accustomed to the legal division of the population into “Europeans and those equated with Europeans” and “Natives and those equated with them”.⁸⁴

Domains of the Intimate

In colonial settings, as Ann Laura Stoler has argued, the “domains of the intimate” were not “private” sites but rather mirrored racialised and gendered structures of colonial control since “in these ‘tense and tender ties’ of empire, relations of power were knotted and tightened, loosened and cut, tangled and undone”.⁸⁵ Exploring these imperial ties, Stoler contends, offers new insights into two fields of colonial control: “one that works through the requisition of bodies—those of both colonials and colonised—and a second that moulds new ‘structures of feeling’—new habits of heart and mind that enable those categories of difference and subject formation.”⁸⁶ While the first aspect of the control over and agency of nyais has already been dealt with in chapter 3, the second one shall be addressed in what follows. An analysis of the mercenaries’ view of intimate relations with Indo-European or Asian women provides valuable hints on gendered and racialised aspects of their feelings and attitudes as well as the tensions arising from it.

Egloff’s letters illuminate this point. Reporting to his parents and siblings from the barracks in Magelang in 1893, he wrote that “anyone with a good criminal record can take a Javanese woman to live with him”.⁸⁷ However, he advised against it and added that only those Europeans fall in love “who have not seen a wench in Europe”.⁸⁸ Egloff’s quote reveals three noteworthy points. First, portraying Javanese women as passive objects that can be “taken”, illustrates the European male gaze of the supposed availability of the colonised female body. Second, and linked to this, it insinuates a racial hierarchy wherein Javanese women occupy the bottom rung. Third, the disdainful reference to his comrades, who had not “seen” women in Europe, distinguishes him from them, stressing his popularity among European women and underlining his masculinity. This image is also matched by his (previously mentioned) misogynistic portrayal of the Javanese women as unfaithful “cats” who “only love money”.⁸⁹

Unlike Egloff’s superficial descriptions, both Camenzind’s memoirs and Brandenberger’s letters offer more intimate insights into their thought patterns concerning cross-cultural relationships.⁹⁰ During his service from 1885 to 1897, Camenzind met a retired Swiss mercenary married to a Javanese woman. Shortly afterwards, he tied the knot with their daughter, Maria Narbertina Wullschleger. From a legal stance, Wullschleger had the status of a Catholic European. However, she identified herself more firmly with the religious practices of her Muslim mother. Camenzind could not, or refused to, understand this, which is why conflict broke out time and again. In his memoirs, he thus noted:

Then I once told her mother the truth, I had married a European woman and not a Javanese, my mother-in-law was of course a Javanese. I could have had enough Javanese

women, therefore I would not have needed to marry her daughter, I married her daughter because I thought I was getting a European, but it was just the opposite, because my wife was almost as fanatical as my mother-in-law was about the pagan faith, and she did not want to know anything more about my faith.⁹¹

Like Egloff, Camenzind's quote reveals his gendered and sexualised thought patterns, according to which male Europeans could (more or less) freely dispose of the bodies of colonised Javanese women. Additionally, it illustrates how vital the European status of his wife was to him. This status was characterised, in particular, by a commitment to Christianity. As a *de facto* practising Muslim (her mother was Muslim and not a "pagan"), in Camenzind's eyes, she seemed no better than an ordinary Javanese. Interestingly, skin colour, on the other hand, appeared to be of no importance to him, as a glance at another passage reveals:

She just didn't want to be black and sometimes powdered herself so badly that I thought she was painted white and I laughed at her again and said I could bring oil paint from the Genieloods [= the warehouses of the technical troop, P.K.], zinc white and paint her with it, then it would stay and not come off any more, I was only joking, but she turned wild as a fox.⁹²

While the reception of skin colour was, along with gender, sexuality, religion and class, an essential part of the intersectional framework that determined colonial hierarchies—in fact, Maria Narbertina Wullschleger wanted to be perceived as "whiter" than she felt for certain (structural) reasons—it nevertheless did not seem to have any influence on the European identity legally assigned from the outside in this case. This was quite common for the Dutch Empire. According to historian Bart Luttikhuis, the concept of "Europeanness" was central to the colonial hierarchy of the Dutch East Indies. However, this should not be equated with "whiteness" since—as in the scenes described above—it allowed the actors greater flexibility in attributing group membership. Thus, legal European status sometimes depended on whether or not the European man legally recognised his child.⁹³

Finally, Camenzind's concept of marriage resonates with a point that emerges, as we shall see below, even more clearly in the case of Heinrich and Lina Sampet Brandenberger: the mimicry of the European bourgeois marriage. In his often-quoted essay *Of Mimicry and Man*, Homi K. Bhabha elaborates on colonial mimicry, that is, the almost, but not quite, imitation of the habitus of the colonising white upper class by colonised subjects. "Mimicry", as he expounds, "emerges as the representation of a difference that is itself a process of disavowal".⁹⁴ This ambivalent process thus leads to the erosion of colonial unambiguities and demarcations, triggering "paranoia" among the colonial rulers.⁹⁵ Following Anne McClintock, who

praised Bhabha's approach for its rich insightfulness but criticised its omission of processes of gender and class,⁹⁶ this study contends that his concept can be extended to the analysis of concubinage or marriage between "white subalterns" from the European lower strata and Indo-European or Asian women.

Almost the same...

In his seminal work on the Swiss bourgeoisie in the nineteenth century, historian Albert Tanner noted that a man only attained his full status and standing in bourgeois society when he married, assuming legal and economic responsibility for a wife and future children.⁹⁷ For many men from the lower classes, however, it was simply not feasible to fulfil these expectations due to their deprived economic background. In this respect, colonial spaces seemed to offer new opportunities to secure their respectability as the male head of the family. With regard to the French Foreign Legion, for instance, Koller concluded that cross-cultural relationships with African or Asian women allowed many legionnaires to feel like family breadwinners for the first time. Moreover, since they could delegate domestic work—which they perceived as feminine—to their wives, this further enhanced their own sense of masculinity.⁹⁸ Beyond the borders of the French Empire, this is also applied to the Dutch East Indies, as exemplified by the case of Brandenberger.

In 1907, Brandenberger reported for the first time to his parents and siblings that he had "taken" a housekeeper. (He only mentioned her name, Sampet, for the first time in 1911.) According to him, she was 17 years old, could cook well, had previously looked after children of officers and had, therefore, "more or less learned Europ. Manners".⁹⁹ In a subsequent letter, he reported how he had bought her a dress for New Year's and that he was pretty satisfied with her because she did the household chores well and "had no big mouth, also a scarce virtue of women". However, this had not always been the case, as he remarked: "In the beginning, 'rebellion' fortissimo also occurred at various times, but thanks to her good character and easy comprehension, it turned into 'pianissimo'."¹⁰⁰ Thus, Brandenberger clearly conveyed to his relatives who was the patriarch of the house. Furthermore, he described in detail how he "helped Sampet get back on her feet". At the age of sixteen, she was forcibly married to a Javanese soldier. Because he had beaten her and provided her with too little food, she ran away and found a job with another employer, where she received only five Swiss francs a month and was allegedly coerced to give most of it to her "heartless" mother. According to his own statements, Brandenberger also told Sampet's mother "directly in the manner of a Prussian sergeant" that she would not receive any money from him.¹⁰¹

Yet Heinrich and Lina Sampet reproduced the ideal bourgeois family not only in letters but also in various photographs that he sent to his relatives, as seen in



Figure 14: Heinrich Brandenberger, Lina Sampet Brandenberger and two children, c. 1908. SSA, Ar 201.303 (Original privately owned by the Brandenberger family, Switzerland).

Figure 14. The photograph probably dates from 1908, showing Heinrich together with Lina Sampet and two children. Reflecting the gendered division of labour, the picture imitates a typical European bourgeois family photo. In the foreground sits Heinrich in his uniform, which can be read as a symbol of his employment. In the background stands Lina Sampet, taking care of the children. As already mentioned in chapter 4, such a gender division of labour was quite out of reach for the broader population in Switzerland until the 1930s.

... but not quite

Although these cross-cultural relationships with their nuclear family model and gender-specific division of labour into the spheres of male wage labour and female house and care work resembled that of bourgeois marriage, they could never live up to its ideal. As discussed above, the marriage between Camenzind and Maria Narbertina Wullschleger was not as harmonious as hoped because of cultural and religious differences. In one passage in his memoirs, Camenzind even revealed that “she might still be alive if she had adopted real European manners”.¹⁰² Camenzind was referring to the last days of Maria Narbertina Wullschleger’s life. Four to five days after the birth of their second child, she was seized with intense fever, but she

resisted vigorously to see a “European doctor”. Instead, she sent for a “Mohamedan priest”. Since the “priest” could not improve her condition, Camenzind got his way and took her to a European doctor. Apparently, the doctor lamented that they consulted him so late and that he could not cure her. About nine days later, she died of typhus, and shortly afterwards, their newborn child passed away too.¹⁰³

Likewise, the relationship between Lina Sampet and Heinrich Brandenberger does not quite correspond to a bourgeois marriage. For example, of the two children shown in the photo above, only the younger one can be attributed to both of them. If the photo was taken around 1908, as indicated by the descendants’ statements and Brandenberger’s particular type of uniform,¹⁰⁴ Sampet and Heinrich had known each other for no more than two years. They had only one child, who was also named Heinrich, born on 9 April, 1908.¹⁰⁵ Based on the date, Heinrich Junior is probably the child Sampet is holding in her arms in the photo. But who was the girl? It is possible that the child was born of Sampet’s first marriage with a Javanese soldier. However, this remains a matter of speculation since she is missing in subsequent family photos, and Heinrich does not mention her in his letters. What became of the girl? Had Heinrich expelled her from the house, or did she leave voluntarily to live with her Javanese grandmother? Was she staying in Java when Brandenberger was transferred to Soembawa (Sumbawa) in 1910? Unfortunately, we do not know.

Apart from this, other clues reveal colonial mimicry. Writing to his mother in 1912, Heinrich asked her for advice on whether he should marry. He explained to her that he had been with Sampet since February 1907. He had acknowledged the children according to the law, bestowing them the same rights as children born of a legal marriage. Thoughts about returning home triggered his worries. Thus, he wrote:

What an uncomfortable feeling my dear children would be left with, if they once came to understand that in our fatherland, children of unmarried parents are so unjustly despised and that they would be made to feel this as sharply as usual? In addition, living together in concubinage (wild marriage) would perhaps not be permitted in our country; but this would create a great gulf between children, father and mother.¹⁰⁶

As this quote shows, Heinrich Brandenberger feared that his children would become victims of social sanctions if they returned. It is interesting to note that in Heinrich’s eyes, the category of race seems to be less of a problem than concubinage. Indeed, illegitimate children from the Dutch East Indies had a difficult time in Heinrich’s home canton of Zurich, as historian Niklaus Müller has pointed out recently regarding the family reunification of the Sumatra-based Swiss merchant Heinrich Frei.¹⁰⁷ According to Zurich court records from 1892, Frei intended to bring his two children, Max and Fritz, whom he had fathered with his “housekeeper”

Karsima and recognised under Dutch law, into the care of his mother in Switzerland. However, the authorities denied the children Swiss citizenship because they were conceived out of wedlock. Frei unsuccessfully appealed the judgement, arguing that “a marriage with such a person according to the moral concepts connected with the nature of a marriage in our view is an impossibility, especially if the European intends to retire to his homeland one day”.¹⁰⁸

Some twenty years later, Heinrich Brandenberger proved this was not as impossible as Frei had argued. After having a priest from Makassar baptise Sampet with the name Lina in December 1912, Heinrich and Lina Sampet got married. Then, in 1918, the Brandenberger family moved to Switzerland, where they remained until the end of their lives.¹⁰⁹ Frei, on the other hand, did not marry his concubine Karsima. As can be seen from his will, written in 1911, he had finally returned to Switzerland from Sumatra at the turn of the century and married Ignatia Castella. They lived together in Zurich in a magnificent property and had two children, Hermann Attilio and Adolf Konrad.¹¹⁰ Thus, whereas for Frei, who hailed from the wealthy upper class, cross-cultural marriage was not conceivable because he feared the damage to his reputation that a liaison to a non-European woman could cause in bourgeois circles, the “colour-line” was not an insurmountable obstacle for Heinrich and Lina Sampet Brandenberger as well as their relatives who belonged to the lower strata of Swiss society. In this respect, concubinage promoted the unambiguity of colonial norms and challenged the European bourgeoisie.

African, Asian and European Comrades

As already discussed in chapter 3, the KNIL recruited its soldiers from various areas in Europe, Africa and the Malay Archipelago. The units were strictly organised along racial categories, which was reflected not least in pay, rations, and equipment.¹¹¹ This categorisation was known not only within the military but also among the wider Swiss public. When this hierarchy was briefly abolished during the mutiny of 1860 and indigenous soldiers shot at Swiss mercenaries at the behest of the Dutch army command, the correspondent of the *Journal de Genève* reacted with indignation:

Here are native soldiers employed to fight Europeans! This is to take away the prestige which surrounds the white race and which plays a large part in the submission of 10 million Javanese to a handful of Europeans. With this prestige gone, we are left with brute force; and, in this case, we shall be crushed under the numbers.¹¹²

Already predetermined by such colonial discourses, Swiss mercenaries thus tried to distinguish themselves firmly from non-European soldiers in their memoirs and

letters. This manifested itself, among other things, in the way they referred to their comrades. While fellow European soldiers were often mentioned by name, the non-European soldiers were stereotypically described as homogenous collectives, deprived of their individual identity. For example, Haab commented on the African troops that “once drilled in, they were very good military men. Fresh from Africa, until these people can do the turns properly and get used to the clothes, hilarious scenes presented themselves”.¹¹³

Moreover, by portraying the African soldiers as hyper-masculine but “uneducated” men who must be tamed through military drill to be deployable, Haab echoed popular contemporary portrayals of African colonial soldiers. As historian Manuel Menrath has pointed out, various imageries of African colonial soldiers serving in the French Colonial Army had circulated in Switzerland at least since the 1860s. Unlike in Germany, where from the Franco-Prussian War to World War II, African colonial soldiers were almost exclusively labelled with various negative attributes, Swiss media attested them positive qualities in combat—without abandoning their European sense of superiority. According to Menrath, the enormously popular *Völkerschauen* (“Human Zoos”), staged in Swiss zoos and inns from the 1870s onwards, conveyed this sense of superiority.¹¹⁴ In this respect, it is hardly surprising that some Swiss mercenaries resorted to a similar clichéd vocabulary in their descriptions as the advertisements of those events did, overemphasising their alleged wildness, skin colour and texture of the hair. Writing to his Swiss comrade Egloff in 1891, for instance, Swiss mercenary Emil Rebsamen commented that the Africans were “interesting guys, well and strongly grown, black as a devil, nimble as a cat”. He added that they have “woolly curly hair” and some had tattoos or scarves on their temples and foreheads, endowing them “a wild look”. Furthermore, he attested that they are gentle, but if you tease them, they show their teeth “like a dog”.¹¹⁵

The indigenous soldiers, by contrast, were probably hardly known to the Swiss audience. In their descriptions, the mercenaries took up the dominant Dutch discourses.¹¹⁶ Thus, they lauded “Ambonese” and “Menadonese” soldiers for their martial skills. Zehnder, to provide one concrete example, stated that these troops are

feared by native enemies because they can tackle them with equal cunning and weapons and know how to move in the wilderness much better than the clumsy Europeans, who are all the more feared in close combat because of their more cold-blooded use of weapons and their greater endurance and not least because of their greater bravado.¹¹⁷

This quote vividly illustrates Zehnder’s rhetorical strategy. He praised the “Ambonese” and “Menadonese” but ultimately attested even better and more masculine qualities to the Europeans so that the latter ranked still at the top of

the hierarchy. This becomes even more apparent in his description of “Javanese” soldiers, who “can rarely be used independently in battle, because they are quite unfamiliar with attacking, or rather, they prefer to leave it to others”.¹¹⁸

Prejudices of cowardly or disloyal “*Inlanders*” (“indigenous”) were widespread among Swiss mercenaries. Referring to “Boginesen u. Nyassas”, Camenzind noted in his unpublished diary: “Most of them wear earrings and have big holes in their ears, walk with bare feet and are very sneaky.”¹¹⁹ Schmid expressed similar doubts about whether the Javanese soldiers would side with the Dutch in an emergency against the backdrop of the revolt in Bantem in 1888. However, when it came to a battle, they fought faithfully shoulder to shoulder.¹²⁰ As Brandenberger’s letters testify, such doubts still circulated in the twentieth century. In view of the strengthening of Sarekat Islam, he doubted in 1913 that the army, “which was largely composed of Muhamedan elements, could be trusted”.¹²¹

Overall, the spectrum of reactions from Swiss mercenaries who encountered the so-called “*Andere Inlanders*” ranged from pity to contempt drenched in racism. Mercenary Eduard Rellstab, for instance, told his parents that the Javanese soldiers were “treated as miserable slaves”.¹²² Edwin Eckert, conversely, described in an impudent manner to his audience how he was infuriated because a Javanese corporal transgressed the “colour-line”, trying to give him some orders: “It annoyed me tremendously that instead of a European superior, they sent me a half-naked native.” Finally, Eckert refused to obey the Javanese corporal “since a native is not at all authorised to command a European soldier”.¹²³

These distinctions from non-European soldiers reinforced the Swiss mercenaries’ affiliation with the supposedly superior, more civilised and masculine Europeans. Based on this common ground, some male friendships were forged between European soldiers across national borders. Schmid, for instance, reported how he met a group of Alsatian soldiers in the early 1880s and noted: “Among soldiers, friendship is quickly sealed and the ‘Du’ [informal German ‘you’, P.K.] comes off one’s lips like in the Emmental.”¹²⁴ Moreover, Zehnder mentioned how he quickly befriended a German mercenary around 1911, with whom he made “quite thorough and sometimes dangerous studies of the customs and traditions of the locals”.¹²⁵ For example, they sneaked into a Chinese temple together to spy on a ritual until the priests chased them away with knives.¹²⁶

However, the homogenising effect of serving together in a colonial contact zone was not as strong as in the French Foreign Legion, where various rituals based on the motto “*Legio Patria Nostra*” (“the Legion is our fatherland”) forged a collectively shared feeling of belonging.¹²⁷ In the KNIL, by contrast, the mercenaries’ Swiss identity gleamed beneath their European awareness. The mercenaries repeatedly reported effusively in their letters and memoirs when they had met compatriots. In a letter from 1860, Eduard Rellstab told his parents that he worked

in the military bookbinder's workshop with another Swiss from Zurich who was "an excellent comrade".¹²⁸ Reporting on the battalions from Magelang and Batavia in 1903, Brandenberger told his mother that he had met fifteen to twenty Swiss, including two men from Zurich.

Nevertheless, not only the mention of other Swiss but also the explicit reference to Swiss culture repeatedly appears in the sources. For instance, Haab described how he was overcome by homesickness when he saw a magazine picture of a Swiss wrestling festival in the Alps.¹²⁹ And writing to his parents and siblings from the outpost in Soembawa (Sumbawa) shortly after the outbreak of World War I, Brandenberger described that he and a compatriot named Merz listened to various Swiss songs on his gramophone, such as today's Swiss national anthem *Trittst im Morgenrot daher* (Stepping in the dawn) or *Mein Schwizerland wach auf* (My Switzerland wake up). Brandenberger went on to explain that this "caused feelings that can only arise among Swiss people in a foreign country".¹³⁰

How vital the commitment to Switzerland was for Brandenberger emerges from a letter of 1906, in which he was displeased with some of his compatriots at Fort Willem I because they spoke High German rather than the Swiss dialect and apparently were convinced of the invincibility of the German Empire.¹³¹ Furthermore, Brandenberger occasionally told his family about the poor state of the KNIL. "Anyone who has seen something of the military before," he criticised, "will notice at first glance the poor cooperation between the various officers and their troops."¹³² In particular, the lack of marching discipline was a thorn in his side. Thus, he concluded that "this military is no match for a European enemy. For the inland enemy, who is present in small numbers and poorly armed, it can suffice, but here too, they still have a lot of work to do."¹³³

Regarding the globally operating Swiss merchant elite, Andreas Zangger has contended that references to Swiss encounters and customs served a purpose beyond mere fun facts and anecdotes. Global trade and migration, Zangger argues, left its mark in nineteenth-century Switzerland, evoking "a desire for 'genuineness' and a distinct revulsion at hybridisation that was shared by not only the majority of those residents in Switzerland but also many of the middle- and upper-class citizens who sojourned overseas".¹³⁴ This ideal of the "authentic" Swiss merchant was exemplified by the fictional character Martin Salander in a novel penned by the author Gottfried Keller. In the novel of the same name, published in 1886, the main protagonist Salander had left his wife and children and emigrated twice to Brazil, where he accumulated considerable wealth. On his second return after seven years, Salander's wife was relieved to realise that "nothing foreign was clinging to him".¹³⁵ According to literary scholar Jeroen Dewulf, even the slightest accent or change in his manners would have been sufficient to disqualify Salander as the central character of a political and socio-moral development novel.¹³⁶ Albeit



Figure 15: Heinrich Brandenberger (back row, fifth from left) together with indigenous and European soldiers, date unknown, probably 1906. SSA, Ar 201.303 (Original privately owned by the Brandenberger family, Switzerland).

it is hard to imagine outside the fictional world of a novel that a sojourn abroad of several years does not leave traces on a person, it is nevertheless striking how some mercenaries emphasised their intimate connection to Switzerland to their Swiss audience, whether in letters or memoirs. In this respect, it seems appropriate to extend Zangger's thesis to the realm of Swiss mercenaries, even if the strategies to negate hybridisation varied according to class.

Enemies & Warfare

Outlining that Swiss mercenaries engaged in acts of extreme colonial violence, chapter 3 briefly elaborated that portraying non-European enemies as “uncivilised” was a common rhetorical strategy to justify these acts towards a European audience. The following section attempts to explain this image in detail. As we shall see, it did not differ significantly from the one that circulated among the Dutch officers in the nineteenth century, in which European (military-)culture served as a benchmark, negative characteristics were exaggerated, and positive features negated. Thus, extra-European enemies were often portrayed as uncivilised, devious, undisciplined, and disorganised. Furthermore, with regard to Muslim opponents, Islam was considered the source of fanaticism and cruelty.¹³⁷

Needless to say, the bulk of Swiss mercenaries shared these images of the enemy, as a quote by Auguste Humberset exemplifies. Echoing contemporary colonial stereotypes, he argued that the “Malays” had lost in the Banjarmasin War (1859–1863) because of the “incompetence of the clerks and chiefs, [...] their ignorance, ferocity, [...], the bad faith and false character of the Malays in Borneo, their fanaticism”.¹³⁸ And reporting on the capture of the warship *Unrust* in 1863, the anonymous non-commissioned officer accentuated in the newspaper *Der Bund* the deceitful actions of the “Dayak”. Apparently, the Dutch crew, “who thought of nothing wrong”, was attacked by a supposedly friendly “chief” and his escort. The author embellished his account pictorially and added that those who tried to escape “were speared like fish with long lances”.¹³⁹ Another Swiss, by contrast, placed the enemies in the same category as Europeans. Writing to his parents in 1859 from Celebes (Sulawesi), he explained that they had been under enemy fire for five hours, “as if we were dealing with Europeans”.¹⁴⁰

This broad array of enemy images also included the topos of the “fanatical Muslim”. For instance, Zehnder elaborated in his account that Muslims who had come back from their pilgrimage to Mecca played a crucial role in the combats because they were, he explained, “fanatical enemies of everything that is not Mohammedan”.¹⁴¹ Although Zehnder had never been involved in a battle, he continued that the “Hadjis” stormed off “with infernal roars” in each battle, and he added:

it requires strong nerves to stand still until the mob has approached to about a hundred metres or even more, only then to prove to the misguided with a volley that their bodies are not immune to the weapons of the whites, as the Hadjis always want them to believe.¹⁴²

Whereas Zehnder, in this quote, still suggests the control of the “whites” over Muslim warriors, the fears of an uncontrolled outbreak of Muslim resistance shimmer in Brandenberger’s letters. In 1913, for example, he wrote to his parents and siblings that

the exhortation issued by the high Islamic priesthood with the fall of Turkey, “stick together, stick together more firmly against the infidel Christian dogs” is visibly taking root and can become disastrous for the Muhamedan population, which is easily inclined to religious fanaticism.¹⁴³

Brandenberger’s letter reveals his deep mistrust towards the Muslim population he had built up over the years. As early as 1911, he told his parents about an incident on Soembawa (Sumbawa) in which the local population had allegedly been incited by two “Mohamed priests” to attack a KNIL patrol. This incident, Brandenberger

argued, is “an actual illustration of how little the local population can be trusted or believed”.¹⁴⁴

Schmid described to his audience in detail what such revolts could look like. Recounting his experiences during the peasants’ revolt in Bantem in 1888, he recounted how he and his colleagues initially found the decapitated body of the assistant resident’s wife in a ditch. Such acts of violence against “white” women perpetrated by colonised subjects represented a double transgression arousing anxiety and fear among Europeans.¹⁴⁵ Pointing out this breach of taboo, Schmid wrote: “her blue eyes, though broken, were open and even now in death spoke a clear language of the horror the poor woman had gone through”.¹⁴⁶

As already mentioned above, one aim of such stereotypical constructions of an enemy image was to legitimise extreme violence on the part of the European troops. Furthermore, fierce and fanatic resistance justified a withdrawal from a battle or failure, as was often the case in the Aceh War in particular, without losing white male prestige. Apart from that, another objective of such representations was to vindicate the rightful claim of the Europeans to colonial possessions. For instance, von Ernst mentioned that he was commissioned in 1872 to protect the European tobacco plantations in Sumatra against “the incursions of the still half-savage tribes”.¹⁴⁷ By discrediting the local population as “semi-wild”, they were associated with archaic and nomadic societies who had, from a European perspective, no legitimate claim to the land. The European plantation owners, by contrast, operated within the framework of the “civilised” rule of law, and they should therefore be protected.

Beyond these discourses of legitimation, however, these images of the enemy were also constitutive in multiple ways for the individual identity formation of the mercenaries, portraying them as adventurous hyper-masculine soldiers.¹⁴⁸ The more exotic, fanatical, or violent the enemy was, the greater the adventure the mercenaries could experience—and the more manly they could present themselves to their audience. In both private letters and published memoirs, individual mercenaries express their excitement about upcoming war campaigns or their disappointment when they failed to happen. For example, Eckert expressed his disappointment when he learned that he would not be deployed in Aceh in 1903, “since each of us newcomers had the desire to go into battle soon and roam the jungle to compete with the skilful Atjeh warrior”.¹⁴⁹ Similarly, the author of a letter published in the *Revue Militaire Suisse* in 1859 apologised to his parents for not having written earlier since he was still waiting for a campaign to tell them about. His friend, by contrast, had been “luckier” as he was on an expedition in Celebes.¹⁵⁰

Another example of an adventurous character emerges vividly in Schmid’s memoirs, published in 1912. Reporting on a campaign during the Aceh War, he described how enemy projectiles whizzed by next to his head, shells burst in the

immediate vicinity, and wounded comrades wailed during combat. Schmid was not injured, despite claiming to have been involved in various attacks. He even boasted that he had fired 102 bullets in a single day and that being a “gymnast from Olten”, he had less trouble fighting in impassable terrain than his comrades.¹⁵¹ In this sense, Schmid staged himself as a fearless and agile fighter, the archetype of the soldier.

Finally, one should note that almost exclusively, societies of the Malay Archipelago were described as enemies but hardly any mention was made of the danger from other colonial powers.

Conclusion

Based on a selection of memoirs, letters and other sources, this chapter has attempted to trace, firstly, how colonial encounters were reflected in the “heads and hearts” of the mercenaries and, secondly, with whom and how they shared these patterns of thought. Through oral, visual and written channels, the mercenaries reproduced colonial stereotypes and transmitted them to the lower classes in urban and rural Switzerland. In their confrontation with representations of the non-European “Other”, they developed their own white Christian masculine European—and sometimes even more specifically—Swiss identity. Through various channels such as letters, lectures, books, and pictorial postcards, they disseminated these colonial images in rural and urban areas to the lower strata of society without access to scientific geographical or ethnographic discourses. What could hardly be analysed, however, is the issue of reception. It appears plausible that the mercenaries fed a communicative memory. However, since the actors involved mainly were marginalised groups, we lack sufficient information on how the recipients of the messages, be it just a small circle of relatives or a larger audience, embraced, adapted, or even rejected the patterns of thought conveyed. From a letter written by Brandenberger’s parents after a visit by one of their son’s former comrades, for example, we know that they did not believe everything he said about the Dutch East Indies.¹⁵²

Admittedly, the overall impact of individual contributions on mainstream culture was probably limited, primarily because few mercenaries had a voice in public discourse. Nevertheless, when this finding is added to the recent historical insights of other scholars working on colonial Switzerland, it becomes apparent that the contributions of mercenaries—along with reports and objects of missionary societies,¹⁵³ travelogues by cosmopolitans,¹⁵⁴ ethnographic or geographic collections and societies,¹⁵⁵ human zoos,¹⁵⁶ or racialised commercials¹⁵⁷—were essential drops that all contributed to the enlargement of an imperial reservoir of knowledge in




Figure 16: The statue “Wehrbereitschaft” by Hans Brandenberger, exhibited at the Swiss National Exhibition in Zurich, 1939. ETH-Bibliothek Zürich, Bildarchiv / Fotograf: Unbekannt / PK_021561 / Public Domain Mark.

Switzerland. Considering this abundance of colonial droplets, the question arises to what extent individual ones took part in the formation of the cultural memory but have so far remained unacknowledged. The following example illustrates that a perspective incorporating affective and rational economies moulded by colonial entanglements penetrates the marrow of national historiography.

Shortly before the outbreak of World War II in 1939, the Swiss National Exhibition took place in Zurich. In the centre of the section called “*Heimat und Volk*” (“Homeland and People”), which discussed “*den gesunden Volkskörper*” (“the healthy body of the people”), an oversized statue of a soldier throwing on a uniform jacket attracted all eyes (See figure 16). According to historian Jakob Tanner, the statue epitomised, on the one hand, the saying “Switzerland wants to defend itself. Switzerland can defend itself. Switzerland must defend itself”. On the other hand, this representation hardly differed from the heroisation of the soldier that was common in Germany and Italy in the 1930s.¹⁵⁸

This icon of the era of the *Geistige Landesverteidigung* (national spiritual defence) has hitherto been assessed within its European framework.¹⁵⁹ What has not been addressed so far, however, is the origin of the statue’s creator, Hans Branderberger, the son of Heinrich and Lina Sampet Brandenberger, introduced above. What does this imply regarding the context in which this statue was created, considering that

the sculptor emerged from a cross-cultural relationship, spent his first six years in the Lesser Sunda Islands, and experienced first-hand the challenges his mother had to cope with after immigrating to Switzerland? Since we cannot provide answers at this point, further research from this perspective remains an urgent desideratum.

Finally, it must be emphasised that Swiss participation in the violent Dutch expansion also left its mark on the communicative memory of some Indonesian communities. Following the traces of Swiss KNIL-Captain Hans Christoffel's 1907 Flores expedition,¹⁶⁰ ethnologist Edgar Keller and his colleague Yoseph Agato Sareng came across a few villagers of the So'a society north of Bajawa who could still recall the bloody scenes of a hundred years earlier, based on the stories of their ancestors. Thomas Mite, a villager from present-day Masu, told them how his father narrowly had escaped death when he was ten years old. According to the story, the Dutch troops approached the *kampung* (village) around midday. The approximately hundred villagers present took refuge in a nearby cave. There, heated discussions ensued. About half of them, including Mite's father, did not feel safe in this shelter and moved on. The others stayed in the cave—with fatal consequences. When Mite's father's party was about six kilometres away from the cave, they, as Mite recounts, "heard the sound of a rifle in quick succession".¹⁶¹ The KNIL soldiers discovered their hiding place and fired indiscriminately at the cave, causing a massacre. Today's villagers estimate that around fifty members of the So'a Society died in that cave. Only three survived, as Ignas Tena, another villager, knows, "because they were hiding under the bodies".¹⁶²

This is just one tragic story among many that took place in the context of European colonial expansion. While they are hardly or only superficially known in the European narrative for linguistic (or political) reasons, there are probably countless comparable stories circulating in the communicative memory of various Indonesian village communities that remain to be researched.

Conclusion: Swiss Tools of Empire

Casting light on the lives and deaths of 5,800 colonial Swiss mercenaries, *Swiss Mercenaries in the Dutch East Indies* has set out to explore three closely intertwined sets of questions. Firstly, this book has sought to elucidate how the transimperial military labour market structures crossed the Dutch Empire's borders to recruit Swiss mercenaries, and what contribution these recruited men made to violently establish and expand a colonial state in the Malay Archipelago. Secondly, it has examined how these "Swiss tools of empire" interacted with and integrated into the colonial society in the Dutch East Indies. The third set of questions dealt with the multifaceted social, cultural, and economic repercussions these Swiss imperial careers had on nineteenth-century Switzerland. Revisiting these overarching questions, this concluding chapter will reflect on this book's main aims and discuss both its contribution and limitations for a broader array of historiography.

Swiss Tools of Empire

This study's foremost goal was to overcome the spatial and temporal limitations of existing Swiss mercenary historiography, which has portrayed the Swiss mercenary business as an exclusively European and predominantly early modern phenomenon that ended in the early 1800s. By extensively outlining the nineteenth-century transimperial military labour market, the present study has shown that thousands of Swiss mercenaries were also deployed both outside Europe and after the founding of the modern federal state in 1848. As "Swiss Tools of Empire", they contributed to Dutch colonial violence and thus helped to expand and maintain Dutch rule in its vast island empire. The Swiss and numerous other European "foreigners" fought on the front lines of colonial wars, participated in extreme violence, set fire to fields and villages, and "disciplined" Chinese and Javanese indentured labourers.

The conspicuous absence of Swiss colonial mercenaries in the otherwise abundant historiography concerning Swiss mercenaries warrants careful consideration. This lacuna can be attributed, in part, to a paradigm shift in recruitment methodologies. Historically, dating back to the seventeenth century, Swiss officers and their family networks orchestrated the organisation of Swiss regiments, which they then offered to foreign monarchs for military service. However, as the nineteenth century unfolded, the demand for these "foreign" regiments declined, primarily due

to a discordance with the emerging liberal and enlightened ideals cherished by the bourgeois elites. According to these ideals, the defence of the nation was perceived as an obligation to be shouldered exclusively by male citizens, as opposed to foreigners. These principles also gained traction within Switzerland, culminating in a series of national proscriptions, notably on foreign military service. Commencing in 1859, the engagement in foreign military service was only sanctioned under specific circumstances, either with explicit authorisation from the Federal Council or in the context of so-called “national” troops—an appellation which, from its inception until its abolition in 1928, often engendered confusion. This legislative evolution was primarily driven by the Swiss parliament’s principal concern, which revolved around preventing foreign armies from incorporating entire regiments that laid claim to a Swiss identity. Consequently, this transformation marked the cessation of Swiss military officers hailing from affluent patrician lineages leading Swiss legions abroad, and it also witnessed the disappearance of Swiss flags from the theatres of war. These themes had long dominated the narrative in Swiss (military) history, relegating the histories of mercenaries from humbler backgrounds, who did not collectively embody the Swiss military prowess, to the margins of historical discourse.

Another notable reason for the neglect of colonial mercenaries in Swiss historiography can be summarised under the phenomenon of “colonial amnesia”.¹ According to Patricia Purschert, this term refers to “an active practice of erasing historical connections that go back to colonialism”.² With regard to Swiss historiography, this practice manifested itself in the conviction that, unlike other European states, Switzerland did *not* have a colonial past.³ It is therefore not surprising that works on “colonial Switzerland” were scarce until a few years ago. However, as outlined in the introduction, a growing body of literature is working towards “curing” this amnesia, providing historical narratives that ultimately also take into account the heterogeneity and diversity of Swiss society in a globally entangled world.

Beyond the Dutch Empire

Adding to a growing body of scholarship within *New Imperial History*, which aims to outline the transimperial dimensions of colonialism, this book has sought to challenge the dyad of the metropolis and the colony and the preponderance of national frameworks in (Dutch) empire studies. First, it has extended Arnold’s concept of “contingent colonialism” to the Dutch East Indies by taking a sample of Swiss mercenaries as a case in point.⁴ Of course, the Swiss mercenaries did not build the Dutch Empire on their own. Still, they fought in many battles across the archipelago with mercenaries from Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, and Poland, playing a decisive role in the violent formation of a colonial state.

Secondly, this analysis has elucidated that the social, economic, and cultural repercussions of the Dutch Empire reached all social strata across both urban and rural regions of the European hinterland. For example, the Dutch Empire tore apart Swiss families, as young emigrating Swiss men left behind their parents, siblings and friends, sometimes even their wives and children. In about half of the cases, this farewell was final. Yet, colonial encounters in the Dutch East Indies also forged new families, as Swiss mercenaries became involved with Indo-European or Asian women—and in some cases, eventually returned and settled in Switzerland. Whether in the colonies or in Switzerland, through their mimicry of a bourgeois family model built on the principles of the gendered division of labour and the nuclear family, Swiss mercenaries constantly challenged existing axes of differentiation such as class, race, sexuality, and religion.

In a poverty-ridden country like Switzerland in the nineteenth century, the Dutch East Indies also promised young men new perspectives to prevent their own social decline and to pursue certain ideals of masculinity. Offering a regular income, board and lodging, colonial military service appeared to be a unique opportunity to bridge a personal economic crisis. Thus, upon completion of their term of service, numerous Swiss mercenaries returned to Switzerland, hoping to lead a financially stable life. Moreover, colonial service did not only promise to overcome cyclical crises; in many cases, regular pension or gratification payments improved veterans' lives. Even though the sums involved were often relatively small, they significantly contributed to uplifting the quality of life of working-class veterans and their wives or relatives. A dense network consisting of bureaucracies and private "service providers" ensured that these payments ran as smoothly as possible across imperial borders. Against the backdrop of precarious welfare services at the time, the administrators of Swiss municipalities lobbied firmly to ensure that the ex-militaries received their money. However, since this interlocking bureaucratic web seemed impenetrable for many low-level administrative offices of the relatively young Swiss federal state, the veterans had to rely on the mediating function of former mercenaries, Swiss banks, or Dutch law firms to facilitate the processing of their dossiers.

A final dimension explored by the present investigation concerns the cultural ramifications of the Dutch Empire in the European hinterland. Through their letters, conversations or memoirs, the mercenaries functioned as amplifiers of hegemonic colonial discourses, feeding a transimperial cultural archive with racist stereotypes and "exotic" imaginaries. The colonial contact zone's systematically racist and gendered hierarchy shaped the mercenaries' colonial gaze. Beyond the elite discourses of scientists and merchants, they spread this epistemic order among the urban and rural lower classes. In these circles, their clichéd portrayals encountered a terrain that had already been tilled to some extent since these classes were also familiar

with Europe's imperial culture through other phenomena such as "ethnological shows", the consumption of colonial goods, or folk tales about colonial adventures.

Marrying New Military History with New Imperial History

The third stated objective was to merge the fields of *New Imperial History* and *New Military History*. This endeavour turned out to be particularly fruitful as it showcased the synergies unleashed by the fusion of economic and social history approaches and those from cultural history currents such as postcolonial studies. For instance, *New Imperial History* profits from *New Military History* because the latter conceives soldiering as labour. Accordingly, soldiers had to be recruited from a military labour market that usually transcended regional, imperial, or national borders. This is true not only of Dutch soldiers and European mercenaries but also, for example, of the Javanese soldiers who fought in Aceh. Against this background, the widespread but highly simplistic dichotomy between European and "indigenous" colonial soldiers seems thus obsolete and calls for a more complex analysis of both a pan-European and South East Asian military labour market.

Secondly, through its focus on everyday military life, *New Military History* reminds us of the prominent role played by non-military actors like *nyais*. Their bodies, compassion, and labour was exploited to care for soldiers and thus maintain the KNIL's fighting power. Consequently, it becomes manifest that they held a crucial and indispensable position within the military framework, even though their contributions were frequently inadequately acknowledged or honoured.

On the other hand, *New Imperial History* encourages us to examine the military milieu from a global and intersectional perspective. In the 1990s, Ute Frevert looked at the German military of the imperial era as a "school of masculinity".⁵ Combining approaches by *New Imperial History* and Frevert's groundbreaking studies,⁶ future research might ask to what extent these barracks were the school of "white" and "civilizing" masculinities, even though these upcoming studies deal exclusively with European armies.

Connected to this, *New Imperial History* finally draws attention to the issue of a new military history "from below". As this study has shown in detail, the social position of mercenaries varied greatly depending on the environment. In the civilian public sphere within Europe, they often encountered classism and, in many cases, structural violence because of their social origins, as illustrated by the plight of the *Verdingkinder*. Although the mercenaries were also socially marginalised within the colonies, with limited participation in the social life of European civilians and officers, the racial hierarchies inherent in the colonial milieu still afforded them certain privileges that they did not enjoy at home. They were paid more than their

Javanese counterparts, enjoyed better equipment, and could mimic a middle-class family model with Javanese women. However, there were instances when these privileges were reversed, such as during the 1860 mutiny, when Dutch commanders ordered Ambonese soldiers to open fire on the Swiss. Adopting an intersectional approach enhances our analytical understanding and allows for a more comprehensive assessment of such complex situations.

Limitations of this Study and Future Research Avenues

This work has positioned Swiss colonial mercenaries in the spotlight, attempting to illuminate their experiences from various angles. However, where there is illumination, shadows also linger in the background. Consequently, this study is not devoid of inherent limitations, the most obvious of which are temporal, spatial and contextual.

As elucidated at the outset, a substantial number of European mercenaries were already in the service of the KNIL before the year 1848, including approximately 1800 Swiss individuals, a majority of whom had enlisted in the four Swiss regiments stationed in the Netherlands until 1829. However, the enduring legacy of colonial service extends even further back in time, tracing its origins to the Dutch East India Company (VOC) era. In addition to the individually recruited Swiss, an entire Swiss regiment, the so-called Regiment de Meuron, served in Cape Town and Ceylon (Sri Lanka) in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. It is hoped that future research will approach the phenomenon of colonial mercenaries from a *longue durée* perspective and explore how the centuries-long rivalry among European colonial powers shaped the military labour market inside and outside Europe.⁷ Such an approach would allow for the first time an analysis of the structures of a global mercenary market against the backdrop of violent European expansion.

Similar to the temporal restrictions, the spatial limitations applied here have imposed boundaries, the overcoming of which could be productive for future research. The West Indies, for example, have been hardly mentioned in this work, as it is estimated that only 100 Swiss were shipped there during the time span under consideration.⁸ Nevertheless, together with further colonial soldiers, they also contributed to forming a colonial state and forged links with the European hinterland, transcending social, cultural, and national boundaries. Furthermore, the transimperial careers of mercenaries who participated in the nineteenth-century subjugation of Tonkin (present-day North Vietnam) as legionaries in the French Foreign Legion prior to their service in the KNIL offer promising points of departure for future research by remapping colonial spaces.

Lastly, perhaps the most critical limitation of this book lies in the selection of its actors. By focusing only on the Swiss group, this book is omitting similar stories for Germany, Belgium, France, the Czech Republic, Denmark or Poland. Future research is required to portray the pan-European character of the Dutch Empire exemplarily and comprehensively.⁹ From a Swiss perspective, moreover, an analysis of the social, cultural, and economic implications of the deployment of Swiss Foreign Legionnaires in nineteenth-century Indochina offers further points of departure for future research. Admittedly, the scarcity of sources hampers such an undertaking.

Notwithstanding, the most valuable contribution that could be made following the present study consists in the inclusion of voices from other subaltern groups such as non-European soldiers, European working-class women or *nyais*. How did the wider population of the Malay Archipelago perceive the mercenaries? Did they regard them as “*Belanda*” (Dutch), or did they distinguish between the European nationalities? A glimpse into Pramoedya Ananta Toer’s *This Earth of Mankind*, in which invalid French KNIL veteran, painter and antique dealer Jean Marais figures as a prominent supporting character, suggests the latter.¹⁰ And beyond the places of peaceful coexistence, how did Sumatran villagers react to violent outbursts by colonial mercenaries from Europe? What did revolting Chinese contract workers think when European colonial soldiers suppressed them? How did the *nyais* feel about their lot? What were their perceptions of Europe, the Netherlands or Switzerland? To the regret of historians, only few sources provide explicit clues. In recent decades, however, various methodological approaches in historical scholarship have opened avenues to tackle these questions, whether by critically examining sources against or along the grain¹¹ or, as the last chapter suggests, by engaging in interviews with descendants.

Despite these shortcomings, nevertheless, it is hoped that the book will make a significant contribution, the impact of which will extend far beyond academic circles by deepening our understanding of the impact of colonialism on the history of European nations without formal colonial possessions and by highlighting the continuing social, economic and cultural effects of this intertwined history that are still felt today. Furthermore, the book seeks to provide a comprehensive analytical framework for understanding the intricacies of modern mercenarism. This is particularly relevant given the ongoing activities of private security and military companies (PMCs or PMSCs), illustrating that mercenary operations remain a significant and unresolved element of twenty-first-century global affairs.

Notes

Chapter 1. Introduction: Swiss Tools of Empire

- ¹ For an overview of the expansion of the Dutch colonial empire, see: H. Schulte Nordholt, *Südostasien* (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 2018), 203–84; U. Bosma, “The Dutch Colonial Empire,” in M. Gehler and R. Rollinger (eds) *Imperien und Reiche in der Weltgeschichte* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2014), 1009–16; M. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), 112–15; P. Groen et al., *Krijgsgeweld en kolonie: Opkomst en ondergang van Nederland als koloniale mogendheid, 1816–2010* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2021); H. L. Wesseling, “The Giant That Was a Dwarf,” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 16:3 (1988), 58–70; C. Fasseur, “Een koloniale paradox,” *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 92 (1979), 162–187; M. Kuitenbrouwer, *The Netherlands and the Rise of Modern Imperialism* (New York: Berg, 1991); E. Locher-Scholten, “Dutch Expansion in the Indonesian Archipelago around 1900 and the Imperialism Debate,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 25:1 (1994), 91–111.
- ² The Dutch Colonial Army was separated from the Dutch Army in 1830 and placed under the authority of the Ministry of the Colonies. Initially it was called the Nederlandsch-Oost-Indische leger, but from 1836 the predicate “koninklijk” (royal) was added. In everyday usage, however, this term did not become established until about a century later. M. Bossenbroek, *Van Holland naar Indië* (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1986), 20; and M. Bossenbroek, *Volk voor Indië: De werving van Europese militairen voor de Nederlandse koloniale dienst 1814–1909* (Amsterdam: Van Soeren & Co, 1992), 87.
- ³ M. Bossenbroek, “The Living Tools of Empire,” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 23 (1995), 26–53.
- ⁴ I. van Kessel, *Zwarte Hollanders: Afrikaanse Soldaten in Nederlands-Indië* (Amsterdam: KIT Publishers, 2005); J. de Moor, “The Recruitment of Indonesian Soldiers for the Dutch Colonial Army, c. 1700–1950,” in D. Kilingray and D. Omissi (eds), *Guardians of Empire*, 53–69 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999).
- ⁵ Following a typology by military historian Stephen Morillo, this study hereafter refers to these non-Dutch colonial soldiers as “mercenaries”, as they fulfil two essential definitional criteria: a soldier’s cultural or national foreignness to the military employer and his strong motive to exchange military labour for material gain. S. Morillo, “Mercenaries, Mamluks, and Militia: Towards a Cross-Cultural Typology of Military Service,” in J. France (ed), *Mercenaries and Paid Men*, 243–60 (Leiden: Brill, 2008). For further discussions, see also: P. Rogger and B. Hitz, “Söldnerlandschaften – räumliche Logiken und Gewaltmärkte in historisch-vergleichender Perspektive,” in *ibid.* (eds) *Söldnerlandschaften* (Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt, 2014), 31–33; on the blurred boundaries of the term “mercenary”, see N. Arielli, *From Byron to Bin Laden* (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press), 6–7; and M. Sikora, “Söldner,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 29:2 (2009), 210–38.
- ⁶ On the VOC, see: B. Veyrassat, “Merceneriat colonial et récits de Voyage,” in J. Batou, B. Etemad, and A. Koukouna (eds), *Deux mondes, une planète*, 261–73 (Lausanne: Éditions d’en bas, 2015); R. Gelder and A. Sauer, “Das ostindische Abenteuer” (Hamburg: Convent, 2004); T. Bunte, S. Ehrenpreis, and B. Van der Linde, “Tiroler in der niederländischen Vereinigten Ostindien-Kompanie (VOC) (ca. 1680–1795),” *Tiroler Heimat* 80:1 (2016), 105–18; C. Tzoref-Ashkenazi, “Deutsche Hilfstruppen

- in Imperialkriegen 1776–1808,” in T. Bühler and C. Stachelbeck, D. Walter (eds), *Imperialkriege von 1500 bis heute: Strukturen, Akteure, Lernprozesse*, 348–49 (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 2011); on the Swiss regiments: H. Amersfoort, *Koning en kanton* (Den Haag: Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis Landmachstaf, 1988); P. Henry and P. Krauer, “Fremde Dienste,” *Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz*.
- ⁷ Bossenbroek, *Volk voor Indië*, 277.
- ⁸ See, e.g.: P. Groen et al., *Krijgsgeweld en kolonie*; U. Bosma, *Indiegangers. Verhalen van Nederlanders die naar Indie trokken* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2010), 151–86. With regard to non-European troops, see: de Moor, “Recruitment of Indonesian Soldiers”; van Kessel, *Zwarte Hollanders*.
- ⁹ Apart from a journal article on Luxembourg mercenaries, only individual cases of foreign soldiers have been investigated so far. U. Bosma and T. Kolnberger, “Military Migrants: Luxembourgers in the Colonial Army of the Dutch East Indies,” *Itinerario* 41:3 (2017), 555–80. Bossenbroek addresses the recruitment of the foreigners mainly from a Dutch perspective. Nonetheless, he provides a sound basis for further studies. Bossenbroek, *Volk voor Indië*. Similarly, Loderichs and van Dissel provide useful starting points for larger studies on European mercenaries. M. Loderichs and A. van Dissel, “Miliaire instrumenten van de koloniale macht 1816–1941,” in P. Groen et al., *Krijgsgeweld en kolonie*, 171–205.
- ¹⁰ In an allusion to Bossenbroek and Headrick, Bernhard C. Schär coined the term “Swiss Tools of Empire” for the Swiss mercenaries. See SNSF-Grant number 172613.
- ¹¹ B. Schär, “Switzerland, Borneo and the Dutch Indies: Towards a New Imperial History of Europe, c.1770–1850,” *Past & Present* 257:1 (2022), 134–167. On the concept of “service providers” against the colonial backdrop, see K. Manjapra, “The Semiperipheral Hand. Middle-Class Service Professionals of Imperial Capitalism,” in C. Dejung, D. Motadel and J. Osterhammel (eds), *The Global Bourgeoisie: The Rise of the Middle Class in the Age of Empire*, 187–88.
- ¹² See, e.g.: B. Schär, *Tropenliebe. Schweizer Naturforscher und niederländischer Imperialismus in Südostasien um 1900* (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 2015); S. Junge, “Familiar Distance: Picture Postcards from Java from a European Perspective, ca. 1880–1930,” *BMGN* 134:3 (2019), 96–121; M. Toivanen, “Java on the Way Around the World,” *BMGN* 134:3 (2019) 47–71; P. Teichfischer, “Transnational Entanglements in Colonial Medicine: German Medical Practitioners as Members of the Health Service in the Dutch East Indies (1816–1884),” *History Medicine and Health* 10 (2016), 63–79; A. Zangger, “Patriotic Bonds and the Danger of Estrangement: Swiss Networks in Colonial South-East Asia, 1850–1930,” in P. Purtschert and H. Fischer-Tiné, *Colonial Switzerland: Rethinking Colonialism from its Margins*, 91–109 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); A. Weber, *Hybrid Ambitions: Science, Governance, and Empire in the Career of Caspar G. C. Reinwardt (1773–1854)* (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2012); and more recent: Dejung et al., *The Global Bourgeoisie*; and C. Dejung, “Transregional Study of Class, Social Groups, and Milieus,” in: Matthias Middell (ed), *The Routledge Handbook of Transregional Study*, 74–81 (London: Routledge, 2019).
- ¹³ This state of research partly draws on the preliminary work of Bernhard C. Schär’s project proposal to the Swiss National Science Foundation in 2017.
- ¹⁴ J. Bourke, “New Military History,” M. Hughes and W. J. Philpott, *Palgrave Advances in Modern Military History* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) 259.
- ¹⁵ On “New Military History”, see: J. W. Chambers, “Conference Review Essay: The New Military History,” *Journal of Military History* 55:3 (1991); T. Kühne, *Was ist Militärgeschichte?* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2000); S. Morillo and M. F. Pavkovic, *What is Military History?* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 39–44; P. Wilson, “Defining Military Culture (Report),” *The Journal of Military History* 72:1 (2008), 11–41.
- ¹⁶ Exact figures are hard to determine, on this see the discussion in: H. R. Fuhrer, R.-P. Eyer, and P. Clerc, *Schweizer in “Fremden Diensten”: verherrlicht und verurteilt* (Zürich, NZZ Verlag, 2006), 42–48.

- ¹⁷ Paul de Vallière provides the foremost example of this: P. de Vallière, *Treue und Ehre: Geschichte der Schweizer in fremden Diensten* (Lausanne: Les Editions d'art Suisse ancien, 1940); on the historiography of Swiss mercenary service, see: Henry and Krauer, "Fremde Dienste"; or R. Jaun, "Einleitung," in R. Jaun and P. Streit, *Schweizer Solddienst: Neue Arbeiten – Neue Aspekte* (Birmensdorf: SVMM, 2010).
- ¹⁸ C. Huber and K. Keller, "Französische Pensionen in der Eidgenossenschaft und ihre Verteilung in Stadt und Amt Zug durch die Familie Zurlauben," in K. von Greyerz, A. Holenstein, and A. Würigler, *Soldgeschäfte, Klientelismus, Korruption in der Frühen Neuzeit*, 153–82 (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2018); P. Rogger, "Pensions in Switzerland Practices, Conflicts, and Impact in the Sixteenth Century," in S. Norrhem and E. Thomson, *Subsidies, Diplomacy, and State Formation in Europe, 1494–1789*, 146–71 (Lund: Lund University Press, 2020); N. Büsser, "Die 'Frau Hauptmannin' als Schaltstelle für Rekrutenwerbungen, Geldtransfer und Informationsaustausch," *Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte* 22 (2007), 143–153; P. Rogger, "Kompaniewirtschaft, Verflechtungszusammenhänge, familiäre Unternehmensorganisation. Die Zurlauben als Militärunternehmer auf den eidgenössischen Söldnermärkten um 1700," in K. von Greyerz, A. Holenstein, and A. Würigler, *Soldgeschäfte, Klientelismus, Korruption in der Frühen Neuzeit*, 211–38 (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2018); B. Ryser, *Zwischen den Fronten: Berner Militärunternehmer im Dienst des Sonnenkönigs Louis XIV* (Zürich: Hier und Jetzt, 2021).
- ¹⁹ V. Groebner and B. Hitz, "Die Schweizer Reisläufer 1500–1700 als Mythos mit Lücken: Geschichtsinzenierung und Kriegsökonomie im Alltag," in R. Jaun and P. Streit, *Schweizer Solddienst: Neue Arbeiten – Neue Aspekte*, 15–22 (Birmensdorf: SVMM, 2010).
- ²⁰ Jaun, "Einleitung"; Rogger and Hitz, "Söldnerlandschaften".
- ²¹ P. Huber and C. Koller, "Armut, Arbeit, Abenteuer – Sozialprofil und Motivationsstruktur von Schweizer Söldnern in der Moderne," *Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 102:1 (2015), 50; see also: P. Huber, *Fluchtpunkt Fremdenlegion. Schweizer im Indochina und Algerienkrieg, 1945–1962* (Zürich: Chronos, 2016).
- ²² C. Koller, *Die Fremdenlegion: Kolonialismus, Söldnertum, Gewalt, 1831–1962* (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 2013), 27–39; 47.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, 161–215.
- ²⁴ M. R. Moyd, *Violent Intermediaries: African Soldiers, Conquest, and Everyday Colonialism in German East Africa* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2014).
- ²⁵ E. Wald, *Vice in the Barracks: Medicine, the Military and the Making of Colonial India, 1780–1868* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
- ²⁶ K. Imy, *Faithful Fighters: Identity and Power in the British Indian Army* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2020); H. Streets-Salter, *Martial Races: The Military, Race, and Masculinities in British Imperial Culture, 1857–1914* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004).
- ²⁷ T. Bühner and C. Stachelbeck, D. Walter (eds), *Imperialkriege von 1500 bis heute: Strukturen, Akteure, Lernprozesse* (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 2011).
- ²⁸ Bossenbroek, *Van Holland naar Indië*; Bossenbroek, *Volk voor Indië*; Bossenbroek, "Living Tools of Empire".
- ²⁹ Groen et al., *Krijgsgeweld en kolonie*.
- ³⁰ G. Teitler, "Manpower Problems and Manpower Policy in the Dutch Colonial Army, 1860–1920," *Acta Politica* 14 (1979), 71–94; G. Teitler, "The Mixed Company: Fighting Power and Ethnic Relations in the Dutch Colonial Army, 1890–1920," in Karl Hack (ed), *Colonial Armies in Southeast Asia*, 71–94 (London: Routledge, 2006); van Kessel, *Zwarte Hollanders*; de Moor, "Recruitment of Indonesian Soldiers".
- ³¹ R. Limpach, *De brandende kampongs van Generaal Spoor* (Amsterdam: boom 2016); P. Groen, "Colonial Warfare and Military Ethics in the Netherlands East Indies, 1816–1941," *Journal of Genocide*

- Research* 14:3–4 (2012), 277–96; M. Kitzen, “Between Treaty and Treason : Dutch Collaboration with Warlord Teuku Uma during the Aceh War, a Case Study on the Collaboration with Indigenous Power-Holders in Colonial Warfare,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 23:1 (2012), 93–116; E. Kreike, “Genocide in the Kampongs? Dutch Nineteenth Century Colonial Warfare in Aceh, Sumatra,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 14:3–4 (2012), 297–315; E. Clavé, “Silenced Fighters: An insight into Women Combatants’ History in Aceh (17th–20th c.),” *Archipel* 87:1 (2014), 273–306.
- ³² P. Groen, “‘Zedelijkheid en martialiteit’. Het kazerneconcubinaat in Nederlands-Indië rond 1890,” in M. Bloembergen and R. Raben, *Het koloniale beschavingsoffensief: Wege naar het nieuwe Indië*, 25–51 (Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, 2009); H. Ming, “Barracks-Concubinage in the Indies, 1887–1920,” *Indonesia* 35 (1983), 65–94.
- ³³ E. Locher-Scholten, *Sumatran Sultanate and Colonial State: Jambi and the Rise of Dutch Imperialism, 1830–1870* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2003); P. Groen, “‘Soldaat’ en ‘bestuursman’: Het Indische leger en de Nederlandse gezagsvestiging op Ceram,” *Mededelingen van de Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis Landmachtstaf* 5 (1982), 203–31.
- ³⁴ T. Bürgisser, “Rohrdorf-Java einfach: Ein Niederrohrdorfer Bauernsohn im indonesischen Kolonialkrieg,” *Badener Neujaahrsblätter* 96 (2021), 197–206.
- ³⁵ B. Schär, “Switzerland, Borneo and the Dutch Indies”.
- ³⁶ A. Zanger, “Balthasar im Pfefferland: Das Schicksal eines Bündner Söldners auf Java (1859–62),” *Bündner Monatsblatt* 2 (2019), 210–233. Further examples are provided by D. Auberson, “Engagés pour six ans en enfer: les mercenaires suisses à la conquête de Java et Bornéo, 1855–1864,” in S. Rial (ed), *De Nimègue à Java: Les soldats suisses au service de la Hollande*, 221–35 (Morges: Château Morges et ses musées, 2014); and C. Menzi, “Robert Walthert (1841–1876): Ein Willisauer Söldner im Dienste der niederländischen Kolonialarmee in Indonesien,” *Heimatkunde Wiggertal* 88 (2023), 148–155.
- ³⁷ For the publications of this project, see the series “Onafhankelijkheid, Dekolonisatie, Geweld en Oorlog in Indonesië 1945–1950” by Amsterdam University Press.
- ³⁸ G. Oostindie et al, *Beyond the Pale: Dutch Extreme Violence in the Indonesian War of Independence, 1945–1949* (Amsterdam: University Press, 2022), 107–108.
- ³⁹ R. Frakking and A. van Mourik, “Dutch Colonial Violence and the Missing Voices of Indonesians,” *Imperial Global Forum*.
- ⁴⁰ Groen, “Colonial Warfare”; T. Menger, “Press the Thumb onto the Eye: Moral Effect, Extreme Violence, and the Transimperial Notions of British, German, and Dutch Colonial Warfare, ca. 1890–1914,” *Itinerario* 46:1 (2022), 84–108; M. Gordon, *Extreme Violence and “the British Way”: Colonial Warfare in Perak, Sierra Leone and Sudan* (London: Bloomsbury Academic Press, 2021); and S. Kuss, *German Colonial Wars and the Context of Military Violence* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017).
- ⁴¹ On everyday colonial violence, see e.g.; M. Muschalek, *Violence as Usual: Policing and the Colonial State in German Southwest Africa* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019); or R. Kumar, “Seeing like a Policeman: Everyday Violence in British India, c. 1900–1950,” P. G. Dwyer and A. Nettelbeck, *Violence, Colonialism and Empire in the Modern World*, 131–49 (New York: Springer, 2018).
- ⁴² B. Stuchtey, “Zeitgeschichte und vergleichende Imperien-geschichte,” *Vierteljahrsheft für Zeitgeschichte* 65:3 (2017), 305.
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- ⁴⁹ Some illustrative examples of transimperial studies are provided, among others, by K. Hoganson and J. Sexton, *Crossing Empires: Taking U.S. History into Transimperial Terrain* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2019); C. Kamissek and J. Kreienbaum, "An Imperial Cloud? Conceptualising Interimperial Connections and Transimperial Knowledge," *Journal of Modern European History* 14:2 (2016), 164–82; C. Blaser, M. Ligtenberg, and J. Selander, "Introduction: Transimperial Webs of Knowledge at the Margins of Imperial Europe," *Comparativ* 31:5–6 (2021), 527–39; J. Hennessey and J. Lahti, "Nordics in Motion: Transimperial Mobilities and Global Experiences of Nordic Colonialism," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 51:3 (2023), 409–20.
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- ⁵¹ M. Bloembergen and M. Eickhoff, *The Politics of Heritage in Indonesia: A Cultural History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019); F. Hoyer, *Relations of Absence: Germans in the East Indies and Their Families c. 1750–1820* (Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet 2020); K. Fatah-Black, "A Swiss Village in the Dutch Tropics: The Limitations of Empire-Centred Approaches to the Early Modern Atlantic World," *BMGN* 128:1 (2013), 31–52; J. Gommans. "Conclusion. Globalizing Empire: The Dutch Case," in Antunes and Gommans *Exploring the Dutch Empire*, 267–78; Legêne, "European Character"; M. Ligtenberg, "Contagious Connections: Medicine, Race, and Commerce between Sumatra, New Guinea, and Frankfurt, 1879–1904," *Comparativ* 31:5 (2021) 555–71; M. Ligtenberg,

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- ⁶⁸ Jan Lucassen included them among “the other proletarians”: J. Lucassen, “The Other Proletarians: Seasonal Labourers, Mercenaries and Miners,” *International Review of Social History* 39:2 (1994), 184–86.
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- ⁷⁷ Bourke, “New Military History”.
- ⁷⁸ Koller, *Die Fremdenlegion*; an exception is, for example: K. Wagner, “Savage Warfare: Violence and the Rule of Colonial Difference in Early British Counterinsurgency,” *History Workshop Journal* 85 (2018): 217–37.
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- ⁸⁰ H. Fischer-Tiné, *Low and Licentious Europeans: Race, Class, and “White Subalternity” in Colonial India* (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2009), 238–41. On the “racial dividend” in the KNIL, see chapter 3.
- ⁸¹ NL-HaNA, Koloniën / Stamboeken Militairen KNIL Oost- en West-Indië, 2.10.50, inv. nr. 1–331.
- ⁸² I owe many thanks to the SIS-Team at ETH Zurich, especially Althea Parker, for their sophisticated support in the creation of the database, as well as Christian Krauer, Niklaus Müller and Stephanie Willi for their endless efforts in feeding the database. For the period after 1885, Bossenbroek’s extrapolation serves as a basis.
- ⁸³ Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerie van Koloniën, nummer toegang 2.10.02; Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Legatie Zwitserland, 1814–1916, nummer toegang 2.05.10.21; Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Consulaat-Generaal Zwitserland, 1818-1904, nummer toegang 2.05.14.05; Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Consulaat Genève (Zwitserland), 1850–1915, nummer toegang 2.05.14.12.
- ⁸⁴ BAR, Nederlande, E2#D.525.

- ⁸⁵ StAAG, StAAI, StAAR, StABE, StABL, StABS, StAFR, StAGR, StALU, StANW, StASG, StASO, STASZ, StATG, StAZH. I have not found any comprehensive documentation on the Foreign Military Services in the KNIL in the other state archives.
- ⁸⁶ The research for the articles was primarily conducted via the following websites: www.delpher.nl; www.letempsarchives.ch; www.e-newspaperarchives.ch; www.e-periodica.ch; www.e-rara.ch [30.09.2023].
- ⁸⁷ *Koloniaal verslag* ('s-Gravenhage: Algemeene Landsdrukkerij, 1868); *Indisch Militair Tijdschrift* (Batavia, 1877–1941).
- ⁸⁸ M. Greig, *Dead Men Telling Tales: Napoleonic War Veterans and the Military Memoir Industry, 1808–1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 1–4; Koller, *Die Fremdenlegion*, 14–17.
- ⁸⁹ C. A. Haab, *Handwerksburschen-Erinnerungen. Meine Reise von St. Gallen nach Ostindien: vier Monate Hin- und vier Monate Rückreise; vier Jahre auf der Insel Java* (Ebnat-Kappel: Haab, 1916).
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- ⁹¹ A. Zehnder, *Unter Hollands Flagge in Ost-Indien* (Luzern: Räber, 1924); E. Eckert, *Erlebnisse eines Schweizers als Deserteurs der holländischen Kolonial-Armee in Ost-Indien* (Weinfelden: Neuenschwander, 1912).
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- ⁹³ For a comprehensive overview, see: Greig, *Dead Men Telling Tales*, 4–11.
- ⁹⁴ D. Chevalley, *Un Suisse à Java et Bornéo. Au service de Hollande* (Genève: Slatkine, 1998).
- ⁹⁵ Since the holdings were only recently handed over to the Social Archive, they do not yet have a signature. I would also like to take this opportunity to explicitly thank the descendants of these mercenaries, the Brandenberger family, the Egloff family and Thomas Bürgisser, Rita and Arthur Hossle, Peter Schüpbach, Roland Schwob, and Felix Müller, for their trust and courtesies.
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- ⁹⁸ This approach is inspired by: D. Gugerli and D. Speich Chassé, *Topografien der Nation Politik, kartografische Ordnung und Landschaft im 19. Jahrhundert* (Zürich: Chronos-Verlag, 2002).

Chapter 2. Swiss Supplies for Dutch Demands: Transformations in a Military Labour Market

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- ² P. Henry and P. Krauer, “Fremde Dienste,” *Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz* (2023).
- ³ For an in-depth discussion of the factors that led to the end of the mercenary regiments in the nineteenth century, see: S. Percy, *Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 94–166; and B. Collins and N. Arielli, “Introduction: Transnational Military Service since the Eighteenth Century,” in *ibid.* (eds), *Transnational Soldiers: Foreign Military Enlistment in the Modern Era*, 1–12 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); see also: J. Thomson, “State Practices, International Norms, and the Decline of Mercenarism,” *International Studies Quarterly* 34:1 (1990), 23–24; on conscription and the invention of standing armies in peacetime, see: J. Osterhammel, *Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (München: C.H. Beck, 2011), 882–85; U. Frevert, *Die kasernierte Nation: Militärdienst und Zivilgesellschaft in Deutschland* (München: Beck, 2001); and the various case studies on Germany, France, Poland, the Netherlands and Switzerland: R. G. Foerster, *Die Wehrpflicht: Entstehung, Erscheinungsformen und politisch-militärische Wirkung* (München: Oldenbourg, 1994).

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- ⁵ Henry and Krauer, “Fremde Dienste”.
- ⁶ Percy, *Mercenaries*, 129–32.
- ⁷ For a summary of the discussion on the French Revolution as a watershed in European recruitment practice, see: N. Arielli, *From Byron to Bin Laden* (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press), 16–21; on foreigners in Napoléon’s army, see: A. Pigead, *L’armée de Napoléon (1800–1815): organisation et vie quotidienne* (Paris: Tallandier, 2002), 201–12.
- ⁸ On the Polish Legions in the Caribbean, see: J. Pachowski and R. K. Wilson, *Poland’s Caribbean Tragedy: A Study of Polish Legions in the Haitian War of Independence 1802–1803* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1986); for the Swiss Soldiers sent in 1803, see F. Bernoulli, *Die helvetischen Halbbrigaden im Dienste Frankreichs 1798–1805* (Frauenfeld: Huber, 1934), 93–99.
- ⁹ J. Delmas and P. Masson, “Chapitre XVI – La remise en ordre du Royaume et le Redressement Maritime,” in A. Blanchard et al., *Histoire militaire de la France. De 1715 à 1871*, vol. 2, 391–408 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992), 395; H. R. Fuhrer and R.-P. Eyer, “Das Ende der ‘Fremden Dienste,’” in Hans Rudolf Fuhrer, Robert-Peter Eyer, and Philippe Clerc (eds) *Schweizer in ‘Fremden Diensten’: verherrlicht und verurteilt*, 247–58 (Zürich: NZZ Verlag, 2006), 257; J. McCormack, *One Million Mercenaries: Swiss Soldiers in the Armies of the World* (London: Cooper, 1993), 171–72.
- ¹⁰ D. Porch, *The French Foreign Legion: A Complete History* (London: Macmillan, 1991); see also: Koller, *Die Fremdenlegion*. In particular 9,000 Poles, among them many noblemen, fled from the Russian tsar to France, see Osterhammel, *Verwandlung der Welt*, 211; on the continuity of Swiss military labour, see also: Maradan *Les Suisses et la Légion étrangère de 1831 à 1861* (Marsens: E. Maradan, 1987).
- ¹¹ For an in-depth inquiry into the colonial war in Algeria, see: O. Le Cour Grandmaison, *Coloniser. Exterminer. Sur la guerre et l’Etat colonial* (Paris: Fayard, 2005); Koller delivers a short recapitulation of the theatres of war, see: Koller, *Die Fremdenlegion*, 26–39. Since the hoped-for rapid successes in the Crimean War did not materialise, the French government even decided at the end of 1854 to found a second Foreign Legion consisting of Swiss nationals. By the time the troops were raised, warfare was already over, so they were transferred to North Africa, see: Maradan, “La Légion Suisse au service de la France,” *Revue Militaire Suisse* 134:11 (1989), 527–99.
- ¹² Koller, *Die Fremdenlegion*, 39–50.
- ¹³ Delmas and Masson, “Chapitre XVI,” 526–33. For a more in-depth overview of the grouping in Armée d’Afrique, Troupes Coloniales and Armée Métropolitaine, see: A. Clayton, *France, Soldiers, and Africa* (London: Brassey’s Defence Publ., 1988), 1–30; on the Tirailleur Sénégalais: M. Echenberg, *Colonial Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West Africa, 1857–1960*. Social History of Africa (Portsmouth, N.H: Heinemann, 1991); for the French recruitment of “natives” in Indochina, see: H. Eckert, “Double-Edged Swords of Conquest in Indochina: Tirailleurs Tonkinois, Chasseurs Annamites and Militias, 1883–1895,” in T. Rettig and K. Hack (eds), *Colonial Armies in Southeast Asia*, 119–45 (London: Taylor & Francis, 2005).

- ¹⁴ E. Déroo, "Mourir: L'appel à l'empire," in P. Blanchard and S. Lemaire (eds), *Culture coloniale, 1871–1931. La France conquise par son empire*, 107–17 (Paris: Éditions Autrement, 2011), 117; and R. Smith, "Soldiery," in P. Levine (ed), *The Ashgate Research Companion to Modern Imperial Histories*, 359–75 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), 365.
- ¹⁵ In 1813, about 20 per cent of the British Army were foreigners (mostly Germans, Dutch and exiled French), see: K. Linch, "The Politics of Foreign Recruitment in Britain during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars," in N. Arielli and B. Collins (eds), *Transnational Soldiers: Foreign Military Enlistment in the Modern Era*, 50–66 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 54; For the King's German Legion, see: B. Simms, *The Longest Afternoon: The Four Hundred Men Who Decided the Battle of Waterloo* (London: Allen Lane, 2014).
- ¹⁶ C. Koller, "The British Foreign Legion – Ein Phantom zwischen Militärpolitik und Migrationsdiskursen," *Militär-geschichtliche Zeitschrift* 74:1–2 (2015), 32–33; and M. Robson, "Strangers, Mercenaries, Heretics, Scoffers, Polluters: Volunteering for the British Auxiliary Legion in Spain, 1835," in Arielli and Collins (eds), *Transnational Soldiers*, 50–66.
- ¹⁷ On the background that led the British government to recruit mercenaries, see: C. C. Bayley, *Mercenaries for the Crimea: The German, Swiss, and Italian Legions in British Service, 1854–1856* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977); Koller, "British Foreign Legion", 31–46; on the British-German Legion: "From Mercenaries to Military Settlers: The British German Legion, 1854–1861," in Stephen M. Miller (ed), *Soldiers and Settlers in Africa, 1850–1918*, 85–122. (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 88–89; for the logistics in the Crimean War and the capture of Sebastopol: G. Wawro, *Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792–1914* (London: Routledge, 2000), 53–64; on the British-Swiss Legion, see also: P. Gugolz, *Die Schweiz und der Krimkrieg 1853–1856* (Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1965).
- ¹⁸ The three legions were initially offered to the British East India Company (hereafter EIC), but the EIC declined. The dismissal of the Italian mercenaries in particular proved to be difficult, since Italian mercenaries not originating from the Kingdom of Sardinia were refused entry into Italian states. The Argentine government offered them to settle as farmers in Bahia di Blanca. Around 160 followed the call. See: Bayley, *Mercenaries for the Crimea*, 117–33.
- ¹⁹ Koller, "British Foreign Legion"; and J. Laband, "Mercenaries", 109–20; on the German military settlers and their families, see also: J. Fisch, *Geschichte Südafrikas* (München: Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag, 1990), 151–52.
- ²⁰ During the War of American Independence, several auxiliary units from six German principalities fought for the British crown. See: C. Tzoref-Ashkenazi, *German Soldiers in Colonial India* (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2014), 34–35. On continental European Soldiers in India, see also: Conway, *Britannia's Auxiliaries*, 41–45.
- ²¹ Tzoref-Ashkenazi, *German Soldiers*, 33–39; on the composition of the EIC's army based in Madras, 1766–180, see: M. Jasanoff, *Edge of Empire: Lives, Culture, and Conquest in the East, 1750–1850* (New York: Vintage Books, 2005), 59–60; on German auxiliaries in the War of Independence, see: Tzoref-Ashkenazi, "Deutsche Hilfstruppen in Imperialkriegen 1776–1808," in Tanja Bühner, Christian Stachelbeck, and Dierk Walter (ed), *Imperialkriege von 1500 bis heute: Strukturen, Akteure, Lernprozesse*, 345–61 (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 2011); the European soldiers of the EIC, however, were not left on their own. From 1754 they were supported by small units of the Crown Troops. See: E. Wald, *Vice in the Barracks: Medicine, the Military and the Making of Colonial India, 1780–1868* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 20.
- ²² B. Crosbie, *Irish Imperial Networks* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 70–79.
- ²³ For the social and national backgrounds of the EIC troops, see P. Stanley, *White Mutiny: British Military Culture in India* (New York: New York University Press, 1998); and D. M. Peers, *Between Mars and Mammon: Colonial Armies and the Garrison State in India, 1819–1835* (London: Tauris

- Academic Studies, 1995); on the relevance of Scots in the British Imperial Army, see for example: T. M. Devine, "Soldiers of Empire, 1750–1914," in J. M. MacKenzie, *Scotland and the British Empire, 176–195* (Oxford: University Press, 2011); and E. M. Spiers, *The Scottish Soldier and Empire, 1854–1902* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006); and for the Irish, e.g.: A. Bubb, "The Life of the Irish Soldier in India: Representations and Self-Representations, 1857–1922," *Modern Asian Studies* 46:4 (2012), 769–813; and R. Adjobimey, "The 1857 Indian Uprising in Irish Ballads: Voices of the Subaltern," in D. S. Roberts and J. J. Wright (eds), *Ireland's Imperial Connections, 1775–1947*, 171–89 (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019).
- ²⁴ This figure is composed of the 14,000 EIC soldiers, of which roughly half were Irish, and the 26,000 regular British troops containing 40 per cent Irish. K. Kenny, "The Irish in the Empire," in *ibid.* (ed), *Ireland and the British Empire*, 90–122. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 104–5; on the social and national backgrounds of the EIC troops, see also Stanley, *White Mutiny*.
- ²⁵ Kenny, "The Irish in the Empire"; T. Denman, "Ethnic Soldiers Pure and Simple? The Irish in the Late Victorian British Army," *War in History* 3:3 (1996), 253–73; and T. Bartlett, "The Irish Soldier in India, 1750–1947," in M. Holmes and D. Holmes (eds), *Ireland and India: Connections, Comparisons, Contrasts*, 12–28 (Dublin: Folens, 1997), 20–22.
- ²⁶ See D. Omissi, *The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860–1940*. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), 3; and Wald, *Vice in the Barracks*, 21.
- ²⁷ Peers, *Between Mars and Mammon*, 73–105; and Streets-Salter, *Martial Races: The Military, Race, and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857–1914* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 25–26.
- ²⁸ Omissi, *Sepoy*, 1–46; on the construction and biologisation of individual religious and social groups as martial races, see: Streets-Salter, *Martial Races*; K. Imy, *Faithful Fighters: Identity and Power in the British Indian Army* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2020); and K. Roy, *Brown Warriors of the Raj: Recruitment and the Mechanics of Command in the Sepoy Army, 1859–1913* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2008).
- ²⁹ For a more detailed listing, see: P. Burroughs, "Defence and Imperial Disunity," in Andrew N. Porter (ed) *The Nineteenth Century*, 320–45. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999), 322; R. J. Moore, "Imperial India, 1858–1914," in A. N. Porter (ed), *The Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 442–44; and: J. Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830–1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 182–83.
- ³⁰ R. N. Buckley, *Slaves in Red Coats: The British West India Regiments, 1795–1815* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979). For Buckley's estimate, see: pp. 54–56; and on the West Indian Army in general: P. D. Morgan, "Black Experience in the British Empire, 1680–1810," in P. D. Morgan and S. Hawkins (eds), *Black Experience and the Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 108–9; and Smith, "Soldiery", 362–63.
- ³¹ For an overview, see: T. Parsons, "African Participation in the British Empire," in Morgan and Hawkins (eds), *Black Experience and the Empire*, 271–74.
- ³² M. Rovinello, "The Draft and Draftees in Italy, 1861–1914," in E.-J. Zürcher (ed), *Fighting for a Living: A Comparative Study of Military Labour 1500–2000*, 479–518 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013), 480. How "Swiss" these regiments actually were, is still to be researched. At least for the time of the Ancien Régime it is known that there were also numerous men from different areas of the Holy Roman Empire, Italy, Austria-Hungary or the Iberian Peninsula. See: R.-P. Eyer, *Die Schweizer Regimente in Neapel im 18. Jahrhundert*, 363; on the Irish soldiers, see: D. P. Corcoran, *The Irish Brigade in the Pope's Army, 1860: Faith, Fatherland and Fighting* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2018).

- ³³ As F. N. Göhde points out, it is controversial to categorise these fighters as “mercenaries”, “professional soldiers” or “political volunteers”. In contemporary propaganda, for instance, one’s own troops were depicted as noble soldiers following a political ideal, while those of the other side were denigrated as “mercenaries”. F. N. Göhde, “A New Military History of the Italian Risorgimento and Anti-Risorgimento: The Case of ‘Transnational Soldiers,’” *Modern Italy* 19:1 (2014) 21–39.
- ³⁴ These Askaris, however, did not always obey orders and sometimes mutinied, see: A. Negussay, “Chapter 4. Adwa 1896: Who Was Savage and Who Was Civilized?,” in P. Milkias and G. Metaferia, *The Battle of Adwa: Reflections on Ethiopia’s Historic Victory Against European Colonialism* (New York, Algora Publishing, 2005), 156; for the Battle of Adwa and the failed conquest of Ethiopia, see: B. Vandervort, *Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830–1914* (London: UCL Press, 1998), 156–66; as well as the insightful introduction to this recent anthology: S. Brioni and S. B. Gulema, *The Horn of Africa and Italy: Colonial, Postcolonial and Transnational Cultural Encounters* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2018).
- ³⁵ On Askaris, see: M. R. Moyd, *Violent Intermediaries: African Soldiers, Conquest, and Everyday Colonialism in German East Africa*. (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2014), 36–87; on the *Schutztruppe*, see: T. Bühner, *Die kaiserliche Schutztruppe für Deutsch-Ostafrika: koloniale Sicherheitspolitik und transkulturelle Kriegführung, 1885 bis 1918* (München: Oldenbourg, 2011), 57–86 and 126–38; S. Kuss, *German Colonial Wars and the Context of Military Violence* (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2017), 79–87; H. Wegmann, *Vom Kolonialkrieg in Deutsch-Ostafrika zur Kolonialbewegung in Freiburg der Offizier und badische Veteranenführer Max Knecht (1874–1954)* (Freiburg i.Br.: rombach verlag, 2019), 87–98; and: Morlang, *Askari und Fitafta: “farbige” Söldner in den deutschen Kolonien* (Berlin: Links, 2008), 15–16.
- ³⁶ See: Kuss, *German Colonial Wars*, 79–87.
- ³⁷ See: D. van Reybrouck, *Congo: The Epic History of a People* (New York: Ecco, 2015), 92–92; and P. Minder, “Quelques Soldats Suisses à la Conquête du Congo Belge: Les 15 Mercenaires de la Force Publique,” *Revue Militaire Suisse* 11 (1996), 35–40.
- ³⁸ R. Roque, *Headhunting and Colonialism: Anthropology and the Circulation of Human Skulls in the Portuguese Empire, 1870–1930* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 2–4.
- ³⁹ On the “jingoism”, see: K. Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
- ⁴⁰ B. Etemad, *Possessing the World: Taking the Measurements of Colonisation from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century*. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 45–46.
- ⁴¹ M. Bossenbroek, *Volk voor Indië: De werving van Europese militairen voor de Nederlandse koloniale dienst 1814–1909* (Amsterdam: Van Soeren & Co, 1992), 277.
- ⁴² Bossenbroeks stops the periodisation of the volatile recruitment in 1909, when the colonial troop deposit in Harderwijk was closed. As I will show below, this wave can be extended until the outbreak of World War I: M. Bossenbroek, “The Living Tools of Empire,” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 23 (1995), 40–45.
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*, 35–51.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 60–81; on the “Swiss ship”, see: NL-HaNA, Koloniën/Stamboeken Militairen KNIL Oost- en West-Indië, 2.10.50, inv. nr. 104, Folio 3826–3854. On the Swiss Regiments hired by King William I, see: Amersfoort, *Koning en kanton*; or more recent and in English: Amersfoort, “The Dutch Army in Transition: From All-Volunteer Force to Cadre-Militia Army, 1795–1830”, in E.-J. Zürcher (ed), *Fighting for a Living: A Comparative Study of Military Labour 1500–2000*, 447–78 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013); for Dipanagara’s perspective on the Java War, see: P. Carey, *The Power of Prophecy: Prince Dipanagara and the End of an Old Order in Java, 1785–1855* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 597–655; on the bentengs, see: P. Groen, “Colonial Warfare and Military Ethics in the Netherlands East Indies, 1816–1941,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 14: 3–4 (2012), 281.

- ⁴⁵ Groen, “Colonial Warfare”, 281.
- ⁴⁶ E. Locher-Scholten, “Dutch Expansion in the Indonesian Archipelago around 1900 and the Imperialism Debate” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 25:1 (1994); Kuitenbrouwer, *The Netherlands and the Rise of Modern Imperialism* (New York: Berg, 1991); for the cultivation system, see: U. Bosma, *The Sugar Plantation in India and Indonesia: Industrial Production, 1770–2010*, Studies in Comparative World History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 88–129.
- ⁴⁷ Bossenbroek, *Volk voor Indië*, 78–81.
- ⁴⁸ See: J. de Moor, “The Recruitment of Indonesian Soldiers for the Dutch Colonial Army, c. 1700–1950,” in D. Kilingray and D. Omissi (eds), *Guardians of Empire*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 57–59. By 1855, their recruitment resumed on a smaller scale and until 1872 approximately 800 West Africans had joined the KNIL where 30 of them served until the end of the century. Van Kessel provides a thorough analysis of this subject: van Kessel, *Zwarte Hollanders: Afrikaanse Soldaten in Nederlands-Indië*.
- ⁴⁹ The following source in three volumes provides a detailed overview of the numerous “expeditions” and wars: G. B. Hooijer, *De krijgsgeschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indië van 1811 tot 1894*; See also: P. Hagen, *Koloniale oorlogen in Indonesië: vijf eeuwen verzet tegen vreemde overheersing* (Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers, 2018).
- ⁵⁰ Locher-Scholten, “Dutch Expansion,” 95; on frontier imperialism, see: Groen, “Colonial Warfare,” 282.
- ⁵¹ Kuitenbrouwer, *The Netherlands*, 34; on Brooke, see: A. Middleton, Rajah Brooke and the Victorians,” *The Historical Journal* 53:2 (2010), 381–400.
- ⁵² For a detailed account on the Bali Wars, see: H. Schulte Nordholt, *The Spell of Power: A History of Balinese Politics, 1650–1940* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996), 160–67.
- ⁵³ J. de Moor, “Warmakers in the Archipelago: Dutch Expeditions in Nineteenth Century Indonesia,” in J. de Moor and H. L. Wesseling (ed), *Imperialism and War: Essays on Colonial Wars in Asia and Africa* (Leiden: Brill, 1989), 57–59; and in more detail: M. F. S. Heidhues, *Golddiggers, Farmers and Traders in the “Chinese Districts” of West Kalimantan, Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 2003), 85–125.
- ⁵⁴ For the Banjarmasin War, see: C. Fasseur, “Een koloniale paradox: de Nederlandse expansie in de Indonesische archipel in het midden van de negentiende eeuw (1830–1870).” *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 92 (1979), 174–78; Fasseur, however, does not mention the tax-related rebellions. For a more in-depth analysis of the rebellions, see: M. I. Saleh, “Agrarian Radicalism and Movements of Native Insurrection in South Kalimantan (1858-1865),” *Archipel* 9 (1975), 135–53; and I. S. Ahyat, “Politics and Economy of Banjarmasin Sultanate in the Period of Expansion of the Netherlands East Indies Government in Indonesia, 1826–1860,” *Tawarikh: International Journal for Historical Studies* 3:2 (2012) 155–76.
- ⁵⁵ On the strategies, see: Groen, “Colonial Warfare”; on the muzzleloader, see: de Moor, “Warmakers in the Archipelago”.
- ⁵⁶ Although the Indian Rebellion also occurred during this period, this did not seem to be the decisive point for an intensified recruitment, as recruitment efforts for both European and indigenous troops had already been enhanced beforehand. Moreover, since indigenous troops were never represented to the same extent as in the British Indian Armies, the fear of an uprising by these formations was comparatively moderate. Thus, Bossenbroek considers it more likely that the desire for expansion of colonial officials on the spot led to an increase in the army. Bossenbroek, *Volk voor Indië*, 133–37.
- ⁵⁷ P. Huber and C. Koller, “Armut, Arbeit, Abenteuer – Sozialprofil und Motivationsstruktur von Schweizer Söldnern in der Moderne,” *Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 102:1 (2015), 34.

- ⁵⁸ Bossenbroek, *Volk voor Indië*, 123–37; on the recruitment in Portsmouth, see: Koller, “British Foreign Legion”, 43.
- ⁵⁹ Bossenbroek, *Volk voor Indië*, 150–52; and Bossenbroek, “Living Tools of Empire”. Nevertheless, there were a few exceptions in practice, as the example of the Swiss Johann Jakob Grieder illustrates. He was admitted to the KNIL in Harderwijk on 10 December 1872. See: NL-HaNA, Koloniën/Stamboeken Militairen KNIL Oost- en West-Indië, 2.10.50, inv. nr. 171, Folio 16377.
- ⁶⁰ M. Kitzen, *The Course of Co-Option: Co-Option of Local Power-Holders as a Tool for Obtaining Control over the Population in Counterinsurgency Campaigns in Weblike Societies. With Case Studies on Dutch Experiences during the Aceh War (1873–c. 1912) and the Uruzgan Campaign (2006–2010)* (Amsterdam: Thesis University of Amsterdam, 2016), 189–92; For a discussion of the different reasons mentioned in scholarship leading to the outbreak of the war, see Kuitenbrouwer, *The Netherlands*, 88–90.
- ⁶¹ E. Kreike, “Genocide in the Kampongs? Dutch Nineteenth Century Colonial Warfare in Aceh, Sumatra,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 14:3–4 (2012), 300.
- ⁶² Kitzen, *The Course of Co-Option*, 195; and Groen, “Colonial Warfare,” 284; on the course of the Aceh War, see the two older, but still often quoted basic works: A. Reid, *The Contest for North Sumatra, Atjeh, the Netherlands and Britain, 1858–1898* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969); and P. van’t Veer, *De Atjeh-oorlog* (Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers, 1969).
- ⁶³ An average troop strength of 8,000 men was maintained in the warzone over the whole year. Accordingly, current research estimates that about 17,000 were embroiled in the Aceh War of 1876. The total size of the KNIL in 1876 amounted to about 30,000. See: Koloniaal Verslag, ’s-Gravenhage, Algemeene Landsdrukkerij 1877, 39; and: Kreike, “Genocide in the Kampongs?,” 301.
- ⁶⁴ Bossenbroek, *Volk voor Indië*, 175–89.
- ⁶⁵ For the diplomatic incidents, see: Bossenbroek, *Volk voor Indië*.
- ⁶⁶ For the mortality rate, see: U. Bosma, “Sailing through Suez from the South: The Emergence of an Indies-Dutch Migration Circuit, 1815–1940,” *The International Migration Review* 41:2 (2007), 518.
- ⁶⁷ For a short interval between 1873 and 1874 there was also the possibility of being engaged for two years. Bossenbroek, *Volk voor Indië*, 278.
- ⁶⁸ See Koloniaal Verslag, ’s-Gravenhage, Algemeene Landsdrukkerij, 1878–1894. I thank my colleague, Monique Ligtenberg, for gathering the data.
- ⁶⁹ During a night attack on the island of Lombok in 1894, a Dutch expeditionary corps suffered 100 dead and 270 injured causing a national outcry in the Netherlands. See: Kuitenbrouwer, *The Netherlands*, 259–66; and on the rise of Dutch nationalism: J. van Goor, “De Lombokexpeditie en het Nederlandse Nationalisme,” in *ibid.* (ed), *Imperialisme in de marge: de afronding van Nederlands-Indië*, 19–70 (Utrecht: HES, 1986).
- ⁷⁰ Bossenbroek, “Living Tools”; on the conditions of admission for officers, see: W. Klinkert and P. Groen, “De Militaire School te Meester Cornelis Een officiersopleiding in de Oost 1852–1896,” in V. Enthoven et al., *Een saluut van 26 schoten: liber amicorum aangeboden aan Ger Teitler bij zijn afscheid als hoogleraar aan het Koninklijk Instituut voor de Marine* (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 2005).
- ⁷¹ G. Teitler, “The Mixed Company: Fighting Power and Ethnic Relations in the Dutch Colonial Army, 1890–1920,” in Karl Hack (ed), *Colonial Armies in Southeast Asia*, 71–94 (London: Routledge, 2006), 155.
- ⁷² Groen, “Colonial Warfare,” 290; on the brief declaration, see: E. Locher-Scholten, *Sumatran Sultanate and Colonial State: Jambi and the Rise of Dutch Imperialism, 1830–1870* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asia Probramm Publications, 2003), 201; and for Snouk Hurgronje, see: A. Missbach, “The Aceh War (1873–1913) and the Influence of Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje,” in A. Graf, S. Schroter, and E. Wieringa (eds), *Aceh History, Politics and Culture*, 39–62 (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010).
- ⁷³ See: E. Locher-Scholten, *Ethiek in fragmenten: Vijf studies over koloniaal denken en doen van Nederlanders in de Indonesische archipel 1877–1942* (Utrecht: HES Publishers, 1981); Groen, “Colonial Warfare”. See also chapter 3 of this book.

- ⁷⁴ On the war in Jambi and the Dutch imperial state formation, see: Locher-Scholten, *Sumatran Sultanate*, 232–42; 245–66; for an overview of Dutch campaigns, see: Groen, “Colonial Warfare”, 290; for Ceram: P. Groen, “‘Soldaat’ en ‘bestuursman’: Het Indische leger en de Nederlandse gezagsvestiging op Ceram,” *Mededelingen van de Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis Landmachtstaf 5* (1982), 203–31.
- ⁷⁵ See: Groen, “Colonial Warfare,” 290–91; and Schulte Nordholt, *The Spell of Power*, 212–14.
- ⁷⁶ Locher-Scholten, “Dutch Expansion”; Groen, “Colonial Warfare”, 288; There is a vast amount of literature on colonialism and the civilizing mission. For British India, see, for instance: H. Fischer-Tiné and M. Mann, *Colonialism as Civilizing Mission: Cultural Ideology in British India*. Anthem South Asian Studies (London: Anthem Press, 2004); on the Dutch East Indies M. Bloembergen and R. Raben, *Het koloniale beschavingsoffensief: Wege naar het nieuwe Indië*, 25–51 (Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, 2009); for the French Empire, e.g.: A. L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895–1930* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997).
- ⁷⁷ Bossenbroek, *Volk voor Indië*, 182–89.
- ⁷⁸ Koloniaal Verslag, ’s-Gravenhage, Algemeene Landsdrukkerij 1915.
- ⁷⁹ These figures refer to the date of departure from Harderwijk, which may differ from the date of admission by several months. Accordingly, there were still many Swiss in 1861, although no Swiss were officially enrolled from the end of 1860 onwards.
- ⁸⁰ Koller and Huber provide an overview of the nineteenth century: Koller and Huber, “Armut, Arbeit, Abenteuer,” 35; for the Early Modern Period, see: P. Rogger and B. Hitz, “Söldnerlandschaften – räumliche Logiken und Gewaltmärkte in historisch-vergleichender Perspektive,” in *ibid.* (eds) *Söldnerlandschaften* (Berlin: Duncker & Humoldt, 2014); on the women running military enterprises, see for instance: N. Büsser, “Die ‘Frau Hauptmannin’ als Schaltstelle für Rekrutenwerbungen, Geldtransfer und Informationsaustausch,” *Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte 22* (2007), 143–153; J. Cornut, “Implications féminines dans l’entrepreneuriat militaire familial en Suisse romande (XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles),” *Genre & histoire 19* (2017); and K. von Greyerz, A. Holenstein, and A. Würzler (eds), *Soldgeschäfte, Klientelismus, Korruption in der Frühen Neuzeit: zum Soldunternehmertum der Familie Zurlauben im schweizerischen und europäischen Kontext* (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2018).
- ⁸¹ Fuhrer and Eyer, “Ende der Fremden Dienste,”. For an overview of the successive ban of military treaties, see: G. Züblin, *Die Falschwerbung und das Delikt der Annahme unerlaubten fremden Militärdienstes nach schweizerischem Recht* (Aarau: HRSauerländer, 1928), 13.
- ⁸² “Es darf ernstlich erwogen werden, ob es gut gethan sei und im Interesse unseres Landes liege, in einer Zeit, wo über allzu grosse Konkurrenz der Arbeit, Uebervölkerung und zunehmendes Proletariat geklagt, wo auf Organisation und Beförderung der Auswanderung hingewirkt wird, durch ausserordentliche Massregeln Tausende von Landesangehörigen heimzuberufen, von denen es sehr vielen schwer fallen dürfte, sich eine erträgliche Stellung im bürgerlichen Leben zu erringen.” Bundesrath, “Botschaft des Bundesrathes an die hohe Bundesversammlung betreffend die Militärkapitulationen (vom 13. November, 1850),” *Bundesblatt 3:54* (1850), 511.
- ⁸³ A. Holenstein, P. Kury, and K. Schulz, *Schweizer Migrationsgeschichte: von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart* (Baden: Hier und Jetzt, 2018), 196–99.
- ⁸⁴ On these numbers, see: Historische Statistik der Schweiz HSSO, 2012. Tab. E.16. hso.ch/2012/e/16; and Historische Statistik der Schweiz HSSO, 2012. Tab. B.1a. hso.ch/2012/b/1a. The statistics on overseas migration do not contain any information on mercenaries.
- ⁸⁵ B. Ziegler, “Das Geschäft mit der Auswanderung,” *Itinera 11* (1992), 59–70; D. Meier and R. Wolfensberger, *Eine Heimat und doch keine: Heimatlose und Nicht-Sesshafte in der Schweiz (16.–19. Jahrhundert)* (Zürich: Chronos, 1998), 511–23.

- ⁸⁶ “Da unter diesen Personen auch Heimathlose zu rechnen sind, und es überhaupt bei dieser Klasse von Menschen viele giebt, die rüstig sind und gerne in der Fremde ihr Glück suchen, wenn sie nur die Mittel besässen dahin zu gelangen, so dürfte dieses vielleicht ein Abflusskanal für Menschen werden, welcher [sic!] dem Staat oder den Gemeinden jetzt schon eine grosse Last ist,” note to the Directorate of the Interior, [?] November 1854, StABE BB XIII A 133.
- ⁸⁷ On the administrative deportation of inmates of the Thorberg prison, see: Meier and Wolfensberger, *Eine Heimat*, 51–23.
- ⁸⁸ “weil mancher eine gewisse Existenz in Indien einer ungewissen in Amerika vorzieht,” note to the Directorate of the Interior, [?] November 1854, StABE BB XIII A 133.
- ⁸⁹ C. Pohlmann, *Die Auswanderung aus dem Herzogtum Braunschweig im Kräftespiel staatlicher Einflussnahme und öffentlicher Resonanz 1720–1897* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2002), 303–7.
- ⁹⁰ Koller, *Die Fremdenlegion*, 56.
- ⁹¹ “Sie werden mit uns darüber einverstanden sein, getreue, liebe Eidgenossen, dass es wichtig ist, diesen Anlass zu ergreifen, Fremden, welche zu sehr gravirt sind, um in ihre Heimath zurückzukehren, und in der Schweiz keine Beschäftigung finden, eine Laufbahn zu eröffnen.” Bundesrath, “Kreisschreiben des Schweizerischen Bundesrathes an die Regierungen sämmtlicher Stände, betreffend 1) Die Aufnahme der Flüchtlinge in die Fremdenlegion in Algerien, 2) Die dermalige Anzahl der Flüchtlinge in der Schweiz,” *Bundesblatt* 1:09 (1850), 96–99, 97; see also Koller, *Die Fremdenlegion*, 56.
- ⁹² For defining biopolitics, Koller draws loosely on Foucault: Koller, *Die Fremdenlegion*, 26–78.
- ⁹³ On Michel Foucault’s concept of biopower and technologies of governance, see Foucault, *La volonté de savoir* (Paris: Gallimard, 1976); and A. Folkers, *Biopolitik: ein Reader* (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2014).
- ⁹⁴ On the tightening of legislation and the complaint, see: Bundesrath, “Botschaft des Bundesrathes an die h. Bundesversammlung, betreffend die Anwerbungen für fremden Kriegsdienst,” *Bundesblatt* 2:35 (1859), 217–221; G. Bislin, *Der Tatbestand des Eintritts in fremden Militärdienst* (Zürich, 1973), 30–32; G. Mülhaupt, “... für die Zwecke des vaterländischen Wehrwesens ...” *Die bundesbehördliche Handhabung fremder Dienste 1859–1927*. Unpublished Master thesis (Bern, 2012), 14–17.
- ⁹⁵ Fuhrer and Eyer, “Ende der ‘Fremden Dienste,’” 256. With the corresponding approval of the Ministry of Military Affairs, however, enlistment for educational purposes was still permitted. J. J. Aellig, *Die Aufhebung der schweizerischen Söldnerdienste im Meinungskampf des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* (Basel: Helbing und Lichtenhahn, 1954), 83–103; *Der unerlaubte Eintritt in fremden Militärdienst als Schwächung der Wehrkraft* (Bern, 1938), 10–13; Mülhaupt, *Die bundesbehördliche Handhabung*; on the military penal code, see: P. Stauffer, “Militärjustiz,” in *Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz (HLS)* (2009).
- ⁹⁶ The Federal Council explicitly mentioned all four armies in a statement. See: Bundesrath, “Kreisschreiben des Bundesrathes an sämmtliche Kantonsregierungen, betreffend Vollziehung des Bundesgesetzes über die Werbung und den Eintritt in fremden Kriegsdienst (vom 16. August 1859),” *Bundesblatt*, 2:42 (1861), 575.
- ⁹⁷ For Swiss entering the French Foreign Legion in 1859, see: Züblin, *Falschwerbung*, 67.
- ⁹⁸ Notice to the Dutch Consul Faesy, 19 November 1860, NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 40. For the infantry of the Dutch National Army, however, individual Swiss nationals were still accepted, who were then allowed to join the KNIL after one year. For example, see the case of Johannes Graf, in: NL-HaNA, Koloniën / Stamboeken Militairen KNIL Oost- en West-Indië, 2.10.50, inv. nr. 143, Folio 10834.
- ⁹⁹ Letter from Consul General Suter-Vermeulen to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 3 July, 1866; as well as the response, 16. August, 1866, NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 40.
- ¹⁰⁰ The KNIL-Veteran Johann Flückiger was arrested by the Bernese police in August 1866. While Flückiger was detained for vagrancy, it turned out that he had entered into Dutch colonial service

- in September 1859, i.e. after the aforementioned law came into force. Letter from the Bernese Governing Council to the Swiss Federal Council, 23 August 1866, BAR, E2#1000/44#2349.
- ¹⁰¹ “eine sogenannte Fremdenlegion,” Suter-Vermeulen to the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, 31 August, 1866; Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs to Suter-Vermeulen, 5 September, 1866; and response of Suter-Vermeulen to the Swiss Federal Council, 10 September, 1866, NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 40.
- ¹⁰² *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 13 September, 1866; and Schweizer Bundesrath, “Bericht des Schweiz. Bundesrathes an die h. Bundesversammlung über seine Geschäftsführung im Jahr 1866,” *Bundesblatt* 1:16 (1867), 652.
- ¹⁰³ “sehr freundlicher Natur,” *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 15 April, 1864.
- ¹⁰⁴ On the Dutch support for Japan’s market opening towards Switzerland, see: R. Mottini, *Die Schweiz und Japan während der Meiji-Zeit (1868-1912)* (St. Gallen, 1998), 50–58; and P. A. Nakai, *Preussen, die Schweiz und Deutschland aus japanischer Sicht: Modernisierung, Politik, Krieg und Frieden* (München: Iudicium, 2014), 30–36.
- ¹⁰⁵ Bossenbroek, *Volk voor Indië*, 125–26.
- ¹⁰⁶ To the numerous recruiters, see the numerous criminal investigations in BAR, E2#1000/44#2342* and E2#1000/44#2343.
- ¹⁰⁷ For a vivid example, see the case of Friedrich Wüthrich: P. Krauer, “Welcome to Hotel Helvetia! Friedrich Wüthrich’s Illicit Mercenary Trade Network for the Dutch East Indies, 1858–1890,” *BMGN – Low Countries Historical Review* 134:3 (2019), 122–47.
- ¹⁰⁸ These figures refer to the date of departure from Harderwijk, which may differ from the date of admission by several months. J. Kruisinga, “Het ‘Koloniaal Werfdepot’ naar aanleiding van het 50-Jarig bestaan van dat korps,” *Indisch Militair Tijdschrift* 27 (1896), 1–20; 107–26; 134–257.
- ¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*
- ¹¹⁰ On the global crisis in the agricultural sector, see: Osterhammel, *Verwandlung der Welt*, 314–22; on the economic crisis in Switzerland, see J.-F. Bergier, *Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Schweiz* (Zürich: Benziger, 1990), 218–61; B. Veyrassat, “Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft an der Wende zum 20. Jahrhundert,” in P. Halbeisen, M. Müller, and B. Veyrassat (eds), *Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Schweiz im 20. Jahrhundert*, 33–89 (Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 2012); and R. Wecker, “Neuer Staat – neue Gesellschaft. Bundesstaat und Industrialisierung (1848–1914),” in S. Arletta and G. Kreis, *Die Geschichte der Schweiz* (Basel: Schwabe, 2014), 435.
- ¹¹¹ Bossenbroek, *Volk voor Indië*, 182–83.
- ¹¹² “de aanwerving van Zwitsers zoveel mogelijke bevorderen,” letter of Louis Gericke van Herwijnen to Suter-Vermeulen, 21 June 1873, NL-HaNA 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 40.
- ¹¹³ See: NL-HaNA 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 40.
- ¹¹⁴ “wie sich so viele so weit vergessen können, um mit unerklärlichem Leichtsinne in einem Augenblick von Aufregung ihre Freiheit gegen einen beinahe sichern Tod oder gegen ein physisches und moralisches Dahinsiechen zu verkaufen. Ein anderes Loos wartet den für hier Angeworbenen nicht; denn unter den vielen Hunderten von Miethsoldaten [sic!] sind nur wenige, die durch große Willenskraft einen guten Charakter sich zu erhalten vermögen; die übrigen 99% sind für die menschliche Gesellschaft verloren.” Bundesrath, “Aus den Verhandlungen des Schweiz. Bundesrathes,” *Bundesblatt* 2:39 (1874), 767.
- ¹¹⁵ Kreisschreiben des Bundesrates an sämtliche eidgenössischen Stände, 9 September, 1874. BAR, E2 1000 44-2349.
- ¹¹⁶ Letter from the Council of Bern to the Federal Council, 12 December, 1874, BAR, #E2#1000/44#842.
- ¹¹⁷ Letter from Suter-Vermeulen to Schenk, 17 December, 1874, BAR, #E2#1000/44#842.
- ¹¹⁸ I have already unravelled this political affair elsewhere, see: Krauer, “Hotel Helvetia”.

- ¹¹⁹ Letter from Consul General Suter-Vermeulen to Foreign Minister Baron Gericke van Herwijnen, 30 June, 1873, NL-HaNA 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 40.
- ¹²⁰ Bossenbroek, *Volk voor Indië*, 182–83.
- ¹²¹ Letter from Consul General Suter-Vermeulen to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Baron Gericke van Herwijnen, 30 June, 1873, NL-HaNA 2.05.14.05, 40.
- ¹²² Letter from the Swiss President Schenk to Suter-Vermeulen, 18 December, 1874, *ibid.*
- ¹²³ A. Zangger, *Koloniale Schweiz: Ein Stück Globalgeschichte zwischen Europa und Südostasien (1860–1930)* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2011), 20–25.
- ¹²⁴ Letter from Consul General Suter-Vermeulen to Gericke van Herwijnen, 17 August, 1873, NL-HaNA 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 40.
- ¹²⁵ See, for instance, the letter from Suter-Vermeulen to Rahn-Meyer, 10 December, 1878, *ibid.*
- ¹²⁶ Botschaft des Bundesrathes an die Bundesversammlung betreffend das Begnadigungsgesuch de Jakob Kamber, 5 June, 1889, BAR, E2#1000/44#2342*.
- ¹²⁷ *Ibid.*
- ¹²⁸ Kruisinga, “Geschiedenis”.
- ¹²⁹ See Veyrassat, “Wirtschaft”. Veyrassat explicitly contradicts Studer’s findings, according to which real wages in Switzerland were relatively low before 1914. R. Studer, “When did the Swiss get so rich?: comparing living standards in Switzerland and Europe, 1800–1913,” *Journal of European Economic History* 37 (2008), 405–52; see also: J. Tanner, *Geschichte der Schweiz im 20. Jahrhundert*, *Europäische Geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert* (München: C.H. Beck, 2015), 44.
- ¹³⁰ Holenstein, Kury, and Schulz, *Schweizer Migrationsgeschichte*.
- ¹³¹ See C. Koller, “Kriminelle Romantiker in der exotischen Hölle: Zur transnationalen Medialisierung der französischen Fremdenlegion,” *Saeculum* 62:2 (2012), 247–65; the three known reports published by Swiss are: Eckert, *Erlebnisse eines Schweizers als Deserteurs der holländischen Kolonial-Armee in Ost-Indien*. (Weinfelden: Neuenschwander, 1912); C. A. Haab, *Handwerksburschen-Erinnerungen. Meine Reise von St. Gallen nach Ostindien: vier Monate Hin- und vier Monate Rückreise; vier Jahre auf der Insel Java* (Ebnat-Kappel: Haab, 1916); and K. Schmid, 15 Jahre Kriegs- und Friedensdienst in Niederländisch-Indien (Olten: Oltner Tagblatt, 1912).
- ¹³² NL-HaNA, Kolonien/Stamboeken Militairen KNIL Oost- en West-Indië, 2.10.50, inv. nr. 221, Folio 32445.
- ¹³³ For a more comprehensive critique of this narrative, see the introduction to this book; and: P. Krauer, “Zwischen Geld, Gewalt und Rassismus: Neue Perspektiven auf die koloniale Schweizer Söldnermigration nach Südostasien, 1848–1914,” *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte* 71:2 (2021), 229–50.
- ¹³⁴ Henry and Krauer, “Fremde Dienste”.
- ¹³⁵ On the Boer-friendly voices, see: F *Die Diskussion über den Burenkrieg in Politik und Presse der deutschen Schweiz* (Zürich: Europa Verlag, 1964). For the enquiries, see: NL-HaNA 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 40.

Chapter 3. Follow the Men: The Many Lives of Swiss Mercenaries

- ¹ “Jetzt kam ein grosser Moment – wir wurden eingekleidet! Was das sagen will, können nur jene begreifen, die das selbst mitgemacht haben. Man hat ein Gefühl wie jemand, der das grosse Los gewonnen hat und noch nicht daran glauben darf, bevor ihm wirklich das Geld vorgezählt wird.” Zehnder initially planned to travel to Harderwijk, but was then informed by railway staff that the colonial army’s troop depot had been relocated to Nijmegen in 1909. A. Zehnder, *Unter Hollands Flagge in Ost-Indien* (Luzern: Räber, 1924), 15.
- ² M. R. Moyd, *Violent Intermediaries: African Soldiers, Conquest, and Everyday Colonialism in German East Africa* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2014).

- ³ In describing these stages, Koller draws on Arnold van Gennep's anthropological concept of the rite de passage. C. Koller, *Die Fremdenlegion: Kolonialismus, Söldnertum, Gewalt, 1831–1962* (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 2013), 82–83.
- ⁴ On a holistic approach illuminating the complex interaction of push and pull factors on a micro, meso and macro level, see: D. Hoerder, J. Lucassen, and L. Lucassen, "Terminologien und Konzepte in der Migrationsforschung," in K. Bade et al., *Enzyklopädie Migration in Europa: vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart*, 28–53 (Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2007), 32.
- ⁵ For the criteria of admission, see: M. Bossenbroek, *Volk voor Indië: De werving van Europese militairen voor de Nederlandse koloniale dienst 1814–1909* (Amsterdam: Van Soeren & Co, 1992), 353–56. As mentioned in chapter 3, the KNIL suspended the recruitment of Swiss towards the end of 1860, but allowed German- and French-speaking Swiss again from 1866 onwards. However, Italian-speaking citizens remained excluded.
- ⁶ The sample is based on the entries on Swiss mercenaries in the *stamboeken* who joined the KNIL between 1848 and 1885. NL-HaNA, Koloniën / Stamboeken Militairen KNIL Oost- en West-Indië, 2.10.50, inv. nr. 121–215.
- ⁷ Unaware of this difference, Bossenbroek assumes that of the 3,500 Swiss who joined the KNIL between 1856 and 1860, about half came from the German-speaking cantons, 15 per cent from the bilingual canton of Bern, 15 per cent from the French-speaking parts and 10 per cent from the southwestern and southeastern mountain cantons (Valais, Grisons, Ticino). Bossenbroek, *Volk voor Indië*, 128.
- ⁸ On the sources, see introduction.
- ⁹ M. Lischer, "Illegitimität," in *Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz (HLS)*, 2008.
- ¹⁰ Quoted after C. Koller, "The British Foreign Legion – Ein Phantom zwischen Militärpolitik und Migrationsdiskursen," *Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift* 74:1–2 (2015), 38.
- ¹¹ See: J. J. Keller, *Erlebnisse eines Thurgauers in neapolitanischen Diensten (1844–1850)* (Trogen, 1903), 4–5; for further examples of Swiss mercenaries serving for the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, see A. Messerli, "Das Glück ist anderswo: Autobiografische Reiseberichte von Schweizer Söldnern im Königreich beider Sizilien zwischen 1832 und 1861," *Schweizerisches Archiv für Volkskunde*, 106:1 (2010), 149–63.
- ¹² D. Porch, *The French Foreign Legion: A Complete History* (London: Macmillan, 1991), xiii; Christian Koller supports Porch's view, see: Koller, *Die Fremdenlegion*, 40.
- ¹³ See: C. A. Haab, *Handwerksburschen-Erinnerungen. Meine Reise von St. Gallen nach Ostindien: vier Monate Hin- und vier Monate Rückreise; vier Jahre auf der Insel Java* (Ebnet-Kappel: Haab, 1916).
- ¹⁴ See the dossier on Friedrich Abderhalden, NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 27.
- ¹⁵ See the dossier on Edouard Favre, NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 27.
- ¹⁶ See the dossier on Emil Werner, NL-HaNA, Gezantschap Zwitserland tot 1916, 2.05.10.21, inv. nr. 108.
- ¹⁷ Letter from Dutch Consul in Zurich to the Dutch Legation in Bern, 19 September, 1908, NL-HaNA, Gezantschap Zwitserland tot 1916, 2.05.10.21, inv. nr. 108.
- ¹⁸ Camenzind, Unpublished Memoirs, c. 1905, 4.
- ¹⁹ See the dossier on Jacob Bächtold, in: BAR, E2#1000/44#2349*.
- ²⁰ *Verdingkinder* were children who were separated from their parents by the state authorities on moral or financial grounds and placed in homes or with farmers where they had to work under harsh conditions and were regularly physically and psychologically abused. M. Lischer, *Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz* (2013).
- ²¹ I owe this information to the grandson of R. Schüpbach, Peter Schüpbach, e-mail 26 March, 2021.
- ²² See: A. Zanger, "Balthasar im Pfefferland: Das Schicksal eines Bündner Söldners auf Java (1859–62)," *Bündner Monatsblatt* 2 (2019), 210–233.

- ²³ On the reputation of the KNIL, see: M. Bossenbroek, "The Living Tools of Empire," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 23 (1995), 38.
- ²⁴ U. Bosma and T. Kolnberger, "Military Migrants. Luxembourgers in the Colonial Army of the Dutch East Indies," *Itinerario* 41:3 (2017), 558; on the social background of Dutch KNIL soldiers, see: U. Bosma and K. Mandemakers, "Indiëgangsters: sociale herkomst en migratiemotieven (1830–1950). Een onderzoek op basis van de Historische Steekproef Nederlandse bevolking (HSN)," *BMGN* 123:2 (2008), 175.
- ²⁵ Letter from Dutch Consul in Zurich to the Dutch Legation in Bern, 19 September, 1908, NL-HaNA, Gezantschap Zwitserland tot 1916, 2.05.10.21, inv. nr. 108.
- ²⁶ See, e.g. the court files in: BAR, E2#1000/44#2343*.
- ²⁷ M. Bellon to the Dutch Consul General, 31 August, 1881, NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 38.
- ²⁸ Carl Appel to the Dutch Consul, 4 November, 1904, NL-HaNA, Gezantschap Zwitserland tot 1916, 2.05.10.21, inv. nr. 108.
- ²⁹ See, e.g.: *Journal de Genève*, 10 April, 1857; *Gazette de Lausanne*, 2 March, 1857; *Der Bund*, 26 February, 1857; *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 5 May, 1857; *Der Liberale Alpenbote*, 26 February, 1857;
- ³⁰ See, e.g.: *Bündner Tagblatt*, 9 February, 1860; *Gazette de Lausanne*, 8 and 10 October, 1859; or the review of ex-soldier Duchow's public talk at the Arbeiterverein in Davos, in: *Davoser Zeitung*, 25 June, 1903.
- ³¹ "die ärgerlichsten Dinge," Zehnder, *Unter Hollands Flagge*, 5.
- ³² "anfangen zu betteln oder nach Ostindien zu gehen"; Haab, *Handwerksburschen-Erinnerungen*, 5.
- ³³ Letter from Rellstab to his parents and siblings, 6 September, 1860, StAZH, Q I 139.3.
- ³⁴ Haab, *Handwerksburschen-Erinnerungen*, 5.
- ³⁵ Letter from Rellstab to his parents and siblings, 6 September, 1860, StAZH, Q I 139.3.
- ³⁶ Letter from Schneider to the Dutch Consul, 8 March, 1900, NL-HaNA, Gezantschap Zwitserland tot 1916, 2.05.10.21, inv. nr. 108.
- ³⁷ See the dossier on Friedrich Abderhalden, in: NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 27.
- ³⁸ Letter from the Federal Chancellery to the Dutch Consul General, 16 November, 1868, NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 27.
- ³⁹ "aus einer Verstimmung," letter from the Government Council of the canton of Schaffhausen to the Federal Council, 10 September, 1859, BAR, E2#1000/44#2349*.
- ⁴⁰ Letter from Honegger's sisters to the Dutch Consul in Zurich, 3 July 1905, NL-HaNA, Gezantschap Zwitserland tot 1916, 2.05.10.21, inv. nr. 108.
- ⁴¹ Haab, *Handwerksburschen-Erinnerungen*, 12; H. Breitenstein, *21 Jahre in Indien. Aus dem Tagebuch eines Militärarztes. Dritter Theil: Sumatra*. (Leipzig: ThGrieben, 1902), 25; E. Carthaus, *Aus dem Reich von Insulinde: Sumatra und der malaische Archipel* (Leipzig: W. Friedrich, 1891), 157.
- ⁴² K. Heinzen, *Reise nach Batavia* (Köln: Boisserée, 1841), 12–16.
- ⁴³ D. Chevalley, *Un Suisse à Java et Bornéo. Au service de Hollande* (Genève: Slatkine, 1998), 147.
- ⁴⁴ See Bossenbroek, *Volk voor Indië*, 186; and P. Krauer, "Welcome to Hotel Helvetia! Friedrich Wüthrich's Illicit Mercenary Trade Network for the Dutch East Indies, 1858–1890," *BMGN – Low Countries Historical Review* 134: 3 (2019), 122–47, 133–35.
- ⁴⁵ E. Eckert, *Erlebnisse eines Schweizers als Deserteurs der holländischen Kolonial-Armee in Ost-Indien*. (Weinfelden: Neuenschwander, 1912), 26; and Zehnder, *Unter Hollands Flagge*, 12.
- ⁴⁶ See Koller, *Die Fremdenlegion*, 40.
- ⁴⁷ Rimbaud, however, deserted shortly after his arrival in Java in 1876. U. Bosma, *Indiegangsters. Verhalen van Nederlanders die naar Indie trokken* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2010), 174.
- ⁴⁸ "wie es in einem anderen Weltteil geht," letter from Arnold Egloff to his parents, 6 January, 1892, SSA, Ar 201.303.

- ⁴⁹ Carl Appel to the Dutch Consul, 4 November, 1904, NL-HaNA, Gezantschap Zwitserland tot 1916, 2.05.10.21, inv. nr. 108.
- ⁵⁰ A. Camenzind, Unpublished Memoirs, c. 1905, 4.
- ⁵¹ C. Koller, "Kriminelle Romantiker in der exotischen Hölle: Zur transnationalen Medialisierung der französischen Fremdenlegion," *Saeculum* 62:2 (2012): 247–65.
- ⁵² For a broad overview on colonial fantasies circulating in the German-speaking world, see S. Zantop, *Colonial Fantasies: Conquest, Family, and Nation in Precolonial Germany, 1770–1870* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997); and the anthology: B. Kundrus, *Moderne Imperialisten: Das Kaiserreich im Spiegel seiner Kolonien* (Köln: Böhlau, 2003); for the french-speaking realm, see: P. Minder, *La Suisse coloniale: les représentations de l'Afrique et des Africains en Suisse au temps des colonies (1880–1939)* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2011); P. Blanchard and S. Lemaire, *Culture coloniale, 1871–1931* (Paris: Éditions Autrement, 2011).
- ⁵³ G. Keller, "'Pankraz der Schmoller'" in *ibid.*, *Die Leute von Seldwyla: Erzählungen*, 9–112. (Braunschweig: Druck und Verlag von Friedrich Vieweg und Sohn, 1856). On colonial discourses of Sati and its functions, see: L. Mani, "Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India," in Murdo J. MacLeod and Evelyn S. Rawski, *European Intruders and Changes in Behaviour and Customs in Africa, America and Asia before 1800*, 381–418 (London: Routledge, 1998); and G. C. Spivak, "The Rani of Sirmur: An Essay in Reading the Archives," *History and Theory* 24:3 (1985), 247–72, 268; on the irony in this novella, see E. Esslinger, "Anabasis: Anmerkungen zu Gottfried Kellers Legionärsnovelle Pankraz, der Schmoller," in Michael Neumann, Marcus Twellmann, and Florian Schneider (eds.), *Modernisierung und Reserve*, 118–37 (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2017).
- ⁵⁴ For this tale, see chapter ten "Der Schädel," in: G. Keller, *Der grüne Heinrich Roman: Zweite Fassung* (Zürich: Diogenes, 1993), 477–510.
- ⁵⁵ "sondern aus Liebe und Lust zu einem Soldaten, welche Tugenden jeder guter Schweiser [sic!] hat und wie sie in allen Länder bekannt sind für treue und tapfere Männer"; letter from Konrad Reutlinger to the Dutch Consul General, 13 August, 1888, NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 38.
- ⁵⁶ M. Lengwiler, "Männlichkeit und Nervenstärke. Zur Bedeutung von Militär und Krieg für die Gründung des Bundesstaates," in L. Blattmann and I. Meier: *Männerbund und Bundesstaat. Über die politische Kultur der Schweiz*, 120–37 (Zürich: Orell Füssli, 1998).
- ⁵⁷ R. Jaun, "Militär, Krieg und Geschlecht. Europäische Entwicklungslinien und schweizerische Besonderheiten," in C. Dejung and R. Stämpfli (eds), *Armee, Staat und Geschlecht: die Schweiz im internationalen Vergleich, 1918–1945*, 83–97 (Zürich: Chronos, 2003).
- ⁵⁸ This argumentative inconsistency was not resolved until the Second World War and even beyond, see: C. Dejung, *Aktivdienst und Geschlechterordnung: eine Kultur- und Alltagsgeschichte des Militärdienstes in der Schweiz 1939–1945* (Zürich: Chronos, 2006), 132–34.
- ⁵⁹ Jaun, "Militär, Krieg und Geschlecht", 88.
- ⁶⁰ R. Jaun, "Armee und Nation: Schweizerische Militärdiskurse des 19. Jahrhunderts im Widerstreit," in U. Altermatt, C. Bosshart-Pflugler, and A. Tanner (eds), *Die Konstruktion einer Nation: Nation und Nationalisierung in der Schweiz, 18.–20. Jahrhundert*, 149–66 (Zürich: Chronos Verlag, 1998), 150–51; and L. Blattmann, "Männerbund und Bundesstaat," in *ibid.* (ed), *Männerbund und Bundesstaat. Über die politische Kultur der Schweiz* (Zürich: Orell Füssli, 1998), 22–24.
- ⁶¹ See chapter 2 of this book.
- ⁶² "sous les drapeux étrangers," Henri Delure to the Dutch Consul in Berne, [188?], in: NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 27.
- ⁶³ Haab reported, for example, that he was examined in Biberach near Kaub. Haab, *Handwerksburschen-Erinnerungen*, 5; Luxembourg mercenary August Kohl recounts two examinations, one in the recruiting office and one in Harderwijk. N. Franz, T. Kolnberger, and H. Lukas,

- August Kohl. *Ein Luxemburger Söldner im Indonesien des 19. Jahrhunderts. Kommentierte Edition der Reise- und Lebensbeschreibungen (1859–1865) des Soldaten August Kohl* (Mersch: Centre nationale de littérature, 2015), 27–28.
- ⁶⁴ Krauer, “Hotel Helvetia”, 129–35.
- ⁶⁵ “Kloakenmündung von Europa [...], durch die sich der Abfall und Kehrriecht von allen Enden unseres Kontinents durchdrängt, um über die See nach Batavia zu schwimmen und den javanischen Boden zu düngen!” Heinzen, *Reise nach Batavia*, 15.
- ⁶⁶ M. Bossenbroek, “Dickköpfe und Leichtfüsse: Deutsche im niederländischen Kolonialdienst des 19. Jahrhunderts,” in Klaus J. Bade (ed) *Deutsche im Ausland – Fremde in Deutschland: Migration in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (München: C.H. Beck, 1992), 249; on the trope of “*het gootgat van Europa*”, see also: *De Hardewijker*, 7 July, 1894. On the symbiotic and tense relationship between the town and the troop depot, see: Bossenbroek, *Volk voor Indië*, 51–60; 143–50; 189–93.
- ⁶⁷ *Der Bund*, 15 August, 1857.
- ⁶⁸ “*da wir Schweizer immer beisammen und weit mehr Hammer als Amboss sind, so werden wir nicht wenig gefürchtet.*” *Der Bund*, 13 December, 1857.
- ⁶⁹ *Der Bund*, 16 August, 1857.
- ⁷⁰ *Der Bund*, 16 August, 1857. From 1855 to 1859 König was commander of the troop depot, see: J. Krusinga, “Het ‘Koloniaal Werfdepot’ naar aanleiding van het 50-Jarig bestaan van dat korps,” *Indisch Militair Tijdschrift* 27 (1896).
- ⁷¹ Rellstab to his parents and siblings, 6 September, 1860, StAZH, Q I 139.3.
- ⁷² “*het toebrengen van kwetsuren of slagen*”; NL-HaNA, Koloniën / Stamboeken Militairen KNIL Oosten West-Indië, 2.10.50, inv. nr. 232, Folio 10739.
- ⁷³ Camenzind, Unpublished Memoirs, c. 1905, 65.
- ⁷⁴ “*die fast ausschliesslich holländische Bevölkerung schlecht auf die Ausländer zu sprechen sei, namentlich die Fischer.*” Heinrich Brandenberger to his parents, Harderwijk 25 November, 1902.
- ⁷⁵ Camenzind, Unpublished Memoirs, c. 1905, 61–65.
- ⁷⁶ Zehnder, *Unter Hollands Flagge*, 11.
- ⁷⁷ “*im allgemeinen vertrugen wir uns gut miteinander hatten doch alle erfahren, dass der Hobel des Schicksals alles gleich macht und es keinen Sinn hatte, einander noch Unangenehmes zu bereiten*”; *ibid.*, 16.
- ⁷⁸ Bossenbroek, *Volk voor Indië*, 149.
- ⁷⁹ Camenzind, Unpublished Memoirs, c. 1905, 69.
- ⁸⁰ Letter from the Dutch Consul general to the Federal Council, 24 March 1874, NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 41.
- ⁸¹ Chief of the Justice and Police Department of the canton of Vaud to the Dutch Consul General, 14 January, 1874, NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 41.
- ⁸² See the correspondence concerning Langenegger 5 May to 31 September, 1879, NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 41.
- ⁸³ Between 1851 and 1872, the transport left mainly from the ports of Nieuwediep, Brouwershaven and Hellevoetsluis, and from 1879 almost exclusively from Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Bossenbroek, *Van Holland naar Indië*, 55–58.
- ⁸⁴ “*an Thiere, die zur Schlachtbank geführt werden, denn an Soldaten, welche zu Kampf und Sieg hinausziehen.*” Carthaus, *Aus dem Reich von Insulinde*, 163.
- ⁸⁵ Letter from Arnold Egloff to his parents, 2 February, 1894, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ⁸⁶ At the middle of the century, the average travel time was around 108 days. With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the introduction of steam navigation, it had been reduced by more than half towards the end of the century. See: Bossenbroek, *Van Holland naar Indië*, 63.

- ⁸⁷ See: Koloniale Werving, in: *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië* 2:11 (1852), 388; and *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië* 1:5 (1857), 332.
- ⁸⁸ Haab, *Handwerksburschen-Erinnerungen*, 6–8 and: Eduard Rellstab to his parents and siblings, 6 September, 1890, StAZH, Q I 139.3.
- ⁸⁹ Letter from Arnold Egloff to his parents, 2 February, 1894, SSA, Ar 201.303; Rellstab to his parents and siblings, 6 September, 1890, StAZH, Q I 139.3.
- ⁹⁰ Chevalley, *Un Suisse*, 32.
- ⁹¹ “weil wir uns mit den Holländern noch nicht verständigen konnten und vom Grossteil sowieso als Eindringlinge betrachtet wurden, hatten wir uns zwecks Unterhaltung und zu allfälligem Schutz und Trutz zusammengetan,” Zehnder, *Unter Hollands Flagge*, 30.
- ⁹² See Eckert, *Erlebnisse eines Schweizers*, 15.
- ⁹³ “dumme Schweizer Kuh,” Schmid, *15 Jahre Kriegs- und Friedensdienst in Niederländisch-Indien* (Olten: Oltner Tagblatt, 1912), 3.
- ⁹⁴ Camenzind, Unpublished Memoirs, c. 1905, 73.
- ⁹⁵ In her seminal work *Imperial Eyes*, Mary Louise Pratt coined the term “contact zone”. By this, she refers to “the space of colonial encounters, the space in which peoples geographically and historically separated come into contact with each other and establish ongoing relations, usually involving conditions of coercion, radical inequality, and intractable conflict.” M. L. Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2008), 7–9.
- ⁹⁶ P. Groen, “‘Zedelijkheid en martialiteit’. Het kazerneconcubinaat in Nederlands-Indië rond 1890,” in M. Bloembergen and R. Raben (eds), *Het koloniale beschavingsoffensief. Wegen naar het nieuwe Indië, 1890–1950* (Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, 2009), 33; G. Teitler, “The Mixed Company: Fighting Power and Ethnic Relations in the Dutch Colonial Army, 1890–1920,” in K. Hack (ed), *Colonial Armies in Southeast Asia*, 71–94 (London: Routledge, 2006), 148.
- ⁹⁷ “kein Bürger lädt einen Militär zu sich in seine Wohnung, wie einem Aussätzigen weicht man ihm auf der Strasse und in den öffentlichen Lokalen aus,” Zehnder, *Unter Hollands Flagge*, 94.
- ⁹⁸ A. Zangger, “Patriotic Bonds and the Danger of Estrangement: Swiss Networks in Colonial South-East Asia, 1850–1930,” in P. Purtschert and H. Fischer-Tiné, *Colonial Switzerland: Rethinking Colonialism from its Margins* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 104.
- ⁹⁹ H. Fischer-Tiné, *Low and Licentious Europeans: Race, Class, and “White Subalternity” in Colonial India* (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2009), 238–41.
- ¹⁰⁰ “da Vater Hein sein Möglichstes thut,” *Skizzen von der Insel Java und den verschiedenen Bewohnern derselben* (Schaffhausen: beim Verleger Franz Hurter und in der Hurter’schen Buchhandlung, 1832), 79.
- ¹⁰¹ “mais quant à l’avancement il y a peu de chances ici. Il faut savoir le hollandais pour être caporal, et c’est une langue infernale à apprendre pour nous autres Français; le javanais nous est plus facile,” Anonymous, “Les Suisses aux Indes: Correspondance,” *Revue Militaire Suisse* 4:17 (1859), 348–50; Auberson suspects that the author is Marc Lecomte from Lausanne. D. Auberson, “Engagés pour six ans en enfer: les mercenaires suisses à la conquête de Java et Bornéo, 1855–1864,” in Sébastien Rial (ed), *De Nimègue à Java: Les soldats suisses au service de la Hollande* (Morges: Château Morges et ses musées, 2014), 233.
- ¹⁰² Koloniaal Verslag, Bijlage B, ‘s Gravenhage 1871, pp. 2–8.
- ¹⁰³ W. Klinkert and P. Groen, “De Militaire School te Meester Cornelis Een officersopleiding in de Oost 1852–1896,” in V. Enthoven et al., *Een saluut van 26 schoten: liber amicorum aangeboden aan Ger Teitler bij zijn afscheid als hoogleraar aan het Koninklijk Instituut voor de Marine* (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 2005).

- ¹⁰⁴ The name “Zwarte Zwitsers” is derived from the parallels in the treaties concerning the Swiss regiments. I. van Kessel, *Zwarte Hollanders: Afrikaanse Soldaten in Nederlands-Indië* (Amsterdam: KIT Publishers, 2005), 79.
- ¹⁰⁵ Van Kessel provides a thorough study of this subject: van Kessel, *Zwarte Hollanders*; on their legal status, see B. Lutikhuis, “Beyond Race: Constructions of ‘Europeanness’ in Late-Colonial Legal Practice in the Dutch East Indies,” *European Review of History: Revue Européenne d’histoire* 20:4 (2013), 539–58.
- ¹⁰⁶ Haab, *Handwerksburschen-Erinnerungen*, 25; and the letter from E. Rebsamen to Arnold Egloff, 2 August, 1891, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ¹⁰⁷ On the construction of “martial races” in the KNIL, see: J. de Moor, “The Recruitment of Indonesian Soldiers for the Dutch Colonial Army, c. 1700–1950,” in D. Kilingray and D. Omissi (eds), *Guardians of Empire*, 53–69 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999). The pay gap among Indonesian troops was not abolished until shortly before the First World War. Teitler, “The Mixed Company”. On the recruitment of the “Ambonese”, see: C. van Fraassen, *Ambon in het 19e-eeuwse Indië: van wingewest tot werfdepot* (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 2018), 535–56.
- ¹⁰⁸ de Moor, “Recruitment of Indonesian,” 60; M. Loderichs and A. van Dissel, “Miliaire instrumenten van de koloniale macht 1816–1941,” in P. Groen et al., *Krijgsgeweld en kolonie: Opkomst en ondergang van Nederland als koloniale mogendheid, 1816–2010* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2021), 180–84.
- ¹⁰⁹ “die Javaner werden hier im eigentlichen Sinn des Wortes als elende Slaven behandelt,” Rellstab to his parents and siblings, 6 September, 1890, StAZH, Q I 139.3.
- ¹¹⁰ “da ein Eingeborner überhaupt nicht befugt ist, über einen europäischen Soldaten zu befehlen,” Eckert, *Erlebnisse eines Schweizers*, 21.
- ¹¹¹ Schmid, *15 Jahre*, 98–102. On the revolt of Banten, see: S. Kartodirdjo, *The Peasants’ Revolt of Banten in 1888: Its Conditions, Course and Sequel. A Case Study of Social Movements in Indonesia*. (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).
- ¹¹² de Moor, “Recruitment of Indonesian Soldiers”. The Mareechaussee Corps was a special unit designated for count-guerrilla operations. Teitler, “The Mixed Company”; Groen, “Colonial Warfare,” 287.
- ¹¹³ P. Hagen, *Koloniale oorlogen in Indonesië: vijf eeuwen verzet tegen vreemde overheersing* (Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers, 2018), 295–97; Loderichs and van Dissel, “Miliaire instrumenten,” 184–85. For Paul van t’Veer’s estimation, see: van t’Veer, *De Atjeh-oorlog*, 311.
- ¹¹⁴ Chevalley, *Un Suisse à Java et Bornéo*, 92.
- ¹¹⁵ Letter from Heinrich Brandenberger to his family and siblings, 11 October, 1909, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ¹¹⁶ Camenzind, Unpublished Memoirs, c. 1905, 193.
- ¹¹⁷ Auberson, “Engagés pour six ans,” 227; on the two months of military training school, see: Eckert, *Erlebnisse eines Schweizers*, 20 and: Camenzind, Unpublished Memoirs, 98.
- ¹¹⁸ T. Stevens, “Mouterij op Java: Achtergronden en verloop van het soldatenoproer van 1860. In het bijzonder Samarang,” *Mededelingen van de sectie militaire geschiedenis Landsmachtstaf 8* (1985), 7.
- ¹¹⁹ *Bataviaasch Handelsblaad*, 29 August, 1860; letter from Egloff to his parents, 22 January, 1893, SSA, Ar 201.303; Zehnder, *Unter Hollands Flagge*, 90; and J. D. Sybrandi, *Beschouwingen over het Indische leger en de toekomst van den gepasporteerden Indischen militair* (Amsterdam: Sybrandi, 1869), 11.
- ¹²⁰ “Nicht aus Mangel an Zeit, zondern an Mangel Neuigkeiten [sic!],” letter from Heinrich Brandenberger to his family and siblings, 1 November, 1905, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ¹²¹ “Gegenwärtig kann ich nichts spannendes schreiben,” letter from Egloff to his parents, 6 January, 1892, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ¹²² Letter from Egloff to his parents, 1 May, 1892, SSA, Ar 201.303.

- ¹²³ On the typical additive veduta designs of tourism postcards and posters, see: C. Rösner, “Zur Geschichte des Reiseplakates,” in Florian Hufnagl (ed), *Reiselust internationale Reiseplakate* (München: Die Neue Sammlung, Staatliches Museum für Angewandte Kunst, 1995).
- ¹²⁴ Sybrandi, *Beschouwingen*, 9–10.
- ¹²⁵ “womit man sich [...] die trüben Gedanken hätte verscheuchen können,” Zehnder, *Unter Hollands Flagge*, 94.
- ¹²⁶ See *ibid.* 94; Eckert, *Erlebnisse eines Schweizers*, 26–27; and Anonymous, “Les Suisses aux Indes”, 349.
- ¹²⁷ *Bataviaasch Handelsblaad*, 29 August, 1860.
- ¹²⁸ Zangger, “Balthasar”, 220.
- ¹²⁹ Hagen, *Koloniale oorlogen in Indonesië*, 307.
- ¹³⁰ E. Wald, *Vice in the Barracks: Medicine, the Military and the Making of Colonial India, 1780–1868* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 118–21.
- ¹³¹ See, e.g.: Zehnder, *Unter Hollands Flagge*, 20; and Schmid, *15 Jahre*, 148.
- ¹³² Zehnder, *Unter Hollands Flagge*, 23.
- ¹³³ Eckert, *Erlebnisse eines Schweizers*, 36.
- ¹³⁴ Schmid, *15 Jahre*.
- ¹³⁵ Chevalley, *Un Suisse*, 86–88 the soldier who was punished was called Bollinger. See also: NL-HaNA, Koloniën / Stamboeken Militairen KNIL Oost- en West-Indië, 2.10.50, inv. nr. 137, Folio 9840.
- ¹³⁶ “die wenigsten überleben diese,” letter from Heinrich Brandenberger to his family and siblings, 12 June, 1903, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ¹³⁷ “die sich vor der Überführung eine Kugel durch den Kopf schossen,” Schmid, *15 Jahre*, 149.
- ¹³⁸ “verschlagenen Trommelfelles,” See Dutoits Dossier, BAR, E2#1000/44#1107*. Dutoit was the nephew of former Federal Councillor Ulrich Ochsenbein.
- ¹³⁹ Anonymous, “Beschouwingen over de doodstraf met den kogel en het recht van gratie,” *Indisch Militair Tijdschrift* 14: 1–6 (1883), 518–27.
- ¹⁴⁰ Bosma, *Indieangers*, 165.
- ¹⁴¹ Quoted after: T. Bürgisser, “Rohrdorf-Java einfach: Ein Niederrohrdorfer Bauernsohn im indonesischen Kolonialkrieg,” *Badener Neujahrsblätter* 96 (2021), 203.
- ¹⁴² Camenzind, Unpublished Memoirs, c. 1905, 108–114.
- ¹⁴³ Chevalley, *Un Suisse*, 126.
- ¹⁴⁴ Letters from Heinrich Brandenberger to his family and siblings, 8 November, 1903 & [?] November, 1905, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ¹⁴⁵ See Schmid, *15 Jahre*, 19.
- ¹⁴⁶ “sie hätten sich ja darüber Lustig gemacht,” Schmid, 142.
- ¹⁴⁷ de Moor also reports on this reluctance on the part of European soldiers towards the doctors: J. de Moor, “An Extra Ration of Gin for the Troops. The Army Doctor and Colonial Warfare in the Archipelago, 1830–1880,” in G.M. van Heteren et al., *Dutch Medicine in the Malay Archipelago, 1816–1942* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1989), 140.
- ¹⁴⁸ D. Peers, “Imperial Vice: Sex, Drink and the Health of British Troops in North Indian Cantonments, 1800–1858,” in D. Killingray and D. Omissi (eds), *Guardians of Empire* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 30–31.
- ¹⁴⁹ U. Bosma, “Sailing through Suez from the South: The Emergence of an Indies-Dutch Migration Circuit, 1815–1940,” *The International Migration Review* 41:2 (2007), 518–20.
- ¹⁵⁰ “dass von einem Transporte von 100 Mann, die von Europa weggehen, höchstens 10 Mann gerechnet werden, die nach Europa zurückkehren,” Eduard Rellstab to his parents and siblings, 6 September, 1890, StAZH, Q I 139.3.

- ¹⁵¹ On the database, see introduction to this book.
- ¹⁵² Stevens, “Mouterij,” 7–8.
- ¹⁵³ Chevalley, *Un Suisse*, 108.
- ¹⁵⁴ Letter from Maria Hänni-Rhyn, 8 August, 1870, NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 41.
- ¹⁵⁵ Letter from the Swiss Federal Chancellery to the Dutch Consul General, 9 January, 1879, and the Consul’s response, 11 February, 1879, NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 41.
- ¹⁵⁶ Schweiz. Generalkonsulat in Batavia, “Bericht des Schweiz. Generalkonsulates in Batavia über das Jahr 1870,” *Bundesblatt*, 2:24 (1871), 628.
- ¹⁵⁷ E. Haffter, *Briefe aus dem Fernen Osten* (Frauenfeld: Huber 1885), 193.
- ¹⁵⁸ “Zur Abwechslung flogen vereinzelt Kugeln über uns weg, die aber gerade so wenig beatet wurden, wie etwa das Summen einer Mücke.” Schmid, *15 Jahre*, 59.
- ¹⁵⁹ “über den Dinst kann ich eigentlich nicht klagen, den ich hab es ja so schön wie ein Prinz,” letter from Egloff to his parents, 1 May, 1892, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ¹⁶⁰ “ein herrliches Leben führen, besser als dasjenige der Arbeiter in Europa,” letter from Rellstab to his parents and siblings, 6 September, 1860, StAZH, Q I 139.3.
- ¹⁶¹ Letter from the Swiss Consul in Batavia to the Swiss Federal Chancellery, 13 August, 1886, BAR, E2#1000/44#1107*.
- ¹⁶² NL-HaNA, Gezantschap Zwitserland tot 1916, 2.05.10.21, inv. nr. 108.
- ¹⁶³ “Suicide de Martin, Vaudois,” Chevalley, *Un Suisse*, 59.
- ¹⁶⁴ Anonymous, “Les Suisses aux Indes”, 349.
- ¹⁶⁵ Eckert, *Erlebnisse eines Schweizers*, 40–44.
- ¹⁶⁶ Letter from the Swiss Consul in Batavia to the Swiss Federal Chancellery, 12 September, 1889, BAR, E2#1000/44#1108*.
- ¹⁶⁷ Bosma, *Indiegangers*, 176.
- ¹⁶⁸ Zehnder, *Unter Hollands Flagge*, 151–54.
- ¹⁶⁹ NL-HaNA, Koloniën / Stamboeken Militairen KNIL Oost- en West-Indië, 2.10.50, inv. nr. 134, Folio 9435; and inv. nr. 132 Folio 8863.
- ¹⁷⁰ A. Kohl, “August-Nikolaus-Joseph Kohl: Reise, Abendtheueren, u. Soldatenleben eines Luxemburgers im Ost-indischem Arschipel,” in N. Franz, T. Kolnberger, and H. Lukas (eds), *August Kohl. Ein Luxemburger Söldner im Indonesien des 19. Jahrhunderts. Kommentierte Edition der Reise- und Lebensbeschreibungen (1859–1865) des Soldaten August Kohl* (Mersch: Centre nationale de littérature, 2015), 94.
- ¹⁷¹ Letter from the Swiss Consul in Batavia to the Swiss Federal Council, 17 January, 1878, BAR, E2#1000/44#1117*.
- ¹⁷² By now, there are several accounts of the mutinies. Zangger provides the most detailed one: Zangger, “Balthasar”; see also: Stevens, “Mouterij”; G. Le Comte, “La dernière Révolte,” *Le Brécaillon: bulletin de l’association du musée militaire genevois* 30 (2010), 22–43; “Engagés pour six ans”; and H. Lukas, “Die Kolonie Niederländisch-Indien im 19. Jahrhundert: Ein Überblick zur historischen Entwicklung mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Zeit August Kohls,” in N. Franz, T. Kolnberger, and H. Lukas (eds), *August Kohl*, 231–32.
- ¹⁷³ G. J. Keiser: *Regtspraak in Militaire Zaken*, 433–433.
- ¹⁷⁴ Zangger, “Balthasar,” 221–23.
- ¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 223.
- ¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 223–25; on the militia, see Stevens, “Mouterij,” 11; Haab, *Handwerksburschen-Erinnerungen*, 20.
- ¹⁷⁷ Haab, *Handwerksburschen-Erinnerungen*, 20–21.
- ¹⁷⁸ “Neun Männer so neben einander aufgehängt zu sehen, ein furchtbar abschreckendes Beispiel für uns Anderen,” letter from Rellstab to his parents and siblings, 6 September, 1860, StAZH, Q I 139.3.

- ¹⁷⁹ Haab, *Handwerksburschen-Erinnerungen*, 21.
- ¹⁸⁰ Zangger, “Balthasar,” 225; Auberson, “Engagés pour six ans,” 229.
- ¹⁸¹ See, e.g.: *De Locomotief*, 3 January, 1871; *Sumatra Courant*, 15 September, 1881.
- ¹⁸² On the limits of the racial dividend, see also: Fischer-Tiné, *Low and Licentious Europeans*, 318–23.
- ¹⁸³ H. Schulte Nordholt, “A Genealogy of Violence,” in F. Colombijn and J. T. Lindblad (eds), *Roots of Violence in Indonesia: Contemporary Violence in Historical Perspective* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002), 37; Bloembergen reinforces this contention. See: M. Bloembergen, *De geschiedenis van de politie in Nederlands-Indië: uit zorg en angst* (Amsterdam-Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, 2009), 18–22. Criticising the analytical shortcomings of this argument, R. Raben added that colonial violence was applied in various excessive or more subtle forms. R. Raben, “On Genocide and Mass Violence in Colonial Indonesia,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 14:3–4 (2012), 488–89; on the structural military violence of the KNIL during the war of decolonisation, see: R. Limpach, *De brandende kampongs van Generaal Spoor* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2016).
- ¹⁸⁴ Raben, “On Genocide,” 487.
- ¹⁸⁵ Following Tom Menger, this study defines “extreme violence” as those forms of physical violence that were already perceived by contemporaries as excessive when directed against “white” people. Menger, *The Colonial Way of War: Extreme Violence in Knowledge and Practice of Colonial Warfare in the British, German and Dutch Colonial Empires, c. 1890–1914* (Cologne: Thesis University of Cologne, 2021); Groen, “Colonial Warfare”; E. Kreike, “Genocide in the Kampongs? Dutch Nineteenth Century Colonial Warfare in Aceh, Sumatra,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 14:3–4 (2012); and P. Groen and A. van Dissel, “De wereld van de militair, 1816–1941,” in Petra Groen et al. (eds), *Krijggeweld en kolonie: Opkomst en ondergang van Nederland als koloniale mogendheid, 1816–2010*, 207–45 (Amsterdam: Boom, 2021), 213–21; for a critique of the concept of “extreme violence” and the twin “acceptable violence” it might suggest, see the introduction to this book.
- ¹⁸⁶ Groen, “Colonial Warfare”; S. Goltermann, *Opfer: Die Wahrnehmung von Krieg und Gewalt in der Moderne* (Frankfurt a.M.: S. Fischer, 2017), 81–136; T. Menger, *Colonial Way of War*, 130–43.
- ¹⁸⁷ Tjut Njak Dhien is probably the best known female resistance fighter. In addition, thousands of women who are unknown today fought against Dutch colonial rule, see: E. Clavé, “Silenced Fighters: An insight into Women Combatants’ History in Aceh (17th–20th c.),” *Archipel* 87:1 (2014), 273–306.
- ¹⁸⁸ Teitler, “The Mixed Company”.
- ¹⁸⁹ Chevalley, *Un Suisse*, 82; 105.
- ¹⁹⁰ “Auf der ersten Anhöhe angekommen, bot sich uns ein trauriger Anblick dar. Soweit das Auge reichte, stunden alle Kampongs (Dörfer) in Flammen.” Schmid, *15 Jahre*, 67.
- ¹⁹¹ Schmid, 65.
- ¹⁹² “Là, ce fut une vraie boucherie: on marchait dans le sang et les cadavres jusqu’aux genoux. Dans cette mêlée, mes deux pays Baudet furent tués sur le coup. Quant à moi, je t’ai déjà donné connaissance de cette rage qui m’emporte comme un tigre furieux: tout ce qui se trouve devant moi tombe sous mes coups.” *Gazette de Lausanne*, 8 October, 1859. Auberson assumes that they were two brothers named Baudet. Auberson, “Engagés pour six ans,” Footnote 75.
- ¹⁹³ “La plume se refuse à retracer ce qu’ils font à un Européen qui est trouvé entre leurs mains,” *Gazette de Lausanne*, 8 October, 1859.
- ¹⁹⁴ Groen, “Colonial Warfare”; Goltermann, *Opfer*, 81–136; Menger, *Colonial Way of War*, 130–43; D. Langewiesche, *Der gewaltsame Lehrer: Europas Kriege in der Moderne* (München: CHBeck), 2019, 337–52.
- ¹⁹⁵ See: Chevalley, *Un Suisse à Java et Bornéo*, 75.
- ¹⁹⁶ “Viele unserer Kameraden fielen noch oder wurden gewundet, doch ich gebe Ihnen die Versicherung, dass unsern bei den Ueberfall gefallenen Kameraden, sowie auch diese, die in den darauffolgenden

- Gefechten den Ehrentod auf dem Schlachtfeld starben, blutig gerächt sein. Tausende Feinde sind getötet, ihre Häuser und andere Besitzungen in Brand aufgegangen, der Radja von Lombok ist gefangen und die meisten feindlichen Anführer sind in eine andere Welt befördert. Auf Ihre Frage, ob viele Schweizer an dem Kriege beteiligt waren, muss ich bejahend antworten und so viel ich weiss, sind 2 gefallen, ca 5 gewundet und einige an Krankheiten indischer Art gestorben.* Letter from Emil Häfeli to Arnold Egloff's father, Magelang 9 January, 1895, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ¹⁹⁷ Quoted after: V. Houben, "Repertoires of European Panic and Indigenous Recaptures in Late Colonial Indonesia," in Harald Fischer-Tiné, *Anxieties, Fear and Panic in Colonial Settings: Empires on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 265.
- ¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 265–66. On the Lombok War, see: H. Schulte Nordholt, *The Spell of Power: A History of Balinese Politics, 1650–1940* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996), 197–99; and J. van Goor, "De Lombokexpeditie en het Nederlandse Nationalisme," in *ibid.* (ed), *Imperialisme in de marge: de afronding van Nederlands-Indië*, 19–70 (Utrecht: HES, 1986).
- ¹⁹⁹ On the estimated death toll, see: P. Bijl, *Emerging Memory: Photographs of Colonial Atrocity in Dutch Cultural Remembrance* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015), 50; on Christoffels contribution, see: H. Stevens and J. Stoopman, *De laatste Batakkoning: koloniale kroniek in documenten 1883–1911* (Arnhem: Museum Bronbeek, 2010), 24–25.
- ²⁰⁰ H. Stevens, "Who in the Netherlands Has Not Heard of Captain Christoffel?" The Peerless Career of a Swiss in Dutch Colonial Service, 1886–1910," in S. Rial (ed), *De Nimègue à Java: Les soldats suisses au service de la Hollande, 237–43* (Morges: Château Morges et ses musées, 2014); Stevens and Stoopman, *De laatste Batakkoning*.
- ²⁰¹ See Groen, "Colonial Warfare," 290.
- ²⁰² See M. Muschalek, *Violence as Usual: Policing and the Colonial State in German Southwest Africa* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019), 5–10; on everyday violence and colonial rule, see also: R. Kumar, "Seeing like a Policeman: Everyday Violence in British India, c. 1900–1950," P. G. Dwyer and A. Nettelbeck, *Violence, Colonialism and Empire in the Modern World*, 131–49 (New York: Springer, 2018).
- ²⁰³ "wieder viel williger zum Arbeiten," Camenzind, Unpublished Memoirs, c. 1905, 127–128. On this case, see also: P. Krauer, "Zwischen Geld, Gewalt und Rassismus: Neue Perspektiven auf die koloniale Schweizer Söldnermigration nach Südostasien, 1848–1914," *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte* 71:2 (2021), 229–50.
- ²⁰⁴ J. Breman, *Taming the Coolie Beast: Plantation Society and the Colonial Order in Southeast Asia* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), 131–75; A. L. Stoler, *Capitalism and Confrontation in Sumatra's Plantation Belt, 1870–1979* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 25–92; and A. Zanger *Koloniale Schweiz: Ein Stück Globalgeschichte zwischen Europa und Südostasien (1860–1930)* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2011), 186–95.
- ²⁰⁵ Breman, *Taming the Coolie Beast*, 152.
- ²⁰⁶ "um wieder Ordnung zu schaffen, u. die Ruhestörer mitzunehmen ins Gefängnis"; Camenzind, Unpublished Memoirs, c. 1905, 127.
- ²⁰⁷ "das sind alles reiche Europäer u. grosse Fabriken u. weit ausgedehnte Besitzungen haben u. viele Koulies," *ibid.*, 127.
- ²⁰⁸ On the mercenaries' astonishment, see: Zehnder, *Unter Hollands Flagge*, 83. The astonishment derives from the fact that most barracks in Europe were staged as male-only zones. U. Frevert, *Die kasernierte Nation: Militärdienst und Zivilgesellschaft in Deutschland* (München: Beck, 2001).
- ²⁰⁹ Groen, "Zedelijkheid en martialiteit," 27; "nyai", as Ming pointed out, is a Javanese word signifying both a respectable woman of middle age, and the mistress or concubines of a European: H. Ming, H. Ming, "Barracks-Concubinage in the Indies, 1887–1920," *Indonesia* 35 (1983), 71; F. Gouda,

- Dutch Culture Overseas: Colonial Practice in the Netherlands Indies, 1900–1942* (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2008), 112–13; A. L. Stoler, “Making Empire Respectable: The Politics of Race and Sexual Morality in 20th-Century Colonial Cultures,” *American Ethnologist* 16:4 (1989), 637.
- ²¹⁰ P. Levine, “Sexuality, Gender, and Empire,” in *ibid* (ed), *Gender and Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 134. On the fears of cross-racial relationships in the Indies, see: P. Pattinama, “Secrets and Danger: Interracial Sexuality in Louis Couperus’s The Hidden Force and Dutch Colonial Culture around 1900,” in J. Clancy-Smith and F. Gouda (eds), *Domesticating the Empire: Race, Gender, and Family Life in French and Dutch Colonialism*, 84–130 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1998).
- ²¹¹ U. Bosma and R. Raben, *Being “Dutch” in the Indies. A History of Creolisation and Empire, 1500–1920* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2008), 69.
- ²¹² Ming, “Barracks-Concubinage,” 69–71.
- ²¹³ On the controversy surrounding concubinage, see: Groen, “Zedelijkheid en martialiteit”; and J. Coté, “Slaves, Coolies, and Garrison Whores: A Colonial Discourse of ‘Unfreedom’ in the Dutch East Indies,” in G. Campbell and E. Elbourne (eds), *Sex, Power and Slavery* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2014), 568–74.
- ²¹⁴ Groen, “Zedelijkheid en martialiteit”. The French Foreign Legion Command defended the concubinage system known as Congai in Indochina with similar arguments. Koller, *Die Fremdenlegion*, 173–74.
- ²¹⁵ Ming, “Barracks-Concubinage,” 71–72; Groen, “Zedelijkheid en martialiteit,” 42; L. Hesselink, Prostitution: A Necessary Evil, Particularly in the Colonies: Views on Prostitution in the Netherlands Indies,” in E. Locher-Scholten and A. Niehof (eds), *Indonesian Women in Focus* (Leiden: Brill, 1987), 216–18.
- ²¹⁶ The image of nyais conveyed in scholarly and fictional literature is fed by sources written by Europeans or members of the Indonesian upper class. On this issue, B. Schär, “Switzerland, Borneo and the Dutch Indies: Towards a New Imperial History of Europe, c.1770–1850,” *Past & Present* 257:1 (2022), 134–167; and Hesselink, “Prostitution”.
- ²¹⁷ Groen, “Zedelijkheid en martialiteit,” 37; Ming, “Barracks-Concubinag,” 72–74.
- ²¹⁸ See the letter from Heinrich Brandenberger to his family and siblings, 1 November, 1905, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ²¹⁹ “den ein solches Weib ist wie eine Katze, sie lieben nur das Geld das der, der ein solches Weib hat gibt, aber nicht ihn selbst,” letter from Egloff to parents and siblings, 22 January, 1893, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ²²⁰ “in allen Geheimnissen der Frauentugenden und manchmal auch Untugenden,” Zehnder, *Unter Hollands Flagge*, 84.
- ²²¹ “Die Maid war schmutzig und das Essen nicht gut,” Haab, *Handwerksburschen-Erinnerungen*, 24.
- ²²² See, e.g.: I. Chatterjee, “Colouring Subalternity: Slaves, Concubines and Social Orphans in Early Colonial India,” *Subaltern Studies* 10 (1999), 58.
- ²²³ Head-König, “Konkubinat,” in *Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz* (2007).
- ²²⁴ Sampet was baptised with the Christian name Lina shortly before the wedding in 1911. NL-HaNA, Koloniën / Pensioenen KNIL, 2.10.50.02, inv. nr. 452, Folio 39020.
- ²²⁵ “u. dan zog mich seine Tochter an,” Camenzind, Unpublished Memoirs, c. 1905, 196.
- ²²⁶ On the remarks of his colleagues, see: Camenzind, Unpublished Memoirs, c. 1905, 197. For the marriage, see NL-HaNA, Koloniën / Pensioenen KNIL, 2.10.50.02, inv. nr. 366, Folio 17589. On the marriage age of women, see: Ming, “Barracks-Concubinage,” 73.
- ²²⁷ Camenzind, Unpublished Memoirs, c. 1905, 196–242.
- ²²⁸ Ming, “Barracks-Concubinage in the Indies, 1887–1920,” 71.
- ²²⁹ Gouda, *Dutch Culture Overseas*, 113.

- ²³⁰ Hesselink, "Prostitution"; T. Hull, "From Concubines to Prostitutes. A Partial History of Trade in Sexual Services in Indonesia," *Moussons. Recherche En Sciences Humaines Sur l'Asie Du Sud-Est* 29 (2017), 67–74; The British Indian Army attempted to regulate prostitution in a similar manner from the mid-1850s to 1888. R. Hyam, *Understanding the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 384–89.
- ²³¹ Letter from Brandenberger to his family and siblings, 19 November, 1906, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ²³² Ming, "Barracks-Concubinage".
- ²³³ *Ibid.*, 74–79; on the privileges, see also: A. Dirks, "For the Youth: Juvenile Delinquency, Colonial Civil Society and the Late Colonial State in the Netherlands Indies, 1872–1942," (Leiden: Thesis Leiden University, 2011), 48–49; on the pupilen school in Gombong, see: Bosma and Raben, *Being "Dutch" in the Indies*, 247–50.
- ²³⁴ "zur Hebung der Kultur und Zivilisation des Landes," Eckert, *Erlebnisse eines Schweizerers*, 29.
- ²³⁵ "ob der Roheit und totalen Indifferenz der staatlichen Behörden," Zehnder, *Unter Hollands Flagge*, 85.
- ²³⁶ M. Ludwig, Murder in the Andamans: A Colonial Narrative of Sodomy, Jealousy and Violence," *South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal* (2013), 2.
- ²³⁷ R. Aldrich, *Colonialism and Homosexuality* (London: Routledge, 2003), 57.
- ²³⁸ Koller attributes this void in the sources to the fact that homosexuality had strong negative associations in the nineteenth century and thus was absent from public discourses on white superior masculinity. Koller, *Die Fremdenlegion*, 153.
- ²³⁹ NL-HaNA, Koloniën / Stamboeken Militairen KNIL Oost- en West-Indië, 2.10.50, inv. nr. 134, Folio 9374 & inv. nr. 133 Folio 9216; on the plea for a reprieve, see Ingold's dossier in: BAR, E2#1000/44#1113*.
- ²⁴⁰ NL-HaNA, Koloniën / Stamboeken Militairen KNIL Oost- en West-Indië, 2.10.50, inv. nr. 137, Folio 9905.
- ²⁴¹ Letter from Heinrich Brandenberger to his family and siblings, 29 April, 1909, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ²⁴² Since we only recorded the annual figures and not the months, there may be a deviation of +/- 11 months in the calculation of the effective length of service.
- ²⁴³ See chapter 4.
- ²⁴⁴ See Chevalley, *Un Suisse*, 128.
- ²⁴⁵ Bosma, "Sailing through Suez," 523.
- ²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 514.
- ²⁴⁷ See: Toelatingsbesluiten van de gouverneur-generaal (in Rade) 1819–1875, Online (accessed 31 July, 2020): <http://www.iisg.nl/migration/europese-immigratie.php>.
- ²⁴⁸ Koloniaal Verslag, Bijlage A, 's Gravenhage 1891, 12–15.
- ²⁴⁹ Bosma and Raben, *Being "Dutch" in the Indies*, 219–57.
- ²⁵⁰ NL-HaNA, Koloniën / Pensioenen KNIL, 2.10.50.02, 337, Folio 9479.
- ²⁵¹ NL-HaNA, Koloniën / Stamboeken Militairen KNIL Oost- en West-Indië, 2.10.50, 178, Folio 17838; on his profession, see: *Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad*, 28 July, 1892.
- ²⁵² Camenzind, Unpublished Memoirs, c. 1905, 194–95.
- ²⁵³ Letter from the Swiss Federal Council to the council of the canton of Lucerne, 20 January, 1864, StALU AKT 23-69 C.4.
- ²⁵⁴ *De Oostpost. Soerabajasche Courant*, 4 April & 6 June, 1865.
- ²⁵⁵ Letter from the Dutch Consul General to the Swiss Federal Chancellery, 19 January, 1874, BAR, E2#1000/44#2343*.
- ²⁵⁶ For the enquiry, see: StABL, NA 2049.
- ²⁵⁷ See his dossier in: BAR, E2#1000/44#1114*

- ²⁵⁸ H. O'Neill, "Thomas Karsten: A Biography," in J. Coté and H. O'Neill, *The Life and Work of Thomas Karsten* (Amsterdam: Architectura & Natura, 2017, 39–40; and NL-HaNA, Koloniën / Stamboeken Militairen KNIL Oost- en West-Indië, 2.10.50, inv. nr. 139, Folio 10276.
- ²⁵⁹ In the State Archives Schwyz is such a certificate of discharge from the KNIL from 1865. On the back are instructions from the Swiss consul in Amsterdam and the Basel police stating that the local authorities in Schwyz will pay him his remaining balance. See, STASZ HA.XI.191.
- ²⁶⁰ For example, the police of Basel City registered around 200 Swiss who returned from 1867 to 1879. See: StABS, Straf und Polizei M 3.
- ²⁶¹ "eine andere u. bessere Mutter," Camenzind, Unpublished Memoirs, c. 1905, 241–271. On the return, see also: *Bataviaasch Nieuwsblaad*, 27 April 1897.
- ²⁶² See: Alfred Brandenberger-Hess: obituary for Heinrich Brandenberger, c. 1967, private property Brandenberger family.
- ²⁶³ "einer Reihe langandauernder schwerer Prüfungen und seelischer Belastungen, galt es doch, in einer sowohl klimatisch, als auch kulturell und gesellschaftlich völlig anders gearteten Welt neue Wurzeln zu schlagen, sprachliche Schwierigkeiten und nicht zuletzt auch oft Vorurteile einer harten Umwelt zu überwinden," Heinrich Brandenberger-Weibel: obituary for Lina Sampet, c. 1960, private property Brandenberger family.
- ²⁶⁴ See Haab, *Handwerksburschen-Erinnerungen*, 37.
- ²⁶⁵ Le Comte, "Le Brécaillon," 40.
- ²⁶⁶ "als schlichter Arbeiter," see: Geleitwort in: Schmid, *15 Jahre*.
- ²⁶⁷ "Seit ich hier in Bern eine so ziemlich einträgliche Stelle vetrete, lassen mir Mutter und Geschwister keine Ruhe, suchen so viel wie möglich Alles aus mir herauszupressen. Noch letzten Winter wurde ich von meinem Bruder ziemlich stark geleimt, so dass ich sehe, dass ich in hier trotz aller Arbeit zu nichts komme und daher den Entschluss fasste, mich, wenn es möglich wäre, wieder in die holländische Armee als Krankenwärter, oder Operations und Sectionswärter, einreihen zu lassen." Letter from Hans von Känel to the Dutch Consul General, 13 September, 1886, NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 38.
- ²⁶⁸ I received this information and supporting documents from Rudolf Schüpbach's grandson, Peter Schüpbach.
- ²⁶⁹ See Krauer, "Hotel Helvetia," 128–29.
- ²⁷⁰ On Michel, see NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr 61; Friedrich Brunner and Rudolf Schläfli are further examples of imprisoned ex-militaries. See: BAR, E2#1000/44#2349*. Unfortunately, I have not found any information about the reasons for their imprisonment.
- ²⁷¹ BAR, E2#1000/44#1111*.
- ²⁷² See the dossier on Dürr, in: BAR, E2#1000/44#1111*.
- ²⁷³ See the dossier on Haller, in: BAR, E2#1000/44#1112*.
- ²⁷⁴ "lachten höhnisch ins Gesicht," StASO, Kriminalprozeduren vor Schwurgericht 1896, Nr. 11; NL-HaNA, 2.10.50.02, inv. nr. 314, Folio 34859. See also: Krauer, "Geld, Gewalt und Rassismus", 246.
- ²⁷⁵ Fischer-Tiné, *Low and Licentious Europeans*, 250–53.
- ²⁷⁶ There are numerous contributions on the psychological consequences of war experiences, especially on the American Civil War, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71, or the wars of the twentieth century. M. Lengwiler, *Zwischen Klinik und Kaserne: die Geschichte der Militärpsychiatrie in Deutschland und der Schweiz 1870–1914* (Zürich: Chronos, 2000); M. Micale and P. Lerner, *Traumatic Pasts: History, Psychiatry, and Trauma in the Modern Age, 1870–1930* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); J. Withuis and A. Mooij, *The Politics of War Trauma: The Aftermath of World War II in Eleven European Countries* (Amsterdam: University Press, 2010). However, a comprehensive study on the

- psychological consequences of European colonial soldiers is lacking. Considering the excessive violence in colonial spaces, this is an essential research desideratum.
- ²⁷⁷ *Täglicher Anzeiger für Thun und das Berner Oberland*, 24. May, 1896. Moreover, Jeker was not the only veteran to be convicted of murder. On 1 January, 1875, former-KNIL and French Foreign Legion Soldier Johann Rudolf Engel murdered a woman and subsequently cut off her head. Anonymous, *Der Mord auf der Schafmatt: eine nach den Schwurgerichtsverhandlungen und sorgfältigen Privaterkundigungen zusammengestellte Kriminal-Geschichte* (Solothurn: Zepfel, 1875).
- ²⁷⁸ Krauer, "Hotel Helvetia".
- ²⁷⁹ Letter from Egloff to parents and siblings, 6 April, 1889, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ²⁸⁰ E-Mail, from Ramon Kaiser, 30 November, 2020.
- ²⁸¹ On the asylum, see: Bossenbroek, *Volk voor Indië*, 141.
- ²⁸² See, e.g. Robert Jordan, NL-HaNA, Koloniën / Stamboeken Militairen KNIL Oost- en West-Indië, 2.10.50, inv. nr. 681, Folio 5941;
- ²⁸³ Schär, *Tropenliebe*; Zangger, *Koloniale Schweiz*.

Chapter 4. Follow the Money: Colonial Cash Flows and Interlocking Bureaucracies

- ¹ "äusserst ungebührlich und unverschämt," letter from the Dutch Consul General to the Military Directorate of the canton of Zurich, 27 October, 1868, NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 60.
- ² Part of this chapter formed the basis for the following article, in which the nexus between welfare state and colonialism is examined in more detail: P. Krauer and B. Schär, "Welfare for War Veterans: How the Dutch Empire Provided for European Mercenary Families, c. 1850 to 1914," *Itinerario* 47:2 (2023), 223–39.
- ³ On micro-global histories as a tool of global economic history, see: G. Riello and T. Roy, "Introduction: Global Economic History, 1500–2000," in *ibid.* (eds), *Global Economic History*, 1–15 (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019). Drawing on Kris Manjapra, service providers are defined as "attorneys, mercenaries, army officers, surveyors, engineers, travel writers, Man Fridays, secretaries, translators, and scientific advisors who helped produce and manage colonial frontiers of difference and helped create pathways of circulation and appropriation across those frontiers." K. Manjapra, "The Semiperipheral Hand: Middle-Class Service Professionals of Imperial Capitalism," in C. Dejung, D. Motadel, and J. Osterhammel (eds), *The Global Bourgeoisie: The Rise of the Middle Classes in the Age of Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 187–88. On the concept of "transregionality": A. Eckert, "All Things Transregional. Perspectives from Germany," in Forum Transregionale Studien (ed), *All Things Transregional? A Conversation about Transregional Research*, 9–17 (Bonn, 2019).
- ⁴ For a detailed list of the premiums, see: M. Bossenbroek, *Volk voor Indië: De werving van Europese militairen voor de Nederlandse koloniale dienst 1814–1909* (Amsterdam: Van Soeren & Co, 1992), 353–54.
- ⁵ For the recruitment campaign, see chapter 2. For the premiums, see Bossenbroek, *Volk voor Indië*, 353–54.
- ⁶ U. Bosma, *Indiegangers. Verhalen van Nederlanders die naar Indie trokken* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2010), 172; and for Switzerland, see: See: Historische Statistik der Schweiz HSSO, 2012. Tab. G.3b. hssso.ch/2012/g/3b.
- ⁷ Bossenbroek, *Volk voor Indië*, 353–54.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, 155.
- ⁹ See, e.g.: "De Soldat in Nederlandsche-Indië," in *Militair Tijdschrift* (1872), 75.

- ¹⁰ “Een man die niet gewend is 600 centen zijn eigendom te noemen, wordt daarop eens in het bezit gesteld van 600 gulden! Waar blijft dat geld in Indië?? Gedeeltelijk in de kantine, maar voor het grootste gedeelte in de stille kroegen en bordeelen. Dat geld jeukt den man in de hand; het moet op, anders heet hij geen goed kameraad; en, het gaat op, in ongelooflijk korten tijd gaat het op, grootendeels verzopen en verbrast.” Anonymous, “Beschouwingen over de doodstraf met den kogel en het recht van gratie,” *Indisch Militair Tijdschrift* 14:1-6 (1883), 516-517. The 600 guilders mentioned refer to the 300 guilders that a soldier receives upon re-enlistment and another 300 guilders paid in the following 6 years in addition to the salary.
- ¹¹ Historische Statistik der Schweiz HSSO, 2012. Tab. G.3b. hssso.ch/2012/g/3b.
- ¹² A report about a deserted Swiss can be found for example in: *Overveluwsch Weekblad*, 16 August, 1884. I thank Bernhard Schär for pointing out this source.
- ¹³ NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 40.
- ¹⁴ P. Krauer, “Welcome to Hotel Helvetia! Friedrich Wüthrich’s Illicit Mercenary Trade Network for the Dutch East Indies, 1858-1890,” *BMGN – Low Countries Historical Review* 134: 3 (2019), 122-47.
- ¹⁵ On the profits and tension caused by the troop depot in Harderwijk, see: Bossenbroek, *Volk voor Indië*, 143-50 and 214-20.
- ¹⁶ “Schlechte Speisen, schlechtes Getränk und drüberhin Alles schrecklich theuer. Die ganze Stadt lebt nur von den Soldaten. Wenn ein solcher ein Magazin betritt, steigen die Preise plötzlich um hundert Prozent.” *Der Bund*, 13 December, 1857.
- ¹⁷ “Er habe sein Geschäft in Holland in ziemlich unredlicher Weise betrieben & die jungen Leute auf alle Arten auszubeuten gesucht. Er habe sich z.B. mit Uhrenhandel befasst & den Anzuwerbenden Uhren zu hohen Preisen verkauft; hatten dann die Leute kein Geld mehr, so kaufte er die Uhren zu einem billigen Preis zurück.” Trial records from the Wüthrich case, 17 December, 1888, BAR, E2#1000/44#2343*.
- ¹⁸ Camenzind, Unpublished Memoirs, 60.
- ¹⁹ J. D. Sybrandi, *Beschouwingen over het Indische leger en de toekomst van den gepasporteerden Indischen militair* (Amsterdam: Sybrandi, 1869), 19.
- ²⁰ M. Bossenbroek, “The Living Tools of Empire,” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 23 (1995), 39.
- ²¹ “Mancher dieser Händler ist so durch die ‘Kolonialen’ zum Hotel- und selbst Villenbesitzer geworden.” A. Zehnder, *Unter Hollands Flagge in Ost-Indien* (Luzern: Räber, 1924), 18.
- ²² “Der Transportführer wurde nämlich zur Bezahlung genöthigt, denn nach dem Sprüchwort (sic!): ‘kein Geld, kein Schweizer’, wollten Viele den holländischen Boden nicht betreten, ehe ein Theil des Handgeldes ausbezahlt war.” *Der Bund*, 15 August, 1857. The proverb, originally in French, “point d’argent, point de suisses”, is a reference to the long-standing mercenary ties between France and the old Confederation. See: M. Pestalozzi, *Das Schweizer Wehrwesen im Spiegel der ausländischen Literatur des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Bern: Berner Druck 1989), 21.
- ²³ A. Zangger, “Balthasar im Pfefferland: Das Schicksal eines Bündner Söldners auf Java (1859-62),” *Bündner Monatsblatt* 2 (2019), 210-233, 216.
- ²⁴ “De soldaat is arm en blijft arm; en terwijl hij voor gebrek verzekerd is, is het uitzigt op fortuin hem gesloten.” (Emphasis made by the original author) *Bataviaasch Handelsblad*, 29 August, 1860.
- ²⁵ Rellstab to his parents and siblings, 6 September, 1860, StAZH, Q I 139.3.
- ²⁶ For the pay in 1867, see: *Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië*, Table Tarief No. 3 Soldijen der onderofficiern en mindere militairen; for 1889, see: A. Swart, “De Soldaat in Nederlandsch Indië,” *De Gids* 53 (1889), 340; for 1893: *Bijblad op het Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indie*, 1893, 372; for 1903: Heinrich Brandenberger to his mother, 2. March, 1903, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ²⁷ Camenzind, Unpublished Memoirs, 144.

- ²⁸ See: I. van Kessel, *Zwarte Hollanders: Afrikaanse Soldaten in Nederlands-Indië* (Amsterdam: KIT Publishers, 2005), 109; for the different treatment of “Inlanders” and “Ambonese”, see: J. de Moor, “The Recruitment of Indonesian Soldiers for the Dutch Colonial Army, c. 1700–1950,” in D. Kilingray and D. Omissi (eds), *Guardians of Empire*, 53–69 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999).
- ²⁹ “*Ferner ist hier eine Unmasse von Offizieren, die alle ein sehr hohes Salair beziehen; und dabei leben wie die Götter in Frankreich, ein krasser Gegensatz gegenüber den Soldaten.*” Heinrich Brandenberger to his parents and siblings, 12 June, 1903, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ³⁰ Bosma, *Indiegangers*, 173.
- ³¹ Brandenberger to his parents and siblings, 21 March, 1906, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ³² See also: Bosma, *Indiegangers*, 154.
- ³³ “*Um die 16 Ct. die jeder Soldat per Tag in die Küche legt wird er vollständig bestohlen. Während beim 15. Batalyon das 4 Km von unser Kaserne stationirt ist, der mann vormittags 11 Uhr seine anständige Quantität Fleisch [...] und um halb 5 Abens von den zusammengelgten Geldern (16 Ct. per Mann) 4–6 Zuspeisen erhält, bestehend aus einem Ei 1 Stück Fleisch, Leber gehaktes zur Kugel geformtes Fleisch; [...] so erhalten wir 11 Uhr ein winziges Stück Fleisch, Abens ½ Ei ganz wenig Fleisch, anstatt der gehakten runden Fleischbollen, werden Kartoffeln gehackt; und um das Zusammenhalten derselben zu bewerkstelligen, mit Mehl vermischt.*” Brandenberger to his parents and siblings, 8 November, 1903, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ³⁴ “*Natürlich ist bei diesem Schwindel auch der Fourier beteiligt, der dazu noch ein Zürcher ist mit Namen’s Schatzmann.*” Brandenberger to his parents and siblings, 8 November, 1903, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ³⁵ This information can be found in the *stamboeken*, see for example: NL-HaNA, Koloniën / Stamboeken Militairen KNIL Oost- en West-Indië, 2.10.50, inv. nr. 131, Folio 8746; inv. nr. 131, Folio 8827; or inv. nr. 8948.
- ³⁶ “*Mein Sold belief sich nun in fünf Tagen auf 1 Gulden, 20 Cent, dazu kamen 1 Gulden, 80 Cent für Rasieren, zusammen 6. Fr. und dazu weniger Dienst.*” C. A. Haab, *Handwerksburschen-Erinnerungen. Meine Reise von St. Gallen nach Ostindien: vier Monate Hin- und vier Monate Rückreise; vier Jahre auf der Insel Java* (Ebnet-Kappel: Haab, 1916), 22.
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*, 23–24.
- ³⁸ “*aussergewöhnlich gut,*” Camenzind, Unpublished Memoirs, 147.
- ³⁹ For rifle manufacturers, see for instance: Christian Gadiant, NL-HaNA, Koloniën / Stamboeken Militairen KNIL Oost- en West-Indië, 2.10.50, inv. nr. 138, Folio 1088; or Peter Ackermann, NL-HaNA, Koloniën / Stamboeken Militairen KNIL Oost- en West-Indië, 2.10.50, inv. nr. 194, Folio 21913; for an example of a stockroom manager: Christian Schieferli, NL-HaNA, Koloniën / Stamboeken Militairen KNIL Oost- en West-Indië, 2.10.50, inv. nr. 136, Folio 9671.
- ⁴⁰ See E. Eckert, *Erlebnisse eines Schweizers als Deserteurs der holländischen Kolonial-Armee in Ost-Indien* (Weinfeld: Neuenchwander, 1912)
- ⁴¹ “*um den sauer verdienten Lohn der Soldaten wieder einzuheimsen, denn diese besuchen diese Kneipe sehr gerne, weil sie dort den billigsten Schnaps erhalten und der Zutritt nur für das Militär gestattet ist.*” Eckert, *Erlebnisse eines Schweizers*, 27–28.
- ⁴² For the calculation of legacies, see below.
- ⁴³ State Council of the canton of Bern to the Swiss Federal Chancellery, 9.2.1870, BAR, E2#1000/44#1111*. The legal term “Bürgerort” does not refer to the place of birth, but to the political municipality where a Swiss citizen holds his or her citizenship.
- ⁴⁴ On pauperism among Europeans in the Dutch East Indies, see: U. Bosma and R. Raben, *Being “Dutch” in the Indies: A History of Creolisation and Empire, 1500–1920* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2008), 228–44.

- ⁴⁵ “In den seltensten Fällen besitzt ein Soldat soviel Geld, dass er samt seiner Familie in seine Heimat zurückkehren könnte.” Eckert, *Erlebnisse eines Schweizers*, 29.
- ⁴⁶ “Würde dies aber der Fall sein, so wäre jedenfalls seine Heimatgemeinde wenig erbaut, von einer so gemischten Rasse besucht zu werden.” *Ibid.*, 29. On the ethnic and social background of the soldiers’ wives, see: H. Ming, “Barracks-Concubinage in the Indies, 1887–1920,” *Indonesia* 35 (1983), 65–94.
- ⁴⁷ Haab, *Handwerksburschen-Erinnerungen*.
- ⁴⁸ For the mercenaries’ different places of residence after service, see chapter 3.
- ⁴⁹ See: V. Groebner, “Pensionen,” in *Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz* (2011).
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.* On the relationship between pension payments and the oligarchy of the political system in the Ancien Régime and the different types of pension payments, see K. von Greyerz, A. Hohenstein, and A. Würzler, *Soldgeschäfte, Klientelismus, Korruption in der Frühen Neuzeit*, 153–82 (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2018). On the asymmetrical political relations implied by pensions, see: P. Rogger, “Pensions in Switzerland Practices, Conflicts, and Impact in the Sixteenth Century,” in S. Norrhem and E. Thomson, *Subsidies, Diplomacy, and State Formation in Europe, 1494–1789*, 146–71 (Lund: Lund University Press, 2020).
- ⁵¹ For France, see: E2#1000/44#1071*; for Naples, see: BAR, E2#1000/44#1125*; for pensions concerning Swiss soldiers in the armies of the American Civil War, see: BAR, E2#1000/44#1166*–BAR, E2#1000/44#1175*.
- ⁵² See: H. Amersfoort, *Koning en kanton: De Nederlandse staat en het einde van de Zwitserse krijgsdienst hier te lande 1814–1829* (Den Haag: Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis Landmachtstaf, 1988), 249.
- ⁵³ See the letter from Consul General Faesy to the Swiss Federal Council, 25 October, 1849, BAR, E2#1000/44#1113*.
- ⁵⁴ On the number of Swiss mercenaries prior to 1848 as well as the criteria, see: Bossenbroek, *Volk voor Indië*, 79, 105; 141, 355; Bosma estimates that between 1840 and 1850, after 9 years of service, only 45 per cent were still alive. See: U. Bosma, “Sailing through Suez from the South: The Emergence of an Indies-Dutch Migration Circuit, 1815–1940,” *The International Migration Review* 41:2 (2007), 523.
- ⁵⁵ On the stipulations of 1860, see: *Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië voor het Jaar 1860* 27, Batavia 1860.
- ⁵⁶ See the list compiled by the Consul General in 1864, in: NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 91.
- ⁵⁷ For the procedure to receive a definitive pension title, see the letter from Consul General Suter-Vermeulen to the Swiss Federal Chancellery, 28 February, 1873, BAR, E2#1000/44#1112*; on the assisting companies, see, for instance: letter from Consul General Suter-Vermeulen to the State Chancellery of the canton of Lucerne, StALU AKT 23/69 C; and Circular of the Consul General, November 1868, BAR, E2#1000/44#11097*.
- ⁵⁸ For Rüttimann’s pension-related financial reports and correspondence, see StALU AKT 23/69, AKT 23/70 as well as PA 1341/34. For his biography, see: M. Lischer, “Rüttimann, Rudolf,” in *Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz* (2016). On Crivelli & Co., see the letter from the State Chancellery of the canton of Lucerne to the Swiss Federal Chancellery, 11 April, 1874, in Joseph Melchior Ehrenbolger’s record, BAR, E2#1000/44#1111*.
- ⁵⁹ For the early embedding of Swiss traders, merchants and banks in global financial networks, see: B. Veyrassat, *Histoire de la Suisse et des Suisses dans la marche du monde: (XVIIe siècle – Première Guerre mondiale): espaces – circulations – échanges*. Collection Les routes de l’histoire (Neuchâtel: Éditions Livreo-Alphil, 2018); and L. Haller, *Transithandel: Geld- und Warenströme im globalen Kapitalismus* (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2019).
- ⁶⁰ The first accounts of the War Commissariat are dated for the year 1870 and concern merely three mercenaries. See: StABS, Fremde Staaten Niederlande C 4; on von Mechel: StABS PA 151; as well

- as: *Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitung* 39 (1912), 313–314. For his brothers see: A. Zangger, *Koloniale Schweiz: Ein Stück Globalgeschichte zwischen Europa und Südostasien (1860–1930)* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2011), 34 and 265; Zangger erroneously calls von Mechel the “Federal” War Commissioner.
- ⁶¹ “dass sie [...] infolge ihres Gesundheitszustandes immer noch nicht im Stande sind, mit ihrer Hände Arbeit ihren Lebensunterzahl zu erwerben.” Letter from Consul General Suter-Vermeulen to the Directorate of the Military of the canton of Zurich, 18 February, 1873, NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 62.
- ⁶² The case of Emil von Arx, who received a gratification for more than 30 years from 1871 onwards, delivers an impressive example of how cumbersome the procedure was: BAR, E2#1000/44#1100*; NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 62, NL-HaNA, Gezantschap Zwitserland tot 1916, 2.05.10.21, inv. nr. 110; and StASO BG 12,29.
- ⁶³ On this, see the documents of the Dutch Consul in Geneva, who kept records of the pensions paid out in Switzerland between 1891 and 1904, in: NL-HaNA, Consulaat Genève, 2.05.14.12, inv. nr. 157.
- ⁶⁴ For the period from 1864 to 1868, see: NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 91; from January 1891 to March 1904, see: NL-HaNA, Consulaat Genève Zwitserland, 2.05.14.12, inv. nr. 155–157. For the pensions in Thurgau, from 1884 to 1914, see: StATG 4’488’3; on the war commissioner of Basel, see: StABS, Fremde Staaten Niederlande C 4; for the national archives, see: NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05; BAR, E2#1000/44#1110*–1117*; and NL-HaNA, Koloniën / Stamboeken Militairen KNIL Oost- en West-Indië, 2.10.50, inv. nr. 617–759; for the cantonal state archives, see e.g.: StAAR, Ca.C12-45-11-03; StABL, Niederlande NA 2049; StABS, Fremde Staaten Niederlande C 4; StALU, AKT 23/69 C & 70 A; StASO, BG 29; StAZG, CC VII. A Ausländisches, Schweizer in ausländischen Diensten; StAZH, QI 139.3.
- ⁶⁵ Source: Bossenbroek, *Voolk voor Indië*, 353–356.
- ⁶⁶ This estimate is based on the historical wage index compiled by the online tool Swistoval. 1904 was set as the starting year and 2009 as the target year. Effectively, the total is likely to have been even higher, as the total is not adjusted for inflation; see: <http://www.swistoval.ch/content/startseite.de.html>, [accessed: 19 January, 2021].
- ⁶⁷ J. S. Furnivall, *Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 171.
- ⁶⁸ NL-HaNA, Koloniën / Stamboeken Militairen KNIL Oost- en West-Indië, 2.10.50, inv. nr. 4, 1022.
- ⁶⁹ M. van Gulpen, *Vom “Kolonialsöldner” zum “obersten Magistrat”: Die transnationale Karriere des Michael Letter von Zug im Kontext der kolonialen Verstrickungen der Schweiz im 19. Jahrhundert*, unpublished master thesis (Zürich: Universität Zürich, 2020); and P. Müller-Grieshaber, “Letter, Franz Josef Michael,” in *Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz (HLS)* (2008).
- ⁷⁰ See: van Gulpen, *Vom “Kolonialsöldner”*, 67–74.
- ⁷¹ *Ibid.*
- ⁷² Louis Wyrsh, also known as “Borneo Louis”, is one of them. See: B. Schär, “Switzerland, Borneo and the Dutch Indies: Towards a New Imperial History of Europe, c.1770–1850,” *Past & Present* 257:1 (2022), 134–167.
- ⁷³ See: G. Teitler, “The Mixed Company: Fighting Power and Ethnic Relations in the Dutch Colonial Army, 1890–1920,” in Karl Hack (ed), *Colonial Armies in Southeast Asia*, 71–94 (London Routledge, 2006), 148. A few non-Dutch mercenaries, however, did become naturalised and were therefore included in the statistics under Dutch. For another example of a stellar career as both KNIL officer and Swiss politician, see: Schär, “Switzerland”.
- ⁷⁴ “gelähmt,” letter from the municipality Eglisau to the Military Department of the canton of Zurich, 15. February, 1873, StAZH, QI 139.3.

- ⁷⁵ NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 62. On Biermer, see: S. Alzinger, *Der Internist Anton Biermer, 1827–1892* (Dietikon: Juris Druck und Verlag, 1992).
- ⁷⁶ F. Lamprecht and M. König, *Eglisau: Geschichte der Brückenstadt am Rhein* (Zürich: Chronos, 1992), 424–30.
- ⁷⁷ In Switzerland, the “*Bürgerort*” (place of citizenship) was responsible for social welfare until 1975. See: B. Studer, *Verfassung, Staat und Nation in der Schweiz seit 1848* in *ibid.* (ed), *Etappen des Bundesstaates: Staats- und Nationsbildung der Schweiz, 1848–1998* (Zürich: Chronos Verlag, 1998), 14.
- ⁷⁸ Letters from the municipality Eglisau to the military department Zurich, 15 February, 1873 & 24 February, 1873, StAZH, QI 139.3.
- ⁷⁹ The compensation of 300 Swiss francs was based on the 1854 law and was increased to a maximum of 1200 francs in 1874. See: W. A. Immer, *Die Entwicklung der schweizerischen Militärinvaliden- und Militärhinterbliebenenfürsorge: mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der derzeitigen allgemeinen Soldatenfürsorge* (Säckingen: Buchdruckerei Gustav Mehr, 1920).
- ⁸⁰ Suter-Vermeulen to the military department of Zurich, 18 February, 1873, NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 34.
- ⁸¹ See the files on Fischer in 1873, in: NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, 34; StAZH, QI 139.3 and BAR, E2#1000/44#1112*.
- ⁸² President of the welfare office to the Military Department of the canton of Zurich, 26 June, 1876, BAR, E2#1000/44#1112.
- ⁸³ Historische Statistik der Schweiz HSSO, 2012. Tab. G.3b. hss0.ch/2012/g/3b.
- ⁸⁴ See: NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 60.
- ⁸⁵ Immer, *Entwicklung*, 47.
- ⁸⁶ Inflicting injuries on oneself was already a common method to get discharged from military service in Napoleon’s armies. See: K. J. Mayer, *Napoleons Soldaten: Alltag in der Grande Armée* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2008), 103–4.
- ⁸⁷ On von Arx, see his files in: NL-HaNA, Kolonien / Stamboeken Militairen KNIL Oost- en West-Indië, 2.10.50, inv. nr. 164, Folio 15005; StASO BG 29; and BAR, E#1000/44/1110*.
- ⁸⁸ This estimate is based on the historical wage index of the platform Swistoval. See: <http://www.swistoval.ch/content/startseite.de.html>, [accessed 19 January, 2021].
- ⁸⁹ Letter from C.F. Bally to the Dutch Consul General, 5 January, 1873, NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 60.
- ⁹⁰ This assumption is based on the sources proving that Eng received his pension regularly between 1891 and 1904.
- ⁹¹ On the wages of working-class people, see: E. Gruner, *Die Arbeiter in der Schweiz im 19. Jahrhundert soziale Lage Organisation Verhältnis zu Arbeitgeber und Staat* (Berlin: Francke, 1968), 125.
- ⁹² “*da ich nichts verdienen kann, habe ich auch kein Geld bis die Pension kommt, womit ich gerade meine Schulden kann bezahlen,*” letter from Friedrich Stalder to the Ministry of Colonies, 16 March, 1888, NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 61.
- ⁹³ “*weil er zu einer entehrenden Strafe verurtheilt und noch nicht rehabilitirt worden ist,*” letter from the Dutch Consul General to the Mayor of Elay, 9 October, 1872, NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 89.
- ⁹⁴ Letter from the Dutch Consul General to the Mayor of Elay, 21 May, 1867, NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 89.
- ⁹⁵ See the dossier on Schärer, in: NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 91.
- ⁹⁶ See the letter from municipality Bärschwil to the Federal Council, 4 April, 1896, BAR, E#1000/44/1113*.
- ⁹⁷ NL-HaNA, Gezantschap Zwitserland tot 1916, 2.05.10.21, inv. nr. 108.

- ⁹⁸ “welche [...] vorzüglich durch die längere Krankheit ihres Mannes herbeigeführt wurde,” letter from the State Chancellery of the canton of St. Gallen to the Federal Chancellery, 19 March, 1887, BAR, E#1000/44/1117*.
- ⁹⁹ “in gelähmten Zustand [...] schwerer und langwieriger Krankheit’. [...] bedürftigen, mit der beschwerlichen Krankenpflege belasteten Eltern,” letter from the State Council of the canton of Aargau, 28 December, 1870, BAR, E#1000/44/1113*.
- ¹⁰⁰ See the letter from the Dutch Consul General to the Swiss Federal Council, 21 January, 1871, BAR, E#1000/44/1113*.
- ¹⁰¹ S. Goltermann, *Opfer: Die Wahrnehmung von Krieg und Gewalt in der Moderne* (Frankfurt a.M.: S. Fischer, 2017), 32–43.
- ¹⁰² “verkürzte Protokolle des Leidens und Sterbens von Soldaten,” Goltermann, *Opfer*, 63.
- ¹⁰³ See, for example: *Nederlandsche Staats-Courant*, 19 August, 1870.
- ¹⁰⁴ For lists of the Swiss Consul based in Amsterdam, see: BAR, E2#1000/44#1102*; for lists compiled by the Dutch Consul General see the notion on the circular by the Swiss Federal Chancellery, 14 November, 1861, in: StaZG CB 8 16 Werbeverbot. For an in-depth analysis of these lists, see also: P. Krauer, “Todeslisten aus Niederländisch-Ostindien: Der koloniale Arm der Schweizer Bürokratie, 1860-1895,” in N. Kreibitz, T. Macho and M. Prieto (eds), *Ordnungen des Todes Von Listen, Statistiken und Dunkelziffern über das Sterben und die Verstorbenen*, 43–60 (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2023).
- ¹⁰⁵ BAR, E2#1000/44#1104*.
- ¹⁰⁶ BAR, E2#1000/44#1100*–BAR, E2#1000/44#1109*.
- ¹⁰⁷ Based on the *stamboeken*, an estimated total of 2,300 Swiss died in the KNIL between 1848 and 1914. See: NL-HaNA, Koloniën / Stamboeken Militairen KNIL Oost- en West-Indië, 2.10.50, inv. nr. 121–282. In the archives concerning inheritances, however, I have only come across references to 1,490 mercenaries. It is not apparent whether the files on the others have not been preserved or whether there was no correspondence in them because they left nothing behind.
- ¹⁰⁸ R. Wecker, “Neuer Staat – neue Gesellschaft. Bundesstaat und Industrialisierung (1848–1914),” in S. Arlettag and G. Kreis, *Die Geschichte der Schweiz* (Basel: Schwabe, 2014), 470.
- ¹⁰⁹ The correspondence concerning the fatalities can be found here: BAR, E2#1000/44#1100*–BAR, E2#1000/44#1109*; and NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 34 & 35. On the confusion of *Heimatort* and *Geburtsort*, see the complaint of the canton of Lucerne, 3 April, 1882, BAR, E2#1000/44#1097*; on the cumbersome task to get hold of the deceased’s mother, see, for instance, the case of Wilhelm Madöry, in: StABL, NA 2049 D.
- ¹¹⁰ For the request see: Letter from Dutch Consul General Suter-Vermeulen to the Swiss Federal Council, 4 July, 1876, and NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 34.
- ¹¹¹ “Chief of Military Administration at the Expedition against Boni”; on Keller see: NL-HaNA, Koloniën / Stamboeken Militairen KNIL Oost- en West-Indië, 2.10.50, inv. nr. 4, Folio 1316; and StAZH, MM 2.149 RRB 1860/1110.
- ¹¹² See the dossier on Baumgartner, BAR, E2#1000/44#1110*.
- ¹¹³ “la petite somme,” letter from the State Chancellery of the canton of Geneva to the Swiss Federal Chancellery, 8 June 1877, BAR, E2#1000/44#1105*; “den unbedeutenden Nachlass,” letter from the State Chancellery of the canton of St. Gallen to the Swiss Federal Chancellery, 6 October, 1870, BAR, E2#1000/44#1104*.
- ¹¹⁴ See the dossier on Hauser, BAR, E2#1000/44#1113*.
- ¹¹⁵ See the files on Jakob Karl Klemenz Speck, BAR, E2#1000/44#1115*.
- ¹¹⁶ “seine Verhältnisse die Auslegung weiterer Kosten nicht wohl gestatten,” letter from the State Chancellery of the canton of Zug to the Swiss Federal Chancellery, 15 May, 1884, BAR, E2#1000/44#1115*.
- ¹¹⁷ For the wedding, see: *Samarangsch Advertentie-Blad*, 19 December, 1862.

- ¹¹⁸ On concubinage, see: Ming, “Barracks-Concubinage”, 66; and A. L. Stoler *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 48.
- ¹¹⁹ On the inheritance as well as the legally recognised child: BAR, E2#1000/44#1107*.
- ¹²⁰ Ming, “Barracks-Concubinage”; and L. Hesselink, Prostitution: A Necessary Evil, Particularly in the Colonies: Views on Prostitution in the Netherlands Indies,” in E. Locher-Scholten and A. Niehof (eds), *Indonesian Women in Focus*, 205–24 (Leiden: Brill, 1987).
- ¹²¹ On probate proceedings, see: letter from the Swiss Consul in Rotterdam to Swiss Federal Chancellery, 30 July, 1890, BAR, E2#1000/44#1109*
- ¹²² “*unvermögend und alt*,” letter from the Directorate of Police of the canton of Bern to the Swiss Federal Chancellery, 7 July 1891, BAR, E2#1000/44#1109*.
- ¹²³ Letter from the State Chancellery of the canton of Neuchâtel to the Swiss Federal Chancellery, 7 March, 1881, BAR, E2#1000/44#1117*.
- ¹²⁴ “*eine dürftige Mutter, welche für die Einsendung des Nachlass dankbar sein wird*,” letter from the State Chancellery of the canton of Zurich to the Swiss Federal Chancellery, 28 June, 1882, BAR, E2#1000/44#1115*.
- ¹²⁵ “*da der Genannte – ein betagter Mann, der als Grossvater noch Verpflichtungen gegen seine Grosskinder trägt, er aus dem Verdienst als Seidenweber – so kümmerlich zu leben hat*.” Letter from the municipal council of Küsnacht to the Swiss Federal Chancellery, 20 July, 1885, BAR, E2#1000/44#1115*.
- ¹²⁶ On “Borneo Louis”, see Schär, “Switzerland”.
- ¹²⁷ For the conditions of admission, see: BAR, E2#1000/44#2349*.
- ¹²⁸ See the files on Odermatt in BAR, E2#1000/44#1115* and NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 34.
- ¹²⁹ “*da der Verstorbene uns eine armenenössige Familie hinterliess*,” see: BAR, E2#1000/44#1108*; and NL-HaNA, Kolonien / Stamboeken Militairen KNIL Oost- en West-Indië, 2.10.50, inv. nr. 213, Folio 30732.
- ¹³⁰ “*dass sowohl der Verstorbenen als seine Eltern Unterstützung aus dortigem Armengut [municipality of Sternenbergl] erhalten haben; namentlich dessen Vater sehr bedürftig sei*.” Letter from the Chancellery of the canton of Zurich to the Swiss Federal Chancellery, 20 November, 1877, BAR, E2#1000/44#1115*.
- ¹³¹ See the letter from the State Chancellery of the canton of Thurgau to the Swiss Federal Chancellery, 27 January, 1879, BAR, E2#1000/44#1106*.
- ¹³² BAR, E2#1000/44#1106*.
- ¹³³ “*Wir bemerken beiläufig, dass der Verstorbene ein unehelicher Sohn, dessen Mutter wohl gestorben sein dürfte, der auch wohl kaum Nachkommen hinterlässt, für den aber möglicherweise der Heimathgemeinderath in frühen Jahre waisenamtlich Unterstützung verabreicht haben kann, ohne Rückvergütung er nun nach unserm Armengesetz aus dem Nachlass zu fordern berechtigt wäre*.” Letter from the State Chancellery of the canton of Lucerne to the Swiss Federal Chancellery, March 26, 1878, BAR, E2#1000/44#1105*.
- ¹³⁴ BAR, E2#1000/44#1105*.
- ¹³⁵ On the organisation of welfare authorities in Switzerland, see: M. Lengwiler, “Dezentral und fragmentiert: Sozialpolitik seit dem späten Ancien Régime,” in S. Arlettaz and G. Kreis, *Die Geschichte der Schweiz*, 422–25 (Basel: Schwabe, 2014); and B. Degen, “Entstehung und Entwicklung des schweizerischen Sozialstaates,” in Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv (ed), *Geschichte der Sozialversicherungen*, 17–48 (Zürich: Chronos, 2006).
- ¹³⁶ See annual report of the Swiss Consul in Batavia from 1875/1876, in: BAR, E2400#1000/717#289*.

- ¹³⁷ “weil da eine verheiratete Frau als Miterbin figurirt und daher die Mitunterzeichnung ihres Ehemannes unumgänglich ist,” (emphasis by S.V.); letter from the Dutch Consul General Suter-Vermeulen to Gottfried Keller, 30 April, 1873, NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 34.
- ¹³⁸ On Bollinger’s inheritance as well as Keller’s involvement, check the corresponding files in NL-HaNA, Consulaat Bern, 2.05.14.05, inv. nr. 34, BAR, E2#1000/44#1103*, and BAR, E2#1000/44#1110*.
- ¹³⁹ Letter from the Dutch Consul General to the Swiss Federal Chancellery, 26 July, 1870.
- ¹⁴⁰ See: E. Joris, “Geschlechtshierarchische Arbeitsteilung und Integration der Frauen,” in Studer (ed), *Etappen des Bundesstaates, 187–201*; and more recent: S. Isler, *Politiken der Arbeit: Perspektiven der Frauenbewegung um 1900* (Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 2019), 228–33.
- ¹⁴¹ On this research desideratum, see also: Krauer and Schär, “Welfare for Veterans”.
- ¹⁴² See the documents in BAR, E2#1000/44#1081* and E2#1000/44#1071*.

Chapter 5. Trace the Memory: Relics and Representation in the Transimperial Cultural Archive

- ¹ G. Wekker, *White Innocence: Paradoxes of Colonialism and Race* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 3.
- ² *Ibid.*, 19.
- ³ Together with M. Ligtenberg and B. Schär, I have also developed this argument elsewhere in a slightly modified version. P. Krauer, M. Ligtenberg, B. C. Schär, “The Other Archipelago: How Dutch Colonial ‘Spores grew into European cultures of innocence’”, conference paper presented at *Spores of Empire: Exploring the Colonial Foundations of Dutch Society and Culture*, University of Utrecht, 21–23 April, 2021.
- ⁴ For a Dutch colonial rhetoric of legitimacy, see: F. Gouda, *Dutch Culture Overseas: Colonial Practice in the Netherlands Indies, 1900–1942* (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2008), 118–56; on the colonial gaze, see: M. L. Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (New York: Routledge, 2008); and *ibid.* “Scratches on the Face of the Country; or, What Mr. Barrow Saw in the Land of the Bushmen,” *Critical Inquiry* 12:1 (1985), 119–43; T. Hunt and M. Lessard, *Women and the Colonial Gaze* (New York: New York University Press, 2002); P. Purtschert, *Kolonialität und Geschlecht im 20. Jahrhundert: Eine Geschichte der weißen Schweiz*. (Bielefeld: transcript, 2019), 40–50; C. Koller, *Rassismus* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2009), 59–64; A. L. Stoler and F. Cooper, “Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda,” in *ibid.* (eds), *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, 1–56 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); G. C. Spivak, “The Rani of Sirmur: An Essay in Reading the Archives,” *History and Theory* 24:3 (1985), 247–72; E. Said, *Orientalism* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978).
- ⁵ C. Koller, *Die Fremdenlegion: Kolonialismus, Söldnertum, Gewalt, 1831–1962* (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 2013), 162–63.
- ⁶ On Wekker’s spatial scope of analysis, see: Wekker, *White Innocence*. On colonialism as a shared project, see, for instance: E. Buettner, *Europe After Empire: Decolonization, Society, and Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); W. Reinhard, *Die Unterwerfung der Welt: Eine Globalgeschichte der europäischen Expansion* (München: C.H. Beck, 2016); B. Schär, “From Batticaloa via Basel to Berlin. Transimperial Science in Ceylon and Beyond around 1900,” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 48:2 (2019), 230–262; D. Arnold “Globalization and Contingent Colonialism. Towards a Transnational History of ‘British’ India,” *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 16:2 (2015); or S. Conrad, “Rethinking German Colonialism in a Global Age,” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 41:4 (2013), 543–66. Specifically for the Dutch case, see: B. Schär, “Introduction: The Dutch East Indies and Europe, ca. 1800–1930: An Empire of Demands and Opportunities,” *BMGN* 134: 3 (2019), 4–20.

- ⁷ With regard to numerous studies from the field of post-colonial studies, Dejung warns against the pitfall of seeing the “West” merely as a monolithic entity. See: C. Dejung, “Zeitreisen durch die Welt. Temporale und territoriale Ordnungsmuster auf Weltausstellungen und schweizerischen Landesausstellungen während der Kolonialzeit,” in P. Purtschert, F. Falk, and B. Lüthi, *Postkoloniale Schweiz: Formen und Folgen eines Kolonialismus ohne Kolonien*, 333–54 (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2012), 336–37.
- ⁸ For the theoretical elaborations of a transnational imperial reservoir of knowledge, see: T. Menger, *The Colonial Way of War: Extreme Violence in Knowledge and Practice of Colonial Warfare in the British, German and Dutch Colonial Empires, c. 1890–1914* (Cologne: Thesis University of Cologne, 2021), 37–38. Drawing on the terminology of the digital cloud, Kreienbaum and Kamissek have called this reservoir “imperial cloud”. C. Kamissek and J. Kreienbaum, “An Imperial Cloud? Conceptualising Interimperial Connections and Transimperial Knowledge,” *Journal of Modern European History* 14:2 (2016), 164–82.
- ⁹ J. Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen* (München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2013), 48–56.
- ¹⁰ C. Dejung, “Oral History und kollektives Gedächtnis. Für eine sozialhistorische Erweiterung der Erinnerungsgeschichte,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 34:1 (2008), 102–4.
- ¹¹ See: R. Jaun, “Armee und Nation: Schweizerische Militärdiskurse des 19. Jahrhunderts im Widerstreit,” in U. Altermatt, C. Bosshart-Pfluger, and A. Tanner (eds), *Die Konstruktion einer Nation: Nation und Nationalisierung in der Schweiz, 18.-20. Jahrhundert* (Zürich: Chronos Verlag, 1998), 150–51; Kreis refers to Swiss mercenarism even as a *lieu de memoire*. G. Kreis, *Schweizer Erinnerungsorte: Aus dem Speicher der Swissness* (Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2010), 87–97; on imagined communities, see: B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).
- ¹² Schmid provides another example. Although no letters written by him are known, he mentioned in his memoirs that he had received letters from his home town Olten, Switzerland. K. Schmid, *15 Jahre Kriegs- und Friedensdienst in Niederländisch-Indien* (Olten: Oltnr Tagblatt, 1912), 34.
- ¹³ See T. Bürgisser, “Rohrdorf–Java einfach: Ein Niederrohrdorfer Bauernsohn im indonesischen Kolonialkrieg,” *Badener Neujahrsblätter* 96 (2021), 198.
- ¹⁴ According to linguist Schikorsky, these letters primarily served to maintain contact with relatives and friends and only secondarily aimed to provide information. I. Schikorsky, “Briefe aus dem Krieg: Zur Schreibpraxis kleiner Leute im 19. Jahrhundert,” in Alfred Messerli and Roger Chartier (eds), *Lesen und Schreiben in Europa 1500–1900*, 451–65 (Basel: Schwabe, 2000).
- ¹⁵ See, for a joint letter, e.g. Egloff’s family to Arnold Egloff, 18 April, 1890; or Egloff’s family to Arnold Egloff, 16 December, 1890. On the quote: “Musst du auch [...] auf Wilde jagt machen,” Egloff’s family to Arnold Egloff, 6 December, 1892, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ¹⁶ “Lieber Bruder da der Vater alle Neuigkeiten geschrieben hat so weiss ich dir nicht viel zu schreiben, Als noch einmal zu wiederholen, dass du so bald als möglich wieder schreiben wirst, wie deine Kost ist, deine Arbeit wie das Klima und was für Handel und Gewerb dort getrieben wird.” Johann Egloff to Arnold Egloff, 18 April, 1890, SSA, Ar 201.303. Nineteenth century German speakers referred to both the British and the Dutch Indies as “India”.
- ¹⁷ “alle Blätter durchstöbert aber von Indien wenig gelesen,” Egloff’s family to Arnold Egloff, 3 August, 1890, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ¹⁸ I obtained this information from the matura thesis of Heinrich Brandenberger’s great-grandson, Michael Brandenberger: *Würde mein Urgroßvater nochmals nach Indonesien auswandern?*, unpublished matura thesis, 2005.
- ¹⁹ The digitised collection of these letters was kindly donated to the Swiss Social Archives in Zurich in 2021.

- ²⁰ Brandenberger to his parents and siblings, 12 June, 1903, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ²¹ Image collection of the Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV) <https://digitalcollections.universiteitleiden.nl/imagecollection-kitlv> [accessed 01.10.2023].
- ²² J. Jäger, "Plätze an der Sonne? Europäische Visualisierungen kolonialer Realitäten um 1900," in C. Kraft, A. Lüdtkke, and J. Martschukat (eds), *Kolonialgeschichten: regionale Perspektiven auf ein globales Phänomen*, 162–84 (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus Verlag, 2010), 175.
- ²³ S. Junge, "Familiar Distance: Picture Postcards from Java from a European Perspective, ca. 1880–1930," *BMGN* 134:3 (2019), 101.
- ²⁴ J. Tagg, *The Burden of Representation: Essays on Photographies and Histories* (London: Macmillan, 1988), 3.
- ²⁵ M. Greig, *Dead Men Telling Tales: Napoleonic War Veterans and the Military Memoir Industry, 1808–1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 145–61.
- ²⁶ C. Koller, "Kriminelle Romantiker in der exotischen Hölle: Zur transnationalen Medialisierung der französischen Fremdenlegion," *Saeculum* 62:2 (2012): 247–65.
- ²⁷ E. Eckert, *Erlebnisse eines Schweizers als Deserteurs der holländischen Kolonial-Armee in Ost-Indien*. (Weinfelden: Neuenschwander, 1912); E. Hauser, *Erinnerungen eines Kolonialsoldaten auf Sumatra* (Basel: Verein für Verbreitung guter Schriften, 1927); Schmid, *15 Jahre*; A. Zehnder, *Unter Hollands Flagge in Ost-Indien* (Luzern: Räder, 1924).
- ²⁸ *Walliser Volksfreund. Volkswirtschaftliches Organ der katholischen Bauern und Arbeiter*, 14 November, 1923; *Bote vom Untersee. Publikationsorgan für den Bezirk Steckborn und die angrenzenden Gemeinden*, 31 August, 1912.
- ²⁹ F. von Ernst, "Niederländisch-Indien," *Jahresbericht der Geographischen Gesellschaft von Bern* 6 (1883), 7.
- ³⁰ "zonder weten van den spreker," Dutch Vice Consul in Davos, to Graaf van Bijlandt, Minister Resident in Bern, 1 July, 1903, NL-HaNA, Gezantschap Zwitserland tot 1916, 2.05.10.21, inv. nr. 112.
- ³¹ "erfreute sich eines verhältnismässig zahlreichen Besuchs," *Davoser Zeitung*, 25 June, 1903.
- ³² *Täglicher Anzeiger für Thun und das Berner Oberland*, 16 November, 1901.
- ³³ On Switzerland, see: A. Zangger, *Koloniale Schweiz: Ein Stück Globalgeschichte zwischen Europa und Südostasien (1860–1930)* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2011), 348–80; and B. Schär, *Tropenliebe: Schweizer Naturforscher und niederländischer Imperialismus in Südostasien um 1900* (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 2015), 297–324; on Germany, see: A. Zimmerman, *Anthropology and Antihumanism in Imperial Germany* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); H. G. Penny, "Traditions in the German Language," in H. Kuklick (ed), *A New History of Anthropology*, 79–95 (Malden, Mass: Blackwell, 2008); on Great Britain: H. Kuklick, *The Savage within: The Social History of British Anthropology, 1885–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); on France: A. Conklin, *In the Museum of Man: Race, Anthropology, and Empire in France, 1850–1950* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2013).
- ³⁴ Zangger, *Koloniale Schweiz*, 376–77; B. Schär, *Tropenliebe*, 78–102.
- ³⁵ M. Ligtenberg, *Zwei Schweizer Ärzte im "Fernen Osten" Wissenschaft, niederländischer Imperialismus, das Schweizer Bürgertum und die Kolonie als Kapital, ca. 1879–1935*, unpublished Master thesis (Zurich: ETH Zurich, 2019), 73.
- ³⁶ For the Dayak shield, see: A. Holenstein, "Nidwalden meets Borneo. Unerwartete Begegnungen in der Schweizer Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts," in T. Asmussen et al. (eds), *Materialized Histories. Eine Festschrift 2.0*. For the objects acquired by Letter, see Burgmuseum Zug, Inv. nr. 10675, 10676, 14857, 14922 and 14934. I owe many thanks to David Etter for providing me this information. Also worth mentioning at this point are two collections which lie outside the scope of the study: Charles-Daniel de Meuron, who commanded a mercenary regiment for the VOC from 1781 to 1795, donated his collection of objects from South Africa and South Asia to the city of Neuchâtel in 1795. See: R. Kaehr, *Le mûrier et l'épée: le cabinet de Charles Daniel de Meuron et l'origine du Musée d'ethnographie*

- à Neuchâtel (Neuchâtel: Musée d'ethnographie, 2000). In 1922, the Swiss (respectively Dutch from 1906 onwards) mercenary Hans Christoffel handed over numerous objects that he had bought or looted during his time in Southeast Asia to the city of Antwerp. They are currently in the MAS Antwerp. See: W. Durinx, P. Catteeuw and R. Francken, "De collectie Hans Christoffel in het MAS Antwerpen," *Volkskunde Journal* 3 (2019), 473–494.
- ³⁷ L. Stadlin-Imbach, *Illustrierter Zugerischer Zeughauskatalog ein Führer durch die Sammlung alter Waffen und Glasgemälde* (Zug: Buchdruckerei von J. Zürcher, 1892), 47–46.
- ³⁸ R. Keller, "Museum in der Burg Zug," *Tugium: Jahrbuch des Staatsarchivs des Kantons Zug, des Amtes für Denkmalpflege und Archäologie, des Kantonalen Museums für Urgeschichte Zug und der Burg Zug* 11 (1995), 50.
- ³⁹ Zangger, *Koloniale Schweiz*, 377; P. Sarasin, "Stiften und Schenken in Basel im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Überlegungen zur Erforschung des bürgerlichen Mäzenatentums," in J. Kocka (ed), *Bürgerkultur und Mäzenatentum im 19. Jahrhundert*, 192–211 (Berlin: Fannei & Walz, 1998); and *ibid.*, *Stadt der Bürger: Bürgerliche Macht und städtische Gesellschaft* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1997).
- ⁴⁰ Schmid, *15 Jahre*, 67.
- ⁴¹ "in kurzer Zeit eine ansehnlichen Sammlung von Schmetterlingen, Käfern, Skorpionen, grossen giftigen Spinnen, [...] ja sogar fliegenden Eidechsen, Schlangen angelegt," Schmid, 145.
- ⁴² *Ibid.*, 151.
- ⁴³ "hübsche Steine, Korallen, Zähne von Krokodilen, wilden Schweinen, Hirschhörner usw. angeschwemte Stücke von Schwämmen etc. [...] hübsche Erinnerung," Brandenberger to his parents and siblings, 1 October, 1911, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ⁴⁴ Brandenberger to his parents and siblings, 3 July, 1912, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ⁴⁵ Brandenberger to his parents and siblings, 24 November, 1912, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ⁴⁶ E. Bischoff, *Kannibale-Werden. Eine postkoloniale Geschichte deutscher Männlichkeit um 1900* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2011), 39–44; Likewise Höfert warns against attributing a passive role to the Other. A. Höfert, "Alteritätsdiskurse: Analyseparameter historischer Antagonismuskonzepte und ihre historiographischen Folgen," in Gabriele Haug-Moritz and Ludolf Pelizaeus *Repräsentationen der islamischen Welt im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit* (Münster: Aschendorff, 2010), 21–22; on rhizom, see G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, *Rhizom* (Berlin: Merve Verlag, 1977).
- ⁴⁷ On the "grammar of difference", see A. L. Stoler and F. Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda," in *ibid.* (eds), *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, 1–56 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 3–4.
- ⁴⁸ Ernst, "Niederländisch-Indien," 24.
- ⁴⁹ "Quant aux indigènes, ils sont généralement bien pris de corps, mais laids de figure. Ils ont quelque chose du singe dans les traits et dans les manières; s'ils laissent, par exemple, tomber quelque objet à terre, c'est avec le pied qu'ils le ramassent." Anonymous, "Les Suisses aux Indes: Correspondance," *Revue Militaire Suisse* 4:17 (1859), 348–50.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*
- ⁵¹ "dumm und unwissend und sehr armeselig gekleidet," *Der Bund*, 20 May, 1860.
- ⁵² "Die Kleidung der Javanen war sehr einfach. [...] Die Haare trugen sie ebensolang wie die Frauen," C. A. Haab, *Handwerksburschen-Erinnerungen. Meine Reise von St. Gallen nach Ostindien: vier Monate Hin- und vier Monate Rückreise; vier Jahre auf der Insel Java* (Ebnat-Kappel: Haab, 1916), 26.
- ⁵³ "wie aus den gesandten Ansichtskarten ersichtlich, ist die Kleidung des jav. Volkes höchst einfach. Dass Sauberkeit beim Jav. hinten ankommt, ist am besten zu sehen an den Kleidern, diese sind beinahe einmal schön und das ist eben wenn sie neu sind. Besser stehts damit bei der Bevölkerung die durch ihren Verdienst gezwung ist mit dem Europ. Element umzugehen." Brandenberger to his parents and siblings, 11 October, 1909, SSA, Ar 201.303.

- ⁵⁴ “Die javanische Haushaltung war sehr einfach und billig. Bei schwarzem Kaffee mit Zucker, Reis mit Sambalgori, etwas Fisch oder Ding-Ding (an der Sonne getrocknetes Büffel Fleisch) waren die Leute glücklich und zufrieden,” Haab, *Handwerksburschen-Erinnerungen*, 27.
- ⁵⁵ “Der Javane ist im Allgemeinen ruhigen, ernsten Sinnes, fleissig und genügsam. Er ist ein geborener Landbauer und Edelmann. [...] Gleichzeitig besitzt er aber auch ein ungläubliches Phlegma, begreift nicht, warum der Mensch sich selber quält mit überflüssiger Arbeit.” von Ernst, “Niederländisch-Indien,” 15.
- ⁵⁶ “Der Javanese, dieses einfache Kind der Natur, hat einen friedlichen Charakter und lebt vielleicht glücklicher, als viele Euroäer. Eine kleine Hütte, von Kokospalmen, Pisangbäumchen und anderen Frachtbäumen beschattet, nebst einem Reisacke, de er mit seinem getreuen Kurbo, Büffel, pflegt, machen ihn glücklich. Unter seinem milden Himmel hat er wenig Bedürfnisse.” *Der Bund*, 9 March, 1861.
- ⁵⁷ “Wer sich etwa die Javanen als Wilde vorstellt, der irrt sich gewaltig.” Zehnder, *Unter Hollands Flagge*, 115.
- ⁵⁸ “gebildete Javanen äusserten daher die berechtigte Klage, dass die Herrschaft der Blandas (Weissen) für sie nicht fördernd gewesen sei, indem sie früher kulturell höher gestanden hätten als jetzt”; *Ibid.*, 115.
- ⁵⁹ “ein neuer Beweis dass die ekelhafte Dumheit seiner Landsleute nicht beim fehlenden Fassungsvermögen sondern beim mangelnden Unterricht zu suchen ist.” Brandenberger to his parents and siblings, 11 October, 1909, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ⁶⁰ “äusserst intelligent, schlau und heimtückisch und nur so lange ehrlich, als es sich rentiert. [...] gelehriger als die Javanen, aber nicht so zuverlässig,” Zehnder, *Unter Hollands Flagge*, 117–18.
- ⁶¹ “Die Malajen, Mohammedaner wie die Javanen haben in allem so ziemlich die gleichen Gewohnheiten, sind auch in der Gestalt von diesen kaum zu unterschieden, nur dass der Malaje das Haar ebenso lange trägt wie die Frauen, aber unter einem turbanähnlichem Kopftuch.” Zehnder, 118.
- ⁶² Egloff to his parents and siblings, 28 March, 1891, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ⁶³ On the category of “Foreign Orientals”, see C. Fasseur, “Cornerstone and Stumbling Block: Racial Classification and the Late Colonial State in Indonesia,” in R. Cribb (ed), *The Late Colonial State in Indonesia: Political and Economic Foundations of the Netherlands Indies*, 31–56 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1994); C. A. Coppel, “The Indonesian Chinese: ‘Foreign Orientals’, Netherlands Subjects, and Indonesian Citizens,” in M. B. Hooker (ed), *Law and the Chinese in Southeast Asia*, 131–49 (Singapore: ISEAS, 2002); and S. Protschky, “Ethical Projects, Ethnographic Orders and Colonial Notions of Modernity in Dutch Borneo. GL Tichelman’s Queen’s Birthday Photographs from the Late 1920s,” in *ibid.* (ed), *Photography, Modernity and the Governed in Late-Colonial Indonesia*, 71–102. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015).
- ⁶⁴ “Vom Handeltreiben versteht der Javan absolut nichts. Auf Ambarawa ist zum Beisp. kein einziger Javane, der eine anständige ‘Warong’ (Esslokal) hat, man ist völlig auf die Chinesen angewiesen die in ihren Krotten den immer guten ‘Bahmi’ verkaufen a 10 und 20 Rp. die Portion.” Brandenberger to his family, 11 October, 1909 SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ⁶⁵ “die in ihren schmutzigen Strassen Spielhöllen, Opiumhäuser und andere gefährliche Buden besassen. Das Araberviertel war noch berüchtiger.” Schmid, *15 Jahre*, 16.
- ⁶⁶ “die Chinesen wissen auch jemand aufs Korn zu nehmen,” A. Camenzind, *Unpublished Memoirs*, c. 1905, 91.
- ⁶⁷ “Im Handel sind die Chinesen und Arabe wie die Juden: sie verkaufen zu allen Preisen.” Haab, *Handwerksburschen-Erinnerungen*, 28.
- ⁶⁸ A. Mattioli, “Antisemitismus in der Geschichte der modernen Schweiz. Begriffsklärungen und Thesen,” in *ibid.* (ed), *Antisemitismus in der Schweiz 1848–1960*, 3–22 (Zürich: Orell Füssli, 1998), 11; on the stereotype of deceitful Jewish dealers, see, e.g.: A. M. Debrunner, “Antisemitismus in der Deutschschweizer Literatur, 1848–1914,” in A. Mattioli (ed), *Antisemitismus in der Schweiz 1848–1960*, 23–43 (Zürich: Orell Füssli, 1998).

- ⁶⁹ On the discriminatory history of Jews in Switzerland, see: R. Wecker, "Neuer Staat – neue Gesellschaft. Bundesstaat und Industrialisierung. (1848–1914)," in S. Arletta and G. Kreis, *Die Geschichte der Schweiz* (Basel: Schwabe, 2014), 456.
- ⁷⁰ On hybridisation and mixture in the Indonesian archipelago, see V. Houben, "Boundaries of Race: Representation of Indisch in Colonial Indonesia Revisited," in H. Fischer-Tiné and S. Gehrman, *Empires and Boundaries. Rethinking Race, Class, and Gender in Colonial Settings*, 66–85 (New York: Routledge, 2009), 70–71.
- ⁷¹ For an example of such naturalists and taxonomy, see: Schär, *Tropenliebe*, 231–34, and 278–83.
- ⁷² "Celebes, Borneo, Sumatra und noch einigen Inseln [...] deren Hauptbeschäftigung es ist, sich gegenseitig auszutreiben, dem Gouvernement Schwierigkeiten zu bereiten und die vorkommendenfalls ein Stück Menschenfleisch gar nicht verachten." Zehnder, *Unter Hollands Flagge*, 120.
- ⁷³ "dem Lande der Urwälder, dem Aufenthalte des Orang-Utangs, des Gorillas, der Boa Constrictor under der Heimat der Tayakes, des berüchtigten Menschesservolkes," Schmid, *15 Jahre*, 24.
- ⁷⁴ "Unter ihnen soll es noch Anthropophagen geben, obwohl man behauptet, dass seitdem die Missionare mehr bei ihnen eingedrungen sind, diese abscheuliche Sitte verschwunden ist." von Ernst, "Niederländisch-Indien," 17.
- ⁷⁵ "Dammerfackeln erhellen die Hütte. Blutbefleckte Gesichter und Dämpfe kochender Kessel füllen den Raum. Schwarze, zerfallene Zähne reissen gierig das gargekochte Fleisch von den Knochen. Von den beiden Missionaren bleibt nichts mehr übrig als die Knochen und die von Banggalamei beanspruchten Schädel [...]." Hauser, *Erinnerungen eines Kolonialsoldaten*, 20.
- ⁷⁶ See, e.g. P. Hulme, *Colonial Encounters: Europe and the Native Caribbean, 1492–1797* (London: Routledge, 1992), 14–15; G. Obeyesekere, *Cannibal Talk. The Man-Eating Myth and Human Sacrifice in the South Seas*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 2–9; Bischoff, *Kannibale-Werden*, 64–65.
- ⁷⁷ *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 19 April, 22 April, 23 April, and 25 April, 1856.
- ⁷⁸ "Bin noch zu kurz um ein Urteil zu fällen. Ins Auge springt jedoch die bekannte Tatsache dass je weiter man ostwärts kommt alles primitiver wird. Bildung, Wohnung, Kleidung erreicht das tiefst denkbare, bis man eben auf Guinea in den Bäumen logiert." Brandenberger to his parents, 10 December, 1917, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ⁷⁹ On the Papuas constructed as a "primitive Other", see, e.g.: R. Mrázek, "Say 'Cheese'. Images of Captivity in Boven Digoel (1927–43)," in S. Protschky (ed), *Photography, Modernity and the Governed in Late-Colonial Indonesia*, 255–80 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015).
- ⁸⁰ "Einfache Handelsangestellte beziehen oft einen Gehalt wie bei uns etwa ein Bundesrat. Gute Handwerker sind hier ebenfalls sehr gesucht und rücken schnell an leitende, gut bezahlte Stellen vor. Ihre Tätigkeit besteht mehr in Aufsicht und Unterweisung, da die eigentliche Arbeit von Eingeborenen verrichtet wird." Zehnder, *Unter Hollands Flagge*, 124.
- ⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 166.
- ⁸² U. Bosma and R. Raben, *Being "Dutch" in the Indies: A History of Creolisation and Empire, 1500–1920* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2008), 235–44.
- ⁸³ E. Haffter, *Briefe aus dem Fernen Osten* (Frauenfeld: Huber 1885), 193–94; on Swiss fears of "alienation", see also: A. Zangger, "Patriotic Bonds and the Danger of Estrangement: Swiss Networks in Colonial South-East Asia, 1850–1930," in P. Purtschert and H. Fischer-Tiné, *Colonial Switzerland: Rethinking Colonialism from its Margins* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 99–102.
- ⁸⁴ On the legal regulations, see Coppel, "The Indonesian Chinese," 133; Houben, "Boundaries of Race"; Luttkhuis, *Negotiating Modernity: Europeaness in Late Colonial Indonesia, 1910–1942* (Florence: European University Institute, 2014).
- ⁸⁵ A. L. Stoler, "Intimidations of Empire: Predicaments of the Tactile and Unseen," in *ibid.* (ed), *Haunted by Empire* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 3; on the regulation of sexual and

- domestic lives of both European colonials and their subjects, see also: A. L. Stoler *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 41–78; A sound example of how Stoler's argument can be applied is provided by Lüthi and dos Santos Pinto in: B. Lüthi and J. dos Santos Pinto, "Adjudicating intimacies in Switzerland," in Nathalie Büsser et al. (eds), *Transnationale Geschichte der Schweiz = Histoire transnationale de la Suisse*, 245–52 (Zürich: Chronos, 2020).
- ⁸⁶ Stoler, "Intimidations of Empire", 2.
- ⁸⁷ "ein jeder der ein gutes Strafregister hat, kann ein Jafanisches Frauenzimmer zu sich nemen [sic!]," Egloff to his parents and siblings, 22 January, 1893, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ⁸⁸ "die in Europa kein Frauenzimmer gesehen haben," Egloff to his parents and siblings, 22 January, 1893, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ⁸⁹ Egloff to his parents and siblings, 22 January, 1893, SSA, Ar 201.303. I have already used this quote in chapter 3.
- ⁹⁰ The following discussion of Camenzind draws on my article: P. Krauer, "Zwischen Geld, Gewalt und Rassismus: Neue Perspektiven auf die koloniale Schweizer Söldnermigration nach Südostasien, 1848–1914", *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte* 71:2 (2021), 229–50.
- ⁹¹ "dan habe ich der Mutter auch einmal gründlich die Wahrheit gesagt, ich hätte eine europ. Frau getraut u. nicht eine Javanin, die Schwiegermutter war natürlich eine Javanin. Javaninen hätte ich genug bekommen, dan hätte ich ihre tochter nicht gebraucht zu heirathen, ich habe ihr tochter geheirathet um das ich glaubte eine Europäerin zu bekommen, aber es sei gerade das Gegentheil, den meine Frau sei auch beinahe so fanatisch wie sie im heidnischen Glauben, u. von meinem Glauben wolle sie nichts mehr wissen," Camenzind, Unpublished Memoirs, c. 1905, 225.
- ⁹² "Sie wollte halt eben nicht schwarz sein u. puderte sich manchmal so arg, dass ich dachte Sie sei weiss angestrichen u. ich sie als wieder auslachte u. sagte ich könne Oelfarbe von der Genieloods [= die Lagerhallen der technischen Truppe, P.K.] bringen, zinkweiss u. sie mitstreichen, dan bleibe es doch u. gehe nicht mehr ab, ich machte als nur Spass, aber Sie wurde als fuchswild." Ibid., 203–204.
- ⁹³ B. Lutikhuis, "Beyond Race: Constructions of 'Europeanness' in Late-Colonial Legal Practice in the Dutch East Indies," *European Review of History: Revue Européenne d'histoire* 20:4 (2013), 539–58. Protschky provides a detailed overview of the debate on whether race or class was constitutive for the social hierarchy of the Dutch East Indies. S. Protschky, "Race, Class, and Gender: Debates over the Character of Social Hierarchies in the Netherlands Indies, circa 1600–1942," *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 167:4 (2011), 543–56.
- ⁹⁴ H. K. Bhabha, "Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse," *October* 28 (1984), 126.
- ⁹⁵ Ibid., 132.
- ⁹⁶ Apart from the lack of gender specificity, McClintock also criticises that Bhabha attributes agency rather to discursive structures than to colonised subjects. A. McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 62–65.
- ⁹⁷ A. Tanner, *Arbeitsame Patrioten – wohlstandige Damen: Bürgertum und Bürgerlichkeit in der Schweiz 1830–1914* (Zürich: Orell Füssli, 1995), 170.
- ⁹⁸ Koller, *Die Fremdenlegion*, 174; on domestic work in barracks being gendered as feminine, see also: C. Dejung, *Aktivdienst und Geschlechterordnung: eine Kultur- und Alltagsgeschichte des Militärdienstes in der Schweiz 1939–1945* (Zürich: Chronos, 2006), 155–57; on the gender-specific division of labour in a Swiss marriage, see also: C. Arni, *Entzweiungen: die Krise der Ehe um 1900* (Köln: Böhlau, 2004), 39–42.
- ⁹⁹ "mehr oder weniger Europ. Manieren gelernt," Brandenberger to his parents and siblings, [?.?] 1907, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ¹⁰⁰ "keinen grossen Mund habe, auch eine gar seltene Tugend der Weiber [...]. Im beginne wahr dan auch zu verschiedenen mahlen 'rebellion' fortissimo, die aber dank ihrem guten Caracker und leichtem

- Begriff ins 'pianissimo' eingelenkt hat.*" Brandenberger to his parents and siblings, 28 March, 1908, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ¹⁰¹ "wieder auf die Beine half. [...] direct auf preussische Unterofficiersmanier," Brandenberger to his parents and siblings, 28 March 1908, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ¹⁰² "sie lebte vielleicht noch wen Sie auch wirkliche europäische Manieren angenommen hätte," Camenzind, Unpublished Memoirs, c. 1905, 203.
- ¹⁰³ Camenzind, Unpublished Memoirs, c. 1905, 203–240.
- ¹⁰⁴ According to historian Marc Lohnstein, this uniform is the "Attila" type, which was distributed between 1894 and 1904. In later photos from 1910, Brandenberger was already wearing a newer uniform. I owe many thanks to Marc Lohnstein of the Bronbeek Museum for this information.
- ¹⁰⁵ NL-HaNA, Koloniën / Pensioenen KNIL, 2.10.50.02, inv. nr. 452, Folio 39020.
- ¹⁰⁶ "Welch ein unglückliches Gefühl müssten wohl meine l. Kinder kriegen, so diese einmahl zu dem Begriffe kämen, dass in unserm Vaterlande, Kinder nicht geheirateter Eltern so höchst ungerecht verachtet werden und man ihnen diese so als gewöhnlich, scharf fühlen liesse? Dazu kommt, dass ein Zusammenleben im Concubinat (wilder Ehe) bei uns vielleicht nicht zugestanden würde; damit würde aber eine grosse Kluft geschaffen zwischen Kinder, Vater und Mutter." Brandenberger to his mother, 15 May, 1912, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ¹⁰⁷ N. Müller, "Familiennachzug um 1900: Eine Kolonialgeschichte zwischen Zürich und Sumatra," *entropie* (2020).
- ¹⁰⁸ "Eine Ehe mit einer derartigen Person nach den mit dem Wesen einer Ehe nach unserer Auffassung zusammenhängenden sittlichen Begriffen sei ein Ding der Unmöglichkeit, zumal wenn der Europäer gedenke, sich wieder einmal in die Heimat zurückzuziehen." StAZH, MM 3.6 RRB 1892/1789.
- ¹⁰⁹ See chapter 3.2.
- ¹¹⁰ Müller, "Familiennachzug um 1900".
- ¹¹¹ P. Groen and A. van Dissel, "De wereld van de militair, 1816–1941," in Petra Groen et al. (eds), *Krijggeweld en kolonie: Opkomst en ondergang van Nederland als koloniale mogendheid, 1816–2010*, 207–45 (Amsterdam: Boom, 2021), 225–28.
- ¹¹² "voilà des soldats indigènes employés à combattre des Européens! C'est enlever le prestige qui entoure la race blanche et qui entre pour beaucoup dans la soumission de 10 millions de Javanais à une poignée d'Européens. Ce prestige disparu, il ne nous reste que la force brutale; et, dans ce cas, nous serons écrasés sous le nombre." *Journal de Genève*, 10 November, 1860.
- ¹¹³ Haab, *Handwerksburschen-Erinnerungen*, 25.
- ¹¹⁴ M. Menrath, "Von 'wilden Bestien' und fremden Freunden. Die Wahrnehmung farbiger Kolonialsoldaten in der Deutschsprachigen Schweiz im Vergleich mit Deutschland, 1870–1940," in *ibid.* (ed), *Afrika im Blick Afrikabilder im deutschsprachigen Europa, 1870–1970*, 123–50 (Zürich: Chronos, 2012); on "human zoos" in Switzerland, see: P. Minder, "Human Zoos in Switzerland," in N. Bancel and P. Blanchard, *Human Zoos Science and Spectacle in the Age of Colonial Empires*, 328–40 (Liverpool: University Press, 2008); R. Brändle, *Wildfremd, hautnah: Zürcher Völkerschauen und ihre Schauplätze 1835–1964* (Zürich: Rotpunktverlag, 2013); and B. Staehelin, *Völkerschauen im Zoologischen Garten Basel 1879–1935* (Basel: Basler Afrika Bibliographien, 1993).
- ¹¹⁵ "Die Neger hier sind schon gesagt intersanthe Kerls. Gut u. stark gewachsen, schwarz wie der Deufel, flink wie en Katz, die Augen, [...]. Doch das merkwürdigste an inen ist das Gesicht, die Stirne mit der Nase bei allen, u. bei vielen noch die Schläfe, sind eingrafirth, oder eingeschnitten was inen ein wildes Ansehen git, wollenes Kraushaar kurz geschnitten [...]. Guthmüthig, maar wen mann sie reizt ist nicht gut Kirschen essen ihnen, dan zeigen sie einem die Zähne, grad wie ein Hund." Emil Rebsamen to Arnold Eglhoff, 3 August, 1891, SSA, Ar 201.303.

- ¹¹⁶ On these prejudices, see: J. de Moor, "The Recruitment of Indonesian Soldiers for the Dutch Colonial Army, c. 1700–1950," in D. Kilingray and D. Omissi (eds), *Guardians of Empire*, 53–69 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999).
- ¹¹⁷ "von eingeborenen Gegnern gefürchtet, weil sie denselben mit gleicher Schlaueit und mit gleichen Waffen zu Leibe rücken können und ungleich besser sich in der Wildnis zu bewegen wissen als die schwerfälligen Europäer, die dafür im Nahkampf desto gefürchteter sind, in Folge ihrer kaltblütigeren Bedienung der Waffen und ihrer grösseren Ausdauer und nicht zuletzt wegen ihres grösseren Draufgängertums." Zehnder, *Unter Hollands Flagge*, 129.
- ¹¹⁸ "Diese sind im Gefecht selten selbständig zu gebrauchen, weil ihnen das Draufgehen ziemlich unbekannt ist, oder besser ausgedrückt, sie das lieber andern überlassen." *Ibid.*, 128–29.
- ¹¹⁹ "die meisten tragen Ohringe, u. haben dan auch grosse Löcher in den Ohren, laufen baarfuss, u. sind sehr heimtückisch." Anton Camenzind, Unpublished Memoirs, c. 1905, 148.
- ¹²⁰ Schmid, *15 Jahre*, 98–102; on the revolt of Banten, see: S. Kartodirdjo, *The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888: Its Conditions, Course and Sequel. A Case Study of Social Movements in Indonesia*. (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).
- ¹²¹ "Ob der zum grössten Teil aus Muhamedanschen Elementen zusammengestellten Armee zu vertrauen wäre? Ich bezweifle." Brandenberger to his parents and siblings, 31 July, 1913, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ¹²² "die Javaner werden hier im eigentlichen Sinn des Wortes als elende Slaven behandelt," Rellstab to his parents and siblings, 6 September, 1890, StAZH, Q I 139.3.
- ¹²³ "Es ärgerte mich ungeheuer, dass man mir anstatt eines europäischen Vorgesetzten, einen halb nackten Eingeborenen sandte. [...]da ein Eingeborner überhaupt nicht befügt ist, über einen europäischen Soldaten zu befehlen," Eckert, *Erlebnisse eines Schweizers*, 21.
- ¹²⁴ "Unter Soldaten ist die Freundschaft schnell besiegelt und das 'Du' geht einem vom Munde wie im Emmental." Schmid, *15 Jahre*, 46.
- ¹²⁵ "recht gründliche und mitunter auch gefährliche Studien über Sitten und Gebräuche der Einheimischen," Zehnder, *Unter Hollands Flagge*.
- ¹²⁶ *Ibid.* 159.
- ¹²⁷ Koller, *Die Fremdenlegion*, 79–115.
- ¹²⁸ "ein trefflicher Camerad," Rellstab to his parents, 6 September, 1860, StAZH, Q I 139.3.
- ¹²⁹ Haab, *Handwerksburschen-Erinnerungen*, 25.
- ¹³⁰ "entstehen Gefühle wie sie eben nur bei Schweizern in der Fremde entstehen können," Brandenberger to his parents and siblings, 1 September, 1914, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ¹³¹ Brandenberger to his parents and siblings, 21 March, 1906, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ¹³² "Einem jeden, der schon früher etwas von Militair gesehen hat, dem fällt auf den ersten Blick, das schlechte Zusammenarbeiten der verschiedenen Offiziere mit Ihren Truppen auf," Brandenberger to his parents and siblings, 21 July, 1903, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ¹³³ "dass dieses Militair einem europäischen Feinde nicht gewachsen ist. Für den in kleiner Zahl vorhandenen und schlecht bewaffneten inländischen Feind kanns ja wohl genügen, aber auch hier haben sie noch ziemlich zu schaffen," Brandenberger to his parents and siblings, 21 July, 1903. On the lack of marching discipline, see also: Brandenberger to his parents and siblings, [date unknown] 1907, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ¹³⁴ Zanger, "Patriotic Bonds," 100.
- ¹³⁵ "nichts Fremdes an ihm haftete," G. Keller, *Martin Salander* (Berlin: Hertz, 1886), 49.
- ¹³⁶ J. Dewulf, *Brasilien mit Brüchen Schweizer unter dem Kreuz des Südens* (Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2007), 257–60.
- ¹³⁷ Groen and van Dissel, "De wereld van de militair," 221–25.
- ¹³⁸ "L'incapacité des employés et chefs [...]. Leur ignorance, leur férocité, [...] la mauvaise foi et le caractère faux des Malais de Bornéo, leur fanatisme, etc.," Chevalley, *Un Suisse à Java et Bornéo*.

- ¹³⁹ “Währendem ein Offizier einem Häuptlinge den Gebrauch einer 30Pfründer Kanone erklärte, wurde er von hinten mit einem Klewang niedergehauen und im gleichen Augenblicke die ganze Schiffsmannschaft, die an nichts Arges dachte, angegriffen. [...] was sich durch Schwimmen retten wollte, wurde wie Fische mit den langen Lanzen gespiest. Nachdem alles ausgemordet war, versenkten die Dajaks das Schiff.” *Der Bund*, 4 March, 1863.
- ¹⁴⁰ “aussi bien que si l’on avait eu affaire à des Européens,” the letter was published in the Newspaper *Gazette de Lausanne*, 8 October, 1859.
- ¹⁴¹ “fanatische Feinde von allem, was nicht mohammedanisch ist,” Zehnder, *Unter Hollands Flagge*, 135.
- ¹⁴² “mit infernalischem Geheul [...] und es braucht starke Nerven, um ruhig stehen zu bleiben, bis sich der Haufen auf etwa hundert Meter genähert hat oder noch mehr, um erst dann mit einer Salve den Irreführten zu beweisen, dass ihre Leiber nicht gefeit sind gegen die Waffen der Weissen, wie es ihnen die Hadjis immer glauben machen wollen.” *Ibid.*, 136.
- ¹⁴³ “Der mit dem Türkischen Untergange durch die hohe Islamitische Priesterwelt ausgegebene Mahnruf, ‘haltet zusammen, haltet fester zusammen gegen die ungläubigen Christenhunde’ fasst zusehends Wurzel und kann bei der leicht zur Religiösen Fanatik neigenden Muhamedanischen Bevölkerung, unheilvoll werden.” Brandenberger to his parents and siblings, 31 July, 1913, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ¹⁴⁴ “illustriert so ächt, wie wenig man der Inl. Bevölkerung vertrauen oder glauben kann,” Brandenberger to his parents and siblings, 1 October, 1911.
- ¹⁴⁵ On colonial anxieties, see: H. Fischer-Tiné and C. Whyte, “Introduction: Empires and Emotions,” in H. Fischer-Tiné, *Anxieties, Fear and Panic in Colonial Settings: Empires on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown*, 1–23 (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
- ¹⁴⁶ “ihre blauen Augen Augen, zwar gebrochen, waren geöffnet und sprachen jetzt noch im Tode eine deutliche Sprache von dem Schrecken, den die Arme durchgemacht hatte,” Schmid, *15 Jahre*, 103.
- ¹⁴⁷ “die Einfälle der noch halb wilden Stämme”; von Ernst, “Niederländisch-Indien,” 15.
- ¹⁴⁸ On the soldier hero as a powerful form of idealised masculinity, see G. Dawson, *Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire and the Imagining of Masculinities* (London: Taylor and Francis, 1994).
- ¹⁴⁹ “da ein jeder von uns den Wunsch hatte, bald in den Kampf zu ziehen und den Urwald zu durchstreifen, um sich mit dem gewandten Atjehkrieger zu messen,” Eckert, *Erlebnisse eines Schweizer als Deserteurs der holländischen Kolonial-Armee in Ost-Indien*, 20.
- ¹⁵⁰ “plus heureu.” Anonymous, “Les Suisses aux Indes,” 349.
- ¹⁵¹ “Oltner Turner,” Olten, Switzerland, is Schmid’s hometown. Schmid, *15 Jahre*, 49–59.
- ¹⁵² Parents and siblings to Heinrich Brandenberger, 26 February, 1914, SSA, Ar 201.303.
- ¹⁵³ P. Harries, *Butterflies and Barbarians. Swiss Missionaries and Systems of Knowledge in South-East Africa* (Oxford: Currey, 2007), 35–66; S. Bleuer and B. Miller, “Verkörpern – Verfestigen – Verflechten: Resonanz Missionarischer Kulturkontakte in der Katholischen Schweiz der 1950er- und 1960er-Jahre,” *Traverse: Zeitschrift Für Geschichte = Revue d’histoire* 26 (2019), 94–108; L. Ratschiller, “Material Matters the Basel Mission in West Africa and Commodity Culture around 1900” in L. Ratschiller and K. Wetjen, *Verflochtene Mission. Perspektiven auf eine neue Missionsgeschichte*, 117–39 (Köln: Böhlau, 2018).
- ¹⁵⁴ For an example of a Swiss travelogue, see: Haffter, *Briefe*, 1885.
- ¹⁵⁵ Schär, *Tropenliebe*.
- ¹⁵⁶ Minder, “Human Zoos”; Brändle, *Wildfremd, hautnah*; Staehelin, *Völkerschauen*.
- ¹⁵⁷ Purtschert, *Kolonialität und Geschlecht im 20. Jahrhundert*.
- ¹⁵⁸ “Die Schweiz will sich verteidigen. Die Schweiz kann sich verteidigen. Die Schweiz muss sich verteidigen.” J. Tanner, *Geschichte der Schweiz im 20. Jahrhundert*, Europäische Geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert (München: C.H. Beck, 2015), 253.
- ¹⁵⁹ “Geistige Landesverteidigung” (Spiritual national defence) refers to a political and cultural movement that, from the 1930s to the 1960s, sought to strengthen values declared to be Swiss and to ward

- off National Socialist, fascist and communist ideologies. M. Jorio, “Geistige Landesverteidigung,” in *Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz* (2006).
- ¹⁶⁰ On the so-called “Flores Expedition”, see, e.g.: *Soerabaiasch Handelsblaad*, 3 August, 1907; 5 August, 1907; 6 August, 1907; 10 September, 1907; 11 September, 1907; 19 October, 1907; 21 October, 1907.
- ¹⁶¹ “*mereka mendegar bungi tenbakan beruturn berasal dari arah gua*,” Notes from Edgar Keller and Yoseph Agato Sareng, taken on their visits in 2007 and 2008. I owe Edgar Keller many thanks for letting me use his notes and interviews.
- ¹⁶² “*karena tertutup mayat-mayat*,” Notes from Edgar Keller and Yoseph Agato Sareng, taken on their visits in 2007 and 2008. Zangger also reported on this story in the newspaper, see: A. Zangger, “Hans Christoffel. Ein Bündner Jagdhund in Indonesien,” *Die Wochenzeitung*, 15 August, 2019.

Chapter 6. Conclusion: Swiss Tools of Empire

- ¹ Regarding the mercenaries, I have already voiced this thought elsewhere; see P. Krauer, “Zwischen Geld, Gewalt und Rassismus: Neue Perspektiven auf die koloniale Schweizer Söldnermigration nach Südostasien, 1848–1914,” *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte* 71:2 (2021), 229–50, 8–9.
- ² “*eine aktive Praxis des Tilgens von geschichtlichen Verbindungen, die auf den Kolonialismus zurückgehen*”; P. Purtschert, *Kolonialität und Geschlecht im 20. Jahrhundert: Eine Geschichte der weißen Schweiz* (Bielefeld: transcript, 2019), 32; Stuart Hall coined the concept of colonial amnesia. Since then, it has been further developed in various contexts. S. Hall, “The Multicultural Question,” in D. Morley and S. Hall (ed), *Essential Essays* 95–133 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2019).
- ³ On “Swiss colonialism”, see: P. Purtschert and H. Fischer-Tiné, “The End of Innocence,” in *ibid.* (eds), *Colonial Switzerland. Rethinking Colonialism from the Margins*, 1–25 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
- ⁴ On “contingent colonialism”, see D. Arnold, “Globalization and Contingent Colonialism: Towards a Transnational History of ‘British’ India,” *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 16:2 (2015).
- ⁵ U. Frevert, “Das Militär als ‘Schule der Männlichkeit’: Erwartungen, Angebote, Erfahrungen im 19. Jahrhundert,” in *ibid.* (ed), *Militär und Gesellschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, 145–73. (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1997).
- ⁶ *Ibid.*; and U. Frevert, *Die kasernierte Nation: Militärdienst und Zivilgesellschaft in Deutschland* (München: Beck, 2001).
- ⁷ B. Veyrassat, “Merceneriat colonial et récits de Voyage,” in J. Batou, B. Etemad, and A. Koukouna (eds), *Deux mondes, une planète*, 261–73 (Lausanne: Éditions d’en bas, 2015); G. Meuron, *Le Régiment Meuron, 1781–1816* (Lausanne: Ed. d’En bas, 1982); C. Gigandet, “Meuron, Charles-Daniel de,” in *Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz* (2008).
- ⁸ J. Kruisinga, “Het ‘Koloniaal Werfdepot’ naar aanleiding van het 50-Jarig bestaan van dat korps,” *Indisch Militair Tijdschrift* 27 (1896).
- ⁹ Monique Ligtenberg, recently provided an example of what this could look like: M. Ligtenberg, *Germanophone Physicians in the Dutch East Indies: Transimperial Histories of Medicine between Europe and Colonized Indonesia, c. 1873–1920s*. (Zürich: Thesis ETH Zürich, 2023).
- ¹⁰ P. A. Toer, *This Earth of Mankind* (New York: Penguin, 1981).
- ¹¹ On these approaches, see e.g.: A. L. Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). For a vivid example from the subject matter of colonial mercenaries see: B. Schär, “Switzerland, Borneo and the Dutch Indies: Towards a New Imperial History of Europe, c.1770–1850,” *Past & Present* 257:1 (2022), 134–167.

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